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MARIO BUNGE
Introduction
1. System
2. Kinds of system
3. Conceptual system
main D (or universe of discourse). I.e., C = <P. D>, where D = Set of refe-
rents of the Ps. Example: any set of propositions about verb-object-subject
orders. P and D must be kept separate (though related) because one and the
same set P of (formal) propositions may be assigned now one reference
class, now another. A context is a system proper only if its component pro-
positions have at least one common referent, for in this case they arc rela-
ted by the equivalence relation of having a nonempty reference class in
common. This, then, is the structure of a context. (More precisely, if P
(Pi* P* •••' Pf —) and Ufa) ~" A» then D equals the union of the Df and
the common referents of the Ps are in the intersection of the Dr R is of
course the reference function, that maps propositions into their reference
classes.) As for the environment of a context, it may be taken as the union
of the environments of all the propositions in the context.
Finally, a classification of a given domain D of items may be charac-
terized as a partition of D together with the set of relations among the sub-
classes of D resulting from the partition. For example, the natural languages
can be divided, with respect to the verb-object-subject order, into six clas-
ses: VOS, VSO, OSV, OVS, SVO, and SOV. (Empirical investigationmay
show that one of these classes is empty. This poses an intriguing problem to
historical linguists, sociolinguists and psycholinguists, but cannot be count-
ed against the partition itself.)
So much for conceptual systems. Let us now take a look at their percep-
tible 'embodiments* (pardon the Platonic idiom) or representations, namely
semiotic systems.
4. Semiotic system
The basic unit of a semiotic system is of course the artificial sign. 'Natural
signs', such as dark clouds, and 'social signs', such as winks, are such only
by way of hypothesis. That is, they are not signs proper but rather per-
ceptible indicators of imperceptible things, properties or events. Hence they
are non-significant, and therefore talk of their "meaning" is at best meta-
phorical, at worst plainly wrong. In particular, it is mistaken to think of so-
cial life as a text or "like a text", just because people "interpret" social
behavior, i.e., make hypotheses concerning its intention or goal. Shorter:
social hermeneutic is basically flawed for confusing hypothesis with
342 Mario Bunge
Designation / \ Denotation
Concept ^ Signified
Reference
Signs arc perceptible entities, not abstract ones like concepts and propo-
sitions: think of readable sentences, visible drawings, audible words, or
gestures. However, only iconic (or representational) signs, such as most
road signs, are directly interpretable. The non-iconic signs, i.e., the sym-
bols, cannot be read without an accompanying, albeit often tacit code.
Think of the letters of the alphabet and the words they compose, in contrast
to the hieroglyphs. Or think of maps, circuit diagrams, organigrams, or even
architectural blueprints.
Symbols can be read only with the help of conventions such as 'Letter
S -* Sibilant sound1, 'Blue patch -» Water body1, 'Serrated line — Ohmic
resistance1, '$ —* dollars', and Money -* commodities1. In other words,
whereas nonsymbolic signs are purely material artifacts, symbols are ma-
terial artifacts together with (explicit or tacit) designation rules.
Note that the designating-denoting and the symbol-nonsymbol splittings
do not coincide because, whereas some symbols stand for concepts, others
Semiotic systems 343
don't. Thus while the numerals '5', and 'V1 designate the number five, which
is a pure concept, the sign '$5* denotes a concrete thing, namely a five dol-
lar bank note (or cheque or money order) or its equivalent in other cur-
rencies, or in commodities.
Note, incidentally, that I am proposing a definition of the concept of
money, which so far has eluded economists, namely this: 'Money is a sym-
bol for commodities'. In other words, money is a semiotic item. Hence
monetary systems, such as the European Monetary System that is being
hatched at the time of writing, is a semiotic system. However, it is not a
language: all languages are semiotic systems, but the converse is false.
The time has come to propose a more detailed definition than D9 of the
concept of a semiotic system introduced in Sect. 2. Here it is.
Dl 1 A semiotic system is a system 5 such that
C(s) = A collection of signs,
E(s) = A culture,
S(s) = Syntactic, semantic, phonological and pragmatic (social) re-
lations.
The first component of this triple (composition) hardly needs eluci-
dation. The second (environment) only serves as a reminder that semiotic
systems do not exist in a vacuum and, moreover, that some signs stand for
natural or social items. As for the structure of a semiotic system, the key re-
lations in it are those of signification, or sign-signified relations: see Figure
1. There are two such relations, according as the object signified is material
or conceptual.
If the sign denotes an actual or conceivable concrete thing, such as a
table or another sign, then it signifies the item it points to, but lacks a mean-
ing. If, by contrast, a sign designates a construct, as in "numeral — num-
ber", then it has a meaning proper.
In my semantics it is stipulated that in the latter case the meaning of a
sign is the ordered pair <sense, reference^ where both members of this
couple are defined exactly elsewhere (Bunge 1974b). If the construct in
question is defined, then its sense is the set of its definers. If it pertains to a
theory, its sense is the set of implying and implied constructs. (That is, S(c)
= {x e C\x => x V c =* x}.) As for the referents of a construct, they are the
object(s) it is about. Thus, the referents of "Aphasiology studies linguistic
disorders" are aphasiology and the set of linguistic disorders.
The objects referred to by a construct may be concrete or abstract, ac-
344 Mario Bunge
6. Communication system
pie, whether contemporaries or not. Moreover, he may not confine his in-
terest to language proper, but may also be interested in other means of
communication, such as body language. In other words, sociolinguists deal
with semiotic systems embedded in social systems. If preferred, they study
the uses that flesh-and-bone people make of semiotic systems.
The study of a linguistic community over time is expected to yield not
only descriptions and rules but also laws and explanations of linguistic
changes. Now, an explanation proper (unlike a mere subsumption under a
generalization) invokes a mechanism. In the case of linguistic changes the
mechanism is psychosocial: even if started by an individual, it becomes a
linguistic change only if it is adopted by an entire culture or at least sub-
culture. And presumably it is socially condoned for being generally regard-
ed (rightly or wrongly) as convenient. For example, the sound III is slowly
being replaced by /d/ in American English, modern Greek, and other lan-
guages, presumably because of ease of delivery and thus communication.
By contrast subjunctives are disappearing from English for a different rea-
son, perhaps because of the increase in permissiveness and the massifica-
tion of culture, both of which impoverish language in some respect while
enriching it in others.
In addition to such spontaneous changes there are, from time to time,
linguistic decrees such as those issued by governments or academics. Good
examples are the linguistic "cleansing" operations of the German language
conducted first by the Nazi regime - which, among other things, eliminated
all the non-Germanic words - and after the war by the authorities in the two
German nations - with the result that the west and the east German vocab-
ularies were far from identical. The only point in recalling these cases is to
emphasize the idea that languages, unlike linguistic communities, do not
evolve by themselves. Hence the patterns of language evolution must be
sought in the speakers and their societies.
Conclusion
This chapter boils down to the simple thesis that languages are semiotic
systems, which in turn are systems of signs employed primarily for purpo-
ses of communication. The accent here is on the concept of a system, which
is of course the central referent of any systemic Weltanschauung. And the
348 Mario Bunge
nucleus of any such global view is the hypothesis that everything is either a
system or a component of one. This hypothesis is an alternative to both on-
tological atomism (everything is either an atom or a collection of atoms of
some kind or other) and ontological holism or collectivism (everything is an
opaque whole). Systemism has the virtue that it stresses wholeness (and the
concomitant emergence) without surrendering analysis. It has the virtue that
it stresses system! city or wholeness without surrendering analysis. If prefer-
red, the systemic view has the virtue of stressing analysis without rejecting
emergence (and the concomitant systemicity). A second advantage of the
systemic view is that it invites looking for connections where none are ap-
parent at first sight. A third is that the systemic approach can be success-
fully employed in all disciplines, from physics and social science to linguis-
tics and mathematics. It is thus, along with logic, mathematics, and the
scientific method, a potent science unifier.
References