Public Corporation - Creation, Conversion, Division, Merger or Dissolution of LGU’s (1st batch of cases)
G.R. No. 135962 March 27, 2000
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Ass'n., Inc.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMDA) is a government agency
tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila, while respondent
Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is the registered owner of
Neptune Street, a road inside a private residential subdivision, the Bel-Air
Village. On December 30, 1995, the president of the respondent received
from the chairman of the petitioner a notice dated December 22, 1995
requesting the respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic
starting January 2, 1996. On that same day, the president of the respondent
was apprised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the
adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished. On January 2, 1996, the
respondent instituted an action for injunction against the petitioner before
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 136, Makati City. The trial court issued a
temporary restraining order.
However, after due hearing, the court denied the issuance of a preliminary
injunction. On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that the MMDA has no
authority to order the opening of Neptune Street being a private subdivision
road and to cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that the
authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by an ordinance.
In this petition, the Court ruled that the MMDA has no power to enact
ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local government
units, acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess
legislative power and police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang
Panlunsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution
ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by
petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court of Appeals did
not err in so ruling.
Moreover, the MMDA was created to put some order in the metropolitan
transportation system, but unfortunately the powers granted by its charter
are limited. Its good intentions cannot justify the opening for public use of a
private street in a private subdivision without any legal warrant. The
promotion of the general welfare is not antithetical to the preservation of the
rule of law.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; STATE; INHERENT POWER; POLICE
POWER; DEFINED. — Police power is an inherent attribute of
sovereignty. It has been defined as the power vested by the Constitution in
the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without,
not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. The power
is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying
measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the general
welfare.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; LODGED PRIMARILY IN THE NATIONAL
LEGISLATURE; CAN BE DELEGATED TO THE PRESIDENT,
ADMINISTRATIVE BOARDS AND LAWMAKING BODIES OF
LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS. — It bears stressing that police power is
lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any
group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National
Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the President and
administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal
corporations or local government units. Once delegated, the agents can
exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the
national lawmaking body.
3. ID.; LOCAL GOVERNMENT; DEFINED. — A local government
is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law
and has substantial control of local affairs." The Local Government Code of
1991 defines a local government unit as a "body politic and corporate" —
one endowed with powers as a political subdivision of the National
Government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its
territory. Local government units are the provinces, cities, municipalities
and barangays. They are also the territorial and political subdivisions of the
state.
4. ID.; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991; CONGRESS
DELEGATED THE POLICE POWER TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT
UNITS. — Our Congress delegated police power to the local government
units in the Local Government Code of 1991. This delegation is found in
Section 16 of the same Code, known as the general welfare clause, viz:
"Sec. 16. General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise
the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well
as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general
welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government
units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and
enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of
appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities,
improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice,
promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order,
and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants."
5. ID.; LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS; EXERCISE POLICE
POWER THROUGH THEIR RESPECTIVE LEGISLATIVE BODIES. —
Local government units exercise police power through their respective
legislative bodies. The legislative body of the provincial government is the
sangguniang panlalawigan, that of the city government is the sangguniang
panlungsod, that of the municipal government is the sangguniang bayan,
and that of the barangay is the sangguniang barangay. The Local
Government Code of 1991 empowers the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod and sangguniang bayan to "enact ordinances,
approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
[province, city or municipality, as the case may be], and its inhabitants
pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the
corporate powers of the [province, city municipality] provided under the
Code . . . ." The same Code gives the sangguniang barangay the power to
"enact ordinances as may be necessary to discharge the responsibilities
conferred upon it by law or ordinance and to promote the general welfare of
the inhabitants thereon."
6. ID.; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY;
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY;
CREATED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7924, TO ADMINISTER BASIC
SERVICES AFFECTING METRO MANILA. — Metropolitan or Metro
Manila is a body composed of several local government units — i.e., twelve
(12) cities and five (5) municipalities, namely, the cities of Caloocan,
Manila, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasay, Pasig, Quezon, Muntinlupa, Las
Piñas, Marikina, Parañaque and Valenzuela, and the municipalities of
Malabon, Navotas, Pateros, San Juan and Taguig. With the passage of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared
as a "special development and administrative region" and the
Administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region placed
under "a development authority" referred to as the MMDA.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; METRO-WIDE SERVICES; COVERAGE. —
"Metro-wide services" are those "services which have metro-wide impact
and transcend local political boundaries or entail huge expenditures such
that it would not be viable for said services to be provided by the individual
local government units comprising Metro Manila." There are seven (7) basic
metro-wide services and the scope of these services cover the following: (1)
development planning; (2) transport and traffic management; (3) solid waste
disposal and management; (4) flood control and sewerage management; (5)
urban renewal, zoning and land use planning, and shelter services; (6) health
and sanitation, urban protection and pollution control; and (7) public safety.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; IMPLEMENTATION OF PLANS, PROGRAMS
AND PROJECTS; ELUCIDATED. — The implementation of the MMDA's
plans, programs and projects is undertaken by the local government units,
national government agencies, accredited people's organizations, non-
governmental organizations, and the private sector as well as by the MMDA
itself. For this purpose, the MMDA has the power to enter into contracts,
memoranda of agreement and other cooperative arrangements with these
bodies for the delivery of the required services within Metro Manila.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; METRO MANILA COUNCIL; APPROVES
METRO-WIDE PLANS, PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS, AND ISSUES
THE NECESSARY RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR ITS
IMPLEMENTATION. — The governing board of the MMDA is the Metro
Manila Council. The Council is composed of the mayors of the component
12 cities and 5 municipalities, the president of the Metro Manila Vice-
Mayors' League and the president of the Metro Manila Councilors' League.
The Council is headed by a Chairman who is appointed by the President and
vested with the rank of cabinet member. As the policy-making body of the
MMDA, the Metro Manila Council approves metro-wide plans, programs
and projects, and issues the necessary rules and regulations for the
implementation of said plans; it approves the annual budget of the MMDA
and promulgates the rules and regulations for the delivery of basic services,
collection of service and regulatory fees, fines and penalties.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; AUTHORIZED TO SET POLICIES
CONCERNING TRANSPORT AND TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT
PROGRAMS. — Clearly, the scope of the MMDA's function is limited to
the delivery of the seven (7) basic services. One of these is transport and
traffic management which includes the formulation and monitoring of
policies, standards and projects to rationalize the existing transport
operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares and
promotion of the safe movement of persons and goods. It also covers the
mass transport system and the institution of a system of road regulation, the
administration of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering
services and traffic education programs, including the institution of a single
ticketing system in Metro Manila for traffic violations. Under this service,
the MMDA is expressly authorized "to set the policies concerning traffic"
and "coordinate and regulate the implementation of all traffic management
programs." In addition, the MMDA may "install and administer a single
ticketing system," fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all traffic
violations.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT GRANTED POLICE POWER; ALL
FUNCTIONS ARE ADMINISTRATIVE IN NATURE. — It will be noted
that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation,
coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management,
monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration.
There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power,
let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been
delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local
government units, there is no provision in R.A. No. 7924 that empowers the
MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro
Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development
authority." It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies
and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people's
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the
efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan
area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually
summed up in the charter itself.
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SANGALANG VS. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT; NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. —
Contrary to petitioner's claim, the two Sangalang cases do not apply to the
case at bar. Firstly, both involved zoning ordinances passed by the
municipal council of Makati and the MMC. In the instant case, the basis for
the proposed opening of Neptune Street is contained in the notice of
December 22, 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent BAVA, through its
president. The notice does not cite any ordinance or law, either by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City or by the MMDA, as the legal
basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street. Petitioner MMDA simply
relied on its authority under its charter "to rationalize the use of roads and/or
thoroughfares for the safe and convenient movement of persons."
Rationalizing the use of roads and thoroughfares is one of the acts that fall
within the scope of transport and traffic management. By no stretch of the
imagination, however, can this be interpreted as an express or implied grant
of ordinance-making power, much less police power. Secondly, the MMDA
is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang. Although the MMC is the
forerunner of the present MMDA, an examination of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 824, the charter of the MMC, shows that the latter possessed
greater powers which were not bestowed on the present MMDA.
13. ID.; LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS; METROPOLITAN
MANILA; CREATED AS A RESPONSE TO RAPID GROWTH OF
POPULATION AND INCREASE OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
REQUIREMENTS. — Metropolitan Manila was first created in 1975 by
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 824. It comprised the Greater Manila Area
composed of the contiguous four (4) cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay and
Caloocan, and the thirteen (13) municipalities of Makati, Mandaluyong, San
Juan, Las Piñas, Malabon, Navotas, Pasig, Pateros, Parañaque, Marikina,
Muntinlupa and Taguig in the province of Rizal, and Valenzuela in the
province of Bulacan. Metropolitan Manila was created as a response to the
finding that the rapid growth of population and the increase of social and
economic requirements in these areas demand a call for simultaneous and
unified development; that the public services rendered by the respective
local governments could be administered more efficiently and economically
if integrated under a system of central planning; and this coordination,
"especially in the maintenance of peace and order and the eradication of
social and economic ills that fanned the flames of rebellion and discontent
[were] part of reform measures under Martial Law essential to the safety
and security of the State."
14. ID.; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY;
METRO MANILA COUNCIL; CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF METRO
MANILA FOR THE PURPOSE OF ESTABLISHING AND
ADMINISTERING PROGRAMS PROVIDING SERVICES COMMON
TO THE AREA. — The MMC was the "central government" of Metro
Manila for the purpose of establishing and administering programs
providing services common to the area. As a "central government" it had the
power to levy and collect taxes and special assessments, the power to charge
and collect fees; the power to appropriate money for its operation, and at the
same time, review appropriations for the city and municipal units within its
jurisdiction. It was bestowed the power to enact or approve ordinances,
resolutions and fix penalties for violation of such ordinances and
resolutions. It also had the power to review, amend, revise or repeal all
ordinances, resolutions and acts of any of the four (4) cities and thirteen (13)
municipalities comprising Metro Manila.
15. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CREATION THEREOF IS COUPLED BY
CREATION OF SANGGUNIANG BAYAN. — The creation of the MMC
also carried with it the creation of the Sangguniang Bayan. This was
composed of the members of the component city and municipal councils,
barangay captains chosen by the MMC and sectoral representatives
appointed by the President. The Sangguniang Bayan had the power to
recommend to the MMC the adoption of ordinances, resolutions or
measures.
16. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; POSSESSED LEGISLATIVE POWERS. — It
was the MMC itself, however, that possessed legislative powers. All
ordinances, resolutions and measures recommended by the Sangguniang
Bayan were subject to the MMC's approval. Moreover, the power to impose
taxes and other levies, the power to appropriate money, and the power to
pass ordinances or resolutions with penal sanctions were vested exclusively
in the MMC. Thus, Metropolitan Manila had a "central government," i.e.,
the MMC which fully possessed legislative and police powers. Whatever
legislative powers the component cities and municipalities had were all
subject to review and approval by the MMC.
17. ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; 1987 CONSTITUTION;
RESTORES AUTONOMY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS IN
METRO MANILA. — After President Corazon Aquino assumed power,
there was a clamor to restore the autonomy of the local government units in
Metro Manila. Hence, Sections 1 and 2 of Article X of the 1987
Constitution provided: "Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions
of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities
and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and
the Cordilleras as herein provided. Section 2. The territorial and political
subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy."
18. ID.; ID.; ID.; RECOGNIZED THE NECESSITY OF CREATING
METROPOLITAN REGIONS. — The Constitution, however, recognized
the necessity of creating metropolitan regions not only in the existing
National Capital Region but also in potential equivalents in the Visayas and
Mindanao. Section 11 of the same Article X thus provided: "Section 11. The
Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political subdivisions,
subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The component
cities and municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and shall be
entitled to their own local executives and legislative assemblies. The
jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby be created shall
be limited to basic services requiring coordination." The Constitution itself
expressly provides that Congress may, by law, create "special metropolitan
political subdivisions" which shall be subject to approval by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected; the
jurisdiction of this subdivision shall be limited to basic services requiring
coordination; and the cities and municipalities comprising this subdivision
shall retain basic autonomy and their own local executive and legislative
assemblies.
19. ID.; ID.; ID.; TRANSITORY PROVISIONS; GAVE THE
PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES THE POWER TO CONSTITUTE
THE METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY. — Pending enactment of this law,
the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution gave the President of the
Philippines the power to constitute the Metropolitan Authority, viz. "Section
8. Until otherwise provided by Congress, the President may constitute the
Metropolitan Authority to be composed of the heads of all local government
units comprising the Metropolitan Manila area."
20. ID.; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY;
METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY; LIMITED TO DELIVERY
OF BASIC URBAN SERVICES REQUIRING COORDINATION IN
METROPOLITAN MANILA. — In 1990, President Aquino issued
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 392 and constituted the Metropolitan Manila
Authority (MMA). The powers and functions of the MMC were developed
to the MMA. It ought to be stressed, however, that not all powers and
functions of the MMC were passed to the MMA. The MMA's power was
limited to the "delivery of basic urban services requiring coordination in
Metropolitan Manila." The MMA's governing body, the Metropolitan
Manila Council, although composed of the mayors of the component cities
and municipalities, was merely given the power of: (1) formulation of
policies on the delivery of basic services requiring coordination and
consolidation; and (2) promulgation of resolutions and other issuances,
approval of a code of basic services and the exercise of its rule-making
power. Under the 1987 Constitution, the local government units became
primarily responsible for the governance of their respective political
subdivisions. The MMA's jurisdiction was limited to addressing common
problems involving basic services that transcended local boundaries. It did
not have legislative power. Its power was merely to provide the local
government units technical assistance in the preparation of local
development plans. Any semblance of legislative power it had was confined
to a "review [of] legislation proposed by the local legislative assemblies to
ensure consistency among local governments and with the comprehensive
development plan of Metro Manila," and to "advice the local governments
accordingly."
21. ID.; ID.; ID.; METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY; NOT A POLITICAL UNIT OF GOVERNMENT. — When
R.A. No. 7924 took effect, Metropolitan Manila became a "special
development and administrative region" and the MMDA a "special
development authority" whose functions were "without prejudice to the
autonomy of the affected local government units." The character of the
MMDA was clearly defined in the legislative debates enacting its charter. . .
. Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power
delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to
promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of
the MMDA's functions. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances
and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis.
This was explicitly stated in the last Committee deliberations prior to the
bill's presentation to Congress. . . . The draft of H. B. No. 14170/11116 was
presented by the Committee to the House of Representatives. The
explanatory note to the bill stated that the proposed MMDA is a
"development authority" which is a "national agency, not a political
government unit." The explanatory note was adopted as the sponsorship
speech of the Committee on Local Governments. No interpellations or
debates were made on the floor and no amendments introduced. The bill
was approved on second reading on the same day it was presented. When
the bill was forwarded on the Senate, several amendments were made.
These amendments, however, did not affect the nature of the MMDA as
originally conceived in the House of Representatives.
22. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT EVEN A SPECIAL METROPOLITAN
POLITICAL SUBDIVISION. — It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is
not local government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative
power. It is not even a "special metropolitan political subdivision" as
contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the Constitution. The creation of a
"special metropolitan political subdivision" requires the approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected. R. A. No. 7924 was not submitted to the inhabitants of Metro
Manila in a plebiscite. The Chairman of the MMDA is not an official
elected by the people, but appointed by the President with the rank and
privileges of a cabinet member. In fact, part of his function is to perform
such other duties as may be assigned to him by the president, whereas in
local government units, the President merely exercises supervisory
authority. This emphasizes the administrative character of the MMDA.
23. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NO POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCES FOR
THE WELFARE OF THE COMMUNITY; CASE AT BAR. — Clearly
then, the MMC under P.D. No. 824 is not the same entity as the MMDA
under R.A. No. 7924. Unlike the MMC, the MMDA has no power to enact
ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local government
units, acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess
legislative power and police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution
ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by
petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court of Appeals did not err
in so ruling.
24. ID.; STATE; INHERENT POWERS; POLICE POWER; GOOD
INTENTIONS CANNOT JUSTIFY THE OPENING FOR PUBLIC USE
OF PRIVATE STREET IN PRIVATE SUBDIVISION WITHOUT ANY
LEGAL WARRANT. — We stress that this decision does not make light of
the MMDA's noble efforts to solve the chaotic traffic condition in Metro
Manila. Everyday, traffic jams and traffic bottlenecks plague the metropolis.
Even our once sprawling boulevards and avenues are now crammed with
cars while city streets are clogged with motorists and pedestrians. Traffic
has become a social malaise affecting our people's productivity and the
efficient delivery of goods and services in the country. The MMDA was
created to put some order in the metropolitan transportation system but
unfortunately the powers granted by its charter are limited. Its good
intentions cannot justify the opening for public use of a private street in a
private subdivision without any legal warrant. The promotion of the general
welfare is not antithetical to the preservation of the rule of law.
G.R. No. 130230 April 15, 2005
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin
SYNOPSIS
Facts:
Respondent Garin was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his
driver’s license was confiscated for parking illegally. Garin wrote to then
MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his license and
expressed his preference for his case to be file in Court. Without an
immediate reply from the chairman, Garin filed for a preliminary injunction
assailing among others that Sec 5 (f) of RA 7924 violates the constitutional
prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing
MMDA to fix and impose unspecified and unlimited fines and penalties.
RTC rule in his favor, directing MMDA to return his license and for the
authority to desist from confiscating driver’s license without first giving the
driver the opportunity to be heard in an appropriate proceeding.
Thus, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Sec 5(f) of RA 7924 which authorizes MMDA to confiscate
and suspend or revoke driver’s license in the enforcement of traffic rules
and regulations constitutional?
Ruling:
The MMDA is not vested with police power. It was concluded that
MMDA is not a local government unit of a public corporation endowed with
legislative power and it has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of
the community.
Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power vested in
the legislature to make, ordain, establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances either with penalties of without, not
repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for good and welfare
of the commonwealth and for subjects of the same. There is no provision in
RA 7924 that empowers MMDA or its council to “enact ordinance, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants
of Metro Manila.” It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down
policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies,
People’s Organizations, NGOs and private sector for the efficient and
expeditious delivery of services. All its functions are administrative in
nature.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; INHERENT
POWERS OF THE STATE; POLICE POWER; A LICENSE TO
OPERATE A MOTOR VEHICLE MAY BE SUSPENDED OR REVOKED
BY THE STATE IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS POLICE POWER. — The
petitioner correctly points out that a license to operate a motor vehicle
is not a property right, but a privilege granted by the state, which may
be suspended or revoked by the state in the exercise of its police power,
in the interest of the public safety and welfare, subject to the
procedural due process requirements. . . . Petitioner cites a long list of
American cases to prove this point, such as State ex. Rel. Sullivan, which
states in part that, "the legislative power to regulate travel over the highways
and thoroughfares of the state for the general welfare is extensive. It may be
exercised in any reasonable manner to conserve the safety of travelers and
pedestrians. Since motor vehicles are instruments of potential danger, their
registration and the licensing of their operators have been required almost
from their first appearance. The right to operate them in public places is
not a natural and unrestrained right, but a privilege subject to
reasonable regulation, under the police power, in the interest of the
public safety and welfare. The power to license imports further power to
withhold or to revoke such license upon noncompliance with prescribed
conditions." Likewise, the petitioner quotes the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in Commonwealth v. Funk, to the effect that: "Automobiles are
vehicles of great speed and power. The use of them constitutes an element
of danger to persons and property upon the highways. Carefully operated,
an automobile is still a dangerous instrumentality, but, when operated by
careless or incompetent persons, it becomes an engine of destruction. The
Legislature, in the exercise of the police power of the commonwealth,
not only may, but must, prescribe how and by whom motor vehicles
shall be operated on the highways. One of the primary purposes of a
system of general regulation of the subject matter, as here by the Vehicle
Code, is to insure the competency of the operator of motor vehicles. Such a
general law is manifestly directed to the promotion of public safety and is
well within the police power." The common thread running through the 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CANNOT BE EXERCISED BY ANY GROUP
cited cases is that it is the legislature, in the exercise of police power, which OR BODY OF INDIVIDUALS NOT POSSESSING LEGISLATIVE
has the power and responsibility to regulate how and by whom motor POWER. — [P]olice power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is
vehicles may be operated on the state highways. aATEDS the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain,
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT GRANTED TO THE METRO MANILA and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, AS IT IS NOT A LOCAL and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
GOVERNMENT UNIT OR A PUBLIC CORPORATION ENDOWED Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
WITH LEGISLATIVE POWER; CASE AT BAR. — In Metro Manila commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. Having been lodged
Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., we primarily in the National Legislature, it cannot be exercised by any
categorically stated that Rep. Act No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The
with police power, let alone legislative power, and that all its functions are National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the president and
administrative in nature. . . . Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal
composed of several local government units. With the passage of Rep. Act corporations or local government units (LGUs). Once delegated, the agents
No. 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the
development and administrative region" and the administration of "metro- national lawmaking body. Our Congress delegated police power to the
wide" basic services affecting the region placed under "a development LGUs in the Local Government Code of 1991. A local government is a
authority" referred to as the MMDA. . . . "[T]he MMDA is not a political "political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and
unit of government. The power delegated to the MMDA is that given to has substantial control of local affairs." Local government units are the
the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which exercise police power
regulations in the implementation of the MMDA's functions. There is no through their respective legislative bodies.
grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare
of the inhabitants of the metropolis." Therefore, insofar as Sec. 5 (f) of Rep.
Act No. 7924 is understood by the lower court and by the petitioner to grant
the MMDA the power to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses
without need of any other legislative enactment, such is an unauthorized
exercise of police power. Thus, where there is a traffic law or regulation
validly enacted by the legislature or those agencies to whom legislative
powers have been delegated (the City of Manila in this case), the petitioner
is not precluded — and in fact is duty-bound — to confiscate and
suspend or revoke drivers' licenses in the exercise of its mandate of
transport and traffic management, as well as the administration and
implementation of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic
engineering services and traffic education programs. This is consistent
with our ruling in Bel-Air that the MMDA is a development authority
created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the
various national government agencies, people's organizations, non-
governmental organizations and the private sector, which may enforce, but
not enact, ordinances.
Heherson Alvarez vs Teofisto Guingona, Jr.
252 SCRA 695 – Political Law – Municipal Corporation – LGU
Requirement – Income – Inclusion of IRAs
In April 1993, House Bill 8817 (An Act Converting the Municipality of
Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of
Santiago) was passed in the House of Representatives.
In May 1993, a Senate Bill (SB 1243) of similar title and content with that
of HB 8817 was introduced in the Senate.
In January 1994, HB 8817 was transmitted to the Senate. In February 1994,
the Senate conducted a public hearing on SB 1243. In March 1994, the
Senate Committee on Local Government rolled out its recommendation for
approval of HB 8817 as it was totally the same with SB 1243. Eventually,
HB 8817 became a law (RA 7720).
2. YES. The IRA should be added in the computation of an LGU’s average
annual income as was done in the case at bar. The IRAs are items of income
because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local
government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local
treasury without need of any further action on the part of the local
government unit. They thus constitute income which the local government
can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds.
To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a
basis, too, to classify the same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have
a technical definition and meaning all its own as used in the Local
Government Code that unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or
transfers referred to when the Code speaks of “funding support from the
national government, its instrumentalities and government-owned-or-
controlled corporations.

Now Senator Heherson Alvarez et al are assailing the constitutionality of

the said law on the ground that the bill creating the law did not originate
from the lower house and that City of Santiago was not able to comply with
the income of at least P20M per annum in order for it to be a city. That in
the computation of the reported average income of P20,974,581.97, the IRA
was included which should not be.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not RA 7720 is invalid for not being originally from the
HOR.

2. Whether or not the IRA should be included in the computation of an

LGU’s income.

HELD: 1. NO. The house bill was filed first before the senate bill as the
record shows. Further, the Senate held in abeyance any hearing on the said
SB while the HB was on its 1st, 2nd and 3rd reading in the HOR. The
Senate only conducted its 1st hearing on the said SB one month after the HB
was transmitted to the Senate (in anticipation of the said HB as well).
G.R. No. 92649 February 14, 1991
Spouses Badua v. Cordillera Bodong Administration
194 SCRA 101 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Judicial Power –
Tribal Court Has No Judicial Power
Facts:
Spouses Leonor and Rosa Badua were occupying a parcel of land in Abra.
The said land is being claimed by David Quema. Quema said he sold the
land to a certain Dra. Erotida Valera but then he was able to repurchase the
land later from the same doctor. The Baduas however contend that they
were the ones who bought the land from Valera but that they cannot
produce the deed of sale because it was with the vice governor. Quema sued
the Baduas not before the regular courts but rather before the Maeng Tribal
Court. The said tribal court is composed of elders respected in the
community and that it is alleged that their decision is likewise respected.
The tribal court is also a branch of the Cordillera Bodong Administration.
Non-compliance to the tribal court’s decision would result to community
ostracism. The tribal court resolved the issue by granting the land to Quema.
The Baduas were then ordered to vacate the land. The Baduas refused.
Thereafter the Baduas received a warning order from the Cordillera
People’s Liberation Army (CPLA) – the military branch of the Cordillera
Bodong Administration. This brought fear to the couple which led to
Leonor’s running away and Rosa’s arrest. They were threatened by the
CPLA hence they appeal before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the Maeng Tribal Court is a competent court.
Held:
No, the Maeng Tribal Court is not a competent court. The Cordillera
AUTONOMOUS Region never came into existence. Hence, the
Cordillera Bodong Council – which would have received judicial power,
granted CAR’s autonomy – never possessed judicial power. What we
currently have is the Cordillera ADMINISTRATIVE Region. Hence, the
Maeng Tribal Council, its supposed branch, likewise never received judicial
power. Therefore, it cannot validly decide on cases, neither can it enforce its
decision.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6766; CORDILLERA
AUTONOMOUS REGION; CREATION THEREOF REJECTED IN
PLEBISCITE CALLED FOR. — In "Cordillera Regional Assembly
Member Alexander P. Ordillo, et al. vs. The Commission on Elections, et
al.," G.R. No. 93054, December 4, 1990, the Court en banc, found that in
the plebiscite that was held on January 23, 1990 pursuant to Republic Act
6766, the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region was rejected
by all the provinces and city of the Cordillera region, except Ifugao
province, hence, the Cordillera Autonomous Region did not come to be.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SPECIAL COURT FOR MINORITIES AND
REGIONAL POLICE FORCE, INEXISTENT. — As a logical consequence
of that judicial declaration, the Cordillera Bodong Administration created
under Section 13 of Executive Order No. 220, the indigenous and special
courts for the indigenous cultural communities of the Cordillera region (Sec.
1, Art. VII, Rep. Act 6766), and the Cordillera People's Liberation Army, as
a regional police force or a regional command of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (Secs. 2 and 4, Article XVIII of R.A. 6766), do not legally exist.
Since the Cordillera Autonomous Region did not come into legal existence,
the Maeng Tribal Court was not constituted into an indigenous or special
court under R.A. No. 6766. Hence, the Maeng Tribal Court is an ordinary
tribal court existing under the customs and traditions of an indigenous
cultural community.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TRIBAL COURTS; NOT PART OF OUR
JUDICIAL SYSTEM. — Such tribal courts are not a part of the Philippine
judicial system which consists of the Supreme Court and the lower courts
which have been established by law (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution).
They do not possess judicial power.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MERE ADVISORY AND
CONCILIATORY BODIES. — Like the pangkats or conciliation panels
created by P.D. No. 1508 in the barangays, they are advisory and
conciliatory bodies whose principal objective is to bring together the parties
to a dispute and persuade them to make peace, settle, and compromise.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; AMICABLE SETTLEMENT,
COMPROMISE AND ARBITRATION AWARD RENDERED,
ENFORCEABLE ONLY THROUGH THE LOCAL CITY OR
MUNICIPAL COURTS. — An amicable settlement, compromise, and
arbitration award rendered by a pangkat, if not seasonably repudiated, has
the force and effect of a final judgment of a court (Sec. 11, P.D. 1508), but
it can be enforced only through the local city or municipal court to which
the secretary of the Lupon transmits the compromise settlement or
arbitration award upon expiration of the period to annul or repudiate it (Sec.
14, P.D. 1508). Similarly, the decisions of a tribal court based on
compromise or arbitration, as provided in P.D. 1508, may be enforced or set
aside, in and through the regular courts only.
UMALI vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 203974
FACTS:
On July 11, 2011, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City passed
Resolution No.183-2011, requesting the President to declare the
conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city of the province
of Nueva Ecija into a highly urbanized city (HUC). Acceding to the
request, the President issued Presidential Proclamation No. 418,
Series of 2012,proclaiming the City of Cabanatuan as an HUC subject to
"ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein, as provided for in
Section 453 of the Local Government Code of 1991."Respondent
COMELEC, acting on the proclamation, issued the assailed Minute
Resolution No.12-0797, for purposes of the plebiscite for the conversion of
Cabanatuan City from component city to highly-urbanized city, only
those registered residents of Cabanatuan City should participate in
the said plebiscite. In due time, petitioner Aurelio M. Umali, Governor of
Nueva Ecija, filed a Verified Motion for Reconsideration, maintaining
that the proposed conversion in question will necessarily and
directly affect the mother province of Nueva Ecija. His main argument is
that Section 453 of the LGC should be interpreted in conjunction with Sec.
10, Art. X of the Constitution. He argues that while the conversion in
question does not involve the creation of a new or the dissolution of an
existing city, the spirit of the Constitutional provision calls for the people of
the local government unit (LGU) directly affected to vote in a plebiscite
whenever there is a material change in their rights and responsibilities. The
phrase "qualified voters therein" used in Sec. 453 of the LGC should then be
interpreted to refer to the qualified voters of the units directly affected by
the conversion and not just those in the component city proposed to be
upgraded. Petitioner Umali justified his position by enumerating the
various adverse effects of the Cabanatuan City’s conversion and
how it will cause material change not only in the political and economic
rights of the city and its residents but also of the province as a whole. To the
Verified Motion for Reconsideration, private respondent Julius Cesar
Vergara, city mayor of Cabanatuan, interposed an opposition on the ground
that Sec. 10, Art. X does not apply to conversions, which is the meat of the
matter. He likewise argues that a specific provision of the LGC, Sec. 453,
as couched, allows only the qualified voters of Cabanatuan City to vote in
the plebiscite. Lastly, private respondent pointed out that when Santiago
City was converted in 1994from a municipality to an independent
component city pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 7720,the plebiscite held
was limited to the registered voters of the then municipality of Santiago.
COMELEC rule against petitioner maintaining that Cabanatuan City is
merely being converted from a component city into an HUC and that the
political unit directly affected by the conversion will only be the city itself.
It argues that in this instance, no political unit will be created, merged with
another, or will be removed from another LGU, and that no boundaries will
be altered. The conversion would merely reinforce the powers and
prerogatives already being exercised by the city, with the political unit’s
probable elevation to that of an HUC as demanded by its compliance with
the criteria established under the LGC. Thus, the participation of the voters
of the entire province in the plebiscite will not be necessary.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Nueva Ecija should be included in the plebicit not only
those in Cabanatuan City.
RULING:
Yes." Political units directly affected" defined In identifying the LGU or
LGUs that should be allowed to take part in the plebiscite, what should
primarily be determined is whether or not the unit or units that desire
to participate will be" directly affected" by the change. Petitioner Umali
asseverates that Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution should be the basis for
determining the qualified voters who will participate in the plebiscite to
resolve the issue. Sec.10, Art. X reads: Section 10, Article X. – No
province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with
the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected. Petitioner Umali elucidates that the phrase "political units
directly affected" necessarily encompasses not only Cabanatuan City but
the entire province of Nueva Ecija. Hence, all the registered voters in the
province are qualified to cast their votes in resolving the proposed
conversion of Cabanatuan City. On the other hand, respondents invoke Sec.
453 of the LGC to support their claim that only the City of Cabanatuan
should be allowed to take part in the voting. Sec. 453 states: Section 453.
Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status. – It shall be the duty of the
President to declare a city as highly urbanized within thirty (30) days after it
shall have met the minimum requirements prescribed in the immediately
preceding Section, upon proper application therefor and ratification in a
plebiscite by the qualified voters therein. Respondents take the phrase
"registered voters therein" in Sec. 453 as referring only to the registered
voters in the city being converted, excluding in the process the
voters in the remaining towns and cities of Nueva Ecija.In this case, the
provision merely authorized the President to make a determination on
whether or not the requirements under Sec. 4521 of the LGC are
complied with. The provision makes it ministerial for the President, upon
proper application, to declare a component city as highly urbanized once the
minimum requirements, which are base

on certifiable and measurable indices under Sec. 452, are

satisfied. The mandatory language "shall" used in the provision leaves the
President with no room for discretion. In so doing, Sec. 453, in effect,
automatically calls for the conduct of a plebiscite for purposes of
conversions once the requirements are met. No further legislation is
necessary before the city proposed to be converted becomes eligible to
become an HUC through ratification, as the basis for the delegation of the
legislative authority is the very LGC. The plebiscite requirement under
the constitutional provision should equally apply to conversions as
well. While conversion to an HUC is not explicitly provided in Sec. 10, Art.
X of the Constitution wenevertheless observe that the conversion of
a component city into an HUC is substantial alteration of
boundaries.

Bai Sandra Sema vs Commission on Elections
558 SCRA 700 – Political Law – Municipal Corporation – Creation of
LGUs by Autonomous Regions (ARMM) – Population Requirement
Facts:
The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of
the province of Maguindanao but it is not part of ARMM because Cotabato
City voted against its inclusion in a plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao
has two legislative districts. The 1st legislative district comprises of
Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities.
A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMM’s Organic Act and vesting
it with power to create provinces, municipalities, cities and barangays.
Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional Assembly created Shariff
Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of the
municipalities of the 1st district of Maguindanao with the exception of
Cotabato City.
For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the
1st district is now only made of Cotabato City (because of MMA 201). But
it later amended this stating that status quo should be retained; however, just
for the purposes of the elections, the first district should be called Shariff
Kabunsuan with Cotabato City – this is also while awaiting a decisive
declaration from Congress as to Cotabato’s status as a legislative district (or
part of any).
Bai Sandra Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of
S. Kabunsuan with Cotabato (1st district). Later, Sema was contending that
Cotabato City should be a separate legislative district and that votes
therefrom should be excluded in the voting (probably because her rival
Dilangalen was from there and D was winning – in fact he won). She
contended that under the Constitution, upon creation of a province (S.
Kabunsuan), that province automatically gains legislative representation and
since S. Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City – so in effect Cotabato is being
deprived of a representative in the HOR.
COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that
regardless of S. Kabunsuan being created, the legislative district is not
affected and so is its representation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can
create validly LGUs.
HELD:
RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is
governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city,
municipality or barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the
creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the
Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any
provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the
political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in
the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative
bodies the power to create local government units. However, under its
plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies
the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards
and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In
fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal
councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to
compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and
the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
Hence, ARMM cannot validly create Shariff Kabunsuan province.
Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at
least 250k, and that a province, once created, should have at least one
representative in the HOR. Note further that in order to have a legislative
district, there must at least be 250k (population) in said district. Cotabato
City did not meet the population requirement so Sema’s contention is
untenable. On the other hand, ARMM cannot validly create the province of
S. Kabunsuan without first creating a legislative district. But this can never
be legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is vested
solely in Congress. At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not
cities and provinces.
G.R. No. 161414 January 17, 2005
Sultan Osop B. Camid v. Office of the President
Sultan Osop B. Camid, petitioner, Vs.
The Office Of The President, Department Of The Interior And Local
Government, Autonomous Region In Muslim Mindanao, Department Of
Finance, Department Of Budget And Management, Commission On Audit,
And The Congress Of The Philippines (House Of Representatives And
Senate)
Facts:
In 1965, an Executive Order issued by Pres. Macapagal creating the
Municipality of Andong, Lanao del Sur was declared by the SC as void as
promulgated in its Pelaez v. Auditor General ruling. Camid alleges that
although no person has been appointed, elected or qualified to serve any of
the elective local government positions in Andong, has metamorphosed into
a full-blown municipality with a complete set of officials appointed to
handle essential services for the municipality and its constituents. It has a
high school, post office, DECS office and 17 “barangay units” with
respective chairmen. Furthermore, its land area was recognized by the
CENRO to have been created through the voided EO 107 as well included
in the as a municipality by the Provincial Statistics Office of Marawi City.
In Nov. 23, 2003, the DILG issued a certification which enumerates 18
municipalities as as “existing” municipalities” even though its creation were
voided in the same ruling that voided Andong’s creation as a municipality.
Camid as as a current resident of Andong, suing as a private citizen and
taxpayer, alleges that said certification results in an unequal treatment to the
detriment of Andong as similarly situated municipalities were recognized by
DILG. He further alleges that Andong is already a “de facto municipal
corporation” similar to Municipality of San Andress in the case of
Municipality of San Narciso v. Hon. Mendez. Furthermore, he alleges that
Andong is covered by Section 442(d) of the LGC of 1991 which states that
“Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or
executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal
officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall
henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.”
Issue:
1. Whether or not Andong is already a “de facto municipal corporation”?
2. Whether a municipality whose creation by executive fiat was previously
voided by this Court may attain recognition in the absence of any curative
or reimplementing statute
Ruling:
1. The SC did not rule on this issue as Camid failed to make a factual
demonstration of the continuous exercise by the municipal corporation of its
corporate powers, as well as the acquiescence thereto by the other
instrumentalities of the state. Proper factual ascertainment is important in
the determination if a municipality is a de facto municipal corporation. It
has been opined that municipal corporations may exist by prescription
where it is shown that the community has claimed and exercised corporate
functions, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the legislature, and
without interruption or objection for period long enough to afford title by
prescription. These municipal corporations have exercised their powers for a
long period without objection on the part of the government that although
no charter is in existence, it is presumed that they were duly incorporated in
the first place and that their charters had been lost.
2. No. The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the
legislature. It can legislate curative laws, which in essence are retrospective,
and aimed at giving "validity to acts done that would have been invalid
under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with," are
validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against
impairment of vested rights. Thus Pelaez and its offspring cases ruled that
the President has no power to create municipalities, yet limited its
nullificatory effects to the particular municipalities challenged in actual
cases before this Court. However, with the promulgation of the Local
Government Code in 1991, the legal cloud was lifted over the municipalities
similarly created by executive order but not judicially annulled. The de facto
status of such municipalities as San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban was
recognized by this Court, and Section 442(b) of the Local Government Code
deemed curative whatever legal defects to title these municipalities had
labored under.
Note: 1. There subsequent legislation was enacted to reconstitute the 18
municipalities.
2. The constituent barrios of Andong revert back into their original not to have been judicially annulled. On the other hand, the municipalities
municipalities, namely the municipalities of Lumbatan, Butig and Tubaran. judicially dissolved in cases such as Pelaez, San Joaquin, and Malabang,
remain inexistent, unless recreated through specific legislative enactments,
as done with the eighteen (18) municipalities certified by the DILG. Those
municipalities derive their legal personality not from the presidential
SYLLABUS issuances or executive orders which originally created them or from Section
1. POLITICAL LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; LOCAL 442(d), but from the respective legislative statutes which were enacted to
GOVERNMENT CODE; LOCAL GOVERNMENT; A MUNICIPALITY revive them.
IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOGNITION AS A DE FACTO
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION WHEN THE EXECUTIVE ORDER
CREATING IT HAS BEEN JUDICIALLY ANNULLED; CASE AT
BAR. — Pelaez and its offspring cases ruled that the President has no
power to create municipalities, yet limited its nullificatory effects to the
particular municipalities challenged in actual cases before this Court.
However, with the promulgation of the Local Government Code in 1991,
the legal cloud was lifted over the municipalities similarly created by
executive order but not judicially annulled. The de facto status of such
municipalities as San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban was recognized by this
Court, and Section 442(b) of the Local Government Code deemed curative
whatever legal defects to title these municipalities had labored under. Is
Andong similarly entitled to recognition as a de facto municipal
corporation? It is not. There are eminent differences between Andong and
municipalities such as San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban. Most prominent is
the fact that the executive order creating Andong was expressly annulled by
order of this Court in 1965. If we were to affirm Andong's de facto status by
reason of its alleged continued existence despite its nullification, we would
in effect be condoning defiance of a valid order of this Court. Court
decisions cannot obviously lose their efficacy due to the sheer defiance by
the parties aggrieved.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 442(D) THEREOF DOES NOT SERVE

TO AFFIRM OR RECONSTITUTE THE JUDICIALLY DISSOLVED
MUNICIPALITIES; CASE AT BAR. — We thus assert the proper purview
to Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code — that it does not serve to
affirm or reconstitute the judicially dissolved municipalities such as
Andong, which had been previously created by presidential issuances or
executive orders. The provision affirms the legal personalities only of those
municipalities such as San Narciso, Alicia, and Sinacaban, which may have
been created using the same infirm legal basis, yet were fortunate enough
MUNICIPAL OF JIMENEZ VS. BAZ
G.R. No. 105746
December 2, 1996
The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by E.O. 258 by then
Pres. Elpidio Quirino, pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Revised Administrative
Code of 1917.
By virtue of Municipal Council Resolution No. 171, Sinacaban laid claim to
a portion of Barrio Tabo-o and to Barrios Macabayao, Adorable, Sinara,
Baja, and Sinara Alto, based on the technical dedcription in E.O. No. 258.
The claim was filed with the Provincial Board of Misamis
Occidental against the Municipality of Jimenez.
While conceding that the disputed area is part of Sinacaban, the
Municipality of Jimenez, in its answer, nonetheless asserted jurisdiction on
the basis of an agreement it had with the Municipality of Sinacaban. This
agreement, which was approved by the Provincial Board of Misamis
Occidental in its Resolution No. 77 dated February 18, 1950, fixed the
common boundary of Sinacaban and Jimenez.
On October 11, 1989, the Provincial Board declared the disputed area to be
part of Sinacaban. It held that the previous resolution approving the
agreement between the parties was void since the Board had no power to
alter the boundaries of Sinacaban as fixed in E.O. 258, that power being
vested in Congress pursuant to the Constitution and the LGC of 1983 (BP
337), Sec. 134. The Provincial Board denied the motion of Jimenez seeking
reconsideration.
On March 20, 1990, Jimenez filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus in the RTC of Oroquieta City, Branch 14 against Sinacaban, the
Province of Misamis Occidental and its Provincial Board, the Commission
on Audit, the Departments of Local Government, Budget and Management,
and the Executive Secretary.
Issues:
1. Whether Sinacaban has legal personality to file a claim.
2. Whether R.A. 7160, Sec. 442 (d) is valid despite not conforming to the
constitutional and statutory requirements for the holding of plebiscites in the
creation of new municipalities.
3. If it has legal personality, whether it is the boundary provided for in E.O.
258 or in Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial board of Misamis Occidental
which should be used as basis for adjudicating Sinacaban’s territorial claim.
Held:
1. The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not validly created as
a municipal corporation is the ruling in Pelaez vs. Auditor General that the
creation of municipal corporations is essentially a legislative matter and
therefore the President was without power to create by executive order the
Municipality of Sinacaban. However, where a municipality created as
such by executive order is later impliedly recognized and its acts are
accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned.
A municipality has been conferred the status of at least a de facto municipal
corporation where its legal existence has been recognized and acquiesced
publicly and officially.
A quo warranto suit against a corporation for forfeiture of its charter must
be commenced within 5 years from the act complained of was
done/committed. Sinacaban has been in existence for 16 years, yet the
validity of E.O. No. 258 creating it had never been questioned. Created in
1949, it was only 40 years later that its existence was questioned and only
because it had laid claim to an area that is apparently desired for its revenue.
The State and even the Municipality of Jimenez itself has recognized
Sinacaban’s corporate existence. Sinacaban is constituted part of a
municipal circuit for purposes of the establishment of MTCs in the country.
Jimenez had earlier recognized Sinacaban in 1950 by entering into an
agreement with it regarding their common boundary.
The Municipality of Sinacaban attained a de jure status by virtue of the
Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, apportioning legislative
districts throughout the country, which considered Sinacaban part of the
Second District of Misamis Occidental. Sec. 442(d) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 must be deemed to have cured any defect in the
creation of Sinacaban since it states that:

“Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code
shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts
organized pursuant to presidential issuances/executive orders and
which have their respective set of municipal officials holding office at the
time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be regular
municipalities.”
Jimenez’s contention that the RTC failed to decide the case “within 1 yr
from the start of the proceedings” as required by Sec. 79 of the LGC of
1983 and the 90-day period provided for in Art.VIII, Sec.15 of the
Constitution does not affect the validity of the decision rendered. Failure of
a court to decide within the period prescribed by law does not divest it of its
jurisdiction to decide the case but only makes the judge thereof liable for
possible administrative sanction.

2. Sinacaban is not subject to the plebiscite requirement since it attained de

facto status at the time the 1987 Constitution took effect. The plebiscite
requirement for the creation of municipalities applies only to new
municipalities created for the first time under the Constitution – it cannot be
applied to municipalities created before.

3. E.O. No. 258 does not say that Sinacaban comprises only the barrios
(now barangays) therein mentioned. What it says is that “Sinacaban
contains” those barrios. The reason for this is that the technical description,
containing the metes and bounds of a municipality’s territory, is controlling.
The trial court correctly ordered a relocation survey as the only means of
determining the boundaries of the municipality & consequently to which
municipality the barangays in question belong.

Any alteration of boundaries that is not in accordance with the law is not
the carrying into effect of the law but its amendment – and a resolution of a
provincial Board declaring certain barrios part of one or another
municipality that is contrary to the technical description of the territory of
the municipality is not binding. If Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board
of Misamis Occidental is contrary to the technical description of the
territory of Sinacaban, it cannot be used by Jimenez as basis for opposing
Sinacaban’s claim.

In case no settlement of boundary disputes is made, the dispute should be

elevated to the RTC of the province (Sec. 79, LGC of 1983). Jimenez
properly brought to the RTC for review the Decision and Resolution of the
Provincial Board. This was in accordance with the LGC of 1983, the
governing law when the action was brought by Jimenez in 1989. The
governing law now is Secs. 118-119, LGC of 1991 (RA 7160).
Miranda vs Aguirre GR No 133064 16 September 1999 denial of their right in RA No. 8528 gives them proper standing to strike
G.R. No. 133064 September 16 1999 down the law as unconstitutional.

FACTS:
1994, RA No. 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality of Santiago,
Isabela, into an independent component city. July 4th, RA No. 7720 was
approved by the people of Santiago in a plebiscite. 1998, RA No. 8528 was
enacted and it amended RA No. 7720 that practically downgraded the City
of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 for the lack of
provision to submit the law for the approval of the people of Santiago in a
proper plebiscite.
Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of the Constitution states that: the judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instru-mentality of the Government.

Respondents defended the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 saying that the

said act merely reclassified the City of Santiago from an independent
component city into a component city. It allegedly did not involve any
“creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries
of local government units,” therefore, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago
is unnecessary. They also questioned the standing of petitioners to file the
petition and argued that the petition raises a political question over which
the Court lacks jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition at bar.

RULING:
Yes. RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional. That Supreme Court has the
jurisdiction over said petition because it involves not a political question but
a justiciable issue, and of which only the court could decide whether or not
a law passed by the Congress is unconstitutional.

That when an amendment of the law involves creation, merger, division,

abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units, a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected is mandatory.
Petitioners are directly affected in the imple-mentation of RA No. 8528.
Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City, Afiado was the President of the
Sangguniang Liga, together with 3 other petitioners were all residents and
voters in the City of Santiago. It is their right to be heard in the conversion
of their city through a plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC. Thus,
 LOCAL AUTONOMY & DECENTRALIZATION
GANZON VS CA
G.R. No. 93252 August 5 1991

FACTS:
Ganzon, after having been issued three successive 60-day of suspension
order by Secretary of Local Government, filed a petition for prohibition
with the CA to bar Secretary Santos from implementing the said orders.
Ganzon was faced with 10 administrative complaints on various charges on
abuse of authority and grave misconduct.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government (as the alter ego of the
President) has the authority to suspend and remove local officials.

RULING:
The Constitution did nothing more, and insofar as existing legislation
authorizes the President (through the Secretary of Local Government) to
proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution contains no
prohibition. The Chief Executive is not banned from exercising acts of
disciplinary authority because she did not exercise control powers, but
because no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary authority.

In those case that this Court denied the President the power (to
suspend/remove) it was not because that the President cannot exercise it on
account of his limited power, but because the law lodged the power
elsewhere. But in those cases in which the law gave him the power, the
Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found little difficulty in sustaining him.

We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary
of Interior from exercising a legal power, yet we are of the opinion that the
Secretary of interior is exercising that power oppressively, and needless to
say, with a grave abuse of discretion.
As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a
remote possibility Mayor Ganzon is to all intents and purposes, to make him
spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and
purposes, his suspension permanent.
Limbona vs. Mangelin (G.R. No. 80391)
Facts:
Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional
Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao
(Assembly). On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam,
Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of
Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the
Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local government
officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly
members through the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session in
November as his presence was needed in the house committee hearing of
Congress. However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in
defiance of the Limbona's advice, where he was unseated from his position.
Petitioner prays that the session's proceedings be declared null and void and
be it declared that he was still the Speaker of the Assembly. Pending further
proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution from the Assembly
expressly expelling petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue
that petitioner had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some
members of the Assembly on a question which should have been resolved
within the confines of the Assembly," for which the respondents now submit
that the petition had become "moot and academic" because of its resolution.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the expulsion of the petitioner (pending litigation) has
made the case moot and academic.
2. Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao subject to the
jurisdiction of the national courts? In other words, what is the extent of self-
government given to the two autonomous governments of Region 9 and 12?
Ruling:
1. The Court does not agree that the case is moot and academic simply by
reason of the expulsion resolution that was issued. If the expulsion was done
purposely to make the petition moot and academic, it will not make it
academic. On the ground of due process, the Court hold that the expulsion is
without force and effect. First, there is no showing that the Sanggunian had
conducted an investigation. It also does not appear that the petitioner had
been made aware that he was charged with graft and corruption before his
colleagues. It cannot be said therefore that he was accorded any opportunity
to rebut their accusations. As it stands, the charges now are leveled amount
to mere accusations that cannot warrant expulsion. Thus, the Court ordered
reinstatement of the petitioner.
2. The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions 9
and 12 by Presidential Decree No. 1618. In relation to the central
government, the Presidential Decree provides that “the President shall have
the power of general supervision and control over the Autonomous
Regions...” Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or
decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when
the central government delegates administrative powers to political
subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the
process to make local governments “more responsive and accountable,”
“and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make
them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and
social progress.” At the same time, it relieves the central government of the
burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national
concerns. The president exercises “general supervision” over them, but only
to “ensure that local affairs are administered according to law.” He has not
control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments
with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an
abdication of political power in the favor of local government units declared
to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart
its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central
authorities.
According to the Supreme Court, an examination of the very Presidential
Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us to
believe that they were never meant to exercise autonomy through
decentralization of power. The Presidential Decree, in the first place,
mandates that “the President shall have the power of general supervision
and control over Autonomous Regions.” In the second place, the
Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to dischage chiefly
administrative services. Thus, the SC assumes jurisdiction.
Upon the facts presented, the Court finds two sessions held on November to
be invalid. Wherefore, the petition is Granted. The petitioner is reinstated as
Member and speaker of the Sanggunian.
Province of Batangas vs Romulo429 SCRA 736
FACTS:
In 1998, then President Estrada issued EO No. 48 establishing the “Program
for Devolution Adjustment and Equalization” to enhance the capabilities of
LGUs in the discharge of the functions and services devolved to them
through the LGC.The Oversight Committee under Executive Secretary
Ronaldo Zamora passed Resolutions No. OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006 and
OCD-99-003 which were approved by Pres. Estrada on October6, 1999. The
guidelines formulated by the Oversight Committee required the LGUs to
identify the projects eligible for funding under the portion of LGSEF and
submit the project proposals and other requirements to the DILG for
appraisal before the Committee serves notice to the DBM for the subsequent
release of the corresponding funds.Hon. Herminaldo Mandanas, Governor
of Batangas, petitioned to declare unconstitutional and void certain provisos
contained in the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 1999, 2000, and
2001, insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year the
amount of P5billion for the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local
Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) & imposed conditions for
the release thereof.
ISSUE:
Whether the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and
the OCD resolutions infringe the Constitution and the LGC of 1991.
HELD:
Yes.The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the
OCD resolutions constitutea “withholding” of a portion of the IRA – they
effectively encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by LGUs and must be
struck down.According to Art. II, Sec.25 of the Constitution, “the State shall
ensure the local autonomy of local governments“. Consistent with the
principle of local autonomy, the Constitution confines the President’s power
over the LGUs to one of general supervision, which has been interpreted to
exclude the power of control. Drilon v. Lim distinguishes supervision from
control: control lays down the rules in the doing of an act – the officer has
the discretion to order his subordinate to do or redo the act, or decide to do
it himself; supervision merely sees to it that the rules are followedbut has no
authority to set down the rules or the discretion to modify/replace them.The
entire process involving the distribution & release of the LGSEF is
constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or “just
share” of the LGUs in the national taxes. Sec.6, Art.X of the Constitution
mandates that the “just share” shall be automatically released to the LGUs.
Since the release is automatic, the LGUs aren’t required to perform any act
to receive the “just share” – it shall bereleased to them “without need of
further action“. To subject its distribution & release to the vagaries of the
implementing rules & regulations as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in
the GAAs of 1999-2001 and the OCD Resolutions would violate this
constitutional mandate.The only possible exception to the mandatory
automatic release of the LGUs IRA is if the national internal revenue
collections for the current fiscal year is less than 40% of the collectionsof
the 3rd preceding fiscal year. The exception does not apply in this case.The
Oversight Committee’s authority is limited to the implementation of the
LGC of 1991 not to supplant or subvert the same, and neither can it exercise
control over the IRA of the LGUs.Congress may amend any of the
provisions of the LGC but only through a separate law and not through
appropriations laws or GAAs. Congress cannot include in a general
appropriations bill matters that should be more properly enacted in a
separate legislation.A general appropriations bill is a special type of
legislation, whose content is limited to specified sums of money dedicated
to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit –any provision therein which is
intended to amend another law is considered an “inappropriate provision“.
Increasing/decreasing the IRA of LGUs fixed in the LGC of 1991 are
matters of general & substantive law. To permit the Congress to undertake
these amendments through the GAAs would unduly infringe the fiscal
autonomy of the LGUs.The value of LGUs as institutions of democracy is
measured by the degree of autonomy they enjoy. Our national officials
should not only comply with the constitutional provisions in local autonomy
but should also appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which these provisions
are based.
HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR., SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF
LAGUNA, and HON. CALIXTO CATAQUIZ, petitioners, vs. HON.
FRANCISCO DIZON PAÑO and TONY CALVENTO, respondents. G.R.
No. 129093
QUISUMBING, J.:
August 30, 2001
FACTS:
On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed
agent by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install
Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto
Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayor’s permit to open lotto
outlet. This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz on the ground that an ordinance
was passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled
Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T.1995 which reads: “ISANG KAPASIYAHAN
TINUTUTULAN ANG MGA ILLEGAL GAMBLING LALO NA ANG
LOTTO SA LALAWIGAN NG LAGUNA”
As A Result of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for
declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order. Petitioners contend that : (1)the assailed resolution is a
valid policy declaration of the Provincial Government of Laguna of its
vehement objection to the operation of lotto and all forms of gambling;(2) It
is likewise a valid exercise of the provincial government’s police power
under the General Welfare Clause of R.A. 7160 otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991;(3) they also maintain that respondent’s
lotto operation is illegal because no prior consultations and approval by the
local government were sought before it was implemented contrary to the
express provisions of Sections 2 (c) and 27 of R.A. 7160. For his part,
respondent Calvento argues that the resolution is, in effect, a curtailment of
the power of the state since in this case the national legislature itself had
already declared lotto as legal. As for the allegation that no prior
consultations and approval were sought from the sangguninang
panlalawigan of Laguna, respondent stated as a declaration of policy and not
a self-executing provision of LGC of 1991.The respondent judge, Francisco
Pano promulgated his decision enjoining the petitioners from implementing
or enforcing resolution of Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995. Motion for
reconsideration was denied. Thus, petitioners filed petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T.1995 of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna and the denial of a mayor’s permit
based thereon are valid
2. Whether prior consultations and approval by the concerned
Sanggunian are needed before a lotto system can be operated in
a given local government unit.
RULING:
The Petition is denied. The Court ruled that the ordinance merely
states the “objection” of the council to said game. It is but a mere policy
statement on the part of the local council, which is not self-executing. Nor
could it serve as a valid ground to prohibit the operation of the lotto system
in the province of Laguna. As a policy statement expressing the local
government’s objection to the lotto, such resolution is valid. This is part of
the local government’s autonomy to air its views which maybe contrary to
that of the national government’s. However, this freedom to exercise
contrary views does not mean that local governments may actually enact
ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress. Given this
premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be
interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.
As for the second issue, Court ruled that petitioners erred in
declaring that sections 2 (C) and 27 of RA 7160 apply mandatorily in the
setting up of lotto outlets around the country. From careful reading of said
provisions, the Court find that these apply only to national programs and/or
projects which are to be implemented in a particular local community. Lotto
is neither a program nor a project of the national government, but of a
charitable institution, the PCSO. Though sanctioned by the national
government, it is far fetched to say that lotto falls within the contemplation
of Section 2 (c) and 27 of the Local Government Code.
G.R. No. 132988 July 19, 2000
Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre
SYNOPSIS
On December 27, 1997, the then President of the Philippines, Fidel V.
Ramos, issued Administrative Order (AO) 372. Subsequently, on December
10, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada issued AO 43, amending Section 4 of
AO 372, by reducing to five percent (5%) the amount of internal revenue
allotment (IRA) to be withheld from local government units (LGUs.)
In this original petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme
Court, petitioner seeks to annul Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it requires
LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25% of their authorized regular
appropriations for non-personal services; and to enjoin respondents from
implementing Section 4 of the Order, which withholds a portion of their
internal revenue allotments.
In sum, the main issue involved here is whether Section 1 of EO 372 and
Section 4 of the same issuance are valid exercises of the President's
power of general supervision over local governments.
The Supreme Court granted the petition.
Respondents and their successors were permanently prohibited from
implementing AO 372 and AO 43 insofar as local government units
were concerned.
According to the Court, Section 1 of AO 372, being merely an advisory, is
well within the powers of the President. Since it is not a mandatory
imposition, the directive cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power
of control. Section 4 of AO 372, however, ordered the withholding of 10%
of the LGUs IRA "pending the assessment and evaluation by the
Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal
situation" in the country. Such withholding clearly contravened the
Constitution and the law. The temporary nature of the retention by the
national government did not matter. Any retention is by itself prohibited. In
sum, the Court ruled that while Section 1 of AO 372 may be upheld as an
advisory, effected in times of national crisis, Section 4 thereof has no color
of validity at all. The latter provision effectively encroaches on the fiscal
autonomy of local governments.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT; POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT; EXERCISE OF GENERAL SUPERVISION OVER
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS; CONSTRUED. — Section 4 of Article X of
the Constitution confines the President's power over local governments to
one of general supervision. It reads as follows: "Sec. 4. The President of the
Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. . . ."
This provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. In
Taule v. Santos, (200 SCRA 512, August 12, 1991) the Court further stated
that the Chief Executive wielded no more authority than that of checking
whether local governments or their officials were performing their duties as
provided by the fundamental law and by statutes. He cannot interfere with
local governments, so long as they act within the scope of their authority.
"Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere
oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority
over such body," the Court said.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUPERVISION AND CONTROL;
DISTINGUISHED. — In Mondano v. Silvosa, (97 Phil. 143, May 30, 1955;
per Padilla, J.) the Court contrasted the President's power of supervision
over local government officials with that of his power of control over
executive officials of the national government. It was emphasized that the
two terms — supervision and control — differed in meaning and extent.
The Court distinguished them as follows: ". . . In administrative law,
supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see
that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to
fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to
make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the
power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer ha[s] done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." In a more recent
case, Drilon v. Lim, (235 SCRA 135, 142, August 4, 1994) the difference
between control and supervision was further delineated. Officers in control
lay down the rules in the performance or accomplishment of an act. If these
rules are not followed, they may, in their discretion, order the act undone or
redone by their subordinates or even decide to do it themselves. On the
other hand, supervision does not cover such authority. Supervising officials
merely see to it that the rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay
down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them.
If the rules are not observed, they may order the work done or redone, but
only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their own manner of
execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see to
it that the rules are followed. ETDHaC
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER OF HEADS OF POLITICAL
SUBDIVISIONS, WHEN PROVIDED FOR BY CONSTITUTION AND
LAW, MAY NOT BE WITHHELD NOR ALTERED. — Under our present
system of government, executive power is vested in the President. The
members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos.
As such, they are subject to the power of control of the President, at whose
will and behest they can be removed from office; or their actions and
decisions changed, suspended or reversed. In contrast, the heads of political
subdivisions are elected by the people. Their sovereign powers emanate
from the electorate, to whom they are directly accountable. By
constitutional fiat, they are subject to the President's supervision only, not
control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their
legitimate powers. By the same token, the President may not withhold or
alter any authority or power given them by the Constitution and the law.
4. ID.; LOCAL GOVERNMENTS; LOCAL AUTONOMY;
CONSTRUED. — Hand in hand with the constitutional restraint on the
President's power over local governments is the state policy of ensuring
local autonomy. In Ganzon v. Court of Appeals, (200 SCRA 271, 286,
August 5, 1991, per Sarmiento, J.) the Court said that local autonomy
signified "a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization." The grant of autonomy is
intended to "break up the monopoly of the national government over the
affairs of local governments, . . . not . . . to end the relation of partnership
and interdependence between the central administration and local
government units . . . ." Paradoxically, local governments are still subject to
regulation, however limited, for the purpose of enhancing self-government.
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government
has not completely relinquished all its powers over local governments,
including autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over local
affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation
is to make governance more directly responsive and effective at the local
levels. In turn, economic, political and social development at the smaller
political units are expected to propel social and economic growth and
development. But to enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs
and policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a
common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in
the President and Congress. As the Court stated in Magtajas v. Pryce
Properties Corp., Inc., (234 SCRA 255, 272, July 20, 1994) municipal
governments are still agents of the national government.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; DECENTRALIZATION OF ADMINISTRATION
AND THAT OF POWER; DISTINGUISHED. — Decentralization simply
means the devolution of national administration, not power, to local
governments. Local officials remain accountable to the central government
as the law may provide. The difference between decentralization of
administration and that of power was explained in detail in Limbona v.
Mangelin (170 SCRA 786, 794–795, February 28, 1989, per Sarmiento, J.)
as follows: "Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or
decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when
the central government delegates administrative powers to political
subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the
process to make local governments 'more responsive and accountable,' and
'ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them
more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social
progress.' At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden
of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns.
The President exercises 'general supervision' over them, but only to 'ensure
that local affairs are administered according to law.' He has no control over
their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of
political power in the favor of local government units declared to be
autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its
own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central
authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power
amounts to 'self-immolation,' since in that event, the autonomous
government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency." cCSHET
6. ID.; ID.; FISCAL AUTONOMY; DEFINED AND CONSTRUED.
— Under existing law, local government units, in addition to having
administrative autonomy in the exercise of their functions, enjoy fiscal
autonomy as well. Fiscal autonomy means that local governments have the
power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable
share in the national taxes released by the national government, as well as
the power to allocate their resources in accordance with their own priorities.
It extends to the preparation of their budgets, and local officials in turn-have
to work within the constraints thereof. They are not formulated at the
national level and imposed on local governments, whether they are relevant
to local needs and resources or not. Hence, the necessity of a balancing of
viewpoints and the harmonization of proposals from both local and national
officials, who in any case are partners in the attainment of national goals.
Local fiscal autonomy does not however rule out any manner of national
government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local
programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals.
Significantly, the President, by constitutional fiat, is the head of the
economic and planning agency of the government, primarily responsible for
formulating and implementing continuing, coordinated and integrated social
and economic policies, plans and programs for the entire country. However,
under the Constitution, the formulation and the implementation of such
policies and programs are subject to "consultations with the appropriate
public agencies, various private sectors, and local government units." The
President cannot do so unilaterally.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; AUTOMATIC RELEASE OF LGUs IRA. — Section
4 of AO 372 cannot, however, be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal
autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national
internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution. The
Local Government Code specifies further that the release shall be made
directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after every quarter of the
year and "shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed
by the national government for whatever purpose." As a rule, the term
"shall" is a word of command that must be given a compulsory meaning.
The provision is, therefore, imperative. Section 4 of AO 372, however,
orders the withholding, effective January 1, 1998, of 10 percent of the
LGUs' IRA "pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development
Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation" in the
country. Such withholding clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law.
Although temporary, it is equivalent to a holdbacks which means
"something held back or withheld, often temporarily." Hence, the
"temporary" nature of the retention by the national government does not
matter. Any retention is prohibited.
8. ID.; ID.; WHEN THE PRESIDENT MAY INTERFERE IN
LOCAL FISCAL MATTERS; REQUISITES. — Consequently, Section
284 of the Local Government Code provides: ". . . [I]n the event the national
government incurs an unmanaged public sector deficit, the President of the
Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the recommendation of [the]
Secretary of Finance, Secretary of the Interior and Local Government and
Secretary of Budget and Management, and subject to consultation with the
presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and the presidents of the liga,
to make the necessary adjustments in the internal revenue allotment of local
government units but in no case shall the allotment be less than thirty
percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the
third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year . . . ." There are therefore
several requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal matters:
(1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government; (2)
consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; and (3) the
corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of
Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management.
Furthermore, any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than
thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of
the third fiscal year preceding the current one. EDATSI
KAPUNAN, J., dissenting opinion:
1. POLITICAL LAW; JUDICIARY; JUDICIAL INQUIRY; WHEN
DETERMINATION OF THE SCOPE AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
AN EXECUTIVE ACTION PREMATURE; CASE AT BAR. — Section 4
of AO No. 372 does not present a case ripe for adjudication. The language
of Section 4 does not conclusively show that, on its face, the constitutional
provision on the automatic release of the IRA shares of the LGUs has been
violated. Section 4, as worded, expresses the idea that the withholding is
merely temporary which fact alone would not merit an outright conclusion
of its unconstitutionality, especially in light of the reasonable presumption
that administrative agencies act in conformity with the law and the
Constitution. Where the conduct has not yet occurred and the challenged
construction has not yet been adopted by the agency charged with
administering the administrative order, the determination of the scope and
constitutionality of the executive action in advance of its immediate adverse
effect involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of
judicial function. Petitioners have not shown that the alleged 5% IRA share
of LGUs that was temporarily withheld has not yet been released, or that the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) has refused and continues
to refuse its release. In view thereof, the Court should not decide as this case
suggests an abstract proposition on constitutional issues.
2. ID., EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT; PRESIDENT; AS CHIEF
FISCAL OFFICER; POWERS AND FUNCTIONS CONSTRUED. — The
President is the chief fiscal officer of the country. He is ultimately
responsible for the collection and distribution of public money: SECTION
3. Power and Functions. — The Department of Budget and Management
shall assist the President in the preparation of a national resources and
expenditures budget, preparation, execution and control of the National
Budget, preparation and maintenance of accounting systems essential to the
budgetary process, achievement of more economy and efficiency in the
management of government operations, administration of compensation and
position classification systems, assessment of organizational effectiveness
and review and evaluation of legislative proposals having budgetary or
organizational implications. In a larger context, his role as chief fiscal
officer is directed towards "the nation's efforts at economic and social
upliftment for which more specific economic powers are delegated. Within
statutory limits the President can, thus, fix "tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development program of the government," as he
is also responsible for enlisting the country in international economic
agreements. More than this, to achieve "economy and efficiency in the
management of government operations," the President is empowered to
create appropriation reserves, suspend expenditure appropriations, and
institute cost reduction schemes. As chief fiscal officer of the country, the
President supervises fiscal development in the local government units and
ensures that laws are faithfully executed. For this reason, he can set aside
tax ordinances if he finds them contrary to the Local Government Code.
Ordinances cannot contravene statutes and public policy as declared by the
national government. The goal of local economy is not to "end the relation
of partnership and interdependence between the central administration and
local government units," but to make local governments "more responsive
and accountable" [to] "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of
national development and social progress." The interaction between the
national government and the local government units is mandatory at the
planning level. Local development plans must thus hew to "national policies
and standards" as these are integrated into the regional development plans
for submission to the National Economic Development Authority." Local
budget plans and goals must also be harmonized, as far as practicable, with
"national development goals and strategies in order to optimize the
utilization of resources and to avoid duplication in the use of fiscal and
physical resources." AHDTIE
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ISSUANCE OF SECTION 4,
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER (AO) No. 372 PROPER IN CONFORMITY
THEREOF; JUSTIFICATION. — Section 4 of AO No. 372 was issued in
the exercise by the President not only of his power of general supervision,
but also in conformity with his role as chief fiscal officer of the country in
the discharge of which he is clothed by law with certain powers to ensure
the observance of safeguards and auditing requirements, as well as the legal
prerequisites in the release and use of IRAs, taking into account the
constitutional and statutory mandates. However, the phrase "automatic
release" of the LGUs' shares does not mean that the release of the funds is
mechanical, spontaneous, self-operating or reflex. IRAs must first be
determined, and the money for their payment collected. In this regards,
administrative documentations are also undertaken to ascertain their
availability, limits and extent. The phrase, thus, should be used in the
context of the whole budgetary process and in relation to pertinent laws
relating to audit and accounting requirements. In the workings of the budget
for the fiscal year, appropriations for expenditures are supported by existing
funds in the national coffers and by proposals for revenue raising. The
money, therefore, available for IRA release may not be existing but merely
inchoate, or a mere expectation. It is not infrequent that the Executive
Department's proposal for raising revenue in the form of proposed
legislation may not be passed by the legislature. As such, the release of IRA
should not mean release of absolute amounts based merely on mathematical
computations. There must be a prior determination of what exact amount the
local government units are actually entitled in light of the economic factors
which affect the fiscal situation in the country. Foremost of these is where,
due to an unmanageable public sector deficit, the President may make the
necessary adjustments in the IRA of LGUs. Thus, as expressly provided in
Article 284 of the Local Government Code: . . . (I)n the event that the
national government incurs an unmanageable public sector deficit, the
President of the Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the recommendation
of Secretary of Finance, Secretary of Interior and Local Government and
Secretary of Budget and Management, and subject to consultation with the
presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and the presidents of the
"liga" to make the necessary adjustments in the internal revenue allotment
of local government units but in no case shall the allotment be less than
thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of
the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year . . . . Under the
aforecited provision, if facts reveal that the economy has sustained or will
likely sustain such "unmanageable public sector deficit." Then the LGUs
cannot assert absolute right of entitlement to the full amount of forty percent
(40%) share in the IRA, because the President is authorized to make an
adjustment and to reduce the amount to not less than thirty percent (30%). It
is, therefore, impractical to immediately release the full amount of the IRAs
and subsequently require the local government units to return at most ten
percent (10%) once the President has ascertained that there exists an
unmanageable public sector deficit. EcSCHD
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER TO MAKE NECESSARY
ADJUSTMENTS IN THE INTERNAL REVENUE ALLOTMENT (IRA)
IN CASE OF AN UNMANAGEABLE PUBLIC SECTOR DEFICIT
IMPLIEDLY INCLUDES DISCRETION FOR TEMPORARILY
WITHHOLDING SUCH IRA; RATIONALE. — By necessary implication,
the power to make necessary adjustments (including reduction) in the IRA
in case of an unmanageable public sector deficit, includes the discretion to
withhold the IRAs temporarily until such time that the determination of the
actual fiscal situation is made. The test in determining whether one power is
necessarily included in a stated authority is: "The exercise of a more
absolute power necessarily includes the lesser power especially where it is
needed to make the first power effective." If the discretion to suspend
temporarily the release of the IRA pending such examination is withheld
from the President, his authority to make the necessary IRA adjustments
brought about by the unmanageable public sector deficit would be
emasculated in the midst of serious economic crisis. In the situation
conjured by the majority opinion, the money would already have been gone
even before it is determined that fiscal crisis is indeed happening. The
majority opinion overstates the requirement in Section 286 of the Local
Government Code that the IRAs "shall not be subject to any lien or
holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever
purpose" as proof that no withholding of the release of the IRAs is allowed
albeit temporary in nature.