Article 2 of the 1987 Constitution

Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.

Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

Oposa vs Factoran

Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law: Intergenerational Responsibility

GR No. 101083; July 30 1993

FACTS:

A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation and
generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of
DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and
other persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They alleged that
they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to
protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the
defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a
misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of
the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of the government.

ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the misappropriation or
impairment of Philippine rainforests?”

HELD:

Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come. The
Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the succeeding
generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably include, inter
alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the future
generations.

Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony
for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion of
their right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obligation to
ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

G.R. No. 79538

Felipe Ysmael, etc vs. Deputy Executive Secretary, etc

October 18, 1990

Petitioner sought the reconsideration of a memorandum order issued by the Bureau of Forest
Development which cancelled its timber license agreement in 1983, as well as the revocation of TLA No.
356 subsequently issued by the Bureau to private respondents in 1984 by sending letters to the Office of
the President and the MNR [now the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
Petitioner’s prayers were to no avail. Hence the petition in the Court, imputing grave abuse of discretion
to public respondents.

RULING:

The Court stressed the authority of administrative bodies to handle matters within there scope without
need of interference by the courts of law. These administrative bodies are deemed to be in better
positions to determine issues within their specialty and resolve the same. The Court cited the doctrine of
res judicata which avers that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies have upon their finality,
the force and binding effect of a final judgment. The rule of res judicata thus forbids the reopening of a
matter once determined by competent authority acting within their exclusive jurisdiction
The Court also held that the assailed orders by public respondent was in line with the latter’s duty to
develop and conserve the country’s natural resources in view of the constitutional mandate of the right
of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. It is
their duty to regulate the issuance of licenses (TLA) as they see fit, which the court cannot interfere with.
The Court further held that sans grave abuse of discretion which may be imputed to public respondents,
the court ruled that petitioner cannot seek affirmative relief.

Henares v LTFRB (Environmental Law)

Henares v LTFRB

GR No. 158290

October 23, 2006

FACTS:

Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding respondents Land
Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as
alternative fuel.

ISSUES:

(1) Do petitioners have legal personality to bring this petition before us?

(2) Should mandamus issue against respondents to compel PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel?

APPLICABLE LAWS:

• Section 16,12 Article II of the 1987 Constitution

The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

• Section 414 of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the "Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999." SEC.
4. Recognition of Rights. – Pursuant to the above-declared principles, the following rights of citizens are
hereby sought to be recognized and the State shall seek to guarantee their enjoyment:

a) The right to breathe clean air;

b) The right to utilize and enjoy all natural resources according to the principle of sustainable
development;

c) The right to participate in the formulation, planning, implementation and monitoring of environmental
policies and programs and in the decision-making process;

d) The right to participate in the decision-making process concerning development policies, plans and
programs, projects or activities that may have adverse impact on the environment and public health;
e) The right to be informed of the nature and extent of the potential hazard of any activity, undertaking
or project and to be served timely notice of any significant rise in the level of pollution and the accidental
or deliberate release into the atmosphere of harmful or hazardous substances;

f) The right of access to public records which a citizen may need to exercise his or her rights effectively
under this Act;

g) The right to bring action in court or quasi-judicial bodies to enjoin all activities in violation of
environmental laws and regulations, to compel the rehabilitation and cleanup of affected area, and to
seek the imposition of penal sanctions against violators of environmental laws; and

h) The right to bring action in court for compensation of personal damages resulting from the adverse
environmental and public health impact of a project or activity.

RULING:

(1) YES. There is no dispute that petitioners have standing to bring their case before this Court. Moreover,
as held previously, a party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which may, in the
exercise of the Court's discretion, be set aside in view of the importance of the issue raised. We brush
aside this issue of technicality under the principle of the transcendental importance to the public,
especially so if these cases demand that they be settled promptly.

(2) NO. plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by petitioners, i.e., a writ of mandamus
commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is available only to
compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the
respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. Mandamus will not
generally lie from one branch of government to a coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that neither
is inferior to the other.

It appears that more properly, the legislature should provide first the specific statutory remedy to the
complex environmental problems bared by herein petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus
is taken.
G.R. No. 156052 March 7, 2007

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO, and BONIFACIO S. TUMBOKON V.
HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila

CORONA, J.

FACTS

On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027. Respondent
mayor approved the ordinance on November 28, 2001. It became effective on December 28, 2001, after
its publication.

Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted pursuant to the police power delegated to local government units, a
principle described as the power inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to
promote the order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of the society.

Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and directed
the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating
their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance.

Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil companies
Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.

However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a
memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in which they agreed that "the scaling
down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option." Under the MOU, the oil
companies agreed to undertake a program to scale down the Pandacan Terminals which shall include,
among others, the immediate removal/decommissioning process of TWENTY EIGHT (28) tanks starting
with the LPG spheres and the commencing of works for the creation of safety buffer and green zones
surrounding the Pandacan Terminals.

The City of Manila and the DOE, on the other hand, committed to enable the OIL COMPANIES to
continuously operate in compliance with legal requirements, within the limited area resulting from the
joint operations and the scale down program.

The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97. In the same resolution, the
Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002.
Thereafter, on January 30, 2003, the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 139 extending the validity of
Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue special business permits to the
oil companies. Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also called for a reassessment of the ordinance.

Petitioners filed this original action for mandamus on December 4, 2002 praying that Mayor Atienza be
compelled to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil
companies.

Respondent’s defense is that Ordinance No. 8027 has been superseded by the MOU and the resolutions.
However, he also confusingly argues that the ordinance and MOU are not inconsistent with each other
and that the latter has not amended the former. He insists that the ordinance remains valid and in full
force and effect and that the MOU did not in any way prevent him from enforcing and implementing it.
He maintains that the MOU should be considered as a mere guideline for its full implementation.

ISSUE: W/N respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the
removal of the Pandacan Terminals, under Section 455 (b) (2) of the Local Government Code (RA 7160)

HELD: YES

Respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., as mayor of the City of Manila, is directed to immediately enforce
Ordinance No. 8027.

Under Rule 65, Section 316 of the Rules of Court, a petition for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station. Mandamus is an extraordinary writ
that is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty that is already imposed
on the respondent and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. The petitioner should have a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the performance of the act
and it must be the clear and imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be done.

Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty, which is questionable
or over which a substantial doubt exists. The principal function of the writ of mandamus is to command
and to expedite, not to inquire and to adjudicate; thus, it is neither the office nor the aim of the writ to
secure a legal right but to implement that which is already established. Unless the right to the relief sought
is unclouded, mandamus will not issue.

To support the assertion that petitioners have a clear legal right to the enforcement of the ordinance,
petitioner SJS states that it is a political party registered with the Commission on Elections and has its
offices in Manila. It claims to have many members who are residents of Manila. The other petitioners,
Cabigao and Tumbokon, are allegedly residents of Manila.

We have ruled in previous cases that when a mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its object
is to compel a public duty, the people who are interested in the execution of the laws are regarded as the
real parties in interest and they need not show any specific interest. Besides, as residents of Manila,
petitioners have a direct interest in the enforcement of the city’s ordinances. Respondent never
questioned the right of petitioners to institute this proceeding.

On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to
"enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city." One of these is Ordinance No.
8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has
not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial
duty to do so.
MMDA v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay (Environmental Law)

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay

GR No. 171947-48

December 18, 2008

FACTS:

The complaint by the residents alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way
below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or
the Philippine Environment Code and that ALL defendants (public officials) must be jointly and/or
solidarily liable and collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B,
waters fit for swimming, diving, and other forms of contact recreation.

ISSUES:

(1) WON Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water Quality and Clean-
up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited
only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents;

(2) WON petitioners be compel led by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay.

APPLICABLE LAWS:

PD 1152 Philippine Environmental Code Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.––

Where the quality of water has deteriorated t o a degree where it s state
will adversely affect its best u sage, the government agencies concerned shall
take such measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such water to meet the
prescribed water quality standards. Section 20. Clean-up Operations.––It shall be the
responsibility of the polluter to contain , remove and clean -
up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the
government agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up operations and
expenses incurred in said operation shall be charged against the persons and/ or entities responsible
for such pollution.

HELD:

(1) Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies
concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning
operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary,
Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as
water quality “has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best
usage.” Section 17 & 20 are of general application and are not for specific pollution incidents only. The
fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such magnitude and scope that it is well -nigh
impossible to draw the line between a specific and a general pollution incident.
(2) The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus. While the
implementation of the MMDA's mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the
enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law
exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may
be compelled by mandamus. Under what other judicial discipline describes as “continuing
mandamus ,” the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in
view of ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or
indifference.

NOTE: This continuing mandamus is no longer applicable, since this is institutionalized in the rules of
procedure for environmental cases.

20 days – Temporary restraining order

ARTICLE 12, 1987 CONSTITUTION

Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources
shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under
the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may
enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such
agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-
five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for
irrigation, water supply fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial
use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

The State shall protect the nation’s marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive
economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as
cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and
lagoons.

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or
financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and
other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State
shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision,
within thirty days from its execution.
 Miners Association of the Philippines v. Factoran, Case Digest

G.R. No. 98332 January 16, 1995

Facts :

Former President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order Nos 211 and 279 in the exercise of her
legislative powers. EO No. 211 prescribes the interim procedures in the processing and approval of
applications for the exploration, development and utilization of minerals pursuant to Section 2, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution. EO No. 279 authorizes the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint-
venture, co-production, or production- sharing agreements for the exploration, development, and
utilization of mineral resources.

The issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR of Administrative Order Nos. 57 which
declares that all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the
1987 Constitution…shall be converted into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from the
effectivity of these guidelines.” and Administrative Order No. 82 which provides that a failure to submit
Letter of Intent and Mineral Production-Sharing Agreement within 2 years from the effectivity of the
Department Administrative Order No. 57 shall cause the abandonment of the mining, quarry, and sand
and gravel claims, after their respective effectivity dates compelled the Miners Association of the
Philippines, Inc., an organization composed of mining prospectors and claim owners and claim holders,
to file the instant petition assailing their validity and constitutionality before this Court.

Issue :
Are the two Department Administrative Orders valid?

Ruling :

Yes. Petitioner's insistence on the application of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, as the
governing law on the acceptance and approval of declarations of location and all other kinds of
applications for the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources pursuant to
Executive Order No. 211, is erroneous. Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pertains to the old
system of exploration, development and utilization of natural resources through "license, concession or
lease" which, however, has been disallowed by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. By virtue
of the said constitutional mandate and its implementing law, Executive Order No. 279 which superseded
Executive Order No. 211, the provisions dealing on "license, concession or lease" of mineral resources
under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining laws are deemed repealed
and, therefore, ceased to operate as the governing law. In other words, in all other areas of
administration and management of mineral lands, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as
amended, and other existing mining laws, still govern. Section 7 of Executive Order No. 279 provides,
thus:
Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other existing mining laws, and their
implementing rules and regulations, or parts thereof, which are not inconsistent with the provisions of
this Executive Order, shall continue in force and effect.
Well -settled is the rule, however, that regardless of the reservation clause, mining leases or agreements
granted by the State, such as those granted pursuant to Executive Order No. 211 referred to this
petition, are subject to alterations through a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State.
Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not be precluded by the
constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering, modifying and amending the
mining leases or agreements granted under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pursuant to
Executive Order No. 211. Police Power, being co-extensive with the necessities of the case and the
demands of public interest; extends to all the vital public needs. The passage of Executive Order No. 279
which superseded Executive Order No. 211 provided legal basis for the DENR Secretary to carry into
effect the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

PICOP RESOURCES, INC. vs. BASE METALS MINERAL RESOURCES CORPORATION

G.R. No. 163509 December 6, 2006

TINGA, J.:
FACTS: In 1987, the Central Mindanao Mining and Development Corporation entered into a
Mines Operating Agreement with Banahaw Mining and Development Corporation whereby the
latter agreed to act as Mine Operator for the exploration, development, and eventualcommercial
operation of CMMCI's 18 mining claims located in Agusan del Sur. Pursuant to theterms of the
Agreement, Banahaw Mining filed applications for Mining Lease Contracts over themining
claims with the Bureau of Mines. On April 29, 1988, Banahaw Mining was issued a
MinesTemporary Permit authorizing it to extract and dispose of precious minerals found within
its miningclaims. Since a portion of Banahaw Mining's mining claims was located in
petitioner PICOP'slogging concession in Agusan del Sur, Banahaw Mining and petitioner
PICOP entered into a MOAwhereby petitioner PICOP allowed Banahaw Mining an
access to its mining claims. In 1991,Banahaw Mining converted its mining claims
to applications for Mineral Production SharingAgreements (MPSA for brevity). While the
MPSA were pending, Banahaw Mining, on December 18, 1996, decided
tosell/assign its rights and interests over 37 mining claims in favor of private respondent Base
MetalsMineral Resources Corporation. The transfer included those covered by its
mining operatingagreement with CMMCI. Upon being informed of the development,
CMMCI, as claim owner,immediately approved the assignment made by Banahaw Mining in
favor of private respondentBase Metals, thereby recognizing private respondent Base
Metals as the new operator of itsclaims. On March 10, 1997, private respondent Base
Metals amended Banahaw Mining's pendingMPSA applications with the Bureau of
Mines to substitute itself as applicant and to submit additional documents in support
of the application. Area clearances from the DENR Regional Director and
Superintendent of the Agusan Marsh and Wildlife Sanctuary were submitted,
asrequired. On November 18, 1997, petitioner PICOP filed with the Mines Geo-
Sciences Bureau(MGB), an Opposition to private respondent Base Metals' application
because it violate the non-impairment clause and will be prejudicial to herein petitioner. The
Panel Arbitrator initially ruled for petitioner, but upon appeal to the Mines Adjudication Board,
judgment was in favor of respondent, CA affirmed stating that the Presidential Warranty of
September 25, 1968 issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos merely confirmed the timber
license granted to PICOP and warranted the latter's peaceful and adequate possession and
enjoyment of its concession areas. It was only given upon the request of the Board of
Investments to establish the boundaries of PICOP's timber license agreement. The
Presidential Warranty did not convert PICOP's timber license into a
Contract because it did not create any obligation on the part of the government in favor of
PICOP. Thus, the non-impairment clause finds no application.

ISSUE: W/N the concession area of petitioner is closed to mining activities .

RULING: Negative. Timber license agreement is not a contract, but a mere privilege. We should
state at this juncture that the policy of multiple land use is enshrined in our laws towards the end
that the country's natural resources may be rationally explored, developed, utilized and
conserved. In like manner, RA 7942, recognizing the equiponderance between mining and
timber rights, gives a mining contractor the right to enter a timber concession and cut timber
therein provided that the surface owner or concessionaire shall be properly compensated for
any damage done to the property as a consequence of mining operations. Firstly, assuming
that the area covered by Base Metals' MPSA is a government reservation, defined
as proclaimed reserved lands for specific purposes other than mineral reservations,
such does not necessarily preclude mining activities in the area. Sec. 15(b) of DAO96-40
provides that government reservations may be opened for mining applications upon prior written
clearance by the government agency having jurisdiction over such reservation. Sec. 6 of
RA7942 also provides that mining operations in reserved lands other than mineral reservations
maybe undertaken by the DENR, subject to certain limitations. Secondly, RA 7942 does not
disallow mining applications in all forest reserves but only those proclaimed as watershed forest
reserves. There is no evidence in this case that the area covered by Base
Metals' MPSA has been proclaimed as watershed forest reserves. DENR Memorandum
Order No. 03-98, which provides the guidelines in the issuance of area status and clearance or
consent for mining applications pursuant to RA 7942, provides that timber or forest
lands, military and other government reservations, forest reservations, forest reserves
other than critical watershed forest reserves, andexisting DENR Project Areas within timber
or forest lands, reservations and reserves, amongothers, are open to mining applications
subject to area status and clearance.Lastly, PICOP failed to present any evidence that the area
covered by the MPSA is a protected wilderness area designated as an initial component of the
NIPAS pursuant to a law,presidential decree, presidential proclamation or executive order as
required by RA 7586

DENR et al VS. YAP et al

NOVEMBER 11, 2010 ~ VBDIAZ
DENR et al VS. YAP et al
G.R. No. 167707
October 8, 2008
FACTS: On November 10, 1978, then President Marcos issued Proc. No. 1801declaring Boracay Island,
among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under
the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the
issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an application
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-
claimants Mayor . Yap, Jr., and others filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proc. No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised
doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or
through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their
lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them. Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation
No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the
Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial confirmation
of imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that
Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified
as “public forest,” which was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of the Revised Forestry
Code, as amended. The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants’ reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA
Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by Public Land
Act and Revised Forestry Code, as amended. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and
disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, declaring that, “PD 1810
and PTA Circular No. 3-82 Revised Forestry Code, as amended.
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. The Republic then appealed to the CA. On
In 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision. Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but
it was similarly denied. Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency the petition in the trial court, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island partly reserved forest land (protection purposes)
and partly agricultural land (alienable and disposable).
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Sacay,and other landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an
original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They allege that
the Proclamation infringed on their “prior vested rights” over portions of Boracay. They have been in
continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial.
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions
ISSUE: the main issue is whether private claimants have a right to secure titles over their occupied
portions in Boracay.

HELD: petitions DENIED. The CA decision is reversed.

Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain
prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain as public
forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as “a mass of lands of the public domain
which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for the determination of which lands
are needed for forest purpose and which are not.” Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including
those in Boracay Island, are ipso factoconsidered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles
already existing prior to its effectivity.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, such
classification modified by the 1973 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution
classification with one addition: national parks. Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated.Prior to
Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively
classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of
State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the
government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may
also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the
required number of years is alienable and disposable. The burden of proof in overcoming
such presumption is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that
the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or
certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006,
the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that
the land is alienable and disposable. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed.
They call for proof.
Proc. No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and
disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest,
or both, he would have identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No.
1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.
NOTES:
1. Private claimants’ reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. Ankron and De Aldecoa were
decided at a time when the President of the Philippines had no power to classify lands of the public
domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts were free to make corresponding
classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the
preponderance of the evidence. Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of Public
Land Act, gave the Executive Department, through the President, the exclusiveprerogative to classify or
reclassify public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest. Since then, courts no longer had the
authority, whether express or implied, to determine the classification of lands of the public domain.
2. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that particular case, having regard for its present or
future value for one or the other purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it is a matter
of public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands that the
courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are
agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular land
registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior value for
one purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each particular case
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitutionclassifying lands of the public
domain into “agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks,” do not necessarily refer to
large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes. The
discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestryis particularly instructive:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply
because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land
may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. “Forest
lands” do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove
trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest
land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of
what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as “forest” is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
There is a big difference between “forest” as defined in a dictionary and “forest or timber land” as a
classification of lands of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what
appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a classification for legal purposes. At any rate, the
Court is tasked to determine the legal status of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical
layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other
commercial establishments, it has not been automatically converted from public forest to alienable
agricultural land.
3. All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to apply for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does not denote their
automatic ouster from the residential, commercial, and other areas they possess now classified as
agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial investments on their occupied alienable
lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess.
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of improvements. They can
take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For another, they may look into other modes of
applying for original registration of title, such as by homestead or sales patent, subject to the conditions
imposed by law.
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire title to their occupied
lots or to exempt them from certain requirements under the present land laws. There is one such bill now
pending in the House of Representatives.

NATIONAL PARKS – Article 12, 1987 Constitution

Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and
national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the
uses to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural
lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except
by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years,
and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five
hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof, by purchase, homestead, or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to the
requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public
domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefor.
Section 4. The Congress shall, as soon as possible, determine, by law, the specific limits of forest lands and
national parks, marking clearly their boundaries on the ground. Thereafter, such forest lands and national
parks shall be conserved and may not be increased nor diminished, except by law. The Congress shall
provide for such period as it may determine, measures to prohibit logging in endangered forests and
watershed areas.
ARTICLE 13, 1987 CONSTITUTION
Section 7. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to
the preferential use of the communal marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall
provide support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and research, adequate financial,
production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The State shall also protect, develop, and
conserve such resources. The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen
against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their labor in the utilization of marine
and fishing resources.

LOCAL GOV’T SHARE – ARTICLE 10, 1987 CONSTI

Section 7. Local governments shall be entitled to an equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and
development of the national wealth within their respective areas, in the manner provided by law,
including sharing the same with the inhabitants by way of direct benefits.
ACCESS TO INFORMATION – SECTION 7, ARTICLE 3 OF THE 1987 CONSTI
PEOPLE’S PARTICIPATION – SEC 16, ARTICLE 3 OF THE 1987 CONSTI

IPRA ARTICLE 12 OF THE 1987 CONSTI

Section 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and
programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure
their economic, social, and cultural well-being.
The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in
determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain.

Carino vs Insular govt

On June 23, 1903, Mateo Cariño went to the Court of Land Registration (CLR) to petition his inscription as
the owner of a 146 hectare land he’s been possessing in the then municipality of Baguio. Mateo only
presented possessory information and no other documentation. The State opposed the petition averring
that the land is part of the US military reservation. The CLR ruled in favor of Mateo. The State appealed.
Mateo lost. Mateo averred that a grant should be given to him by reason of immemorial use and
occupation as in the previous cases Cansino vs Valdez and Tiglao vs Government; and that the right of the
State over said land has prescribed.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the land by virtue of his possession of it for some
time.
HELD: No. The statute of limitations did not run against the government. The government is still the
absolute owner of the land (regalian doctrine). Further, Mateo’s possession of the land has not been of
such a character as to require the presumption of a grant. No one has lived upon it for many years. It was
never used for anything but pasturage of animals, except insignificant portions thereof, and since the
insurrection against Spain it has apparently not been used by Cariño for any purpose.
While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a
sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper
administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did the State remained the absolute
owner.
Cruz vs Secretary of DENR
Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Constitutional Law; IPRA; Regalian Doctrine

GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000

FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known
as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The
petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural
resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution.
ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the
law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain.
Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights
granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives
them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale
utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale development and
exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They
are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that
existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by
the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to
alienate the same.
Separate Opinion of Justice Puno in Cruz v. Secretary of DENR

History of Philippine Land Laws

Facts:
In 1997, RA 8371 (Indigenous Peoples Rights Act/IPRA) was passed. Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a
petition for prohibition and mandamus, questioning the constitutionality of certain provisions of IPRA: a)
It allows the indigenous people/cultural community to OWN NATURAL RESOURCES ; b) It defines ancestral
lands and ancestral domains in such a way that it may include private lands owned by other individuals;
c) It categorizes ancestral lands and domains held by native title as never to have been public land; d) It
violates due process in allowing NCIP (National Commission on Indigenous Peoples) to take jurisdiction
over IP land disputes and making customary law apply to these. In the first deliberation of the SC, the
votes were 7‐7, so the case was re‐deliberated upon.

Issue:
Did the IPRA violate the Regalian Theory?
A. IPRA: Under the IPRA law, lands which have not been registered before, if granted with a
CADT/CALT, will be recognized as privately owned by the IPs from the beginning‐ thus, has never
been part of public domain.
B. Regalian Theory: Lands which has not been recognized as privately owned belongs to the State

Held:
No Final Decision. Petition dismissed due to lack of votes; Law remained valid and constitutional (7 to
grant ‐7 to dismiss).

Justice Puno’s Separate Opinion: The IPRA Law DID NOT VIOLATE the Regalian Theory
1. These lands claimed by the IPs have long been theirs BY VIRTUE OF NATIVE TITLE; they have lived
there even before the Spanish colonization. “Native title refers to ICCs/IPs’ pre‐conquest rights to lands
and domains held under a claim of private ownership as far back as memory reaches. These lands are
deemed never to have been public lands and are indisputable presumed to have been held that way since
before the Spanish Conquest.”

2. AND Native Title is an Exception to the Regalian Doctrine: ... Oh Cho vs Director of Lands: “This
exception would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his
predecessors‐in‐interest since time immemorial”

3. Native Titles provide a different Type of Private Ownership

“Sec. 5. Indigenous concept of ownership. ‐‐‐ Indigenous concept of ownership sustains the view that
ancestral domains and all resources found therein shall serve as the material bases of their cultural
integrity. The indigenous concept of ownership generally holds that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs
private but community property which belongs to all generations and therefore cannot be sold,
disposed or destroyed. It likewise covers sustainable traditional resource rights.”
4. It complies with Regalian Doctrine: Natural Sources within ancestral domains are not owned by the
IPs
* The IPs claims are limited to “lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs,
sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any
time within the domains;”
* IPRA did not mention that the IPs also own all the other natural resources found within the ancestral
domains

Discussion related to the topic of the Torrens System and Mode of Acquiring Ownership (land):
I. HISTORY ON THE MODE OF ACQUIRING LAND OWNERSHIP IN THE PHILIPPINES:
A. Laws of the Indies
“The Regalian Theory is a Western legal concept first introduced by the Spaniards into the country
through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas.”
 By virtue of Spain’s "discovery" and conquest of the Philippines, its lands became the exclusive
patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown
 Back then, the Spanish Government distributed the lands by issuing royal grants and
concessions to Spaniards, both military and civilian

B. Valenton‐vs‐Murciano Case (1904, American Regime)

 Long‐time occupation will not necessarily lead to ownership of the land
 "While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a
possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that
proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he
did that the State remained the absolute owner."

C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System

1903: 1st Public Land Act (Act No. 926)
3⁄4 Provides rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling, and leasing of portions of the
public domain of the
Philippine Islands

1919: 2nd Public Land Act (Act 2874)

3⁄4 more comprehensive but limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos, Americans and
citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges

1936: Present Public Land Law (Commonwealth Act No. 141)

3⁄4 Almost the same as Act 2874, except that it gave the Filipino citizens and corporations which were
previously only granted to Americans

**1903: Land Registration Law (Act 496)

3⁄4 It placed all public and private lands in the Philippines under the Torrens system
3⁄4 almost a verbatim copy of the Massachussetts Land Registration Act of 1898

II. TORRENS SYSTEM

Origin: Patterned after the Merchant Shipping Acts in South Australia by Sir Robert Torrens
Government’s Role:
The government must issue an official certificate of title attesting to the fact that the person named is
the owner of the property described therein, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted
or the law warrants or reserves
Certificate of Title: The certificate of title is indefeasible and imprescriptible and all claims to the parcel
of land are quieted upon issuance of said certificate.

III. REGALIAN DOCTRINE

 Despite of several legal developments on land distribution, the Regalian doctrine is still retained
in our Constitution.
 Under this concept, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural resources enumerated
therein, whether on public or private land, belong to the State.