In the 1930s, Russia (USSR) developed a rate significantly outstripping the rate of development of all

other countries of the world. This situation did not suit the focus of the world's evil – the United States
and certain international circles.
Germany began to prepare for war with Russia, i.e. with the Soviet Union. And again the leadership of
Germany was placed in a network that eventually ruined its people, acquiring world domination for the
U.S. Yes, that's right. The Germans in the Second World War won world domination, without realizing
it, not for himself but for U.S.
Since 1924 the German monopolists, with the active participation and assistance from the United States
and England, hoped to use Germany as a shock force against the Soviet Union, by beginning the
restoration of the military-industrial potential of Germany. The Versailles peace Treaty of 1919,
prohibiting Germany from having armed forces, was forgotten. After Germany lost the First World War
of 1914-1918, only the lazy did not throw stones at the Germans.
The Germans were laughed at, were humiliated, represented in the form of inferior beings. The
Germans said they couldn't do anything and only knew how to start and lose a war. To the Germans it
was a shame, but the First World War, which claimed 10 million lives, really untied and failed Germany,
and the Germans were silent, suffered, and conscious of their guilt. This continued for 15 years.
In 1933 the Nazi party (organized in 1919) came to power in Germany, led by Adolf Hitler
(Schicklgruber). Hitler said: "The Germans, you are a great nation, in you flows the blue blood." After
years of humiliations and insults the Germans they were called a great nation! The Germans promised
the whole world, and almost all of Germany followed Hitler. It was designed by the warmongers.
The Germans had already begun to dream about Russian and Ukrainian lands. These statements and
promises had brought the religious, mystical basis for substantiating the greatness of the German
nation, the introduction of special rituals and paraphernalia, such as swastikas. At this time, the United
States and England continued to hold investments in the German armaments industry, and we, the
USSR, despite the measures taken, found it impossibly difficult to compete with Germany in production
of weapons and number of soldiers and officers in the armed forces.
World War II was unleashed in 1939 for the U.S. achieve the following strategic objectives:
 The mutual destruction or significant weakening of the USSR and Germany.
 The subordination of Europe to the will of the United States.
The coming to power of the Nazis contributed to the creation of the state of Israel.
Without the active assistance of Germany from the United States and England, the Second World War
could not happen, since Germany was not in a condition to arm the army in the quantities needed for
most modern weapons. The United States and England had created all conditions for the beginning of
the war to destroy the USSR.
The U.S. had to eliminate two powers, allowing the strength and power of America to set a world
dictatorship and to live at the expense of other people's labour, other people's wealth. The elimination
of Germany and the Soviet Union opened the path to world power to the US.
Germany was preparing to seize the Soviet Union and destroy the Russian and other people living in its
territory. The Germans were dreaming about our land, about the great huge Germany and wanted our
death. Millions of Germans were ready to kill us all and take our lands and our property.
Liberal ideology, in which the supreme value is money (in socialist ideology it's the supreme value of
man), brought the Germans and some other nations of Europe to the point that gangsterism has become
the norm of their behaviour.

Germany, before the outbreak of the Second world war, was preceded by the following events: the war
in Spain, the occupation of Germany, Italy and Japan on the territory of other states, the establishment
of a military alliance against the USSR, the refusal of England and France on signing the mutual
assistance pact with the USSR, surrender of Czechoslovakia to Germany via the Munich agreement. In
1931, Spain had overthrown the monarchy and proclaimed a Republic. The Spanish Republic did not
last long. In 1936, the Spanish fascists led by Franco revolted, which was prepared and supported by
the fascist states of Italy and Germany.
England and France declared a policy of non-intervention that was actually comparable with joining the
side of the Nazis. In 1939, Spain installed the fascist dictatorship of General Franco. Volunteers from
all over the world fought in Spain against the fascists. But it was not much as they could not win. The
Soviet Union also sent volunteers to Spain who fought with the Nazis initially, and successfully beat
them in the air and on the ground. But when the Germans began to use the latest models of equipment,
volunteers became convinced that German military equipment, particularly aircraft, was superior to the
Soviet's.
Our fighter planes, "I-16" and "I-15", were the best in the world, but suddenly it became clear that they
belonged to a generation of obsolete weapons. Similar conclusions had been made about other types of
weapons, in particular tanks. The Soviet government took all measures to accelerate the development
and launch of a series of new generation weapons that were not inferior, and in some cases, were
superior to similar types of weapons from other countries.
Russia once again performed a miracle, and already in 1941, we had a new weapons for the troops, and,
most importantly, we were able to increase their production, as was the case for the entire war. From
late 1942, the production of weapons was far ahead of Germany with a United Europe. From other
events it should be noted that in 1935 Italian troops invaded Abyssinia (Ethiopia), and on March 7 1936,
Nazi battalions, without resistance occupied the Rhineland demilitarized zone.
In April 1939, Italy occupied Albania. In March 1938, the Anschluss took place (accession), but rather,
the seizure by Germany of Austria. On September 29-30, 1938 as a result of the Munich agreement,
Czechoslovakia was divided and the Sudetenland was ceded to Germany, and in March 1939, Germany
occupied the rest of Czechoslovakia.
Japan in 1931 seized Manchuria and by 1938 captured a large part of China's territory. Stalin, in his
report at the XVIII Congress of the party, said: "The war quietly crept onto the nations, and dragged
into its orbit over five hundred million people, extending its vast territory – from Tianjin, Shanghai and
Cato through Abyssinia to Gibraltar... the new imperialist war had become a fact".
A united military alliance was against the Soviet Union, featuring the most aggressive powers of the
world: Germany, Japan and Italy. In addition to these countries in the union with Germany was
Hungary, Romania and Finland. The Soviet government was concerned with the intention of the West
to provoke a military conflict between Germany with its allies and the Soviet Union, and the possible
involvement of England, France and the USA in the war against the Soviet Union.
The government of the USSR had sufficient grounds for concern. Negotiations with Western countries
that had not entered into an Alliance with Germany were conducted from the spring of 1939, but did
not bring any results. Britain and France did not want to conclude a mutual assistance Pact with the
Soviet Union. They did not want to conclude a mutual assistance Pact with Poland. By the way, Poland
was craving together with Germany to attack the USSR. Germany refused the services of Poland. There
is reason to believe that such actions are explained by its decision to liquidate Poland, to destroy the
poles, and to include their lands in the metropolis. Perhaps that is why Hitler took Poland as an ally
against the USSR.
Of course, the question of the unfulfilled will of the German alliance between Germany and Poland is of
interest, but to understand the history of the Second world war, we must look at a more important
global issue: why did Britain and France refuse, in May 1939, to sign the Treaty of mutual assistance
with the Soviet Union, and, thus, refuse, when it was not too late, to neutralize the aggressive ambitions
of Germany? They gave Germany Austria and Czechoslovakia, and given the fact that they refused to
sign the Treaty with the Soviet Union, these countries can be called direct participants in the outbreak
of the Second world war.
England and France had not signed the Treaty of mutual assistance with the USSR as they were
confident that the war will not come to them: England will sit on their island, and France is the "Maginot
line". England and France hoped for the mutual destruction or extreme weakening of Russia and
Germany and other European countries, leading to the strengthening of England and France.
Some members of the government and political leaders openly spoke about it, in particular, the Minister
of the aviation industry of England, Moore-Brabazon. Son Of W. Churchill, Randolph, talked about what
the ideal outcome of the war in the East would be: that when the last German was killed, the last Russian
was lying dead nearby. Apparently, the son inherited the dreams of his father – Winston Churchill.
It is obvious that England and France sought to strengthen Germany to use against the USSR. In
particular, the Munich agreement had not strengthened their security, unlike the USSR Treaty
concluded in the future with Germany, so this creates the conspiracy theory that they were
strengthening Germany for the attack on the Soviet Union.
The Munich agreement, because of England and France (of course, not without the blessing of the USA)
can be called a crime, not only against Czechoslovakia and the USSR, but also against humanity in
general. But they are silent about it, and everyone is talking about the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the
conclusion of which the government of the USSR for some time provided security to his people via
peaceful labor and mass production of new types of military equipment, such as T-34 and KV tanks.
How did Germany become stronger, gaining Austria and Czechoslovakia? Consider at least one -
Czechoslovakia. Only the plants of "Skoda" supplied the Germans during the Second world war so many
weapons that it allowed them to fight with 40 German divisions. In 1938-1939, these plants produced
"almost the same product as all the English military factories at the same time... for one of 1938," wrote
Winston Churchill.
British historian F. Rothstein wrote the following: "Perhaps, throughout the history of diplomacy
(including the political training of people from internal propaganda) there is not such an example of
aiding the aggressor (1935 to 1939) to attack a state (the USSR) that has long elected the ruling class of
Great Britain as a target". The actions of the US, Britain and France led to the outbreak of world war II.

In 1939 the USSR made every effort to merge with the leading countries of the West in order to stand
against the fascist threat. But this was to no avail. In the negotiations between the USSR with the
military delegations of France and England, on 21 August 1939, the country had confirmed the West's
unwillingness to reach an agreement with the USSR. Their unwillingness to complete the agreement
with us was declared beforehand when they arrived to negotiations 9 days late.
The Soviet Union offered Poland military aid. But Poland refused the help. On 18 August 1939 the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland, Józef Beck, and the ambassadors of England and France answered
the following: "We have no military agreement with the USSR. We don't want it." But the Soviet Union
wanted to conclude a military agreement with Poland, as it became clear that Germany would attack
Poland and German troops would reach the Soviet border in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus,
and would significantly reduce the time required to capture the vital centers of the Soviet Union.
What was the USSR doing in this situation, when neither England, nor France, nor Czechoslovakia
(under pressure from the first two countries), nor Poland wanted to enter into the USSR Treaty of
mutual assistance? What was done to the USSR when the West was preparing to attack Germany, and
from the East - Japan, and all Western countries "blessed" the aggressors? The leadership of our country
had found a way seemingly out of the stalemate, which was delivered to the USSR in the form of the
concluded non-aggression Treaty with Germany.
This agreement, or as it is called, "pact", had changed the attitude of the Western powers and Japan.
They began to reckon with the USSR.
Stalin was personally involved in negotiations with German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop
on 23 August 1939. On this day, the negotiations ended with the signature of the aforementioned
German Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov
(Scriabin) on the Soviet-German non-aggression Treaty. It was named on behalf of Ministers - the
"Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact".
Perhaps the Treaty was accompanied by a secret protocol defining the "sphere of influence" of the two
parties. Germany pledged not to interfere in the Affairs of Eastern Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania
and Bessarabia, that is, those territories which before the revolution were part of the Russian Empire
and after the revolution were in the Soviet state, and were captured by Polish military means in the
Young Soviet Republic in 1918-1920.
The USSR pledged not to intervene in the Affairs of Poland, Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia.
By the way, it is worth remembering that the Congress of Vienna, 1814-1815, produced the redistribution
of Poland: from which the greater part of the Warsaw Duchy created Kingdom (the Kingdom of) Poland,
which was transferred to the Russian Tsar. Other Polish lands were transferred to Prussia and Austria.
The Soviet government recognized the Polish people's right to self-determination and annulled all
treaties of the Tsarist government on the partitions of Poland. Poland "thanked" the Soviet government
in 1920 by attacking the Soviet state.
In a speech on 3rd July 1941, Stalin said: "What have we won, with Germany's signing of the non-
aggression Pact? We secured our country's peace for one and a half years and the opportunity to prepare
the fleeing of their forces...". Stalin was telling the truth. It was at this time were new models of weapons
were designed and launched into production.
It is impossible not to draw attention to the fact that during the period of compliance with the Treaty,
Germany gave us a certain amount of unique, important industrial equipment, which allowed us to
produce weapons in large quantities and high quality.
Deliveries were determined by a number of treaties. In particular, a few days before the conclusion of
the Treaty of non-aggression (August 19) was signed, there was the Soviet-German loan agreement, and
further agreements on the supply of equipment.
The question naturally arose: why did Germany allow us to recover their territory, provided cash loans,
delivered industrial equipment that could be used to produce weapons? These facts explain that
Germany had assessed the possibilities of an "inferior" race of Slavs and believed that all would return
in a few weeks, and the factories with German equipment, ultimately, will work in Germany.
"Let the Russians build them for Germans," said Berlin, playing a dangerous game. Most importantly,
Hitler believed that Germany, after signing the Treaty with the USSR, could quietly expand his holdings,
accumulating industrial and human capacity, which would allow the destruction of the Soviet Union
without any effort.
The Soviet-German Pact has been portrayed as an aggressive act by the USSR by those who hate Russia
and the people living in it. After all, this agreement contributed to the fact that we won and survived in
this terrible war with Europe. The agreement was concluded to improve the safety of the people living
on the territory of the USSR. We would be proud of this diplomatic and political solution, but many
residents echoed the slander towards Russia and were ready to repent for the fact that such a Treaty
was signed. And yet they did not realize that we had much to be proud of, and nothing to repent for.
Our nation and government at the time gave us millions of reasons to be proud of the Homeland and
the people. Take for instance the presence of a non-aggression Treaty with Germany, which our
government managed to make so that the Soviet Union would not be embroiled in a war in Europe and
Germany.

The website of the TV channel "Tvzvezda" has published a series of articles on the great Patriotic war
of 1941-1945 by writer Leonid Maslovsky, based on his book "Russkaya Pravda", published in 2011.
In his opinion articles, Maslovsky reveals "the myths of the imaginary foe, Russia, and the events of
the great Patriotic war, showing the greatness of our Victory." The author notes that in his articles he
is going to "show the US' unhelpful role in West Germany's preparations for war with the USSR".
On the 1st of September 1939, Germany invaded Poland. This day is considered the beginning of the
Second World War. Neither Britain nor France came to the aid of the Poles.
Poland at that time was a major nation with a strong, well-armed army, but failed to provide appreciable
resistance to the Wehrmacht, and in the early days was defeated by the German army. In mid-
September, German troops came to Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia.
The USSR could not prevent the further advance of the German armies. On the 17th of September 1939,
the Soviet government handed a note to the Polish Ambassador reading: "The Polish government has
disintegrated and shows no signs of life. This means that the Polish state and its government has ceased
to exist... rendering itself without leadership, Poland has become a convenient field for all contingencies
and surprises that may pose a threat to the USSR... in view of this situation the Soviet government has
ordered the general command of the Red Army to give the order to cross the border and take under its
protection the life and property of the population of Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia".
After handing the note to the Polish Ambassador on the same day, 17 September 1939, Soviet troops of
the Ukrainian forces (under the command of the commander of the 1st rank S. K. Timoshenko) and
Belarusian (under the command of the commander of the 2nd rank M. P. Kovalev) fronts entered the
East areas of Poland.
In the period from 9th to 17th September, the Polish government fled the country, and the emigre Polish
government was created in France, which later moved to England.
The population of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus greeted the Red army with flowers, erected
triumphal arches and hung red banners, tearing off the white strip from the Polish flag.
The need for the Soviet invasion of Poland was recognized in the West. At that time first Lord of the
Admiralty Winston Churchill, on October 1, in a radio interview said: "Russia is pursuing a cold policy
of self interests... Protecting Russia from the Nazi threat is clearly needed, as Russian armies stand on
the line. Anyway, this line exists and, consequently, has established the Eastern front, which Nazi
Germany does not dare to attack".
Churchill provoked Germany with the words "do not dare to attack". But Churchill's assessment offered
no condemnation of the actions of the Soviet Union against Poland. The same can be said about the
opinion of the governments of England and France.
The British government at the meeting on 18th September 1939, that is, the day after the Soviet invasion
of Poland, decided not to express protest at the actions of the Soviet Union, because England had
pledged to protect Poland from Germany.
Based on the decision of the government the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of England, all British
embassies and press officers sent a telegram which argued that England does not intended to declare
war on the Soviet Union now, and must remain in the best possible relations with the USSR. On
September 23th, the people's Commissar of Internal Affairs L. Beria reported to the people's Commissar
of Defense Voroshilov.
The chief of the General Staff of the Polish army, W. Stachiewicz pointed out: "The Soviet soldiers did
not shoot at our own, demonstrating their location in every way possible". Perhaps that is why Polish
troops are in the vast majority of cases, not resisting, surrendering to the red army.
Belarusian and Ukrainian population are not only friendly to the Soviet troops, but in September 1939
raised an anti-Polish uprising.
On the 21st of September, the Deputy Commissar of Defence, the Commander of the 1st rank G. I. Kulik
reported to Stalin: "The Polish officers... are afraid of the Ukrainian peasants and the population, which
intensified with the arrival of the red army, and they punish the Polish officers. So much so that in
Burshtyn, Polish officer groups who were sent to school were under little protection, and asked for
protection as POW's by fear of possible reprisals from the local population."
On the territory of Poland, Soviet and German troops did not behave like allies. By agreement, the
German and Soviet armies were not supposed to approach each other closer than 25 kilometers.
In Brest, the German and Soviet troops were not in contact with each other. First German troops went
out of town, and then the Soviets entered.
No documents, no pictures, or evidence of a joint parade of Soviet and German troops. Yes, there are
motion pictures in Brest of marching columns of German troops, but there are no pictures of the joint
movement of Soviet and German troops - a parade.
The release of German troops from Brest was like a parade, because the Germans did not want to give
up Brest, and under orders, they left the city with flags flying triumphantly as the winners. There was
no joint parade of the Red army and the Wehrmacht.
It should be noted that our actions in 1939 in Poland were no different from the actions of, for example,
England and the USA in similar, but not identical, situations to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union
intervened in Poland, sought to ensure the safety of their people and put the people of Western Ukraine
and Western Belorussia under their protection.
England occupied Egypt because of the Suez canal, ignoring the protests of the Egyptian government.
USA, in 1942, occupied Morocco without the consent of the Moroccan Sultan and the government of
Vichy. In 1941, the USSR and Britain sent troops to Iran. There are other examples of actions of the
United Kingdom and the United States that were similar to the Soviet Union.
But unlike the USSR, England and USA desire to preserve their profits derived from the exploitation of
other Nations – commercial benefits.
On the 28th of September, the Soviet Union signed a Treaty with Germany, establishing the border
between Germany and the USSR. Basically, the border ran along the Curzon line, which was determined
by a Commission of the Paris peace conference in 1919-1920.
The Poles didn't need Germany for any reason: neither as allies, nor as a colony. Germany wanted Polish
lands.
The Poles salvation is entirely beholden to the Soviet Union. But they have forgotten about it and speak
out against the Russian state as if they are fierce enemies.

The website of the TV channel "Tvzvezda" has published a series of articles on the great Patriotic war
of 1941-1945 by writer Leonid Maslovsky, based on his book "Russkaya Pravda", published in 2011.
In his opinion articles, Maslovsky reveals "the myths of the imaginary foe, Russia, and the events of
the great Patriotic war, showing the greatness of our Victory." The author notes that in his articles he
is going to "show the US' unhelpful role in West Germany's preparations for war with the USSR".
In November 1939, the security of the nation remained central to the government of the USSR. From
the point of view of safety, it was impossible to avoid passing near the Leningrad border of Finland
without hostilities. In the event of war with Germany the position of the border was threatened by the
rapid seizure by the Germans of Leningrad and the entire North-Western part of the USSR, which could
have led to incalculable victims and even to the military defeat of the Soviet Union.
The Border of Finland was located 32 kilometers from Leningrad. Visibly, the Emperor Alexander I
wasn't deeply implicated in state affairs. After the conquest of Finland he included Karelian Isthmus,
which belonged to Russia, in Finland to complete the Finish state.
The annexation to Russia in 1809, Finland, under the name the Grand Duchy of Finland, was not a
deprivation of sovereignty of the Finns, because the Finns in the XII–XIV centuries had been captured
by the Swedes.
Soviet Russia, after the revolution in 1917, gave the state of Finland independence. The latter also
"thanked" Russia, in 1919–1920, together with the countries of the Entente who participated in anti-
Soviet intervention, and in 1922, attacked Soviet Karelia.
Finnish troops had been defeated by the red army and expelled from our territory. Finland, in 1922
sought, and Poland in 1920, to seize part of the territory from a defensive war-exhausted Russia.
In 1939, as before, Finland had expressed hostility to the Soviet Union and showed no interest in
strengthening and in weakening Russia's security. Besides, Finland was sure that in the confrontation
with the USSR it would be supported by all Western countries, including Germany, England and France,
and therefore refused Moscow's request to move the border with Leningrad a few tens of kilometers
into the Karelian Isthmus.
In return, the USSR was offered twice as much territory in Soviet Karelia and even asked to rent a plot
of land for construction of a naval base at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland. Our favorable conditions
for Finland were not adopted. Moreover, the Finns behaved provocatively and provoked the outbreak
of hostilities.

The behavior of the leading European countries showed that Western countries were pushing the Finns
to war with the USSR. In his memoirs, K. A. Meretskov wrote: "On 26th November I received an
emergency message in which it was reported that near the village of Mainila the Finns have opened
artillery fire on Soviet border guards. Four people were killed, nine others were wounded.
Ordered to take control of the border along its entire length by forces of military district, I immediately
sent the dispatch to Moscow. From there came the order to prepare for a counterstrike. Training was
given weekly, but in practice had to be cut down to four days, as Finnish troops in some places crossed
the border, wedging into our territory and sending groups of saboteurs to the rear of the Soviets."
In connection with these events, on 28th November 1939, the Soviet government denounced the Soviet-
Finnish non-aggression Treaty and withdrew its diplomatic representatives from Finland.
On November 30th 1939, the troops of the Leningrad military district went on the offensive on the
Karelian Isthmus. Our troops ran into the "Mannerheim line". General Badu, who constructed these
fortifications, wrote: "Nowhere in the world are natural conditions so favorable for the construction of
the strengthened lines like in Karelia. At this narrowest point between the two watered areas – lake
Ladoga and the Gulf of Finland – there are dense forests and huge cliffs. Made of wood and granite, and
where necessary, concrete, built by the famous "Mannerheim line".
The great fortress "Mannerheim line" has added anti-tank obstacles made from granite. Even 25 tanks
are not able to overcome them. Amidst the granite, the Finns, with the use of explosions, set up machine
guns and battery emplacements that weren't threatened by the strongest bombs."
However there is an opinion that in fact the "Mannerheim line" was far from the best example of
European fortification. The hardships our troops had been associated with the lack of reliable
intelligence information about the nodes in the defense of the "Mannerheim line".
K. A. Meretskov wrote: "Before the action I requested exploration in Moscow, but again received
information that later was not confirmed, as it underestimated the real power of "Mannerheim line".
Unfortunately, this has created many difficulties. The red army had to literally stretch it to understand
what it is".
But still, the main reason for the slow progress of our troops was not this, but that the Red army had no
advantage over the Finnish army in number of troops, which, for success, required the advancing army
to hold a place of approach on the defending enemy in existing conditions.
The number of Finnish troops on the Karelian Isthmus was 130 thousand people, the Soviet – 169
thousand. There are stories about "human waves", storming bunkers, that are not true.
The Red army had a huge number of tanks with anti-bullet armour, but could not crush the Finnish
army, as the Finns had pillboxes and camouflaged bunkers that could only be destroyed by special
weapons, and they were absent in the advancing troops of the Leningrad military district.
With this ratio of forces and the absence of special large-caliber artillery, the Red army could not
successfully move forward in the forest against permanent fortifications. The secondary direction to
Karelian Isthmus, between lakes Ladoga and Onega, the number of Soviet troops failed to provide a
successful offensive.
The Soviet command ensured that before the Red army entered Finland, the long-term fortifications of
the "Mannerheim line" was impossibe to break up with the means the available forces possessed, so the
approach was stopped. We had to gear up the army to the level, which an advancing army should have
in the direction of the main attack, and with the appropriate weapons.
In February 1940, the strength of the Soviet troops amounted to 460 thousand compared to 150
thousand Finnish troops that met the requirements of military science. For the destruction of concrete
pillboxes, the army was equipped with 280-mm mortars "Br-5", 203-mm howitzer "B-4" that the Finns
called "Stalin's sledgehammer", and the necessary quantity of 152-mm artillery.
As a result of the measures taken "Mannerheim Line" in February 1940 had been successfully breached
in the short term.

K. A. Meretskov, at the April meeting of 1940, explained the reason for our unsuccessful attack in
December 1939 as follows: "How was our offensive on fortified regions? It's wrong to say that we were
trying to take them directly. The artillery's fire which was done was very powerful, it made the enemy
abandon the trenches, but nevertheless, the offensive was beaten back. Why? Because the most
important thing was not done: the protective concrete wasn't destroyed. The defenders still remained
in it and were cutting the road for infantry which was behind the take, by the fire of machine guns behind
the tanks. We witnessed the heroism of tanks, which broke through the fortified regions, but in any case
we were unable to diminish the distance between the tanks and infantry because of the protective
concrete".
By the way, the Finns on the 29th October 1941, attacked the Soviet Karelian fortified region, but
suffered huge losses, and could not break through to Leningrad from the North. Karelian fortified region
stood in the way of the Finns - an impenetrable fortress throughout the war.
In 1939, between the lakes of Ladoga and Onega, the Finns managed to encircle a portion of our troops
to the delight of all Europe. The environment had become possible through the fault of our
commanders, and because of the presence of other factors set out below. But even this mournful event
does not diminish our honor, because the Finns fought people who were hungry, cold, and cut into small
garrisons for two months.
For our troops to attack in the dense forests, and in the absence of the necessary number of troops for
the offensive who had sufficient experience, it has been extremely difficult. Our commanders didn't
know about the fortifications and the number of Finnish troops. And who would have thought that the
little Finland could put up such a large army? Honor, glory and eternal memory to our soldiers, who for
two months were kept in these extreme conditions, the defense, pulling a part of the Finnish troops
from the "Mannerheim line".
The war with Finland lasted 3 months and 12 days. Losses on the Soviet side amounted to 131,476
people, the loss of the Finnish army – 48,243 people. Our losses exceed the Finnish losses almost three
times, but we must remember that we stormed a concrete fortress and came among rocks, forests and
swamps in the most unfavourable terrain.
Breaking through the "Mannerheim line", the Soviet forces had the opportunity in a short period of time
to occupy the whole of Finland, because the Finnish army was totally destroyed, but we chose not to do
so, and as soon as Finland had asked for, we signed a peace Treaty.
So, on 12th March 1940, a peace Treaty was signed. The USSR gained the Karelian Isthmus, the North-
East shore of Lake Ladoga in the area of Kuolajarvi, part of the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas. The
Finns also agreed to lease the island of Hanko and adjacent Islands.
During the great Patriotic war the defenders of the Rybachy Peninsula deservedly became legendary
heroes of the Arctic, who wrote poetry and composed songs. They bravely defended our country, the
Straits, the allied convoys. It is unknown whether we could keep the Arctic, Murmansk without these
peninsulas. This confirms that in the war with Finland, our government sought only to ensure the safety
of the peoples of the USSR.
The mistakes made by our military in the Finnish war, were carefully considered, the negative and
positive actions of our army were analyzed. They especially created the Commission of the Main military
Council of red army on the generalization of the experience of the Finnish campaign.
Instead, Voroshilov was appointed at a post in the People's Commissar of Defense by S. K. Timoshenko.
Many stories have been written about the war with Finland. In particular, the fact that Soviet soldiers
fought with rifles, and the Finnish with submachine guns, i.e. guns. In fact, in the Finnish infantry
regiment, submachine guns accounted for 3% of the number of rifles. They were used mostly in special
battalions. In addition, the guns compensated for the disadvantages of the unreliable-in-battle Finnish
light machine guns, which had a capacity of only twenty rounds. Automatic weapons of the red army
were much better than the Finnish, and we had it in quantities greater than the Finns.
Of course, the West was arming the Finns. Britain, France, Sweden, Finland sent their only aircraft -
500 units. USA, Norway, Italy and other countries also sent arms to Finland . But the stories about the
Finnish military, being universally armed with machine guns, is completely untrue, and this,
unfortunately, is not the only example of distortion of truth about the war with Finland.
At the meeting of the officers of the red army on lessons learned fighting against Finland Stalin on April
17, 1940, it was stated: "Whether it was impossible to go to war? It seems to me that it was impossible...
the War was necessary because peace negotiations with Finland didn't yield results, and the safety of
Leningrad had to be guaranteed, of course, for its safety is the safety of our homeland...". At that
meeting, he proclaimed the slogan: "don't spare a minute to spare the people".
Stalin was deeply worried about the errors of the military, because our military actions in 1939 in
Finland, Germany showed that we are still students in the organization of modern warfare. But such a
conclusion was pushing Germany to war with us.
The war with Finland was a trial of strength of the West against Russia. After the encirclement and
defeat of the Finns by our 44th infantry division, Winston Churchill, in a radio interview on 20th
January 1940, stated that Finland "had opened to the world the weakness of the red army".
This statement was uttered with a view to accelerating the German attack on the Soviet Union and, of
course, as was shown by the later fighting of the red army, it was mostly untrue. All Western policy was
aimed at achieving one goal – to achieve a German attack on the USSR.

The website of the TV channel "Tvzvezda" has published a series of articles on the great Patriotic war
of 1941-1945 by writer Leonid Maslovsky, based on his book "Russkaya Pravda", published in 2011.
In his opinion articles, Maslovsky reveals "the myths of the imaginary foe, Russia, and the events of
the great Patriotic war, showing the greatness of our Victory." The author notes that in his articles he
is going to "show the US' unhelpful role in West Germany's preparations for war with the USSR".
Germany used simple but true methods of disinformation: Hitler had issued the order to attack, and
the scheduled date of occurrence of the attack was cancelled. On the offensive on the Western front,
Hitler issued an order 27 times, cancelling it 26 times.
Thus, he acted in relation to the USSR. Germany successfully spread misinformation. Goebbels wrote
in his diary on May 25, 1941: "As for Russia, we have managed to organize a grand flow of false messages.
Fake newspaper stories do not give foreign countries the opportunity to understand where truth starts
and falsehood ends. This is the atmosphere that we need".
On the 14th of June 1941, Goebbels wrote in his diary the following entry: "English radio already claims
that our campaign against Russia is a bluff". On the 15th of June he wrote: "Our game is fully successful".
Scouts from the USSR and England took German disinformation seriously and filled up Moscow on the
date of the German attack on the USSR. Days passed, weeks and even months from the named date,
and Germany did not attack the USSR. Our intelligence reports had gained a growing distrust.
And then on 14th June 1941, Soviet Newspapers published a TASS statement which refuted the rumors
about "the proximity of war between the USSR and Germany", – it refuted the assumption of territorial
and economic claims, allegedly made by Germany to the Soviet Union, and allegations about the
concentration of Soviet and German troops on the border.
As was reported by TASS, in particular, who stated that, "Germany also is closely following the
conditions of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, like the Soviet Union, which is why, according to
Soviet circles, the rumors about Germany's intentions to break the pact and take the attack on the Soviet
Union is deprived of any of soil.". Even before the publication in the press, on 13th June 1941, Molotov
handed Schulenburg the message from TASS.
The TASS announcement was thoughtful and a timely diplomatic move of the Soviet government, which
was made to ascertain from the Germans themselves their intentions, and in the event of a German
attack on the USSR, they would clearly be identified as the aggressor.
The TASS announcement meant Germany could declare only two answers – their peaceful intentions
or declaring war, or to remain silent. Silence in this case was tantamount to a declaration of intent in
the near future to start a war against the Soviet Union.
Hitler could do nothing to oppose the move of the Soviet government, and in Germany, the Soviet
message was not even mentioned. The Soviet government, headed by Stalin, made the world understand
that Germany would soon attack the Soviet Union.
And all the unfounded allegations that Stalin did not believe in the possibility of an attack on us by
Germany and did not take measures to repel aggression, are not worth a brass farthing.

Before an announcement by TASS, on May 10th, 1941, in Scotland, Rudolf Hess landed with a
parachute. He had been a reliable ally of Adolf Hitler, who, whilst in prison, wrote the book "Mein
Kampf", and then took one of the leading posts in Hitler's Germany. There is reason to believe that Hess,
representing Hitler's Germany, and Great Britain concluded an agreement based on mutual
concessions. As a result, Germany could start a war with the USSR without fear for their rear.
Despite all sufficient action taken by the USSR government to ensure a hundred years after the war no
one could accuse the Soviet Union of aggression, there are dozens of "historians" like Viktor Suvorov,
who write that the Soviet Union attacked or wanted to attack Germany.
He writes about it, despite the whole history of the Second world war suggesting that the aggressor was
Nazi Germany, who attacked not only the USSR, but also other countries too. The leadership of
Germany, Adolf Hitler personally, wrote dozens of times publicly stating the expansion of the living
space to the East, about the necessity of the seizure of land of inferior races and first of all – the vast
territories of the Soviet Union.
He writes about the aggressive plans of the USSR, knowing that from the very beginning of the
formation of the Nazi party and the coming to power of Hitler, Germany had turned their greedy gaze
to the East, i.e. the Soviet Union, and its purpose was world domination. This goal was announced to
the whole world, and today's prosecutors of Russia are not allowed to know this.
They deliberately lie and defame the most peaceful people on earth – Russian people. Even Hitler, in a
speech at the meeting of the headquarters on 9th January 1941 said: "Stalin, the ruler of Europe, is an
intelligent head, he will not openly oppose Germany." And on 5th May 1941, the German military
attaché in the USSR, Krebs, reported to Halder: "Russia will do everything to avoid war. Will go to any
concessions, including territorial".
Our greatest misfortune is the fact that the liberal West is funding individuals, deliberately distorting
our history, and the liberal media is promoting the works of forgers with all means available. This forger
is the aforementioned UK national Viktor Suvorov (real name - Rezun). His books litter the shelves of
Russian bookstores. His books educate a considerable part of the new generations. In my opinion, no
country in the West under any circumstances would allow anything like this.
Our intellectuals are convinced that as a result of the repressions of 1937–1938, the place of a mature
and experienced officer, took the young and unprepared, and this led to severe defeats in the beginning
of the war.
In reality, it is time to replace the dead: J.B. Gamarnik, V. M. Primakov, M. N. Tukhachevsky, I. F.
Fedko, I. E. Yakir, with G.F. Zhukov, Konev, Malinovsky, Rokossovsky, F. I. Tolbukhin, who went to the
original world war, joining it, except for officer Tolbukhin, as simple soldiers. Their rank was promoted
for excellence in fighting, military service and study.
Those who were replaced in the First world war did not participate and were appointed for partisan
services. M. N. Tukhachevsky in world war I participated for a few months. The training of troops in the
time of Uborevich and Yakir was poor with low qualification of commanders, which is supported by
documents describing the state of the red army, in particular, in 1936.
In the period from 1937 to 22nd June 1941, the number of troops in the Red army had increased 3.56
times – from 1.433 million people to 5.1 million people. The officer corps by January 1, 1941, reached
580 thousand people, and by 22 June – 680 thousand people. Almost all the officers of the red army
had a military education. Without military education before the war, the number of officers in the army
would have been less than 0.1%. These facts indicate that there was no decapitation of the army.
For three years, in the period from 1st January 1937 to 1st May 1940, the army dismissed 36,898 people
for various reasons, including those associated with illness, age limit, misconduct. It was not 40
thousand people, as is commonly believed.

According to Article 58 - 9,913 soldiers were convicted, with 1,364 people sentenced to capital
punishment.
Because of the cleanup of the officer corps, taking into account the laid-off and recovered, 13,685 people
were actually fired. In relation to the number of officers in the red army, on December 31, 1940 the
number discharged from the army for political reasons accounts for 2.36 per cent. Moreover, the 2.36%
(dismissed officers) were replaced by trained personnel.
From the above information it is obvious that the talk of "beheading the army" on the eve of the great
Patriotic war of 1941–1945 is not true.
You can say that our officer corps on 22nd June 1941 were not sufficiently prepared to wage a new,
modern war with the vastly superior forces of the enemy, but the reason for this unpreparedness is not
related to the purge of the army.
But we can agree that it is hardly possible to find officer corps capable of equalling and resisting an army
who seized weapons, conquered all European countries, including France, and had a number of allies,
twice the number of Red Army.

Soldiers of the Wehrmacht are in gray uniform with their sleeves rolled up, with the advantage of
walking on our land, and more often than not - sitting in a car or motorcycle with a "MP-40" gun. Soviet
soldiers are often portrayed wearing a soldier's overcoat, walking with a trilinear rifle with a bayonet.
The horses in the Wehrmacht seems to be just some native wild ones. These images do not correspond
to the reality of the time, but they dominate the minds of people. In fact, Wehrmacht soldiers went on
foot, armed with a rifle. Fully motorized division was only a small part of the German army.
In the German army, horses moved all the guns of the artillery regiment infantry division. Only in the
Wehrmacht in 1941 did they have in excess of one million horses, 88% of which were in infantry
divisions. The Red Army at that time was motorized to a greater extent. Infantry divisions of the Red
army artillery regiment had two artillery regiments, one for mechanical traction and the other for horse-
drawn. The regiment of the mechanical traction forces used "STZ-NATI", "S-65 stalinetz" and "T-20
Komsomolets" tractors, amongst freight cars and other equipment.
Our military jokingly called submachine guns a weapon for gangsters or "police" weapons. The Germans
also thought so and spoke clearly: "The gun is unsuitable for a fire fight at ranges exceeding 200 meters",
but in order to win the battle in 1941 it was necessary to hit the enemy, starting at 400 meters, so our
army was equipped with guns, machine guns in limited quantities as a melee weapon. The same thing
must be said about the German army.

The attitude towards the submachine gun had not changed in the German army in early 1943: at
Stalingrad, surrounded by the army, Paulus was captured by the troops of the don front, commanded
by Rokossovsky, with other weapons, including 156,987 rifles and just over 10,000 machine guns. In
the Soviet divisions, to meet the German invasion at the border, submachine guns were used quite a lot,
and self-loading rifles more than SMGs.
A great achievement of Soviet designers, V.G Fedorov, V.A Degtyarev, S.G Simonov and F.V Tokarev,
was the development of semi-automatic rifles. The production of self-loading rifles of Tokarev's and
Simonov's design was constant. Before the war, the Red Army received the world's best automatic
weapon, many times superior to the submachine guns, more than 1.5 million self-loading rifles.
It should be noted that our self-loading rifle "SVT" was more superior to similar small arms of the
Wehrmacht and did not yield to the self-loading rifles of the US. After the war, the self-loading rifle was
the most common small armament in NATO countries.

During the war we lacked funds for the production of self-loading rifles. The German mass production
of self-loading rifles was also "unaffordable". And only the US had the opportunity to produce self-
loading rifles in mass quantities.
The Red Army, instead of self-loading rifles, started to supply more submachine and machine guns. You
must take into account the fact that mass trench warfare had ended, and had generally decreased the
value of small arms of the infantryman in the Great War, and, already having the opportunity, the
industry of the USSR did not resume production of self-loading rifles. In my opinion, it was the right
decision, as it was more appropriate to use the money to produce guns, tanks and planes.
One of the recent cases of the massive use of self-loading rifles is the defense of Tula in autumn 1941.
"SVT" was produced at the Tula arms factory, including the automatic version, and was immediately
given to troops defending the city.
One of the German prisoners of war, captured near Tula, with widened eyes said: "We did not expect
that the Russians will be armed with machineguns".
A.V Isaev wrote: "The Tokarev self-loading rifle remained an almost forgotten legend. Only occasionally
glimpses on TV of the soldiers of the "Asian tigers" and the black soldiers of another "liberation front"
with shiny clean (self-loading rifle) "FN FAL" served as a reminder of what could happen if the war is
postponed".
Those who say that in the beginning of the war our army did not have a sufficient number of automatic
firearms are mistaken. The Red Army had more automatic weapons than the Germans, and with better
combat characteristics.

We produced not only excellent automatic small arms, but also wonderful carbines, sniper rifles, pistols
and the world's best rifle Mosin model 1891/1930. Some researchers called the lack of anti-tank guns in
the Red Army on 22.06.1941 almost a disaster. Such opinions appeared after the undeserved
glorification of guns in movies, with malicious intent to rob us of the truth about our wonderful artillery
– as was said in 1945 at the Victory Parade on Red Square in Moscow: "The best artillery in the world."
Before the attack on the USSR in 1941, the Germans were armed with anti-tank guns. Our army start to
get them after the outbreak of war in August 1941. This can be explained only by the fact that we had
surpassed Germany in the number of guns.
It was namely our guns, not the anti-tank guns that halted the German tanks at Moscow and Leningrad
in 1941. 76-mm guns and 85-mm anti-aircraft guns from the air defense of Moscow struck any German
tank at a distance of over 1000 meters.
Rokossovsky wrote: "To honor the higher officers, who headed the artillery of the Soviet Army, I must
say that our artillery, in quality, in terms of training of officers and all personnel was much higher than
the artillery of all armies of the capitalist countries. And it proved this throughout the great Patriotic
war. Starting with the first fights, the main means of combating enemy tanks, suppressing their weight
and mobility, were, above all, artillery. It covered herself in unfading glory in the battle of Moscow".
At the same time we should note that it's better for infantry to have a not as effective anti-tank gun in
comparison with a greater capacity one, than not to have one at all.

But war is war, and it is not always possible to anticipate where the tanks will break through the enemy,
and it is impossible for each direction to supply anti-tank artillery battery. But the possibility of anti-
tank guns, as well as the German Panzerfaust, are greatly exaggerated. Rifle vs tank – it's like a bayonet
against a tank in close combat. Anti-gun, of course, could destroy an armored personnel carrier and
even a tank, it is possible to use, for any purpose, even on airplanes, but it cannot be labelled as an
effective weapon against tanks. It is not an effective weapon against tanks as German bazookas,
produced by the Germans in the amount of 8 million pieces.
Hitler did not spare his soldiers, who had almost no chances of survival, joining the fight with bazookas
against the tanks, who had to fire the bazookas from 30 to 50 meters. Anti-tank guns can hit a tank at
ranges up to 500 meters. Even in street fighting against tanks, bazookas accounted for losses at the huge
amount of not more than 10% of the total losses, and in the field, such losses were insignificant.
But in 1941, our tanks were not threatened by bazookas, as the Germans first models came in 1943, and
they were massively used in 1945.
Regarding the so-called grenade launcher, A. V. Isaev wrote the following: "The words "rocket-propelled
grenade launcher" puts something into the imagination at lightning speed like "RPG-7": a pipe on the
shoulder of a soldier and a cumulative grenade. However, this design in the 1930's was simply not
possible. Developments were in a completely different area.
37-mm dynamo-reactive cannon were inferior in penetrating armor, and ordinary 45-mm guns did
not reliably defeat the main tanks of potential opponents. The role of repression in the history of
Dynamo-reactive cannon should not be exaggerated. Indeed, L.V Kurchevsky was arrested in 1937 and
released in 1939. But his guns were adopted and even produced in small series. The main reason for
rejecting them were their low technical performance, reliability and armour piercing ability".
Tukhachevsky and Kurchevskoy called for financing of the design and manufacture of Dynamo-reactive
cannons only. In making their proposals to the Soviet government, our army would be left without anti-
tank artillery. V.G Grabin wrote about how he worked to overcome the objection of Tukhachevsky and
submit for commission the legendary 76-mm gun, one of the best cannons of the great Patriotic war.
Some believe that the cause of our defeats in the first period of the war was a misunderstanding by the
Red Army in the essence of modern warfare, which was expressed in the composition of the cavalry
divisions. Those divisions were supposedly thrown on the tanks by our commanders, causing senseless
death of people and horses. This is simply not true.
The bottom line is that the cavalry did not fight with swords, and rifles, machine guns, grenades,
mortars, and often they advanced together with the tanks as a movable unit, but the battle was fought
nevertheless without swords and small arms. Battle horses, as a rule, were taken to a shelter, and
cavalrymen fought as infantry. Following regulations, an offensive with drawn swords was allowed
against not so well-armed enemies, and many cavalrymen went through the war having never
participated in an offensive with drawn swords. A flexible cavalry unit had the advantage over tanks,
cars, armored personnel carriers and motorcycles as the movement required no diesel fuel, no gasoline,
no roads.
Cavalry corps were the most stable compounds of the Red Army in 1941. Unlike mechanized corps, they
were able to survive endless deviations and environments in 1941. The cavalry successfully fought in
1945, having all kinds of weapons in its ranks, including hundreds of tanks. Despite being behind the
Wehrmacht in the number of vehicles, the Red Army to some degree had compensated with the cavalry.
Cavalry, as a movable unit, was necessary on the defence, for example, eliminating the breakthrough of
a front, counterattacks, quick withdrawal of the troops under threat, and on the offensive.
The Cavalry of the Red Army was the most beautiful branch of service. Look at our handsome cavalry
on our Bay with white markings on their faces, tall, strong and graceful horses of Budenny breed, and
your heart will be filled with joy from seeing the beauty and the pride brought before the eyes from the
Russian prowess and strength.
What about the Germans? Had they cavalry or not? They had it. Pure cavalry units existed in every
German division. In addition, in the Wehrmacht at the time of the attack on the USSR, there was one
cavalry division. During the war, the Germans gradually increased the number of cavalry units.
Many accuse the Red Army of constantly seeking to counterattack, instead of creating and maintaining
a deep defense. Authors who write this know nothing about military affairs. Defense, yes, even on a
front of several thousand kilometres (during the war the length of the front ranged from 2.2 to 6
thousand km with a depth of the territory covered by the fighting, up to 2.5 thousand kilometers or
more) can lead only to disastrous defeat.
"The defense strategy is like death, especially when the division accounts for less than 4-8 kilometer
strip along the front (the width of the area of defense) and a depth of 4 to 6 kilometers. It is hoped to
hold the defense on the strip on the front 8 to 12 kilometers per division. Whatever you do, the lower
density of troops will lead to a breakthrough", experts say.
The defending army is passively waiting for a blow. It is very difficult to predict where the enemy will
strike the main blow. And the blow is usually inflicted in the place where it was not expected. If the
direction of the main attack of the enemy is able to concentrate their forces 3-10 times superior to the
forces of the defending side and, of course, strike with superior force, no defense will remain standing.
Our military leaders, of course, understood this, but they didn't have the strength and sufficient means
to capture the strategic initiative, and they were forced to defend themselves with limited
counterattacks. All countries, from the more or less large European countries, including Poland, France,
England and even Finland had offensive military plans. The USSR also had offensive plans, including
in the event of war with Germany. But the word "offensive" in no case meant that the USSR planned to
attack, to commit aggression.
Plans were provided for the operation of the armed forces of the country in case of an enemy attack. We
were unable to implement this plan, but the Red Army at the first opportunity counterattacked. M.
Glants wrote the following about the Soviet counterattacks in 1941: "On the other hand, the continuous
and irrational, often useless Soviet offensive imperceptibly destroyed the fighting force of German
troops, causing the loss that led Hitler to change his strategy and, ultimately, created the conditions for
the defeat of the Wehrmacht outside Moscow. Those Soviet officers and soldiers who survived their
(offensive), a serious and costly baptism of fire, ultimately, used their quick learning to apply terrible
losses to their tormentors".
That is, Glants recognizes that our attacks were efficient, and brought us useful results.
Our military commanders are often professionally portrayed as being unprepared. Explain, in
particular, the fact that the higher command positions in the military were appointed to those who
distinguished themselves in battle in Spain, Khalkhin-Gol, in Finland, regardless of their lack of
experience and relevant abilities. The question naturally arises: "Why should we appoint to leadership
positions those who have done nothing to prove themselves, who have been trapped in the lower ranks
of the officers, not officers who risked their lives, distinguished themselves in battle as heroes?"
As history has shown, the USSR won the war because they had hundreds of thousands of intelligent
production managers and generals. It was a very correct assessment of human abilities. And in
Russia there were hundreds of thousands capable of great leadership, and creative work of the people.
This is confirmed by the whole history of the prewar, war and postwar time. The history of great
achievements and victories, and no country in the world has a hundredth of this. We, more than anyone
on earth, through work and combat, have earned the right to walk with our heads held high. But many
Russian citizens are ashamed of their history and are tied in a knot in front of the "enlightened" West.

Intelligence reports suggested an impending German attack on the USSR on 22.06.1941, but the Soviet
government considered it possible that Germany had deliberately leaked information about the attack
on the USSR on that date.
The purpose of these German actions could have been the desire to force us to conduct mobilization
activities, to gather the whole army near the border, and to give the Germans a pretext for declaring us
as the aggressor, and the ability to break the boundaries of our whole army. When the date given by our
intelligence of the German attack on the USSR came, and the attack did not happen, this gave every
reason not to trust the intelligence. The attack on 22nd June 1941 was transmitted by too many sources.
The Soviet government deemed a repeatition of the mistakes of the past unacceptable. On July 19th
(August 1) 1914, Germany declared war on Russia after Tsar Nicholas II declared a state of mobilization.
Of course, the First world war was unleashed with the goal of crushing Russia, but the reason for
declaring war, was to mobilize Russia.
Therefore, it is not excluded that Stalin, on the proposal of S.K Timoshenko and G.K Zhukov, about the
mobilization on June 14th 1941 said: "Your offer to mobilize the country, raise the troops and move
them to the Western borders? This is war! You both understand this or not?!".
The Soviet government left 60% of their troops in the second and third echelons, i.e, at a distance of
400 km from the border. This decision in general was aimed at saving the Red Army, as the Germans,
with the first blows, would use all their strength and experience to crush the enemy's defense, and even
with an equal ratio of forces we, most likely, wouldn't have been able to absorb this blow, and the army
would have lost.

Due to this decision we kept the army in major battles at Smolensk, Kiev, Leningrad and defeated
German troops near Moscow. It should be noted that even in the absence of evidence of mobilization
on the eve of war, in addition to the expanded recruitment of persons in reserve for training sessions,
a sufficient number of pseudo-historians accuse the USSR of an attack on Germany.
But their slander is unconvincing on the background of a huge number of facts indicating the contrary.
If we had declared full alert before Germany, for example on 21.06.1941, and the Germans – 22.06.1941,
even if it happened a few hours earlier than Germany, it would have given an excuse throughout Europe
to declare that we had attacked Germany.
The USSR would have been blamed for the outbreak of the Second world war. It's an important reason
why Stalin rejected the proposal to put all the troops of the border districts on full alert. And what
purpose would this announcement have served for our troops? Troops should always be in combat
readiness.
On the evening of 21.06.1941, Stalin ordered troops to be sent according to the Directive, which stated
that an attack may start with provocative actions of the Germans, and our troops, so as to not cause
complications (the prosecution of the USSR for the outbreak of war), we must not yield to any
provocations. Furthermore, the directive contained an order to Timoshenko and Zhukov to prepare for
a possible enemy attack on the night of the 21st on 22.06.1941.
Before Hess' mission and the posts of TASS, the concentration of German troops near our border did
not yet indicate that they were ready for an immediate attack on the USSR. Moreover, the troops were
there for several months and the Soviet Union did not attack them. The presence of German troops close
to our border could be explained by the desire of Germany to mislead England.
But after Hess' mission and the reaction of Germany to TASS, the Soviet leadership became increasingly
drawn to the fact that the troops were intending to attack the USSR. On 22.06.1941, the threat was
perceived as real, because Germany ended the war in the Balkans and was ready for a new war.
However there was no confidence in the attack on us the next day by Germany and its allies. There was
faint hope that Germany would first attack England. Today it is all clear, but then it was not as clear as
it seems. But the government of the Soviet Union correctly understood the situation and sent a directive
to the troops.
Our intelligence spent public money abroad, and the Soviet government never received the necessary
intelligence for decision making upon receiving information about the mission of Hess, nor the direction
nor the strength of the main attack of the German troops. But a defending side can remain standing
only if it knows in advance the direction and strength of the main attack of the enemy.
The date of the attack is secondary information compared to the information about the direction of the
main strikes of the enemy. The lack of intelligence necessary for the defense of our borders led to
inaction by the military because they didn't know which direction(s) the enemy would inflict major
blows, and thus the troops distributed relatively evenly along the border.
Doubts about the reliability of the provided intelligence regarding the date of the attack had compelled
us to act with extreme caution. And if we were accused in 1941 for the attack on Germany, it is unknown
how our relationships with future allies, Great Britain and the United States, would have evolved.

But, of course, concern about relationships with our future allies were not a major factor of
consideration when making decisions. Any sane person in the place of the Soviet leadership, up to the
final few minutes, would have been sceptical of the attack on 22.06.1941 by Germany.
First of all, Germany, to all countries that they attacked, filed a claim, exhibited a pre-condition. The
USSR was not issued with any claims, neither in oral or written form. Secondly, the Soviet leadership
was aware that German troops were not ready for war in winter conditions, as the German army had no
winter clothing, and by Soviet standards in such circumstances, the country could not have started a
war. Thirdly, the USSR suggested that Germany would first attack the weaker opponent – England, to
completely eliminate the threat of military force, not merely use the assurances of the Hess, and then
attack the USSR.
All these reasons are axioms, and introduced doubt in the probability of a German attack on 22.06.1941
on the Soviet Union. The USSR government did not allow us to be declared as aggressors, and despite
the doubts, they took measures to repel aggression, using the relevant available information. But the
information of intelligence, unfortunately, was not enough, and our military was not able to concentrate
troops on the main attack of Germany and its allies on the USSR. The government's actions before the
war led to the conclusion that they should be condemned.
The West glorifies its government and army, the losers of the war, and some maniacs try to highlight
the mistakes and miscalculations of the government and army of the winners, the country who defeated
the strongest opponent, the strongest army in the world. Our state's heads, like our military
commanders, had of course committed errors (those who do nothing never commit any mistakes), but
their errors didn't led to a fiasco as it did with the errors of German heads and military commanders.
Our leaders and our military leaders led the USSR to victory over the army of the United Europe, over
the advanced German industry, greater than France, Czechoslovakia and other European countries
combined.
The Red Army's number of available weapons in the army, in June 1941, was superior to the
Wehrmacht, despite the fact that Germany seized the arms of all its conquered countries of Europe,
including the arms of France, with its enormous number of tanks, guns and aircraft. On the number of
troops in the armed forces, Germany surpassed the USSR by 1.6 times, namely 8.5 million people in the
Wehrmacht and a little over 5 million people in the worker-peasant Red Army.
This balance of forces occurred despite the fact that, in preparation to repel aggression, the USSR only
in the period from 1937 to 22nd June 1941 increased the strength of the Red Army from 1,433 million
people to 5.1 million people. But when we speak about our defeats in 1941, the power that came upon
us during that terrible time is mentioned only in passing. After all, it wasn't just the power of Germany,
but the huge "country" of Europe. It far exceeded our strength and capabilities in peacetime.
It took infinite power of all the forces of the Soviet people for a period of 4 years to defeat the enemy
who attacked our country. Workers often slept in the shops, saving working time, and the soldiers and
officers of the Red Army, tens of thousands were killed in fierce continuous battles with the enemy.

So let's look at the question of enemy strength. 8.5 million German armed forces with 1.2 million person
civilian staff entered, which were hired from all countries of Europe, and possibly in non-European
countries. From the 8.5 million people, land forces amounted to about 5.2 million people. The 8.5
million number does not include the number of those in the armies of the European allies of Germany:
Italy, Hungary, Romania, Finland. And this is no small force, for example, the armed forces of the
Kingdom of Romania alone numbered from 700,000 to 1,100,000 people, and the Finnish defence
forces – 560,000-605,000.
If we assume that on average the army of these allies consisted of 625,000 people, and this is the
minimum possible number, we see that actually on 22.06.1941, Germany's allies had at least 11 million
trained, armed officers and soldiers, and Germany could very quickly compensate for the loss of their
army by strengthening their troops.
Our Red Army, totalling 5 million people in 1941, resisted the armies subordinate to Germany, with a
total number no less than 11 million people. Only when the number of German troops, which exceeded
the number of Soviet troops by 1.6 times, merged together with the forces of European allies, did it
exceeded the number of Soviet troops by at least 2.2 times.
This is such a monstrously huge force which the Red Army resisted. That's why Krebs told Halder:
"Russia will do everything to avoid war. Will go to any concessions, including territorial".
The fact is that the number of "new Germany" troops, i.e. United Europe, was more than 300 million
people, and by 1941, more than 1.5 times the population of the USSR, which at that time was 194.1
million people.

The question may arise: why did the USSR not bring the strength of their army up to 11 million people
before the war? You have to understand that these 11 million men had to withdraw from the national
economy at a time when industry and agriculture treasured each pair of workers, it was necessary to
arm and train the military, with clothes, shoes, and to ensure a normal power supply.
We had just risen to our feet after two devastating wars, Russia had no funds to pay the armed forces,
which was equal in numbers to the armed forces of the rich and huge number of states of United
Germany in Europe. Upon the outbreak of war the company switched to work with an extended working
day under martial law, some workers and specialists were called into the army, and women and children
replaced them at the machines of factories, usually performing work that did not require high
qualification. Skilled workers continued to work. The vast majority of peasants were not provided with
armor.
The 8.5 million people of the German army were armed with 5639 tanks and assault guns, more than
10 thousand combat aircraft, more than 61,000 guns and mortars. The Navy, in June 1941, consisted of
217 warships of main classes, including 161 submarine. On June 22nd 1941, 5.5 million soldiers and
officers of Hitler's Germany and his satellites crossed the Soviet border and invaded our land. Of the 5.5
million soldiers, no less than 800 thousand people were allies.
During the war the number of troops allied with German states increased. During the war the only
prisoners we had taken were 752,471 Romanian, Hungarian, Italian and Finnish troops. The 5.5-million
army in Europe attacked the USSR with about 4,300 tanks and assault guns, 47,200 guns and mortars,
4980 combat aircraft and more than 190 warships.
The number of Soviet Armed forces by June 1941 amounted to more than 5 million people (5,080, 977
people): in the ground forces and the air defense forces – more than 4.5 million people in the air force
– 476,000, in the Navy – 344,000 people. The Red Army consisted of more than 67 ,000 guns and
mortars, 1860 new tanks and more than 2700 (3719 PCs, according to G.K Zhukov) combat aircraft of
new types. In addition, the army had a large number of outdated armored vehicles and aircraft.
The Navy had 276 warships of main classes, including 212 submarines. The number of troops that
attacked us exceeded the number of all the armed forces of the USSR by about 500,000. But we must
bear in mind that in June 1941, the war with Germany did not involve armed forces in the far East in
case of an attack by Japan, in the Caucasus in case of an attack by Turkey, and other hazardous areas. I
believe that the deployment in these areas was not less than one million servicemen.
Thus, the number of troops of the Red Army who intended to attack Germany with its allies, on
22.06.1941, was no more than 4 million people, compared to 5.5 million troops of Germany and its
satellites. In addition, Germany since the first weeks of the war had redeployed a fresh division from
Europe to the Eastern front.
As can be seen from the above data, the Red Army, at the beginning of the war, compared to the forces
of Germany and her allies who attacked the USSR, had 19,800 more guns and mortars, more than 86
units of combat ships of the basic classes, but also a superior number of guns to the attacking enemy.
Combat characteristics of small arms, guns of all calibers and mortars were not only not inferior, but in
many cases were superior to the weapons of Germany.
As for the armored and air forces, our army had them in quantities far exceeding the number of the
pieces of equipment available to the enemy at the beginning of the war. But the bulk of our tanks and
planes, compared to Germany, were a weapon of the "old generation", obsolete. The tanks mostly just
had bulletproof armor, a considerable percentage of aircraft and tanks were faulty and had to be written
off.
However it should be noted that, before the war, the Red Army had 595 units of heavy tanks KB and
1225 units of medium tanks T-34 and 3719 new types of aircraft: YAK-1, LaGG-3, MiG-3, bombers Il-4
(DB-ZB), PE-8 (TB-7), PE-2, Il-2.
Basically we had designed and produced specific new, expensive and high-tech equipment in the period
from early 1939 until mid-1941, that is, for the most part during the action of the 1939 Treaty of non-
aggression "Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact". During the 19 peaceful pre-war years, the Soviet Union built
11,500 large industrial enterprises. With the outbreak of war most of these companies had started to
work for the front, for victory. Before the war most of the weapons were manufactured thanks to newly
built plants and factories: blast furnaces and open-hearth furnaces for smelting steel, production of
guns, planes, tanks, ships, submarines and other enterprises of the military-industrial complex.
The presence of a large number of weapons allowed us to survive and to win. Even with the huge losses
of weapons in the initial period of the war, we still had a sufficient number of weapons for the resistance
during the retreat and for the onset, near Moscow. Short-term shortages of artillery, small arms,
automatic weapons could be felt on some parts of the front, causing a lack of ammunition, delayed
emergence of artillery units in the right direction, and irregularities in the supply, delivery of weapons
and ammunition to the troops.
As a result of the bloody battles and the retreat of the army, aircraft and tanks, especially, were lost.
Many tanks were lost due to the lack of fuel. Very often tanks were left due to our troop's exit from the
encirclement. We lost planes in the fighting and on airfields. But I must say that in 1941, the German
army had no equipment, similar to our KB heavy tanks, armored attack aircraft Il-2 and rocket artillery
type BM-13 (Katyusha).
German troops on the 22nd of June 1941 began their attack on the USSR from three directions: Eastern ("Centre"
army group) in Moscow, South-East (South army group) in Kiev and North-East ( North army group) on
Leningrad. In addition, the German "Norway" army was advancing in the direction of Murmansk.
The German armies collectively attacked the USSR army from Italy, Romania, Hungary, Finland and volunteer
groups from Croatia, Slovakia, Spain, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and other countries of Western
Europe.
Having started to bomb our cities where children were sleeping peacefully, Germany immediately established
itself with the force of a criminal, not having a human face.
This started the bloodiest war in the history of the Russian state's existence. Our battle with Europe was deadly.
In the war against the USSR, Hitler said: "We are talking about a war of extermination."
Some researchers, sometimes in uncontrollable grief, speak and write about the incorrect planning of the German
attack on the Soviet Union, and claim that for Germany, in 1941, it was necessary by all means to attack in one
direction – to Moscow.
In my opinion, in this instance they would not have been able to defeat us and take Moscow, because the advent
of our fresh army group would beat the Germans in the flanks from the North and from the South, and the Germans
would have barely reached Moscow. And even if they survived, it would not have been possible to capture it, it
is likely that the fight with the Red Army would have left them surrounded.
Hitler and the General Staff of the German Army's plan to attack the USSR was given the name "Barbarossa" on
behalf of the German Emperor's horrendous atrocities.
On the 29th of June 1941, Hitler declared: "In four weeks we will be in Moscow, and it will be plowed under".
No German General spoke, in their forecasts, about the seizure of Moscow later than August. The deadline for the
capture of Moscow was all of August, and October for the territory of the USSR from the Urals along the
Arkhangelsk – Astrakhan line.
The U.S. military believed that the German war against the USSR would result in occupation within one to three
months, and the military of England – from three to six weeks. They expressed such forecasts knowing the force
of the attack that Germany unleashed on the USSR. The West privately evaluated how long we could stay at war
with Germany.
The German government was so sure of a quick victory that they did not even feel the need to spend money on
warm winter clothing for the army.

The confidence of the German leadership in a quick victory was well-founded, because after the invasion of the
Soviet Union with an army of 5.5 million, Germany, without counting their allies, still had four million soldiers
and officers not involved in the war on the Eastern front against the USSR.
Enemy troops were advancing from the Barents to the Black sea, the length of the front being over 2,000
kilometers. Germany relied on blitzkrieg, meaning lightning strike, of our armed forces and their destruction as a
result of a lightning strike.
The locations of 57% of Soviet troops in the second and third echelons initially contributed to the breakdown of
the calculation of the Germans in the blitzkrieg. And in combination with the resistance of our troops in the first
echelon of defense, it completely disrupted the German calculations for the blitzkrieg.
And speaking of blitzkrieg, the Germans in the summer of 1941 failed to destroy even our air force. Germany,
one month after the attack on the USSR, lost a third of their planes. Our Soviet pilots and anti-aircraft gunners
brought down these planes because we had planes and antiaircraft guns.
On the first day of the war on the 22nd of June 1941, the Germans, regardless of losses, spent the whole day
bombing (or trying to bomb) our airfields, organizing a series of successive blows. These attacks cannot be called
unexpected for our pilots.
The checkpoints were monitoring the air situation around the clock, and reported to the airfields any violation of
the airspace of the USSR.
Our pilots knew of the approaching enemy and fought with them, sparing their life. Luftwaffe pilots couldn't
obtain power in USSR airspace by bombing Soviet airfields as they didn't get full freedom of movement in the
airspace for the following battles.
The assertion that the alleged military warehouses of the USSR were located along the Western border, and
therefore in the first weeks of the war a significant number of the country's military equipment fell into the hands
of the enemy, is not true
In fact in the first echelon, i.e. up to 100 kilometers from the border, were 43% of our troops. These troops had to
be constantly supplied with weapons, ammunition, spare parts, fuel and lubricants, uniforms, food.
For this purpose warehouses were organised at the location of the troops. A small amount of military equipment
of the country was stored in these warehouses.
Warehouses of strategic importance were never placed near the border: almost all military stocks were always
kept in the rear, mainly in the Moscow and Volga military districts.
As we have seen above, the loss of weapons and ammunition in the warehouses at the Western border could not
have significantly impacted the maintenance of the army.
During all the battles that took place in the period from June to December 1941, the warehouses received more
than 30 million pieces of ammunition for artillery guns with the caliber of 45 millimeters to 203 millimeters,
including a mass of projectiles for guns with the caliber of 45 millimeters to 76 millimeters, including anti-aircraft
missiles – more than 22 million units.
The amount of projectiles of different calibers received by the troops in this period ranged from 28% to 35% of
the number of shells which were in warehouses on the 22nd of June 1941.
Defense depots were in much smaller sizes, but were replenished with ammo in the second part of 1941. The
presence of tens of millions of shells in warehouses in December 1941 could take place only under the delivery
of a huge number of shells to the warehouses before the war.
Half of the shells received in 1941 were expended in battle, and half were lost during transportation and through
retreating. That's why we can assert that our ancestors in 1941 fired on the German invaders of the Soviet union
and their allies, from 45 mm guns and tank cannons, nearly 3,888,000 shots, about 3,565,000 shots from 76-
millimeter guns, tank guns – 3,888,000 shots, and from anti-aircraft guns – 3,680,000 shots.
It doesn't sound at all like the actions of the unarmed, running away in panic . To fire so many shots, we needed
not only millions of shells, but tens of thousands of guns. And they were with the Red Army in 1941.
That's where the truth is revealed on the main reason why we survived. Our troops were retreating, but fought
bravely and survived thanks to a sufficient quantity of weapons and ammunition.
Individual German generals and historians have left us their testimonies about the courage of soldiers and officers
of the Red Army and the huge losses of German manpower and equipment in the first days of the great Patriotic
war.
The chief of the General staff of the land forces of Germany, Colonel General Franz Halder, in his diary on June
26nd 1941, wrote: "The "South" army group is slowly moving forward, unfortunately, they are carrying significant
losses. The enemy, acting against the "South" group of armies, says that the leadership is firm and energetic". On
June 27th he said: "On the front... events did not develop as planned at higher headquarters".
On the 11th July 1941, Halder wrote in his diary the following: "The Command of the enemy acts vigorously and
skilfully. The enemy is fighting fiercely and fanatically. Tank units suffered heavy losses in personnel and
equipment. The troops are tired". The 17th of July: "The Troops are extremely exhausted... Combat strength is
gradually declining...".
So who and by what means had reduced the "combat strength" and "material numbers"? They had stripped our
officers and soldiers of our Soviet weapons. German aircraft were destroyed by Soviet aircraft and antiaircraft
guns, and tanks were destroyed in most cases by the Soviet artillery.
Regarding the battles that took place on 22nd June – 3rd July 1941, the German General Kurt von Tippelskirch
wrote: "Before July 3rd, heavy fighting continued along the entire front. The Russians retreated to the East very
slowly and often only after leaping ahead of German tanks do they stage fierce counter-attacks".

Paul Carell, in his book "Hitler goes East", commends the bravery of the Soviet soldiers who fought in Belarus in
the end of June 1941: "The Russians fought fanatically, and they were led by resolute officers and Commissars
who had not succumbed to the panic that arose after the first set of defeats". Note: instead of the word "brave",
the word "fanatically" is used, and among other things, he said that there had been panic, and the intelligent
courage of our soldiers turned into irrational fanaticism not from the fighters, but commanders and Commissars.
Such evidence suggests that there are two truths: all know the truth about all of our defeats, and even in many
times on an exaggerated scale, and no one knows about the truth of our victories in the summer of 1941. The only
way of informing the population of the country is through Russian intelligentsia. All over the world, instead, they
primarily inform about their victories, and they try to remember defeats as little as possible, or not at all.
The German airforce suffered huge losses, starting from the first day of the war, when they stubbornly all day
tried to bomb our airfields. In these raids, the Germans lost a number of aircraft, comparable with the lost Soviet
aircraft. We lost on the first day of the war 800 aircraft on airfields.
But this loss could not significantly influence neither the rate of advance of the German armies, nor the state of
the Soviet air force at the beginning of the war, we had more than 20 thousand aircraft (only for the period from
01.01.1939 on 22.06.1941, Red army received 18 thousand combat aircraft and seven thousand tanks). But they
were mostly tanks with bulletproof armour, and the aircraft were already obsolete.
However it should be noted that the Red Army had, before the war, 595 units of heavy KV tanks, 1,225 units of
medium T-34 tanks and 3,719 new types of aircraft: YAK-1, LaGG-3, MiG-3, bomber Il-4 (DB-ZB), PE-8 (TB-
7), PE-2, Il-2.
Here's what the people's Commissar of the aviation industry of the USSR from 1940 to 1946, A.I Shakhurin,
wrote: "For the first 14 days of fighting, according to German sources, the Luftwaffe lost more planes than in any
subsequent similar periods of time. For the period from 22nd June to 5th July (1941) the German air force lost a
total of 807 aircraft of all types, and for the period from 6th to 19th July - 477 aircraft. A third of the German air
force, which they had before the attack on our country, had been destroyed."
Thus, in the first month of fighting in the period from 22.06.1941 to 19.07.1941, Germany lost 1,284 aircraft.
Amazingly, such glorious victories in the worst period of the war are today known by only a few people in all of
greater Russia.
So who and what kind of weapon destroyed the 1,284 aircraft of the Luftwaffe during the first month of the war?
Our pilots and gunners destroyed a specified number of aircraft in the first weeks of the war because they had the
necessary planes and anti-aircraft guns.
According to data published in 2005 by a team of authors from the Institute of World History, RAS, in the period
from 22.06.1941 to 10.11.1941, Germany in the war against the USSR lost 5,180 aircraft. The Soviet Union had
lost 10,000 planes. Given that our air force had mostly planes inferior in combat to the Luftwaffe, and the fact
that our army was retreating, not always having the opportunity to overtake aircraft at other airfields, the ratio of
losses confirms the lack of Luftwaffe absolute air superiority even in the first five months of the war.
Our losses of other types of equipment were also huge, as was the loss of the great Soviet people, soldiers and
officers of the Red Army. Commanders of the German troops were horrified at the German losses. The former
chief of staff of the German 4th Army, General G. Blumentritt said: "The first battles in June 1941, showed us
what the Red Army could do. Our losses had reached 50%... Our troops soon learned what it means to fight against
the Russians".
On 29.06.1941, F. Halder wrote in his diary: "The Russians everywhere fight to the last man... Only the occasional
surrender". Some of our researchers claim that the prisoners who had surrendered were basically only unarmed
engineers, whose number was more than 150,000 people.
The majority of cultivated liberal Russia historians make the westerners joyful by automatically including all
surrounded Soviet soldiers and officers in the number of POW.
Moreover, they quote the well-known and officially confirmed sources of information about the number of
personal staff of military units not only before fighting but also before the beginning of military actions.
They use for reference the quantity of surrounded soldiers from the inner quantity of fighters without paying
attention to losses during battlefield before their hostitlies.
Thus, willingly or unwillingly there is a very significant increase in the number of Soviet soldiers taken prisoner
by the adversary.
Unfortunately, after all the successful approaches of separate units of our troops that took place in June 1941, it
isn't acceptable to write or speak about it. But such evidence stands. For example, in the period from 23rd to 29th
June 1941, in tank battles at Dubno, Lutsk and Rivne, our armored tanks on the southwestern front smashed the
German armored forces North of Dubno, in particular the 16th Panzer division, moved up to 30–35 miles, entered
the city of Dubno and went to the rear of the 3rd Nazi motorized corps.
The Germans pulled troops from other areas and saved the cavalry from defeat, but forces in the encirclement of
our troops had already left. Thanks to this counterattack by our troops we orderly departed to Kiev.
From the above evidence it is clear that our forces were retreating, but fought bravely against the Nazi invaders.
The reason for the retreat of the Soviet troops was associated with superior forces that attacked us from United
Europe.
All the theoretical calculations said the USSR was supposed to lose that war. But we won it!
The army can provide an organized resistance to the enemy on a huge front only when there is solid command
and control state structures. Without the state government there will be no troops nor weapons, nor ammunition,
nor food. That is, without the leadership of the country, the five million army loses its combat capability.
The head of state, of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, at that terrible time was the Chairman of the Council
of People's Commissars (Council of Ministers), the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b),
in the future, and the Supreme Commander Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin. Many historians write that Stalin lost
in the first days of the war, and only confused and "courageous" people like N.S Khrushchev prevented the
abdication of Stalin from the government.
They like to refer to the memoirs of A.I Mikoyan. But those memories can't be taken seriously, since many
researchers believe that the memories of Mikoyan had their seals completely redone. Perhaps, after reading "his"
memoirs, Mikoyan, in indignation, would turn over in his grave. But the dead can't protest. The information stated
in memoirs doesn't correspond to the facts given and confirmed by other documents.
Archived records, written by Stalin in the period from 21st June to 3rd July 1941, state that each day, except 29th
and 30th June, Stalin received visitors in the Kremlin. The notebook indicates not only the date, time and number,
but also the names of the visitors received by Stalin.
On the 29th and 30th June, Stalin was working in the country: he considered the positions in the country, on the
fronts, especially on the Western front, surrendered Minsk, edited the "Directive of Sovnarkom and the Central
Committee of the CPSU(b)", prepared text of the upcoming speech to the nation on radio and other public
documents. It should be noted that all his speeches were prepared by Stalin himself.
What kind of confusion can be discussed, if only in the first day of the war – 22.06.1941 – Stalin received 29
people? Historian V.M Zhukhrai said that such bold, resolute men, crossed the Rubicon of death by hanging, can't
get lost. Stalin was not like his usual self, because, according to academician B. S Preobrazhensky, on 22.06.1941,
he was sick with a heavy form of quinsy with a temperature around 40 degrees. And only the terrible events of
war caused him, holding on to the wall, to get up from the sofa at the cottage in Volyn and go to the Kremlin. The
illness of Stalin, as well as the members of the great Patriotic war, was recorded by the doctor of historical
Sciences, B.G Soloviev and candidate of philosophical Sciences V.V Sukhodeyev.
Regarding the behavior of Stalin on 22.06.1941, Molotov told Chuev: "It would be inappropriate to say that he
lost courage, but it's true that he took it heavily and tried to not show it." According to the memoirs of the first
Secretary of the Communist party (Bolsheviks) of Byelorussia, P. K Ponomarenko, Stalin called him on June 22nd
at 7 am. Another witness of the events of those days was Chadaev, who recalled that Stalin came into the office
of Molotov after his speech on the radio.
There are many other memories of G.K Zhukov to the pilot M.V Vodopyanov, which tell of a conversation with
Stalin on 22.06.1941. A hero of the Soviet Union, pilot Vodopyanov on 22nd June 1941 flew a seaplane from the
North to Moscow. He splashed down on the Moscow River in Khimki – and immediately went to the Kremlin.
He was received by Stalin. (The Heroes of Soviet union and of Socialist labor were received by Stalin out of turn).
Vodopyanov proposed a bombing raid on Nazi Germany, to bomb Berlin. Setting off from the Islands of Saaremaa
(Ezel), and Hiiumaa (Dago), a Soviet aircraft bombed Berlin and the industrial centers of Germany.
At the meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU(b), which was attended by Stalin, the Commissar for defense, Marshal
S.K Timoshenko and chief of General staff army General G.K Zhukov, the decision was made to convert the
Baltic, Western and Kiev special districts into North-Western, Western and South-Western fronts. The General-
Colonel F.I Kuznetsov, General of the army D.G Pavlov and Colonel General M.P Kirponos became commanders,
respectively,
The main reason of refusal in Stalin's speeches on the first day of the war was the vagueness of the situation on
the fronts. But only he could write the words: "Our cause is just. The enemy will be defeated. The victory will be
ours". This is a purely Stalinist style, when proposals are not very beautiful, but every word is remembered for a
lifetime. And Molotov does not deny that he wrote the text of the speech together with Stalin.
On the 24th of June 1941, it was decided to establish the council for evacuation headed by L.M Kaganovich for
the evacuation of the population, institutions, military and other cargoes, industrial equipment and other valuables.
In three days the resolution on the procedure for removal and placement of human contingents and valuable
property was adopted, as well as the decision to export state reserves of precious metals from Moscow, precious
stones of the Diamond Fund of the USSR and the values of the Armoury chamber of the Kremlin.
And 29.06.1941, we adopted the previously mentioned "Directive of Sovnarkom and the Central Committee of
the CPSU(b) party and Soviet organizations of frontline areas". It was a well thought out document that
specifically defined the actions of the Soviet government and people during the war.
The given facts testify to the discrepancy in the validity of the statements about the disorganization of the troops,
the confusion of Stalin and other members of the government in the first days of the war.

On the 3rd of July 1941, Stalin addressed the nation by radio, beginning his speech with the following words:
"Comrades! Citizens! Brothers and sisters! Fighters of our army and Navy! I turn to you, my friends! The
treacherous military attack of Hitlerite Germany on our Fatherland begun on June 22nd, and continues."
Stalin did not hide his excitement, he was telling the truth, strengthening the faith in the coming victory. "Despite
the heroic resistance of the Red Army, despite the fact that the best divisions of the enemy, and the best part of
his aviation is already defeated and have found their grave on the battlefields, the enemy continues to push
forward, throwing new forces to the front.
Hitler's troops were able to capture Lithuania, a considerable part of Latvia, the Western part of Belarus and part
of Western Ukraine. Fascist aviation expanded parts of the actions of their bombers, bombing Murmansk, Orsha,
Mogilev, Smolensk, Kiev, Odessa and Sevastopol. Our Homeland is in serious danger.
How could it have happened that our glorious Red Army surrendered to a number of fascist troops in our cities
and neighborhoods? Are the German fascist troops really invincible forces, or tirelessly trumpeted by the boastful
fascist propagandists? Of course not! History shows that there are no invincible armies and never was... The same
should be said about the current Nazi army of Hitler.
This army had not yet met serious resistance on the continent of Europe. Only on our territory has it met serious
resistance. And if, as a result of this resistance, the best divisions of the German fascist army are broken by our
Red Army, it means that Hitler's fascist army can be defeated and will be defeated, defeated like the armies of
Napoleon and Wilhelm".

Next, Stalin analyzed the reason for the temporary success of Nazi Germany, the advisability of concluding a non-
aggression Pact in 1939, saying that Germany, having broken the Covenant, had exposed "itself in the eyes of the
world as a bloody aggressor... That's why all of our valiant army, our whole valiant Navy, all our pilots - the
falcons, all the people of our country, all the best people in Europe, America and Asia, finally, all the best in
Germany – condemns the treacherous acts of German fascists... and see that our cause is right, that the enemy will
be defeated, that we must win.
Due to the effect of the imposed war, our country has entered into deadly combat with our worst and cunning
enemy – German fascism... What is required in order to eliminate the danger hanging over our country, and what
measures need to be taken in order to defeat the enemy?
First of all it is necessary that our people, the Soviet people, understood all depths of danger which threaten our
country, and are released from complacency, from carelessness, from the moods of peaceful construction quite
clear in pre-war time, but are harmful now when war radically changed the situation."
Stalin explained the goals of the enemy, urged to stop being carefree, to mobilize themselves and reorganize all
their work on a new war footing, "Who knows no mercy to the enemy," to prevent whining, cowardice,
scaremongering and desertion.
"The people of the Soviet Union must rise to defend their rights, their land against the enemy. Red Army, Red
Navy and all citizens of the Soviet Union must defend every inch of Soviet soil, fight to the last drop of blood for
our towns and villages, to show courage, initiative and gumption inherent in our people", – said Stalin.
Furthermore, Stalin spoke of aid for the Red Army's wounded, the strengthening of the rear, aid to our fighter
battalions in their struggle with saboteurs, enemy parachutists, about the necessity to hijack the entire
working train tracks, not to leave the enemies valuable property, food, fuel, steal all the cattle, the creation of
guerrilla groups, on the nature of our wars as wars of "national Patriotism" and liberation, that "we will have loyal
allies", the transfer of all power for the completeness of the state, creating the State defense Committee, about the
need for all people to unite around the party and the government for the defeat of the enemy, to win.
At the end of the speech, Stalin addressed the people with slogans such as "All our forces – in support of our
heroic Red Army and our glorious Red fleet! All the power of the people – to defeat the enemy! Forward, to our
victory!".

People believed in their strength and power, in the victory. They believed in Stalin like he was their own father.
Researcher O.A Platonov writes: "In fact, in his address to the nation, Stalin outlined the nation-wide programme
to fight the enemy. Its simple and accessible language allowed us to convey many of the essential tasks of war to
the hearts and minds of many Russian people. The moral value of his performance was huge. The words "Our
cause is just, the enemy will be defeated" became the main slogan of the great Patriotic war. Firmness and
confidence in victory inspired the Russian people".
Remembering the impact of Stalin's speech on July 3, 1941 on the Soviet people, the poet and writer S.V
Mikhalkov wrote: "Today, whether we want to admit it or not, it was his speech, which started with the words
"Brothers and sisters!", in 1941, that aroused unprecedented enthusiasm among people of all ages. They went to
the recruiting stations to volunteer. They had faith in the word – great faith, if it was pronounced by a reputable
person. And the fact that Stalin was for millions an authoritative person, it can be denied only by stupidity or by
malice". But today they write about both the evil intentions of Stalin, and about the rout of our troops in the
summer of 1941.
The great Patriotic war flared up, absorbing the new territory of the USSR. On the 26th of September 1941, reports
informed the German high command about the victory at Kiev. It was said that they captured 665,000 people,
captured 3,718 guns and 884 tanks.
Earlier these Goebbels quotes were not highlighted, but with the beginning of Perestroika they started coming
through the historical works and even school books. Russian historians denied those reports, indicating that before
the Kiev operation in the South-Western front there were 677,085 persons. At the end of the operation, only in
the military formations which could avoid the encirclement and could retreat the battles to rear boundaries, totalled
150,541 persons.
When you consider that the troops of the southwestern front during the fierce fighting, which lasted almost all of
September, suffered heavy losses, a large number of troops escaped the encirclement, a large part of the enemy
broke through the ring, then the number the Germans could have taken prisoner near Kiev is no more than 50,000
people.
The troops of the southwestern and Bryansk fronts actually stopped the offensive of G. Guderian in Romny, but
the tank fire from the Kremenchug bridgehead from the secretly concentrated four German tank divisions meeting
Guderian had decided the outcome of the battle of the southwestern front at Kiev in favor of the German troops.
The Germans won the battle of Kiev by halting their offensive in the Moscow area and deploying Guderian's tank
divisions South of Kiev. Vasilevsky wrote about the Kiev defensive battle: "The enemy has achieved success at a
high price. The Red Army in the fierce battle defeated the ten divisions of the enemy personnel. They lost over
100,000 soldiers and officers. Losses for the enemy continued to grow. For more than a month the Soviet troops
had kept the "Center" army group in the Kiev area. It was very important for the preparation of the battle of
Moscow".
The Kiev defensive battle lasted from 7th July to 26th September 1941. Our troops near Kiev were killed. The
Wehrmacht had never seen such resistance in any of the wars unleashed by Germany. Hitler's favourite field
Marshal, von Bock, wrote: "Kiev is a brilliant success. But as the Russians stood unbroken in front of me, and
standing, I don't know whether they will be able to be broken".
After the fall of Kiev, it became harder to keep the defense of Odessa, which for 73 days fought 18 German and
Romanian divisions, but only on October 16th did our units leave the city in an orderly manner.
The Germans did not give rest to Crimea, from which our air force could destroy the Romanian oil fields.
Therefore, on 18th October, German troops began an offensive, and by the middle of November, occupied the
territory of Crimea, except for the city of Russian glory – Sevastopol. In 1941, Sevastopol proved to be too much
for the Germans. The Red Army and Black Sea fleet defended the city for 250 days, from 30th October 1941 to
4th July 1942.
The battle of Smolensk lasted from 10th July to 10th September 1941. It was one of the reasons for the change of
the plan of "Barbarossa". The battle of Smolensk, which covered up to 650 kilometers and a depth of 250
kilometers of the front, foiled Hitler's plan of a lightning war against the USSR.
The Soviet troops inflicted heavy losses on the "Center" army group. During the Second world war the German
troops were first forced onto the defensive on the main line. In addition, thanks to the Smolensk battle, the Nazi
command did not dare to throw a 3rd Panzer group to attack Leningrad. The battle of Smolensk, and the battle
near Kiev, allowed the Soviet command to gain time to prepare the defense of Moscow and the subsequent defeat
of the enemy in the battle of Moscow 1941–1942.
The Smolensk and Kiev battle proceeded at the same time, and they can be called a single operation, temporarily
halting the offensive of the fascist hordes on Moscow. The most distinguished military units in the battle of
Smolensk were awarded the title of Guards. These were the first Guard compounds in the Red Army.
In the Elninsky operation, which took place in the period of the battle of Smolensk, our troops who did not have
advantages in numbers but were superior to the enemy in number of artillery pieces, on 30th August 1941 went
on the offensive, breaking through the German defense, releasing the city of Yelnya, defeating one motorized and
seven infantry divisions of the Wehrmacht, eliminating Elninsky ledge that threatened the left wing of the Western
front, pushing the Germans behind the Desna river, freeing a large area of native land and capturing many
prisoners.
Like the battle of Smolensk, on 10th July the battle for Leningrad began. On this day, German troops began the
assault on Leningrad. We barely had enough forces to defend the city. Our troops failed to prevent the severing
of Leningrad from the land territory of the USSR, but also were not allowed to close the encirclement of the
German armies.
To stop the Germans on the outskirts of Volkhov river, Volkhov hydroelectric power station near Tikhvin, Stavka
allocated four divisions to help, of which 20,000 soldiers were immediately airlifted and the rest – from the Ladoga
naval flotilla. This fact specifies that our army had firm management on both the planes and ships of the military
flotilla on Lake Ladoga.
Our war was sacred. Blessed are the soldiers who died in the war, and holy are the winners who returned home
from the front, saints are the workers who forged arms in the rear. Europe has been at war with Russia for over 7
centuries, but are unable to defeat Russia in battle – "mysterious Russian souls" appear for Europe as something
more than they can chew. And all the European Nations were in Hitler's army, except Serbs and Greeks, and even
the British sat out on their Islands. And they killed our men, women, children.
Hitler and the German General staff theoretically calculated correctly: the German army would quickly break the
Soviet army at Leningrad and Kiev and join the armies advancing on Moscow. But he did not realize that before
him would not be Europe, but the heroic Russia. In this case the experience of the war in Europe was not beneficial,
but instead was detrimental for Germany.
The evacuation of people and enterprises at the rapid onset of Nazi troops and their allies is one of the feats
accomplished during the great Patriotic war. Without this feat of the Soviet people, I.V Stalin's government,
privates and officers of the NKVD troops and the leaders of the Soviet enterprises could not have claimed victory
in 1945.

On June 24th 1941, the Council for the evacuation was created. On July 3rd 1941, the President of the Council
for the evacuation (June 1942 – the Commission for the evacuation) was N.M Shvernik. The brunt of the
management of the evacuation of industrial enterprises fell on his Deputy A.N Kosygin.
From the beginning the organisational structure of the Council was carefully considered. Decisions were binding
on all party, Soviet and economic bodies. The evacuation was subject not only to people and businesses, but also
material goods, including food.
Until 3rd July 1941, decisions were already made about the evacuation to the rear from the front line for aviation
plants, Mariupol armor mill, and 26 plants of the people's Commissariat of arms of Leningrad and Central areas.
Even Belarus, where the onset of the enemy hordes had been particularly fast, managed to evacuate 109 large
enterprises
"Zaporizhstal" needed 8 thousand cars just for export. Not only the military was removed, but also equipment
necessary for life after the war, like units of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station. The property of collective and
state farms were evacuated: cars, tractors, harvesters, grain, cattle etc.
The cultural value of museums, libraries, palaces of culture, clubs, including museums of Moscow, Leningrad,
Novgorod, Pskov, Smolensk, Tula, Feodosia, were all exported east to the cities of Ukraine and Belarus. 18,430
exhibits from the Tretyakov gallery of Moscow, 300,000 exhibits from the Russian Museum in Leningrad, and
1,117,000 exhibits of the Hermitage were evacuated.
Recovering half of the wagon fleet of the railways of the country was the most stressful period of the evacuation.
In 6 months they transported about 1.5 million cars with such goods. People and goods were also transported by
sea and river. In the second half of 1941, as scheduled, 2,593 industrial enterprises, including 1,523 of large size
were moved to the East.
In 1942, a further 150 large enterprises were evacuated. According to incomplete data from the front line in
Eastern regions, 2.4 million cattle, 5.1 million sheep and goats, 0.2 million pigs, 0.8 million horses, a lot of
agricultural machinery, stocks of grain and other foodstuffs were moved.
The enterprise had not only to carry, but also to restore and run the operation. Many evacuated companies were
merged into the related existing companies in the Urals, Siberia, Volga region and Central Asia. But many
production areas were rebuilt. In July of 1941 a special construction and parts company was created, characterized
by mobility. Many enterprises were put into operation within 1.5–2 months of arrival at their new location. For
example, 3/4 of the aviation factories were restored by the end of 1941, and 9 by this time were already operating
at full capacity. Likewise, the factories of the tank industry were recovered.
The restoration of all arrivals in connection with the evacuation of factories was completed in mid-1942. Together
with the removal of material assets, the huge task of evacuating the population from the front line was carried out.
On 5th July 1941, the Council of People's Commissars (SNK) of the USSR (since 1946 the Council of Ministers)
adopted a special resolution "On the procedure for evacuating the population in time of war" and "regulations on
evacuation". In the autumn of 1941, in the Council for evacuation, a special Office for the evacuation of the
population, headed by the Deputy Chairman of the SNK of the RSFSR K.D Pamfilova, authorized all major areas
to host evacuees.
On the ground, the Executive committees of the Soviets created the relevant departments. First from the front line
were the trains with the children. Within one month 300,000 from Leningrad were shipped, and 500,000 children
from Moscow and the suburbs. The evacuation of children continued into the future. The evacuation of the adult
population was carried out. In difficult conditions, in the first days of the war 120,000 people from the Baltic
republics were evacuated, 300,000 from Moldova, more than 1 million from Belarus, 350,00 from Kiev and all
Ukraine with 3.5 million people, from Leningrad – 1.7 million, Moscow – 2 million people.
In the period from June 1941 to 1st February 1942, 10.4 million people were evacuated by rail to the rear regions
of the country, 2 million were transported by water. A total of 12.4 million people were transported during this
period. Another 8 million people were evacuated during the second wave of evacuation in the summer of 1942.
The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on September 13th 1941 adopted a resolution "On the
construction of living quarters for evacuees". The erected buildings were of a simplified type, and standard houses
were built. The bulk of evacuated people were satisfied with the housing due to the security of the local population.
Nobody remained without a roof over their head. The 12.4 million people evacuated in 1941, and 8 million people
evacuated in 1942, were provided with accommodation, food, and medical care.

In the conditions of conducting a largest-scale war, especially during the most difficult first period, the solution
to these issues was associated with giant difficulties, the resolution of which was under force only by the Soviet
state. World history had not known anything like it. Only the Soviet state and the restorative work in new places
evacuated more than 2,500 enterprises.
To accomplish such a feat, it was necessary to have an outstanding government and intelligent working people,
because such feats are accomplished only through the heroic work of millions of people living in the name of one
common goal – victory over the enemy. The Soviet Union during the war had such a government and such people.
Not only did home front workers and soldiers and officers of the army do everything possible to win, but also
soldiers and officers of the NKVD. They fought on the fronts of the great Patriotic war, putting their life on the
altar of Victory, obtained intelligence, opposed German military counterintelligence, provided order in cities
liberated by the Soviet troops that were swarming with German agents, fought in the rear with German agents,
saboteurs and reined in war criminals. As well as thousands of others, it was very important for the country's
security affairs.
In 1941 a completely different kind of people from regular folk appeared in military units of People Commissariat
of Internal Affairs. These people as all our heroes merit us to erect the monument for them. And the image of the
military structures of the NKVD, which exists today in our society, is largely untrue. The fact that we persevered
and, ultimately, defeated the German fascist hordes, was due to the huge contribution made by the soldiers and
officers of the NKVD troops.

In fact, the officers and privates of the troops of the NKVD soldiers defended the army from the tyranny of the
commanders. The commanders of the front, for example, Meretskov, had at their disposal several hundred
thousand armed men, who were obliged to obey their orders. But what if he became conceited, started to drink, to
walk, to make destructive decisions for subordinates? To prevent this, the supervisors of this magnitude needed
to be controlled. And how to control them? The control was carried out by employees of People's Commissariat
of Internal Affairs.
The importance of complaints received by NKVD wasn't the only thing in the exercise of control over the
commander's staff of army. It's not a secret that dozens or sometimes even hundreds of complaints were received
by NKVD, concerning the commander's of the front of the army, accusing their activities. The time came when it
was indispensable to check what was really going on with these commanders, to point out their deficiencies and
at the same time to explain to them that the power of commander of any level is limited by those of the state.
To do this, the commander was summoned to the NKVD and it was assessed whether they could continue to be
trusted, for example, Meretskov, to command the front. If no reason was given to distrust them, then the
commander returned to the front in the same position and rank. But if the commander was de-ranked, they were
reported to senior management, and there the question of admissibility of their further service in the army as a
commander of large military units would be decided. And if the NKVD established that the military commander
has committed a crime by his actions, he was put on trial. But, as we know from the history of the war, such cases
were very few. Military leaders responsible for large losses of subordinate soldiers in carrying out military
operations were prosecuted.
Only the presence of senior control of the soldiers guaranteed the neutralisation of tyranny from the commanders.
The slender, deep and thoroughly thought-out system of management and control was directed towards the
common cause of justice and victory. Much was done by the NKVD to identify refugees. Imagine the summer
and autumn of 1941. Hundreds of thousands of people went to the East. Here there were military units who were
exiting encirclement, stragglers, deserters, German's agents, refugees with children, goods, livestock and animals.
Most of these people had to find shelter, food, work and place of service. The West did not have borders as such,
as the front was constantly moving, but the detachments of border guards still stood at the front line, who were
called defensive squads. Every person heading East talked to the staff of special departments and defensive units.
They checked and saved many lives from starvation, sending them to the corresponding public authorities, finding
housing and jobs for refugees. They directed the formation of soldiers. They identified among the refugees,
deserters, enemy agents and saboteurs, thereby protecting our rear from fresh casualties and destruction. The
titanic work of employees of the NKVD was carried out conscientiously and selflessly.
The efficiency of particular departments is confirmed by the return of hundreds of thousands of troops in the Red
Army and refugees. For example, on 10th October 1941 the Deputy chief of Management of special departments,
S. Milshtein reported: "Special departments of the NKVD and defensive squads of the NKVD, for the protection
of the rear, detained 657,364 soldiers, stragglers from their units and those fleeing from the front.
These operational barriers special departments arrested 249,969 people, and defensive squads of the NKVD troops
for the protection of rear – 407,395 military personnel. From among the detainees of Special departments, 25,878
people were arrested, the rest of the 486,632 formed into squads and sent back to the front."
This number does not include the soldiers who had escaped from captivity or were released from the environment,
because on the day of reporting the NKVD did not record these categories of the military. It should be noted that
at the time there were no penal battalions, but even if they existed, then they would only be composed of
individuals from the 25,878 people arrested. And 632,486 persons had been directed to the formation of new or
the replenishment of the fighting divisions.
In December 1941 the decision was made on the compulsory inspection of soldiers who escaped from captivity
or out of the environment. They were sent to the applicable collection and transit points. These points were
established in each army. And that decision was reasonable. A traitor could lead to the deaths of hundreds,
thousands and even tens of thousands of Soviet people.
Thus, for a period of less than 4 months, the NKVD returned, not counting those released from the environment
or who had escaped from captivity, 632,486 people to the army. If those who left encirclement and escaped from
captivity are added, the number of soldiers who returned to the army, at the end of 1941, were not less than one
million people. Our historians think all of the counted were taken captive by Germans. There is reason to believe
that these soldiers were counted twice: as captured and as killed in combat.
It is obvious that the data about our losses during the war, requires careful, honest, qualified and objective
examination and counting. K.K Rokossovsky, in his book, asserts that in the hard time for our army of the
Summer-Autumn in 1941, the military formation was completed by the fighters and commanders who had
escaped, POWs and those who left encirclement.
From these facts it is obvious that hundreds of thousands of people, military and civilian, were saying thank you
to the officers and soldiers of the NKVD. It can also be seen that the number of Soviet prisoners of war and those
killed was much less than commonly believed. Without the activities of the NKVD victory in the war would have
cost us significantly heavier losses or even would not have been possible.
The people of the USSR did everything possible to win. During the war our Soviet people had given the state
money and jewellery, surrendered voluntarily and gratuitously, to fund the manufacture of weapons to the amount
of 16 billion rubles.
The beginning of the battle of Moscow
Nazi command had prepared a major offensive to seize Moscow under the code name "Typhoon". The day of
September 30th 1941 is considered to be the beginning day of the battle of Moscow. In the article about the battles
of Kiev, we considered the number of our prisoners to be a lie.
Similarly untrue is the data on the number of captured Soviet soldiers and officers at Vyazma we find when
reading the majority of sources that describe our losses at Vyazma early in the battle of Moscow.

It should be noted that the German army in late September 1941 was still very strong. Large losses in manpower
and equipment in the border battles at Minsk, Kiev, Smolensk and Leningrad, with thousands of towns and cities
and villages of the Soviet Union under the protection of our soldiers, were offset by the transfer of fresh troops
from Europe to the Germans.
During the war the Red Army carried out only 160 large battles, and small battles were in the tens of thousands.
But of all the battles only three battles are distinguished: Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk – not because they're the
largest battles of the great Patriotic war (there were bigger ones), but because these battles decided the fate of the
Motherland, the whole country. To save the USSR, we had to win these battles.
The battle of Moscow can be divided into two parts: defensive, from 30th September to 5th December 1941 and
offensive – from 5th December to 20th April 1942. For the implementation of the plan to capture Moscow, the
German command concentrated the "Center" army group to the east of Smolensk - 1,800,000 people, 1,700 tanks,
over 14,000 guns and mortars and 1,390 aircraft.
Advancing troops of the Wehrmacht resisted our three fronts: the Western (commanded by Colonel General I.S
Konev), Reserve (commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union S.M Budyonny), Bryansk (commanded by Colonel
General A.I Eremenko). Just on the West the troops of the three fronts had 1,250,000 people, 990 tanks, 7,600
guns and mortars and 677 aircraft.
On the day of the start of the offensive, on 30th September 1941, the German forces broke through our defenses
and surrounded the troops of the Bryansk front, but failed to keep it, and on October 23rd the troops of the Bryansk
front, with the help of aviation, the surrounding front was broken, which allowed them to reach the new boundaries
of defense. During heavy and bloody fighting our troops suffered heavy losses. This battle was called the Orel-
Bryansk operation of 1941.
On 30th September 1941, the troops of the Bryansk front consisted of the 50th, 3rd, 13th armies and the task force.
These three armies and the task force amounted to about 250,000 people.
On 10th November 1941 the Bryansk front was abandoned. On October 2nd 1941, 50% of tanks and 75% of the
infantry divisions of the "Center" army group gathered together, German troops dealt two strong strikes in the
direction of Vyazma, breaking through our front and surrounding some of the troops of the Western and Reserve
fronts.
Surrounded, the troops under the command of Lieutenant General M.F Lukin fought bravely, holding down 28
German divisions, of which 14 could not be released for a further advance on Moscow until mid-October. In mid-
October, some of the troops broke out of encirclement and joined the ranks of the defenders of Moscow; some
parts continued to conduct guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines.
The German high command in his summary reported 663,000 prisoners taken by German troops at Vyazma. The
value of Goebbels' and German commanders' information we know courtesy of Goebbels' quote which says that
a lie repeated 1000 times becomes the truth. Data from Goebbels without any reservations misleads a considerable
number of our historians and researchers.
The actual number of our troops surrounded at Vyazma in Soviet sources is not indicated by the people, but by
the armies. The encyclopaedia of the great Patriotic war (1985), edited by M.M Kozlov, and G.K Zhukov, A.M
Vasilevsky and K.K Rokossovsky indicates that four armies of the Western and Reserve fronts (19th, 20th, 24th
and 32nd) were surrounded at Vyazma. In one army there were about 80,000 people - before the outbreak of
hostilities there were no more than 320,000 people in these armies.
Taking into account the actual number of losses during the fighting being 50% or more of the personnel of the
officers and soldiers of the Red Army, the factual number of those surrounded was 150,000 people. Fighting
continued until October 12th-13th. Many officers and soldiers surrounded by the armies were killed in the fighting,
some broke out of the encirclement, some went to the guerrillas, and the actual number of Soviet soldiers and
officers, which may have been taken prisoner, did not exceed 50,000 people. It is possible that the number of
prisoners in general was measured using isolated cases.
As always the Germans, in their statements, over exaggerated the results achieved from the offensive. The
Germans overstated the number of Soviet troops who could have been captured at Vyazma by more than tenfold.
The encirclement at Kiev and Vyazma were the largest and most well-known environments of our troops during
the great Patriotic war. Unfortunately, the number of surrounded, and especially captured soldiers and officers of
the Red Army, is currently listed by most historians on the basis of untrue German sources.
In October 1941, the Soviet high command in Moscow had an ample number of troops for the defense of Moscow
and fortified the area. German troops in some places broke through defenses, passed our frontiers, sent saboteurs
to the rear, and in this case sometimes our divisions were not there to stop the German military from breaking our
defense lines.
In these critical moments, before the approach was able to resist the German units that had broken through parts
of the Soviet armies, they were forced to stand against the enemy and any nearby military units. Podolsk cadets
restrained the Germans at this critical moment, approaching the main forces, directing towards the broken enemy.
Due to the fact that the Germans were concentrated at the place of the planned breakthrough of our defense, a
large number of German tanks, put up against our defense, broke through the Soviet units often, until the approach
of our tanks and anti-tank artillery, in Russian, they fought to the death. We should always remember and honour
the feat of the Podolsk cadets, young boys, standing next to other units of the Red Army to the death in the way
of the German tanks, but at the same time we should not conclude that there was no defense present, i.e. other
military units on the way of German fascist invaders who were tearing towards Moscow.
And if you read that the German "Center" army group opened the way to Moscow, after encirclement of the Soviet
forces at Vyazma, don't believe what you read. The tale of the open road to Moscow is passed from book to book,
talked about on TV, featured in movies.
In fact, Stalin appointed Zhukov as commander of the Western front, but did not give him a new army. Zhukov
adopted the fresh armies of I.S Konev and S.M Budyonny. On 10th October 1941, Konev gave Zhukov 4 armies,
namely: 22nd, 29th, 30th and 16th. Budyonny also gave Zhukov 4 armies – 31st, 33rd, 43rd and 49th. The 8
armies transferred to Zhukov from Konev and Budyonny were originally, before the outbreak of hostilities,
composed of 666,400 people.
These 8 armies were combined in one Western front and subordinated to Zhukov. Thus, Zhukov on 10th October
1941, received not two regiments, according to the slanderers of Russia, but 8 armies. These armies came from
Vyazma; from the 12 armies at Vyazma, 4 were encircled, thus 8 armies were taken from Konev and Budyonny
and given to Zhukov. It was with the force of these 8 armies and divisions, which tried to break the encirclement,
that Zhukov held the front before the arrival of new military forces.
The battle of Vyazma showed that even with a carefully prepared defense, the enemy in most cases will break
through the front. And Vyazma defense was prepared thoroughly in accordance with the requirements of the HQ:
September 10th 1941, "fixedly entrench ourselves at the expense of minor directions and fix defences with the
aim of creating a powerful well manoeuvred group for a future offensive."
The army commanders and Stavka completed Directive No. 002 373, dated 27th September, which decreed: "In
all parts of the front to go hard, stubborn defense, while conducting active reconnaissance of enemy forces and
only if necessary, the taking of private offensive operations to improve their defensive positions. To mobilize all
infantry forces of the front, armies, and divisions with the aim to dig into the ground and make the entire front
trenches full profile, in a few lines, barbed wire entanglements and antitank obstacles."
The exact implementation of the requirements of the HQ was described by Konev and commander of the Western
front M.F Lukin, who said: "Trenches were dug almost everywhere, full profile trenches. In areas occupied by
tanks, mines were placed, and where possible, anti-tank ditches and scarps were dug. They built shelters and
canopies for gun emplacements".
Despite these measures, the defense of Vyazma was broken. This fact confirms that defense does not guarantee
the retention of the front in the absence of the necessary density of troops and information about the direction of
the main attack of the enemy.
Troops of the Western front under the command of G.K Zhukov moved into the Mozhaisk line of defense. On
20th October 1941, the GKO (State Defense Committee) introduced a state of siege in Moscow and the
surrounding areas.
In October the enemy staged 31 air raids in Moscow, these attacks in total were attended by 2,000 enemy planes,
with 278 being shot down, only 72 planes managed to drop bombs. From mid-October until the beginning of
November, there were persistent fights in Mozhaisk.
In July 1941, the construction of fortified areas on the outskirts of Moscow began. The main line of defense was
a system of field and permanent fortifications, including concrete pillboxes and bunkers, anti-tank and anti-
personnel obstacles.
It included Volokolamsk, Mozhaisk, Maloyaroslavets and Kaluga's fortified region. By 10th October 1941, 296
pillboxes, 535 bunkers, 170 kilometers of anti-tank ditches, and 95 kilometers of scarps were built. Kaluga's
fortified region did not play the final role, in fact by the end of October, German troops under the command of F.
Bock were only able to penetrate up to 75 kilometres into our defenses, but were unable to break through the
front.
In the Volokolamsk area the 16th army fought under the command of Lieutenant General Rokossovsky, Mozhaisk
– 5th army of major-General Lelyushenko, and after his injury – Major-General L.A Govorov, Narofominsk –
33rd army of General Lieutenant M.G Yefremov, in Maloyaroslavets - 43rd army of Major-General K.D Golubev,
and in the Kaluga direction – 49th army Lieutenant General I.G Zakharkin. The names of these commanders went
down in the history of the Moscow battle and in the history of our country.
Intense battles were fought in and near the city of Kalinin (Tver). On October 14th, German tanks broke into
Kalinin. On October 17th the Kalinin front was created under the command of Colonel General I.S Konev. The
Germans stopped, and they did not break through the rear of the Northwest front, or in the Tula direction.
The army and people of the city of Tula did not let the enemy pass, destroying a lot of manpower and equipment
(100 tanks) of the enemy. They made a worthy contribution to the defense of Tula and released the troops at the
Bryansk front from the environment.
In the month of October the defence of Moscow was conducted at the limit of human forces. So only the Soviet,
Russian people could battle. But shouldn't Stalin be praised for, in July 1941, organizing the construction of
concrete pillboxes, bunkers, anti-tank barriers and other defensive military buildings, fortified areas on the
outskirts of Moscow, and for providing weapons, ammunition, food and uniforms for soldiers?!
Our troops held the Western front near Moscow primarily because, in October 1941, the Soviet soldiers and
officers fighting the enemy had weapons to shoot down planes, destroy tanks, and confuse the ground infantry of
the enemy.

A solemn meeting on 6th November and the parade on Red Square on November 7th, 1941.
All of the country, with bated breath, was worried about the Moscow Battle. The most difficult was the month of
October. The harsh face of our capital city in the fall of 1941 evoked love and pride of the majority of the Russian
people. Moscow was closed with sandbagged shop windows of the buildings, balloons in the sky, sirens howling,
columns of military and militias walking to the front, the harsh Red Square and the Kremlin simply will forever
remain in the memory and in the heart of every person who has seen documentary footage of Moscow in autumn
1941.

Stalin decided to celebrate the 24th anniversary of the great October socialist revolution as it was adopted in 1918
– the ceremonial meeting on November 6th and the parade on Red Square on 7th November. During these days
Stalin often appeared on the streets of Moscow. He said: "It will be our street festival!" And the head of security,
Vlasick, who was concerned about possible bombings, was told: "Vlasick, don't worry. Our bombs will not pass
us".
At that time Moscow was the largest industrial and cultural center of not only the USSR but also around the world.
It was a city-worker, producing a huge number of products – both high-tech products and products of light and
food industries. Products of the Moscow enterprises were characterised by high quality and sold in all the cities
of the Soviet Union.
Today Moscow is perhaps even more hard working, but for such a huge city it almost does not produce anything.
On 15th October the decision was taken on the departure of Moscow People's Commissariats (Ministries). People
from Moscow continued to be evacuated (2 million people), as well as art and other valuables, and even the
sarcophagus with the body of Vladimir Lenin was sent to the distant Tomsk.
In this regard, there is one interesting fact that shows the difference between the Soviet, national and liberal States.
When Stalin, at a meeting, asked the remaining People's Commissars and Politburo members "How are things in
Moscow?", A.I Shakhurin said that in one company, workers resented the non-payment of wages, which the plant
manager took. But actually because of the evacuation there was not enough money in the state bank. "Where is
Zverev?" – Stalin asked Molotov. "In Kazan," said Molotov. "Immediately bring money by plane," Stalin ordered.
And it was, when the enemy was near Moscow.
At that time there were cases of the detention of the heads of state authorities for illegally traveling from Moscow,
stealing products from stores and other offences that indicated a panic, but there was no big panic in Moscow.
Despite the evacuation of a significant number of people, work was quickly established in all spheres of urban
life even when the enemy hordes were near the city.
In Moscow there was the GKO supreme command and the minimum necessary administration for operation of
the country and the army party, government and military apparatuses. The evacuation was caused by the fact that,
according to Stalin, the Germans were ahead of us and brought reserves to break through the front near Moscow.
The threat to Moscow was real, but I think that still the Germans would have been defeated in street battles.
But they were prepared just in case, adopting a decision to build a defensive line of three strips: on the District
railway, on the garden district and the Boulevard district. Stalin allowed Zhukov to move the headquarters of the
Western front from Perkhushkovo away from the front line in Moscow to Belarusian station or to Arzamas, and
the military said: "The headquarters will remain in Perkhushkovo, and I'll stay in Moscow. Goodbye."
On October 17th the urban radio network appealed to Muscovites Secretary of the Central Committee and Moscow
city Committee (MGK) of VKP(b), A.S Shcherbakov, who reported on the situation at the front near Moscow and
declared that Moscow will fight stubbornly, fiercely, until the last drop of blood. He also brought to the attention
of the Muscovites the very significant fact that contributed to the stabilization of the situation in the city: Stalin in
Moscow.
After this message the Muscovites were not so fearful of the Panzer divisions of Guderian and Hoth, located near
Moscow, and went to fight as volunteers in the militia, working day and night to protect the capital. Whoever says
that Moscow could have handed it over to the enemy does not understand that in 1941 Moscow was the capital of
the USSR, which, in the event of capture, Hitler promised to wipe off the earth together with the people inhabiting
it.
In 1812 the capital of Russian Empire was St. Petersburg, and references to the decision to move it to Moscow,
adopted in the 19th century, do not correspond to the realities that existed in different times.
Stalin, as always, was seasoned, calm and demanding. After receiving the report of Zhukov that the Germans
suffered heavy casualties, were forced to regroup and replenish their forces, to pull back, and so could not advance
any further, Stalin took the decision on holding a solemn meeting and a parade. The adoption of this decision was
facilitated by the fact that by this time, near Moscow, our aircraft were not inferior to the Germans and together
with the air defenses could guarantee that no German plane will attack Red Square.
The proposal of Stalin to hold a parade shocked many officials; Commander of the Moscow military district
Lieutenant-General P.A Artemyev spoke out against holding the parade, but the GKO was supported by Stalin,
and a final decision was taken for its implementation.
For the solemn meeting on 6th November 1941, in the metro station "Mayakovskaya", a room was prepared for
two thousand seats. Members of the State Defense Committee (GKO) came by train via the subway. The radio all
over the country declared: "Moscow speaking! Spread the word of the solemn meeting of the Moscow Soviets..."
The country heard that Moscow was still standing and is fighting the enemy.
A presentation was made by Stalin; he talked about the huge losses of people and territory and that the German
plan of blitzkrieg, meaning lightning war, torn, about the intention of Hitler and Goering to destroy the Russian
people and other Slavic people, about the appeal of the German command to the soldiers to exercise extreme
violence against the people of the USSR.
Stalin said: "These people, devoid of conscience and honour, people with the morals of animals, have the audacity
to call for the destruction of the great Russian nation, the nation of Plekhanov and Lenin, Belinsky and
Chernyshevsky, Pushkin and Tolstoy, Glinka and Tchaikovsky, Gorky and Chekhov, Sechenov and Pavlov,
Surikov, Suvorov and Kutuzov! The German invaders want a war of extermination with the people of the USSR.
Well, if the Germans want to have a war of extermination, they'll get it. Now our task... will be to exterminate
every single Germans man who made his way to the territory of our Motherland as an occupier. No mercy to the
German invaders! Death to the German invaders! Our cause is just – victory will be ours!"
On November 7th, 1941, at 8 o'clock in the morning, Stalin, the party and the government climbed onto the
Mausoleum for the historical parade on Red Square in Moscow. The parade started two hours earlier than usual.
On the square were Marines, Cadets of the artillery school, the Navy, NKVD troops, militia units, cavalry,
artillery, and tanks all lined up. The parade was directed by the Commander of the Moscow military district,
General P.A Artemyev, who headed the Moscow defense zone simultaneously.
On the morning of 7th November, Stalin got up early, before dawn. Because of the blackout lights were not
burning, and you couldn't see the snowflakes rushing along the street, but only hear the howling wind and feel the
breath of the cold outside the window. Stalin thought about the soldiers that carry all the hardships in the frozen
trenches. The day dawned, the wind died down. Stalin and Vlasik went to Red Square. It was snowing. It covered
the Spasskaya tower, Kremlin wall, Red Square cobblestones, and in that white outfit it was even more beautiful.
They didn't want to believe that there is a war at that moment and that very close to Moscow guns were firing on
the advancing German tanks, and a young dashing Lieutenant wearing a fur cap commands: "Fire!" Only a cuckoo
knows how long this lieutenant had left to live, but it is speechless in this stone-deaf and frozen forest, and we'll
never know the fate of the lieutenant.
At this time in the snowy fields near Moscow, machine and assault guns fired bitingly, artillery guns. It was the
sacred battle for our Homeland, for our children, for our wives and mothers, brothers and sisters, for the life of
future generations.
The fighting had killed the good Russian people, men, many of which had not yet become fathers, had never
known the happiness of being loved, the light of joy to touch the delicate little hands of a child and hearing the
word "daddy". And the people living on the land who defended it, never, in a thousand years, should we forget
their sacrifice, of their heroism. If we forget about them, they will die. That is the law of life.
In my poem "Ninth of May" are these lines: "And Russia without them was empty, and the earth groaned with
tears, and prayer from the Church flew past gentle Russian birches. They lived to reach Berlin and to take revenge
on Germany in the battle for their deceased brothers and sons, and their grief in their eyes."
Only the people standing in a fight to the death have the right to live on the territory of Russia. Such people will
never forget their compatriots who died for freedom and independence of their country. And if you forget, you
lose the right to life, and would be weak and helpless in the face of the advancing enemy. It is because the Soviet
soldiers fired the machine guns, poured out gunfire on the enemy with rifles, that Moscow lived.
At eight o'clock in the morning the striking of the Kremlin's chimes were heard. With the last kick of the gates of
the Spasskaya tower, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.M Budyonny left on horseback. That parade, as in the past
before the war, with Semyon Mikhailovich Budyonny, strengthened faith in the power of the Soviet Union.
Lieutenant-General P.A Artemyev, who, as was mentioned above, commanded the parade, reported on the
readiness of troops for parade in honor of the 24th anniversary of the great October socialist revolution. Budyonny
was inspecting the troops and congratulating the officers and soldiers on the holiday. Our soldiers in unison
answered and dearly shouted: "Hurrah!" To show their determination and willingness to fight and sacrifice for the
Motherland they spoke the Russian word for Hurrah.
The morale of the soldiers, their sincerity, youthfulness, generosity and belief in their power had passed onto
Muscovites, guests of the capital, members of the party and the government. Then a fanfare played the cue "Listen
up!" According to tradition, Budyonny was supposed to speak at the parade, but the floor was taken by Stalin. At
first, for security reasons, they planned to broadcast the parade only on radio Moscow, but at the last minute Stalin
changed his mind and asked to broadcast the parade throughout the Soviet Union, and the world.
He spoke from the rostrum of the Mausoleum, referring to the inhabitants of the country: "Comrades, Red Army
and Red Navy men, Commanders and political instructors, working men and women, collective farmers, workers,
intellectuals, brothers and sisters in the rear of our enemy, temporarily fallen under the yoke of the German
brigands, our glorious partisans and guerrillas are destroying the rear of the German invaders!
In his speech, Stalin remembered the Civil war and said: "Our country's industry, food and raw materials are many
times richer now than 23 years ago... the Enemy is not as strong as some portray them as frightened intellectuals.
They are not the devil they are painted as... the German invaders are straining their last forces. There is no doubt
that Germany cannot withstand this strain for long. Several months, six months, maybe a year, and Hitlerite
Germany must burst under the weight of their crimes" - (exactly one year later, in November 1942, the victorious
offensive of the Red Army began at Stalingrad and ended in Berlin).
He confidently said that the Red Army would soon liberate Europe, the oppressed people of Europe and the whole
world look at our soldiers, "As the force capable of destroying the predatory hordes of German invaders," and
continued, addressing the participants of demonstration: "The great liberation mission requires your part. Be
worthy of this mission!
The war, which you lead, is the war of liberation, a just war. Let the brave image of our great ancestors inspire
you in this war – Alexander Nevsky, Dmitry Donskoy, Dmitry Pozharsky, Kuzma Minin, Alexander Suvorov,
Mikhail Kutuzov! Let the victorious banner of the great Lenin overshadow you!"
The parade began. The orchestral division named after Dzerzhinsky, under the baton of the conductor of the
military intendant 1st rank A.V Agapkin, who wrote the famous March "Farewell of Slavianka", played at the
military marches. The sounds of those marches took place on Red Square with the 2nd Moscow rifle division,
cavalry, artillery, tanks and other troops. Most participants of the parade departed from Red Square straight to the
front.
The orchestra fell silent, and the most sincere, the most Russian march "Farewell of Slavianka" for a long time
sounded in the hearts of those who were returning from a parade of citizens and members of the party and the
government. Before their eyes were open, kind, courageous people leaving for the front of great sons and a great
country. Mothers, wives, sisters, children performed the clean sounds of the march "Farewell of Slavianka" on the
front, in a terrible battle with the hated enemy of their sons, husbands, brothers and fathers! Millions.
The airwaves of big stations and small stations were soaked in the sounds of the glorious Russian march. Thanks
to him, Agapkin, we low bow to all whose hearts remember and honor those hard times of hard trials and great
victories. Our whole country, the whole world knew that Moscow did not give up, that Russia was alive and
determined to defeat the cruel and powerful enemy. The Soviet people ecstatically listened to the words of Stalin
and the news about the parade and solemn meeting in Moscow! Hitler's gang of criminals, listening to the
celebrations on Red Square, went into a rage! The German conquerors were cringing in fear when they heard the
words of Stalin: "Death to the German invaders!".
In mid-November 1941 the German command thought that they would need just one punch, and Moscow would
"bow down" before their European conquerors. The Nazi command, on 15th-16th November, threw two strike
groups into the offensive, created in the first half of November 1941, seeking to bypass Moscow from the North
through Klin-Solnechnogorsk and from the South via Tula-Kashira.
Frontiers of the German troops were very close to the capital. Kryukovo station, near which after two weeks of
intense fighting the shaft of Hitler's tanks was stopped, was located 40 kilometers from Leningrad station in
Moscow.
Also the Germans had planned to go to Moscow along the Volokolamsk highway, but at the Dubosekovo junction
28 men from the 316th rifle division of General-major I.V Panfilov took the fight to the German infantry, and
then to German tanks. The battle lasted over four hours. A handful of Soviet soldiers stood in the way of German
tanks and with their lives they did not let the Germans on the Volokolamsk highway. Nearly all were killed. The
feat of the 28 Panfilov heroes went down in history, as was thought then, forever, and in the words of political
instructor V.G Klochkova "Great Russia, and nowhere to retreat, behind Moscow!" – everyone knew the defenders
of Moscow.
Falling on the field of battle near Moscow on 18th November 1941 - the commander of the 316th rifle division,
General-major I.V Panfilov. The documentary "the Unknown war" shows the funeral of I.V Panfilov. They are
full of bright Russian sadness, they feel the Russian indomitable courage. Panfilov was followed by comrades in
arms and, like from an epic fairy tale, his mighty fighting horse to the grave.
At Yasnaya Polyana, the Germans one day established large-caliber long-range artillery for bombardment of
Moscow and absolutely destroyed the estate of L.N Tolstoy, desecrating his grave. Then our counter-attack drove
the Germans back, capturing their guns. At the first opportunity the estate of L.N Tolstoy was completely restored,
as well as the house of P.I Tchaikovsky in Klin. When you watch documentaries and see the level of destruction,
it is difficult to believe in the possibility of restoring Yasnaya Polyana to the way it was. But, as we have seen, at
the time the impossible was possible.
In the November offensive the Germans failed to break through our front and only slightly advanced towards
Moscow, suffering heavy losses in manpower and equipment. Among the defenders of Moscow were
distinguished soldiers General-majors L.M Dovator, A.P Beloborodov, and the regiment of Katukov. Partisans
acted in the rear of German troops near Moscow.
The Germans were scared of the partisans. When they managed to detain a young female guerrilla fighter, Zoya
Kosmodemyanskaya, they subjected her to severe torture, and hanged her on 29th November 1941 in the village
of Petrishcheva. The whole country knew of the feat of Zoya. People were proud of her fortitude and pitied the
young girl, who died in terrible agony at the hands of "civilized" European conquerors, destroying our land and
manors of great writers, composers and Russian boys and girls who didn't obey them.
In December the Germans had not captured Moscow and even on December 1st when they managed to break our
defence at Naro-Fominsk, they were stopped and defeated in the area of Golitsyn. Simultaneously with the attack
at Naro-Fominsk, the Germans on 2nd December launched a new offensive at Tula from the East and West. But
Tula was a tough nut to crack, and even after cutting a road linking the city with Moscow, the Germans failed to
take Tula. Moreover, the Soviet troops near Tula were surrounded by part of the 4th tank division and 2nd tank
army of the Germans. Troops of the 50th army and the population of the city, who were protecting the city, showed
heroism.
It should be noted that the defense of our troops near Moscow was successful because the front narrowed and we
significantly increased the density of our defensive forces, and counter-strikes like, for example, near Tula,
reduced the offensive capabilities of the German armies. The Germans didn't want to admit that they were unable
to defeat the Soviet army, and at one time blamed the disruption of the offensive on Moscow on the Russian
winter, which according to information, for example, from Guderian, described it as minus 68 degrees Celsius.
These German generals cannot be called fully developed human beings, because educated people understand that
cold at 68 degrees for a few hours would deprive the suburbs of all vegetation and turn it into the Antarctica. In
fact, in the month of November the frosts of Moscow remained within the range of minus 5 degrees Celsius and
only in the middle of the month did they briefly fall to minus 20 degrees.

Absolutely correctly, G.K Zhukov wrote that the German troops near Moscow were not stopped by the rain and
snow, but by the "iron fortitude, courage and heroism of the Soviet troops, behind whom were their people, the
capital, home." The decisions during the Battle of Moscow were deeply thought out, and the execution of plans
was well organized, which allowed our troops on November 29th 1941 to liberate the South of Rostov-on-don,
and in the North on December 9th to liberate the town. By pinning down the southern and Northern group of
German forces, our command had created favorable conditions for the offensive of the Red Army near Moscow.
It wasn't the Siberian division who provided our troops the opportunity of transition to the offensive near Moscow,
but the reserve army, which was created by the Stavka, and tightened towards Moscow before moving our troops
on the offensive. Vasilevsky recalled: "A major event was the completion of the preparation of regular and special
reserve forces. At the edge of Vytegra – Rybinsk – Gorky – Saratov – Stalingrad – Astrakhan a new strategic
frontier for the Red Army was created. Ten reserve armies were created here on the basis of the decision of the
GKO, which was accepted on the 5th October.
Creating them throughout the battle of Moscow was one of the basic and everyday concerns of the party Central
Committee, GKO and Stavka. We, the leaders of the General staff, gave daily reports to the Supreme Commander
about the situation on the fronts and reported in detail about the creation of these groups. It is no exaggeration to
say that the outcome of the battle of Moscow was down to the decisive fact that the party and the Soviet people,
in a timely manner, had formed, armed, trained and deployed a new army into the capital".
The troops' manpower and equipment was constantly replenished by the German leadership. By early December
1941, the "Center" army group had in its composition 1,708,000 soldiers, about 13,500 guns and mortars, 1,170
tanks, and 615 aircraft. Our troops by this time were ready to seize the strategic initiative.
The counter-offensive of the Red Army began at the same time on the huge front from Kalinin to Yelets. On the
5th of December 1941, without an operational pause, they went on the offensive on the Kalinin front (commander
– Colonel General I.S Konev), on December 6th – as did the operational group of the southwestern front
(commander – Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K Timoshenko, and on 18.12.1941 – Lieutenant-General F.Y
Kostenko), also on December 6th the offensive and Western front began (commander – army General G.K
Zhukov).
Together with the ground forces they attacked the German part of the military air force (air force commander –
Lieutenant General P.F Zhigarev) and the long-range aviation (ADD) under the command of General A.E
Golovanov, who from 30.11.1941, was personally subordinate to the Supreme Commander I.V Stalin.
The German armies across the broad front retreated, suffering heavy losses. The black uniforms of dead soldiers
and officers of the SS, elite german divisions, especially stood out on the Russian white snow fields. And if in
June 1941 German troops suddenly attacked us, in December 1941 near Moscow, the Germans were suddenly
attacked by our Soviet troops.
Despite the deep snow and cold, our Red Army successfully attacked; the German army began to panic. On the
attack near Moscow, Rokossovsky wrote: "The deep snow and extreme cold made it difficult for us to manoeuvre
to the side of the roads with the aim to cut off escape routes of the enemy. So the German generals, perhaps, can
thank the harsh winter that contributed to their departure from Moscow with fewer losses, but they cannot refer
to the idea that the Russian winter was the cause of their defeat. During the retreat the German troops did
everything to slow down our approach. They densely mined roads, arranged various traps... On the way the Nazis
burned all the villages. If any houses had survived, they were mined."
A.M Vasilevsky wrote that in Moscow, the Germans lost more than 500,000 people, 1,300 tanks, 2,500 guns, over
15,000 cars and a lot of other equipment. The German army had not experienced such losses.
And if the USSR in December 1941 won the battle of Moscow and crushed the enemy, the United States suffered
one defeat after another from Japan, which was an order of magnitude weaker than the new Germany. Germany
also never missed an opportunity to show its power to England and the U.S. with the onset of Rommel's armies
in Egypt and the appearance of German submarines off the coast of the U.S, which sank American ships not only
in transit but also in the coastal zone of New York.
American historian Robert Sherwood, who called the winter of 1941/42 "winter disasters", wrote: "The only
source of good news was the Russian front. The Red Army, continuing their remarkable counterattacks, beat
snow-covered, frostbitten Germans with many advanced positions".
Please note the derogatory, abusive, belittling of the Red Army, of its perseverance and courage, its arms and
heroism in the battles. After all, "Beaten snow-covered, frostbitten Germans" is not worth any effort. This does
not win the battle, but the mockery of the frost-bitten "people", is worthy of pity. So, in reading between the lines
of R. Sherwood's evaluation is the heroic resistance of the Soviet people. Neither valor, nor the scale of the fighting
of the Red Army (counterattack) is in the assessment of R. Sherwood, which shows only a desire to humiliate
both us and our heroism. So read between the lines - the allegedly defective Russian barbarians killed frostbitten
enlightened German soldiers.
Yes, they are all much of a muchness: Western liberalism, and its creation of fascism. And they both wished for
and today wish for our death. For this purpose the Nazis came in 1941 to kill us. Glory to the Soviet people! The
USSR withstood the first blow and responded with dignity. Zhukov, who carried the first major victory in the
battle of Moscow with him for the rest of his life, wrote: "Stalin was all this time in Moscow, organizing forces
and means for the defeat of the enemy. I'll give him his dues. As the head of the State Committee of Defence and
based on the administrative board of the People's Commissariats, he had done tremendous work in organizing the
necessary strategic reserves and the material-technical means. The rigid insistence he achieved, one might say,
was almost impossible."

The complete defeat of German troops near Moscow in December 1941 prevented the intervention of Hitler. Penal
battalions, the in-German trial divisions, and, in particular, using the definition of Keitel, the "merciless hardness
of Hitler", prevented panic in the Army in December 1941.
During the winter campaign the Nazi military tribunal condemned 62,000 soldiers and officers for desertion,
unauthorized departure, disobedience and so on. 35 Generals were suspended from their posts, including Field
Marshall Generals Brauchitsch, Bock, and Colonel-General Guderian.
Keitel wrote the following about the retreat of the German army near Moscow: "It would be contrary to the truth
if I hadn't stated here with the utmost conviction: the catastrophe was avoided only by sheer force of will,
perseverance and the relentless hardness of Hitler. If the well thought out plan in its original form of a step-by-
step retreat, in which the desire to implement it was narrow minded, egoistic and dictated by the disastrous
situation of the heavily pushed and suffering from the awful cold (reason of apathy) "Center" group of
armies, hadn't been crossed out inexorably without any compromise by the Führer's opposition and his iron
energy, the fate of German army in 1941 would've been inevitably the same as Napoleon's one in 1812.
As a witness to and participant in the events of those terrible weeks I have to say most definitely! All heavy
weapons, all the tanks and all motorized tools would have remained on the battlefield. Being aware of the image
of their own defencelessness, the troops would have also surrendered their handguns, and, having behind them a
relentless pursuer, would have ran."
At this time the number of penal battalions in the German Army had especially been growing. Trial divisions,
which existed until the end of the war, saved the German units from destruction, but were stopped by the retreat
of the Germans at Moscow. Few people know that the practice of penal battalions was borrowed by Stalin from
Germany. Soldiers of the Soviet army that were sent to penal battalions, had to fight until first blood, i.e. a wound,
and after making amends, could return to ordinary battalions. And the goal was not getting rid of people, but the
punishment of servicemen who committed crimes. These battalions were mainly used for reconnaissance of the
enemy firing points. But enough of the theme of battalions – this topic is 1942, and we shall get back to it.
Soviet troops on 9th December liberated Rogachevo, December 11th – Istra, December 12th – Solnechnogorsk,
December 15th – Klin, December 16th – Kalinin, December 20th– Volokolamsk. Hundreds of other villages and
towns were liberated in December 1941 along the Western front and the Kalinin front.
The troops successfully advanced on the southwestern front. The Germans were unable to stop the advance of our
troops on the line of the Oka river. And on 30th December Kaluga was taken. The advance of Soviet troops in the
South did not end with the liberation of Rostov-on-don. Pursuing the retreating enemy, our troops crossed the
river Mius and created the Barvenkovsky ridge in the region of Izum.
The troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts failed in December 1941 to break the blockade of Leningrad. But
we seized the strategic initiative and even landed troops in Crimea with the aim of assiting the fighting in
Sevastopol. Hearts of the Soviet people were filled with pride and belief in a speedy victory and the end of the
war. But Stalin saw the real strength of the armies of Europe. Stalin said to the Envoy of the President of the
United States, Harry Hopkins, "I believe, however, that the war will be intense and maybe prolonged". And asked
for the materials necessary for a long war.
With the only attack on the Western strategic direction our troops smashed 11 Panzers, 4 motorised infantry units
and 23 German divisions. In December 1941, our troops continued to attack, however, moving ahead, Vasilevsky
wrote: "During the winter offensive the Soviet troops defeated 50 enemy divisions, causing especially serious
defeats to the main grouping of enemy troops – the "Centre" group of the Army".
The prestige of Germany in the eyes of Japan and Turkey dropped significantly. Our soldiers were stronger than
the selective SS physical training, will and military skill. It is possible to judge the elite German SS troops at least
because the service only took recruits from the countryside with an excellent state of health. Even those with a
filled in tooth were not allowed to be enrolled in this division.
Our military equipment worked reliably in the heat and in the cold. Our officers gained experience in bloody
battles. Our Red Army was advancing, covering the snowy ground with corpses of German soldiers and officers,
smashed artillery pieces, burned tanks and vehicles of the enemy and fallen enemy horses. And a lot of serviceable
equipment had been abandoned in a panic by fleeing German soldiers. Columns of German prisoners were led to
the East by our soldiers, holding rifles at the ready with fixed bayonets.
But not only the defeated German army saw the soldiers. Thousands of Germans in burned down villages and
homeless civilians met our fighters on the way, dozens of ruined cities with blown up factories and homes,
thousands shot, women and children tortured to death appeared before the eyes of Soviet soldiers.
At the sight of these terrible atrocities of the German invaders, the hearts of the soldiers and officers of the Red
Army filled with holy wrath, demanded revenge and retribution, called them to battle. They say that Stalin issued
an order to officers and soldiers, after Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya was tortured, to not take any prisoners.
The British Foreign Secretary, Eden, arrived in Moscow late in the evening of the 15th December 1941. He came
through the not-defeated-by-the-Germans city of Murmansk. Eden rashly said to Stalin: "For now, Hitler still
stands near Moscow, and Berlin is far away." To which Stalin replied: "It's nothing, the Russians have already
been to Berlin twice, and there will be a third time".
During the feast, Stalin offered Eden "Russian whisky" – pepper vodka, and when he caught his breath, said, "This
drink can only be drank by strong people. Hitler is beginning to feel it". Eden was driven around the roads of the
suburbs, and he saw the broken German military equipment and vehicles across Europe. He had also seen hundreds
of bodies of conquerors who trampled down the earth of Warsaw and Dunkerque, the North Cape and Crete, Paris
and Thessaloniki, and considered themselves masters of the world, but found death at the hands of Soviet soldiers
in the fields and forests near Moscow. On the return journey Eden told Maisky: "Now I've seen with my own eyes
how the German army can suffer defeat, retreat, flee".
On the 8th of July 1941, the chief of the General staff of the land forces of Germany, Colonel General F. Halder,
who yearned to destroy all Slavs and had done everything possible to destroy them (after the war, until 1961, he
collaborated with the military-historical service of the U.S army), wrote in his official diary: "The unwavering
decision of the Führer to level Moscow and Leningrad to the ground, to completely get rid of the population of
these cities." But this did not happen.
In 1941 our grandparents and great-grandparents defended the right to life and, greeting the new year of 1942,
proclaimed a toast for Victory. What would've happened to the people of the USSR in case of defeat in WWII is
shown in the story depicted by Marshal of aviation Golovanov. He wrote: "Once a blond, blue-eyed girl was
discovered in a downed German bomber in the form of a military pilot. When asked how she, a woman, could
decide to bomb peaceful city, killing innocent women and children, she replied: "Germany needs space, but she
doesn't need people on these lands".
In 1942, the Red Army continued to advance. Moscow and Tula regions were liberated, as well as many areas of
Kalinin, Smolensk, Ryazan and Orel regions. Losses in manpower for the "Center" group of armies alone, who
recently stood near Moscow, for the period from 1st January to 30th March 1942 was more than 333,000 people.
After the 8th January to 20th April Sychevka-Vyazemskoy, Toropetskiy-Holmsky, Rzhevsky and Bolkhov
offensive operations, the troops of our Western, Kalinin and Bryansk fronts went on the defensive. Further
advance was impossible because of the spring thaw and the associated difficulties of supplying the army with
munitions, the losses in men and materiel as a result of four months of offensive engagements, and a lack of
reserves needed to gain superiority over the German "Centre" group of armies.
The German leadership restored order in the army by punitive disciplinary measures and created a heavily fortified
line of defense, which the Red Army did not have sufficient forces to break through. Besides, the German
command had moved substantial forces from Western Europe to hold the front. In particular, to avoid defeat
during our Rzhev-Vyazma operation in 1942, the Germans transferred 12 divisions and two brigades out of
Western Europe.
The day of the transfer of our troops to defend the aforementioned fronts (20 April 1942) is considered the day of
the end of the battle of Moscow.
During the great Patriotic war, the serving army conducted 51 strategic, more than 250 front-line and about 1,000
military operations, of which nearly two-thirds were on the offensive. All these operations and battles were
conducted under the guidance of the Supreme Command headed by Stalin. Millions of people were set in motion
by the decision of the Stavka.
Zhukov wrote the following about the Stavka: "The Stavka was in charge of all military operations of the armed
forces on land, at sea and in the air, producing the capacity for strategic efforts in the struggle against the reserves
and using the forces of the guerrilla movement. The General Staff was its working body. The intentions and plans
of strategic operations and campaigns were worked out in the Stavka's apparatus - HQ, with participation of some
members of the Stavka."
This was preceded by lots of work in the Politburo and the State Defense Committee. They discussed the
international situation at this point in time, and studied the potential political and military capabilities of warring
States. Only after studying and discussing all public issues were projections of a political and military nature
made. As a result of all this complex work the political and military strategy that guided the Supreme Command
was determined.
In the development of the next operation, Stalin usually summoned the Chief of the General staff and his Deputy
and painstakingly considered with them the operational-strategic situation on the Soviet-German front: the state
of the troops of the fronts, the data from all kinds of intelligence and the preparation of the reserves of all military
branches. Then the Chief of logistics of the Red Army was summoned to the Stavka, as well as commanders of
various military branches and the heads of major departments of the people's Commissariat of Defence, who
would have to basically give support for the operation.
Then the Supreme Commander, Supreme Deputy and Chief of Staff discussed the strategic opportunities for our
troops. The Chief of the General Staff and Deputy Supreme was given the task of thinking and calculating our
capabilities for those operations that were planned to be held. Usually the Supreme assigned us four or five days
for this job. Upon expiration of the period a preliminary decision was taken. Thereafter, the Supreme gave the
Chief of the General Staff the task to request the opinion of the military councils of the fronts of the operation.
The Stavka was well aware of the situation on the fronts, and responded in a timely manner to changing
circumstances. Through it the General Staff, closely following the progress of the operations, made the necessary
adjustments to their troops, elaborating on them or tackling new problems that had arisen in the existing situation.
If necessary, they produced a regrouping of strength, the means to achieve the goals of the operation and delivered
tasks to the troops, and in special cases ceased the operation. Marshal of artillery N.D Yakovlev wrote: "The work
rate was remarkable for its simplicity and intelligence. No ostentatious speeches, elevated tone, or talking softly".
In October 1941, the 7th Army, under the command of K.A Meretskov, after three months of battles and retreats,
stopped the Finns, reinforced by German troops on the Svir river on the Eastern side of Lake Ladoga, not allowing
them to connect with German troops and to completely close the encirclement of Leningrad. The plans of the
German command were disrupted. The Finns and the Germans weren't allowed to pass to Vologda from the side
of lake Onega.
German troops were unable to crush the Red army and take Leningrad, but the Germans were near. Thus, the
connection of the city of Leningrad and the Leningrad front with the country by land was interrupted. Supply
across Lake Ladoga was complicated by the fact that a group of German troops crossed the river Volkhov, cut the
railway Tikhvin – Volkhov, and on 8th November 1941 captured Tikhvin.
In Leningrad there was a famine. Bread rations, which amounted to approximately 800 grams on average per day,
were rapidly declining. On October 1st bread rations decreased for a third time: workers and engineers received
400 grams of bread a day, civilian employees, dependents and children – over 200 grams. On November 20th (5th
reduction) the workers were given 250 grams of bread a day. All the rest – 125 grams. Sick and weak people
began to die from hunger and cold as the amount of food delivered did not meet the needs of the city residents,
despite a significant number of evacuees from the town's people.
Just from Leningrad, more than half of the prewar population - 1.7 million people - was evacuated. But the supply
of the city to Lake Ladoga was relatively briefly interrupted by German troops. On the 9th of December, our
troops liberated Tikhvin and drove the Germans across the river Volkhov, sending trains to the Voybokalo metro.
A continuous stream of traffic went to Leningrad. From December 25th 1941 quantities of products began to
grow.
At the end of December, Red Army troops occupied several bridgeheads on the left bank of the river. As a result
of the Tikhvin offensive operation Soviet troops advanced 100–120 kilometers and liberated a large territory.

The successfully conducted military operation allowed the railwaymen by the end of January 1942 to build
additional railways tracks to Lake Ladoga, and loads of the wagons began to unloaded directly into the body of
trucks which were stood on the frozen ice. Further along the Lake, on the ice of the Lake road, the goods were
delivered to Leningrad, which allowed to significantly improve nutrition standards of residents and soldiers of
Leningrad front, as well as improve the supplying of troops with arms and ammunition.
From February 1942 supplying the city with food in adequate quantity was established and lasted until the
breakthrough of the blockade.
Vasilevsky wrote about the day and night continuous flow in Leningrad of cars loaded with food, medicines, fuel,
equipment, ammunition, and return journeys took away women, children, the elderly, wounded and sick.
K.A Meretskov noted that even before the spring thaw (spring 1942) on Lake Ladoga in Leningrad more than
300,000 tons of various cargoes were delivered, and about 500,000 people in need of care and treatment were
removed.
The navigation of cargoes continued to be delivered by water transport by the Northwestern river shipping
company and the ships of the Ladoga military flotilla.
In my opinion, the riverine contribution in the supply of the city and the Leningrad front are undervalued. Like
the car's drivers in winter, during the navigation time the boatmen around the clock were bringing goods to
Leningrad and evacuating people, and from 1942 also.
In the documentary footage, in particular in the film the Unknown war, of Leningrad, people leaving the front,
working in factories and cleaning in the spring of 1942 the streets of the city, don't look as gaunt as, for example,
prisoners of German concentration camps.
Some people want to make the hero city of Leningrad appear like the concentration camp of Leningrad. The
tendency to transform Soviet heroes into victims is seen in all the liberal papers, and the number of victims of the
blockade of Leningrad, published in the media, increases year upon year. In fact, the city worked, fought, children
went to school, worked theaters and cinemas.
Leningrad was defended by the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts. The Leningrad front was blockaded; the Volkhov
front was on the outside of the ring of the blockade and stretched for 250 kilometers along the Volkhov river. The
Volkhov front was grinding down Hitler's troops, who were thrown on Leningrad and weren't given a chance to
connect with the Finnish forces, which were stopped North of the river Svir.
In this regard, the besieged Leningrad cannot be considered in isolation from the Leningrad front; the position of
the front can be reached by tram. Leningrad and the Leningrad front fought together and formed a single fortress.
After evacuation and on the Leningrad front the main number of residents of Leningrad decreased, but they didn't
die of hunger. Fighters and commanders of the Leningrad front, militiamen are buried together with the dead and
the deceased residents in the cemeteries of Leningrad.
To consider Leningrad in isolation from the Leningrad front means deliberately making a mistake and arriving at
untrue conclusions.

Our troops had carried out three operations to break the blockade, but only the last one was a success. In the period
from 7th January - 30th April 1942 the forces of the "Volkhov" front and 54th Army of the Leningrad front held
the Luban offensive with a view to liberate Leningrad, but they did not manage to cast aside the Germans from
Lake Ladoga.
Only 16 miles separated the troops of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts. To break the siege, these troops had to
meet. And on August 19th 1942, troops of the Leningrad front, and on August 27th, troops of the Volkhov front,
with the assistance of forces of the Baltic fleet and the Ladoga military flotilla went on the offensive towards each
other. The Sinyavino offensive started that also aimed to liberate Leningrad. Our troops were confident of victory.
Meretskov wrote: "Designs to attack the troops gave us in the chosen direction more than three-fold superiority
over the enemy in manpower, four – in tanks, double – in artillery and mortars. That's what we thought being
unaware of the arrival of the Manstein division from South".
As Manstein's divisions experienced profits near Sevastopol, they came from Sevastopol for the assault of
Leningrad. But they failed to take Leningrad by storm. The offensive of our troops tore apart the prepared new
German assault on Leningrad. E. Manstein wrote: "And instead of the planned attack on Leningrad the battle
unfolded south of Lake Ladoga".
Outlining the events of the Sinyavino offensive, most historians cite the description of Manstein. But it is
Meretskov and not Manstein who described it clearly and honestly. He wrote following about the results of this
operation: "The bulk of the troops concluded their exit on the East coast by dawn on September 29th. The
remaining units withdrew on the night of September 30th. The active fighting had stopped. Our troops and the
enemy troops came back around to the old position. Artillery duels and mutual raids of the aviation as if by inertia
continued for a few days, but offensive actions had not been undertaken".
Neither the Volkhov front commander K.A Meretskov, nor the Chief of the General Staff A.M Vasilevsky never
mentioned German or allied troops in the environment of the Sinyavino offensive. The Neva operational group
was fighting until 6th October. The Nazi command made many efforts to throw the troops into the water of the
Neva river, but brave soldiers of the Leningrad front, thanks to the courage of the soldiers who fired artillery
across the river, managed to hold on to two small bridgeheads. That was the end of the Sinyavino offensive. The
Volkhov and Leningrad fronts failed to break the siege of Leningrad. However, the calculations of Hitler's
command to storm Leningrad were a complete failure.
The song "Drinking Song of Volkhov Front" has a line about the Sinyavino offensive: "You will be eternally
glorified in the legends, under a hail of machine-gun fire, thrust our bayonets on the Sinyavino heights, our
regiments fought at Mga".
Loss of German troops, killed and prisoners, amounted to about 60,000 people, and in technology – 260 aircraft,
200 tanks, 600 guns and mortars. According to testimony of POWs, only 20 people were left in the ranks of a
majority of divisions. "Better three times to visit Sevastopol, than to remain here", – said the prisoners. Fighters
and commanders of the Red Army counterattacked and the two major offensives protected the inhabitants of the
besieged city. Leningrad continued to live, work and fight.
Goods continued to be supplied to Leningrad all day via a continuous stream by rail and then by road or river
transport (depending on the time of year) 25 kilometers across Lake Ladoga.
Supplies not only reached the city but also the whole Leningrad front with arms, projectiles, bombs, ammunition,
spare parts and food. On the return journey the railroad wagons and boats transported people, and, from the
summer of 1942, products produced by the enterprises of Leningrad.
It should be noted that the degree of risk both in winter and in summer on the route around the lake is exaggerated:
the path does not exceed 25 kilometers and was protected from the air and ground forces. There were losses of
course, but compared to the number of delivered goods, they are insignificant.
"In the summer Leningrad received the first tons of liquid fuel for the 25-km-long pipeline, laid to supply the city
and the front, on the bottom of Lake Ladoga. Later on an underwater cable here began to function with current,
partially restoring the Volkhov hydroelectric station. This allowed a number of enterprises to resume production
of military products", – specifies K.A Meretskov.
Thus, in 1941–1942, the Army and the government did everything possible to supply the city and the Leningrad
front, protect the residents of Leningrad and break the blockade by land.
On the 28th of December, the Supreme command adopted the third plan of the operations to break the blockade
and assigned it the name "Iskra". "The idea of this operation was to ensure counter-attacks on two fronts –
Leningrad and Volkhov – to defeat the enemy group on the Shlisselburg–Sinyavino ledge, to break the blockade
and restore the land connection of Central parts of the country with Leningrad.
Our troops near Leningrad had to fight in difficult conditions: in the summer, a huge number of mosquitoes, not
giving the soldiers rest day or night, in the winter, severe frosts and snow drifts. All this around forests and
swamps, for which walking is difficult, not to mention the movement of vehicles, artillery pieces, tanks and other
equipment.
After careful consideration of all options it was decided to break through the German fortifications slightly north
of the place where they attempted to break the blockade from 19th August to 10th October 1942 while conducting
the Sinyavino offensive. "This area was the most difficult due to the presence of the extremely powerful enemy
fortifications, but also the shortest. We had to overcome a 12-kilometer strip between Shlisselburg and Limes, or
six miles for each of our two fronts", – wrote K.A Meretskov.
The Leningrad front was to strike a counter blow only in the place close to the troops of the Volkhov front. There
was not the sufficient force for a deeper operation on the Leningrad front, since all the supplies to the front and
the city was carried on the Road of life, that is, on the ice of Lake Ladoga.
The Germans tried to cut the Road of life, but the Dry Islands were split. Because of the position of the Leningrad
front and the difficulty of moving equipment in a swampy area, they had to plan the attack on the Shlisselburg–
Sinyavino ledge area fortified by the Germans. The Germans density of troops in this area twice exceeded the age
envisaged in their charters.
But the Stavka could provide for each kilometer of the front, on average, 160 guns and mortars. This allowed our
troops to create an extremely high density of fire, enough to break the German fortifications. All of the front-line
aviation of the 14th air army Major-General I.P Zhuravlev was re-deployed to the site of the approach. The
operation also involved the long-range aviation of Colonel-General A.E Golovanov. The Baltic fleet and the
Ladoga military flotilla supported the offensive of our troops.
On the 12th of January 1943, aviation and artillery preparation began. Our artillery destroyed the German lines
for about two hours. Tens of tons of metal thrown at the enemy destroyed the German positions and suppressed
their many gun emplacements. Our troops went on the offensive.
The maximum resistance of the enemy had made in the area of Round grove. All day there was fighting, which
repeatedly turned into fistfights. By the evening the specified node of the resistance was taken. The 327th division,
after this perfect feat, was renamed as guards. On the 13th and 14th January Lipki and Workers Settlement No.
8 were isolated and cut off. All attempts of fresh Germans troops to reach them at Mga were without success.
Only the two most severe kilometers remained on the fronts to break through the blockade. And they were passed.
On the 18th of January 1943, troops of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts met. The siege of Leningrad, which
lasted 500 days and nights (1 year 4 months and 10 days), was broken; the city's relationship with the country by
land had been restored.
It is the millions of heroic deeds of the Soviet people at the front and in the rear that gave us victory. The history
of the great Patriotic war has many great examples of mass displays of heroism. No country and no army in the
world knew of such heroism.
"When units of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts in late January 1943, was turned to the South, occupying
positions along the Sinyavino front, the rear was already in full swing: in the corridor North of Sinyavino a railway
to Leningrad was being built. The advancing troops moved in front of the railroad crews. They come to the
assistance of the local population, and then a number of military units from the fronts were allocated for the
construction of tracks... A temporary ice-timber bridge was erected on the Neva, which connected to a branch of
the track from the Chernaya River to the village named after Morozov.
Already February 2nd, as soon as the structurally repaired railcars were lowered and secured on the last rail, a
structure test was passed, and after four days freight trains raced past in succession on the 36-kilometer line. The
road to victory was the result of two weeks of heroic work that was put into operation", – wrote the Volkhov front
commander K.A Meretskov. Parallel to the railways were the roads cars.
The Germans began to bombard the constructed railways, but another branch to another railway line was laid in
a safer place, and with heavy artillery on both fronts and guns taken from ships of the Baltic fleet, they destroyed
a German battery, and they fell silent.
For nearly 12 months the front's troops' involvement in the fighting became more or less inflamed, in the direction
of Mga station, trying to broaden the band of liberated territory and not allowing the Germans to take back the
already conquered soil. But our armies did not have the forces sufficient to break through the German defenses.
And the Stavka could not allocate additional troops because the main reserves were left in Stalingrad and Kursk,
which decided the fate of the war.
After breaking the siege in battle on 18th January 1943, Soviet artillery and aircraft harassed the Germans. A.E
Golovanov wrote that German troops in the area of Sinyavino were bombarded by large groups of amassed planes,
which gave more visible results. So, in eleven raids on the area only 1,299 long-range bomber aircraft participated.
The front's aviation massively bombed the German troops.
It is known that when during the attack on Leningrad, the siege of the city and the retreat, not only ours, but also
the German military units suffered huge losses. But our historians and politicians are silent on this, thus
representing unjustified losses near Leningrad.
Some even write that there was no need to protect the city, and it was necessary to hand it over to the enemy, and
then Leningrad residents would have avoided hunger, and soldiers – bloody fights. People write and talk about it,
knowing that Hitler promised to destroy all the inhabitants of Leningrad.
I think they understand that the fall of Leningrad would have meant the destruction of a huge number of the
population of the Northwestern part of the USSR and the loss of tremendous quantities of material and cultural
values.
In addition, the released German and Finnish troops could have been deployed to Moscow and to other areas of
the Soviet-German front, which in turn could have led to the victory of Germany and the destruction of the entire
population of the European part of the Soviet Union.
Only haters of Russia are sorry that Leningrad was not handed over to the enemy. Hitler was going to take
Leningrad in four weeks, by July 21 1941, and free up troops to be sent to the assault on Moscow, but he could
not take the city by January 1944.
Hitler ordered to offer the surrender of the city in exchange for the German troops not taking and erasing the city
from the face of the earth, but actually, in January 1944, the German divisions stationed near Leningrad were
erased from the face of the earth by the troops of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts.
Hitler stated that Leningrad will be the first major city captured by the Germans in the Soviet Union, and spared
no effort for its capture, but he did not consider that he was fighting not in Europe but in Soviet Russia. He did
not take into account the courage of Leningrad and the strength of our weapons.

In the USSR everyone at the front and in the rear was, as they say, worth their weight in gold. Since the time of
industrialisation the country lacked the human resources for the construction of factories, work for building
enterprises in the country, and the development of the territories of the Far East and Siberia.
There was a lack of human resources to protect the homeland and the rear during the great Patriotic war; Hitler's
United Europe considerably exceeded the USSR in number. Until the summer of 1943 the troops' strength of
Germany and its allies exceeded the number of troops of the Red Army on the Eastern front by more than 1 million
people .

Despite superior enemy forces, our troops in the first half of 1942, not only in the battle of Moscow, but in other
areas in separate operations had achieved positive results.
From January 7th to May 20th 1942, armies of the Northwest front held the Demyansk offensive operation,
encompassing six German divisions (about 95,000 people). Unfortunately, it was not possible to take capture or
destroy the surrounded grouping. Most of the German troops escaped. In 1942, the Red Army conducted more
than 20 large-scale offensive and defensive operations.
Whilst performing some operations, our troops achieved significant tactical success: when the forces holding the
North-West and the right wing of the Kalinin fronts in the period from 9th January to 6th February 1942 during
the Toropets–Kholm operation, our forces moved 250 kilometres and broke through to Velikiye Luki and
Vitsebsk; in conducting an operation from 18th to 31st January in Barvenkovo-Lozovaya the troops of the
southwestern and southern fronts advanced 100km in Western and South-Western directions, inflicting significant
losses on the enemy – up to 70% of the personnel of the infantry divisions; when our forces carried out an operation
from 30th July to 23rd August at Rzhev-Sychevka on the left wing of the Kalinin and right wing of the Western
fronts, German forces suffered heavy losses in manpower (50 – 80% of staff) and technology (in the 3rd German
tank division, from 150-160 tanks only 20-30 remained).
There are other examples of successful offensives of our troops in operations in the winter and summer of 1942.
But generally we did not have enough forces to fully implement the goals set for operations in the spring and
summer of 1942.
However, it was necessary to continue to conduct offensive operations on certain routes: first, to expel the enemy
from the occupied territories, secondly, to preserve the strategic initiatives necessary to prevent large unjustified
loss, and thirdly, to help our defending troops - in particular the troops defending Sevastopol.
This support started back in 1941. On 25th December 1941, just over a month after the German and Romanian
armies captured Crimea, the Kerch-Feodosiya operation commenced - Soviet troops were planted on the Kerch
Peninsula.
The operation began with the objective of assisting Sevastopol, which, since 30th October 1941, continued to
fight the advancing German troops. On 2nd January 1942, the operation was successfully completed, and the
Kerch Peninsula was cleared of the enemy. Since that time, the defense of the Crimean Peninsula held the front.
The memoirs of German military leaders exaggerate the number of our troops that landed on the Kerch Peninsula.
"In fact, near Kerch, from 26th to 31st December, about 19,000 members of the 51st army of the Transcaucasian
front were planted. In Feodosia, from 29th to 31st December, with the help of the Chernomorsky fleet, 3 echelons
containing 23,000 troops from the staff of 44th army of the same front landed.
Taking into account the losses incurred on January 1st, no more than 40,000 people were concentrated here. By
this time the enemy had, considering transferred reserves, about the same," - writes A.V Isyaev and E.M Moroz.
They were mostly Romanian troops.
Manstein wrote about the six divisions of the 44th army that landed at Feodosiya, while there were only three:
157th and 236th infantry and 9th infantry. We didn't have not only a threefold superiority over the enemy,
according to von Manstein, but any superiority at all. But, despite the lack of superiority, our troops still occupied
the Kerch Peninsula.
Mainstein made Earl von Sponeck the scapegoat, who, it should be noted, by retreating his troops he saved the
division from destruction from the impact of Soviet paratroopers. On 23rd January 1942, von Sponeck was
sentenced to death and executed in 1944. Manstein approved their power and used their own mistakes to prosecute
others.
On 2nd January, the front line stabilized, and from that moment the commander of the 11th army began to
assemble forces against our troops standing on the Kerch Peninsula, not having enough to move into the depths
of the Crimean Peninsula. But the presence of our troops did not allow the enemy to take Sevastopol.
Therefore, on 20th March 1942, the troops of the field marshal took to the offensive against our Crimean front.
Manstein's offensive ended in defeat with heavy losses. This defeat can be explained by the superiority of the
Soviet troops, who themselves went on the offensive, as well as poor training of the German tank division. Von
Bock supports Manstein and declares the loss of the advancing German military's 72 tanks. But there were only
17 German tanks on our positions, of which 8 turned out to be serviceable and were entered by Soviet troops. V.
Goncharov concludes: "It can be stated that there was total eyewash in the Wehrmacht - from the tank regiment
to the command of the army groups".
Our offensive on 9th April on the enemy's positions had not brought us success. It should be noted that the
personnel of our troops, deployed in Crimea in January-February 1942 to assist the paratroopers, designed in the
republics of the Caucasus, showed low efficiency.

On May 8th, 1942, the Germans again assumed the offensive and captured... the Kerch Peninsula. Most
researchers and historians believe this victory was the most brilliant of victories Manstein won against
overwhelming odds. It should be noted that he won all the other victories by having superior forces to the enemy.
In my opinion, there are no grounds to assert unequivocally the superiority of our troops over the Germans due to
the fact that there is no official information about the number of German troops who took part in the May offensive
on the Kerch Peninsula.
V. Goncharov estimated our forces at 249,800 people, including those located in Kerch and Kamysh Burun as
part of the black sea fleet and Azov flotilla. V. Goncharov wrote the following on the number of German troops:
"The number of German troops is unknown and Manstein, and later German historians, chose not to report it.
From the number of units (estimated 10 divisions plus housing and attached parts) we can assume that even with
the losses in previous battles, the total number of German troops was from 150,000 to 200,000 people".
But maybe the Germans had joined forces and offset the loss in numbers in previous battles. In my opinion, the
strength of Soviet and German troops was the same, and the challenges facing them, were the same: to help their
troops in battle for Sevastopol. Soviet troops, of course, helped the defenders of the city, while the troops of
Manstein helped their Nazi invaders of the city.
Manstein claims 170,000 Soviet prisoners of war were captured in these battles. But calculations show that
Manstein wrote a lie, increasing the number of Soviet prisoners as well as constantly increasing the number of
Soviet troops opposing him.
The evacuation of the Soviet troops was made in very difficult conditions, and from 14th to 20th May, 120,000
people were taken from the Kerch Peninsula. This information is confirmed by the encyclopedia and research of
V. Goncharov.

The КВБМ (military vehicle driving school) report about the fighting, composed in July 1942, indicates 150,000
people trafficked across the Strait. And this is a real figure, as many wounded and rear divisions began crossing
over on May 9th-10th. But like the 120,000, 150,000 does not take into account those who passed through the
Strait on their own.
Part of our troops took refuge in Adzhimushkay quarries and heroically fought the enemy in October 1942. Some
of the Soviet fighters were killed in the fighting and at the crossing. A.M Vasilevsky wrote: "As a result, the
enemy, on May 14th, broke through to the outskirts of Kerch. The retreat of our troops began to the East and
across the Kerch Strait to the Taman Peninsula. The troops suffered heavy losses."
Usually entering captivity refers to being missing without a trace, that is, the number of troops where the fact of
their death is not confirmed, so it is difficult to establish the number of killed Soviet soldiers and officers in the
May fighting in defence of the Kerch Peninsula and at the crossing. The sailors of the Chernomorsky fleet and
Azov flotilla battling at sea could hardly have been among the prisoners.
A.V Vasilevsky wrote about what we had in the composition of the Crimean front 21st division. For 1942 our
infantry division of 7,000 people was considered well-stocked, which means that the number of rifle divisions of
the Crimean front was no more than 150,000 people.
Even if we take the number of our troops on the Kerch Peninsula on May 8th 1942 as equal to 249,800 people,
and deduct from this amount the evacuated, killed, remaining in the quarries, the sailors of the fleet and of the
flotilla, as well as those not taken into account who were crossing through the Strait, the number of captured
Soviet soldiers and officers could not exceed 50,000 people, and this is the maximum possible number.
I think that in fact the number of prisoners was much less. The Nazis carried out brutal terror in the city and
suburbs of Kerch; they killed 15,000 Soviet prisoners of war, killed 14,000 civilians and more than 14,000 were
taken away for forced labor in Germany.
Perhaps the number of our prisoners of war was 15,000 people, and the Germans shot them all, because they did
not want to feed and protect them; they used their course of extermination of the Soviet people, and in the number
of prisoners Manstein recorded almost all were troops of the Crimean front.
But the question arises: who issued the mandate to mindlessly rely on foreign sources and to present untrue
information?!
Kilometres of ditches were filled with corpses of children: what the murderous Nazis did in Crimea
To be able to continue to live, we need to regain the truth about the war, regardless of any difficulties. The victory
in the great Patriotic war kept our human dignity - this is our last bastion of peace. Most of the other great
achievements of the Soviet era have been forgotten.

The truth about the war shows that our problems primarily were associated with the significantly superior forces
of the "State" that attacked us – Hitler's United Europe. But, of course, there were also mistakes made by our
military commanders.
The causes of our defeat in the battle of the Kerch Peninsula were studied by the Stavka. The Stavka Committee
determined that the leadership of the troops of the Crimean front, commander Lieutenant General D.T Kozlov,
and representative of Supreme command of the army Commissar of the 1st rank L.Z Mehlis "was clearly
untenable." The front commander, and the representative of the Stavka were removed from their posts and dropped
down the ranks.

"The loss of the Kerch Peninsula put our troops defending the Sevastopol defensive area in an exceptionally
difficult situation. All the forces of the 11th German army had been turned against them. The heroic defense of
the city lasted 250 fiery days and nights.
In early July 1942, when it became clear that the third enemy offensive could not be repelled, part of defenders of
Sevastopol were evacuated to the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus. But there was still a lot of fighters on the shore
who continued the selfless struggle until 9th July. Individual units went to the Crimean guerrillas and continued
the fight there," wrote A.M Vasilevsky.
The capture of Sevastopol was the peak of Manstein's military career and at the same time, the last victory of the
German troops under his leadership.
"Leningrad, Stalingrad, Kharkov, and Kursk will be the steps to defeat, and the Dnieper, Korsun, Kamenets
Podolskiy are the lesions, which only managed to escape a complete rout. That is why crafty evaluation of the
balance of forces, modest reserves, and minor distortion will gradually be replaced by entirely inflated numbers,
overestimating their troops and shamelessly overstating the number of the enemy," writes A.V Isaev and M.E
Morozov.
Indeed, when you compare the information on the number of actual troops, you can only wonder at the extent of
the lying, which has come from General field-marshals. For example, Manstein writes that in March 1943, the
"South" army group (the former "Don" army group) had a 700-kilometer front from the Azov Sea to the area north
of Kharkov, and a balance of forces 1:7, that is, the number of Soviet troops opposing the Germans, exceeded the
latter by 7-fold. In fact, on February 22th, the number of Soviet troops was 746,057 people, and the enemy –
662,200 people.

In March, the balance of forces changed in favor of the Germans. It is obvious that the cited figures are a conscious
fraud. A normal person cannot believe that foreign and homegrown counterfeiters can distort information by 5-
10 times. And even more, people the level of field Marshal. It is a calculated forgery.
Even Hitler was fed up of the scandalous, arrogant, deceitful, suffering defeat after defeat, commander of the
"South" army group, and on 30th March 1944, he honorably sent Manstein into retirement.
And what those "Mainsteins" were doing in our country can be seen from the report of the Extraordinary State
Commission about the crime of Germans in the city of Kerch. The act was presented at the Nuremberg process.
Here's what it says:
"In January 1942, when examining Bagerovo, a ditch was discovered that was one kilometer in length, 4 meters
in width, with a depth of 2 meters and was filled with corpses of women, children, the elderly, and adolescents.
Near the trench were frozen pools of blood. There were scattered children's hats, toys, ribbons, torn-off buttons,
gloves, baby bottles, shoes, galoshes, together with stumps of arms and legs and other body parts. It was all
splashed with blood and brains."

That's why the Germans were afraid to surrender and fought to the last, not from courage, but from fear that in
captivity they would be answerable for all committed crimes. But they didn't know they had attacked the most
noble people on earth who do not kill unarmed people.
For the first time our troops retook Kerch from the Germans on 30th December 41. German troops stayed in Kerch
for just a month and a half, and during that time committed a lot of atrocities. This example is not the only evidence
of the atrocities of the Germans in Crimea. These crimes were committed by savages at the highest stage of
development of liberal European Fascism. The Germans committed such atrocities in most towns and villages of
the Soviet Union. And after all it wasn't us, but they who came to our land.
The Red Army, despite all the hatred for the enemy, never ever allowed such atrocities. The leadership of Germany
knew this, and even during the war, sophisticated lies from the relevant German service made many provocations
to degrade the Soviet army. When making these provocations, they spared neither their own nor someone else's,
and committed crimes to persecute our army again.
In most cases, our past is distorted intentionally, purposefully, and, in my opinion, this dirty work is well funded.
The falsifiers themselves compose slanderous fabrications about the alleged numerous instances of atrocities on
the part of our fighters and get the papers out of the office of Goebbels. And I must say, today's Nazis, the disciples
of Goebbels, have surpassed their teachers in the pure desecration of our past victories.
But all the efforts of Goebbels and his students to create dramatizations and myths about the atrocities of our
troops are crumbling at the first fair and comprehensive study of the issue by such researchers as A. Isaev, P.
Sutulin, O. Rubetsky, G. Pernavsky, A. Djukov, B. Goncharov, M. Morozov, I. Krichevsky, Dmitry Makeev, I.V
Pyhalov, O. Ross, K. Asmolov, and N. Mendkovich.
We are grateful for their titanic work much needed by the people. The mind and heart of a normal person shudders
at the atrocities committed by the Germans en masse on our land. In less than six months, from July 1941, in the
area of responsibility of the 11th army, which since September 1941 was commanded by E. von Manstein, a total
of 75,881 people were executed in Crimea.
"The fall of Sevastopol was the finest hour of Erich von Manstein, born von Lewinski, and this is what marked
the hour. I.V Antonyuk, sailor of the 8th naval infantry brigade:
"... we were assembled into a column, four persons wide, and pushed forward. All ragged, dirty. The Germans
shot, beat with rifle butts, shot in the air at people or at the column. When we were brought to Yalta road, before
reaching Sapun mountain, a column of tanks was coming in front of us. They did not waver, but the Krauts did
not turn our column away either. Those who tried to escape from the convoy, the Germans shot at with machine
guns. So from head to tail the Germans crushed the columns with the tank's caterpillar tracks. We were not
stopped. And tanks were continuing to advance on us all the time. Many of us tried to run away but were shot."
L.A Tarasenko, a resident of the city of Sevastopol (in 1942 she was 14 years old):
"Our long resistance made the Germans brutal. They snatched sailors from the convoy and shot them at close
range. Our fighters here and there in the column were fighting with the German guards. When we got out on the
highway, I was shocked to see how huge machines were passing the prisoners, and when they passed, the people
were squashed like frogs on the tarmac".

A.P Makarenko (Lukashevsky), Voenfeldsher of the 3rd battalion, 287th infantry regiment of the 25th Chapayev
division:
"We were pushed together with our wounded on the road to Inkerman barefoot. They were beaten and shot when
weary. Here in Inkerman was a passage of the Black river behind the barbed wire. Those who rushed to drink
and to wash, remained there. Germans threw hand grenades at all of them."

A.P Utin, sailor:

"The Germans in black uniforms with rolled-up sleeves, husky men with drunken faces snatched prisoners from
the column every 5-6 steps and shot them in the back of the head. When we reached Bakhchisarai, half of the
column was left".

N.A Yanchenko, sailor/radio operator from the training detachment of the Black Sea fleet:
"On July 4th, I was taken prisoner... On the way we were escorted by Tatar traitors. They beat the medical staff.
After prison in Sevastopol, we were escorted through the Belbek valley, which was mined. Many of our Red Army
and Red Navy men died here. We were sent into Bakhchisaray camp, it was so crowded the apple had nowhere to
fall. Three days later we were marched to Simferopol, with not only Germans accompanying us, but also Crimean
Tartar traitors. I saw once a Tatar beheading a Red Army Navyman".

Lieutenant I.P Mikhailyuk, commander of the fighter battalion of the 20th air force base of the Black Sea fleet:
"... we were told that the wounded who can walk are allowed to go in the general column, but if you fall behind,
you will be shot. It was like this all the way to Belbek... In Belbek, the German translator announced that the
Commissars and political officers were ordered to leave the column for a specified location. Then the commanders
were summoned. In the meantime, the traitors of the Crimean Tatars went between the prisoners and looked for
named people. If anyone was found, they were immediately taken away and another 15-20 people, near
recumbent".

How did a retired field-Marshal assure us? - "My opinion was shared by almost all formations of the ground
forces. And in the 11th army, the order concerning commissioners was not carried out."
And at the turning point of the corner of Cossack Bay in the direction of 35th artillery batteries, a monument
stands there nowadays with inscriptions in two languages – Russian and German, for who died here in 1942 and
in 1944. Those who were shot here, and for those who did the shooting ..." - writes A.V Isaev and E.M Morozov.
Yes, it is this kind of monuments that we started to erect now.
After the dismemberment of the Soviet Union in 1991, an attack began on the Russian army at a time when the
most powerful army in the world began to reduce its population, destroy its missiles, planes, guns, tanks, ships,
submarines, and other weapons. Years passed, but the work on the reduction of the Russian army up to amusing
proportions did not stop for a single day, and only President Vladimir Putin managed to stop the complete defeat
of the Russian army and military-industrial complex.
By destroying the Russian army, liberals inflicted to Russian and other people of Russia the same sentiment of
distress which they experienced at the time when their advanced military industry was however inferior to the
army and military industry of Hitler's United Europe.
The population of the Russian Federation after 1991 showed an absolute indifference to the condition of the
Armed Forces. Now we have to catch up and possibly Russians will pay dearly for carelessness and indifference
to the ruin of their army and the military-industrial complex.
In the pre-war period under Stalin we built and had done everything possible to strengthen the army and industrial
development, but did not have the time to attack the enemy to surpass Europe in the production of weapons and
equipment of the modern army. We did not have a sufficient period of peace to surpass all of Germany's United
Europe, which in numbers of people alone were almost twofold that of the USSR.
The military situation on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front in July 1942 changed in favor of the enemy
after capturing not only Crimea, but Sevastopol too. The Stavka and General Staff assessed the situation
realistically. In the summer of 1942 an active strategic defense was planned, reserve accumulation, and then the
transition to a decisive offensive.
Kharkiv slaughter: How "brilliant leader" Khrushchev killed thousands of soldiers
The balance of forces on the Soviet-German front by May 1942 was as follows: the Red Army had 5.1 million
people (without air defense forces and the Navy), almost 3,900 tanks, 44,900 guns and mortars, and about 2,200
combat aircraft.
The Nazi army had 6.2 million people, 3,229 tanks and assault guns, 57,000 guns and mortars, and 3395 combat
aircraft. Please note: Germany and allies had 1.1 million more soldiers and officers compared to our ground forces.
The superiority in the number of German & ally troops remained from the first day of the war until 1943.
But already in the summer of 1943 the number of troops of the Red Army exceeded the number of German troops
by 1.8 million people. And some people say that the armies of the USSR lost more troops than Germany and its
allies!
In the summer of 1942, Germany had superior guns and aircraft. We had a slight superiority in tanks, but light
tanks still constituted a large proportion of our units.
The largest grouping of German troops (more than 70 divisions) was in the Moscow area. On May 1st, 1942, 217
divisions operated on the Soviet-German front (German numbers were approximately twice as high as the
divisions of the Soviet armed forces) and 20 brigades of the enemy, that is, about 80% of all the land forces of
Germany and its allies, as well as three of the five German air fleets. In connection with this fact, the Stavka did
not move their troops from the West to the South-West direction.
And whatever may be said, in my opinion, this was the right decision, like the decision to place strategic reserves
in the area of Tula, Voronezh, Stalingrad, and Saratov.
More of our energy and resources were focused on the southwest and West. Ultimately, such a distribution of
forces led to the defeat of the German, or rather European army, and it was therefore inappropriate to speak about
the wrong distribution of our troops by the summer of 1942. It is through this distribution of troops that we had
the opportunity in November to gather sufficient strength to defeat the enemy at Stalingrad, and were able to
replenish our troops during defensive battles.
While the Germans were engaged in Kerch, the commander of the southwestern front, S.K Timoshenko, came to
the Stavka with a proposal to conduct a major offensive at Kharkov, and sent a plan of operations. S.K Timoshenko
and N. Khrushchev insisted on the implementation of the plan. Stalin agreed to conduct operations with forces of
the southwestern front involving troops of the southern front. In this instance, our intelligence once again
performed badly, and Timoshenko did not know that the Germans, on May 18th, had prepared "Operation
Fridericus-1" to eliminate the Barvenkovsky protrusion so that the area could be used as a place to concentrate
troops for the upcoming attack to the East.
Hoping for an equal balance of forces and means, which there was in the beginning of the offensive, our troops
went into the thick of the forthcoming summer offensive of the German armies. Upon the delivery of the report
of the General Staff on 17th May, 1942, Stalin proposed to stop the offensive due to the impact of the Germans
from the South. Timoshenko and Khrushchev assured that the situation in the South would be back to normal
soon. On May 18th, Stalin again spoke with Timoshenko and again received soothing assurances.

Only in the evening of 18th May did Timoshenko and Khrushchev raise the alarm and began to demand the
cessation of the offensive. Stalin was outraged. They demanded an end to the offensive for the same reasons that
Stalin had just warned them. At the time, they objected and continued the attack, and on the evening of May 18th,
began to speak the words of Stalin on their behalf. After a few hours, Stalin gave permission for the cessation of
the offensive on Kharkov, realizing that it was too late.
On May 19th, the impact grouping of our troops advancing on Kharkov was stopped by Timoshenko. As a result
of the irresponsible offensive, the three armies in the South and South-Western fronts suffered heavy casualties.
The impact troops of the southwestern front were surrounded. Forces from the 32nd army rescued 22,000 people
from the encirclement. Part of the soldiers and commanders managed to break through in small groups and go to
the eastern bank of the northern Donets.
Timoshenko and Khrushchev should have been prosecuted, but they got off lightly. Stalin took the blame because
he was the one who allowed the attack on Kharkov to begin.
In mid-June, the South-Western front, under the blows of the German troops, were twice forced to retreat and
withdraw across the river Oskol. The Kharkov battle lasted from the 12th to the 29th of May, 1942. The defeat at
Kharkov, and then in Crimea showed that by the summer of 1942 the Germans once again became stronger than
us.
As a result, we did not dislodge the Germans from Kharkov, and the Germans pushed us out of the Barvenkovsky
protrusion, and we lost an important operational bridgehead on the northern Donets. The troops of the
southwestern and southern fronts suffered heavy losses in manpower and equipment. Our historians do not analyse
these events, and write that, according to German military command, in the battles at Kharkov the Germans
captured 240,000 prisoners.

The analysis shows that the German command never in all of the war told the truth about the number of our
prisoners that were captured. And if you believe them, then in 1941 the Germans captured all surviving officers
and soldiers of the Red Army. In fact, our army only managed to grind the fresh German division and army coming
and going from Europe. England and the United States calmly watched as we bled in the fight. In their favour was
the fact that the Germans did not shed any less blood than us, and November 19th, 1942, more so than us.
The number of our soldiers and officers captured in Kharkov is greatly exaggerated. The Germans actually indicate
not the number taken prisoner, and their calculations exaggerated the initial number of staff of our armies
advancing on Kharkiv. Here the 6th army and task force of the Southwest front, coming from the Barvenkovsky
protrusion, and also the 28th army's secondary attack of Kharkov from the district of Volchansk, struck the main
blow. Germans included in number of prisoners also the numbers of the 9th army of the Southern front holding
the defence from the South near where the 57th army held the defence.
German data is not true, because first of all, not all but part of forces of the three armies were surrounded
(according to Vasilevsky and our historians, they were all surrounded by impact troops); secondly, our troops
after the German attack for nearly two weeks fought fierce battles and had large losses; thirdly, some of our
officers and soldiers came from the environment and therefore the number of Germans taken prisoner by our
military may not have exceeded 20,000 people. Thousands of people taken into captivity is a lot.
I think that along with the dead, we lost about 80,000 people in this battle. We must remember that at that time
our army had a strength of much (often almost double) below what was authorized. In my opinion, regardless of
whether we would keep the defense of the Barvenkovsky protrusion or, as actually happened, we began the
offensive on Kharkov, in any case, we would have crumbled and would have left a foothold, because our troops,
exhausted from fighting in the offensive that liberated hundreds of thousands of square meters of his native land,
was in need of rest, replenishment of men, and ammunition and equipment. After losing the battle of Kharkov,
we had lost the bridgehead on the Northern Donets - Barvenkovsky protrusion.
The Supreme command needed larger reserves for planning offensive operations. Therefore, the General Staff did
not plan any major offensive operations in the summer of 1942. But against the German forces, surpassing the
Red Army by 1.1 million people, we could not hold the defense on the direction of the main attack for long, and
were forced to retreat under the threat of encirclement.
It was impossible to compensate for the missing numbers with the number of artillery, aircraft, and other weapons,
as evacation operations has only just started to operate at full capacity, and the military industry of Europe was
superior to the military industry of the Soviet Union.

And the threat of encirclement was real. "On June 28th, the Nazi group forces of Colonel-General Weichs went
on the offensive from the areas East of Kursk. The Nazi command counted on this attack and blows from
Volchansk to Voronezh to surround and destroy the troops of the Bryansk front, covering the Voronezh direction,
and then turning to the South, with an additional impact near Slavyansk, to destroy the troops of the southwestern
and southern fronts, and to open the way to the Volga and the North Caucasus," writes A.M Vasilevsky.
The commanders of these fronts were, respectively, F.I Golikov, S.K Timoshenko, and Malinovsky. In the future,
the Bryansk front was divided into two: Bryansk and Voronezh. On 14.07.1942, Lieutenant-General N. F. Vatutin
was appointed the commander of the Voronezh front.
During the decision on the choice of the front commander, Vatutin worked as Deputy Chief of the General Staff.
All candidates who Vasilevsky, with Vatutin, offered the post of commander of the Voronezh front, Stalin
assigned. "All of a sudden Nikolai Fedorovich stood up (says the chief of the General staff A. M. Vasilevsky) and
said:
"Comrade Stalin! Assign me as commander of the Voronezh front.
"You?"And Stalin raised his eyebrows.
"I supported Vatutin, although was sorry to let him go from the General Staff."
Stalin paused, looked at me and said:
"Okay. If comrade Vasilevsky agrees with you, I don't mind."
So N.F Vatutin was the commander of the Voronezh, then southwest front, which, subordinated to the main force
of our troops, defeated the Germans at Stalingrad.
The problem of the destruction of the three fronts was entrusted to the German group of the "South" armies, which
was later divided into two groups of armies: "B", under the command of field Marshal F. Bock, and "A" - under
the command of field Marshal V. Liszt. They had distinguished themselves by their atrocities in Yugoslavia and
Greece.
The Stavka, if necessary, reinforce the troops of these fronts, and because of this, as well as the skilful actions of
the General Staff and the commanders of the Soviet troops, the Germans were unable to achieve their goals in the
environment and the destruction of the divisions, corps, and armies of our fronts. Under fighting our troops
departed to the East.
This is just how K.K Rokossovsky, on July 5th, 1942, was appointed to his post as commander of the 16th army
force commander of the Bryansk front, one of the battles in the Voronezh direction: "On the land where the battles
were part of the 5th tank army, the situation was deteriorating: the enemy continued to advance. It was necessary
to urgently bring new strength. We decided to push the front line with the reserve 7th armored corps under the
command of P.A Rotmistrov.
While at an observation post in the area where the events were unfolding, you could see the whole course of the
battle. Flat, open terrain contributed to this. Fighting with our departing units and those who were pressing on
their opponent were clearly visible. Enemy tanks could be seen in small groups on a broad front, taking cannon
fire, mainly intervalic in nature.
German infantry was moving behind them, lying from time to time and taking continuous automatic fire. In the
distance, on the horizon, through the thick clouds of dust, the movement of new columns of tanks and other
vehicles were observed.
Our anti-tank artillery quite accurately beat the advancing tanks of the enemy. Where possible it changed positions
and immediately opened fire, slowing the enemy advance and covering our departing infantry, which also fought
back with machine-gun and mortar fire. The withdrawal had an organized character. But it was obvious that,
entering into battle with their main force, approaching from the depths, the enemy will easily crush our units.
However, by this time part of the 7th tank corps arrived. Before our eyes, the corps turned and resolutely marched
towards the main tank forces of the enemy, hitting them with all our batteries, including the artillery and tank
corps. Particularly effective were the "Katyusha" volleys.
The battlefield was shrouded in clouds of dust. Through them shone a dim flash of gunfire and shell explosions.
In many places pillars of black smoke soared from burning enemy vehicles. Our infantry rallied and, together with
tanks, rushed to the enemy. The enemy could not resist this friendly and swift attack. After heavy losses, they
withdrew.
Enemy aircraft, except for certain aircraft, almost did not participate in combat. Nor did our aircraft. All our
attempts to build on the progress in this area did not produce results. But the offensive was repelled. In these
battles, the commander of the 5th Panzer army, General Lizyukov, was killed (tank units, aviation, and the
Generals went on the attack). He was moving in the combat formation of one of the connections. To inspire
tankmen, the general rushed forth in his KV tank, rushed into an arrangement of the opponent and laid down his
life." The Germans were rapidly advancing, which was facilitated by the superiority in forces and natural
conditions of the region.
On 6th July, 1942, street fighting began for Voronezh, in which Soviet troops held the left side of the city and the
bridgehead on the right Bank. Nazi occupiers had driven out all the civilian population of the captured parts of
Voronezh, destroyed over 2,000 people, who were executed on the outskirts of the city in Pishchane and more
than 500 wounded and sick who were in the city hospital.