Professional Documents
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CASE DOCTRINES
ALTHOUGH EXPERT OPINIONS FURNISHED BY PSYCHOLOGISTS REGARDING THE
TEMPERAMENT OF PARTIES ARE USUALLY GIVEN CONSIDERABLE WEIGHT BY THE
COURTS, THE EXISTENCE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY MUST STILL BE PROVEN BY
INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE.
The psychiatric evaluation of Dr. Zalsos did not explain in reasonable detail how Natividad’s condition
could be characterized as grave, deeply–rooted, and incurable within the parameters of psychological
incapacity jurisprudence. Aside from failing to disclose the types of psychological tests which she
administered on Natividad, Dr. Zalsos failed to identify in her report the root cause of Natividad’s
condition and to show that it existed at the time of the parties’ marriage. Neither was the gravity or
seriousness of Natividad’s behavior in relation to her failure to perform the essential marital obligations
sufficiently described in Dr. Zalsos’s report. Further, the finding contained therein on the incurability of
Natividad’s condition remains unsupported by any factual or scientific basis and, hence, appears to be
drawn out as a bare conclusion and even self–serving. Although expert opinions furnished by
psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties are usually given
considerable weight by the courts, the existence of psychological incapacity must still be
proven by independent evidence. (Republic vs. De Gracia, G.R. No. 171557, February 12, 2014).
ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, SHOULD REFER TO THE MOST SERIOUS CASES OF
PERSONALITY DISORDERS CLEARLY DEMONSTRATIVE OF AN UTTER INSENSITIVITY OR
INABILITY TO GIVE MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE TO THE MARRIAGE
Psychological incapacity, as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, should
refer to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It must be a malady that is so grave and
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one
is about to assume. Thus, to warrant the declaration of nullity of marriage, the psychological incapacity
must: (a) be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in a marriage; (b) have juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage;
and (c) be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved. It cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties, especially where the pieces of evidence
presented are grossly deficient to show the juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the condition
of the party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated to assume and perform the essential marital
duties. (Republic vs. Romero II, G.R. No. 209180; February 24, 2016).
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A PERSON NEED NOT HAVE HIS FEET ON EVERY SQUARE METER OF THE LAND TO
ESTABLISH PHYSICAL POSSESSION
The only question that the courts must resolve in forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases is who between
the parties is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property in dispute. The main issue is
possession de facto, independently of any claim of ownership or possession de jure that either party may
set forth in his pleading. The principal issue must be possession de facto, or actual possession, and
ownership is merely ancillary to such issue. In forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that it was in prior
physical possession of the premises until it was deprived thereof by the defendant. Jurisprudence states
that the law does not require a person to have his feet on every square meter of the ground before it can
be said that he is in possession thereof. In Bunyi v. Factor, the Court held that "visiting the property on
weekends and holidays is evidence of actual or physical possession. The fact of her residence somewhere
else, by itself, does not result in loss of possession of the subject property." (Sps. Fahrenbach v.
Pangilinan, G.R. No. 224549; August 07, 2017)
TAX DECLARATIONS AND TAX RECEIPTS MAY ONLY BECOME THE BASIS OF A CLAIM
FOR OWNERSHIP WHEN THEY ARE COUPLED WITH PROOF OF ACTUAL POSSESSION OF
THE PROPERTY
It is an elemental rule that a decree of registration bars all claims and rights which arose or may have
existed prior to the decree of registration. By the issuance of the decree, the land is bound and title thereto
quieted, subject only to certain exceptions under the property registration decree. Besides, tax
declarations and tax receipts may only become the basis of a claim for ownership when they are coupled
with proof of actual possession of the property. (Heirs of Delfin v. Rabadon, G.R. No. 165014 July 31,
2013)
FOR A CASE OF FORCIBLE ENTRY TO PROSPER, COMPLAINANT MUST JUSTIFY HIS RIGHT
TO THE DE FACTO POSSESSION (PHYSICAL OR MATERIAL POSSESSION) OF THE DISPUTED
PREMISES
Notwithstanding petitioner’s proper classification of his action, his forcible entry complaint, nonetheless,
cannot be granted on its merits, considering that he had failed to justify his right to the de facto possession
(physical or material possession) of the disputed premises. As pointed out by the CA, TD No. 00-TY-002-
11458, or the supposed document from which petitioner hinges his right to the de facto possession of the
subject land, only covers his house and not the entire land itself. Nothing appears on record to show that
he has the right to the de facto possession of the 172.80 sq. m. portion which, on the contrary, appears to
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be consistent with the claim of ownership of respondent in view of TD No. OOTY-002-13031 covering
the same property as registered in her name. Thus, with no evidence in support of petitioner's stance,
and the counter-evidence showing respondent's right to the de facto possession of the 172.80 sq. m.
portion as its ostensible owner, the forcible complaint must necessarily fail. (Javier v. Lumontad, G.R.
No. 203760, December 3, 2014)
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The strength of the buyer’s inquiry on the seller’s capacity or legal authority to sell depends on the proof
of capacity of the seller. If the proof of capacity consists of a special power of attorney duly notarized,
mere inspection of the face of such public document already constitutes sufficient inquiry. If no such
special power of attorney is provided or there is one but there appears to be flaws in its notarial
acknowledgment, mere inspection of the document will not do; the buyer must show that his
investigation went beyond the document and into the circumstances of its execution. (Heirs of Sarili v.
Lagrosa, G.R. No. 193517; January 15, 2014)
Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that the period to contest a decree of registration shall be one (1) year
from the date of its entry and that, after the lapse of the said period, the Torrens certificate of title issued
thereon becomes incontrovertible and indefeasible. The prescriptive period for actions for reconveyance
is ten (10) years reckoned from the date of issuance of the certificate of title, except when the owner is in
possession of the property, in which case the action for reconveyance becomes imprescriptible
(Paraguya v. Sps. Crucillo, GR No. 200265; December 2, 2013)
However, a perusal of the pertinent deeds of absolute sale reveals that definite portions of the subject
land were eventually sold, and the buyers took possession and introduced improvements thereon,
declared the same in their names, and paid the realty taxes thereon, all without any objection from
respondents who never disputed the sales in favor of the buyers. Consequently, the Court finds that there
is, in this case, a partial factual partition or termination of the co-ownership, which entitles the buyers to
the segregation of their respective portions, and the issuance of new certificates of title in their names
upon compliance with the requirements of law (Genorga v. Heirs of Meliton, G.R. No. 224515; July 3,
2017)
The RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has been conferred with the original and exclusive power
to determine just compensation for parcels of land acquired by the State pursuant to the agrarian reform
program. To guide the RTC in this function, Section 17 of RA 6657 enumerates the factors which must be
taken into consideration to accurately determine the amount of just compensation to be awarded in a
particular case. They are: (a) the acquisition cost of the land; (b) the current value of like
properties; (c) the nature and actual use of the property, and the income therefrom; (d) the
owner's sworn valuation; (e) the tax declarations; (f) the assessment made by government
assessors; (g) the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers,
and by the government to the property; and (h) the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from
any government financing institution on the said land, if any. Corollarily, pursuant to its rule-
making power under Section 49 of the same law, the DAR translated these factors into a basic formula,
which courts have often referred to and applied, as the CA did in this case. It, however, bears stressing
that courts are not constrained to adopt the said formula in every case since the determination
of the amount of just compensation essentially partakes the nature of a judicial function. In
this accord, courts may either adopt the DAR formula or proceed with its own application for
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as long as the factors listed in Section 17 of RA 6657 have been duly considered (Land Bank v.
Alfredo Hababag, Sr., G.R. No. 172352, September 16, 2015)
RA 9700 SHALL NOT APPLY TO CLAIMS/CASES WHERE THE CLAIM FOLDERS WERE
RECEIVED BY THE LBP PRIOR TO JULY 1, 2009. IN SUCH A SITUATION, JUST
COMPENSATION SHALL BE DETERMINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 17 OF RA
6657, AS AMENDED, PRIOR TO ITS FURTHER AMENDMENT BY RA 9700.
However, it bears pointing out that while Congress passed RA 9700 on August 7, 2009, further amending
certain provisions of RA 6657, as amended, among them, Section 17, and declaring "[t]hat all previously
acquired lands wherein valuation is subject to challenge by landowners shall be completed and finally
resolved pursuant to Section 17 of [RA 6657], as amended,"74 DAR AO 2, series of 2009, which is the
implementing rules of RA 9700, had clarified that the said law shall not apply to claims/cases where the
claim folders were received by the LBP prior to July 1, 2009.75 In such a situation, just compensation shall
be determined in accordance with Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, prior to its further amendment by
RA 9700. (Land Bank of the Philippines v Kho, G.R. No. 214901, June 15, 2016)
WHILE SHE HERSELF AS CO-OWNER HAD THE RIGHT TO MORTGAGE OR EVEN SELL HER
UNDIVIDED INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY, SHE COULD NOT MORTGAGE OR
OTHERWISE DISPOSE OF THE SAME IN ITS ENTIRETY WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF OTHER
CO-OWNERS.
While she herself as co-owner had the right to mortgage or even sell her undivided interest in the subject
property, she could not mortgage or otherwise dispose of the same in its entirety without the consent of
the other co-owners. Consequently, the validity of the subject Real Estate Mortgage and the subsequent
foreclosure proceedings therefor conducted in favor of respondent bank should be limited only to the
portion which may be allotted to it, as Susana's successor-in-interest, in the event of partition (Magsano
vs. Pangasinan Savings and Loan Bank, G.R. No. 215038, October 17, 2016).