CHAPTER 2: THE LRC AND ITS RD
ABRIGO V. DE VERA
J. PANGANIBAN
 Sps Abrigo cannot validly argue that they were
fraudulently misled into believing that the property was
unregistered. A Torrens title, once registered, serves as a
notice to the whole world. All persons must take notice,
and no one can plead ignorance of the registration.
Mere registration of title is not good enough; good faith
must concur with the registration.
A person dealing with registered land is not required to go
behind the registry to determine the condition of the
property, since such condition is noted on the face of the
register or certificate of title.
 De Vera ascertained and verified that her vendor was the
sole owner and in possession of the subject property by
examining her vendors title in the Registry of Deeds and
actually going to the premises.
GUARANTEED HOMES V. VALDEZ
J. Tinga
 It could not be inferred that the petitioner had any actual
knowledge of facts that would impel it to make further
inquiry into the title of the Spouses Rodolfo.
A person dealing with registered property need not go
beyond, but only has to rely on, the title of his predecessor-
in-interest.
The purchaser is not bound by the original certificate but
only by the certificate of title of the person from whom he
had purchased the property.
Instance when a fraudulent document may become the root
of a valid title:
 Where the certificate of title was transferred to the
forger and while it remained that wat, the land was
subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser.
 The respondents cannot make out a case for quieting of
title since the title they are relying on had been cancelled.
Respondents have no title to anchor their complaint.
BARANDA V. GUSTILO
The function of a Register of Deeds with reference to the
registration of deeds encumbrances, instruments and the
like is ministerial in nature.
 The respondent Acting register of Deeds did not have any
legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of the
judge’s order directing him to cancel the notice of lis
pendens annotated in the certificates of titles of the
petitioners over the subject parcel of land.
 In case of doubt as to the proper step to him, he should
have asked the opinion of the Commissioner of Land
Registratio.
DE LEON V. DE LEON
J. Velasco, Jr.
 The subject property is the conjugal property of Bonifacio
and Anita.
 Title to the property in question only passed to Bonifacio
after he had fully paid the purchase price after 2 years his
marriage with Anita.
The mere registration of a property in the name of one
spouse does not destroy its conjugal nature. What is
material is the time when the property was acquired.
ALFONSO V. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
J. Carpio-Morales
 The facts on record show that petitioner had knowledge
of circumstances that suggested the existence of an
irregularity.
 Even her contention that she was without a remedy to
correct an erroneous entry that had been carried over to
the derivative TCT was belied by her filing before the RTC
a petition for the correction of the erroneous entries.
 Alfonso failed to take precautionary measures.
 Justice Agcaoili:
o If Alfonso made a timely discovery of the error in
the questioned entry, but still was in doubt on
how to proceed, she could have easily referred
the matter to the LRA Administrator en consulta
as authorized by Section 117 of PD 1529.
NAAWAN COMMUNITY RURAL BANK V. CA
J. CORONA
 However, a close scrutiny of the records reveals that, at
the time of the execution and delivery of the sheriffs deed
of final conveyance on September 5, 1986, the disputed
property was already covered by the Land Registration Act
and Original Certificate of Title No. 0-820 pursuant to
Decree No. N189413 was likewise already entered in the
registration book of the Register of Deeds of Cagayan De
Oro City as of April 17, 1984.
 Thus, the property was already under the operation of the
Torrens System.
 The issuance of a certificate of title had the effect of
relieving the land of all claims except those noted thereon.
 Accordingly, private respondents, in dealing with the
subject registered land, were not required by law to go
beyond the register to determine the legal condition of
the property.
 Having made the necessary inquiries, private respondents
did not have to go beyond the certificate of title.
 Considering that they exercised diligence, they should be
considered as innocent purchasers for value and in good
faith.
REGISTRATION UNDER PD 1529
MALABANAN V. REPUBLIC
J. Tinga
Section 14(1) of PD 1529: who may apply
- Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
 of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier
Section 14(1) merely requires the property sought to be
registered as already alienable and disposable at the time
the application for registration of title is filed.
 The petitioners failed to show sufficient evidence that
they have been in ownership of the land since June 12,
1945. The earliest ownership that can be gathered from
their evidence is on 1948 as shown by a tax declaration.
Section 14(2) of PD 1529
- Those who acquired ownership of a private
property by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws
2 kinds of prescription
1. Ordinary prescription: possession of the property
for 10 years and in good faith as well as just title
2. Extraordinary prescription: 30 years
Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for
public use or for public service, shall form part of the
patrimonial property of the State. There must be an express
declaration by the State that the public dominion property
is no longer intended for public service or the development
of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial.
It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are
expressly declared by the State to no longer intended for
public service or the development of national wealth that
the period of acquisitive prescription begin to run. Such
declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by
Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the
President is duly authorized by law.
 The petitioners failed to show that there is an express
declaration that the property is no longer intended for
public service of the development of national wealth.
REPUBLIC V. DOLDOL
J. Romero
Applicant must prove:
 That the land is alienable public land
 That his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land must be under a
bona fide claim or ownership since June 12, 1945 or
earlier
 Doldol’s occupation of the land only started in 1959, much
later than June 12, 1945.
REPUBLIC V. REMMAN ENTERPRISES
Section 14(1) of PD 1529: who may apply
- Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier
- Refers to the judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles to public land acquired through
CA 141
Applicants must first prove the following:
1. Subject land forms part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain
2. Applicants or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain
3. It is under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier
 The requirement that the lands must be alienable and
disposable is not satisfied in this case.
 In addition to the certification issued by the proper
government agency, applicants must prove that the DENR
Secretary had approved the classification and released the
land of public domain as alienable and disposable.
o The DENR certifications presented are not
sufficient that the subject properties are indeed
classified by the DENR Secretary as alienable and
disposable.
 The second and third requirements are also lacking.
 Applicants cannot just offer general statement which are
mere conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of
possession.
A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the
claimant does not constitute possession under claim of
ownership.
While tax declaration are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, they constitute proof of claim of ownership.
That the subject properties were declared for taxation
purposes only in 2002 gives rise to the presumption that the
respondent claimed ownership or possession of the subject
properties starting that year.
REPUBLIC V. JOSON
J. Bersamin
 The respondent failed to prove that the land was declared
as alienable and disposable at the time of the application
for registration. The note made by the surveyor is not
enough to show that the land has been classified as
alienable and disposable. The land was declared alienable
and disposable only after the application.
 A survey conducted by a geodetic engineer that
included a certification on the classification of the land
as alienable and disposable was not sufficient to
overcome the presumption that the land still formed
part of the alienable public domain.
 The declaration must be made by the President or the
Secretary of the DENR.
 Furthermore, mere certification issued by the CENRO
or PENRO did not suffice to support the application for
registration, because the applicant must also submit a
copy of the original classification of the land as
 alienable and disposable as approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified true copy by the legal custodian
of the official records.
 Respondent cannot also invoke Section 14(2) of PD 1529
because there is no express declaration that the subject
land forms part of the patrimonial property of the State or
that it is no longer intended for public use or for the
development of the national wealth.
REPUBLIC V. SESE
J. Mendoza
 The respondents fell short of the requirements provided
by Section 14(1) of PD 1529
 The annotation in the survey plan does not prove that the
land is alienable and disposable.
A mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of
public domain.
The applicant must establish the existence of a positive act
of the government such as:
1. Presidential proclamation or an executive order
2. Administrative action
3. Investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands
investigators
4. Legislative act or statute
 The earliest that respondents and their predecessor-in-
interest can trace back possession and occupation of the
land was only in the year of 1950.
 They cannot also invoke Section 14(2) of PD 1529 because
there is no express declaration by the State that the land
is no longer intended for public use or for the
development of national wealth or a patrimonial property.
CITY MAYOR V. EBIO
J. Villarama, Jr.
 The land was formed from the alluvial deposits that have
gradually settled along the banks of Cut-cut creek.
Alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek do not form part
of the public domain as the alluvial property automatically
belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have
been added.
The only restriction provided by law is that the owner of the
adjoining property must register the same under the
Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be
subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
Public dominion cannot be acquired by prescription.
 The State is neither a necessary nor an indispensable party
to an action where no positive act shall be required from
it or where no obligation shall be imposed upon it, such as
in the case at bar. None of its properties is being divested
nor any of its rights infringed.
REPUBLIC V. EAST SILVERLANE REALTY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
J. Reyes
 The respondent cannot register the subject property in its
name on the basis of Section 14(2) of PD 1529.
The period of possession preceding the classification of the
property as patrimonial cannot be considered in
determining the completion of the prescriptive period.
 It was not proven that the respondent and its
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the
subject property in the manner prescribed by law and for
the period necessary before acquisitive prescription may
apply.
 It was only in 1990 that the subject property had been
declared patrimonial and it is only then that the
prescriptive period began to run.
 Respondent cannot also invoke Section 14(1) of PD 1529.
 The earliest that the respondent can trace back the
possession of its predecessors-in-interest is in 1948.
Possession is:
 Open when it is patent, visible, apparent,
notorious and not clandestine;
 Continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and
not intermittent or occasional;
 Exclusive when the adverse possessor can show
exclusive dominion over the land and an
appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and
 Notorious when it so conspicuous that it is
generally known and talked about by public or the
people in the neighborhood.
It is only when these tax declaration are coupled with proof
of actual possession of the property that they may become
the basis of a claim of ownership.
 The testimony of the respondent’s witness is self-serving.
o Allegedly sourced from the respondent’s
predecessors-in-interest
o Did not specify the specific acts of dominion or
ownership were performed by the respondent’s
predecessors-in-interest
REPUBLIC V. CA AND TANCINCO
J. Gutierrez, Jr.
Requisites for accretion:
1. The deposit be gradual and imperceptible
2. That it be made through the effects of the current
of the water
3. The land where the accretion takes place is
adjacent to the banks of the river
 There is no evidence whatsoever to prove that the
addition to the said property was made gradually through
the effects of the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue
Rivers.
GRANDE V. CA
J. Barrera
The accretion does not become a registered land
automatically because the lot which receives it is covered
by a Torrens title.
 The accretion if not registered can be acquired by third
persons through prescription.
 The respondents have been in possession of the accretion
since 1934. It is only in 1958 when the petitioners sought
to register the land. By then, prescription had already
supervened in favor of the respondents.

INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD V. UP
J. Davide, Jr.
 When the Republic of the Philippines ceded and
transferred the property to UP through RA 3990, the
Republic completely removed the land from the public
domain.
 It divested itself of its rights and title thereto and
relinquished and conveyed the same to UP and made the
latter the absolute owner thereof, subject only to the
existing concession.
 Through RA 3990, UP is granted the authority to collect
forest charges and to supervises the operations of its
concession insofar as the property of UP is concerned.

REPUBLIC, REP. BY MINDANAO MEDICAL CENTER V. CA

J. Martin
 Proclamation No. 350 legally effected a land grant to the
Mindanao Medical Center of the whole lot validly
sufficient for initial registration under the Land
Registration Act.

LA TONDENA V. REPUBLIC
J. Leonen
 The land subject of application needs only to be classified
as alienable and disposable as of the time of the
application, provided that applicant’s possession and
occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945.
 Petitioner failed to prove possession and occupation since
June 12, 1945. The oldest record was the tax declaration
dated 1948.

REPUBLIC V. ZUBURBAN REALTY

J. Bersamin
 Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis of
possession, while Section 14(2) entitles registration on the
basis of prescription.
 Based on the records, applicants were invoking Section
14(2). However, there is no evidence showing that the
land was within an area declared to be patrimonial
property of the State or to be no longer intended for
public service or for the development of national wealth.