1. Mala in se vs. Mala Prohibita associates to come to Manila to bring the money out of the Philippines.

Commissioner of Customs, Alexander Padilla, then filed a complaint against

Padilla vs Dizon
Baltazar R. Dizon for acquitting Lo Chi Fai.
Facts: Respondent Baltazar R. Dizon acquitted, in his decision, the tourist and
Issue: Whether or not respondent Baltazar R. Dizon is guilty of gross
accused, Lo Chi Fai, saying that Lo Chi Fai had no willful intention to violate
incompetence or gross ignorance of the law in holding that the accused, Lo
the law. He also directed the release to Lo Chi Fai of at least the amount of
Chi Fai, for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the prosecution must
US$3,000.00 under Central Bank Circular No. 960.
establish that the accused had the criminal intent to violate the law.
Lo Chi Fai was caught by Customs guard at the Manila International Airport
Ruling: Yes. Baltazar R. Dizon ignored the fact that the foreign currency and
while attempting to smuggle foreign currency and foreign exchange
foreign currency instruments found in the possession of Lo Chi Fai when he
instruments out of the country.
was apprehended at the airport and the amounts of such foreign exchange
An information was filed against Lo Chi Fai with the RTC for violation of Sec. did not correspond to the foreign currency declarations presented by Lo Chi
6, Central Bank Circular No. 960 with a penal sanction provided by Sec. 1, PD Fai at the trial, and that these currency declarations were declarations
NO. 1883. belonging to other people.

Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular No. 960 provides that no person shall take out
or transmit or attempt to take out or transmit foreign exchange in any form
out of the Philippines without an authorization by the Central Bank. Tourists
and non-resident visitors may take out or send out from the Philippine foreign
exchange in amounts not exceeding such amounts of foreign exchange
brought in by them. Tourists and non-resident temporary visitors bringing
with them more than US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other foreign
currencies shall declare their foreign exchange in the form prescribed by the
Central Bank at points of entries upon arrival in the Philippines.
Sec. 1, P.D. No. 1883 provides that any person who shall engage in the trading
or purchase and sale of foreign currency in violation of existing laws or rules
and regulations of the Central Bank shall be guilty of the crime of
blackmarketing of foreign exchange and shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
temporal (minimum of 12 years and 1 day and maximum of 20 years) and a
fine of no less than P50,000.00.
At the trial, Lo Chi Fai tried to establish that he was a businessman from
Hongkong, that he had come to the Philippines 9 to 10 times to invest in
business in the country with his business associates, and that he and his
business associates declared all the money they brought in and all
declarations were handed to and kept by him. Because of the revolution
taking place in Manila during that time, Lo Chi Fai was urged by his business
In invoking the provisions of the Central Bank Circular No. 960 to justify the
release of US$3,000.00 to Lo Chi Fai, Baltazar R. Dizon again diplayed gross
incompetence and gross ignorance of law. There is nothing in the Central
Bank Circular which could be taken as authority for the trial court to release
the said amount of US Currency to Lo Chi Fai.
Estrada vs SANDIGANBAYAN GR148560 Nov. 19, 2001
FACTS: Estrada challenged the validity of RA 7659 (an act defining and
penalizing the crime of plunder) as being invalid for abolishing the element of
mens rea in crimes already punishable under the RPC, all of which are
purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due
process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him. Specifically he challenged Sec.4 on the rule of evidence which states that
“for purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary
to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of
the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth,
it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or
criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy”
ISSUE: is the contention of Estrada correct?
RULING: NO. Plunder is mala in se which requires proof of criminal intent.
Sec. 4 only means to say that where the charge is conspiracy to commit
plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act done to
further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal cats indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as constituting the pattern concerned,
however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the requisite mens
rea must be shown.
The legislative declaration in RA 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense
implies that it is a malum in se. for when the acts punished are immoral or
inherently wrong, they are mala in se and does not matter that such acts are
punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate
crimes are mainly mala in se.
Go vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172602, Sept 3, 2007 (MR)
FACTS: Petitioner, Henry Go, a private individual, stands charged with
violation of Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019, the clear terms of which
punishes public officers who, on behalf of the government, enter into
contracts or transactions manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
Background: On or about November 26, 1998, or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the accused VICENTE C. RIVERA, JR., Secretary of the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), committing the
offense in relation to his office and taking advantage of the same, in
conspiracy with accused HENRY T. GO, Chairman and President of the
Philippine International Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO), did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter into an Amended and Restated
Concession Agreement (ARCA), after the project for the construction of the
Ninoy Aquino International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) was awarded
to Paircargo Consortium/PIATCO, which ARCA substantially amended the
draft Concession Agreement covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III
under Republic Act 6957 as amended by Republic Act 7718 (BOT Law)
providing that the government shall assume the liabilities of PIATCO in the
event that the latter defaults specifically Article IV, Section 4.04 in relation to
Article I, Section 1.06 of the ARCA which term is more beneficial to PIATCO
and in violation of the BOT law, and manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government of the Republic of the Philippines.
ISSUE: Can the crime of violating Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 be committed by
private individuals?
RULING: No. The first element of the crime is that the accused must be a
public officer who enters into a contract on behalf of the government. The
philosophy behind this is that the public officer is duty bound to see to it that
the interest of the government is duly protected. Thus, should the contract
or transaction entered into by such public officer is manifestly or grossly
disadvantageous to the governments interests, the public officer is held liable
for violation of Section 3(g), whether or not this public officer profited or will
profit thereby.
In Luciano v. Estrella, Justice Reyes held that the act treated in Section 3(g)
partakes of the nature of malum prohibitum; it is the commission of that act
as defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that
determines whether or not the provision has been violated. An act which is
declared malum prohibitum, malice or criminal intent is completely
immaterial. Section 3(g), however, applies restrictively only to public officers
entering into a contract on behalf of the government manifestly or grossly
disadvantageous to the government. The criminal liability of the public
officers for violation of Section 3(g) is separate and distinct from the liability
of private persons under Section 4(b) of Republic Act No. 3019. In other
words, notwithstanding the allegation of conspiracy to violate Section 3(g),
the liability of private individuals who participated in the transaction must be
established under the appropriate provision which is Section 4(b), for
knowingly inducing or causing the public officers to commit Section
3(g) where criminal intent must necessarily be proved. This is in clear
recognition that Section 3(g), a malum prohibitum,specifically applies to
public officers only. It is well-settled that penal statutes are strictly construed
against the State and liberally for the accused, so much so that the scope of
a penal statute cannot be extended by good intention or by implication. The
Information lumping petitioner with a public official for conspiracy to violate
Section 3(g), is totally infirm. The acts for which private persons can be
charged together with the public officials are enumerated in the last
paragraph of Section 3 and Section 4, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Republic Act
No. 3019. If warranted, petitioner Go should be charged for violation
of Section 4(b) in relation to Section 3(g).
BONGALON vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 169533, March 20, 2013
Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes the crime of
child abuse under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610. Only when the
laying of hands is shown beyond reasonable doubt to be intended by the
accused to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the
child as a human being should it be punished as child abuse. Otherwise, it is
punished under the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS: On May 11, 2002, Jayson Dela Cruz (Jayson) and Roldan, his older
brother, both minors, joined the evening procession for the Santo Niño at Oro
Site in Legazpi City; that when the procession passed in front of Bongalon’s
house, the latter’s daughter Mary Ann Rose, also a minor, threw stones at
Jayson and called him “sissy”; that the petitioner confronted Jayson and
Roldan and called them names like “strangers” and “animals”; that Bongalon
struck Jayson at the back with his hand, and slapped Jayson on the face;
that Bongalon then went to the brothers’ house and challenged Rolando dela
Cruz, their father, to a fight, but Rolando did not come out of the house to
take on Bongalon; that Rolando later brought Jayson to the Legazpi City Police
Station and reported the incident; that Jayson also underwent medical
treatment at the Bicol Regional Training and Teaching Hospital; that the
doctors who examined Jayson issued two medical certificates attesting that
Jayson suffered contusions.
Bongalon denied having physically abused or maltreated Jayson. He
explained that he only talked with Jayson and Roldan after his minor
daughters had told him about Jayson and Roldan’s throwing stones at them
and about Jayson’s burning Cherrylyn’s hair. He denied shouting invectives at
and challenging Rolando to a fight, insisting that he only told Rolando to
restrain his sons from harming his daughters.
Crime charged: child abuse, an act in violation of Section 10(a) of R.A. 7610
RTC: found and declared the petitioner guilty of child abuse as charged
CA: affirmed the conviction, but modified the penalty
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was guilty of the crime charged and that
even assuming that he was guilty, his liability should be mitigated because he
had merely acted to protect her two minor daughters (ONLY SLIGHT PHYSICAL
INJURIES; PENALTY IS MITIGATED)
HELD: Although the Court affirms the factual findings of fact by the RTC and
the CA to the effect that the petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his hand
and slapped Jayson on the face, it disagrees with their holding that his acts
constituted child abuse within the purview of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act
No. 7610.
The records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that his laying of
hands on Jayson had been intended to debase the “intrinsic worth and
dignity” of Jayson as a human being, or that he had thereby intended to
humiliate or embarrass Jayson. The records showed the laying of hands on
Jayson to have been done at the spur of the moment and in anger, indicative
of his being then overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the personal safety
of his own minor daughters who had just suffered harm at the hands of
Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of his selfcontrol, he lacked that specific
intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child
as a human being that was so essential in the crime of child abuse.
It is not trite to remind that under the well-recognized doctrine of pro reo,
every doubt is resolved in favor of the petitioner as the accused. Thus, the
Court should consider all possible circumstances in his favor. Considering that
Jayson’s physical injury required five to seven days of medical attention, the
petitioner was liable for slight physical injuries under Article 266(1) of the
Revised Penal Code.
The penalty for slight physical injuries is arresto menor, which ranges from
one day to 30 days of imprisonment. In imposing the correct penalty,
however, the Court has to consider the mitigating circumstance of passion or
obfuscation under Article 13(6) of the Revised Penal Code, because the
petitioner lost his reason and self-control, thereby diminishing the exercise
of his will power. It is relevant to mention, too, that in passion or obfuscation,
the offender suffers a diminution of intelligence and intent.
Arresto menor is prescribed in its minimum period in the absence of any
aggravating circumstance that offset the mitigating circumstance of passion.
Accordingly, with the Indeterminate Sentence Law being inapplicable due to
the penalty imposed not exceeding one year, the petitioner shall suffer a
straight penalty of 10 days of arresto menor.
Edgar Teves v. Comelec & Herminio Teves
Facts:
Petitioner was a candidate for the position of Representative of the 3rd
legislative district of Negros Oriental during the May 14, 2007
elections. Respondent Herminio G. Teves filed a petition to disqualify
petitioner on the ground that in Teves v. Sandiganbayan he was convicted of
violating Section 3(h), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, for possessing pecuniary or financial interest in a
cockpit, which is prohibited under Section 89(2) of the Local Government
Code (LGC) of 1991.
Respondent alleged that petitioner is disqualified from running for public
office because he was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude which
carries the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office.
The COMELEC First Division disqualified petitioner from running for
the position of member of House of Representatives and ordered the
cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy. Upon MR, COMELEC en banc
denied the motion saying that since petitioner lost in the last 14 May 2007
congressional elections, it thereby rendered the instant MR moot and
academic.
Issue: Whether petitioner’s violation of Section 3(h), R.A. No. 3019 involves
moral turpitude?
Ruling:
Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done
contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or
depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen,
or to society in general.
The essential elements of the violation of said provision are as
follows: 1) The accused is a public officer; 2) he has a direct or indirect
financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction; 3) he
either: a) intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with
such interest, or b) is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution
or by law.
Thus, there are two modes by which a public officer who has a direct
or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or
transaction may violate Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019. The first mode is when the
public officer intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection
with his financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or
transaction. The second mode is when he is prohibited from having such an
interest by the Constitution or by law.
In Teves v. Sandiganbayan, petitioner was convicted under the
second mode for having pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit which is
prohibited under Sec. 89(2) of the Local Government Code of 1991.
The evidence for the prosecution has established that petitioner
Edgar Teves, then mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, owned the cockpit in
question. Even if the ownership of petitioner Edgar Teves over the cockpit
were transferred to his wife, still he would have a direct interest thereon
because, as correctly held by respondent Sandiganbayan, they remained
married to each other from 1983 up to 1992, and as such their property
relation can be presumed to be that of conjugal partnership of gains in the
absence of evidence to the contrary. Hence, his interest in the Valencia
Cockpit is direct and is, therefore, prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC
of 1991.
However, conviction under the second mode does not
automatically mean that the same involved moral turpitude. A
determination of all surrounding circumstances of the violation of the statute
must be considered. Besides, moral turpitude does not include such acts as
are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being
positively prohibited, as in the instant case.
The Court clarified that not every criminal act, however, involves
moral turpitude. It is for this reason that "as to what crime involves moral
turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine." In resolving the foregoing
question, the Court is guided by one of the general rules that crimes mala in
se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not.
Moral turpitude implies something immoral in itself, regardless of
the fact that it is punishable by law or not. It must not be merely mala
prohibita, but the act itself must be inherently immoral. The doing of the act
itself, and not its prohibition by statute fixes the moral
turpitude. Consequently, considering all circumstances, the Court held that
petitioner’s conviction does not involve moral turpitude.
The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not
illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the
people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or
penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to
Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit.
2. Relation of RPC to SPL
Sanchez vs People
Facts: Appellant was charged with the crime of Other Acts of Child Abuse in
an Information[6] dated August 29, 2001 which reads:
The undersigned, Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, hereby accuses
Leonilo Sanchez alias Nilo of Lajog, Clarin, Bohol of the crime of Other Acts of
Child Abuse, committed as follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of September, 2000 in the municipality of Clarin,
province of Bohol, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, acting as a Family Court, the above-named accused, with intent to
abuse, exploit and/or to inflict other conditions prejudicial to the child's
development, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously abuse
physically one [VVV],[7] a sixteen (16) year old minor, by hitting her thrice in
the upper part of her legs, and which acts are prejudicial to the child-victim's
development which acts are not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, but the same are covered by Art. 59, par. 8 of P.D. No. 603 as
amended; to the damage and prejudice of the offended party in the amount
to be proved during the trial.
The appellant argues that the injuries inflicted by him were minor in nature
that it is not prejudicial to the child-victim’s development and therefore P.D.
No. 603 is not applicable and he should be charged under the Revised Penal
Code for slight physical injuries.
Issue: Whether or not P.D. 603 as amended is applicable to the case at hand.
Ruling: In this case, the applicable laws are Article 59 of P.D. No. 603 and
Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 provides:
SECTION 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other
Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's Development. —
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or
exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's
development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No.
603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
As gleaned from the foregoing, the provision punishes not only those
enumerated under Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, but also four
distinct acts, i.e., (a) child abuse, (b) child cruelty, (c) child exploitation and
(d) being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child’s development.
The Rules and Regulations of the questioned statute distinctly and separately
defined child abuse, cruelty and exploitation just to show that these three
acts are different from one another and from the act prejudicial to the child’s
development. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, an accused can be
prosecuted and be convicted under Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act
No. 7610 if he commits any of the four acts therein. The prosecution need
not prove that the acts of child abuse, child cruelty and child exploitation have
resulted in the prejudice of the child because an act prejudicial to the
development of the child is different from the former acts.
Moreover, it is a rule in statutory construction that the word “or” is a
disjunctive term signifying dissociation and independence of one thing from
other things enumerated. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense which
it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of “or” in Section 10(a) of Republic Act
No. 7610 before the phrase “be responsible for other conditions prejudicial
to the child’s development” supposes that there are four punishable acts
therein. First, the act of child abuse; second, child cruelty; third, child
exploitation; and fourth, being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the
child’s development. The fourth penalized act cannot be interpreted, as
petitioner suggests, as a qualifying condition for the three other acts, because
an analysis of the entire context of the questioned provision does not warrant
such construal.
Appellant contends that, after proof, the act should not be considered as
child abuse but merely as slight physical injuries defined and punishable
under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant conveniently forgets
that when the incident happened, VVV was a child entitled to the protection
extended by R.A. No. 7610, as mandated by the Constitution. As defined in
the law, child abuse includes physical abuse of the child, whether the same is
habitual or not. The act of appellant falls squarely within this definition. We,
therefore, cannot accept appellant's contention.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Section 10(a) in relation to
Sections 3(a) and 3(b) No. 1 of Rep. Act No. 7610 and Sec. 59(8) of PD 603,
amended.
People vs. Saley
FACTS: Antonine Salye aka Annie Saley was found by the trial court guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of eleven counts of estafa punishable under the
RPC and six counts of illegal recruitment, one commited in large scale,
proscribed by the Labor Code.
ISSUE: Does a conviction under the Labor code for illegal recruitment bar
punishment for the offender for Estafa under the RPC?
RULING: NO. Conviction for these various offenses under the Labor Code
does not bar the punishment of the offender for estafa. Illegal recruitment is
a malum prohibitum offense where criminal intent of the accused is not
necessary for conviction while estafa is malum in se which requires criminal
intent to warrant conviction.
People vs. Simon, 234 SCRA 555 (Long case)
SUMMARY: Appeal of a drug pusher convicted under RA 6425 before the
amendment, appealed after the amendment. Amendment modifies old
penalties that does not make sense in Court and thus Court had to construct
and set out correct penalties based from the amendments.
FACTS: Accused Martin Simon was charged with a violation of Section 4,
Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. He
sold tea bags of marijuana to a Narcotics Command (NARCOM) poseur-buyer.
The confiscated 4 tea bags, weighing a total of 3.8 grams, when subjected to
laboratory examination, were found positive for marijuana.
Simon denied the accusation against him, claiming that on the day of
question, he was picked up by the police at their house while watching TV.
He was told that he was a pusher so he attempted to alight from the jeep but
he was handcuffed instead. When they finally reached the camp, he was
ordered to sign some papers and, when he refused, he was boxed in the
stomach eight or nine times by Sgt. Pejoro. He was then compelled to affix
his signature and fingerprints on the documents presented to him. He denied
knowledge of the marked money or the 4 teabags of dried marijuana leaves,
and insisted that the marked money came from the pocket of Pejoro.
Moreover, the reason why he vomited blood was because of the blows he
suffered at the hands of Pejoro.
Dr. Evelyn Gomez-Aguas, a resident physician of Romana Pangan
District Hospital, declared that she treated appellant for three days due to
abdominal pain, but her examination revealed that the cause for this ailment
was appellant’s peptic ulcer. She did not see any sign of slight or serious
external injury, abrasion or contusion on his body.
Simon was sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, to
pay a fine of twenty thousand pesos and to pay the costs.
Simon then seek the reversal of the judgement
ISSUE: Was the conviction of Simon correct?
RULING: To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the sale must be
clearly and unmistakably established. To sell means to give, whether for
money or any other material consideration. It must, therefore, be established
beyond doubt that appellant actually sold and delivered two tea bags of
marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez, who acted as the poseur-buyer, in
exchange for two twenty-peso bills.
After careful review, the Court held that there were 2 tea bags of marijuana
that was sold and there were 2 other tea bags of marijuana confiscated. Thus,
Simon should be charged of selling for the 2 tea bags of marijuana only.
However, there is an overlapping error in the provisions on the penalty
of reclusion perpetua by reason of its dual imposition, that is, as the
maximum of the penalty where the marijuana is less than 750 grams, and also
as the minimum of the penalty where the marijuana involved is 750 grams or
more. The same error has been committed with respect to the other
prohibited and regulated drugs provided in said Section 20 (RA 6425). To
harmonize such conflicting provisions in order to give effect to the whole law,
the court hereby hold that the penalty to be imposed where the quantity of
the drugs involved is less than the quantities stated in the first paragraph shall
range from prision correccional to reclusion temporal, and not reclusion
perpetua. This is also concordant with the fundamental rule in criminal law
that all doubts should be construed in a manner favorable to the accused.
The court held that Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended by Republic Act
No. 7659, has unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under the Revised Penal
Code in their technical terms, hence with their technical signification and
effects. In fact, for purposes of determining the maximum of said sentence,
the court have applied the provisions of the amended Section 20 of said law
to arrive at prision correccional and Article 64 of the Code to impose the same
in the medium period. Such offense, although provided for in a special law, is
now in effect punished by and under the Revised Penal Code. Correlatively, to
determine the minimum, the court applied first part of the aforesaid Section
1 which directs that “in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished
by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of said Code, and the minimum which shall be within
the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the
offense.”
Mitigating and aggravating circumstances under RPC not applicable to Special
Laws. However, SC states that this is because of Special Laws who impose
own penalties and do not depend on RPC for them. In this amendment and
case, penalty depends on RPC thus mitigating/aggravating circumstances
applies only as to:
While not squarely in issue in this case, but because this aspect is
involved in the discussion on the role of modifying circumstances, we
have perforce to lay down the caveat that mitigating circumstances
should be considered and applied only if they affect the periods and
the degrees of the penalties within rational limits(if penalty derived
from RPC)...cannot be below prison correcional.
As per amendment, penalty is dependent on quantity of drugs sold which is
now only 2 teabags (3.8g). SC interpreted amendment further as:
 if the marijuana involved is below 250 grams, the penalty to be
imposed shall be prision correccional; from 250 to 499 grams, prision Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the
mayor; and 500 to 749 grams, reclusion temporal. Proceeds or Instrument of the Crime. — The penalties for offenses
under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15
Indeterminate Sentence Law applies to Special Laws where penalty is derived and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs
from RPC as per sec 1 of said law. Thus, minimum should be the one lower involved is in any of the following quantities:
than minimum, which in this case would be arresto mayor (6 mo).
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, in the case at bar, appellant should be begrudged the benefit of a
minimum sentence within the range of arresto mayor, the penalty next lower 5. 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana
to prision correccional which is the maximum range have fixed through the
application of Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised Penal Code. For, with fealty xxx xxx xxx
to the law, the court may set the minimum sentence at 6 months of arresto
mayor, instead of 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional. Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing
quantities, the penalty shall range from prision correccional to
reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity.
Notes: DANGEROUS DRUGS LAW (RA 6425) amended by RA 7659

SPECIAL LAW AMENDMENTS RELEVANT TO CASE:

Sec. 13. Ladonga vs. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 141066, Feb. 17, 2005

Sections 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of Art. II of Republic Act No. 6425, as

amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, are hereby
amended to read as follows: FACTS:

Evangelina and Adronico Ladonga and spouse, conspiring and knowing fully
xxx xxx xxx
well that they did not have sufficient funds deposited with the United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), drew and issue UCPB Check No. 284743
Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. — The penalty of reclusion postdated July 7, 1990 in the amount of P9,075.55), payable to Alfredo
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand Oculam, and thereafter, without informing the latter that they did not have
pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, sufficient funds deposited with the bank to cover up the amount of the check,
unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously pass on, indorse, give
another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited and deliver the said check to Alfredo by way of rediscounting of the
drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. aforementioned checks; however, upon presentation of the check to the
drawee bank for encashment, the same was dishonored for the reason that
xxx xxx xxx the account of the accused had already been closed, to the damage and
prejudice of Alfredo.
Sec. 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby
amended to read as follows:
The RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22. Adronico applied for probation
which was granted. On the other hand, petitioner brought the case to the
Court of Appeals, arguing that the RTC erred in finding her criminally liable
for conspiring with her husband as the principle of conspiracy is inapplicable
to B.P. Blg. 22 which is a special law; moreover, she is not a signatory of the
checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof.
ISSUE:
a.) Whether conspiracy is applicable in violations of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22, by invoking art. 10 of RPC?
b.) Whether or not the cases cited by the CA in affirming in toto the
conviction of petitioner as conspirator applying the suppletory
character of the RPC to special laws like BP 22 is applicable?
RULING:
A.) YES. Some provisions of the Revised Penal Code, especially with the
addition of the second sentence in Article 10, are applicable to special laws. It
submits that B.P. Blg. 22 does not provide any prohibition regarding the
applicability in a suppletory character of the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code to it.
Article 10 of the RPC reads as follows: ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the
provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are or in the future may be
punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this
Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should
specially provide the contrary.
The article is composed of two clauses. The first provides that offenses which
in the future are made punishable under special laws are not subject to the
provisions of the RPC, while the second makes the RPC supplementary to such
laws
B.) B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application
of the provisions of the RPC. Thus, in the absence of contrary provision in B.P.
Blg. 22, the general provisions of the RPC which, by their nature, are
necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily. Indeed, in the recent
case of Yu vs. People the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on
subsidiary imprisonment under Article 39 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22.
The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy in this case is
analogous to the application of the provision on principals under Article 17
in U.S. vs. Ponte. For once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a
criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and
the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes
secondary, since all the conspirators are principals. BUT In the present case,
the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt act in
furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. Conspiracy must be established, not
by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence.
Evangeline Ladonga is ACQUITTED of the charges against her under B.P. Blg.
22 for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. No pronouncement as to costs.
People v. Luisito Bustinera
Facts:
ESC Transport hired Luisito Bustinera as a taxi driver. It was agreed
that appellant would drive the taxi from 6:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m., after which
he would return it to ESC Transport's garage and remit the boundary fee in
the amount of P780.00 per day. On December 25,1996, appellant admittedly
reported for work and drove the taxi, but he did not return it on the same day
he was supposed to. The owner of ESC reported the taxi stolen. On January
9, 1997, Bustinera's wife went to ESC Transport and revealed that the taxi had
been abandoned. ESC was able to recover. The trial court found him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft.
Issue: Which law should be applied, the RPC or “The Anti-Carnapping Law”?

Ruling:
The Anti-Carnapping Law should be applied.
Bustinera was convicted of qualified theft under Article 310 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended for the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle.
However, Article 310 has been modified, with respect to certain vehicles, by
Republic Act No. 6539, as amended, otherwise known as "AN ACT
PREVENTING AND PENALIZING CARNAPPING." When statutes are in pari
materia or when they relate to the same person or thing, or to the same
class of persons or things, or cover the same specific or particular subject
matter, or have the same purpose or object, the rule dictates that they
should be construed together interpretare et concordare leges legibus, est
optimus interpretandi modus. Every statute must be so construed and
harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence.
The elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308 of
the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2)
that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent
to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5)
that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things.
Theft is qualified when any of the following circumstances is present:
(1) the theft is committed by a domestic servant; (2) the theft is committed
with grave abuse of confidence; (3) the property stolen is either a motor
vehicle, mail matter or large cattle; (4) the property stolen consists of
coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation; (5) the property stolen is
fish taken from a fish pond or fishery; and (6) the property was taken on the
occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other
calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.
On the other hand, Section 2 of Republic Act No.6539, as amended
defines "car napping" as "the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle
belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence
against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things." The
elements of car napping are thus: (1) the taking of a motor vehicle which
belongs to another; (2) the taking is without the consent of the owner or by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons or by using force upon
things; and (3) the taking is done with intent to gain. Car napping is essentially
the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle, the concept of unlawful taking in
theft, robbery and car napping being the same. From the foregoing, since
appellant is being accused of the unlawful taking of a Daewoo sedan, it is the
anti-car napping law and not the provisions of qualified theft which would
apply
The designation in the information of the offense committed by
appellant as one for qualified theft notwithstanding, appellant may still be
convicted of the crime of carnapping. For while it is necessary that the
statutory designation be stated in the information, a mistake in the caption
of an indictment in designating the correct name of the offense is not a fatal
defect as it is not the designation that is controlling but the facts alleged in
the information which determines the real nature of the crime.
Go-Tan vs Tan
Facts: On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan
(Steven) were married.[3] Out of this union, two female children were born,
Kyra Danielle[4] and Kristen Denise.[5] On January 12, 2005, barely six years
into the marriage, petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Protective Order (TPO)[6] against Steven and her parents-in-law,
Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan (respondents) before the RTC. She
alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were causing verbal,
psychological and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5,
paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i)[7] of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,[8]
otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act
of 2004.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES PERFECTO & JUANITA,
PARENTS-IN-LAW OF SHARICA, MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE PETITION FOR THE
ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 9262, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF 2004.
Ruling: The Court rules in favor of the petitioner.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and their
children'' as any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a
woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the
person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a
common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within
or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical,
sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats
of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation
of liberty. While the said provision provides that the offender be related or
connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating
relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of
conspiracy under the RPC. Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal
Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under
special laws, such as R.A. No. 9262, in which the special law is silent on a
particular matter.

the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC may be applied

suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision of Section 47
that the RPC shall be supplementary to said law. Thus, general provisions of
the RPC, which by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied
suppletorily. Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No.
9262. For once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is
shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent
or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the
conspirators are principals.