1
ART. 19 AND 21 ABUSE OF RIGHTS subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez. Hence, the present action,
Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, et al., No. L-14628, 109 Phil. 629 , September 30, 1960
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14628 September 30, 1960
FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.
Regino Hermosisima for petitioner.
F.P. Gabriel, Jr. for respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
An appeal by certiorari, taken by petitioner Francisco Hermosisima, from a decision of Court
of Appeals modifying that of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.
On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter referred to as complaint, filed with said of
her child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural child and moral damages for alleged breach of promise.
Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied
having ever promised to marry the complainant. Upon her motion, said court ordered petitioner, on
October 27, 1954, to pay, by way of alimonypendente lite, P50.00 a month, which was, on February 16,
1955, reduced to P30.00 a month. In due course, later on, said court rendered a decision the
dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the child, Chris Hermosisima,
as the natural daughter of defendant, and confirming the orderpendente lite, ordering
defendant to pay to the said child, through plaintiff, the sum of thirty pesos (P30.00),
payable on or before the fifth day of every month sentencing defendant to pay to plaintiff
the sum of FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P4,500.00) for actual and
compensatory damages; the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as moral damages;
and the further sum of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) as attorney's fees for plaintiff, with
costs against defendant.
On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, except as to the
actual and compensatory damages and the moral damages, which were increased to P5,614.25 and
P7,000.00, respectively.
The main issue before us is whether moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for
breach of promise to marry. The pertinent facts are:
Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since 1950, Soledad then a teacher in
the Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years younger
than she, used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he had made no
promise of marriage prior thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a life insurance
underwriter in the City of Cebu, where intimacy developed among her and the petitioner, since one
evening in 1953, when after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on
board M/V "Escaño," to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February 1954, Soledad
advised petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child,
Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954, in a private maternity and clinic. However,
which was commenced on or about October 4, 1954.
Referring now to the issue above referred to, it will be noted that the Civil Code of Spain
permitted the recovery of damages for breach to marry. Article 43 and 44 of said Code provides:
ART. 43. A mutual promise of marriage shall not give rise to an obligation to
contract marriage. No court shall entertain any complaint by which the enforcement of such
promise is sought.
ART. 44. If the promise has been in a public or private instrument by an adult, or by
a minor with the concurrence of the person whose consent is necessary for the celebration
of the marriage, or if the banns have been published, the one who without just cause
refuses to marry shall be obliged to reimburse the other for the expenses which he or she
may have incurred by reason of the promised marriage.
The action for reimbursement of expenses to which the foregoing article refers
must be brought within one year, computed from the day of the refusal to celebrate the
marriage.
Inasmuch as these articles were never in force in the Philippines, this Court ruled inDe Jesus
vs. Syquia (58 Phil., 866), that "the action for breach of promises to marry has no standing in the civil
law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced . . . upon the faith of such promise".
The Code Commission charged with the drafting of the Proposed Civil Code of the Philippines deem it
best, however, to change the law thereon. We quote from the report of the Code Commission on said
Proposed Civil Code:
Articles 43 and 44 the Civil Code of 1889 refer to the promise of marriage. But
these articles are not enforced in the Philippines. The subject is regulated in the Proposed
Civil Code not only as to the aspect treated of in said articles but also in other particulars. It
is advisable to furnish legislative solutions to some questions that might arise relative to
betrothal. Among the provisions proposed are: That authorizing the adjudication of moral
damages, in case of breach of promise of marriage, and that creating liability for causing a
marriage engagement to be broken.1awphîl.nèt
Accordingly, the following provisions were inserted in said Proposed Civil Code, under
Chapter I, Title III, Book I thereof:
Art. 56. A mutual promise to marry may be made expressly or impliedly.
Art. 57. An engagement to be married must be agreed directly by the future spouses.
Art. 58. A contract for a future marriage cannot, without the consent of the parent or
guardian, be entered into by a male between the ages of sixteen and twenty years or by a
female between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years. Without such consent of the
parents or guardian, the engagement to marry cannot be the basis of a civil action for
damages in case of breach of the promise.
Art. 59. A promise to marry when made by a female under the age of fourteen years is not
civilly actionable, even though approved by the parent or guardian.
Art. 60. In cases referred to in the proceeding articles, the criminal and civil responsibility of
a male for seduction shall not be affected.
Art. 61. No action for specific performance of a mutual promise to marry may be brought.
 2
Art. 62. An action for breach of promise to marry may be brought by the aggrieved party
even though a minor without the assistance of his parent or guardian. Should the minor
refuse to bring suit, the parent or guardian may institute the action.
Art. 63. Damages for breach of promise to marry shall include not only material and
pecuniary losses but also compensation for mental and moral suffering.
Art. 64. Any person, other than a rival, the parents, guardians and grandparents, of the
affianced parties, who cause a marriage engagement to be broken shall be liable for
damages, both material and moral, to the engaged person who is rejected.
Art. 65. In case of breach of promise to marry, the party breaking the engagement shall be
obliged to return what he or she has received from the other as gift on account of the
promise of the marriage.
These article were, however, eliminated in Congress. The reason therefor are set forth in the
report of the corresponding Senate Committee, from which we quote:
The elimination of this Chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not
actionable has been definitely decide in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia, 58 Phil., 866. The history of
breach of promise suit in the United States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself
more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led
to the abolition of the rights of action in the so-called Balm suit in many of the American States.
See statutes of:
Florida 1945 — pp. 1342 — 1344
Maryland 1945 — pp. 1759 — 1762
Nevada 1943 — p. 75
Maine 1941 — pp. 140 — 141
New Hampshire 1941 — p. 223
California 1939 — p. 1245
Massachusetts 1938 — p. 326
Indiana 1936 — p. 1009
Michigan 1935 — p. 201
New York 1935
Pennsylvania p. 450
The Commission perhaps though that it has followed the more progression trend in
legislation when it provided for breach of promise to marry suits. But it is clear that the
creation of such causes of action at a time when so many States, in consequence of years of
experience are doing away with them, may well prove to be a step in the wrong direction.
(Congressional Record, Vol. IV, No. 79, Thursday, May 19, 1949, p. 2352.)
The views thus expressed were accepted by both houses of Congress. In the light of the clear
and manifest intent of our law making body not to sanction actions for breach of promise to marry,
the award of moral damages made by the lower courts is, accordingly, untenable. The Court of
Appeals said award:
Moreover, it appearing that because of defendant-appellant's seduction power,
plaintiff-appellee, overwhelmed by her love for him finally yielded to his sexual desires in
spite of her age and self-control, she being a woman after all, we hold that said
defendant-appellant is liable for seduction and, therefore, moral damages may be
recovered from him under the provision of Article 2219, paragraph 3, of the new Civil Code.
Apart from the fact that the general tenor of said Article 2219, particularly the paragraphs
preceding and those following the one cited by the Court of Appeals, and the language used in said
paragraph strongly indicates that the "seduction" therein contemplated is the crime punished as such
in Article as such in Article 337 and 338 of the Revised Penal Code, which admittedly does not exist in
the present case, we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not
only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant — who around
thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life
insurance agent are supposed to be — when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere
apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered
herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" "by having a
fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy."
The court of first instance sentenced petitioner to pay the following: (1) a monthly pension of
P30.00 for the support of the child: (2) P4,500, representing the income that complainant had
allegedly failed to earn during her pregnancy and shortly after the birth of the child, as actual and
compensation damages; (3) P5,000, as moral damages; and (4) P500.00, as attorney's fees. The Court
of Appeals added to the second item the sum of P1,114.25 — consisting of P144.20, for
hospitalization and medical attendance, in connection with the parturiation, and the balance
representing expenses incurred to support the child — and increased the moral damages to
P7,000.00.
With the elimination of this award for damages, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby affirmed, therefore, in all other respects, without special pronouncement as to cost in this
instance. It is so ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Gutierrez David,
Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-17396 May 30, 1962
CECILIO PE, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
ALFONSO PE, defendant-appellee.
Cecilio L. Pe for and in his own behalf as plaintiff-appellant.
Leodegario L. Mogol for defendant-appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
 3
Plaintiffs brought this action before the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover moral,
compensatory, exemplary and corrective damages in the amount of P94,000.00 exclusive of
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
Defendant, after denying some allegations contained in the complaint, set up as a defense that the
facts alleged therein, even if true, do not constitute a valid cause of action.
After trial, the lower court, after finding that defendant had carried on a love affair with one Lolita Pe,
an unmarried woman, being a married man himself, declared that defendant cannot be held liable for
moral damages it appearing that plaintiffs failed to prove that defendant, being aware of his marital
status, deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita's affection. So it rendered decision dismissing
the complaint.1äwphï1.ñët
Plaintiffs brought this case on appeal before this Court on the ground that the issues involved are
purely of law.
The facts as found by the trial court are: Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of one Lolita Pe.
At the time of her disappearance on April 14, 1957, Lolita was 24 years old and unmarried. Defendant
is a married man and works as agent of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory. He used to stay in the
town of Gasan, Marinduque, in connection with his aforesaid occupation. Lolita was staying with her
parents in the same town. Defendant was an adopted son of a Chinaman named Pe Beco, a collateral
relative of Lolita's father. Because of such fact and the similarity in their family name, defendant
became close to the plaintiffs who regarded him as a member of their family. Sometime in 1952,
defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray
the rosary. The two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine trysts not only
in the town of Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. They exchanged
love notes with each other the contents of which reveal not only their infatuation for each other but
also the extent to which they had carried their relationship. The rumors about their love affairs
reached the ears of Lolita's parents sometime, in 1955, and since then defendant was forbidden from
going to their house and from further seeing Lolita. The plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings
against defendant who is a Chinese national. The affair between defendant and Lolita continued
nonetheless.
Sometime in April, 1957, Lolita was staying with her brothers and sisters at their residence at 54-B
España Extension, Quezon City. On April 14, 1957, Lolita disappeared from said house. After she left,
her brothers and sisters checked up her thing and found that Lolita's clothes were gone. However,
plaintiffs found a note on a crumpled piece of paper inside Lolita's aparador. Said note, written on a
small slip of paper approximately 4" by 3" in size, was in a handwriting recognized to be that of
defendant's. In English it reads:
Honey, suppose I leave here on Sunday night, and that's 13th of this month and we will have a date
on the 14th, that's Monday morning at 10 a.m.
Reply
Love
The disappearance of Lolita was reported to the police authorities and the NBI but up to the present
there is no news or trace of her whereabouts.
The present action is based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code which provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner which is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
There is no doubt that the claim of plaintiffs for damages is based on the fact that defendant, being a
married man, carried on a love affair with Lolita Pe thereby causing plaintiffs injury in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy. But in spite of the fact that plaintiffs have clearly
established that in illicit affair was carried on between defendant and Lolita which caused great
damage to the name and reputation of plaintiffs who are her parents, brothers and sisters, the trial
court considered their complaint not actionable for the reason that they failed to prove that
defendant deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita's affection Thus, the trial court said: "In the
absence of proof on this point, the court may not presume that it was the defendant who deliberately
induced such relationship. We cannot be unmindful of the uncertainties and sometimes inexplicable
mysteries of the human emotions. It is a possibility that the defendant and Lolita simply fell in love
with each other, not only without any desire on their part, but also against their better judgment and
in full consciousness of what it will bring to both of them. This is specially so with respect to Lolita,
being an unmarried woman, falling in love with defendant who is a married man."
We disagree with this view. The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita's affection
cannot lead, to any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery,
seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. This is shown by the fact that
defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray
the rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter's family who was allowed free access
because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of her family, the two
eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs not only in Gasan but
also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. When the rumors about their illicit affairs
reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden from going to their house and even
from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese
national. Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the
parental home. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that
 4

defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and
love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her
family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed
an injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as
contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review and set aside the
Decision1 of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmed in toto the 16
October 1939 Decision of Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil
Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue of whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of
promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced to pay the The antecedents of this case are not complicated:
plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of
litigations. Costs against appellee. On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid
trial court a complaint2 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement
Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur. to get married. She alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and
a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner, on
the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an
exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City;
before 20 August 1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the
condition that they would get married; they therefore agreed to get married after the end of the
school semester, which was in October of that year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's
parents in Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20
August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin
before she began living with him; a week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude
towards her started to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such
maltreatment, she sustained injuries; during a confrontation with a representative of the barangay
captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage
agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married to
someone living in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner
to pay her damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses
G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993 amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as
may be just and equitable. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,
vs. In his Answer with Counterclaim,3 petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of the parties
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents. as averred in the complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner. alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he never proposed marriage to
or agreed to be married with the private respondent; he neither sought the consent and approval of
Corleto R. Castro for private respondent. her parents nor forced her to live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop
coming to his place because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money and
passport; and finally, no confrontation took place with a representative of the barangay captain.
Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a result
thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered
DAVIDE, JR., J.: mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous
expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages.
 5
After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order4 embodying
the stipulated facts which the parties had agreed upon, to wit:
1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, while the defendant is
single, Iranian citizen and resident (sic) of Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since September 1,
1987 up to the present;
2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum Northwestern, Dagupan City, College of
Medicine, second year medicine proper;
3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette , Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City
since July, 1986 up to the present and a (sic) high school graduate;
4. That the parties happened to know each other when the manager of the Mabuhay Luncheonette,
Johhny Rabino introduced the defendant to the plaintiff on August 3, 1986.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on 16 October
1989 a decision5 favoring the private respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter
damages and attorney's fees; the dispositive portion of the decision reads:
IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant.
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos
as moral damages.
2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of three thousand (P3,000.00)
pesos as atty's fees and two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos at (sic) litigation expenses and to pay the
costs.
3. All other claims are denied.6
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private
respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue
who readily submits to sexual advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false
pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, d) because of his persuasive promise to marry her,
she allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that deceitful promise, private
respondent and her parents — in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions — made some
preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and
chickens, inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his
promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused
Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The
trial court gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony because, inter alia, she would not
have had the temerity and courage to come to court and expose her honor and reputation to public
scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false.7
The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of the evidence for the
private respondent in the foregoing decision, digested by the respondent Court as follows:
According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that she never had a
boyfriend before, defendant started courting her just a few days after they first met. He later
proposed marriage to her several times and she accepted his love as well as his proposal of marriage
on August 20, 1987, on which same day he went with her to her hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet her parents and inform them of their relationship and their
intention to get married. The photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their submarkings) of defendant with
members of plaintiff's family or with plaintiff, were taken that day. Also on that occasion, defendant
told plaintiffs parents and brothers and sisters that he intended to marry her during the semestral
break in October, 1987, and because plaintiff's parents thought he was good and trusted him, they
agreed to his proposal for him to marry their daughter, and they likewise allowed him to stay in their
house and sleep with plaintiff during the few days that they were in Bugallon. When plaintiff and
defendant later returned to Dagupan City, they continued to live together in defendant's apartment.
However, in the early days of October, 1987, defendant would tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he
went to school, and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made her sleep the
whole day and night until the following day. As a result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff became
pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine to abort the fetus. Still plaintiff continued to live
with defendant and kept reminding him of his promise to marry her until he told her that he could not
do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City. That was the time plaintiff left
defendant, went home to her parents, and thereafter consulted a lawyer who accompanied her to the
barangay captain in Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her godmother, and a barangay tanod sent by
the barangay captain went to talk to defendant to still convince him to marry plaintiff, but defendant
insisted that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City, although the
truth, as stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial, is that defendant is still single.
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had informed them of his desire
to marry Marilou, he already looked for sponsors for the wedding, started preparing for the reception
by looking for pigs and chickens, and even already invited many relatives and friends to the
forthcoming wedding. 8
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals which docketed the
case as CA-G.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief,9 he contended that the trial court erred (a) in not
 6
dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral damages,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision 10 affirming in toto the
trial court's ruling of 16 October 1989. In sustaining the trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court
made the following analysis:
First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who was already 29 years old at
the time, does not appear to be a girl of loose morals. It is uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior
to her unfortunate experience with defendant and never had boyfriend. She is, as described by the
lower court, a barrio lass "not used and accustomed to trend of modern urban life", and certainly
would (sic) not have allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive promise made by the
defendant to marry her." In fact, we agree with the lower court that plaintiff and defendant must
have been sweethearts or so the plaintiff must have thought because of the deception of defendant,
for otherwise, she would not have allowed herself to be photographed with defendant in public in so
(sic) loving and tender poses as those depicted in the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot believe,
therefore, defendant's pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to him except a waitress at the restaurant
where he usually ate. Defendant in fact admitted that he went to plaintiff's hometown of Bañaga,
Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic) the town fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18,
1988), at (sic) a beach party together with the manager and employees of the Mabuhay Luncheonette
on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on April 1, 1987 when he allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother
who told him to marry her daughter (pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left Dagupan City
where he was involved in the serious study of medicine to go to plaintiff's hometown in Bañaga,
Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some kind of special relationship between them? And this special
relationship must indeed have led to defendant's insincere proposal of marriage to plaintiff,
communicated not only to her but also to her parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of the
restaurant where plaintiff was working and where defendant first proposed marriage to her, also
knew of this love affair and defendant's proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she declared was the
reason why plaintiff resigned from her job at the restaurant after she had accepted defendant's
proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral character and must think
so low and have so little respect and regard for Filipino women that he openly admitted that when he
studied in Bacolod City for several years where he finished his B.S. Biology before he came to Dagupan
City to study medicine, he had a common-law wife in Bacolod City. In other words, he also lived with
another woman in Bacolod City but did not marry that woman, just like what he did to plaintiff. It is
not surprising, then, that he felt so little compunction or remorse in pretending to love and promising
to marry plaintiff, a young, innocent, trustful country girl, in order to satisfy his lust on her. 11
and then concluded:
In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-appellant's fraudulent and
deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue
and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
promise, and it was likewise these (sic) fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's
parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage. And as
these acts of appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against morals, good customs, and public policy,
and are even gravely and deeply derogatory and insulting to our women, coming as they do from a
foreigner who has been enjoying the hospitality of our people and taking advantage of the
opportunity to study in one of our institutions of learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be
made, under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to compensate for the moral damages and
injury that he had caused plaintiff, as the lower court ordered him to do in its decision in this case. 12
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March 1991; he raises therein
the single issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. 13
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed any moral
wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public policy; he has not professed love or proposed
marriage to the private respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for
liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a
foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian
Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had made a
promise to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable because of his
Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to take
four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not
posses good moral character. Moreover, his controversial "common law life" is now his legal wife as
their marriage had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful
cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be pinned
on him for the live-in relationship, the private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an
illicit arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he
had professed his love to the private respondent and had also promised to marry her, such acts would
not be actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case. The mere breach of promise is not
actionable. 14
On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the petition and the
petitioner had filed his Reply thereto, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the
parties to submit their respective Memoranda, which they subsequently complied with.
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments in support of his
thesis, it is clear that questions of fact, which boil down to the issue of the credibility of witnesses, are
also raised. It is the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's
findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter court having heard the witnesses and having had
 7
the opportunity to observe closely their deportment and manner of testifying, unless the trial court
had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which, if considered, might affect the result of the
case. 15
Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts had overlooked
any fact of substance or values which could alter the result of the case.
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or
weigh all over again the evidence introduced by the parties before the lower court. There are,
however, recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, in Medina vs.Asistio, Jr., 16 this Court took the time,
again, to enumerate these exceptions:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures
(Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurb
or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion
(Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts
(Cruz v. Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30,
1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellate and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto
Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia v. Court of
Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of
fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When
the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by
the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33
SCRA 242 [1970]).
Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the above quoted exceptions
in this case. Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts must be respected.
And now to the legal issue.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. 17 Congress
deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it
so. The reason therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code,
from which We quote:
The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has
been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. 18 The history of breach of promise suits in
the United States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by
designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of rights
of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of the American states. . . . 19
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the
concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold
number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and
punish in the statute books. 20
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by
positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims
of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, the
Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil
Code the following rule:
Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-year old
daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl
becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above nineteen years of
age. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the
grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and family have suffered incalculable
moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring action for damages. But under the proposed article,
she and her parents would have such a right of action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would vouchsafe adequate legal
remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide
for specifically in the statutes. 21
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
 8
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict,
known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an
Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it
includes not only negligence, but international criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false
imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the
Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain
exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be
covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 22 In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts
which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that
vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has
greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and
adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. 23
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that
where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a
woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the
giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying
her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to
accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant
to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and
the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that
such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive
protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and
womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's
parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24 In
short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single
Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code
Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal
seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the
private respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to
marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of
Appeals,25 this Court denied recovery of damages to the woman because:
. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he
is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant — who was around thirty-six (36) years
of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are
supposed to be — when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also,
because the court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner
because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him by having a fruit of their
engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at possible recovery if there had
been moral seduction, recovery was eventually denied because We were not convinced that such
seduction existed. The following enlightening disquisition and conclusion were made in the said case:
The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code Commission's
memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who had been seduced. The essential feature is seduction,
that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes
essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the
seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil.
595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the
woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal
lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par.
56) She must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts,
persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and do have that effect, and which result in her
person to ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or deception is the
essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recovery.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire of curiosity of the
female, and the defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for the commission of the act.
It has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of
the female sex, and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would be
swift to profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662)
xxx xxx xxx
 9
Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to
1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintain intimate sexual relations with appellant,
with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly
there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she
surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she
would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early
fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut short all sexual relations upon
finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his defendant did not intend to fulfill his promise.
Hence, we conclude that no case is made under article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of
action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the
complaint. 27
In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently retired from
this Court, opined that in a breach of promise to marry where there had been carnal knowledge,
moral damages may be recovered:
. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was due to mutual lust.
(Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56
(sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE
be the promise to marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal knowledge, there is a chance that there
was criminal or moral seduction, hence recovery of moral damages will prosper. If it be the other way
around, there can be no recovery of moral damages, because here mutual lust has intervened). . . .
together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses for the wedding
presentations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:
It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still subsists, notwithstanding the incorporation
of the present article31 in the Code. The example given by the Code Commission is correct, if there
was seduction, not necessarily in the legal sense, but in the vulgar sense of deception. But when the
sexual act is accomplished without any deceit or qualifying circumstance of abuse of authority or
influence, but the woman, already of age, has knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot be said that
there is an injury which can be the basis for indemnity.
But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness (sic), the action lies. The court,
however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to deceive the woman under the
circumstances, because an act which would deceive a girl sixteen years of age may not constitute
deceit as to an experienced woman thirty years of age. But so long as there is a wrongful act and a
resulting injury, there should be civil liability, even if the act is not punishable under the criminal law
and there should have been an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for that reason.
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that granting, for
argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also
at fault. According to him, both parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the
Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra vs. Marcos, 32 the private respondent cannot recover
damages from the petitioner. The latter even goes as far as stating that if the private respondent had
"sustained any injury or damage in their relationship, it is primarily because of her own doing, 33 for:
. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor sooner or later. Take
notice that she is a plain high school graduate and a mere employee . . . (Annex "C") or a waitress (TSN,
p. 51, January 25, 1988) in a luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a man who can give her
economic security. Her family is in dire need of financial assistance. (TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18, 1988).
And this predicament prompted her to accept a proposition that may have been offered by the
petitioner. 34
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he harbors a
condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of the latter's ignoble
birth, inferior educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment.
Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all moved by good faith and an honest motive.
Marrying with a woman so circumstances could not have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his
profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice,
beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her to
be his life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who
honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to
enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and
brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that the
petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which
directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in
the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his obligations.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may not have
been impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual
congress not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of
conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she found out that the petitioner was not going to
marry her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari
delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." 35At most, it
could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.
 10

Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his transgression has been
brought about by the imposition of undue influence of the party on whom the burden of the original
wrong principally rests, or where his consent to the transaction was itself procured by
fraud. 36
In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:
Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be no action by one against
the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule, however, has been interpreted as applicable only
where the fault on both sides is, more or less, equivalent. It does not apply where one party is literate
or intelligent and the other one is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209).
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get
married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his
bride-to-be:
Dear Bet —
Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the Convair today.
Please do not ask too many people about the reason why — That would only create a scandal.
Paquing

We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be said that this But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:
Court condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the petitioner stay together
in the same room in their house after giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of
NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE .
parents to protect the honor of their daughters and infuse upon them the higher values of morality
and dignity.
PAKING
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.

SO ORDERED. Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. Plaintiff adduced
evidence before the clerk of court as commissioner, and on April 29, 1955, judgment was rendered
ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary
G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964
damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and the costs.

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee,

On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings and
vs.
motion for new trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it cut. But the court, on August 2,
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.
1955, ordered the parties and their attorneys to appear before it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at
this stage of the proceedings the possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement." It added that
Jalandoni & Jamir for defendant-appellant. should any of them fail to appear "the petition for relief and the opposition thereto will be deemed
Samson S. Alcantara for plaintiff-appellee. submitted for resolution."

BENGZON, J.P., J.: On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court. Instead, on the following day his counsel
filed a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on defendants petition for relief. The counsel
The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed by appropriate stated that he would confer with defendant in Cagayan de Oro City — the latter's residence — on the
planning and serious endeavors, but terminated in frustration and, what is worse, complete public possibility of an amicable element. The court granted two weeks counted from August 25, 1955.
humiliation.
Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by the court had expired on
September 8, 1955 but that defendant and his counsel had failed to appear.
 11
Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its order of July 6, 1956 calling the
parties and their attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956. This time. however, defendant's counsel
informed the court that chances of settling the case amicably were nil.
On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant's aforesaid petition. Defendant has
appealed to this Court. In his petition of June 21, 1955 in the court a quo defendant alleged excusable
negligence as ground to set aside the judgment by default. Specifically, it was stated that defendant
filed no answer in the belief that an amicable settlement was being negotiated.
A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence,
must be duly supported by an affidavit of merits stating facts constituting a valid defense. (Sec. 3, Rule
38, Rules of Court.) Defendant's affidavit of merits attached to his petition of June 21, 1955 stated:
"That he has a good and valid defense against plaintiff's cause of action, his failure to marry the
plaintiff as scheduled having been due to fortuitous event and/or circumstances beyond his control."
An affidavit of merits like this stating mere conclusions or opinions instead of facts is not valid. (Cortes
vs. Co Bun Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951; Vaswani vs. P. Tarrachand Bros., L-15800, December 29, 1960.)
Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was in fact unnecessary, or a mere
surplusage, because the judgment sought to be set aside was null and void, it having been based on
evidence adduced before the clerk of court. In Province of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-16519, October
30, 1962, this Court pointed out that the procedure of designating the clerk of court as commissioner
to receive evidence is sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule 33) of the Rules of Court. Now as to
defendant's consent to said procedure, the same did not have to be obtained for he was declared in
default and thus had no standing in court (Velez vs. Ramas, 40 Phil. 787; Alano vs. Court of First
Instance, L-14557, October 30, 1959).
In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts that the judgment is
contrary to law. The reason given is that "there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action
for breach of promise to marry. Indeed, our ruling in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept.
30, 1960), as reiterated in Estopa vs. Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere breach of a
promise to marry" is not an actionable wrong. We pointed out that Congress deliberately eliminated
from the draft of the new Civil Code the provisions that would have it so.
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be
perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who
wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract
marriage, which was subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954.
Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The
bride-to-be's trousseau, party drsrses and other apparel for the important occasion were purchased
(Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with
accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received (Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then, with
but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old,: simply left a note for
plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it ... " He enplaned to his
home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing
changed rest assured returning soon." But he never returned and was never heard from again.
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to
marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the
above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be
solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which
defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages awarded were excessive. No question is
raised as to the award of actual damages. What defendant would really assert hereunder is that the
award of moral and exemplary damages, in the amount of P25,000.00, should be totally eliminated.
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the
cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages, defendant contends that the
same could not be adjudged against him because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the
condition precedent is that "the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or
malevolent manner." The argument is devoid of merit as under the above-narrated circumstances of
this case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton ... , reckless [and] oppressive manner." This Court's
opinion, however, is that considering the particular circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral
and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the lower court's judgment is hereby
affirmed, with costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, and Zaldivar,
JJ.,concur.
G.R. No. 101749 July 10, 1992
CONRADO BUNAG, JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, First Division, and ZENAIDA B. CIRILO, respondents.
 12
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner appeals for the reversal of the decision 1 of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on
May 17, 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. 07054, entitled "Zenaida B. Cirilo vs. Conrado Bunag, Sr. and Conrado
Bunag, Jr.," which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XI at Bacoor, Cavite,
and, implicitly, respondent court's resolution of September 3, 1991 2 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
Respondent court having assiduously discussed the salient antecedents of this case, vis-a-vis the
factual findings of the court below, the evidence of record and the contentions of the parties, it is
appropriate that its findings, which we approve and adopt, be extensively reproduced hereunder:
Based on the evidence on record, the following facts are considered indisputable: On the afternoon of
September 8, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. brought plaintiff-appellant to a motel or hotel
where they had sexual intercourse. Later that evening, said defendant-appellant brought
plaintiff-appellant to the house of his grandmother Juana de Leon in Pamplona, Las Piñas, Metro
Manila, where they lived together as husband and wife for 21 days, or until September 29, 1973. On
September 10, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant filed their respective
applications for a marriage license with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Bacoor, Cavite. On
October 1, 1973, after leaving plaintiff-appellant, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. filed an affidavit
withdrawing his application for a marriage license.
Plaintiff-appellant contends that on the afternoon of September 8, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag,
Jr., together with an unidentified male companion, abducted her in the vicinity of the San Juan de
Dios Hospital in Pasay City and brought her to a motel where she was raped. The court a quo, which
adopted her evidence, summarized the same which we paraphrased as follows:
Plaintiff was 26 years old on November 5, 1974 when she testified, single and had finished a college
course in Commerce (t.s.n., p. 4, Nov. 5, 1974). It appears that on September 8, 1973, at about 4:00
o'clock in the afternoon, while she was walking along Figueras Street, Pasay City on her way to the San
Juan de Dios Canteen to take her snack, defendant, Conrado Bunag, Jr., came riding in a car driven by
a male companion. Plaintiff and defendant Bunag, Jr. were sweethearts, but two weeks before
September 8, 1973, they had a quarrel, and Bunag, Jr. wanted to talk matters over with plaintiff, so
that he invited her to take their merienda at the Aristocrat Restaurant in Manila instead of at the San
Juan de Dios Canteen, to which plaintiff obliged, as she believed in his sincerity (t.s.n., pp. 8-10, Nov. 5,
1974).
Plaintiff rode in the car and took the front seat beside the driver while Bunag, Jr. seated himself by her
right side. The car travelled north on its way to the Aristocrat Restaurant but upon reaching San Juan
Street in Pasay City, it turned abruptly to the right, to which plaintiff protested, but which the duo
ignored and instead threatened her not to make any noise as they were ready to die and would bump
the car against the post if she persisted. Frightened and silenced, the car travelled its course thru F.B.
Harrison Boulevard until they reached a motel. Plaintiff was then pulled and dragged from the car
against her will, and amidst her cries and pleas. In spite of her struggle she was no match to the joint
strength of the two male combatants because of her natural weakness being a woman and her small
stature. Eventually, she was brought inside the hotel where the defendant Bunag, Jr. deflowered her
against her will and consent. She could not fight back and repel the attack because after Bunag, Jr.
had forced her to lie down and embraced her, his companion held her two feet, removed her panty,
after which he left. Bunag, Jr. threatened her that he would ask his companion to come back and hold
her feet if she did not surrender her womanhood to him, thus he succeeded in feasting on her
virginity. Plaintiff described the pains she felt and how blood came out of her private parts after her
vagina was penetrated by the penis of the defendant Bunag, Jr. (t.s.n. pp. 17-24, Nov. 5, 1974).
After that outrage on her virginity, plaintiff asked Bunag, Jr. once more to allow her to go home but
the latter would not consent and stated that he would only let her go after they were married as he
intended to marry her, so much so that she promised not to make any scandal and to marry him.
Thereafter, they took a taxi together after the car that they used had already gone, and proceeded to
the house of Juana de Leon, Bunag, Jr.'s grandmother in Pamplona, Las Piñas, Metro Manila where
they arrived at 9:30 o'clock in the evening (t.s.n., p. 26, Nov. 5, 1974). At about ten (10) o'clock that
same evening, defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr., father of Bunag, Jr. arrived and assured plaintiff that
the following day which was a Monday, she and Bunag, Jr. would go to Bacoor, to apply for a marriage
license, which they did. They filed their applications for marriage license (Exhibits "A" and "C") and
after that plaintiff and defendant Bunag, Jr. returned to the house of Juana de Leon and lived there as
husband and wife from September 8, 1973 to September 29, 1973.
On September 29, 1973 defendant Bunag, Jr. left and never returned, humiliating plaintiff and
compelled her to go back to her parents on October 3, 1973. Plaintiff was ashamed when she went
home and could not sleep and eat because of the deception done against her by
defendants-appellants (t.s.n., p. 35, Nov. 5, 1974).
The testimony of plaintiff was corroborated in toto by her uncle, Vivencio Bansagan who declared that
on September 8, 1973 when plaintiff failed to arrive home at 9:00 o'clock in the evening, his sister
who is the mother of plaintiff asked him to look for her but his efforts proved futile, and he told his
sister that plaintiff might have married (baka nag-asawa, t.s.n., pp. 5-6, March 18, 1976). However, in
the afternoon of the next day (Sunday), his sister told him that Francisco Cabrera, accompanied by
barrio captain Jacinto Manalili of Ligas, Bacoor, Cavite, informed her that plaintiff and Bunag, Jr. were
in Cabrera's house, so that her sister requested him to go and see the plaintiff, which he did, and at
the house of Mrs. Juana de Leon in Pamplona, Las Piñas, Metro Manila he met defendant Conrado
Bunag, Sr., who told him, "Pare, the children are here already. Let us settle the matter and have them
married."
 13
He conferred with plaintiff who told him that as she had already lost her honor, she would bear her
sufferings as Boy Bunag, Jr. and his father promised they would be married.
Defendants-appellants, on the other hand, deny that defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr.
abducted and raped plaintiff-appellant on September 8, 1973. On the contrary, plaintiff-appellant and
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. eloped on that date because of the opposition of the latter's father to
their relationship.
Defendant-appellants claim that defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant had earlier
made plans to elope and get married, and this fact was known to their friends, among them, Architect
Chito Rodriguez. The couple made good their plans to elope on the afternoon of September 8, 1973,
when defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr., accompanied by his friend Guillermo Ramos, Jr., met
plaintiff-appellant and her officemate named Lydia in the vicinity of the San Juan de Dios Hospital. The
foursome then proceeded to (the) aforesaid hospital's canteen where they had some snacks. Later,
Guillermo Ramos, Jr. took Lydia to Quirino Avenue where she could get a ride home, thereby leaving
the defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant alone. According to defendant-appellant
Bunag, Jr., after Guillermo Ramos, Jr. and Lydia left, he and plaintiff-appellant took a taxi to the
Golden Gate and Flamingo Hotels where they tried to get a room, but these were full. They finally got
a room at the Holiday Hotel, where defendant-appellant registered using his real name and residence
certificate number. Three hours later, the couple check out of the hotel and proceeded to the house
of Juana de Leon at Pamplona, Las Piñas, where they stayed until September 19, 1873.
Defendant-appellant claims that bitter disagreements with the plaintiff-appellant over money and the
threats made to his life prompted him to break off their plan to get married.
During this period, defendant-appellant Bunag, Sr. denied having gone to the house of Juan de Leon
and telling plaintiff-appellant that she would be wed to defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. In fact, he
phoned Atty. Conrado Adreneda, member of the board of directors of Mandala Corporation,
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr.'s employer, three times between the evening of September 8, 1973
and September 9, 1973 inquiring as to the whereabouts of his son. He came to know about his son's
whereabouts when he was told of the couple's elopement late in the afternoon of September 9, 1973
by his mother Candida Gawaran. He likewise denied having met relatives and emissaries of
plaintiff-appellant and agreeing to her marriage to his son. 3
A complaint for damages for alleged breach of promise to marry was filed by herein private
respondent Zenaida B. Cirilo against petitioner Conrado Bunag, Jr. and his father, Conrado Bunag, Sr.,
as Civil Case No. N-2028 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIX at Bacoor, Cavite. On August 20, 1983,
on a finding, inter alia, that petitioner had forcibly abducted and raped private respondent, the trial
court rendered a decision 4 ordering petitioner Bunag, Jr. to pay private respondent P80,000.00 as
moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, P20,000.00 by way of temperate damages, and
P10,000.00 for and as attorney's fees, as well as the costs of suit. Defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr. was
absolved from any and all liability.
Private respondent appealed that portion of the lower court's decision disculpating Conrado Bunag, Sr.
from civil liability in this case. On the other hand, the Bunags, as defendants-appellants, assigned in
their appeal several errors allegedly committed by trial court, which were summarized by respondent
court as follows: (1) in finding that defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr. forcibly abducted and
raped plaintiff-appellant; (2) in finding that defendants-appellants promised plaintiff-appellant that
she would be wed to defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr.; and (3) in awarding plaintiff-appellant
damages for the breach of defendants-appellants' promise of marriage. 5
As stated at the outset, on May 17, 1991 respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing
both appeals and affirming in toto the decision of the trial court. His motion for reconsideration
having been denied, petitioner Bunag, Jr. is before us on a petition for review, contending that (1)
respondent court failed to consider vital exhibits, testimonies and incidents for petitioner's defense,
resulting in the misapprehensions of facts and violative of the law on preparation of judgment; and (2)
it erred in the application of the proper law and jurisprudence by holding that there was forcible
abduction with rape, not just a simple elopement and an agreement to marry, and in the award of
excessive damages. 6
Petitioner Bunag, Jr. first contends that both the trial and appellate courts failed to take into
consideration the alleged fact that he and private respondent had agreed to marry, and that there
was no case of forcible abduction with rape, but one of simple elopement and agreement to marry. It
is averred that the agreement to marry has been sufficiently proven by the testimonies of the
witnesses for both parties and the exhibits presented in court.
This submission, therefore, clearly hinges on the credibility of the witnesses and evidence presented
by the parties and the weight accorded thereto in the factual findings of the trial court and the Court
of Appeals. In effect, what petitioner would want this Court to do is to evaluate and analyze anew the
evidence, both testimonial and documentary, presented before and calibrated by the trial court, and
as further meticulously reviewed and discussed by respondent court.
The issue raised primarily and ineluctably involves questions of fact. We are, therefore, once again
constrained to stress the well-entrenched statutory and jurisprudential mandate that findings of fact
of the Court of Appeals are, as a rule, conclusive upon this Court. Only questions of law, distinctly set
forth, may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, subject
to clearly settled exceptions in case law.
Our jurisdiction in cases brought to us from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising
the errors of law imputed to the latter, its findings of fact being conclusive. This Court has
emphatically declared that it is not its function to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its
jurisdiction being limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the lower
court. Barring, therefore, a showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in
the record, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion, such
 14
findings must stand, for this Court is not expected or required to examine or contrast the oral and
documentary evidence submitted by the parties. 7 Neither does the instant case reveal any feature
falling within, any of the exceptions which under our decisional rules may warrant a review of the
factual findings of the Court of Appeals. On the foregoing considerations and our review of the
records, we sustain the holding of respondent court in favor of private respondent.
Petitioner likewise asserts that since action involves a breach of promise to marry, the trial court
erred in awarding damages.
It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an action for breach of
promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property
advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. 8 Generally, therefore, a breach of promise
to marry per se is not actionable, except where the plaintiff has actually incurred expenses for the
wedding and the necessary incidents thereof.
However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to those provided
in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Correlatively, under Article 21 of said Code, in relation to paragraph
10 of said Article 2219, any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for moral
damages. 9 Article 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many
victims of moral wrongs helpless even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury,
and is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically provide for in the statutes. 10
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts of petitioner in forcibly abducting
private respondent and having carnal knowledge with her against her will, and thereafter promising to
marry her in order to escape criminal liability, only to thereafter renege on such promise after
cohabiting with her for twenty-one days, irremissibly constitute acts contrary to morals and good
customs. These are grossly insensate and reprehensible transgressions which indisputably warrant
and abundantly justify the award of moral and exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 21 in relation
to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and Article 2229 and 2234 of Civil Code.
Petitioner would, however, belabor the fact that said damages were awarded by the trial court on the
basis of a finding that he is guilty of forcible abduction with rape, despite the prior dismissal of the
complaint therefor filed by private respondent with the Pasay City Fiscal's Office.
Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that every
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. In other words, criminal liability will give rise to
civil liability ex delicto only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another
and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. 11 Hence, extinction of the penal action does not carry
with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. 12
In the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint for forcible abduction with rape was by mere
resolution of the fiscal at the preliminary investigation stage. There is no declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil case might arise did not exist. Consequently, the dismissal
did not in any way affect the right of herein private respondent to institute a civil action arising from
the offense because such preliminary dismissal of the penal action did not carry with it the extinction
of the civil action.
The reason most often given for this holding is that the two proceedings involved are not between the
same parties. Furthermore, it has long been emphasized, with continuing validity up to now, that
there are different rules as to the competency of witnesses and the quantum of evidence in criminal
and civil proceedings. In a criminal action, the State must prove its case by evidence which shows the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while in a civil action it is sufficient for the plaintiff to
sustain his cause by preponderance of evidence only. 13 Thus, in Rillon, et al. vs. Rillon, 14 we stressed
that it is not now necessary that a criminal prosecution for rape be first instituted and prosecuted to
final judgment before a civil action based on said offense in favor of the offended woman can likewise
be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, and the assailed judgment and
resolution are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J. and Padilla, J., concur.
Nocon, J., took no part.
G.R. No. 88582 March 5, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HEINRICH S. RITTER, accused-appellant,
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Esteban B. Bautista for accused-appellant.
 15
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The appellant challenges his conviction of the crime involving a young girl of about 12 years old who
had been allegedly raped and who later died because of a foreign object left inside her vaginal canal.
Heinrich Stefan Ritter was charged with the crime of rape with homicide under an information which
reads:
That on or about the tenth (10th day of October, 1986 in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with lewd design and with intent
to kill one Rosario Baluyot, a woman under twelve (12) years of age, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of said Rosario Baluyot and inserted a foreign
object into the vaginal canal of said Rosario Baluyot which caused her death shortly thereafter, to the
damage and prejudice of her relatives. (66)
When arraigned, the accused pleaded "Not Guilty". Thereafter, the case was set for trial on the
merits.
To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecutor presented the following witnesses, namely: (1) Jessie
Ramirez, (2) Maria Burgos y Turla, (3) P/Cpl. Mariano Victoria, (4) Policarpio Baluyot, (5) Dr. Reino
Rosete, (6) Sumulong Daniel, (7) Jessica Herrera, (8) Sister Eva Palencia, (9) Conrado Salonga, (10) Dr.
Devonne Loop, (11) Dr. Leo Cruz, (12) Paul Maclor, (13) Aida Sarmiento, (14) Patricia Prollamanta (15)
Mel Santos, (16) Lorna Limos, (17) Eduard Lee Bungarner, (18) Ronaldo Marquez, (19) Tom Bonte, (20)
2nd Asst. City Fiscal Nini Alcala, (21) lst Asst. City Fiscal Dorentino Z. Floresta, (22) Corazon Caber, (23)
Rodolfo Mercurio and (24) Fe Israel.
On the other hand, the defense offered in evidence Exhibits "1" to "24" and the testimonies of (1)
Heinrich S. Ritter, (2) Father Roque Villanueva, (3) Angelita Amulong (4) Gaspar Alcantara, (5) Dr. Val
Barcinal and (6) Dr. Pedro C. Solis.
The facts of the case upon which the lower court based its finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
are summarized in its decision, as follows:
The people's evidence show that on October 10, 1986 about midnight, accused Heinrich Stefan Ritter
brought a boy and girl namely: Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot inside his hotel room at MGM
Hotel along Magsaysay Drive, Olongapo City. These two (2) children were chosen from among a bunch
of street children. Once inside the hotel room accused told them to take a bath. Jessie
Ramirez, alias "Egan", was the first to take a bath and when he came out Rosario Baluyot went to the
bathroom to do the same. While Rosario Baluyot was inside the bathroom, accused Ritter took out
some pictures depicting dressed up young boys, and put them on top of the table. Other things which
were taken out and placed on top of a table were three (3) other objects which he described as like
that of a vicks inhaler. One of these objects the accused played with his hands and placed it on his
palms. The color of which is grayish blue which turned out later to be the foreign object which was
inserted inside the vagina of Rosario Baluyot. The other objects were later established to be anti-nasal
inhalers against pollution purchased by the accused in Bangkok when he went there as a tourist.
While Rosario was in the bathroom, accused told Ramirez to lay down on bed, and so did the accused.
He then started masturbating the young boy and also guided the boy's hand for him to be
masturbated, so that they masturbated each other, while they were both naked, and he gave Jessie
Ramirez an erection. When Rosario Baluyot came out of the bathroom, she was told to remove her
clothes by accused and to join him in bed. The accused then placed himself between the two (2)
children and accused started fingering Rosario.
At this time, Ramirez was already sleepy, but Rosario touched him to call his attention. He looked, and
he saw accused placing his penis against the vagina of Rosario and that he was trying to penetrate the
vagina but it would not fit. After what he saw, Ramirez did not anymore bother to look because he
was sleepy and fell asleep.
The following morning, the accused, whom the juveniles described as an "American, paid
Ramirez alias"Egan" P200.00 and Rosario P300.00. He then left them in the hotel. After the American
left, they went downstairs, and Rosario told Egan that the American inserted something in her vagina.
But they could not do anything anymore, because the American had already left, and neither did they
report the matter to the police. Sometime the following day, Jessie saw Rosario and he asked her
whether the object was already removed from her body and Rosario said "Yes". However, Jessie
Ramirez claimed that on the evening of that same date, he saw Rosario and she was complaining of
pain in her vagina and when Egan asked her, she said that the foreign object was not yet removed.
Then there was another occasion wherein Jessie was summoned and when he came he saw Rosario
writhing in pain and when he tried to talk to Rosario she scolded him with defamatory remarks.
Thereafter, he did not see Rosario anymore because he already went home to his aunt's house who
resided at Barrio Barretto and resumed his studies in the primary grades.
On May 14, 1987, Gaspar Alcantara, a defense witness, while garbage scavenging at Lot 21, near the
gate of the U.S. Naval Base saw Rosario at Magsaysay Drive near the Happy Bake Shop near Lot 21,
being ogled by people because Rosario's skirt was bloodied and she was unconscious and foul
smelling. Since nobody helped Rosario, he took pity on her condition and brought her to the Olongapo
City General Hospital in an unconscious condition, via jeepney. He went to the Information desk and
he was the one who gave the personal circumstances of Rosario as to her name, age, her residence as
Nagbakulaw, Lower Kalaklan, and Gaspar Alcantara signed as "guardian" of Rosario, while Rosario was
already in the emergency room. Although Gaspar Alcantara denied that he did not know the name of
Rosario Baluyot when he brought her to the hospital, this is belied by the testimony of the
Information clerk Lorna Limos, who was then on duty. Limos testified that it was Alcantara who
supplied the personal circumstances of Rosario. The Court gives more credence to the testimony of
Miss Limos as against Gaspar Alcantara who became a defense witness, for the reason that through
 16
his own testimony, Gaspar Alcantara claimed that even prior to May 14, 1987, he had already known
Rosario Baluyot for more than one (1) year, because he has seen the said girl go to the house of his
twin brother, Melchor Alcantara, who is his immediate neighbor. Rosario used to visit a girl by the
name of "Nora" who was then in the custody of his brother. His brother Melchor was also living with
their mother, brother and sister-in-law and their two (2) children in his house. Rosario as per Gaspar's
testimony even stays for one week or a few days at his brother's house when she visits Nora. So the
Court can safely assume that of all the more than one (1) year that he had regularly seen Rosario at
his brother's house, he must have already did come to know the name of Rosario Baluyot including
her age. In his testimony in Court he stated that he even asked Rosario for movie and softdrinks
money which can safely be concluded that he knows her very well. It is against normal behavior
especially to a Filipino who have a characteristic of curiosity not to have found out the real name of
the girl he claims to know only as "Tomboy".
While Rosario Baluyot was confined at the Olongapo City General Hospital, nobody was attending to
her since she is a street child, having stowed away from the custody of her grandmother. Three (3)
good samaritans who belong to religious and civic organizations, in the persons of Jessica Herrera, Fe
Israel and Sr. Eva Palencia, in one of their missions in the hospital chanced upon Rosario Baluyot who
was all alone with no relatives attending to her and after finding out that she was only 12 years old
decided to help her. After a short interview with Rosario, regarding her name and age only because
she clamped up about her residence and her relatives, they decided to help her by providing her the
medicine she needed during her confinement in readiness for an operation. It was Fe Israel who was
able to get the name and age of Rosario Baluyot from Rosario Baluyot herself when she saw her for
the first time. For Fe Israel, the age of Rosario Baluyot was an important factor because their program
assisted only indigent patients from infants up to 13 years old.
Rosario's first ailment at the Olongapo City General Hospital was loose bowel movement and vomiting,
which was first suspected as gastro-enteritis, but which came out later as symptoms of peritonitis due
to a massive infection in the abdominal cavity. Subsequently, on May 17, 1987, after she was
examined by the physicians at the hospital, it was found out that there was a foreign object lodged in
her vaginal canal and she had vaginal discharge tinged with blood and foul smelling odor emanating
from her body. One of the doctors who attended to her was Dr. Barcinal, an OB-GYNE. Dr. Barcinal
tried to extract the foreign object by means of a forceps, but several attempts proved futile because
said object was deeply embedded in the vaginal canal and was covered by tissues. Her abdomen was
enlarged, tender and distended, symptoms of peritonitis. The patient was feverish and incoherent
when she was scheduled for operation on May 19, 1987, after the first attempt for an operation on
May 17 was aborted allegedly because the consent of Dr. Reino Rosete, the hospital director was not
obtained. The surgeon who operated on her was Dr. Rosete himself. He testified that Rosario had to
be operated even in that condition in order to save her life. Her condition was guarded. This was
corroborated by Dr. Leo Cruz, the anesthesiologist during Rosario's operation. It was in the evening of
May 19 at about 7:00 p.m. when Dr. Rosete opened her abdomen by making a 5 inch incision on her
stomach. He found out that the fallopian tubes were congested with pus and so with the peritonieum,
and the pelvic cavity, and patches of pus in the liver, although the gallbladder and kidney appeared to
have septicemia, poisoning of the blood. The peritonitis and septicemia were traced to have been
caused through infection by the foreign object which has been lodged in the intra-vaginal canal of
Rosario. The foreign object which was already agreed upon by both parties that it is a portion of a
sexual vibrator was extracted from the vagina of Rosario while under anesthesia. Said object was
coated with tissues, pus and blood. Dr. Rosete gave it to the assisting surgical nurse for safekeeping
and gave instructions to release it to the authorized person. This object was shown by the nurse to Dr.
Leo Cruz. Dr. Rosete considered the operation successful and the patient was alive when he left her
under Dr. Cruz. Dr. Cruz stayed with said patient in the ward for about 30 minutes and thereafter he
left. The following day, Rosario got serious and it was Dr. Leo Cruz who pronounced her death at 2:00
to 2:15 in the afternoon of May 20, 1987.
Thereafter, a death certificate was prepared under the direction of Dr. Cruz which was indicated
therein that the cause of death was cardio-respiratory arrest, secondary to septicemia caused by the
foreign object lodged in the intra uteral vaginal canal of Rosario Baluyot.
The foreign object was washed by nurse Obedina, then placed it in a transparent small jar and labelled
"Rosario Baluyot". Jessica Herrera asked the nurse for the foreign object, and it was given to her
under proper receipt. Herrera then showed the same to the persons who helped financially Rosario's
case, and afterwards she gave it to Sister Eva Palencia. Sis. Palencia was in custody of the said object
until Mr. Salonga came and asked her for the object.
After Rosario Baluyot died, Sis. Palencia and a companion went to Gaspar Alcantara to ask him in
locating the relatives of Rosario. They were able to trace Rosario's grandmother, Mrs. Maria Burgos
Turla, and informed her that her granddaughter was already dead and lying in state at St. Martin
Funeral Parlor. Mrs. Turla went there with her son, who shouldered all the burial expenses for
Rosario.
Subsequently, Sis. Palencia, Fr. Cullens and Mr. Salonga came to her residence at Sta. Rita and asked
her if she was interested in filing a case against the person who caused the death of her
granddaughter. Of course she agreed. Hence, she was brought to the Fiscal's (City) Office to file the
same.
After the case was filed against the herein accused, Atty. Edmundo Legaspi with his messenger came
to her house and told her that the accused was willing to settle the case, but that accused Ritter had
only P15,000.00. The old woman did not accept it because she knows that the accused is liable to pay
damages anyway. After that, she received a letter from Atty. Legaspi telling her to get a lawyer for her
case. By this time, Mrs. Turla, who wanted to have the case settled once and for all giving the reason
that she can no longer bear the situation, sent her nephew, Conrado Marcelo to Atty. Legaspi. Her
nephew obliged and told her that she will be paid at the office of Atty. Legaspi. On a date not clear in
the records, she went with her nephew Conrado Marcelo, and Roberto Sundiam, an assistant
barangay tanod of Sta. Rita, and while they were there, she saw Ritter arrive at the law office. Ritter
 17
and Atty. Legaspi talked at the office near the bathroom, and thereafter Ritter left. After he left, Atty.
Legaspi told Rosario's grandmother that they are willing to settle for P20,000.00, but that Ritter left
only P15,000.00, so she received the money with the understanding that there was a balance of
P5,000.00 yet. She was made to sign a statement, and she was asked to change the age of her
granddaughter Rosario. With the document prepared, she and the lawyer's messenger went to the
Fiscal's office to have it subscribed, and was subscribed before an assistant city fiscal. But the balance
of P5,000.00 was not paid, because later on Atty. Legaspi became the OIC of Olongapo City and he
could no longer attend to it. Atty. Legaspi, during one of the hearings before the Court even
apologized to her.
As to the case, P/Cpl. Marino Victoria, as criminal investigator of Station "A", was directed by Col.
Daos, Station Commander of the Olongapo Police Department to make a follow up of the case of
Rosario Baluyot. On the other hand, since the suspect who inserted the foreign object inside Rosario's
vagina was said to be an American, the NISRA Subic Naval Base also conducted its investigation
headed by criminal investigator Agent Conrado Salonga. Coordinating with the local police and with
Sister Eva Palencia, since Rosario was a street child at Magsaysay Drive, they rounded up about 43
street children and from some of them they learned that Rosario Baluyot was with Jessie Ramirez with
an American at the MGM Hotel when the foreign object was inserted in her vagina. After finding
Jessie Ramirez, they asked him about Rosario Baluyot. They found out that indeed he was with
Rosario Baluyot sometime before Christmas of 1986 with an American, who brought them to the said
hotel. Jessie Ramirez was taken inside the U.S. Naval Base, Olongapo City and took his statement.
Then he was brought to Mr. Edward Lee Bungarner, a cartographer, and out of the description
supplied by Ramirez, a composite drawing was photocopied and copies thereof were distributed to
the local police and to the sentries at the gate of the U.S. Naval Base. Some American servicemen who
had resemblance to the composite drawing were photographed and these were shown to Jessie
Ramirez, but the result was negative. Aside from the physical description by Ramirez about the
appearance of the suspect, he also described him as having the mannerisms of a homo-sexual.
After obtaining information that foreign homo-sexuals frequented Ermita, Manila, and thinking that
the so-called American may be European or Australian national, the team composed of Agent Salonga,
Mr. Heinsell, P/Cpl. Marino Victoria and P/Cpl. Andres Montaon, Jessie Ramirez and Michael Johnson,
another juvenile, proceeded to Manila. They first went to the Manila NISRA Office, and thereafter
checked in a hotel. That was on September 23, 1987. On the first night, they went to Luneta Park
where foreign homo-sexuals were said to be frequenting, but the result was negative. Then on
September 25, at about 11:00 p.m., while they were standing at the corner of A. Mabini and M.H. del
Pilar Street, a male caucasian who looked like a homo-sexual stopped by admiringly infront of the two
(2) juveniles, Ramirez and Johnson. Jessie Ramirez then reported to Mr. Salonga that this foreigner
had a similarity with the American suspect, so the two minors were instructed to follow the foreigner
and to strike a conversation. They did, and when they returned, Jessie Ramirez told them that indeed
the said foreigner was the one who brought him and Rosario Baluyot to the MGM Hotel. Bobby
Salonga told Ramirez that this foreigner had no beard while the one previously described by Ramirez
had a beard. Jessie Ramirez told them that maybe he have just shaved it off. The said caucasian then
entered a bar, and after several minutes he came out, and Jessie Ramirez upon his signal with his
thumbs up, as a signal to confirm that the said foreigner is the suspect, arrested Ritter and brought
him to the Manila Western Police District. It could be mentioned at this stage that in this operation
they were accompanied by two (2) policemen from the Western Police District. The foreigner was
hand cuffed and was told that he was a suspect for Rape with Homicide. After the arrest, they first
went to the pension house of the suspect in Ermita, Manila to get his shoulder bag which contained
his personal belongings, and from there they brought him to the Western Police Department. At the
said police headquarters, they were allowed a permissive search by the foreigner of his clutch bag and
his small shoulder bag and confiscated his passport, I.D., 3 inhalers, money in the form of dollars and
travellers checks amounting about $1,500.00 and about P100.00, all duly receipted for. From the
passport they learned that the suspect's name was Heinrich Stefan Ritter, an Austrian national. During
the questioning of Hitter, Salonga and his team already left the headquarters and went to their hotel,
because at this time Jessie Ramirez was already shaking with fear after he identified the accused.
The following day, they brought the accused to Olongapo and was detained at the Olongapo City Jail.
The case for Rape with Homicide was filed against him at the City Fiscal of Olongapo. At the
preliminary investigation, accused was assisted by his own counsel. The private complainant was
Maria Burgos Turla because it was she who had custody of Rosario Baluyot after her mother Anita
Burgos died on January 12, 1982, and their father Policarpio Baluyot had left them under her custody.
When this case was filed, the father's whereabouts was unknown, and he only appeared when the
trial of this case before the Court was already in progress. And upon his (Policarpio Baluyot) own
admission, he only learned about the death of his daughter Rosario Baluyot from the newspaper, long
after Rosario was already gone.
The defense tried to dislodge the case by claiming that there could be no crime of Rape with Homicide
because the suspect was described as an American while Ritter is an Austrian. Also advanced by the
defense is that, it is a case of mistaken identity. That Rosario Baluyot was at the time of the
commission of the offense, already more than 13 years old, she having been born on December 26,
1973 as per baptismal certificate, wherein it appears that Rosario Baluyot was baptized on December
25, 1974 and was born on December 26, 1973 as testified to by Fr. Roque Villanueva of St. James
Parish Church who issued the Baptismal Certificate, having custody and possession of the book of
baptism for the year 1975, but admitted that he had no personal knowledge about the matters or
entries entered therein. Likewise, the defense's stand is that the accused cannot be liable for
Homicide because a vibrator is not a weapon of death but it is a thing for the purpose of giving sexual
pleasure, and that the death of Rosario Baluyot was due to the incompetence of Dr. Rosete, the
surgeon and Director of the Olongapo City General Hospital, who operated on her. (Rollo, pp.
109-116)
On March 29, 1989, the trial court rendered its decision. The dispositive portion of the decision reads
as follows:
 18
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court holds, that the prosecution has established
the GUILT of the accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Rape with Homicide as defined
and penalized in Art. 335 No. 3 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences HEINRICH STEFAN
RITTER to a penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of
SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS (P60,000.00) Philippine Currency, and TEN THOUSAND PESOS (Pl0,000.00) by
way of attorney's fees to the private prosecutors and to pay the costs. (Rollo, p. 126)
The accused now comes to this Court on the following assigned errors allegedly committed by the
court:
I certificate, the act or declaration about pedigree may be received in evidence on any notable fact in
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED
OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED ON OCTOBER 10, 1986 AND THAT IT WAS ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHO
COMMITTED IT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT ROSARIO BALUYOT
WAS LESS THAN TWELVE (12) YEARS OLD WHEN THE ALLEGED OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED AND IN
HOLDING THAT THERE WAS RAPE WITH HOMICIDE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GIVING CREDENCE TO AND NOT
REJECTING THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE AND IN NOT UPHOLDING THAT OF THE DEFENSE AND
ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED.
Inasmuch as it is the bounden duty of this Court to affirm a judgment of conviction only if the guilt of
the accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, it behooves us to exert the most painstaking
effort to examine the records in the light of the arguments of both parties if only to satisfy judicial
conscience that the appellant indeed committed the criminal act (See People v. Villapaña, 161 SCRA
73 [1988]).
The appellant was convicted by the trial court of the crime of rape with homicide of a young girl who
died after the rape because of a foreign object, believed to be a sexual vibrator, left inside her vagina.
As stated by the trial court one crucial issue in this case is the age of the victim—whether or not
Rosario Baluyot was less than twelve (12) years old at the time the alleged incident happened on
October 10, 1986. The age is important in determining whether or not there was statutory rape,
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code defines the third type of rape as having carnal knowledge of a
woman under 12 years of age, in which case force, intimidation, deprivation of reason or unconscious
state do not have to be present.
The trial court found that Rosario was below 12 years old when she was sexually abused by the
accused and, therefore, rape was committed inspite of the absence of force or intimidation.
In resolving the issue, the trial court put great weight on the testimonies of the victim's grandmother
and father who testified that she was born on December 22, 1975. These oral declarations were
admitted pursuant to then Rule 130, Section 33 of the Rules of Court where, in the absence of a birth
the life of a member of the family. Since birth is a matter of pedigree within the rule which permits
the admission of hearsay evidence, oral declarations are therefore admissible as proof of birth
(Decision, p. 54).
The grandmother, Maria Burgos Turla, testified that she remembered Rosario's birth date because her
brother died in Pampanga and her daughter, Anita (Rosario's mother) was the only one who failed to
attend the funeral because the latter has just given birth allegedly to Rosario (T.S.N. p. 8, Jan. 13,
1988).
The father likewise testified that as far as he could remember, Rosario was born on December 22,
1975 (T.S.N., p. 4, Jan. 27, 1988) and he was certain that Rosario was more than one (1) year old when
she was baptized (T.S.N., p. 45, Jan. 27, 1988).
The trial court further added that their testimony is supported by the clinical record and the death
certificate indicating that she was 12 years old when she was admitted at the Olongapo City General
Hospital for treatment. The age was supplied by Rosario's alleged guardian, Gaspar Alcantara to the
hospital's clinical record clerk, Lorna Limos. Fe Israel, a social worker who interviewed Rosario Baluyot
also testified that she was told by Rosario that she was 12 years old. The trial court accepted this as
adequate evidence of the truth. Moreover, Jessie Ramirez, the principal witness in this case declared
that he was born on September 5, 1973 and that he was older than Rosario Baluyot. Therefore, since
he was 13 years old in 1986, Rosario must have been less than 12 yeas old in 1986. (Decision, p. 55)
The trial court concluded that the oral declarations of the grandmother and father supported by other
independent evidence such as the clinical record, death certificate and the testimonies of Fe Israel
and Jessie Ramirez, rendered the baptismal certificate presented by the defense without any
probative or evidentiary value. (Decision, p. 55)
The findings of the trial court with respect to Rosario Baluyot's age cannot stand the application of
evidentiary rules.
 19
The trial court relied on Section 33, Rule 130 (now Section 40 of Rule 130 of the 1989 Revised Rules of
Court).
For oral evidence to be admissible under this Rule, the requisites are:
(1) That the declarant must be dead or outside of the Philippines or unable to testify;
(2) That pedigree is in issue;
(3) That the person whose pedigree is in question must be related to the declarant by birth or
marriage;
(4) That the declaration must be made before the controversy occurred or ante litem motam; and
(5) That the relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must as
a general rule be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
These requirements were not satisfied by the evidence for the prosecution nor do the declarations fall
within the purview of the rule.
The victim's grandmother and father whose declarations regarding Rosario's age were admitted by
the trial court are both alive, in the Philippines and able to testify as they both did testify in court.
Their declarations were made at the trial which is certainly not before the controversy arose. The
other witnesses who testified on Rosario's age are not members of the victim's family. The
testimonies of Rosario's relatives must be weighed according to their own personal knowledge of
what happened and not as hearsay evidence on matters of family history.
At this point, we find the evidence regarding Rosario's age of doubtful value.
The trial court justified the admissibility of the grandmother's testimony pursuant to the ruling laid
down in U.S. v. Bergantino, (3 Phil., 118 [1903]) where the Court accepted the testimony of the
mother that her daughter was 14 years old and 4 months old. The mother stated that she knew the
age because the child was born about the time of the cholera epidemic of 1889. This was not hearsay,
but came from one who had direct knowledge of the child's birth.
It is however, equally true that human memory on dates or days is frail and unless the day is an
extraordinary or unusual one for the witness, there is no reasonable assurance of its correctness.
(People v. Dasig 93 Phil. 618, 632 [1953])
With respect to the grandmother's testimony, the date of the brother's death or funeral was never
established, which indicates that the day was rather insignificant to be remembered. The father's
declaration is likewise not entirely reliable. His testimony in court does not at all show that he had
direct knowledge of his daughter's birth. He was certain though that she was more than one (1) year
old at the time she was baptized.
The other witnesses are not at all competent to testify on the victim's age, nor was there any basis
shown to establish their competence for the purpose. The clinical records were based on Gaspar
Alcantara's incompetent information given when he brought the victim to the hospital. Alcantara
came to know her only about a year before her death. He had absolutely no knowledge about the
circumstances of Rosario's birth. The death certificate relied upon by the trial court was merely based
on the clinical records. It is even less reliable as a record of birth.
All the evidence presented by the prosecution showing that Rosario Baluyot was less than 12 years
old at the time of the alleged incident are not adequate to establish the exact date of birth, much less
offset a documentary record showing a different date.
The defense presented Rosario Baluyot's baptismal certificate which the trial court rejected as being
hearsay and of no value. As against the oral declarations made by interested witnesses establishing
Rosario's age to be less than 12 years old, the evidence on record is more convincing and worthy of
belief. (See Filinvest Land, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 664, 673 [1990]).
By virtue of a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum, issued by the lower court to the St. James
Parish Church, Subic, Zambales, Fr. Roque Villanueva a Roman Catholic priest testified and stated that
he is the head of said parish. He brought with him Baptismal Register No. 9 entitled "Liber
Baptisnorum", a latin term for baptismal book or record. On page 151, No. 3 of the said Registry Book,
there appears the name of Rosario Baluyot who was baptized on December 25, 1974, and born on
December 26, 1973. Parents are Policarpio Baluyot and Anita Burgos, residents of Subic, Zambales.
Edita R. Milan appears as the only sponsor with Olongapo City as her address.
In the case of Macadangdang v. Court of appeals (100 SCRA 73 [1980]), we held that:
xxx xxx xxx
In our jurisprudence, this Court has been more definite in its pronouncements on the value of
baptismal certificates. It thus ruled that while baptismal and marriage certificates may be considered
public documents, they are evidence only to prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates
therein specified—but not the veracity of the status or declarations made therein with respect to his
kinsfolk and/or citizenship (Paa v. Chan, L-25945, Oct. 31, 1967). Again, in the case of Fortus v.
Novero (L-22378, 23 SCRA 1331 [1968]), this Court held that a baptismal certificate is conclusive proof
only of the baptism administered, in conformity with the rites of the Catholic Church by the priest
 20

who baptized the child, but it does not prove the veracity of the declarations and statements
contained in the certificate that concern the relationship of the person baptized. Such declarations
and statements, in order that their truth may be admitted, must indispensably be shown by proof
recognized by law. (At pp. 84-85)
In the same light, the entries made in the Registry Book may be considered as entries made in the
course of business under Section 43 of Rule 130, which is an exception to the hearsay rule. The
baptisms administered by the church are one of its transactions in the exercise of ecclesiastical duties
and recorded in a book of the church during the course of its business. (U.S. v. de Vera, 28 Phil. 105
[1914] Hence, the certificate (Exhibit "22") presented by the defense that Rosario Baluyot was
baptized on December 25, 1974 may be admitted in evidence as proof of baptism. Policarpio Baluyot,
the victim's father testified that he had in his possession a baptismal certificate different from the one
presented in court. However, no other baptismal record was ever presented to prove a date different
from that brought by the official custodian. Since the baptismal certificate states that Rosario was
baptized on December 25, 1974, it is therefore highly improbable that Rosario could have been born
on December 22, 1975. She could not have been baptized before she was born. Exhibit "22" may be
proof only of baptism but it puts a lie to the declaration that Rosario was born in 1975. With the
father's assertion that Rosario was more than one (1) year old when she was baptized, we are then
more inclined to agree that Rosario was born in 1973 as stated in the Baptismal Registry.
In the case of People v. Rebancos (172 SCRA 425 [1989]), the Court stated:
We agree with the defense that there was no proof of such facts. On the contrary, the evidence shows
that Rosario submitted herself to the sexual advances of the appellant. In fact, she appears to have
consented to the act as she was paid P300.00 the next morning while her companion, Jessie Ramirez
was paid P200.00 (T.S.N. p. 50, January 6, 1988). The environmental circumstances coupled with the
testimonies and evidence presented in court clearly give the impression that Rosario Baluyot, a poor
street child, was a prostitute inspite of her tender age. Circumstances in life may have forced her to
submit to sex at such a young age but the circumstances do not come under the purview of force or
intimidation needed to convict for rape.
In view of these clear facts which the prosecution failed to refute, no rape was committed. But was
Ritter guilty of homicide?
The trial court justified its ruling by saying that the death of the victim was a consequence of the
insertion of the foreign object into the victim's vagina by the appellant.
We now ask "Was the appellant responsible for the sexual vibrator left inside Rosario's vagina which
led to her death?
The trial court convicted the accused based on circumstantial evidence. Unfortunately, the
circumstances are capable of varying interpretations and are not enough to justify conviction.

Jessie Ramirez, the principal witness did not actually see the object inserted in Rosario's vagina.
xxx xxx xxx Neither could he identify the object (Exhibit "C-2") taken from Rosario as the same object which the
appellant was holding at that time of the alleged incident.
. . . Although no birth certificate was presented because her birth had allegedly not been registered,
her baptismal certificate, coupled by her mother's testimony, was sufficient to establish that Mary In his sworn statement given to the police investigator on September 4, 1987, he answered that:
Rose was below twelve years old when she was violated by Rebancos. (At. p. 426)

xxx xxx xxx

Unfortunately, in the instant case, nobody could corroborate the date on a more reliable document as
to Rosario's birth which could serve as sufficient proof that she was born on December 26, 1973.
T Habang kayo ay nasa loob ng kuwarto ng otel, mayroon ka bang napansin na inilabas ng kano sa
Therefore, she was more than 12 years old at the time of the alleged incident on October 10, 1986.
kanyang daladalahan kung mayroon man?

Moreover, it is not incumbent upon the defense to prove Rosario's age. The burden of proof lies on
S Ang Amerikano ay may dala-dalang shoulder bag na kulay itim, at napansin ko na may inilabas siya
the prosecution to prove that Rosario was less than 12 years old at the time of the alleged incident in
sa kanyang bag na parang vicks inhaler, na kanyang inamoy-amoy habang nasa otel kami at
a charge of statutory rape. The prosecution failed in this respect.
pagkatapos niya ay inilapag niya sa lamiseta.

Since Rosario was not established to have been under 12 years of age at the time of the alleged sexual
T Ilarawan mo nga sa akin ang bagay na nakita mong inilabas ng Amerikano?
violation, it was necessary to prove that the usual elements of rape were present; i.e. that there was
force of intimidation or that she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious in accordance with
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.
 21
S Ito ay may habang tatlong pulgada at ang takip nito ay may habang dalawang pulgada. Iyong takip
ay bilog na patulis at may tabang mga kalahating pulgada. Hindi ko napansin ang hugis ng dulo ng
bagay na may takip dahil natatakpan ng kamay at ilong ng Amerikano.
T Ipinakikita ko sa iyo ang isang larawan. Tignan mong mabuti ang larawang ito at sabihin mo nga sa
akin kung makikilala mo ang mga bagay na nasa larawang ito, na may kinalaman sa nakita mong
kinuha ng Amerikano sa kanyang bag?
S Napansin ko na ang kulay asul na bagay sa larawan ay katulad na katulad noong takip ng bagay na
inilabas ng Amerikano sa kanyang bag. Kaya lang ay bakit naging kulay asul gayong ng makita ko ito
ay kulay puti? (Exhibit "A", p. 2; Emphasis Supplied)
Presumably, what Jessie Ramirez saw was merely the Vicks inhaler which the appellant does not deny
having possessed at that time. He was certain that the object was white. (T.S.N. p. 91, January 6,
1988)
Later, Ramirez retracted and corrected himself. He said that it was grayish in color with color blue
(Medyo kulay abo na may kulay na parang blue). (T.S.N. p. 92, January 6, 1988) The inconsistency of
the witness' testimony casts doubt as to the veracity of the statements made especially when he
answered on additional cross-examination that the reason why he concluded that Exhibit "C-2" was
the same object being held by Ritter was because it was the only one shown to him by the
prosecution (T.S.N. pp. 109-110, January 6, 1988). Jessie Ramirez was not all certain about the sexual
vibrator because he did not actually see it in the possession of the appellant.
What he merely remembers is the revelation made by Rosario the next morning that the foreigner
inserted something inside her vagina. The trial court admitted such statement as part of the res
gestae. In a strained effort to accept such statement as part of res gestae, the trial court focused the
test of admissibility on the lapse of time between the event and the utterance. For the average 13
years old, the insertion of a mechanical device or anything for that matter into the vagina of a young
girl is undoubtedly startling. For Rosario and Jessie, however, there must be more evidence to show
that the statement, given after a night's sleep had intervened, was given instinctively because the
event was so startling Res gestae does not apply. (Section 42, Rule 130, Rules of Court)
Even if it were established that the appellant did insert something inside Rosario's vagina, the
evidence is still not adequate to impute the death of Rosario to the appellant's alleged act.
Jessie Ramirez testified that Rosario was able to remove the object inserted in her vagina. We quote:
Q Now, you also stated on direct examination that later on Rosario even categorically admitted to you
that she was already able to remove the object allegedly inserted inside her vagina, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. CARAAN:
Q Will you kindly tell to this Honorable Court the exact words used by Rosario Baluyot later on when
you met her when you asked her and when she told you that she was already able to remove that
object from her vagina?
A "Oy, Jessie, natanggal na, "she told me that. I asked her, "Was it already removed?" And she
answered, "Yes, it was removed." But the same night, she again complained of pain of her stomach.
She sent one of her friends to call for me. And as a matter of fact, Tomboy was uttering defamatory
words against me as she was groaning in pain. (TSN, Jan. 6,1988, pp. 72-73)
This encounter happened on the night of the day following the day after both children were invited by
the foreigner to the hotel. (T.S.N. p. 73, January 6, 1988). Rosario was said to be groaning in pain so
we can just imagine the distress she was undergoing at this point in time. If the device inserted by the
appellant caused the pain, it is highly inconceivable how she was able to endure the pain and
discomfort until May, 1987, seven (7) months after the alleged incident. Evidence must not only
proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. (People vs.
Patog, 144 SCRA 429 [1986]).
At this juncture, we find Dr. Pedro Solis' testimony rather significant. Dr. Pedro Solis, a witness for the
defense is considered an expert witness. (A Doctor of Medicine and a graduate of the State University
in 1940, a degree of Bachelor of Laws and member of the Bar 1949, and a graduate of the Institute of
Criminology University. He was awarded Post Graduate Diploma in Criminology in 1963, and also a
graduate of United Nations Asia and Far East Asia Institute on the Prevention of Crimes in Tokyo Japan
1965. He was appointed Medico Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation in 1940 until
1944. He became Chief Medico Legal Officer in 1970 and became the Deputy Director of the NBI up to
1984. He is at present a Professorial Lecturer on Legal Medicine at the UP, FEU, UE, and Fatima
College of Medicine; a Medico Legal Consultant of the PGH Medical Center, Makati Medical Center,
UERM Medical Center, MCU Medical Center. He has been with the NBI for 43 years. He has attended
no less than 13 conferences abroad. He is the author of the textbooks entitled "Legal Medicine" and
"Medical Jurisprudence".) With his impressive legal and medical background, his testimony is too
authoritative to ignore. We quote the pertinent portions of his testimony:
Q Now Dr. Solis, would you kindly go over this object marked as Exh. "C-2" which object was described
as a part of a sexual vibrator battery operated. Now, given this kind of object, would you kindly tell us
what would be the probable effect upon a 12 years old girl when it is inserted into her vagina?
 22
A Well, this vibrator must be considered a foreign body placed into a human being and as such be
considered a foreign object. As a foreign object, the tendency of the body may be: No. 1—expel the
foreign body—No. 2.—The tendency of the body is to react to that foreign body. One of the reactions
that maybe manifested by the person wherein such foreign body is concerned is to cover the foreign
body with human tissue, in a way to avoid its further injury to the body.
Now, the second reaction is irritation thereby producing certain manifest symptoms and changes in
the area where the foreign body is located.
In severe cases, the symptoms manifestation might not only be localized but may be felt all over the
body, we call it systemic reaction. Now, considering the fact that this foreign body as shown to me is
already not complete, this shows exposure of its different parts for the body to react. If there is
mechanism to cause the foreign body to vibrate, there must be some sort of power from within and
that power must be a dry cell battery. [The] composition of the battery are, manganese dioxide
ammonium, salts, water and any substance that will cause current flow. All of these substances are
irritants including areas of the container and as such, the primary reaction of the body is to cause
irritation on the tissues, thereby inflammatory changes develop and in all likelihood, aside from those
inflammatory changes would be a supervening infection in a way that the whole generative organ of
the woman will suffer from diseased process causing her the systemic reaction like fever, swelling of
the area, and other systemic symptoms. . . . . (TSN., pp. 13-15, October 19,1988)
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, given this object, how long would it take, Doctor before any reaction such as an infection
would set in, how many days after the insertion of this object in the vagina of a 12 year old girl?
A In the example given to me, considering that one of the ends is exposed, in a way that vaginal
secretion has more chance to get in, well, liberation of this irritant chemicals would be enhanced and
therefore in a shorter period of time, there being this vaginal reaction.
Q How many days or weeks would you say would that follow after the insertion?
A As I said, with my experience at the NBI, insertion of any foreign body in the vaginal canal usually
developed within, a period of two (2) weeks . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Q . . . [T]he subject in this case was allegedly raped, and a sexual vibrator was inserted in her vagina
on October 10, 1986 and she was operated on, on May 19, 1987 the following year, so it took more
than 7 months before this was extracted, would you say that it will take that long before any adverse
infection could set in inside the vagina?
A Infection and inflamatory changes will develop in a shorter time. (TSN., Oct. 19,1988, p. 18)
xxx xxx xxx
Q When you said shorter, how long would that be, Doctor?
A As I said, in my personal experience, hair pins, cottonballs and even this lipstick of women
usually, there are only about two (2) weeks time that the patient suffer some abnormal symptoms.
Q Now, considering that this is a bigger object to the object that you mentioned, this object has a
shorter time?
A Yes, Sir shorter time. (TSN., Oct. 19. 1988, p. 20)
The trial court, however, ruled that "there is no hard and fast rule as to the time frame wherein
infection sets in upon insertion of a foreign body in the vagina canal. For Dr. Solis, the time frame is
not more than 10 months, and this case is still within the said time frame."
A more generous time interval may be allowed in non-criminal cases. But where an accused is facing a
penalty of reclusion perpetua, the evidence against him cannot be based on probabilities which are
less likely than those probabilities which favor him.
It should be clarified that the time frame depends upon the kind of foreign body lodged inside the
body. An examination of the object gave the following results:
(1) Color: Blue
Size: (a) Circumference—3.031
inches (b) Length—approximately
2.179 inches.
Composition: Showed the general
characteristics of a styrene-butadiene plastic.
(2) The specimen can be electrically operated by means of a battery as per certification dated 01 June
1988, signed by Mr. Rodolfo D. Mercuric, Shipboard Electrical Systems Mechanics, Foreman II, SRF
Shop 51, Subic (see attached certification).
 23
(3) No comparative examination was made on specimen #1 and vibrator depicted in the catalog
because no actual physical dimensions and/or mechanical characteristics were shown in the catalog.
(Exhibit "LL")
The vibrator end was further subjected to a macro-photographic examination on the open end
portion which revealed the following:
Result of Examination
Macro-photographic examination on the open end portion of specimen #1 shows the following
inscription:
MABUCHI MOTOR JAPAN RE 14 PAT (Exhibit "MM")
From the above results, the subject object is certainly not considered as inert and based on Dr. Solis'
testimony, it is more likely that infection should set in much earlier. Considering also that the object
was inserted inside the vagina which is part of the generative organ of a woman, an organ which is
lined with a very thin layer of membrane with plenty of blood supply, this part of the body is more
susceptible to infection. (T.S.N. p. 34, October 19, 1988)
The truth of Dr. Solis' testimony is more probable under the circumstances of the case. We see no
reason why his opinions qualified by training and experience should not be controlling and binding
upon the Court in the determination of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. (People v. Tolentino, 166 SCRA
469 [1988]).
Dr. Barcinal, another witness for the defense also testified that he examined Rosario Baluyot on May
17, 1986 as a referral patient from the Department of Surgery to give an OB-GYN clearance to the
patient prior to operation. (T.S.N. p. 6, September 28, 1988)
Q And how many times did you examine this patient Rosario Baluyot on that day?
A I examined her twice on that day.
Q The first time that you examined her, what is the result of your findings, if any?
A My first examination, I examined the patient inside the delivery room. The patient was brought to
the delivery room wheel-chaired then from the wheel chair, the patient was ambigatory (sic). She was
able to walk from the door to the examining table. On examination, the patient is conscious, she was
fairly nourished, fairly developed, she had fever, she was uncooperative at that time and examination
deals more on the abdomen which shows slightly distended abdomen with muscle guarding with
tenderness all over, with maximum tenderness over the hypogastric area. (T.S.N. p. 5, September 28,
1988)
xxx xxx xxx
Q What about your second examination to the patient, what was your findings, if any?
A In my second examination, I repeated the internal examination wherein I placed my index finger
and middle finger inside the vagina of the patient and was able to palpate a hard object. After which, I
made a speculum examination wherein I was able to visualize the inner portion of the vaginal canal,
there I saw purulent foul smelling, blood tints, discharge in the vaginal canal and a foreign body
invaded on the posterior part of the vaginal canal.
xxx xxx xxx
A I referred back to Dr. Fernandez about my findings and he asked me to try to remove the said
foreign object by the use of forceps which I tried to do so also but I failed to extract the same.
Q All this time that you were examining the patient Rosario Baluyot both in the first and second
instance, Rosario Baluyot was conscious and were you able to talk to her when you were examining
her?
A Yes, sir.
Q And did you ask her why there is a foreign object lodge inside her vagina?
A Yes, Sir I asked her.
Q And what did she tell you, if any?
A She said in her own words that "GINAMIT AKO NG NEGRO AT SIYA ANG NAGLAGAY NITO."
Q Did she also tell you when, this Negro who used her and who inserted and placed the foreign object
on her vagina?
A Yes, Sir I asked her and she said he used me three (3) months ago from the time I examined her.
Q Now, you said that you referred the patient to the ward, what happened next with your patient?
 24
A To my knowledge, the patient is already scheduled on operation on that date.
Q Meaning, May 17, 1987?
A Yes, Sir I was presuming that the patient would undergo surgery after that?
(TSN, Sept. 28,1988, pp. 8-9; Emphasis supplied)
The trial court debunked Dr. Barcinals testimony considering Rosario's condition at that time. It ruled
that it is inconceivable that she would be striking a normal conversation with the doctors and would
be sitting on the examination table since Gaspar Alcantara stated that when he brought Rosario
Baluyot to the hospital, she was unconscious and writhing in pain.
It was not improbable for Rosario Baluyot to still be conscious and ambulant at that time because
there were several instances testified to by different witnesses that she was still able to talk prior to
her operation:
(1) Fe Israel, a witness for the prosecution and a member of the Olongapo Catholic Charismatic
Renewal Movement testified that as a member of this group she visits indigent children in the hospital
every Saturday and after office hours on working days.
On the Saturday prior to Rosario's death which was May 17, she was still able to talk to Rosario
Baluyot. In fact, one of her groupmates helped Rosario go to the comfort room to urinate. (T.S.N., pp.
16-19, May 25, 1988)
(2) Angelita Amulong, a witness for the defense is another para social worker who worked at Pope
John 23rd Community Center under Sister Eva Palencia. In one of her hospital visits, she encountered
Rosario Baluyot in the month of May, 1987. She actually saw a child who happened to be Rosario
Baluyot seated on the cement floor and when she asked why she was seated there, she was told that
it was too hot in the bed. She saw Rosario Baluyot for about 2 or 3 days successively. (T.S.N. pp. 10-13,
September 7, 1988)
(3) Gaspar Alcantara, the person who brought Rosario to the hospital actually testified that she was
conscious (T.S.N. p. 36, September 14, 1988) but writhing in pain. He took pity on her so he brought
her to the hospital (T.S.N. p. 12, September 14, 1988)
From the above testimonies, it is clear that Rosario was still conscious and could still answer questions
asked of her although she was complaining of stomach pains. Unfortunately, the medical attention
given to her failed to halt the aggravation of her condition. The operation on May 19 was too late.
Rosario died because of septicemia, which in layman's language is blood poisoning, and peritonitis,
which is massive infection, in the abdominal cavity caused by the foreign object or the cut sexual
vibrator lodged in the vagina of the victim. This led to the infection from the uterus to the fallopian
tubes and into the peritoneum and the abdominal cavity.
The trial court convicted the accused citing the rationale of Article 4 of the RPC
He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.
But before the conviction is affirmed, we must first follow the rule as stated in the case of Urbano vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court (157 SCRA 1 [1988]) to wit:
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the
wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the
proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable
doubt. (Emphasis supplied)
In People v. Tempongko, Jr., (144 SCRA 583, 592 [1986]), we explained that:
xxx xxx xxx
The basic principle in every criminal prosecution is that accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The
accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved by the prosecution. If the prosecution fails,
it fails utterly, even if the defense is weak or, indeed, even if there is no defense at all. The defendant
faces the full panoply of state authority with all "The People of the Philippines" arrayed against him. In
a manner of speaking, he goes to bat with all the bases loaded. The odds are heavily against him. It is
important, therefore, to equalize the positions of the prosecution and the defense by presuming the
innocence of the accused until the state is able to refute the presumption by proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. (At. p. 592)
The evidence for the accused maybe numerically less as against the number of witnesses and
preponderance of evidence presented by the prosecution but there is no direct and convincing proof
that the accused was responsible for the vibrator left inside the victim's vagina which caused her
death seven (7) months after its insertion. What the prosecution managed to establish were mere
circumstances which were not sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.
While circumstantial evidence may suffice to support a conviction it is imperative, though, that the
following requisites should concur:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
 25
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. (Rule 133, Sec. 4 Revised Rules of Court)
For the well-entrenched rule in evidence is that "before conviction can be had upon circumstantial
evidence, the circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the defendant, to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the
crime (People v. Subano, 73 Phil. 692 [1942]; Emphasis supplied). It must fairly exclude every
reasonable hypothesis of innocence (Dorado v. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 420, 433 [1987]). In this
case the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution does not conclusively point to the
liability of the appellant for the crime charged. (People v. Tolentino, supra)
We are aware of the wide publicity given to the plight of Rosario Baluyot and how her death
exemplified starkly the daily terrors that most street children encounter as they sell their bodies in
order to survive. At an age when innocence and youthful joys should preponderate in their lives, they
experience life in its most heartless and inhuman form. Instead of nothing more than gentle
disappointments occupying their young minds, they daily cope with tragedies that even adults should
never be made to carry.
It is with distressing reluctance that we have to seemingly set back the efforts of Government to
dramatize the death of Rosario Baluyot as a means of galvanizing the nation to care for its street
children. It would have meant a lot to social workers and prosecutors alike if one pedophile-killer
could be brought to justice so that his example would arouse public concern, sufficient for the
formulation and implementation of meaningful remedies. However, we cannot convict on anything
less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. The protections of the Bill of Rights and our criminal justice
system are as much, if not more so, for the perverts and outcasts of society as they are for normal,
decent, and law-abiding people.
The requirement of proof which produces in an unprejudiced mind moral certainty or conviction that
the accused did commit the offense has not been satisfied.
By way of emphasis, we reiterate some of the factors arousing reasonable doubt:
1. The evidence on Rosario Baluyot's baptism creates reasonable doubt about her being less than 12
years old when the carnal knowledge took place. If the evidence for the prosecution is to be believed,
she was not yet born on the date she was baptized.
2. Since the proof of Rosario's being under 12 years of age is not satisfactory, the prosecution has to
prove force, intimidation, or deprivation of reason in order to convict for rape. There is no such proof.
In fact, the evidence shows a willingness to submit to the sexual act for monetary considerations.
3. The only witness to the fact of Ritter's placing a vibrator inside the vagina of Rosario was Jessie
Ramirez. This witness did not see Ritter insert the vibrator. The morning after the insertion, he was
only told by Rosario about it. Two days later, he allegedly met Rosario who informed him that she was
able to remove the object. And yet, Ramirez testified that on the night of that second encounter, he
saw Rosario groaning because of pain in her stomach. She was even hurling invectives. Ramirez'
testimony is not only hearsay, it is also contradictory.
4. It was improbable, according to expert medical testimony, for a foreign object with active
properties to cause pain, discomfort, and serious infection only after seven months inside a young
girl's vaginal canal. Infection would have set in much earlier. Jessie Ramirez recalled that the incident
happened in December of 1986. (TSN., January 6, 1988, pp. 15-17) The evidence, however shows that
the appellant was not here in the Philippines that December. As per the Commission on Immigration
Arrival and Departure Report, Heinrich Ritter arrived in the Philippines on October 7, 1986 and left on
October 12, 1986. He never returned until September 23, 1987 (Exhibits "DD" and "EE") The incident
could have happened only in October, but then it would have been highly improbable for the sexual
vibrator to stay inside the vagina for seven (7) months with the kind of serious complications it
creates.
5. The gynecologist who attended to Rosario during her hospital confinement testified that she told
him "Ginamit ako ng Negro at siya ang naglagay nito." The accused is not a black.
Noteworthy is the fact that nothing was mentioned about Rosario's activities after the hotel incident.
Considering Dr. Barcinal's testimony indicating that she was "used" by a "Negro" three (3) months
prior to admission in the hospital and Rosario's unfortunate profession, there is always the possibility
that she could have allowed herself to be violated by this perverse kind of sexual behavior where a
vibrator or vibrators were inserted into her vagina between October, 1986 and May, 1987.
Moreover, the long delay of seven (7) months after the incident in reporting the alleged crime renders
the evidence for the prosecution insufficient to establish appellant's guilty connection with the
requisite moral certainty. (SeePeople v. Mula Cruz, 129 SCRA 156 [1984]).
The established facts do not entirely rule out the possibility that the appellant could have inserted a
foreign object inside Rosario's vagina. This object may have caused her death. It is possible that the
appellant could be the guilty person. However, the Court cannot base an affirmance of conviction
upon mere possibilities. Suspicions and possibilities are not evidence and therefore should not be
taken against the accused. (People v. Tolentino, supra)
Well-established is the rule that every circumstance favorable to the accused should be duly taken
into account. This rule applies even to hardened criminals or those whose bizarre behaviour violates
the mores of civilized society. The evidence against the accused must survive the test of reason. The
 26
strongest suspicion must not be allowed to sway judgment. (See Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA
593 [1986]). As stated in the case of People v. Ng (142 SCRA 615 [1986]):
. . . [F]rom the earliest years of this Court, it has emphasized the rule that reasonable doubt in criminal
cases must be resolved in favor of the accused. The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt
calls for moral certainty of guilt. It has been defined as meaning such proof "to the satisfaction of the
court, keeping in mind the presumption of innocence, as precludes every reasonable hypothesis
except that which it is given to support. It is not sufficient for the proof to establish a probability, even
though strong, that the fact charged is more likely to be true than the contrary. It must establish the
truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral certainty—a certainty that convinces and satisfies the
reason and the conscience of those who are to act upon it. (Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972
Edition, p. 379, citing U.S. v. Reyes, 3 Phil. 3). . . .
In the instant case, since there are circumstances which prevent our being morally certain of the guilt
of the appellant, he is, therefore, entitled to an acquittal.
This notwithstanding, the Court can not ignore the acts of the appellant on the children, Jessie
Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot in October, 1986 at the MGM Hotel. Inspite of his flat denials, we are
convinced that he comes to this country not to look at historical sights, enrich his intellect or indulge
in legitimate pleasures but in order to satisfy the urgings of a sick mind.
With the positive Identification and testimony by Jessie Ramirez that it was the appellant who picked
him and Rosario from among the children and invited them to the hotel; and that in the hotel he was
shown pictures of young boys like him and the two masturbated each other, such actuations clearly
show that the appellant is a pedophile. When apprehended in Ermita, he was sizing up young children.
Dr. Solis defined pedophilia in his book entitled Legal Medicine, 1987 edition, as follows:
Pedophilia—A form of sexual perversion wherein a person has the compulsive desire to have sexual
intercourse with a child of either sex. Children of various ages participate in sexual activities, like
fellatio, cunnilingus, fondling with sex organs, or anal sexual intercourse. Usually committed by a
homosexual between a man and a boy the latter being a passive partner.
Ritter was prosecuted for rape with homicide and not pedophilia, assuming this is a crime by itself.
Pedophilia is clearly a behavior offensive to public morals and violative of the declared policy of the
state to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and social well-being of our youth. (Article
II, Section 13, 1987 Constitution) (Harvey v. Defensor Santiago, 162 SCRA 840, 848 [1989]). Pedophiles,
especially thrill seeking aliens have no place in our country.
In this case, there is reasonable ground to believe that the appellant committed acts injurious not only
to Rosario Baluyot but also to the public good and domestic tranquility of the people. The state has
expressly committed itself to defend the right of children to assistance and special protection from all
forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development.
(Art. XV, Section 3 [2] . . . (Harvey v. Santiago, supra). The appellant has abused Filipino children,
enticing them with money. The appellant should be expelled from the country.
Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from civil liability which is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action. (Rule III, Section 1) The well-settled doctrine is that a
person while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable. We reiterate what has been stated
in Urbano v. IAC, supra.
. . . While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable
doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages. (Article 29, Civil
Code). The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a
declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of
Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).
The reason for the provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the acquittal of the
accused on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not
necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same act or omission, has been explained by the
Code Commission as follows:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is
one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless instances
of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court
as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is
derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable
consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and
civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are
separate and distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the other, private rights. One
is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for the reparation of damages
suffered by the aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so different from each other that article
1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise upon the civil action
arising from a crime; but the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be
extinguished." It is just and proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the
accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying
the complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the
invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the
right of the aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the
criminal law?
 27
For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform under discussion. It will
correct a serious defect in our law. It will close up an inexhaustible source of injustice—a cause for
disillusionment on the part of the innumerable persons injured or wronged.
Rosario Baluyot is a street child who ran away from her grandmother's house.1âwphi1 Circumstances
forced her to succumb and enter this unfortunate profession. Nonetheless, she has left behind heirs
who have certainly suffered mental anguish, anxiety and moral shock by her sudden and incredulous
death as reflected in the records of the case. Though we are acquitting the appellant for the crime of
rape with homicide, we emphasize that we are not ruling that he is innocent or blameless. It is only
the constitutional presumption of innocence and the failure of the prosecution to build an airtight
case for conviction which saved him, not that the facts of unlawful conduct do not exist. As earlier
stated, there is the likelihood that he did insert the vibrator whose end was left inside Rosario's
vaginal canal and that the vibrator may have caused her death. True, we cannot convict on
probabilities or possibilities but civil liability does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt. The
Court can order the payment of indemnity on the facts found in the records of this case.
The appellant certainly committed acts contrary to morals, good customs, public order or public policy
(see Article 21 Civil Code). As earlier mentioned, the appellant has abused Filipino children, enticing
them with money. We can not overstress the responsibility for proper behavior of all adults in the
Philippines, including the appellant towards young children. The sexual exploitation committed by the
appellant should not and can not be condoned. Thus, considering the circumstances of the case, we
are awarding damages to the heirs of Rosario Baluyot in the amount of P30,000.00.
And finally, the Court deplores the lack of criminal laws which will adequately protect street children
from exploitation by pedophiles, pimps, and, perhaps, their own parents or guardians who profit from
the sale of young bodies. The provisions on statutory rape and other related offenses were never
intended for the relatively recent influx of pedophiles taking advantage of rampant poverty among
the forgotten segments of our society. Newspaper and magazine articles, media exposes, college
dissertations, and other studies deal at length with this serious social problem but pedophiles like the
appellant will continue to enter the Philippines and foreign publications catering to them will continue
to advertise the availability of Filipino street children unless the Government acts and acts soon. We
have to acquit the appellant because the Bill of Rights commands us to do so. We, however, express
the Court's concern about the problem of street children and the evils committed against them.
Something must be done about it.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant HEINRICH STEFAN RITTER
is ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt. The appellant is ordered to pay the amount of
P30,000.00 by way of moral and exemplary damages to the heirs of Rosario Baluyot. The
Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation is hereby directed to institute proper deportation
proceedings against the appellant and to immediately expel him thereafter with prejudice to re-entry
into the country.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ, concur.
G.R. No. 154259 February 28, 2005
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners,
vs.
ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. "AMAY BISAYA," respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila Garden (Hotel Nikko)1 and
Ruby Lim assail the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 reversing the
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 104, as well as the Resolution 4 of
the Court of Appeals dated 09 July 2002 which denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The cause of action before the trial court was one for damages brought under the human relations
provisions of the New Civil Code. Plaintiff thereat (respondent herein) Roberto Reyes, more popularly
known by the screen name "Amay Bisaya," alleged that at around 6:00 o’clock in the evening of 13
October 1994, while he was having coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko,5 he was spotted by his friend of
several years, Dr. Violeta Filart, who then approached him.6 Mrs. Filart invited him to join her in a
party at the hotel’s penthouse in celebration of the natal day of the hotel’s manager, Mr. Masakazu
Tsuruoka.7 Mr. Reyes asked if she could vouch for him for which she replied: "of course." 8Mr. Reyes
then went up with the party of Dr. Filart carrying the basket of fruits which was the latter’s present for
the celebrant.9 At the penthouse, they first had their picture taken with the celebrant after which Mr.
Reyes sat with the party of Dr. Filart.10 After a couple of hours, when the buffet dinner was ready, Mr.
Reyes lined-up at the buffet table but, to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was stopped
by petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who claimed to speak for Hotel Nikko as Executive Secretary thereof. 11
In a loud voice and within the presence and hearing of the other guests who were making a queue at
the buffet table, Ruby Lim told him to leave the party ("huwag ka nang kumain, hindi ka imbitado,
bumaba ka na lang").12 Mr. Reyes tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart.13 Dr. Filart, who
was within hearing distance, however, completely ignored him thus adding to his shame and
humiliation.14 Not long after, while he was still recovering from the traumatic experience, a Makati
policeman approached and asked him to step out of the hotel.15 Like a common criminal, he was
escorted out of the party by the policeman.16 Claiming damages, Mr. Reyes asked for One Million
 28
Pesos actual damages, One Million Pesos moral and/or exemplary damages and Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos attorney’s fees.17
Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not under the
ignominious circumstance painted by the latter. Ms. Lim narrated that she was the Hotel’s Executive
Secretary for the past twenty (20) years.18 One of her functions included organizing the birthday party
of the hotel’s former General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka.19 The year 1994 was no different. For Mr.
Tsuruoka’s party, Ms. Lim generated an exclusive guest list and extended invitations accordingly.20
The guest list was limited to approximately sixty (60) of Mr. Tsuruoka’s closest friends and some hotel
employees and that Mr. Reyes was not one of those invited.21 At the party, Ms. Lim first noticed Mr.
Reyes at the bar counter ordering a drink.22 Mindful of Mr. Tsuruoka’s wishes to keep the party
intimate, Ms. Lim approached Mr. Boy Miller, the "captain waiter," to inquire as to the presence of Mr.
Reyes who was not invited.23 Mr. Miller replied that he saw Mr. Reyes with the group of Dr. Filart.24
As Dr. Filart was engaged in conversation with another guest and as Ms. Lim did not want to interrupt,
she inquired instead from the sister of Dr. Filart, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, who told her that Dr. Filart did not
invite Mr. Reyes.25 Ms. Lim then requested Ms. Fruto to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was
not invited.26 Mr. Reyes, however, lingered prompting Ms. Lim to inquire from Ms. Fruto who said
that Mr. Reyes did not want to leave.27 When Ms. Lim turned around, she saw Mr. Reyes conversing
with a Captain Batung whom she later approached.28 Believing that Captain Batung and Mr. Reyes
knew each other, Ms. Lim requested from him the same favor from Ms. Fruto, i.e., for Captain Batung
to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited.29 Still, Mr. Reyes lingered. When Ms. Lim
spotted Mr. Reyes by the buffet table, she decided to speak to him herself as there were no other
guests in the immediate vicinity.30However, as Mr. Reyes was already helping himself to the food, she
decided to wait.31 When Mr. Reyes went to a corner and started to eat, Ms. Lim approached him and
said: "alam ninyo, hindo ho kayo dapat nandito. Pero total nakakuha na ho kayo ng pagkain, ubusin
na lang ninyo at pagkatapos kung pwede lang po umalis na kayo."32 She then turned around trusting
that Mr. Reyes would show enough decency to leave, but to her surprise, he began screaming and
making a big scene, and even threatened to dump food on her.33 1awphi1.nét
Dr. Violeta Filart, the third defendant in the complaint before the lower court, also gave her version of
the story to the effect that she never invited Mr. Reyes to the party. 34 According to her, it was Mr.
Reyes who volunteered to carry the basket of fruits intended for the celebrant as he was likewise
going to take the elevator, not to the penthouse but to Altitude 49.35 When they reached the
penthouse, she reminded Mr. Reyes to go down as he was not properly dressed and was not invited. 36
All the while, she thought that Mr. Reyes already left the place, but she later saw him at the bar
talking to Col. Batung.37 Then there was a commotion and she saw Mr. Reyes shouting.38 She ignored
Mr. Reyes.39 She was embarrassed and did not want the celebrant to think that she invited him.40
After trial on the merits, the court a quo dismissed the complaint,41 giving more credence to the
testimony of Ms. Lim that she was discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. The trial court
likewise ratiocinated that Mr. Reyes assumed the risk of being thrown out of the party as he was
uninvited:
Plaintiff had no business being at the party because he was not a guest of Mr. Tsuruoka, the birthday
celebrant. He assumed the risk of being asked to leave for attending a party to which he was not
invited by the host. Damages are pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the breach of
some duty or the violation of some right. Thus, no recovery can be had against defendants Nikko
Hotel and Ruby Lim because he himself was at fault (Garciano v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 436). He
knew that it was not the party of defendant Violeta Filart even if she allowed him to join her and took
responsibility for his attendance at the party. His action against defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim
must therefore fail.42
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court as it found more commanding of
belief the testimony of Mr. Reyes that Ms. Lim ordered him to leave in a loud voice within hearing
distance of several guests:
In putting appellant in a very embarrassing situation, telling him that he should not finish his food and
to leave the place within the hearing distance of other guests is an act which is contrary to morals,
good customs . . ., for which appellees should compensate the appellant for the damage suffered by
the latter as a consequence therefore (Art. 21, New Civil Code). The liability arises from the acts which
are in themselves legal or not prohibited, but contrary to morals or good customs. Conversely, even in
the exercise of a formal right, [one] cannot with impunity intentionally cause damage to another in a
manner contrary to morals or good customs.43
The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that the actuation of Ms. Lim in approaching several people to
inquire into the presence of Mr. Reyes exposed the latter to ridicule and was uncalled for as she
should have approached Dr. Filart first and both of them should have talked to Mr. Reyes in private:
Said acts of appellee Lim are uncalled for. What should have been done by appellee Lim was to
approach appellee Mrs. Filart and together they should have told appellant Reyes in private that the
latter should leave the party as the celebrant only wanted close friends around. It is necessary that
Mrs. Filart be the one to approach appellant because it was she who invited appellant in that occasion.
Were it not for Mrs. Filart’s invitation, appellant could not have suffered such humiliation. For that,
appellee Filart is equally liable.
...
The acts of [appellee] Lim are causes of action which are predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of
consideration of one person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but respect of such
dignity. Under Article 20 of the Civil Code, every person who violates this duty becomes liable for
damages, especially if said acts were attended by malice or bad faith. Bad faith does not simply
 29
connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity
and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty to some motive or interest or ill-will that
partakes of the nature of fraud (Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA, et al., 309 SCRA 603).44
Consequently, the Court of Appeals imposed upon Hotel Nikko, Ruby Lim and Dr. Violeta Filart the
solidary obligation to pay Mr. Reyes (1) exemplary damages in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P200,000); (2) moral damages in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); and
(3) attorney’s fees in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000).45 On motion for reconsideration,
the Court of Appeals affirmed its earlier decision as the argument raised in the motion had "been
amply discussed and passed upon in the decision sought to be reconsidered."46
Thus, the instant petition for review. Hotel Nikko and Ruby Lim contend that the Court of Appeals
seriously erred in –
I.
… NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA CONSIDERING
THAT BY ITS OWN FINDINGS, AMAY BISAYA WAS A GATE-CRASHER
II.
… HOLDING HOTEL NIKKO AND RUBY LIM JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH
DR. FILART FOR DAMAGES SINCE BY ITS OWN RULING, AMAY BISAYA "COULD NOT
HAVE SUFFERED SUCH HUMILIATION," "WERE IT NOT FOR DR. FILART’S
INVITATION"
III.
… DEPARTING FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ALLEGEDLY CAUSED THE HUMILIATION OF AMAY
BISAYA
IV.
… IN CONCLUDING THAT AMAY BISAYA WAS TREATED UNJUSTLY BECAUSE OF HIS
POVERTY, CONSIDERING THAT THIS WAS NEVER AN ISSUE AND NO EVIDENCE WAS
PRESENTED IN THIS REGARD
V.
… IN FAILING TO PASS UPON THE ISSUE ON THE DEFECTS OF THE APPELLANT’S
BRIEF, THEREBY DEPARTING FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, they
cannot be made liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave
(and being embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he was a "gate-crasher."
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury" 47 )
refers to self-inflicted injury48 or to the consent to injury49 which precludes the recovery of damages
by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in
doing so.50 As formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine does not find application to the case
at bar because even if respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party,
petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still under obligation to treat him
fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame.
Thus, the threshold issue is whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes, a.k.a.
"Amay Bisaya," to leave the party where he was not invited by the celebrant thereof thereby
becoming liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Parenthetically, and if Ruby Lim were so
liable, whether or not Hotel Nikko, as her employer, is solidarily liable with her.
As the trial court and the appellate court reached divergent and irreconcilable conclusions concerning
the same facts and evidence of the case, this Court is left without choice but to use its latent power to
review such findings of facts. Indeed, the general rule is that we are not a trier of facts as our
jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and revising errors of law.51 One of the exceptions to this general
rule, however, obtains herein as the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court.52 The lower court ruled that Ms. Lim did not abuse her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party
as she talked to him politely and discreetly. The appellate court, on the other hand, held that Ms. Lim
is liable for damages as she needlessly embarrassed Mr. Reyes by telling him not to finish his food and
to leave the place within hearing distance of the other guests. Both courts, however, were in
agreement that it was Dr. Filart’s invitation that brought Mr. Reyes to the party.
The consequential question then is: Which version is credible?
From an in depth review of the evidence, we find more credible the lower court’s findings of fact.
First, let us put things in the proper perspective.
We are dealing with a formal party in a posh, five-star hotel,53 for-invitation-only, thrown for the
hotel’s former Manager, a Japanese national. Then came a person who was clearly uninvited (by the
celebrant)54 and who could not just disappear into the crowd as his face is known by many, being an
 30
actor. While he was already spotted by the organizer of the party, Ms. Lim, the very person who
generated the guest list, it did not yet appear that the celebrant was aware of his presence. Ms. Lim,
mindful of the celebrant’s instruction to keep the party intimate, would naturally want to get rid of
the "gate-crasher" in the most hush-hush manner in order not to call attention to a glitch in an
otherwise seamless affair and, in the process, risk the displeasure of the celebrant, her former boss.
To unnecessarily call attention to the presence of Mr. Reyes would certainly reflect badly on Ms. Lim’s
ability to follow the instructions of the celebrant to invite only his close friends and some of the
hotel’s personnel. Mr. Reyes, upon whom the burden rests to prove that indeed Ms. Lim loudly and
rudely ordered him to leave, could not offer any satisfactory explanation why Ms. Lim would do that
and risk ruining a formal and intimate affair. On the contrary, Mr. Reyes, on cross-examination, had
unwittingly sealed his fate by admitting that when Ms. Lim talked to him, she was very close. Close
enough for him to kiss:
Q: And, Mr. Reyes, you testified that Miss Lim approached you while you were at the buffet table?
How close was she when she approached you?
A: Very close because we nearly kissed each other.
Q: And yet, she shouted for you to go down? She was that close and she shouted?
A: Yes. She said, "wag kang kumain, hindi ka imbitado dito, bumaba ka na lang."
Q: So, you are testifying that she did this in a loud voice?
...
A: Yes. If it is not loud, it will not be heard by many.55
In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him
to ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a very close distance. Ms.
Lim having been in the hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues
to be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not inspire belief and
is indeed incredible. Thus, the lower court was correct in observing that –
Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the latter to leave the
party was made such that they nearly kissed each other, the request was meant to be heard by him
only and there could have been no intention on her part to cause embarrassment to him. It was
plaintiff’s reaction to the request that must have made the other guests aware of what transpired
between them. . .
Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no need for the police to take him out.56
Moreover, another problem with Mr. Reyes’s version of the story is that it is unsupported. It is a basic
rule in civil cases that he who alleges proves. Mr. Reyes, however, had not presented any witness to
back his story up. All his witnesses – Danny Rodinas, Pepito Guerrero and Alexander Silva - proved
only that it was Dr. Filart who invited him to the party.57
Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not invited,
cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily,
neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its employee.58
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights,59 is not
a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances. Article 19 states:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.1awphi1.nét
Elsewhere, we explained that when "a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the
norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed
for which the wrongdoer must be responsible."60 The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain
standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance
of one’s duties.61 These standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and
observe honesty and good faith.62 Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to
injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad
faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. 63 When Article 19 is violated, an action
for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising
from a violation of law64 which does not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask
Mr. Reyes to leave. Article 21, on the other hand, states:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 2165 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There is an act
which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3)
it is done with intent to injure.66
A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21,67 and that is, the act complained of must be
intentional.68
 31

As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim was driven
by animosity against him. These two people did not know each other personally before the evening of
13 October 1994, thus, Mr. Reyes had nothing to offer for an explanation for Ms. Lim’s alleged
abusive conduct except the statement that Ms. Lim, being "single at 44 years old," had a "very strong
bias and prejudice against (Mr. Reyes) possibly influenced by her associates in her work at the hotel
with foreign businessmen."69 The lameness of this argument need not be belabored. Suffice it to say
that a complaint based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code must necessarily fail if it has nothing to
recommend it but innuendos and conjectures.
All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any damage which Mr. Reyes might
have suffered through Ms. Lim’s exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety
and good faith, must be his to bear alone.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed by Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden is
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 and its Resolution dated 09
July 2002 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 104, dated 26 April 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was likewise acceptable and SO ORDERED.
humane under the circumstances. In this regard, we cannot put our imprimatur on the appellate
court’s declaration that Ms. Lim’s act of personally approaching Mr. Reyes (without first verifying Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
from Mrs. Filart if indeed she invited Mr. Reyes) gave rise to a cause of action "predicated upon mere
rudeness or lack of consideration of one person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but
respect of such dignity."70 Without proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms. Lim’s act of by-passing Mrs.
Filart cannot amount to abusive conduct especially because she did inquire from Mrs. Filart’s
companion who told her that Mrs. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes.71 If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only of
bad judgment which, if done with good intentions, cannot amount to bad faith.

ART. 22 UNJUST ENRICHMENT

Not being liable for both actual and moral damages, neither can petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko be
made answerable for exemplary damages72 especially for the reason stated by the Court of Appeals. H.L. CARLOS CONSTRUCTION, INC., petitioner, vs. MARINA PROPERTIES CORPORATION, JESUS K.
The Court of Appeals held – TYPOCO SR. and TAN YU, respondents.

Not a few of the rich people treat the poor with contempt because of the latter’s lowly station in
life.l^vvphi1.net This has to be limited somewhere. In a democracy, such a limit must be established.
Social equality is not sought by the legal provisions under consideration, but due regard for decency
and propriety (Code Commission, pp. 33-34). And by way of example or correction for public good and
to avert further commission of such acts, exemplary damages should be imposed upon appellees.73
The fundamental fallacy in the above-quoted findings is that it runs counter with the very facts of the
case and the evidence on hand.l^vvphi1.net It is not disputed that at the time of the incident in
question, Mr. Reyes was "an actor of long standing; a co-host of a radio program over DZRH; a Board
Member of the Music Singer Composer (MUSICO) chaired by popular singer Imelda Papin; a showbiz
Coordinator of Citizen Crime Watch; and 1992 official candidate of the KBL Party for Governor of
Bohol; and an awardee of a number of humanitarian organizations of the Philippines." 74 During his
direct examination on rebuttal, Mr. Reyes stressed that he had income75 and nowhere did he say
otherwise. On the other hand, the records are bereft of any information as to the social and economic
standing of petitioner Ruby Lim. Consequently, the conclusion reached by the appellate court cannot
withstand scrutiny as it is without basis.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
There is unjust enrichment when a building contractor is denied payment for increased labor
cost validly incurred and additional work validly rendered with the owners express or implied
agreement.
The Case
The Petition for Review[1] before the Court, filed under Rule 45, seeks the reversal of the
Decision[2] dated March 29, 2001, issued by the Court of Appeals[3] in CA-GR CV No. 60975.The
assailed Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one
entered DISMISSING the [petitioners] Complaint, AND PARTIALLY GRANTING THE
 32
[RESPONDENT-CORPORATIONS] COUNTERCLAIM, IN THAT THE [PETITIONER] IS DIRECTED TO PAY
UNTO THE [RESPONDENT-CORPORATION] THE SUM OF P4,604,579.00 in ACTUAL DAMAGES
PLUS P3,549,416.00 AS AND FOR LIQUIDATED DAMAGES.[4]
The Facts
The facts of the case, summarized by the Court of Appeals (CA), are as follows:
[Respondent] MARINA PROPERTIES CORPORATION (MPC for brevity) is engaged in the business of real
estate development. On May 10, 1988, MPC entered into a contract[5] with [Petitioner] H.[L.] CARLOS
CONSTRUCTION, INC. (HLC) to construct Phase III of a condominium complex called MARINA
BAYHOMES CONDOMINIUM PROJECT, consisting of townhouses and villas, totaling 31 housing units,
for a total consideration of P38,580,609.00, within a period of 365 days from receipt of Notice to
Proceed. The original completion date of the project was May 16, 1989, but it was extended to
October 31, 1989 with a grace period until November 30, 1989.[6]
The contract was signed by Jovencio F. Cinco, president of MPC, and Honorio L. Carlos, president of
HLC.
On December 15, 1989, HLC instituted this case for sum of money against not only MPC but also
against the latters alleged president, [Respondent] Jesus K. Typoco, Sr. (Typoco) and [Respondent]
Tan Yu (Tan), seeking the payment of various sums with an aggregate amount of P14 million pesos,
broken down as follows:
a) P7,065,885.03 for costs of labor escalation, change orders and material price escalation;
b) P2,000,000.00 as additional compensatory damages, exclusive of the cost of suit.
c) P3,147,992.00 representing retention money allegedly withheld by MPC on HLCs Progress Billings
as of January 1990, and
d) P2,000,000.00 representing the value of construction materials allegedly withheld/detained by
MPC.
Traversing the allegations of the complaint, [respondents] filed separate answers, whereby the two
individual [respondents] alleged that they are not parties to the Construction Contract and
Amendatory Contract and are therefore not liable to HLC. [Respondent] MPC on the other hand
alleged that the [petitioner] has no cause of action against it and that it (HLC) is not entitled to its
various claims. MPC interposed a counterclaim in the aggregate sum of P68,296,227.14 for actual and
compensatory damages, liquidated damages, unliquidated advances, and attorneys fees.[7]
On May 15, 1997, the trial court[8] ruled as follows:[9]
WHEREFORE, premises above considered, judgment is hereby rendered for [Petitioner] H.L. CARLOS
CONSTRUCTION, INC. and as against [Respondents] MARINA PROPERTIES CORPORATION, TAN YU, and
JESUS K. TYPOCO, SR., who are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the [petitioner], as
follows:
1. the amount of P7,065,885.03, representing unpaid labor escalation costs, change orders and
material price escalations, plus 12% interest per annum from date of filing of the complaint, until fully
paid;
2. the amount of P3,147,992.39 representing the 10% retention money withheld by the [respondents]
[from] [petitioners] progress billing as of January 1990, plus 12% interest per annum from the date of
filing of the complaint, until fully paid;
3. the amount of P2,000,000.00 representing the value of construction materials and the like detained
by the [respondents], plus 12% legal interest from the date of filing of the complaint, until fully paid;
4. the sum equivalent to 15% of the principal sum as and by way of attorneys fees; and to
5. [p]ay the costs of this suit.
The counterclaim for liquidated damages, are hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence. Liquidated
damages can only be awarded under paragraph 2 of the amended construction contract that
extended the completion period and mainly on the finding of the 85% substantial completion of the
project, and that the delay and stoppage of the project was caused by [respondents] default in
payment of [the] progress billings that would have allowed [petitioner] to have the capability to
continue and complete the project.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA held that respondents were not liable for escalations in the cost of labor and
construction materials, because of the following reasons: (1) the contract between the parties was for
a lump sum consideration, which did not allow for cost escalation; and (2) petitioner failed to show
any basis for the award sought.
 33

Respondents were also absolved from paying for change orders and extra work, inasmuch as g. Whether or not the petitioner is liable to the respondents for actual and liquidated
there was no supplemental agreement covering them as required in the main Construction damages.[11]
Contract. Although Progress Billing No. 24 apparently indicates that extra work was rendered by
In simpler terms, the issues to be resolved are as follows:
petitioner, this claim is not supported by sufficient evidence.
(1) Whether petitioner is entitled to (a) a price escalation for labor and material cost, (b) the
The CA further failed to find any basis for the release of the 10 percent retention fee. The
cost of change orders and extra work, (c) the release of the 10 percent retention money, (d) the cost
Construction Contract had provided that such release would be made only under certain conditions,
of illegally detained materials, and (e) attorneys fees
none of which was complied with, as petitioner failed to complete the work required. Furthermore,
MPC was not held liable for detained or withheld construction materials, since petitioner had (2) Whether Typoco and Tan are solidarily liable with MPC
eventually withdrawn them.
(3) Whether petitioner is liable for actual and liquidated damages
Nothing in the records indicated any personal liability on the part of Typoco and Tan. Moreover,
they had nothing to assume, as MPC was not held liable to petitioner.

Furthermore, the CA ruled that petitioner was liable for actual and liquidated damages. The The Courts Ruling
latter had abandoned the project prior to its completion; hence, MPC contracted out the work to
another entity and incurred actual damages in excess of the remaining balance of the contract
price. In addition, the Construction Contract had stipulated payment of liquidated damages in an The Petition is partly meritorious.
amount equivalent to 1/1000 of the contract price for each calendar day of delay.

Hence, this Petition.[10]

First Issue:
Liability for Additional Costs

Issues
In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:
a. Whether or not the respondents are liable to pay the petitioner its claim for price
escalation of construction materials and labor cost escalation.
b. Whether or not the respondents are liable to the petitioner for cost of change orders
and extra works.
c. Whether or not the respondents are liable to the petitioner for the ten percent
retention money.
Petitioner argues that it is entitled to price escalation for both labor and materials, because
MPC was delayed in paying for its obligations. The former admits that it is normally not entitled to any
price increase for labor and materials, because a contractor is expected to build into its price a
contingency factor to protect it from cost increases that may occur during the contract period. [12] It
justifies its claim, however, on the ground that a contractor cannot be expected to anticipate price
increases beyond the original contract period. Respondents, on the other hand, aver that it was
delayed in finishing the project; hence, it is not entitled to any price increase.
It must be pointed out that the reason for the CAs denial of petitioners claim was that the
contract between the parties was for a lump sum consideration, and petitioner was guilty of delay in
completing the project.

d. Whether or not the respondents are liable to pay the petitioner attorneys fees.

e. Whether or not the respondents are liable to the petitioner for the cost of illegally Labor and Material
detained materials. Cost Escalation
f. Whether or not the respondents Jesus Typoco Sr., and Tan Yu are jointly and solidarily
liable to the petitioner for the latters claims.
 34
We agree with petitioner that it is entitled to price escalation, but only for the labor component
of Progress Billing No. 24. The Construction Contract contains the following provision on the
considerations therefor:
6.1 For and in consideration of the true and faithful performance of the work by the
CONTRACTOR, the OWNER shall pay the Lump Sum Contract Price of
PESOS: THIRTY EIGHT MILLION FIVE HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED NINE (P38,580,609.00) broken down as shown in the Bid
Form. No cost escalation shall be allowed except on the labor component of
the work x x x.[13]
Since the Contract allows escalation only of the labor component, the implication is that
material cost escalations are barred. There appears to be no provision, either in the original or in the
amended contract, that would justify billing of increased cost of materials. Furthermore, no evidence
-- like official economic data showing an increase in the price index of construction materials -- was
even adduced by petitioner to prove that there had indeed been increases in material costs.[14]
Petitioner attempts to pass off these cost escalations as a form of damages suffered by it as a
natural consequence of the delay in the payment of billings and claims for additional work.It argues
that the baseless and malicious refusal to pay for those claims renders respondents liable for damages
under Article 2201 of the Civil Code.
We disagree. Without tackling the issue of delay, we find that the contentious Progress Billing
No. 24 contains no claim for material cost escalation. The other unsettled bills claimed by petitioner
are those for change orders or extra work, which have not been shown to be related to the increase in
cost of materials. Dealt with in separate contracts between the parties were such claims, the costs of
which were to be determined and agreed upon only when required by MPC. Materials used for those
additional jobs were to be purchased only when the work was contracted, not prior thereto. As
admitted by petitioner, expenses for change orders/additional work were not included in the agreed
contract price[15] and, hence, were not subject to increases.
MPC admits that the labor cost escalation clause was adopted by the parties to safeguard the
contractor against losses in the event that, during the execution of the Contract, the government
would order a minimum wage adjustment, which would then inflate the labor cost. [16] Respondents
deny liability for this added expense because, according to the Contract, the allowance for labor cost
escalation is available only within the duration of the original construction period.
We clarify. The claimed cost of labor escalation pertains to the period September 1 to
December 15, 1989, in the amount of P170,722.10; and December 16 to January 27,
1990,P45,983.91. During those periods, petitioner had not yet incurred any delay in the project,
originally stipulated to be finished by May 16, 1989. But by mutual agreement, the period was
extended up to October 31, 1989, with a grace period until November 30, 1989.
Furthermore, a legislated wage increase became effective after the expiration of the original
period.[17] Respondents are, therefore, liable for this increase in labor cost, because they allowed
petitioner to continue working on the project until April 20, 1990 (even beyond November 30, 1989).
MPC argues that to allow the claim for labor cost escalation would be to reward petitioner for
incurring delay, thereby breaching a contractual obligation.
This contention is untenable. Before the expiration of the extended period, petitioner was not
yet in delay. It was granted by MPC an extension to complete the project until November 30,
1989. Moreover, despite the expiration of the extended period, MPC allowed it to continue working
on the project until the former took over and awarded that project to another contractor. Hence,
labor costs were actually incurred by petitioner until April 20, 1990. It was thus entitled to
reimbursement for labor cost escalation until that date. MPC cannot now be allowed to question the
true valuation of the additional labor because, instead of submitting to an independent evaluator, it
violated the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) issued by the trial court and hired another contractor
to finish the project.
Noteworthy is the fact that MPC paid for the labor cost escalation during the period August 1-15,
1989,[18] which was past the expiration of the original period. Apparently, it thereafter stopped paying
for labor cost escalation in response to the suit filed against it by petitioner.
The CA denied the labor cost escalation claim because, despite having billed MPC therefor,
petitioner accepted payments that did not include such claim. The appellate court construed the
acceptance by petitioner as a waiver of the latters right to be reimbursed for the increased labor cost.
We believe that this position is untenable. The CA mistook Exhibits C-7-B[19] and D-1[20] as bills
coming from petitioner, when in truth they were Accomplishment Evaluation Sheets issued by
MPC. The notation labor escalation not included in the said Exhibits was an admission on the part of
MPC that it had not paid such amount, upon the advice of Atty. Jose C. Laureta, its resident
counsel. According to him, petitioner should be faulted for having incurred labor cost increases after
the expiration of the original period (after May 16, 1989). Not having waived such increases, it should
thus bear them.[21]
To allow MPC to acquire the partially accomplished project without paying for labor cost
escalation validly incurred would constitute unjust enrichment at the expense of petitioner.[22]There is
unjust enrichment under Article 22 of the Civil Code when (1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2)
such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another.[23] Since petitioner had
rendered services that were accepted by MPC, then the former should be compensated for
them. Labor cost escalation, in this case, has already been earned by petitioner.
Change Orders and Extra Work
 35
Petitioner claims entitlement to compensation for change orders and extra work that were
covered by construction memoranda. MPC counters, however, that the former never presented any
cost estimate for additional work. The estimate would have formed the basis for a consensual
agreement and a computation of actual accomplishment, for which MPC could have been unilaterally
billed. Worse, the extra work was allegedly assessed by its engineer to be worth only P705.41.
We side with petitioner. The General Conditions to the Construction Contract provides:
13. CLAIMS FOR EXTRA AND FORCE ACCOUNT WORK:
If the Contractor claims that any construction by drawings or otherwise involve extra cost under this
Contract, he shall give the Owner and/or the Architect, written notice thereof within a reasonable
time after receipt of such instructions, and in any event before proceeding to execute the work,
except in emergency endangering life or property. No such claim shall be valid unless so made.
Extra work for which no price is provided in the proposal shall be covered by a
supplementary agreement to be signed by both parties before such work is
commenced. [24]
The CA is correct in holding that there is no supplemental agreement covering the claimed extra
work and change orders. Exhibits C-1, C-2, C-2-A, C-3 and C-4 show billings for extra work sent by
petitioner to MPC. But the former did not submit in evidence the alleged construction memoranda
covering them. Neither were they mentioned in the letter[25] of Roilo Golez dated November 24, 1989.
Progress Billing No. 24, which pertained to the project as covered by the Construction Contract,
did not mention any claim for extra work or change orders. These additional jobs were covered by
separate bills other than the twenty-four Progress Billings sent by petitioner.
MPC, however, never denied having ordered additional work. In Item No. 12 of its Amended
Answer,[26] it averred that petitioners claim for change orders and extra work were
premature. Limneo P. Miranda, respondents work engineer, manifested that additional work was
indeed done, but that claims therefor were not settled for the following reasons: (1) reconciliation
between the parties was never completed due to the absence of petitioners representative in
scheduled meetings; (2) difference in opinion on the proper valuation of the additional work, as MPC
wanted to use the net quantity method, while petitioner preferred the gross method; and (3) some
claims were rejected by MPC, because they had not been properly approved in accordance with the
Contract.[27]
Evidence on record further reveals that MPC approved some change order jobs despite the
absence of any supplementary agreement. In its Over-all Summary of Reconciled Quantities as of
September 6, 1989 (Annex C),[28] it valued petitioners valid claim therefor at P79,340.52. After noting
that the claim had extremely been bloated, Atty. Laureta, in-house counsel for respondent
corporation, affirmed as valid the amount stated in the summary.[29]
Petitioner may have failed to show the construction memoranda covering its claim, but it
inarguably performed extra work that was accepted by MPC. Hence, we will consider Annex C as the
proper valuation thereof.
Under the principle of quantum meruit, a contractor is allowed to recover the reasonable value
of the thing or services rendered despite the lack of a written contract, in order to avoid unjust
enrichment.[30] Quantum meruit means that in an action for work and labor, payment shall be made in
such amount as the plaintiff reasonably deserves. [31] To deny payment for a building almost
completed and already occupied would be to permit unjust enrichment at the expense of the
contractor.[32]
The CA held that since Billing No. 24 did not include any claim for additional work, such work
had presumably been previously paid for. This reasoning is not correct. It is beyond dispute that the
change orders and extra work were billed separately from the usual progress billings petitioner sent
to MPC.
Retention Money
The CA denied the claim for the 10 percent retention money, because petitioner had failed to
comply with the conditions under paragraph 6.3 of the Construction Contract. On the other hand, the
latter avers that these conditions were deemed fulfilled under Article 1186 of the Civil Code because,
when its contract was terminated, MPC prevented the fulfillment of those conditions. It would
allegedly be unfair and unreasonable for petitioner to guarantee a project finished by another
contractor.
We disagree with petitioner. In the construction industry, the 10 percent retention money is a
portion of the contract price automatically deducted from the contractors billings, as security for the
execution of corrective work -- if any -- becomes necessary. This amount is to be released one year
after the completion of the project, minus the cost of corrective work.[33] The conditions for its release
are stated in the Construction Contract as follows:
6.3 In all cases, however, payment of the progress billings shall be subject to deduction of
twenty percent (20%) recoupment of the downpayment, ten percent (10%)
retention and expanded withholding tax on CONTRACTORS income. Upon
issuance of the Certificate of Completion of the work by the OWNER and
upon submission of Guaranty Bond, Ninety Percent (90%) of the retained
amount shall be released to the CONTRACTOR and the balance thereof shall
be released by the OWNER within thirty (30) days after the expiration of the
guaranty period which is 365 days after issuance of the certificate of
completion. [34]
 36
None of the foregoing conditions were satisfied; hence, the CA was correct in forfeiting the
retention fee. The completion of the work was stipulated in the Contract to be within 365 days from
the issuance of a Notice to Proceed or until May 16, 1989. Then the period was extended up to
November 30, 1989. Petitioner worked on the project till April 20, 1990. It was given by MPC ample
time and two extensions to complete the project. The simple truth is that in failing to finish the
project, the former failed to fulfill a prerequisite for the release of the retention money.
Detained Materials
Petitioner claims cost reimbursement of illegally detained materials, as it was allowed to
withdraw them from the site only after two years from the unilateral termination of the Contract.By
1992, only 30 percent of the materials detained were salvageable, while the rest had depreciated.
This contention has no merit. According to the CAs ruling, the only proof that MPC detained
materials belonging to petitioner was the denial of the request, contained in the latters February 1990
letter,[35] for the release of used form lumber. Aside from that letter, however, no other attempt was
shown to have been made by petitioner to obtain its request. It should have tried again to do so
before claiming that respondents unreasonably prevented it from removing its construction materials
from the premises. As to the other materials, there was absolutely no attempt to remove them from
the construction site. Hence, we cannot say that these were ever withheld from petitioner.
Detention is not proved by Atty. Lauretas letter[36] dated July 4, 1992, allowing petitioner to
remove its materials from the site. The letter was merely a directive for it to clear out its belongings
therefrom, in view of the hiring of a second contractor to finish the project.
Moreover, in a specifically designated yard inside the construction site, petitioner maintained a
warehouse that was guarded by its own security complement and completely inaccessible to MPC
personnel.[37] It therefore had control over those materials and should have made provisions to keep
them safe from the elements and from pilferage.
Attorneys Fees
Petitioner argues that it is entitled to attorneys fees based on Article 2208 of the Civil Code,
because (1) respondents act or omission has compelled it to litigate with third persons or to incur
expenses to protect its interest; and (2) respondents acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing
to satisfy its plainly valid, just and demandable claim.
The grant of some of the claims of petitioner does not change the fact that it did not finish the
project. Attorneys fees are not granted every time a party prevails in a suit, because no premium
should be placed on the right to litigate.[38] Petitioner is not, after all, blameless in the present
controversy. Just because MPC withheld some payments from petitioner does not mean that the
former was in gross or evident bad faith. MPC had claims that it wanted to offset with those of the
latter.
Second Issue:
Typoco and Tans Liabilities
Petitioner claims that Respondents Jesus Typoco and Tan Yu are solidarily liable with MPC.
We concur with the CA that these two respondents are not liable. Section 31 of the Corporation
Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 68) provides:
Section 31. Liability of directors, trustees or officers. Directors or trustees who willfully and knowingly
vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or who are guilty of gross negligence or
bad faith x x x shall be liable jointly and severally for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by the
corporation, its stockholders and other persons.
The personal liability of corporate officers validly attaches only when (a) they assent to a
patently unlawful act of the corporation; or (b) they are guilty of bad faith or gross negligence in
directing its affairs; or (c) they incur conflict of interest, resulting in damages to the corporation, its
stockholders or other persons.[39]
The records are bereft of any evidence that Typoco acted in bad faith with gross or inexcusable
negligence, or that he acted outside the scope of his authority as company president.The unilateral
termination of the Contract during the existence of the TRO was indeed contemptible -- for which
MPC should have merely been cited for contempt of court at the most -- and a preliminary injunction
would have then stopped work by the second contractor. Besides, there is no showing that the
unilateral termination of the Contract was null and void.
Respondent Tan is not an officer or a director of MPC. His participation is limited to an alleged
conversation between him and Engineer Mario Cornista, petitioners project manager.Supposedly, the
former verbally agreed therein to guarantee the payment of the latters progress billings. We find no
satisfactory evidence to show respondents alleged solidary liability to petitioner.
Third Issue:
Liability for Actual and Liquidated Damages
 37

Petitioner avers that it should be exonerated from the counterclaims for actual and liquidated
damages, because its failure to complete the project was due to respondents acts.
Central to the resolution of this issue is the question of which party was in delay. Aside from the
contentious Progress Billing No. 24, there are no other unpaid claims. The bills for extra work and
change orders, aside from those for the beams and columns, were premature and still subject to
reconciliation and adjustment. Hence, we cannot hold MPC liable for them.
In comparison, petitioner did not fulfill its contractual obligations. It could not totally pass the
blame to MPC for hiring a second contractor, because the latter was allowed to terminate the services
of the contractor.
10.1 The OWNER shall have the right to terminate this Contract in the event that the
CONTRACTOR incurs a fifteen percent (15%) or greater slippage in the
prosecution of the overall work evaluated against the Project schedule as
indicated by the critical path of the approved PERT/CPM network for the
Project or as amended by Art. II herein.
upon and not by way of penalty, and as such, the OWNER shall not be
further required to prove that he has incurred actual damages to be entitled
thereto. In the case of such delays, the OWNER is hereby authorized to
deduct the amount of liquidated damages from any money due or which
may become due the CONTRACTOR in this or any other contract or to collect
such amount from the CONTRACTORs performance bond whichever is
convenient and expeditious to the OWNER.
Liquidated damages are those that the parties agree to be paid in case of a breach. [44] As
worded, the amount agreed upon answers for damages suffered by the owner due to delays in the
completion of the project. Under Philippine laws, these damages take the nature of penalties.[45] A
penal clause is an accessory undertaking to assume greater liability in case of a breach. It is attached
to an obligation in order to ensure performance.
Thus, as held by the CA, petitioner is bound to pay liquidated damages for 92 days, or from the
expiration of the grace period in the Amended Contract until February 1, 1990, when it effectively
abandoned the project.

Either party shall have the right to terminate this Contract for reason of violation or non-compliance
by the other party of the terms and conditions herein agreed upon.[40]
As of November 30, 1989, petitioner accomplished only approximately 80 percent of the
project. In other words, it was already in delay at the time. In addition, Engineer Miranda testified
that it would lose money even if it finished the project; [41] thus, respondents already suspected that it
had no intention of finishing the project at all.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is partly GRANTED and the assailed Decision MODIFIED. Petitioner
is AWARDED labor cost escalation in the sum of P1,196,202 and cost of extra work in the sum
of P79,340.52. In all other respects, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Azcuna, J., on official leave - official business.

Petitioner was in delay and in breach of contract. Clearly, the obligor is liable for damages that
are the natural and probable consequences of its breach of obligation. [42] Petitioner was already paid
by MPC in the amount of P31,435,187 out of the total contract price of P38,580,609; thus,
only P7,145,422 remained outstanding. In order to finish the project, the latter had to contract the
services of a second construction firm for P11,750,000. Hence, MPC suffered actual damages in the
amount of P4,604,579 for the completion of the project.

Petitioner is also liable for liquidated damages as provided in the Contract,[43] the pertinent
portion of which is quoted as follows:

4.1 Time is an essential feature of this Contract and in the event that the CONTRACTOR
fails to complete the contracted work within the stipulated time inclusive of
any granted extension of time, the CONTRACTOR shall pay the OWNER, as
liquidated damages, the amount of one over one thousand (1/1000) of the
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. PHILAB INDUSTRIES, INC., respondent.
value of the contract price for each and every calendar day of delay
(Sundays and Holidays included), not to exceed 15% of [the] Contract
amount, in the completion of the work as specified in Article II above. It is DECISION
understood that the liquidated damages herein provided are fixed, agreed CALLEJO, SR., J.:
 38
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 44209, as well as its Resolution[2] denying the petitioners motion for the
reconsideration thereof. The Court of Appeals set aside the Decision[3] of Branch 150 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, which dismissed the complaint of the respondent against the
petitioner for sum of money and damages.
The Facts of the Case
Sometime in 1979, the University of the Philippines (UP) decided to construct an integrated
system of research organization known as the Research Complex. As part of the project, laboratory
equipment and furniture were purchased for the National Institute of Biotechnology and Applied
Microbiology (BIOTECH) at the UP Los Baos. Providentially, the Ferdinand E. Marcos Foundation
(FEMF) came forward and agreed to fund the acquisition of the laboratory furniture, including the
fabrication thereof.
Renato E. Lirio, the Executive Assistant of the FEMF, gave the go-signal to BIOTECH to contact a
corporation to accomplish the project. On July 23, 1982, Dr. William Padolina, the Executive Deputy
Director of BIOTECH, arranged for Philippine Laboratory Industries, Inc. (PHILAB), to fabricate the
laboratory furniture and deliver the same to BIOTECH for the BIOTECH Building Project, for the
account of the FEMF. Lirio directed Padolina to give the go-signal to PHILAB to proceed with the
fabrication of the laboratory furniture, and requested Padolina to forward the contract of the project
to FEMF for its approval.
On July 13, 1982, Padolina wrote Lirio and requested for the issuance of the purchase order and
downpayment for the office and laboratory furniture for the project, thus:
1. Supply and Installation of Laboratory furniture for the BIOTECH Building Project
Amount : P2,934,068.90
Supplier : Philippine Laboratory Furniture Co.,
College, Laguna
Attention: Mr. Hector C. Navasero
President
Downpayment : 40% or P1,173,627.56
2. Fabrication and Supply of office furniture for the BIOTECH Building Project
Amount : P573,375.00
Supplier : Trans-Oriental Woodworks, Inc.
1st Avenue, Bagumbayan
Tanyag, Taguig, Metro Manila
Downpayment : 50% or P286,687.50[4]
Padolina assured Lirio that the contract would be prepared as soon as possible before the
issuance of the purchase orders and the downpayment for the goods, and would be transmitted to
the FEMF as soon as possible.
In a Letter dated July 23, 1982, Padolina informed Hector Navasero, the President of PHILAB, to
proceed with the fabrication of the laboratory furniture, per the directive of FEMF Executive Assistant
Lirio. Padolina also requested for copies of the shop drawings and a sample contract[5] for the project,
and that such contract and drawings had to be finalized before the down payment could be remitted
to the PHILAB the following week. However, PHILAB failed to forward any sample contract.
Subsequently, PHILAB made partial deliveries of office and laboratory furniture to BIOTECH after
having been duly inspected by their representatives and FEMF Executive Assistant Lirio.
On August 24, 1982, FEMF remitted P600,000 to PHILAB as downpayment for the laboratory
furniture for the BIOTECH project, for which PHILAB issued Official Receipt No. 253 to FEMF. On
October 22, 1982, FEMF made another partial payment of P800,000 to PHILAB, for which the latter
issued Official Receipt No. 256 to FEMF. The remittances were in the form of checks drawn by FEMF
and delivered to PHILAB, through Padolina.
On October 16, 1982, UP, through Emil Q. Javier, the Chancellor of UP Los Baos and FEMF,
represented by its Executive Officer, Rolando Gapud, executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
in which FEMF agreed to grant financial support and donate sums of money to UP for the construction
of buildings, installation of laboratory and other capitalization for the project, not to
exceed P29,000,000.00. The obligations of FEMF under the MOA are the following:
ARTICLE II
OBLIGATIONS OF THE FOUNDATION
2.1. The FOUNDATION, in carrying out its principal objectives of promoting philantrophic and scientific
projects through financial support to such projects that will contribute to the countrys economic
development, shall grant such financial support and donate such sums of money to the RESEARCH
COMPLEX as may be necessary for the construction of buildings, installation of laboratories, setting up
of offices and physical plants and facilities and other capital investment of the RESEARCH COMPLEX
and/or any of its component Research Institutes not to exceed P29 Million. For this purpose, the
FOUNDATION shall:
(a) Acquire and donate to the UNIVERSITY the site for the RESEARCH COMPLEX; and
 39
(b) Donate or cause to be donated to the UNIVERSITY the sum of TWENTY-NINE MILLION PESOS
(P29,000,000.00) for the construction of the buildings of the National Institutes of Biotechnology and
Applied Microbiology (BIOTECH) and the installation of their laboratories and their physical plants and
other facilities to enable them to commence operations.
2.2. In addition, the FOUNDATION shall, subject to the approval of the Board of Trustees of the
FOUNDATION, continue to support the activities of the RESEARCH COMPLEX by way of recurrent
additional grants and donations for specific research and development projects which may be
mutually agreed upon and, from time to time, additional grants and donations of such amounts as
may be necessary to provide the RESEARCH COMPLEX and/or any of its Research Institutes with
operational flexibility especially with regard to incentives to staff purchase of equipment/facilities,
travel abroad, recruitment of local and expatriate staff and such other activities and inputs which are
difficult to obtain under usual government rules and regulations.[6]
The Board of Regents of the UP approved the MOA on November 25, 1982.[7]
In the meantime, Navasero promised to submit the contract for the installation of laboratory
furniture to BIOTECH, by January 12, 1983. However, Navasero failed to do so. In a Letter dated
February 1, 1983, BIOTECH reminded Navasero of the need to submit the contract so that it could be
submitted to FEMF for its evaluation and approval.[8] Instead of submitting the said contract, PHILAB
submitted to BIOTECH an accomplishment report on the project as of February 28, 1983, and
requested payment thereon.[9] By May 1983, PHILAB had completed 78% of the project, amounting
to P2,288,573.74 out of the total cost of P2,934,068.90. The FEMF had already paid forty percent
(40%) of the total cost of the project. On May 12, 1983, Padolina wrote Lirio and furnished him the
progress billing from PHILAB.[10] On August 11, 1983, the FEMF made another partial payment
of P836,119.52 representing the already delivered laboratory and office furniture after the requisite
inspection and verification thereof by representatives from the BIOTECH, FEMF, and PHILAB. The
payment was made in the form of a check, for which PHILAB issued Official Receipt No. 202 to FEMF
through Padolina.[11]
On July 1, 1984, PHILAB submitted to BIOTECH Invoice No. 01643 in the amount of P702,939.40
for the final payment of laboratory furniture. Representatives from BIOTECH, PHILAB, and Lirio for the
FEMF, conducted a verification of the accomplishment of the work and confirmed the same. BIOTECH
forwarded the invoice to Lirio on December 18, 1984 for its payment.[12] Lirio, in turn, forwarded the
invoice to Gapud, presumably sometime in the early part of 1985. However, the FEMF failed to pay
the bill. PHILAB reiterated its request for payment through a letter on May 9, 1985.[13] BIOTECH again
wrote Lirio on March 21, 1985, requesting the payment of PHILABs bill.[14] It sent another letter to
Gapud, on November 22, 1985, again appealing for the payment of PHILABs bill.[15] In a Letter to
BIOTECH dated December 5, 1985, PHILAB requested payment of P702,939.40 plus interest thereon
of P224,940.61.[16] There was, however, no response from the FEMF. On February 24, 1986, PHILAB
wrote BIOTECH, appealing for the payment of its bill even on installment basis.[17]
President Marcos was ousted from office during the February 1986 EDSA Revolution. On March
26, 1986, Navasero wrote BIOTECH requesting for its much-needed assistance for the payment of the
balance already due plus interest of P295,234.55 for its fabrication and supply of laboratory
furniture.[18]
On April 22, 1986, PHILAB wrote President Corazon C. Aquino asking her help to secure the
payment of the amount due from the FEMF.[19] The letter was referred to then Budget Minister
Alberto Romulo, who referred the letter to then UP President Edgardo Angara on June 9, 1986. On
September 30, 1986, Raul P. de Guzman, the Chancellor of UP Los Baos, wrote then Chairman of the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) Jovito Salonga, submitting PHILABs claim to be
officially entered as accounts payable as soon as the assets of FEMF were liquidated by the PCGG.[20]
In the meantime, the PCGG wrote UP requesting for a copy of the relevant contract and the
MOA for its perusal.[21]
Chancellor De Guzman wrote Navasero requesting for a copy of the contract executed between
PHILAB and FEMF. In a Letter dated October 20, 1987, Navasero informed De Guzman that PHILAB
and FEMF did not execute any contract regarding the fabrication and delivery of laboratory furniture
to BIOTECH.
Exasperated, PHILAB filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against UP. In the
complaint, PHILAB prayed that it be paid the following:
(1) PESOS: SEVEN HUNDRED TWO THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED THIRTY NINE & 40/100
(P702,939.40) plus an additional amount (as shall be determined during the
hearing) to cover the actual cost of money which at the time of transaction the
value of the peso was eleven to a dollar (P11.00:$1) and twenty seven (27%)
percent interest on the total amount from August 1982 until fully paid;
(2) PESOS: ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) exemplary damages;
(3) FIFTY THOUSAND [PESOS] (P50,000.00) as and for attorneys fees; and
(4) Cost of suit.[22]
PHILAB alleged, inter alia, that:
3. Sometime in August 1982, defendant, through its officials, particularly MR. WILLIAM
PADOLINA, Director, asked plaintiff to supply and install several laboratory furnitures
and equipment at BIOTECH, a research laboratory of herein defendant located at its
campus in College, Laguna, for a total contract price of PESOS: TWO MILLION NINE
HUNDRED THIRTY-NINE THOUSAND FIFTY-EIGHT & 90/100 (P2,939,058.90);
4. After the completion of the delivery and installation of said laboratory furnitures and
equipment at defendants BIOTECH Laboratory, defendant paid three (3) times on
installment basis:
 40
a) P600,000.00 as per Official Receipt No. 253 dated August 24, 1982;
b) P800,000.00 as per Official Receipt No. 256 dated October 22, 1982;
c) P836,119.52 as per Official Receipt No. 202 dated August 11, 1983;
thus leaving a balance of PESOS: SEVEN HUNDRED TWO THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED
THIRTY-NINE & 40/100 (P702,939.40).
5. That notwithstanding repeated demands for the past eight years, defendant arrogantly
and maliciously made plaintiff believe that it was going to pay the balance aforestated,
that was why plaintiffs President and General Manager himself, HECTOR C. NAVASERO,
personally went to and from UP Los Baos to talk with defendants responsible officers
in the hope of expecting payment, when, in truth and in fact, defendant had no
intention to pay whatsoever right from the start on a misplaced ground of
technicalities. Some of plaintiffs demand letters since year 1983 up to the present are
hereto attached as Annexes A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H hereof;
6. That by reason of defendants malicious, evil and unnecessary misrepresentations that it
was going to pay its obligation and asking plaintiff so many red tapes and
requirements to submit, compliance of all of which took plaintiff almost eight (8) years
to finish, when, in truth and in fact, defendant had no intention to pay, defendant
should be ordered to pay plaintiff no less than PESOS: ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P100,000.00) exemplary damages, so that other government institutions may be
warned that they must not unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of the people
they serve.[23]
In its answer, UP denied liability and alleged that PHILAB had no cause of action against it
because it was merely the donee/beneficiary of the laboratory furniture in the BIOTECH; and that the
FEMF, which funded the project, was liable to the PHILAB for the purchase price of the laboratory
furniture. UP specifically denied obliging itself to pay for the laboratory furniture supplied by PHILAB.
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint without
prejudice to PHILABs recourse against the FEMF. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit without prejudice to plaintiff's recourse
to the assets of the Marcos Foundation for the unpaid balance of P792,939.49.
SO ORDERED.[24]
Undaunted, PHILAB appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) alleging that the trial court erred in
finding that:
1. the contract for the supply and installation of subject laboratory furniture and
equipment was between PHILAB and the Marcos Foundation; and,
2. the Marcos Foundation, not the University of the Philippines, is liable to pay the
respondent the balance of the purchase price.[25]
The CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and held that there was never a contract
between FEMF and PHILAB. Consequently, PHILAB could not be bound by the MOA between the
FEMF and UP since it was never a party thereto. The appellate court ruled that, although UP did not
bind itself to pay for the laboratory furniture; nevertheless, it is liable to PHILAB under the maxim: No
one should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another.
The Present Petition
Upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration of the appellate courts decision, UP, now the
petitioner, filed its petition for review contending that:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO APPLY THE LAW ON CONTRACTS
BETWEEN PHILAB AND THE MARCOS FOUNDATION.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE LEGAL PRINCIPLE OF UNJUST
ENRICHMENT WHEN IT HELD THAT THE UNIVERSITY, AND NOT THE MARCOS
FOUNDATION, IS LIABLE TO PHILAB.[26]
Prefatorily, the doctrinal rule is that pure questions of facts may not be the subject of appeal by
certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as this mode of appeal is generally
restricted to questions of law.[27] However, this rule is not absolute. The Court may review the factual
findings of the CA should they be contrary to those of the trial court. [28]Correspondingly, this Court
may review findings of facts when the judgment of the CA is premised on a misapprehension of
facts.[29]
On the first assigned error, the petitioner argues that the CA overlooked the evidentiary effect
and substance of the corresponding letters and communications which support the statements of the
witnesses showing affirmatively that an implied contract of sale existed between PHILAB and the
FEMF. The petitioner furthermore asserts that no contract existed between it and the respondent as it
could not have entered into any agreement without the requisite public bidding and a formal written
contract.
The respondent, on the other hand, submits that the CA did not err in not applying the law on
contracts between the respondent and the FEMF. It, likewise, attests that it was never privy to the
MOA entered into between the petitioner and the FEMF. The respondent adds that what the FEMF
donated was a sum of money equivalent to P29,000,000, and not the laboratory equipment supplied
by it to the petitioner. The respondent submits that the petitioner, being the recipient of the
laboratory furniture, should not enrich itself at the expense of the respondent.
The petition is meritorious.
 41

It bears stressing that the respondents cause of action is one for sum of money predicated on
the alleged promise of the petitioner to pay for the purchase price of the furniture, which, despite
demands, the petitioner failed to do. However, the respondent failed to prove that the petitioner ever
obliged itself to pay for the laboratory furniture supplied by it. Hence, the respondent is not entitled
to its claim against the petitioner.
There is no dispute that the respondent is not privy to the MOA executed by the petitioner and
FEMF; hence, it is not bound by the said agreement. Contracts take effect only between the parties
and their assigns.[30] A contract cannot be binding upon and cannot be enforced against one who is
not a party to it, even if he is aware of such contract and has acted with knowledge
thereof.[31] Likewise admitted by the parties, is the fact that there was no written contract executed
by the petitioner, the respondent and FEMF relating to the fabrication and delivery of office and
laboratory furniture to the BIOTECH. Even the CA failed to specifically declare that the petitioner and
the respondent entered into a contract of sale over the said laboratory furniture. The parties are in
accord that the FEMF had remitted to the respondent partial payments via checks drawn and issued
by the FEMF to the respondent, through Padolina, in the total amount of P2,288,573.74 out of the
total cost of the project of P2,934,068.90 and that the respondent received the said checks and issued
receipts therefor to the FEMF. There is also no controversy that the petitioner did not pay a single
centavo for the said furniture delivered by the respondent that the petitioner had been using ever
since.
the FEMF paid for the bills and statement of accounts of the respondent, for which the latter
unconditionally issued receipts to and under the name of the FEMF. Indeed, witness Lirio testified:
Q: Now, did you know, Mr. Witness, if PHILAB Industries was aware that it was the Marcos
Foundation who would be paying for this particular transaction for the completion
of this particular transaction?
A: I think they are fully aware.
Q: What is your basis for saying so?
A: First, I think they were appraised by Dr. Padolina. Secondly, there were occasions
during our inspection in Los Baos, at the installation site, there were occasions, two
or three occasions, when we met with Mr. Navasero who is the President, I think, or
manager of PHILAB, and we appraised him that it was really between the foundation
and him to which includes (sic) the construction company constructing the building.
He is fully aware that it is the foundation who (sic) engaged them and issued the
payments.[36]
The respondent, in its Letter dated March 26, 1986, informed the petitioner and sought its
assistance for the collection of the amount due from the FEMF:

We agree with the petitioner that, based on the records, an implied-in-fact contract of sale was Dear Dr. Padolina:
entered into between the respondent and FEMF. A contract implied in fact is one implied from facts
and circumstances showing a mutual intention to contract. It arises where the intention of the parties May we request for your much-needed assistance in the payment of the balance still due us on the
is not expressed, but an agreement in fact creating an obligation. It is a contract, the existence and laboratory furniture we supplied and installed two years ago?
terms of which are manifested by conduct and not by direct or explicit words between parties but is
to be deduced from conduct of the parties, language used, or things done by them, or other pertinent Business is still slow and we will appreciate having these funds as soon as possible to keep up our
circumstances attending the transaction. To create contracts implied in fact, circumstances must operations.
warrant inference that one expected compensation and the other to pay.[32] An implied-in-fact
contract requires the parties intent to enter into a contract; it is a true contract. [33] The conduct of the
We look forward to hearing from you regarding this matter.
parties is to be viewed as a reasonable man would view it, to determine the existence or not of an
implied-in-fact contract.[34] The totality of the acts/conducts of the parties must be considered to
determine their intention. An implied-in-fact contract will not arise unless the meeting of minds is Very truly yours,
indicated by some intelligent conduct, act or sign.[35]
PHILAB INDUSTRIES, INC.[37]
In this case, the respondent was aware, from the time Padolina contacted it for the fabrication
and supply of the laboratory furniture until the go-signal was given to it to fabricate and deliver the
The respondent even wrote former President Aquino seeking her assistance for the payment of
furniture to BIOTECH as beneficiary, that the FEMF was to pay for the same. Indeed, Padolina asked
the amount due, in which the respondent admitted it tried to collect from her predecessor, namely,
the respondent to prepare the draft of the contract to be received by the FEMF prior to the execution
the former President Ferdinand E. Marcos:
of the parties (the respondent and FEMF), but somehow, the respondent failed to prepare one. The
respondent knew that the petitioner was merely the donee-beneficiary of the laboratory furniture
and not the buyer; nor was it liable for the payment of the purchase price thereof. From the inception, YOUR EXCELLENCY:
 42

At the instance of the national government, subject laboratory furnitures were supplied by our
company to the National Institute of Biotechnology & Applied Microbiology (BIOTECH), University of
the Philippines, Los Baos, Laguna, in 1984.
Out of the total contract price of PESOS: TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED THIRTY-NINE THOUSAND
FIFTY-EIGHT & 90/100 (P2,939,058.90), the previous administration had so far paid us the sum
of P2,236,119.52 thus leaving a balance of PESOS: ONE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND
SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY-EIGHT & 61/100 (P1,412.748.61) inclusive of interest of 24% per annum and
30% exchange rate adjustment.
On several occasions, we have tried to collect this amount from your predecessor, the latest of which
was subject invoice (01643) we submitted to DR. W. PADOLINA, deputy director of BIOTECH. But this,
notwithstanding, our claim has remained unacted upon up to now. Copy of said invoice is hereto
attached for easy reference.
Article 22 of the New Civil Code reads:
Every person who, through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes
into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return
the same to him. (Boldface supplied)
In order that accion in rem verso may prosper, the essential elements must be present: (1) that
the defendant has been enriched, (2) that the plaintiff has suffered a loss, (3) that the enrichment of
the defendant is without just or legal ground, and (4) that the plaintiff has no other action based on
contract, quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict.[43]
An accion in rem verso is considered merely an auxiliary action, available only when there is no
other remedy on contract, quasi-contract, crime, and quasi-delict. If there is an obtainable action
under any other institution of positive law, that action must be resorted to, and the principle of accion
in rem verso will not lie.[44]

Now that your excellency is the head of our government, we sincerely hope that payment of this The essential requisites for the application of Article 22 of the New Civil Code do not obtain in
obligation will soon be made as this is one project the Republic of the Philippines has use of and this case. The respondent had a remedy against the FEMF via an action based on an implied-in-fact
derives benefit from.[38] contract with the FEMF for the payment of its claim. The petitioner legally acquired the laboratory
furniture under the MOA with FEMF; hence, it is entitled to keep the laboratory furniture.
Admittedly, the respondent sent to the petitioner its bills and statements of accounts for the
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court
payments of the laboratory furniture it delivered to the petitioner which the petitioner, through
of Appeals is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch
Padolina, transmitted to the FEMF for its payment. However, the FEMF failed to pay the last
150, is REINSTATED. No costs.
statement of account of the respondent because of the onset of the EDSA upheaval. It was only when
the respondent lost all hope of collecting its claim from the government and/or the PCGG did it file SO ORDERED.
the complaint against the petitioner for the collection of the payment of its last delivery of laboratory
furniture. Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Chico-Nazario, J., on leave.
We reject the ruling of the CA holding the petitioner liable for the claim of the respondent
based on the maxim that no one should enrich itself at the expense of another.

Unjust enrichment claims do not lie simply because one party benefits from the efforts or
obligations of others, but instead it must be shown that a party was unjustly enriched in the sense
that the term unjustly could mean illegally or unlawfully.[39]

Moreover, to substantiate a claim for unjust enrichment, the claimant must unequivocally prove
that another party knowingly received something of value to which he was not entitled and that the ARTURO SARTE FLORES, G.R. No. 183984
state of affairs are such that it would be unjust for the person to keep the benefit. [40] Unjust
enrichment is a term used to depict result or effect of failure to make remuneration of or for property ARTURO FLORES VS. SPOUSES LINDO
or benefits received under circumstances that give rise to legal or equitable obligation to account for
them; to be entitled to remuneration, one must confer benefit by mistake, fraud, coercion, or
request.[41] Unjust enrichment is not itself a theory of reconvey. Rather, it is a prerequisite for the
enforcement of the doctrine of restitution.[42]
DECISION
 43
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 30 May 2008 Decision2 and the 4 August 2008
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94003
The Antecedent Facts
The facts, as gleaned from the Court of Appeals Decision, are as follows:
On 31 October 1995, Edna Lindo (Edna) obtained a loan from Arturo Flores (petitioner) amounting
to P400,000 payable on 1 December 1995 with 3% compounded monthly interest and 3% surcharge in
case of late payment. To secure the loan, Edna executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage4 (the Deed)
covering a property in the name of Edna and her husband Enrico (Enrico) Lindo, Jr. (collectively,
respondents). Edna also signed a Promissory Note5 and the Deed for herself and for Enrico as his
attorney-in-fact.
Edna issued three checks as partial payments for the loan. All checks were dishonored for
insufficiency of funds, prompting petitioner to file a Complaint for Foreclosure of Mortgage with
Damages against respondents. The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33
(RTC, Branch 33) and docketed as Civil Case No. 00-97942.
In its 30 September 2003 Decision,6 the RTC, Branch 33 ruled that petitioner was not entitled to
judicial foreclosure of the mortgage. The RTC, Branch 33 found that the Deed was executed by Edna
without the consent and authority of Enrico. The RTC, Branch 33 noted that the Deed was executed
on 31 October 1995 while the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by Enrico was only dated 4
November 1995.
The RTC, Branch 33 further ruled that petitioner was not precluded from recovering the loan from
Edna as he could file a personal action against her. However, the RTC, Branch 33 ruled that it had no
jurisdiction over the personal action which should be filed in the place where the plaintiff or the
defendant resides in accordance with Section 2, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its Order7 dated 8 January 2004, the RTC, Branch 33
denied the motion for lack of merit.
On 8 September 2004, petitioner filed a Complaint for Sum of Money with Damages against
respondents. It was raffled to Branch 42 (RTC, Branch 42) of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, and
docketed as Civil Case No. 04-110858.
Respondents filed their Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims where they admitted
the loan but stated that it only amounted to P340,000. Respondents further alleged that Enrico was
not a party to the loan because it was contracted by Edna without Enricos signature. Respondents
prayed for the dismissal of the case on the grounds of improper venue, res judicata and
forum-shopping, invoking the Decision of the RTC, Branch 33. On 7 March 2005, respondents also
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and lack of cause of action.
The Decision of the Trial Court
On 22 July 2005, the RTC, Branch 42 issued an Order8 denying the motion to dismiss. The RTC, Branch
42 ruled that res judicata will not apply to rights, claims or demands which, although growing out of
the same subject matter, constitute separate or distinct causes of action and were not put in issue in
the former action. Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. In its Order9 dated 8 February
2006, the RTC, Branch 42 denied respondents motion. The RTC, Branch 42 ruled that the RTC, Branch
33 expressly stated that its decision did not mean that petitioner could no longer recover the loan
petitioner extended to Edna.
Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order before the Court of Appeals.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 30 May 2008 Decision, the Court of Appeals set aside the 22 July 2005 and 8 February 2006
Orders of the RTC, Branch 42 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
The Court of Appeals ruled that while the general rule is that a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and
not appealable, the rule admits of exceptions. The Court of Appeals ruled that the RTC, Branch 42
acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying respondents motion to dismiss.
The Court of Appeals ruled that under Section 3, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a party
may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action. If two or more suits are instituted on
the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one on a judgment upon the merits in any one is
available ground for the dismissal of the others. The Court of Appeals ruled that on a nonpayment of a
note secured by a mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of action against the debtor, that is
recovery of the credit with execution of the suit. Thus, the creditor may institute two alternative
remedies: either a personal action for the collection of debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage,
but not both. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner had only one cause of action against Edna for
 44
her failure to pay her obligation and he could not split the single cause of action by filing separately a
foreclosure proceeding and a collection case. By filing a petition for foreclosure of the real estate
mortgage, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner had already waived his personal action to recover
the amount covered by the promissory note.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 4 August 2008 Resolution, the Court of Appeals
denied the motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in dismissing
the complaint for collection of sum of money on the ground of multiplicity of suits.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
The rule is that a mortgage-creditor has a single cause of action against a mortgagor-debtor, that is, to
recover the debt.10 The mortgage-creditor has the option of either filing a personal action for
collection of sum of money or instituting a real action to foreclose on the mortgage security.11 An
election of the first bars recourse to the second, otherwise there would be multiplicity of suits in
which the debtor would be tossed from one venue to another depending on the location of the
mortgaged properties and the residence of the parties.12
The two remedies are alternative and each remedy is complete by itself.13 If the mortgagee opts to
foreclose the real estate mortgage, he waives the action for the collection of the debt, and vice
versa.14 The Court explained:
x x x in the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may institute
against the mortgage debtor either a personal action for debt or a real action to foreclose
the mortgage. In other words, he may pursue either of the two remedies, but not both. By
such election, his cause of action can by no means be impaired, for each of the two
remedies is complete in itself. Thus, an election to bring a personal action will leave open to
him all the properties of the debtor for attachment and execution, even including the
mortgaged property itself. And, if he waives such personal action and pursues his remedy
against the mortgaged property, an unsatisfied judgment thereon would still give him the
right to sue for deficiency judgment, in which case, all the properties of the defendant,
other than the mortgaged property, are again open to him for the satisfaction of the
deficiency. In either case, his remedy is complete, his cause of action undiminished, and any
advantages attendant to the pursuit of one or the other remedy are purely accidental and
are all under his right of election. On the other hand, a rule that would authorize the
plaintiff to bring a personal action against the debtor and simultaneously or successively
another action against the mortgaged property, would result not only in multiplicity of suits
so offensive to justice (Soriano v. Enriques, 24 Phil. 584) and obnoxious to law and equity
(Osorio v. San Agustin, 25 Phil. 404), but also in subjecting the defendant to the vexation of
being sued in the place of his residence or of the residence of the plaintiff, and then again in
the place where the property lies.15
The Court has ruled that if a creditor is allowed to file his separate complaints simultaneously or
successively, one to recover his credit and another to foreclose his mortgage, he will, in effect, be
authorized plural redress for a single breach of contract at so much costs to the court and with so
much vexation and oppressiveness to the debtor.16
In this case, however, there are circumstances that the Court takes into consideration.
Petitioner filed an action for foreclosure of mortgage. The RTC, Branch 33 ruled that petitioner was
not entitled to judicial foreclosure because the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was executed
without Enricos consent. The RTC, Branch 33 stated:
All these circumstances certainly conspired against the plaintiff who has the burden of
proving his cause of action. On the other hand, said circumstances tend to support the claim
of defendant Edna Lindo that her husband did not consent to the mortgage of their conjugal
property and that the loan application was her personal decision.
Accordingly, since the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was executed by defendant
Edna Lindo lacks the consent or authority of her husband Enrico Lindo, the Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage is void pursuant to Article 96 of the Family Code.
This does not mean, however, that the plaintiff cannot recover the P400,000 loan plus
interest which he extended to defendant Edna Lindo. He can institute a personal action
against the defendant for the amount due which should be filed in the place where the
plaintiff resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides at the
election of the plaintiff in accordance with Section 2, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules on Civil
Procedure. This Court has no jurisdiction to try such personal action.17
 45
Edna did not deny before the RTC, Branch 33 that she obtained the loan. She claimed, however, that
her husband did not give his consent and that he was not aware of the transaction.18Hence, the RTC,
Branch 33 held that petitioner could still recover the amount due from Edna through a personal
action over which it had no jurisdiction.
Edna also filed an action for declaratory relief before the RTC, Branch 93 of San Pedro Laguna (RTC,
Branch 93), which ruled:
At issue in this case is the validity of the promissory note and the Real Estate Mortgage
executed by Edna Lindo without the consent of her husband.
The real estate mortgage executed by petition Edna Lindo over their conjugal property is
undoubtedly an act of strict dominion and must be consented to by her husband to be
effective. In the instant case, the real estate mortgage, absent the authority or consent of
the husband, is necessarily void. Indeed, the real estate mortgage is this case was executed
on October 31, 1995 and the subsequent special power of attorney dated November 4,
1995 cannot be made to retroact to October 31, 1995 to validate the mortgage previously
made by petitioner.
The liability of Edna Lindo on the principal contract of the loan however subsists
notwithstanding the illegality of the mortgage. Indeed, where a mortgage is not valid, the
principal obligation which it guarantees is not thereby rendered null and void. That
obligation matures and becomes demandable in accordance with the stipulation pertaining
to it. Under the foregoing circumstances, what is lost is merely the right to foreclose the
mortgage as a special remedy for satisfying or settling the indebtedness which is the
principal obligation. In case of nullity, the mortgage deed remains as evidence or proof of a
personal obligation of the debtor and the amount due to the creditor may be enforced in an
ordinary action.
In view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the deed of real estate
mortgage as void in the absence of the authority or consent of petitioners spouse therein.
The liability of petitioner on the principal contract of loan however subsists notwithstanding
the illegality of the real estate mortgage.19
The RTC, Branch 93 also ruled that Ednas liability is not affected by the illegality of the real estate
mortgage.
Both the RTC, Branch 33 and the RTC, Branch 93 misapplied the rules.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall
belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail,
subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of
within five years from the date of contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority
of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or
consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person,
and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or
both offerors. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 124 of the Family Code of which applies to conjugal partnership property, is a reproduction of
Article 96 of the Family Code which applies to community property.
Both Article 96 and Article 127 of the Family Code provide that the powers do not include disposition
or encumbrance without the written consent of the other spouse. Any disposition or encumbrance
without the written consent shall be void. However, both provisions also state that the transaction
shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third
person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse x x x before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
In this case, the Promissory Note and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage were executed on 31 October
1995. The Special Power of Attorney was executed on 4 November 1995. The execution of the SPA is
the acceptance by the other spouse that perfected the continuing offer as a binding contract
between the parties, making the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a valid contract.
However, as the Court of Appeals noted, petitioner allowed the decisions of the RTC, Branch 33 and
the RTC, Branch 93 to become final and executory without asking the courts for an alternative relief.
The Court of Appeals stated that petitioner merely relied on the declarations of these courts that he
could file a separate personal action and thus failed to observe the rules and settled jurisprudence on
multiplicity of suits, closing petitioners avenue for recovery of the loan.
 46
Nevertheless, petitioner still has a remedy under the law.
In Chieng v. Santos,20 this Court ruled that a mortgage-creditor may institute against the
mortgage-debtor either a personal action for debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. The
Court ruled that the remedies are alternative and not cumulative and held that the filing of a criminal
action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was in effect a collection suit or a suit for the recovery
of the mortgage-debt.21 In that case, however, this Court pro hac vice, ruled that respondents could
still be held liable for the balance of the loan, applying the principle that no person may unjustly
enrich himself at the expense of another.22
The principle of unjust enrichment is provided under Article 22 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or
legal ground, shall return the same to him.
There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a
person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and
good conscience.23 The principle of unjust enrichment requires two conditions: (1) that a person is
benefited without a valid basis or justification, and (2) that such benefit is derived at the expense of
another.24
The main objective of the principle against unjust enrichment is to prevent one from enriching himself
at the expense of another without just cause or consideration.25 The principle is applicable in this case
considering that Edna admitted obtaining a loan from petitioners, and the same has not been fully
paid without just cause. The Deed was declared void erroneously at the instance of Edna, first when
she raised it as a defense before the RTC, Branch 33 and second, when she filed an action for
declaratory relief before the RTC, Branch 93. Petitioner could not be expected to ask the RTC, Branch
33 for an alternative remedy, as what the Court of Appeals ruled that he should have done, because
the RTC, Branch 33 already stated that it had no jurisdiction over any personal action that petitioner
might have against Edna.
Considering the circumstances of this case, the principle against unjust enrichment, being a
substantive law, should prevail over the procedural rule on multiplicity of suits. The Court of Appeals,
in the assailed decision, found that Edna admitted the loan, except that she claimed it only amounted
to P340,000. Edna should not be allowed to unjustly enrich herself because of the erroneous decisions
of the two trial courts when she questioned the validity of the Deed. Moreover, Edna still has an
opportunity to submit her defenses before the RTC, Branch 42 on her claim as to the amount of her
indebtedness.
WHEREFORE, the 30 May 2008 Decision and the 4 August 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 94003 are SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42 is directed to
proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. 04-110858.
SO ORDERED.
ART. 26 RIGHT TO PRIVACY
RODRIGO CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. NESTOR NICOLAS and ALLEM
NICOLAS, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Petitioner Rodrigo Concepcion assails in this petition for review on certiorari the Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated 12 December 1994 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City ordering him to pay respondent spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas the sums of P50,000.00
for moral damages, P25,000.00 for exemplary damages and P10,000.00 for attorneys fees, plus the
costs of suit.* Petitioner claims absence of factual and legal basis for the award of damages. h Y
The courts a quo found that sometime in 1985 the spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas resided
at No. 51 M. Concepcion St., San Joaquin, Pasig City, in an apartment leased to them by the owner
thereof, Florence "Bing" Concepcion, who also resided in the same compound where the apartment
was located. Nestor Nicolas was then engaged in the business of supplying government agencies and
private entities with office equipment, appliances and other fixtures on a cash purchase or credit basis.
Florence Concepcion joined this venture by contributing capital on condition that after her capital
 47
investment was returned to her, any profit earned would be divided equally between her and
Nestor. Jksm
Sometime in the second week of July 1985 Rodrigo Concepcion, brother of the deceased husband of
Florence, angrily accosted Nestor at the latters apartment and accused him of conducting an
adulterous relationship with Florence. He shouted, "Hoy Nestor, kabit ka ni Bing! x x x Binigyan ka pa
pala ni Bing Concepcion ng P100,000.00 para umakyat ng Baguio. Pagkaakyat mo at ng asawa mo
doon ay bababa ka uli para magkasarilinan kayo ni Bing."[1]
To clarify matters, Nestor went with Rodrigo, upon the latters dare, to see some relatives of the
Concepcion family who allegedly knew about the relationship. However, those whom they were able
to see denied knowledge of the alleged affair. The same accusation was hurled by Rodrigo against
Nestor when the two (2) confronted Florence at the terrace of her residence. Florence denied the
imputations and Rodrigo backtracked saying that he just heard the rumor from a relative. Thereafter,
however, Rodrigo called Florence over the telephone reiterating his accusation and threatening her
that should something happen to his sick mother, in case the latter learned about the affair, he would
kill Florence. Chief
As a result of this incident, Nestor Nicolas felt extreme embarrassment and shame to the extent that
he could no longer face his neighbors. Florence Concepcion also ceased to do business with him by
not contributing capital anymore so much so that the business venture of the Nicolas spouses
declined as they could no longer cope with their commitments to their clients and customers. To
make matters worse, Allem Nicolas started to doubt Nestors fidelity resulting in frequent bickerings
and quarrels during which Allem even expressed her desire to leave her husband. Consequently,
Nestor was forced to write Rodrigo demanding public apology and payment of damages. Rodrigo
pointedly ignored the demand, for which reason the Nicolas spouses filed a civil suit against him for
damages.
In his defense, Rodrigo denied that he maligned Nestor by accusing him publicly of being Florence's
lover. He reasoned out that he only desired to protect the name and reputation of the Concepcion
family which was why he sought an appointment with Nestor through Florence's son Roncali to
ventilate his feelings about the matter. Initially, he discussed with Nestor certain aspects of the joint
venture in a friendly and amiable manner, and then only casually asked the latter about his rumored
affair with his sister-in-law.
In contesting the decision of the appellate court, petitioner Rodrigo Concepcion raises the following
issues: (a) whether there is basis in law for the award of damages to private respondents, the Nicolas
spouses; and, (b) whether there is basis to review the facts which are of weight and influence but
which were overlooked and misapplied by the respondent appellate court. Esm
Petitioner argues that in awarding damages to private respondents, the Court of Appeals was without
legal basis to justify its verdict. The alleged act imputed to him by respondent spouses does not fall
under Arts. 26[2] and 2219[3] of the Civil Code since it does not constitute libel, slander, or any other
form of defamation. Neither does it involve prying into the privacy of anothers residence or meddling
with or disturbing the private life or family relation of another. Petitioner also insists that certain facts
and circumstances of the case were manifestly overlooked, misunderstood or glossed over by
respondent court which, if considered, would change the verdict. Impugning the credibility of the
witnesses for private respondents and the manner by which the testimonial evidence was analyzed
and evaluated by the trial court, petitioner criticized the appellate court for not taking into account
the fact that the trial judge who penned the decision was in no position to observe first-hand the
demeanor of the witnesses of respondent spouses as he was not the original judge who heard the
case. Thus, his decision rendered was flawed. Esmsc
The Court has ruled often enough that its jurisdiction in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the
factual findings complained of are devoid of support by the evidence on record or the assailed
judgment is based on misapprehension of facts.[4] The reason behind this is that the Supreme Court
respects the findings of the trial court on the issue of credibility of witnesses, considering that it is in a
better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.[5] Thus it accords the highest respect, even
finality, to the evaluation made by the lower court of the testimonies of the witnesses presented
before it. Esmmis
The Court is also aware of the long settled rule that when the issue is on the credibility of witnesses,
appellate courts will not generally disturb the findings of the trial court; however, its factual findings
may nonetheless be reversed if by the evidence on record or lack of it, it appears that the trial court
erred.[6] In this respect, the Court is not generally inclined to review the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals unless its findings are erroneous, absurd, speculative, conjectural, conflicting, tainted with
grave abuse of discretion, or contrary to the findings culled by the trial court of origin.[7] This rule of
course cannot be unqualifiedly applied to a case where the judge who penned the decision was not
the one who heard the case, because not having heard the testimonies himself, the judge would not
be in a better position than the appellate courts to make such determination.[8]
However, it is also axiomatic that the fact alone that the judge who heard the evidence was not the
one who rendered the judgment but merely relied on the record of the case does not render his
judgment erroneous or irregular. This is so even if the judge did not have the fullest opportunity to
weigh the testimonies not having heard all the witnesses speak nor observed their deportment and
manner of testifying. Thus the Court generally will not find any misapprehension of facts as it can be
fairly assumed under the principle of regularity of performance of duties of public officers that the
transcripts of stenographic notes were thoroughly scrutinized and evaluated by the judge himself.
 48
Has sufficient reason then been laid before us by petitioner to engender doubt as to the factual
findings of the court a quo? We find none. A painstaking review of the evidence on record convinces
us not to disturb the judgment appealed from. The fact that the case was handled by different judges
brooks no consideration at all, for preponderant evidence consistent with their claim for damages has
been adduced by private respondents as to foreclose a reversal. Otherwise, everytime a Judge who
heard a case, wholly or partially, dies or lives the service, the case cannot be decided and a new trial
will have to be conducted. That would be absurb; inconceivable. Esmso
According to petitioner, private respondents evidence is inconsistent as to time, place and persons
who heard the alleged defamatory statement. We find this to be a gratuitous observation, for the
testimonies of all the witnesses for the respondents are unanimous that the defamatory incident
happened in the afternoon at the front door of the apartment of the Nicolas spouses in the presence
of some friends and neighbors, and later on, with the accusation being repeated in the presence of
Florence, at the terrace of her house. That this finding appears to be in conflict with the allegation in
the complaint as to the time of the incident bears no momentous significance since an allegation in a
pleading is not evidence; it is a declaration that has to be proved by evidence. If evidence contrary to
the allegation is presented, such evidence controls, not the allegation in the pleading itself, although
admittedly it may dent the credibility of the witnesses. But not in the instant case. Msesm
It is also argued by petitioner that private respondents failed to present as witnesses the persons they
named as eyewitnesses to the incident and that they presented instead one Romeo Villaruel who was
not named as a possible witness during the pre-trial proceedings. Charging that Villaruels testimony is
not credible and should never have been accorded any weight at all, petitioner capitalizes on the fact
that a great distance separates Villaruels residence and that of private respondents as reflected in
their house numbers, the formers number being No. 223 M. Concepcion St., while that of the Nicolas
spouses, No. 51 along the same street. This being so, petitioner concludes, Villaruel could not have
witnessed the ugly confrontation between Rodrigo and Nestor. It appears however from Villaruels
testimony that at the time of the incident complained of, he was staying in an apartment inside the
compound adjacent to that of the Nicolas spouses. Whether his apartment was then numbered 223 is
not stated. What is definite and clear is his statement that he and Nestor Nicolas were neighbors on
14 July 1985.
There are other inconsistencies pointed out by petitioner in the testimonial evidence of private
respondents but these are not of such significance as to alter the finding of facts of the lower court.
Minor inconsistencies even guarantee truthfulness and candor, for they erase any suspicion of a
rehearsed testimony.[9] Inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses with on minor details and
collateral matters do not affect the substance of their testimonies.[10]
All told, these factual findings provide enough basis in law for the award of damages by the Court of
Appeals in favor of respondents. We reject petitioners posture that no legal provision supports such
award, the incident complained of neither falling under Art. 2219 nor Art. 26 of the Civil Code. It does
not need further elucidation that the incident charged of petitioner was no less than an invasion on
the right of respondent Nestor as a person. The philosophy behind Art. 26 underscores the necessity
for its inclusion in our civil law. The Code Commission stressed in no uncertain terms that the human
personality must be exalted. The sacredness of human personality is a concomitant consideration of
every plan for human amelioration. The touchstone of every system of law, of the culture and
civilization of every country, is how far it dignifies man. If the statutes insufficiently protect a person
from being unjustly humiliated, in short, if human personality is not exalted - then the laws are indeed
defective.[11] Thus, under this article, the rights of persons are amply protected, and damages are
provided for violations of a persons dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind. Exsm
It is petitioners position that the act imputed to him does not constitute any of those enumerated in
Arts 26 and 2219. In this respect, the law is clear. The violations mentioned in the codal provisions are
not exclusive but are merely examples and do not preclude other similar or analogous acts. Damages
therefore are allowable for actions against a persons dignity, such as profane, insulting, humiliating,
scandalous or abusive language.[12] Under Art. 2217 of the Civil Code, moral damages which include
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury, although incapable of pecuniary computation, may
be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission.
There is no question that private respondent Nestor Nicolas suffered mental anguish, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation as a proximate result of petitioners abusive,
scandalous and insulting language. Petitioner attempted to exculpate himself by claiming that he
made an appointment to see Nestor through a nephew, Roncali, the son of Florence, so he could talk
with Nestor to find out the truth about his rumored illicit relationship with Florence. He said that he
wanted to protect his nephews and nieces and the name of his late brother (Florences
husband).[13] How he could be convinced by some way other than a denial by Nestor, and how he
would protect his nephews and nieces and his familys name if the rumor were true, he did not say.
Petitioner admitted that he had already talked with Florence herself over the telephone about the
issue, with the latter vehemently denying the alleged immoral relationship. Yet, he could not let the
matter rest on the strength of the denial of his sister-in-law. He had to go and confront Nestor, even
in public, to the latter's humiliation. Kyle
Testifying that until that very afternoon of his meeting with Nestor he never knew respondent, had
never seen him before, and was unaware of his business partnership with Florence, his subsequent
declarations on the witness stand however belie this lack of knowledge about the business venture
for in that alleged encounter he asked Nestor how the business was going, what were the collection
problems, and how was the money being spent. He even knew that the name of the business, Floral
Enterprises, was coined by combining the first syllables of the name Florence and Allem, the name of
Nestors wife. He said that he casually asked Nestor about the rumor between him and Florence which
Nestor denied. Not content with such denial, he dared Nestor to go with him to speak to his relatives
 49
who were the source of his information. Nestor went with him and those they were able to talk to
denied the rumor. Kycalr
We cannot help noting this inordinate interest of petitioner to know the truth about the rumor and
why he was not satisfied with the separate denials made by Florence and Nestor. He had to confront
Nestor face to face, invade the latters privacy and hurl defamatory words at him in the presence of his
wife and children, neighbors and friends, accusing him - a married man - of having an adulterous
relationship with Florence. This definitely caused private respondent much shame and
embarrassment that he could no longer show himself in his neighborhood without feeling distraught
and debased. This brought dissension and distrust in his family where before there was none. This is
why a few days after the incident, he communicated with petitioner demanding public apology and
payment of damages, which petitioner ignored. Calrky
If indeed the confrontation as described by private respondents did not actually happen, then there
would have been no cause or motive at all for them to consult with their lawyer, immediately demand
an apology, and not obtaining a response from petitioner, file an action for damages against the latter.
That they decided to go to court to seek redress bespeaks of the validity of their claim. On the other
hand, it is interesting to note that while explaining at great length why Florence Concepcion testified
against him, petitioner never advanced any reason why the Nicolas spouses, persons he never knew
and with whom he had no dealings in the past, would sue him for damages. It also has not escaped
our attention that, faced with a lawsuit by private respondents, petitioner sent his lawyer, a certain
Atty. Causapin, to talk not to the Nicolas spouses but to Florence, asking her not to be involved in the
case, otherwise her name would be messily dragged into it. Quite succinctly, Florence told the lawyer
that it was not for her to decide and that she could not do anything about it as she was not a party to
the court case.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Br. 167, holding Rodrigo Concepcion
liable to the spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas for P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00
for exemplary damages, P10,000.00 for attorney's fees, plus costs of suit, is AFFIRMED. Mesm
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014
RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA, Petitioners,
vs.
ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The individual's desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation in society is an equally
powerful desire. Thus each individual is continually engaged in a personal adjustment process in
which he balances the desire for privacy with the desire for disclosure and communication of himself
to others, in light of the environmental conditions and social norms set by the society in which he
lives.
- Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)
The Case
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in relation to
Section 19 of A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC,1 otherwise known as the "Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data."
Petitioners herein assail the July 27, 2012 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City
(RTC) in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB, which dismissed their habeas data petition.
The Facts
Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara (Julienne), both minors, were, during the period
material, graduating high school students at St. Theresa's College (STC), Cebu City. Sometime in
January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend, Julia
and Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their
undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded by Angela Lindsay Tan (Angela) on her
Facebook3 profile.
Back at the school, Mylene Rheza T. Escudero (Escudero), a computer teacher at STC’s high school
department, learned from her students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting
themselves from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Escudero then asked her students if they
knew who the girls in the photos are. In turn, they readily identified Julia, Julienne, and Chloe Lourdes
Taboada (Chloe), among others.
 50
Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective personal Facebook accounts
and showed her photos of the identified students, which include: (a) Julia and Julienne drinking hard
liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along the streets of Cebu wearing
articles of clothing that show virtually the entirety of their black brassieres. What is more, Escudero’s
students claimed that there were times when access to or the availability of the identified students’
photos was not confined to the girls’ Facebook friends,4but were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook
user.5
Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her student’s Facebook page,
showed the photosto Kristine Rose Tigol (Tigol), STC’s Discipline-in-Charge, for appropriate action.
Thereafter, following an investigation, STC found the identified students to have deported themselves
in a manner proscribed by the school’s Student Handbook, to wit:
1. Possession of alcoholic drinks outside the school campus;
2. Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts;
3. Smoking and drinking alcoholicbeverages in public places;
4. Apparel that exposes the underwear;
5. Clothing that advocates unhealthy behaviour; depicts obscenity; contains sexually suggestive
messages, language or symbols; and 6. Posing and uploading pictures on the Internet that entail
ample body exposure.
On March 1, 2012, Julia, Julienne, Angela, and the other students in the pictures in question, reported,
as required, to the office of Sr. Celeste Ma. Purisima Pe (Sr. Purisima), STC’s high school principal and
ICM6 Directress. They claimed that during the meeting, they were castigated and verbally abused by
the STC officials present in the conference, including Assistant Principal Mussolini S. Yap (Yap),
Roswinda Jumiller, and Tigol. What is more, Sr. Purisima informed their parents the following day that,
as part of their penalty, they are barred from joining the commencement exercises scheduled on
March 30, 2012.
A week before graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angela’s mother, Dr. Armenia M. Tan (Tan), filed a
Petition for Injunction and Damages before the RTC of Cebu City against STC, et al., docketed as Civil
Case No. CEB-38594.7In it, Tan prayed that defendants therein be enjoined from implementing the
sanction that precluded Angela from joining the commencement exercises.
On March 25, 2012,petitioner Rhonda Ave Vivares (Vivares), the mother of Julia, joined the fray as an
intervenor. On March 28, 2012, defendants inCivil Case No. CEB-38594 filed their memorandum,
containing printed copies of the photographs in issue as annexes. That same day, the RTC issued a
temporary restraining order (TRO) allowing the students to attend the graduation ceremony, to which
STC filed a motion for reconsideration.
Despite the issuance of the TRO,STC, nevertheless, barred the sanctioned students from participating
in the graduation rites, arguing that, on the date of the commencement exercises, its adverted motion
for reconsideration on the issuance ofthe TRO remained unresolved.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data,
docketed as SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB8 on the basis of the following considerations:
1. The photos of their children in their undergarments (e.g., bra) were taken for posterity before they
changed into their swimsuits on the occasion of a birthday beach party;
2. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at "Friends Only." They, thus, have
a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be respected.
3. Respondents, being involved in the field of education, knew or ought to have known of laws that
safeguard the right to privacy. Corollarily, respondents knew or ought to have known that the girls,
whose privacy has been invaded, are the victims in this case, and not the offenders. Worse, after
viewing the photos, the minors were called "immoral" and were punished outright;
4. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced without their
consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of the photos and by
subsequently showing them to STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of petitioners’ children
were intruded upon;
5. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data, and digital
images happened at STC’s Computer Laboratory; and
6. All the data and digital images that were extracted were boldly broadcasted by respondents
through their memorandum submitted to the RTC in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-38594. To
petitioners, the interplay of the foregoing constitutes an invasion of their children’s privacy and, thus,
prayed that: (a) a writ of habeas databe issued; (b) respondents be ordered to surrender and deposit
with the court all soft and printed copies of the subjectdata before or at the preliminary hearing; and
(c) after trial, judgment be rendered declaring all information, data, and digital images accessed,
saved or stored, reproduced, spread and used, to have been illegally obtained inviolation of the
children’s right to privacy.
 51
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC, through an Order dated July 5, 2012,
issued the writ of habeas data. Through the same Order, herein respondents were directed to file
their verified written return, together with the supporting affidavits, within five (5) working days from
service of the writ.
In time, respondents complied with the RTC’s directive and filed their verified written return, laying
down the following grounds for the denial of the petition, viz: (a) petitioners are not the proper
parties to file the petition; (b) petitioners are engaging in forum shopping; (c) the instant case is not
one where a writ of habeas data may issue;and (d) there can be no violation of their right to privacy as
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy on Facebook.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 27, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for habeas data. The dispositive
portion of the Decision pertinently states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
The parties and media must observe the aforestated confidentiality.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.9
To the trial court, petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of the
minors’ right to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of the writ of habeas data.
Moreover, the court a quoheld that the photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without
restrictions as to who may view them, lost their privacy in some way. Besides, the RTC noted, STC
gathered the photographs through legal means and for a legal purpose, that is, the implementation of
the school’s policies and rules on discipline.
Not satisfied with the outcome, petitioners now come before this Court pursuant to Section 19 of the
Rule on Habeas Data.10
The Issues
The main issue to be threshed out inthis case is whether or not a writ of habeas datashould be issued
given the factual milieu. Crucial in resolving the controversy, however, is the pivotal point of whether
or not there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or
security of the minors involved in this case.
Our Ruling
We find no merit in the petition.
Procedural issues concerning the availability of the Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of
a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.11 It is an independent
and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of
information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to
informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself,
particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order
to achieve unlawful ends.12
In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right to informational
privacy, among others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined habeas dataas "a procedure
designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age."13 The writ, however,
will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access to information about a
person.Availment of the writ requires the existence of a nexus between the right to privacy on the
one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. 14 Thus, the existence of a person’s
right to informational privacy and a showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or
threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim are indispensable
before the privilege of the writ may be extended.15
Without an actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to informational privacy, a habeas
datapetition will not prosper. Viewed from the perspective of the case at bar,this requisite begs this
question: given the nature of an online social network (OSN)––(1) that it facilitates and promotes
real-time interaction among millions, if not billions, of users, sans the spatial barriers, 16 bridging the
gap created by physical space; and (2) that any information uploaded in OSNs leavesan indelible trace
in the provider’s databases, which are outside the control of the end-users––is there a right to
informational privacy in OSN activities of its users? Before addressing this point, We must first resolve
the procedural issues in this case.
a. The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances
Contrary to respondents’ submission, the Writ of Habeas Datawas not enacted solely for the purpose
of complementing the Writ of Amparoin cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
 52
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Sec. 2. Who May File. – Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of habeas data. However,
in cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the petition may be filed by:
(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the spouse, children and
parents; or
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil
degreeof consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
(emphasis supplied)
Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ only to cases of extralegal
killings or enforced disappearances, the above underscored portion of Section 2, reflecting a variance
of habeas data situations, would not have been made.
Habeas data, to stress, was designed "to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information
age."17 As such, it is erroneous to limit its applicability to extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances only. In fact, the annotations to the Rule preparedby the Committee on the Revision
of the Rules of Court, after explaining that the Writ of Habeas Data complements the Writ of Amparo,
pointed out that:
The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce one’s right
to privacy, more specifically the right to informational privacy. The remedies against the violation of
such right can include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or
information or files in possession or in control of respondents.18 (emphasis Ours) Clearly then, the
privilege of the Writ of Habeas Datamay also be availed of in cases outside of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances.
b. Meaning of "engaged" in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
Respondents’ contention that the habeas data writ may not issue against STC, it not being an entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party, while valid to a point, is, nonetheless, erroneous.
To be sure, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be available only
against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the businessof gathering, storing, and collecting of
data. As provided under Section 1 of the Rule:
Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing
of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
(emphasis Ours)
The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys the idea that habeas
data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of private individuals or
entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her
correspondences, or about his or her family. Such individual or entity need not be in the business of
collecting or storing data.
To "engage" in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour. To "engage" means "to
do or take part in something."19 It does not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in pursuit
of a business. What matters is that the person or entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said
data or information about the aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether such undertaking carries
the element of regularity, as when one pursues a business, and is in the nature of a personal
endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at all, is immaterial and such will not prevent
the writ from getting to said person or entity.
To agree with respondents’ above argument, would mean unduly limiting the reach of the writ to a
very small group, i.e., private persons and entities whose business is data gathering and storage, and
in the process decreasing the effectiveness of the writ asan instrument designed to protect a right
which is easily violated in view of rapid advancements in the information and communications
technology––a right which a great majority of the users of technology themselves are not capable of
protecting.
Having resolved the procedural aspect of the case, We now proceed to the core of the controversy.
The right to informational privacy on Facebook
a. The Right to Informational Privacy
The concept of privacyhas, through time, greatly evolved, with technological advancements having an
influential part therein. This evolution was briefly recounted in former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno’s
speech, The Common Right to Privacy,20 where he explained the three strands of the right to privacy,
viz: (1) locational or situational privacy;21(2) informational privacy; and (3) decisional privacy.22 Of the
three, what is relevant to the case at bar is the right to informational privacy––usually defined as the
right of individuals to control information about themselves.23
 53
With the availability of numerous avenues for information gathering and data sharing nowadays, not
to mention each system’s inherent vulnerability to attacks and intrusions, there is more reason that
every individual’s right to control said flow of information should be protected and that each
individual should have at least a reasonable expectation of privacy in cyberspace. Several
commentators regarding privacy and social networking sites, however, all agree that given the
millions of OSN users, "[i]n this [Social Networking] environment, privacy is no longer grounded in
reasonable expectations, but rather in some theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking."24
It is due to this notion that the Court saw the pressing need to provide for judicial remedies that
would allow a summary hearing of the unlawful use of data or information and to remedy possible
violations of the right to privacy.25 In the same vein, the South African High Court, in its Decision in the
landmark case, H v. W,26promulgated on January30, 2013, recognized that "[t]he law has to take into
account the changing realities not only technologically but also socially or else it will lose credibility in
the eyes of the people. x x x It is imperative that the courts respond appropriately to changing times,
acting cautiously and with wisdom." Consistent with this, the Court, by developing what may be
viewed as the Philippine model of the writ of habeas data, in effect, recognized that, generally
speaking, having an expectation of informational privacy is not necessarily incompatible with engaging
in cyberspace activities, including those that occur in OSNs.
The question now though is up to whatextent is the right to privacy protected in OSNs? Bear in mind
that informational privacy involves personal information. At the same time, the very purpose of OSNs
is socializing––sharing a myriad of information,27 some of which would have otherwise remained
personal.
b. Facebook’s Privacy Tools: a response to the clamor for privacy in OSN activities
Briefly, the purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users the ability to interact and to stay connected to
other members of the same or different social media platform through the sharing of statuses, photos,
videos, among others, depending on the services provided by the site. It is akin to having a room filled
with millions of personal bulletin boards or "walls," the contents of which are under the control of
each and every user. In his or her bulletin board, a user/owner can post anything––from text, to
pictures, to music and videos––access to which would depend on whether he or she allows one, some
or all of the other users to see his or her posts. Since gaining popularity, the OSN phenomenon has
paved the way to the creation of various social networking sites, includingthe one involved in the case
at bar, www.facebook.com (Facebook), which, according to its developers, people use "to stay
connected with friends and family, to discover what’s going on in the world, and to share and express
what matters to them."28
Facebook connections are established through the process of "friending" another user. By sending a
"friend request," the user invites another to connect their accounts so that they can view any and all
"Public" and "Friends Only" posts of the other.Once the request is accepted, the link is established
and both users are permitted to view the other user’s "Public" or "Friends Only" posts, among others.
"Friending," therefore, allows the user to form or maintain one-to-one relationships with other users,
whereby the user gives his or her "Facebook friend" access to his or her profile and shares certain
information to the latter.29
To address concerns about privacy,30 but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was armed with
different privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s profile 31 as well as information
uploaded by the user. In H v. W,32 the South Gauteng High Court recognized this ability of the users to
"customize their privacy settings," but did so with this caveat: "Facebook states in its policies that,
although it makes every effort to protect a user’s information, these privacy settings are not
foolproof."33
For instance, a Facebook user canregulate the visibility and accessibility of digital images(photos),
posted on his or her personal bulletin or "wall," except for the user’sprofile picture and ID, by
selecting his or her desired privacy setting:
(a) Public - the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
(b) Friends of Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view the photo;
(b) Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;
(c) Custom - the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the Facebook user;
and
(d) Only Me - the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to set up barriers to broaden or
limit the visibility of his or her specific profile content, statuses, and photos, among others, from
another user’s point of view. In other words, Facebook extends its users an avenue to make the
availability of their Facebook activities reflect their choice as to "when and to what extent to disclose
facts about [themselves] – and to put others in the position of receiving such confidences." 34 Ideally,
the selected setting will be based on one’s desire to interact with others, coupled with the opposing
need to withhold certain information as well as to regulate the spreading of his or her personal
information. Needless to say, as the privacy setting becomes more limiting, fewer Facebook users can
view that user’s particular post.
STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy
 54
Without these privacy settings, respondents’ contention that there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy in Facebook would, in context, be correct. However, such is not the case. It is through the
availability of said privacy tools that many OSN users are said to have a subjective expectation that
only those to whomthey grant access to their profile will view the information they post or upload
thereto.35
This, however, does not mean thatany Facebook user automatically has a protected expectation of
privacy inall of his or her Facebook activities.
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is first necessary that said
user, in this case the children of petitioners,manifest the intention to keepcertain posts private,
through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility.36 And this
intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of the OSN’s privacy tools. In other
words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation,in cyber world, of the user’s invocation of
his or her right to informational privacy.37
Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or deny access to his or
her post orprofile detail should not be denied the informational privacy right which necessarily
accompanies said choice.38Otherwise, using these privacy tools would be a feckless exercise, such that
if, for instance, a user uploads a photo or any personal information to his or her Facebook page and
sets its privacy level at "Only Me" or a custom list so that only the user or a chosen few can view it,
said photo would still be deemed public by the courts as if the user never chose to limit the photo’s
visibility and accessibility. Such position, if adopted, will not only strip these privacy tools of their
function but it would also disregard the very intention of the user to keep said photo or information
within the confines of his or her private space.
We must now determine the extent that the images in question were visible to other Facebook users
and whether the disclosure was confidential in nature. In other words, did the minors limit the
disclosure of the photos such that the images were kept within their zones of privacy? This
determination is necessary in resolving the issue of whether the minors carved out a zone of privacy
when the photos were uploaded to Facebook so that the images will be protected against
unauthorized access and disclosure.
Petitioners, in support of their thesis about their children’s privacy right being violated, insist that
Escudero intruded upon their children’s Facebook accounts, downloaded copies ofthe pictures and
showed said photos to Tigol. To them, this was a breach of the minors’ privacy since their Facebook
accounts, allegedly, were under "very private" or "Only Friends" setting safeguarded with a
password.39 Ultimately, they posit that their children’s disclosure was only limited since their profiles
were not open to public viewing. Therefore, according to them, people who are not their Facebook
friends, including respondents, are barred from accessing said post without their knowledge and
consent. Aspetitioner’s children testified, it was Angelawho uploaded the subjectphotos which were
only viewable by the five of them,40 although who these five are do not appear on the records.
Escudero, on the other hand, stated in her affidavit41 that "my students showed me some pictures of
girls cladin brassieres. This student [sic] of mine informed me that these are senior high school
[students] of STC, who are their friends in [F]acebook. x x x They then said [that] there are still many
other photos posted on the Facebook accounts of these girls. At the computer lab, these students
then logged into their Facebook account [sic], and accessed from there the various photographs x x x.
They even told me that there had been times when these photos were ‘public’ i.e., not confined to
their friends in Facebook."
In this regard, We cannot give muchweight to the minors’ testimonies for one key reason: failure to
question the students’ act of showing the photos to Tigol disproves their allegation that the photos
were viewable only by the five of them. Without any evidence to corroborate their statement that the
images were visible only to the five of them, and without their challenging Escudero’s claim that the
other students were able to view the photos, their statements are, at best, self-serving, thus
deserving scant consideration.42
It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account that her students,
who are the minors’ Facebook "friends," showed her the photos using their own Facebook accounts.
This only goes to show that no special means to be able to viewthe allegedly private posts were ever
resorted to by Escudero’s students,43 and that it is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos
were, in reality, viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at large.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is"Public," it can be surmised that the
photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’
children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If suchwere the case, they cannot invoke
the protection attached to the right to informational privacy. The ensuing pronouncement in US v.
Gines-Perez44 is most instructive:
[A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and renounce all
privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances suchas here, where the Defendant
did not employ protective measures or devices that would have controlled access to the Web page or
the photograph itself.45
Also, United States v. Maxwell46 held that "[t]he more open the method of transmission is, the less
privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages sent to the public at large inthe chat room or e-mail that
is forwarded from correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of privacy."
 55
That the photos are viewable by "friends only" does not necessarily bolster the petitioners’
contention. In this regard, the cyber community is agreed that the digital images under this setting
still remain to be outside the confines of the zones of privacy in view of the following:
(1) Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its users the tools to interact
and share in any conceivable way;"47
(2) A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are total strangers;48
(3) The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the hundreds; and
(4) A user’s Facebook friend can "share"49 the former’s post, or "tag"50 others who are not Facebook
friends with the former, despite its being visible only tohis or her own Facebook friends.
It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to "Friends" is no
assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the
source of the content. The user’s own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own
Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or
not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the respective
Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the privacy
setting of which was set at "Friends."
To illustrate, suppose A has 100 Facebook friends and B has 200. A and B are not Facebook friends. If
C, A’s Facebook friend, tags B in A’s post, which is set at "Friends," the initial audience of 100 (A’s own
Facebook friends) is dramatically increased to 300 (A’s 100 friends plus B’s 200 friends or the public,
depending upon B’s privacy setting). As a result, the audience who can view the post is effectively
expanded––and to a very large extent.
This, along with its other features and uses, is confirmation of Facebook’s proclivity towards user
interaction and socialization rather than seclusion or privacy, as it encourages broadcasting of
individual user posts. In fact, it has been said that OSNs have facilitated their users’ self-tribute,
thereby resulting into the "democratization of fame."51Thus, it is suggested, that a profile, or even a
post, with visibility set at "Friends Only" cannot easily, more so automatically, be said to be "very
private," contrary to petitioners’ argument.
As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned students’
Facebook friends, respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion since
it was the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were mere
recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering the
information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate access to the said posts.
Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the minors. Curiously enough, however, neither the
minors nor their parents imputed any violation of privacy against the students who showed the
images to Escudero.
Furthermore, petitioners failed to prove their contention that respondents reproduced and
broadcasted the photographs. In fact, what petitioners attributed to respondents as an act of
offensive disclosure was no more than the actuality that respondents appended said photographs in
their memorandum submitted to the trial court in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-38594.52 These
are not tantamount to a violation of the minor’s informational privacy rights, contrary to petitioners’
assertion.
In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to be more precise, the photos of
minor students scantily clad, are personal in nature, likely to affect, if indiscriminately circulated, the
reputation of the minors enrolled in a conservative institution. However, the records are bereft of any
evidence, other than bare assertions that they utilized Facebook’s privacy settings to make the photos
visible only to them or to a select few. Without proof that they placed the photographs subject of this
case within the ambit of their protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that they have an
expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in question.
Had it been proved that the access tothe pictures posted were limited to the original uploader,
through the "Me Only" privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has been screened to limit access
to a select few, through the "Custom" setting, the result may have been different, for in such
instances, the intention to limit access to the particular post, instead of being broadcasted to the
public at large or all the user’s friends en masse, becomes more manifest and palpable.
On Cyber Responsibility
It has been said that "the best filter is the one between your children’s ears."53 This means that
self-regulation on the part of OSN users and internet consumers ingeneral is the best means of
avoiding privacy rights violations.54 As a cyberspace communitymember, one has to be proactive in
protecting his or her own privacy.55 It is in this regard that many OSN users, especially minors,
fail.Responsible social networking or observance of the "netiquettes"56 on the part of teenagers has
been the concern of many due to the widespreadnotion that teenagers can sometimes go too far
since they generally lack the people skills or general wisdom to conduct themselves sensibly in a
public forum.57
Respondent STC is clearly aware of this and incorporating lessons on good cyber citizenship in its
curriculum to educate its students on proper online conduct may be mosttimely. Too, it is not only
STC but a number of schools and organizations have already deemed it important to include digital
literacy and good cyber citizenshipin their respective programs and curricula in view of the risks that
the children are exposed to every time they participate in online activities.58 Furthermore, considering
the complexity of the cyber world and its pervasiveness,as well as the dangers that these children are
 56

wittingly or unwittingly exposed to in view of their unsupervised activities in cyberspace, the PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
participation of the parents in disciplining and educating their children about being a good digital Associate Justice
citizen is encouraged by these institutions and organizations. In fact, it is believed that "to limit such
risks, there’s no substitute for parental involvement and supervision."59 WE CONCUR:

As such, STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of teaching its students to beresponsible
in their dealings and activities in cyberspace, particularly in OSNs, whenit enforced the disciplinary
actions specified in the Student Handbook, absenta showing that, in the process, it violated the
students’ rights.

OSN users should be aware of the risks that they expose themselves to whenever they engage
incyberspace activities.1âwphi1 Accordingly, they should be cautious enough to control their privacy
and to exercise sound discretion regarding how much information about themselves they are willing
to give up. Internet consumers ought to be aware that, by entering or uploading any kind of data or
information online, they are automatically and inevitably making it permanently available online, the
perpetuation of which is outside the ambit of their control. Furthermore, and more importantly,
information, otherwise private, voluntarily surrendered by them can be opened, read, or copied by
third parties who may or may not be allowed access to such.

It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in their online dealings and
activities and must not be negligent in protecting their rights. Equity serves the vigilant. Demanding
relief from the courts, as here, requires that claimants themselves take utmost care in safeguarding a
right which they allege to have been violated. These are indispensable. We cannot afford protection
to persons if they themselves did nothing to place the matter within the confines of their private zone.
OSN users must be mindful enough to learn the use of privacy tools, to use them if they desire to keep
the information private, and to keep track of changes in the available privacy settings, such as those
of Facebook, especially because Facebook is notorious for changing these settings and the site's
layout often.
ART. 31 INDEPENT CIVIL ACTION
In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not violate the minors' privacy rights, We find no
cogent reason to disturb the findings and case disposition of the court a quo. MANOLO P. SAMSON, petitioner, vs. HON. REYNALDO B. DAWAY, in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 90, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
CATERPILLAR, INC., respondents.
In light of the foregoing, the Court need not belabor the other assigned errors.

DECISION
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated July 27, 2012 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB is hereby AFFIRMED. YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

No pronouncement as to costs. Assailed in this petition for certiorari is the March 26, 2003 Order[1] of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 90, which denied petitioners (1) motion to quash the information; and (2) motion
SO ORDERED. for reconsideration of the August 9, 2002 Order denying his motion to suspend the arraignment and
 57
other proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-108043-44. Petitioner also questioned its August 5,
2003 Order[2] which denied his motion for reconsideration.
The undisputed facts show that on March 7, 2002, two informations for unfair competition
under Section 168.3 (a), in relation to Section 170, of the Intellectual Property Code (Republic Act No.
8293), similarly worded save for the dates and places of commission, were filed against petitioner
Manolo P. Samson, the registered owner of ITTI Shoes. The accusatory portion of said informations
read:
That on or about the first week of November 1999 and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused,
owner/proprietor of ITTI Shoes/Mano Shoes Manufactuirng Corporation located at Robinsons Galleria,
EDSA corner Ortigas Avenue, Quezon City, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
distribute, sell and/or offer for sale CATERPILLAR products such as footwear, garments, clothing, bags,
accessories and paraphernalia which are closely identical to and/or colorable imitations of the
authentic Caterpillar products and likewise using trademarks, symbols and/or designs as would cause
confusion, mistake or deception on the part of the buying public to the damage and prejudice of
CATERPILLAR, INC., the prior adopter, user and owner of the following internationally: CATERPILLAR,
CAT, CATERPILLAR & DESIGN, CAT AND DESIGN, WALKING MACHINES and TRACK-TYPE TRACTOR &
DESIGN.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
On April 19, 2002, petitioner filed a motion to suspend arraignment and other proceedings in
view of the existence of an alleged prejudicial question involved in Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 for
unfair competition pending with the same branch; and also in view of the pendency of a petition for
review filed with the Secretary of Justice assailing the Chief State Prosecutors resolution finding
probable cause to charge petitioner with unfair competition. In an Order dated August 9, 2002, the
trial court denied the motion to suspend arraignment and other proceedings.
On August 20, 2002, petitioner filed a twin motion to quash the informations and motion for
reconsideration of the order denying motion to suspend, this time challenging the jurisdiction of the
trial court over the offense charged. He contended that since under Section 170 of R.A. No. 8293, the
penalty5 of imprisonment for unfair competition does not exceed six years, the offense is cognizable
by the Municipal Trial Courts and not by the Regional Trial Court, per R.A. No. 7691.
In its assailed March 26, 2003 Order, the trial court denied petitioners twin motions.6 A motion
for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied on August 5, 2003.
Hence, the instant petition alleging that respondent Judge gravely abused its discretion in
issuing the assailed orders.
The issues posed for resolution are (1) Which court has jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases
for violation of intellectual property rights? (2) Did the respondent Judge gravely abuse his discretion
in refusing to suspend the arraignment and other proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-108043-44
on the ground of (a) the existence of a prejudicial question; and (b) the pendency of a petition for
review with the Secretary of Justice on the finding of probable cause for unfair competition?
Under Section 170 of R.A. No. 8293, which took effect on January 1, 1998, the criminal penalty
for infringement of registered marks, unfair competition, false designation of origin and false
description or representation, is imprisonment from 2 to 5 years and a fine ranging from Fifty
Thousand Pesos to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, to wit:
SEC. 170. Penalties. Independent of the civil and administrative sanctions imposed by law, a criminal
penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years to five (5) years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00), shall be imposed on any person
who is found guilty of committing any of the acts mentioned in Section 155 [Infringement], Section
168 [Unfair Competition] and Section 169.1 [False Designation of Origin and False Description or
Representation].
Corollarily, Section 163 of the same Code states that actions (including criminal and civil) under
Sections 150, 155, 164, 166, 167, 168 and 169 shall be brought before the proper courts with
appropriate jurisdiction under existing laws, thus
SEC. 163. Jurisdiction of Court. All actions under Sections 150, 155, 164 and 166 to 169 shall be
brought before the proper courts with appropriate jurisdiction under existing laws. (Emphasis
supplied)
The existing law referred to in the foregoing provision is Section 27 of R.A. No. 166 (The
Trademark Law) which provides that jurisdiction over cases for infringement of registered marks,
unfair competition, false designation of origin and false description or representation, is lodged with
the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court)
SEC. 27. Jurisdiction of Court of First Instance. All actions under this Chapter [V Infringement] and
Chapters VI [Unfair Competition] and VII [False Designation of Origin and False Description or
Representation], hereof shall be brought before the Court of First Instance.
We find no merit in the claim of petitioner that R.A. No. 166 was expressly repealed by R.A. No.
8293. The repealing clause of R.A. No. 8293, reads
SEC. 239. Repeals. 239.1. All Acts and parts of Acts inconsistent herewith, more particularly Republic
Act No. 165, as amended; Republic Act No. 166, as amended; and Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised
 58
Penal Code; Presidential Decree No. 49, including Presidential Decree No. 285, as amended, are
hereby repealed. (Emphasis added)
Notably, the aforequoted clause did not expressly repeal R.A. No. 166 in its entirety, otherwise,
it would not have used the phrases parts of Acts and inconsistent herewith; and it would have simply
stated Republic Act No. 165, as amended; Republic Act No. 166, as amended; and Articles 188 and 189
of the Revised Penal Code; Presidential Decree No. 49, including Presidential Decree No. 285, as
amended are hereby repealed. It would have removed all doubts that said specific laws had been
rendered without force and effect. The use of the phrases parts of Acts and inconsistent herewith
only means that the repeal pertains only to provisions which are repugnant or not susceptible of
harmonization with R.A. No. 8293.7 Section 27 of R.A. No. 166, however, is consistent and in harmony
with Section 163 of R.A. No. 8293. Had R.A. No. 8293 intended to vest jurisdiction over violations of
intellectual property rights with the Metropolitan Trial Courts, it would have expressly stated so under
Section 163 thereof.
Moreover, the settled rule in statutory construction is that in case of conflict between a general
law and a special law, the latter must prevail. Jurisdiction conferred by a special law to Regional Trial
Courts must prevail over that granted by a general law to Municipal Trial Courts.8
In the case at bar, R.A. No. 8293 and R.A. No. 166 are special laws9 conferring jurisdiction over
violations of intellectual property rights to the Regional Trial Court. They should therefore prevail over
R.A. No. 7691, which is a general law.10 Hence, jurisdiction over the instant criminal case for unfair
competition is properly lodged with the Regional Trial Court even if the penalty therefor is
imprisonment of less than 6 years, or from 2 to 5 years and a fine ranging from P50,000.00 to
P200,000.00.
In fact, to implement and ensure the speedy disposition of cases involving violations of
intellectual property rights under R.A. No. 8293, the Court issued A.M. No. 02-1-11-SC dated February
19, 2002 designating certain Regional Trial Courts as Intellectual Property Courts. On June 17, 2003,
the Court further issued a Resolution consolidating jurisdiction to hear and decide Intellectual
Property Code and Securities and Exchange Commission cases in specific Regional Trial Courts
designated as Special Commercial Courts.
The case of Mirpuri v. Court of Appeals,11 invoked by petitioner finds no application in the
present case. Nowhere in Mirpuri did we state that Section 27 of R.A. No. 166 was repealed by R.A.
No. 8293. Neither did we make a categorical ruling therein that jurisdiction over cases for violation of
intellectual property rights is lodged with the Municipal Trial Courts. The passing remark in Mirpuri on
the repeal of R.A. No. 166 by R.A. No. 8293 was merely a backgrounder to the enactment of the
present Intellectual Property Code and cannot thus be construed as a jurisdictional pronouncement in
cases for violation of intellectual property rights.
Anent the second issue, petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that there was a prejudicial
question. In his petition, he prayed for the reversal of the March 26, 2003 order which sustained the
denial of his motion to suspend arraignment and other proceedings in Criminal Case Nos.
Q-02-108043-44. For unknown reasons, however, he made no discussion in support of said prayer in
his petition and reply to comment. Neither did he attach a copy of the complaint in Civil Case No.
Q-00-41446 nor quote the pertinent portion thereof to prove the existence of a prejudicial question.
At any rate, there is no prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to
law, proceed independently of each other.12 Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the
independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the
criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
In the case at bar, the common element in the acts constituting unfair competition under
Section 168 of R.A. No. 8293 is fraud.13 Pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, in cases of
defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from
the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Hence, Civil Case No. Q-00-41446, which as
admitted14 by private respondent also relate to unfair competition, is an independent civil action
under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify
the suspension of the criminal cases at bar.
Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides
SEC. 11. Suspension of arraignment. Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be
suspended in the following cases
xxxxxxxxx
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department of
Justice, or the Office of the President; Provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty
(60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.
While the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the
aforecited provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the
filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said
period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.
In the instant case, petitioner failed to establish that respondent Judge abused his discretion in
denying his motion to suspend. His pleadings and annexes submitted before the Court do not show
the date of filing of the petition for review with the Secretary of Justice.15 Moreover, the Order dated
August 9, 2002 denying his motion to suspend was not appended to the petition. He thus failed to
discharge the burden of proving that he was entitled to a suspension of his arraignment and that the
questioned orders are contrary to Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Indeed, the age-old but familiar rule is that he who alleges must prove his allegations.
 59
In sum, the dismissal of the petition is proper considering that petitioner has not established
that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion. So also, his failure to attach documents
relevant to his allegations warrants the dismissal of the petition, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 46 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, which states:
SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements. The petition shall
contain the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a concise
statement of the matters involved, the factual background of the case, and the grounds relied upon
for the relief prayed for.
It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of service thereof on the
respondent with the original copy intended for the court indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall
be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, order,
resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such material portions of the record as are referred to therein,
and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto.
xxxxxxxxx
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient
ground for the dismissal of the petition. (Emphasis added)
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
George (Culhi) Hambon, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals and Valentino U. Carantes, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Petitioner George (Culhi) Hambon filed herein petition for review on certiorari, raising the
following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT A CIVIL CASE FOR DAMAGES BASED ON AN INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION FALLING
UNDER ARTICLE 32, 33, 34 AND 2176 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE BE DULY DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO
MAKE RESERVATION TO FILE A SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION IN A CRIMINAL CASE FILED ARISING FROM THE
SAME ACT OR OMISSION OF THE ACCUSED PURSUANT TO RULE 111, SECTION 1 OF THE RULES OF
COURT, THE FAILURE TO MAKE RESERVATION BEING DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE CRIMINAL CASE
WAS DISMISSED BEFORE THE PROSECUTION STARTED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE FOR FAILURE OF THE
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TO APPEAR DESPITE NOTICE
SHOULD A STRICT INTERPRETATION OF RULE 111, SECTION 1 OF THE RULES OF COURT WHICH
INFRINGES ON A RIGHT OF A PARTY BASED ON A SUBSTANTIVE LAW BE PERMITTED WHEN TO DO SO
WOULD DIMINISH, MODIFY AND/OR AMEND A SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
The factual background that led to the filing of the petition is as follows:
On June 6, 1989, the petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio (Branch 6), a
complaint for damages[2] for the injuries and expenses he sustained after the truck driven by the
respondent bumped him on the night of December 9, 1985.[3] In answer thereto, respondent
contended that the criminal case arising from the same incident, Criminal Case No. 2049 for Serious
Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence, earlier filed on January 8, 1986,[4] had already been
provisionally dismissed by the Municipal Trial Court of Tuba, Benguet on March 23, 1987, due to
petitioners lack of interest;[5] and that the dismissal was with respect to both criminal and civil
liabilities of respondent.[6]
After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision, dated December 18, 1991, ruling that
the civil case was not barred by the dismissal of the criminal case, and that petitioner is entitled to
damages. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered, sentencing defendant Valentino Cerantes to pay plaintiff
George Hambon the sum of P60,000.00 for hospitalization and medical expenses and P10,000.00 for
native rituals, as Actual Damages; the sum of P10,000.00 as Moral Damages, P5,000.00 as Exemplary
Damages and P5,000.00 as Attorneys fees and costs.
SO ORDERED.[7]
On appeal,[8] the Court of Appeals, in its decision promulgated on March 8, 1995,[9] reversed and
set aside the decision of the trial court, and dismissed petitioners complaint for damages.
According to the appellate court, since the petitioner did not make any reservation to institute a
separate civil action for damages, it was impliedly instituted with the criminal case, and the dismissal
of the criminal case carried with it the dismissal of the suit for damages, notwithstanding the fact that
the dismissal was provisional as it amounted to an acquittal and had the effect of an adjudication on
the merits. [10]
Hence, herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
 60
Petitioner argues that the ruling in the case of Abellana v. Marave[11] should be observed, i.e., a
civil action for damages may be filed and proceed independently of the criminal action even without
reservation to file the same has been made;[12] and that the requirement of reservation, as provided
in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, practically diminished/amended/modified his substantial right. [13]
The petition must be denied.
Petitioner filed the complaint for damages on June 6, 1989. Hence, Section 1, Rule 111 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended in 1988,[14] is the prevailing and governing law in this
case, viz.:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action
for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action
prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under
Article 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of
the accused.
...
Under the foregoing rule, civil actions to recover liability arising from crime (ex delicto) and
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code (quasi-delict) are deemed impliedly instituted with
the criminal action unless waived, reserved or previously instituted.
Thus, in Maniago v. Court of Appeals,[15] the Court ruled that the right to bring an action for
damages under the Civil Code must be reserved, as required by Section 1, Rule 111, otherwise it
should be dismissed;[16] and that the reservation requirement does not impair, diminish or defeat
substantive rights, but only regulates their exercise in the general interest of orderly procedure.[17]
In the Maniago case, petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of the bus driven by Herminio
Andaya that figured in a vehicular accident with the jeepney owned by respondent Alfredo
Boado. The petitioner therein initially sought for the suspension of the civil case for damages filed
against him in view of the pendency of the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage
to property and multiple physical injuries filed against his driver. The respondent, in the criminal case,
did not reserve the right to bring the separate civil action against the petitioner or his driver. The
criminal case was later dismissed for the failure of the prosecution to prosecute its case. On appeal,
the Court identified the issues as (1) whether the respondent can file a civil action for damages
despite the absence of reservation; (2) whether the dismissal of the criminal case brought with it the
dismissal of the civil action; and (3) whether the reservation requirement is substantive in character
and beyond the rule-making power of the Court.[18]
The Court expounded:
. . . 1quite clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute separately all civil actions for
the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will de deemed to have been instituted with the criminal
case.In other words the right of the injured party to sue separately for the recovery of the civil liability
whether arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from quasi-delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be
reserved otherwise they will de deemed instituted with the criminal action.
...
Contrary to private respondents contention, the requirement that before a separate civil action may
be brought it must be reserved does not impair, diminish or defeat substantive rights, but only
regulates their exercise in the general interest of procedure. The requirement is merely procedural in
nature. For that matter the Revised Penal Code, by providing in Art. 100 that any person criminally
liable is also civilly liable, gives the offended party the right to bring a separate civil action, yet no one
has ever questioned the rule that such action must be reserved before it may be brought
separately.[19]
While the Abellana case ruled that a reservation is not necessary, the 1988 amendment of the
rule explicitly requires reservation of the civil action.
x x x Prior reservation is a condition sine qua non before any of these independent civil actions can be
instituted and thereafter have a continuous determination apart from or simultaneous with the
criminal action.
. . . Far from altering substantive rights, the primary purpose of the reservation is, to borrow the
words of the Court in "Caos v. Peralta":
. . . to avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression and abuse, to prevent delays, to clear
congested dockets, to simplify the work of the trial court; in short, the attainment of justice with the
least expense and vexation to the parties-litigants.[20]
Thus, herein petitioner Hambon should have reserved his right to separately institute the civil
action for damages in Criminal Case No. 2049. Having failed to do so, Civil Case No. 1761-R for
damages subsequently filed by him without prior reservation should be dismissed. With the dismissal
of Criminal Case No. 2049, whatever civil action for the recovery of civil liability that was impliedly
instituted therein was likewise dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, and
the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 8, 1995, is AFFIRMED in toto.
 61

SO ORDERED. TINGA, and

CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Promulgated:
HERNANDO B. DELIZO,
Respondent. August 17, 2004

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP

No. 50995 granting the petition for certiorari of respondent Dr. Hernando B. Delizo and nullifying the

December 18, 1998 and February 1, 1999 Orders[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City in

Criminal Case No. 167-MD for estafa.

The Antecedents

Arsenio T. Ng filed a criminal complaint for estafa against the respondent with the Office of the City

Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City, docketed as Inv. Slip No. 97-10288. After the requisite preliminary
ART. 36 PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
investigation, First Assistant City Prosecutor Esteban A. Tacla, Jr. signed an Information dated October

10, 1997, charging the respondent with estafa.The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 141624
Petitioner, That on or about the 24th day of October, 1996, in the City of Mandaluyong,
Present: Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
PUNO, J., Chairman, above-named accused, being then President and Chairman of Mediserv, Inc., by
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, means of deceit, false pretenses and fraudulent representation, executed prior to
- versus - CALLEJO, SR., or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, succeeded in inducing herein
 62
complainant, Arsenio T. Ng to give the amount of P12 Million, to the accused on
his pretext that said amount will be converted by him into shares of stock
(120,000 shares of stocks) and in order to complement such false pretenses or
fraudulent acts, he (respondent) even showed a Board Resolution defining his
authority to contract loan from the complainant and the conversion of such loan
into shares of stock, which, on the strength by said manifestations and
representations, the complainant gave said amount and duly received by the
accused, he knowing fully well that the same were false and fraudulent and were
only made to entice complainant into believing that he, indeed, is empowered and
in a position to issue the equivalent number of shares of stocks (120,000) in order
to obtain, as in fact, he (accused) obtained the total amount of P12 Million from
the complainant and the accused, once in possession of the money, far from
complying with his obligation to release the 120,000 shares of stocks into
complainants name, despite demands made on him and, with intent to defraud,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply
and convert said amount, to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of Arsenio T. Ng, in the aforementioned amount of P12 Million.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
Before the Information was filed, the Ambulatory Health Care Institute, Inc. (AHCII), also known as
Clinica Manila (CM), and the
Health Check, Inc. (HCI) filed a Complaint on October 22, 1997 with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) against the respondent and a certain John Doe for injunction and damages. The
case was docketed as SEC Case No. 10-97-5794. The petitioners therein alleged, inter alia, that a
special meeting of the stockholders of CM was held on October 9, 1997 after due notice to the
respondent two weeks before the said date. During the said meeting, the stockholders elected a new
board of directors, replacing the respondent as CM president. Thereafter, at 3:00 p.m. of October 13,
1997, the respondent and an unidentified companion arrived at the CM office at SM Megamall,
announced that he was still the president, and rallied the officers and employees against the new
board of directors. Despite the security guards request for him to leave the premises, the respondent
refused to do so. He, thereafter, wrote the China Banking Corporation, the depository bank of CM,
requesting it not to honor any change in the authorized signatories for CM, and appended thereto a
falsified General Information Sheet (GIS) to show that he was still a member of the board of directors
and president of CM. It was prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Commission to adjudge
that respondent be ordered:
1. Not to do any act or deed that will disturb or interfere with the operations and
business of the petitioners, and not to cause any alarm, scandal, disturbance,
intrigue, disloyalty, disorder, or defiance on the part of any (sic) employees,
officers, contractors, workers of CLINICA MANILA and HEALTH CHECK, INC.;
2. Not to do any act that will interfere with or disturb the management and
operation of the funds, bank accounts, receivables, and all other property
transactions of the petitioners, and to stop representing themselves as having any
kind of power and authority over any asset of the two companies and their
management;
3. Not to do any act or deed, directly or indirectly, that will dishonor the name and
reputation of the petitioners;
4. To pay actual damages of P1,000,000; moral damages of P2,000,000; and
exemplary damages of P500,000; and to pay the costs of suit.[4]
On October 23, 1997, AHCII, Mediserv, Inc. (MI) and the respondent, filed a Complaint with the SEC
against Arsenio T. Ng, Kelly S. Salvador, Antonio Roberto M. Abaya, Bartolome C. Felipe, Jr., Joel
Abanilla and Nonette C. Mina. The complainants alleged, inter alia, that they had been stockholders of
AHCII since August 1995, and represented a majority of the outstanding capital stock, owning 52.37%
and 6.08%, respectively, as shown by the GIS dated October 15, 1997 filed with the SEC; the
respondent was the incumbent chairman of the board of directors and president of AHCII; and there
was no quorum during the stockholders meeting of October 9, 1997; as such, the said meeting where
a new set of board of directors and officers were, elected was in violation of the by-laws of the
 63

complainant AHCII and, consequently, illegal. The complainants prayed that the following reliefs be amendment to real estate mortgage over its property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.

granted after due proceedings: 205824 of the Register of Deeds of Manila. MI also executed a promissory note on October 5, 2000 in

a) Declaring the Writ of Preliminary Injunction earlier issued as favor of the bank in the amount of P11,200,000. The bank, thereafter, foreclosed the mortgage and
permanent;
sold the property at public auction in favor of the bank for P15,649,023.29, through defendant Notary
b) Adjudging the Special Stockholders Meeting purportedly held on
October 9, 1997 as null and void ab initio; Public Romeo A. Ignacio, Jr. It was prayed that, after due proceedings, it be granted the following
c) Adjudging any action, proceeding, resolution, and/or election made in
the alleged stockholders meeting purportedly held on October 9, 1997 reliefs:
as null and void ab initio;
d) Adjudging respondents Arsenio T. Ng, Kelly S. Salvador, Antonio WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that:
Roberto M. Abaya, Bartolome C. Felipe, Jr., Joel Abanilla and Nonette C.
Mina, jointly and severally, liable to pay to complainant Delizo moral 1. Immediately upon filing of this Complaint, this Honorable Court issues a Writ of
damages of not less than P1,000,000.00; Preliminary Injunction, or at least a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining and
restraining defendant Register of Deeds from effecting/allowing the registration
or annotation of the purported auction sale of plaintiffs property covered by TCT
e) Adjudging respondents Arsenio T. Ng, Kelly S. Salvador, Antonio No. 205824 of the Register of Deeds for the City of Manila in favor of defendant
Roberto M. Abaya, Bartolome C. Felipe, Jr., Joel Abanilla and Nonette C. Landheights, or any transaction, dealing or incident arising from the purported
Mina, jointly and severally, liable to pay to the complainants, as auction sale allegedly conducted by defendant Ignacio until further orders from
follows: this Honorable Court.
i. Exemplary damages of not less than P500,000.00;
ii. Actual damages not less than P250,000.00; 2. After hearing, to render Judgment, as follows:
iii. Attorneys fee of P200,000.00;
iv. Costs of litigation. a. Declaring the Writ of Preliminary Injunction earlier
issued as permanent;
Other equitable reliefs are prayed for.[5] b. Declaring the alleged public auction sale
conducted by defendant Ignacio over the subject
plaintiffs property, as null and void;
The case was docketed as SEC Case No. 10-97-5796. c. Ordering and commanding Defendant China Bank
to comply and to reduce into writing and/or to
document its agreement with plaintiff to consolidate
In the meantime, Mediserv, Inc., represented by its president, the respondent, and its treasurer, the first P5 million loan of plaintiff with it with the
plaintiffs second loan of P1,800,000.00;
Marissa D. Delizo, filed a complaint with the RTC of Manila, Branch 29, against the China Banking d. Adjudging defendants China Banking Corporation,
Landheights (Iloilo) Development Corporation and
Corporation, the Landheights (Iloilo) Development Corporation, Notary Public Romeo A. Ignacio, Jr.
Romeo A. Ignacio, Jr., jointly and severally, liable to
and the Registrar of Deeds for the City of Manila. An amended complaint was later filed, where it was pay to plaintiff the following:

alleged, inter alia, that MI received a loan from the bank in the amount of P9,820,000, later increased 1. Attorneys Fees in the amount
of P200,000.00; and
to P11,200,000. To secure the payment of the said loan, MI executed a real estate mortgage and
2. Costs of suit.
 64
Other equitable reliefs are prayed for.[6]
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-86152.
On December 3, 1997, the Information for estafa against the respondent was filed with the
RTC of Mandaluyong City and raffled to Branch 214. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
167-MD. The private prosecutor filed an ex parte motion for preliminary attachment, which was
opposed by the respondent. On December 18, 1998, the trial court issued an Order[7] directing the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment on a bond of P8,000,000. The respondent filed a motion
for reconsideration of the order with a prayer for the suspension of the proceedings on the ground of
the existence of a prejudicial question on December 23, 1998.
As early as January 13, 1998, the trial court in Branch 213 issued an Order denying the motion to
suspend proceedings on the ground that the private complainant, Arsenio T. Ng, was not a
stockholder of MI; hence, the pendency of the two (2) SEC cases was not a ground for the suspension
of the case. On February 1, 1999, the trial court issued the assailed Order denying the motion for
reconsideration.
On February 19, 1999, the respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 50995, for the nullification of the Orders of the trial court,
contending as follows:
6.A.) THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND ACTED IN
EXCESS AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT
OF PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT GROSSLY IGNORING THE ESTABLISHED RULE THAT
APPLICATIONS FOR A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT MUST BE STRICTLY
CONSTRUED AGAINST THE APPLICANT AND LIBERALLY IN FAVOR OF THE PARTY
AGAINST WHOM IT IS DIRECTED.
6.B.) THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND ACTED IN
EXCESS AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE ISSUANCE OF THE
PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT DESPITE THE CLEAR SHOWING THAT THE CIVIL
ASPECT OF THE CRIMINAL CASE IS ALREADY COVERED BY CASES BEFORE THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MANILA; HENCE, THERE IS NO CIVIL ASPECT ATTACHED AND/OR DEEMED
INSTITUTED WITH THE CRIMINAL CASE.
6.C.) THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND ACTED IN
EXCESS AND/OR WITHOUT
JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
ATTACHMENT ON A P12 MILLION CLAIM PER THE INFORMATION WITH ONLY P8
MILLION BOND; HENCE, GROSSLY INSUFFICIENT, IMPROPER AND UNREASONABLE.
6.D.) THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND ACTED IN
EXCESS AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN MERELY RELYING ON THE
ALLEGATIONS OF THE EX PARTE MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT WHICH ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY AFFIDAVIT/S AS
REQUIRED UNDER THE RULES.
6.E.) THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND ACTED IN
EXCESS AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN NOT SUSPENDING THE PROCEEDINGS
IN THE SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASE IN VIEW OF THE PRESENCE OF PREJUDICIAL
QUESTIONS IN THE SEC CASES AND THE RTC CASE WHICH ARE DETERMINATIVE OF
THE INNOCENCE OR GUILT OF THE ACCUSED, THE HEREIN PETITIONER.
6.F.) THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND ACTED IN
EXCESS AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN DENYING THE MOTION TO
DISQUALIFY PRIVATE PROSECUTOR BEFORE THE SAID MOTION CAN BE HEARD;
HENCE, A CLEAR AND PALPABLE VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS.
6.G.) THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND ACTED IN
EXCESS AND/OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN NOT DISQUALIFYING THE PRIVATE
PROSECUTOR DESPITE THE CLEAR SHOWING THAT THE CIVIL ASPECT OF THE
SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASE IS PRESENTLY LITIGATED AND/OR THE SUBJECT OF
SEPARATE ACTIONS BEFORE THE SEC AND THE RTC.[8]
 65
On January 18, 2000, the CA rendered a Decision granting the petition and nullifying the assailed
Orders of the trial court, as well as the writ of preliminary attachment it issued.The fallo of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is given due course. The assailed Orders of December 18,
1998 and February 1, 1999, as well as the writ of attachment are hereby set
aside. The respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Mandaluyong City,
Branch 214, is hereby directed to suspend proceedings of Criminal Case No.
167-MD considering the existence of a prejudicial question in SEC Cases Nos.
10-97-5794 and 10-97-5796 and Civil Case No. 97-86152.
SO ORDERED.[9]
The Present Petition
The People of the Philippines, now the petitioner, filed its petition for review on certiorari with this
Court, on the following grounds:
Public interest requires that all criminal acts be immediately investigated and
prosecuted for the protection of society (Gorospe vs. Pana Florida, 101 SCRA
445). Thus, the suspension of criminal proceedings must be avoided unless the
basis and grounds thereof are clear and unmistakable.
The finding of the trial court that the criminal case, the civil case filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Manila and the cases filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) are based on the same transaction is grounded
entirely on speculation. The complaints filed with the RTC and SEC cases do not
support such finding.
Moreover, in ruling that a prejudicial question exists, the court based its finding
solely on its conclusion that the criminal, civil and SEC cases arose out of the same
transaction. This is contrary to Sec. 5, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court and the ruling
of the Supreme Court that for a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal
action, it must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon
which the criminal prosecution is based, but also that the resolution of the issues
raised in said civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused (Ras vs. Rasul, 100 SCRA 125).[10]
The petitioner, thus, raises the following issues for resolution:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE CRIMINAL, CIVIL AND SEC CASES ARE BASED ON THE SAME
TRANSACTION.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE CASES FILED WITH THE SEC AND THE CIVIL CASE FILED
WITH THE RTC RAISE PREJUDICIAL QUESTIONS WHICH WOULD NECESSITATE THE
SUSPENSION OF THE CRIMINAL ACTION FOR ESTAFA.
Central to the issues in the case at bar are Sections 5 and 6, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, [11] which
read:
Sec. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. The two (2) essential elements of a
prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A petition for suspension of
the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil
action may be filed in the office of the fiscal or the court conducting the
preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial,
the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time
before the prosecution rests.[12]
The petitioner asserts that the issues involved in Criminal Case No. 167-MD for estafa are
entirely different from and unrelated to the issues in the SEC cases and in Civil Case No. 97-86152
pending before the RTC of Manila. It asserts that, contrary to the rulings of the appellate court, the
said cases are based on facts and transactions different from those in the criminal case. According to
the petitioner, the resolution of the issues in the SEC and the civil cases are not determinative of the
 66

guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case; hence, the suspension of the proceedings in criminal actions can, according to the law and rules, proceed independently of each other.[15] The

the criminal case was barren of factual and legal bases. rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. [16]

On the other hand, the CA held that the P12,000,000 subject of the transaction in the In this case, the transaction subject of the criminal case for estafa against the respondent is the

criminal case was the same amount involved in the SEC cases and the civil case. The CA then receipt of the amount of P12,000,000 from the private complainant, Ng, which was intended for the

concluded that the issues raised or involved in such cases were determinative of the guilt or purchase of 120,000 shares of stocks of MI. According to the Information in Criminal Case No. 167-MD,

innocence of the respondent in the criminal case, warranting the suspension of the latter case. the respondent used the money for his personal benefit instead of purchasing the said shares in

The Ruling of the Court behalf of Ng. The event or occurrence subject of SEC Case No. 97-5794 filed by the AHCII and the HCI

against the respondent was the latters refusal to vacate the office of the president, and his insistence

on performing and exercising the duties and powers of the said office, as well as the chairmanship of
The petition is meritorious.
the board of directors of the said corporation despite his alleged ouster from the said positions. The

In case the civil action is instituted ahead of the criminal action, under Section 2, Rule 111 of plaintiff corporations sought a writ of injunction and relief for damages against the

the Rules of Court, the civil action shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found before respondent. Neither Ng nor the MI were parties in the said case. On the other hand, SEC Case No.

judgment on the merits upon the commencement of the criminal action. Such criminal action has 97-5796 was filed by the respondent and several others, for and in representation of the AHCII and

precedence over the civil action to enforce the civil liability of the accused arising from the delict. An the MI, as the plaintiffs, to nullify the October 9, 1997 stockholders meeting and the election of the

exception is where the prejudicial question exists, under Sections 5 and 6, Rule 111 of the Rules of board of directors and officers held thereon, anchored on their claim that they owned majority of the

Court, as amended. outstanding capital of the AHCII, and that the said meeting and election subsequently held were null

and void. As in SEC Case No. 97-5794, Ngs projected investment of P12,000,000 in the MI which, as
If the issues raised in a civil action are so similar or intimately related to those in the criminal
alleged in the Information, the respondent had misused for his personal benefit, was not the subject
case such that the resolution of the said issues in the civil case are determinative of the juris et de
of SEC Case No. 97-5796. There is even no showing in the SEC cases that Ng claimed to be a
jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case, the proceedings in the latter case
stockholder of the MI on account of the respondents receipt of the P12,000,000 for the intended
shall be suspended and the civil action shall proceed until judgment on its merits. [13] A prejudicial
purchase of 120,000 shares of stocks therein.
question is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime because if both actions arose

from the same fact or transaction, the civil case does not constitute a prejudicial question to the These issues are not, in any way, determinative of the guilt or innocence of the respondent

determination of the criminal action.[14] Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the in the criminal case for estafa. Whether the said meeting and elections will be declared null and void
 67

by the SEC will not result in the conviction or acquittal of the respondent for estafa, for swindling Ng

of P12,000,000. Furthermore, the SEC cases involve intra-corporate disputes between the respondent, Moreover, the respondent failed to submit to the CA the answer and other pleadings filed by Ng as

on the one hand, and Ng and the other stockholders of the AHCII, on the other, for the control of the well as the pleadings of the stockholders of the AHCII in the SEC cases, containing allegations that they

said corporations management. It must be stressed that the petitions before the SEC are bare of became the majority and controlling stockholders of the AHCII because of the infusion

allegations relating to the alleged P12,000,000 received by the respondent from Ng, and intended for of P12,000,000. Such pleadings would have bolstered the respondents stance in this case, and

the latters purchase of 120,000 shares of stocks in the MI. debilitated that of the petitioner herein.

In his petition with the CA, the respondent alleged that in the SEC cases, the MI insisted that We agree with the petitioners contention that the issue of whether or not the P12,000,000 was

the P12,000,000 received by him was a mere loan; that he would not be liable of estafa if he could merely a loan by Ng in favor of the MI is a matter of defense by the respondent in the criminal case.

prove the same.[17] According to the respondent, Ng alleged in the said SEC cases that he and the
The transaction subject of the civil case is the loan procured by the MI in the amount of P9,820,000,
members of his group became the major and controlling stockholders in AHCII because of the infusion
later increased to P11,200,000, from the China Banking Corporation, the payment of which was
of P12,000,000 by Ng. On the other hand, the respondent averred in his comment on the instant
secured by a real estate mortgage and amended real estate mortgage over its property in Sampaloc,
petition that the P12,000,000 he received from Ng referred to AHCII shares of stocks owned by
Manila. The MI sought to nullify the extrajudicial foreclosure of the said
MI.[18] A cursory reading of the Information will show that the P12,000,000 was intended for the
mortgage and the sale of its property at public auction, on its allegation that it did not breach its
purchase of 120,000 shares of stocks of the MI, and not of the AHCII. Even the CA in its decision
contract with the bank. The respondents agreement with Ng for the purchase of 120,000 shares of
declared that the P12,000,000 was intended for Ngs purchase of shares of stocks in the MI:
stocks in the MI, as well as the alleged misappropriation of the amount of P12,000,000 by the
As regard the motion to suspend the proceedings in [the] questioned
criminal case in view of the presence of a prejudicial question in the SEC cases, respondent, is not the subject matter of the civil case. Ng is not even a party thereto; neither was he
petitioner insists in that the nature of the subject transaction involving the
privy to the said transaction between the respondent and the MI, and the China Banking Corporation
alleged P12 million of Mr. Cusencio (sic) T. Ng which is the subject of the case at
bar, is, likewise, the subject of the consolidated SEC cases. A perusal of the involving the said loan.
complaints (p. 79, Rollo) filed with the SEC (SEC Cases Nos. 10-97-5794 and
10-97-5796) and the Regional Trial Court of Manila shows that there really exists a
prejudicial question. It appears, as claimed by private respondent, that the In sum, the outcome of the civil case is not, in any way, determinative of the guilt or
amount of P12 million subject of the instant Criminal Case for Estafa was given to
innocence of the respondent in the criminal case. The CA thus erred in granting the petition of the
petitioner to be diverted into shares of stocks from Mediserv, Inc., while the
petitioner averred that the amount was given as a loan. Thus, it is clear that the respondent and nullifying the assailed orders of the trial court.
nature of the transaction involving the P12 million of private respondent in the
criminal case is the same as the cases before the SEC and the Civil Case
Q-97-88152 (sic) in the Regional Trial Court of Manila.[19]
 68
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals is SET ASIDE. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City dated December 18,
1998 and February 1, 1999 are REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
SPOUSES ANTONIO S. PAHANG and LOLITA T. PAHANG, petitioners, vs. HON. AUGUSTINE A. VESTIL,
Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court- Branch 56, Mandaue City, DEPUTY SHERIFF,
Regional Trial Court-Branch 56 and METROPOLITAN BANK and TRUST
COMPANY, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by the Spouses Antonio and Lolita Pahang,
for the nullification of the Decision[1] and Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
59157.
The Antecedents
On January 5, 1996, the petitioners, Spouses Antonio and Lolita Pahang, received a short-term
loan of one million five hundred thousand pesos (P1,500,000.00) from the respondent Metropolitan
Bank & Trust Company payable on December 27, 1996. The loan was covered by Non-Negotiable
Promissory Note No. 190601[3] and was, likewise, secured by a real estate mortgage on a parcel of
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 29607.[4] As the petitioners failed to pay the
loan, the interest and the penalties due thereon, the respondent foreclosed the real estate mortgage
extrajudicially. As a consequence, the mortgaged property was sold at public auction on January 8,
1998 to the respondent bank as the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was executed by Pasnonito D.
Antiporda as Ex-Officio Sheriff in favor of the respondent on January 14, 1998 and was registered with
the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City on January 27, 1998.
On December 29, 1998, the respondent wrote the petitioners that the one-year redemption
period of the property would expire on January 27, 1999.[5] Instead of redeeming the property, the
petitioners filed, on January 19, 1999, a complaint for annulment of extrajudicial sale against the
respondent bank and the Sheriff in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu (Mandaue City), Branch 56,
docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-3454.[6] Therein, the petitioners alleged that the respondent bloated
their obligation of P1,500,000.00 to P2,403,770.73 by including excessive past due interest, penalty
charges, attorneys fees and sheriffs expense. They claimed that such exorbitant charges were made to
frustrate their chance to pay the loan, and to ensure that the respondent bank would be the highest
bidder during the auction sale. They also asserted that the respondent failed to remit to the Sheriff
the purchase price of the property and was, likewise, guilty of fraud, collusion, breach of trust or
misconduct in the conduct of the auction sale of their property. Besides praying for injunctive relief,
the petitioners prayed for the following alternative reliefs:
3. After trial on the merits, and after determination of plaintiffs true obligation with defendant bank,
to declare the foreclosure on the subject property as null and void, and to allow the plaintiffs to
pay the same; as alternative prayer, to allow the plaintiffs to redeem the subject real property based
on the amount determined and established as true and exact obligation of plaintiffs to defendant
bank.[7]
After the expiration of the one-year redemption period, the respondent consolidated its
ownership over the foreclosed property. Consequently, TCT No. 44668 was issued by the Register of
Deeds in its name. On July 23, 1999, the respondent filed a Petition for Writ of Possession before the
RTC of Mandaue City (Branch 56), docketed as LRC Case No. 3.[8]
The petitioners, citing the ruling of this Court in Belisario v. The Intermediate Appellate
Court,[9] opposed the petition on the ground that the core issue in their complaint in Civil Case No.
MAN-3454 constituted a prejudicial question, which warranted a suspension of the proceedings
before the court. The petitioners averred that the filing of their complaint within the period to
redeem the foreclosed property was equivalent to an offer to redeem the same, and had the effect of
preserving such right. They also asserted that the respondent acted in bad faith in procuring the title
over the property despite the pendency of their complaint in Civil Case No. MAN-3454.
On March 28, 2000, the RTC of Mandaue City, Branch 56, rendered a decision in LRC Case No. 3
granting the petition and ordering the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the respondent.[10]
Citing the case of Javelosa v. Court of Appeals,[11] and Gawaran v. Court of Appeals,[12] the RTC
ruled that since the petitioners failed to redeem the property within one year from the foreclosure,
 69
the respondent was entitled to a writ of possession as a necessary consequence of the readjudication
of ownership and the corresponding issuance of the original certificate. [13]The petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration of the decision, but the court issued an order denying the motion, stating
that it was merely its ministerial function to issue a writ of possession.[14]
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 59157 for the nullification of the March 28, 2000 Decision and the May 19, 2000 Order of the
RTC. Thepetitioners alleged that the RTC committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction in granting the petition of the respondent bank for a writ of possession in
LRC Case No. 3 instead of suspending the proceedings therein based on the ruling of this Court
in Belisario vs. The Intermediate Appellate Court.[15]
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Finding that the RTC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the issuance of the
writ of possession, the CA rendered a decision on March 2, 2001, dismissing the petition. [16] Citing the
rulings of this Court in Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals[17] and Navarra v. Court of Appeals,[18] the CA
explained that the pendency of a separate proceeding questioning the validity of the mortgage and
the extrajudicial foreclosure thereof cannot bar the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the
purchaser at public auction. The appellate court ruled that after a title on the property has been
consolidated in the mortgagee, the issuance of a writ of possession becomes a ministerial act of the
trial court. Furthermore, the right of the respondent bank to possess the property was based on its
right of ownership as a purchaser of the properties in the foreclosure sale. The CA explained that the
ruling in the Belisario case was inapplicable because it involved a complaint to enforce the repurchase
of the foreclosed property within the period of redemption, whereas, the complaint filed by the
petitioners in Civil Case No. MAN-3454 was for the annulment of the mortgage or extrajudicial sale
which was not equivalent to an offer to redeem the property.[19]
The Present Petition
The motion for reconsideration of the petitioners of the decision, having been denied by the
appellate court, the petitioners filed this instant petition, assigning the following errors:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING PETITIONERS RIGHT OF
REDEMPTION OVER THEIR FORECLOSED PROPERTY AS HAVING EXPIRED ON JANUARY
26, 1999, IN THE LIGHT OF THEIR PENDING COMPLAINT TO ANNUL THE FORECLOSURE
FILED BEFORE THE EXPIRATION OF THE ONE-YEAR REDEMPTION PERIOD, ON THE
GROUND OF FRAUD, AND CONSIDERING FURTHER THEIR SPECIFIC PRAYER THEREOF
FOR DETERMINATION OF THEIR TRUE OBLIGATION WITH PRIVATE RESPONDENT, AND
TO ALLOW THEM TO PAY THE SAME AND/OR TO REDEEM THEIR FORECLOSED
PROPERTY.[20]
2. PETITIONERS COMPLAINT FOR ANNULMENT OF THE FORECLOSURE OF THEIR PROPERTY
WITH A PRAYER FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND INJUNCTION TO STOP
THE ISSUANCE OF A DEFINITE DEED OF SALE AND CONSOLIDATION OF TITLE OF THEIR
PROPERTY IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT, WHILE GIVING PREFERENCE AND
ACTING WITH DISPATCH ON PRIVATE RESPONDENTS PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF
WRIT OF POSSESSION ON THE SAME PROPERTY, BY GRANTING THE WRIT OF
POSSESSION THEREON THEREBY RENDERING MOOT AND ACADEMIC PETITIONERS
PRAYERS IN THEIR COMPLAINT FOR ANNULMENT OF FORECLOSURE.[21]
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE DECISION OF THIS
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF BELISARIO VS. THE INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, G.R. NO. L-73503, WHEREBY THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT TO
ENFORCE REPURCHASE WITHIN THE PERIOD FOR REDEMPTION IS EQUIVALENT TO AN
OFFER TO REDEEM AND HAS THE EFFECT OF PRESERVING THE RIGHT OF REDEMPTION
INAPPLICABLE TO THE CASE OF PETITIONERS.[22]
4. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE FACT THAT THE
ISSUE OR ISSUES JOINED IN THE COMPLAINT FOR ANNULMENT BEFORE RESPONDENT
JUDGE DOCKETED AS CIVIL CASE NO. MAN-4353 (sic) IS A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION TO
THE ISSUE RAISED IN THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF POSSESSION IN LRC CASE NO. 3. [23]
5. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HAVING FAILED TO CONSIDER THE VALID
CAUSES OF ACTION OF PETITIONERS IN THEIR COMPLAINT FOR ANNULMENT IN CIVIL
CASE NO. MAN-4354 (sic).[24]
The threshold issues are as follows: (a) whether or not the complaint of the petitioners in Civil
Case No. MAN-3454 for annulment of extrajudicial sale is a prejudicial question to the petition of the
respondent bank for the issuance of a writ of possession in LRC Case No. 3; and, (b) whether or not
the RTC committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
granting the petition of the respondent in LRC Case No. 3 and in issuing the writ of possession in its
favor.
The issues being interrelated, the Court shall resolve the same simultaneously.
The petitioners contend that their complaint in Civil Case No. MAN-3454 and the respondents
petition for a writ of possession in LRC Case No. 3 were raffled to Branch 56 of the RTC.Although their
complaint in Civil Case No. MAN-3454 was for the nullification of the extrajudicial sale at public
auction on the ground of fraud, they also prayed, as an alternative remedy, that they be allowed to
redeem the property based on the amount to be determined by the court after trial. Hence, they
assert, the filing of their complaint before the expiry of the redemption period to enforce their right
of redemption was equivalent to a formal offer to redeem the property and had the effect of
 70
preserving their right of redemption. They argue that the RTC should have suspended the proceedings
in LRC Case No. 3 pending the final resolution of Civil Case No. MAN-3454 so as not to render moot
and academic the latter case, conformably with the ruling of the Court in Belisario vs. The
Intermediate Appellate Court,[25] after all, the two cases were pending before the same court. The
petitioners, thus, aver that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction in granting the petition of the respondent bank for a writ of possession in LRC Case
No. 3. They, likewise, aver that the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the decision of the trial
court and declared, thus:
Further, as to the applicability of the case of Belisario vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (G.R. No.
L-73503, Aug. 30, 1988, 165 SCRA 101, 108), suffice it to say, that the cause of action therein was to
enforce the repurchase of the foreclosed property within the period of redemption, which the
Supreme Court held that it has the effect of preserving the right of redemption. Whereas, Civil Case
No. MAN-3454 filed by the petitioners is for the annulment of mortgage or extrajudicial sale, which is
not in effect an offer to redeem. Verily, the pendency of said civil case does not preserve the right of
redemption of the petitioners after the period of redemption.[26]
The Courts Ruling
The contentions of the petitioners have no merit.
A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent
of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It generally
comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there
exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may
proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The
rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. [27]
In the present case, the complaint of the petitioners for Annulment of Extrajudicial Sale is a civil
action and the respondents petition for the issuance of a writ of possession of Lot No. 3-A, Block 1,
Psd-07-021410, TCT No. 44668 is but an incident in the land registration case and, therefore, no
prejudicial question can arise from the existence of the two actions.[28] A similar issue was raised
in Manalo vs. Court of Appeals,[29] where we held that:
At any rate, it taxes our imagination why the questions raised in Case No. 98-0868 must be considered
determinative of Case No. 9011. The basic issue in the former is whether the respondent, as the
purchaser in the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, may be compelled to have the property
repurchased or resold to a mortgagors successor-in-interest (petitioner); while that in the latter is
merely whether the respondent, as the purchaser in the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, is
entitled to a writ of possession after the statutory period for redemption has expired. The two cases,
assuming both are pending, can proceed separately and take their own direction independent of each
other.[30]
The focal issue in Civil Case No. MAN-3454 was whether the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real
estate mortgage executed by the petitioners in favor of the respondent bank and the sale of their
property at public auction for P2,403,770.73 are null and void, whereas, the issue in LRC Case No. 3
was whether the respondent bank was entitled to the possession of the property after the statutory
period for redemption had lapsed and title was issued .
Our ruling in Belisario has no application in this case because in the said case, no prejudicial
question was involved. We merely held therein that the filing of an action to enforce redemption
within the period of redemption is equivalent to a formal offer to redeem, and should the Court allow
the redemption, the redemptioner should then pay the amount already determined. In fine, the filing
of an action by the redemptioner to enforce his right to redeem does not suspend the running of the
statutory period to redeem the property, nor bar the purchaser at public auction from procuring a
writ of possession after the statutory period of redemption had lapsed, without prejudice to the final
outcome of such complaint to enforce the right of redemption.[31]
The remedy of the petitioners from the assailed decision of the RTC in LRC Case No. 3 was to
appeal by writ of error to the Court of Appeals.[32] However, instead of appealing by writ of error, the
petitioners filed their petition for certiorari. Certiorari is not proper where the aggrieved party has a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law. Moreover, the error of the trial court in granting the
respondent bank a writ of possession, if at all, was an error of judgment correctible only by an
ordinary appeal.
It bears stressing that the proceedings in a petition and/or motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession, after the lapse of the statutory period for redemption, is summary in nature. [33]The trial
court is mandated to issue a writ of possession upon a finding of the lapse of the statutory period for
redemption without the redemptioner having redeemed the property. It cannot be validly argued that
the trial court abused its discretion when it merely complied with its ministerial duty to issue the said
writ of possession.[34]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE. The assailed decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59157 is AFFIRMED.
Cost against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.