1
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 82511. March 3, 1992.]
GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMISSION and IMELDA SALAZAR, Respondents.
Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for Petitioner.
Gerardo S. Mansalon for Private Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE; EMPLOYMENT; PREVENTIVE
SUSPENSION, REMEDIAL RECOURSE OF EMPLOYER PENDING INVESTIGATION OF
ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF EMPLOYEE. — The investigative findings of Mr. Maramara,
which pointed to Delfin Saldivar’s acts in conflict with his position as technical
operations manager, necessitated immediate and decisive action on any employee closely
associated with Saldivar. The suspension of Salazar was further impelled by the discovery
of the missing Fedders airconditioning unit inside the apartment private respondent
shared with Saldivar. Under such circumstances, preventive suspension was the proper
remedial recourse available to the company pending Salazar’s investigation. By itself,
preventive suspension does not signify that the company has adjudged the employee
guilty of the charges she was asked to answer and explain. Such disciplinary measure is
resorted to for the protection of the company’s property pending investigation of any
alleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the employee.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; EMPLOYEE ILLEGALLY DISMISSED ENTITLED TO REINSTATEMENT
AND SEPARATION. — To go back to the instant case, there being no evidence to show an
authorized, much less a legal, cause for the dismissal of private respondent, she had
every right, not only to be entitled to reinstatement, but as well, to full backwages.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSES. — The intendment of the law in prescribing the twin
remedies of reinstatement and payment of backwages is, in the former, to restore the
dismissed employee to her status before she lost her job, for the dictionary meaning of
the word "reinstate" is "to restore to a state, condition, position, etc. from which one had
been removed" and in the latter, to give her back the income lost during the period of
unemployment. Both remedies, looking to the past, would perforce make her
"whole."cralaw virtua1aw library
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ILLEGAL DISMISSAL; REINSTATEMENT; GROUNDS FOR DENIAL. —
Over time, the following reasons have been advanced by the Court for denying
reinstatement under the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto; that
reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the long passage of time (22 years of
litigation) or because of the realities of the situation; or that it would be "inimical to the
employer’s interest;" or that reinstatement may no longer be feasible; or, that it will not
serve the best interests of the parties involved; or that the company would be prejudiced
by the workers’ continued employment; or that it will not serve any prudent purpose as
when supervening facts have transpired which make execution on that score unjust or
inequitable or, to an increasing extent, due to the resultant atmosphere of "antipathy and
antagonism" or "strained relations" or "irretrievable estrangement" between the employer
and the employee.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; BACKWAGES AND SEPARATION PAY AWARDED WHERE
REINSTATEMENT CAN NOT BE EFFECTED. — In lieu of reinstatement, the Court has
variously ordered the payment of backwages and separation pay or solely separation pay.
6. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION; WHERE THE STATUTE IS
CLEAR AND FREE FROM AMBIGUITY, IT MUST BE GIVEN ITS LITERAL MEANING. —
The wording of the Labor Code is clear and unambiguous: "An employee who is ‘unjustly
dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement . . . and to his full backwages . . ."
Under the principles of statutory construction, if a statute is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or verba legis derived from the maxim index animi
sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words
employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or will and preclude
the court from construing it differently. The legislature is presumed to know the meaning
of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of
such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the
words of a statute there should be no departure. Neither does the provision admit of any
qualification.
7. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE; EMPLOYMENT; REINSTATEMENT;
NOT APPROPRIATE IN THE PRESENCE OF STRAINED RELATIONS BETWEEN
EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE; QUALIFICATION. — If in the wisdom of the Court, there
may be a ground or grounds for non-application of Article 279 of the Labor Code, this
should be by way of exception, such as when the reinstatement may be inadmissible due
to ensuing strained relations between the employer and the employee. In such cases, it
should be proved that the employee concerned occupies a position where he enjoys the
trust and confidence of his employer; and that it is likely that if reinstated, an
atmosphere of antipathy and antagonism may be generated as to adversely affect the
efficiency and productivity of the employee concerned.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — The principle of "strained relations" cannot
be applied indiscriminately. Otherwise, reinstatement can never be possible simply
because some hostility is invariably engendered between the parties as a result of
litigation. That is human nature. Besides, no strained relations should arise from a valid
and legal act of asserting one’s right; otherwise an employee who shall assert his right
could be easily separated from the service, by merely paying his separation pay on the
pretext that his relationship with his employer had already become strained. Here, it has
not been proved that the position of private respondent as systems analyst is one that
may be characterized as a position of trust and confidence such that if reinstated, it may
well lead to strained relations between employer and employee. Hence, this does not
constitute an exception to the general rule mandating reinstatement for an employee who
has been unlawfully dismissed. In the instant case, petitioner has predicated its
dismissal of Salazar on loss of confidence. As we have held countless times, while loss of
confidence or breach of trust is a valid ground for termination, it must rest on some basis
which must be convincingly established. An employee may not be dismissed on mere
presumptions and suppositions.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; WITHOUT LEGAL GROUND, ILLEGAL; EMPLOYEE ENTITLED TO
REINSTATEMENT AND BACKWAGES. — It is also worth emphasizing that the Maramara
report came out after Saldivar had already resigned from GMCR on May 31, 1984. Since
Saldivar did not have the opportunity to refute management’s findings, the report
remained obviously one-sided. Since the main evidence obtained by petitioner dealt
principally on the alleged culpability of Saldivar, without his having bad a chance to voice
his side in view of his prior resignation, stringent examination should have been carried
out to ascertain whether or not there existed independent legal grounds to hold Salazar
answerable as well and, thereby, justify her dismissal. Finding none, from the records, we
find her to have been unlawfully dismissed. Petitioner GMRC is ordered to REINSTATE
 2
private respondent Imelda Salazar and to pay her backwages equivalent to her salary for
a period of two (2) years only.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
For private respondent Imelda L. Salazar, it would seem that her close association with
Delfin Saldivar would mean the loss of her job. In May 1982, private respondent was
employed by Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation (GMCR) as general systems
analyst. Also employed by petitioner as manager for technical operations’ support was
Delfin Saldivar with whom private respondent was allegedly very close.
Sometime in 1984, petitioner GMCR, prompted by reports that company equipment and
spare parts worth thousands of dollars under the custody of Saldivar were missing,
caused the investigation of the latter’s activities. The report dated September 25, 1984
prepared by the company’s internal auditor, Mr. Agustin Maramara, indicated that
Saldivar had entered into a partnership styled Concave Commercial and Industrial
Company with Richard A. Yambao, owner and manager of Elecon Engineering Services
(Elecon), a supplier of petitioner often recommended by Saldivar. The report also
disclosed that Saldivar had taken petitioner’s missing Fedders airconditioning unit for his
own personal use without authorization and also connived with Yambao to defraud
petitioner of its property. The airconditioner was recovered only after petitioner GMCR
filed an action for replevin against Saldivar. 1
It likewise appeared in the course of Maramara’s investigation that Imelda Salazar
violated company regulations by involving herself in transactions conflicting with the
company’s interests. Evidence showed that she signed as a witness to the articles of
partnership between Yambao and Saldivar. It also appeared that she had full knowledge
of the loss and whereabouts of the Fedders airconditioner but failed to inform her
employer.
Consequently, in a letter dated October 8, 1984, petitioner company placed private
respondent Salazar under preventive suspension for one (1) month, effective October 9,
1984, thus giving her thirty (30) days within which to explain her side. But instead of
submitting an explanation, three (3) days later or on October 12, 1984, private
respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for illegal suspension, which she
subsequently amended to include illegal dismissal, vacation and sick leave benefits, 13th
month pay and damages, after petitioner notified her in writing that effective November
8,1984, she was considered dismissed "in view of (her) inability to refute and disprove
these findings." 2
After due hearing, the Labor Arbiter in a decision dated July 16, 1985, ordered petitioner
company to reinstate private respondent to her former or equivalent position and to pay
her full backwages and other benefits she would have received were it not for the illegal
dismissal. Petitioner was also ordered to pay private respondent moral damages of
P50,000.00. 3
On appeal, public respondent National Labor Relations Commission in the questioned
resolution dated December 29, 1987 affirmed the aforesaid decision with respect to the
reinstatement of private respondent but limited the backwages to a period of two (2) years
and deleted the award for moral damages. 4
Hence, this petition assailing the Labor Tribunal for having committed grave abuse of
discretion in holding that the suspension and subsequent dismissal of private respondent
were illegal and in ordering her reinstatement with two (2) years’
backwages.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On the matter of preventive suspension, we find for petitioner GMCR.
The investigative findings of Mr. Maramara, which pointed to Delfin Saldivar’s acts in
conflict with his position as technical operations manager, necessitated immediate and
decisive action on any employee closely associated with Saldivar. The suspension of
Salazar was further impelled by the discovery of the missing Fedders airconditioning unit
inside the apartment private respondent shared with Saldivar. Under such
circumstances, preventive suspension was the proper remedial recourse available to the
company pending Salazar’s investigation. By itself, preventive suspension does not signify
that the company has adjudged the employee guilty of the charges she was asked to
answer and explain. Such disciplinary measure is resorted to for the protection of the
company’s property pending investigation of any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance
committed by the employee. 5
Thus, it is not correct to conclude that petitioner GMCR had violated Salazar’s right to
due process when she was promptly suspended. If at all, the fault lay with private
respondent when she ignored petitioner’s memorandum of October 8, 1984 "giving her
ample opportunity to present (her) side to the Management." Instead, she went directly to
the Labor Department and filed her complaint for illegal suspension without giving her
employer a chance to evaluate her side of the controversy.
But while we agree with the propriety of Salazar’s preventive suspension, we hold that
her eventual separation from employment was not for cause.
What is the remedy in law to rectify an unlawful dismissal so as to "make whole" the
victim who has not merely lost her job which, under settled jurisprudence, is a property
right of which a person is not to be deprived without due process, but also the
compensation that should have accrued to her during the period when she was
unemployed?chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate
the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An
employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without
loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the
time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement"
6 (Emphasis supplied).
Corollary thereto are the following provisions of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
of the Labor Code:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 2. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not
terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause as provided in the Labor
Code or when authorized by existing laws.
Sec. 3. Reinstatement. — An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to backwages." ‘ 7 (Emphasis
supplied)
 3
Before proceeding any further, it must be recalled that the present Constitution has gone
further than the 1973 Charter in guaranteeing vital social and economic rights to
marginalized groups of society, including labor. Given the pro-poor orientation of several
articulate Commissioners of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, it was not
surprising that a whole new Article emerged on Social Justice and Human Rights
designed, among other things, to "protect and enhance the right of all the people to
human dignity, reduce social, economic and political inequalities, and remove cultural
inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good." 8
Proof of the priority accorded to labor is that it leads the other areas of concern in the
Article on Social Justice, viz., Labor ranks ahead of such topics as Agrarian and Natural
Resources Reform, Urban Land Reform and Housing, Health, Women, Role and Rights of
People’s Organizations and Human
Rights. 9
The opening paragraphs on Labor state:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for
all. It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining
and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of
work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law." 10 (Emphasis
mine)
Compare this with the sole provision on Labor in the 1973 Constitution under the Article
on Declaration of principles and State Policies that provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 9. The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality
in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and
regulate the relations between workers and employers. The State shall ensure the rights
of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and
humane conditions of work. The State may provide for compulsory arbitration." 11
To be sure, both Charters recognize "security of tenure" as one of the rights of labor
which the State is mandated to protect. But there is no gainsaying the fact that the intent
of the framers of the present Constitution was to give primacy to the rights of labor and
afford the sector "full protection," at least greater protection than heretofore accorded
them, regardless of the geographical location of the workers and whether they are
organized or not.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
It was then CONCOM Commissioner, now Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., who
substantially contributed to the present formulation of the protection to labor provision
and proposed that the same be incorporated in the Article on Social Justice and not just
in the Article on Declaration of Principles and State Policies "in the light of the special
importance that we are giving now to social justice and the necessity of emphasizing the
scope and role of social justice in national development." 12
If we have taken pains to delve into the background of the labor provisions in our
Constitution and the Labor Code, it is but to stress that the right of an employee not to
be dismissed from his job except for a just or authorized cause provided by law has
assumed greater importance under the 1987 Constitution with the singular prominence
labor enjoys under the article on Social Justice. And this transcendent policy has been
translated into law in the Labor Code. Under its terms, where a case of unlawful or
unauthorized dismissal has been proved by the aggrieved employee, or on the other hand,
the employer whose duty it is to prove the lawfulness or justness of his act of dismissal
has failed to do so, then the remedies provided in Article 279 should find application.
Consonant with this liberalized stance vis-a-vis labor, the legislature even went further by
enacting Republic Act No. 6715 which took effect on March 2, 1989 that amended said
Article to remove any possible ambiguity that jurisprudence may have generated which
watered down the constitutional intent to grant to labor "full protection." 13
To go back to the instant case, there being no evidence to show an authorized, much less
a legal, cause for the dismissal of private respondent, she had every right, not only to be
entitled to reinstatement, but as well, to full backwages. 14
The intendment of the law in prescribing the twin remedies of reinstatement and payment
of backwages is, in the former, to restore the dismissed employee to her status before she
lost her job, for the dictionary meaning of the word "reinstate" is "to restore to a state,
condition, position, etc. from which one had been removed" 15 and in the latter, to give
her back the income lost during the period of unemployment. Both remedies, looking to
the past, would perforce make her "whole."cralaw virtua1aw library
Sadly, the avowed intent of the law has at times been thwarted when reinstatement has
not been forthcoming and the hapless dismissed employee finds himself on the outside
looking in.chanrobles law library
Over time, the following reasons have been advanced by the Court for denying
reinstatement under the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto; that
reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the long passage of time (22 years of
litigation) or because of the realities of the situation; 16 or that it would be "inimical to
the employer’s interest;" 17 or that reinstatement may no longer be feasible; 18 or, that it
will not serve the best interests of the parties involved; 19 or that the company would be
prejudiced by the workers’ continued employment; 20 or that it will not serve any
prudent purpose as when supervening facts have transpired which make execution on
that score unjust or inequitable 21 or, to an increasing extent, due to the resultant
atmosphere of "antipathy and antagonism" or "strained relations" or "irretrievable
estrangement" between the employer and the employee. 22 In lieu of reinstatement, the
Court has variously ordered the payment of backwages and separation pay 23 or solely
separation pay. 24
In the case at bar, the law is on the side of private Respondent. In the first place, the
wording of the Labor Code is clear and unambiguous: "An employee who is ‘unjustly
dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement . . . and to his full backwages . . ."
25 Under the principles of statutory construction, if a statute is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or verba legis derived from the maxim index animi
sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words
employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or will and preclude
the court from construing it differently. 26 The legislature is presumed to know the
meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by
the use of such words as are found in the statute. 27 Verba legis non est recedendum, or
from the words of a statute there should be no departure. Neither does the provision
admit of any qualification. If in the wisdom of the Court, there may be a ground or
grounds for non- application of the above-cited provision, this should be by way of
exception, such as when the reinstatement may be inadmissible due to ensuing strained
relations between the employer and the employee.
 4

In such cases, it should be proved that the employee concerned occupies a position
where he enjoys the trust and confidence of his employer; and that it is likely that if
reinstated, an atmosphere of antipathy and antagonism may be generated as to adversely
affect the efficiency and productivity of the employee concerned.
A few examples will suffice to illustrate the Court’s application of the above principle:
where the employee is a Vice-President for Marketing and as such, enjoys the full trust
and confidence of top management; 28 or is the Officer-In-Charge of the extension office
of the bank where he works; 29 or is an organizer of a union who was in a position to
sabotage the union’s efforts to organize the workers in commercial and industrial
establishments; 30 or is a warehouseman of a non-profit organization whose primary
purpose is to facilitate and maximize voluntary gifts by foreign individuals and
organizations to the Philippines; 31 or is a manager of its Energy Equipment Sales. 32
Obviously, the principle of "strained relations" cannot be applied indiscriminately.
Otherwise, reinstatement can never be possible simply because some hostility is
invariably engendered between the parties as a result of litigation. That is human nature.
33
Besides, no strained relations should arise from a valid and legal act of asserting one’s
right; otherwise an employee who shall assert his right could be easily separated from the
service, by merely paying his separation pay on the pretext that his relationship with his
employer had already become strained. 34
Here, it has not been proved that the position of private respondent as systems analyst is
one that may be characterized as a position of trust and confidence such that if
reinstated, it may well lead to strained relations between employer and employee. Hence,
this does not constitute an exception to the general rule mandating reinstatement for an
employee who has been unlawfully dismissed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On the other hand, has she betrayed any confidence reposed in her by engaging in
transactions that may have created conflict of interest situations? Petitioner GMCR
points out that as a matter of company policy, it prohibits its employees from involving
themselves with any company that has business dealings with GMCR. Consequently,
when private respondent Salazar signed as a witness to the partnership papers of
Concave (a supplier of Ultra which in turn is also a supplier of GMCR), she was deemed
to have placed herself in an untenable position as far as petitioner was concerned.
However, on close scrutiny, we agree with public respondent that such a circumstance
did not create a conflict of interests situation. As a system analyst, Salazar was very far
removed from operations involving the procurement of supplies. Salazar’s duties revolved
around the development of systems and analysis of designs on a continuing basis. In
other words, Salazar did not occupy a position of trust relative to the approval and
purchase of supplies and company assets.
To rely on the Maramara report as a basis for Salazar’s dismissal would be most
iniquitous because the bulk of the findings centered principally on her friend’s alleged
thievery and anomalous transactions as technical operations’ support manager. Said
report merely insinuated that in view of Salazar’s special relationship with Saldivar,
Salazar might have had direct knowledge of Saldivar’s questionable activities. Direct
evidence implicating private respondent is wanting from the records.
It is also worth emphasizing that the Maramara report came out after Saldivar had
already resigned from GMCR on May 31, 1984. Since Saldivar did not have the
opportunity to refute management’s findings, the report remained obviously one-sided.
Since the main evidence obtained by petitioner dealt principally on the alleged culpability
of Saldivar, without his having bad a chance to voice his side in view of his prior
resignation, stringent examination should have been carried out to ascertain whether or
not there existed independent legal grounds to hold Salazar answerable as well and,
thereby, justify her dismissal. Finding none, from the records, we find her to have been
unlawfully dismissed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of public respondent National Labor Relations
Commission dated December 29, 1987 is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner GMCR is ordered
to REINSTATE private respondent Imelda Salazar and to pay her backwages equivalent to
her salary for a period of two (2) years only.This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Paras, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr. and Nocon, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., no part as son handled case while still with counsel’s law firm.
Feliciano, J., no part, in view of stock interest in petitioner.
Padilla, JJ., no part, in view of equity interest in petitioner corporation.
Cruz, J., concur in the result.
Narvasa, C.J., I agree with Justice Herrera that there is just cause for dismissal.
Herrera, J., I believe there is just cause for dismissal per investigative findings (See Dec.,
p. 2).

In the instant case, petitioner has predicated its dismissal of Salazar on loss of
confidence. As we have held countless times, while loss of confidence or breach of trust is
a valid ground for termination, it must rest on some basis which must be convincingly
established. 35 An employee may not be dismissed on mere presumptions and
suppositions. Petitioner’s allegation that since Salazar and Saldivar lived together in the
same apartment, it "presumed reasonably that complainant’s sympathy would be with
Saldivar" and its averment that Saldivar’s investigation although unverified, was probably
true, do not pass this Court’s test. 36 While we should not condone the acts of disloyalty
of an employee, neither should we dismiss him on the basis of suspicion derived from
speculative inferences.
 5
EN BANC
G.R. No. 109445 November 7, 1994
FELICITO BASBACIO, Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, FRANKLIN DRILON in his capacity as Secretary of Justice, Respondent.
Amparita S. Sta. Maria for petitioner.
MENDOZA, J.:
This case presents for determination the scope of the State's liability under Rep. Act No.
7309, which among other things provides compensation for persons who are unjustly
accused, convicted and imprisoned but on appeal are acquitted and ordered
released.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner Felicito Basbacio and his son-in-law, Wilfredo Balderrama, were convicted of
frustrated murder and of two counts of frustrated murder for the killing of Federico
Boyon and the wounding of the latter's wife Florida and his son Tirso, at Palo, Calanuga,
Rapu-Rapu, Albay, on the night of June 26, 1988. The motive for the killing was
apparently a land dispute between the Boyons and petitioner. Petitioner and his son-in-
law were sentenced to imprisonment and ordered immediately detained after their bonds
had been cancelled.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner and his son-in-law appealed. Only petitioner's appeal proceeded to judgment,
however, as the appeal of the other accused was dismissed for failure to file his
brief.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On June 22, 1992 the Court of Appeals rendered a decision acquitting petitioner on the
ground that the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy between him and his son-in-law.
He had been pointed to by a daughter of Federico Boyon as the companion of Balderrama
when the latter barged into their hut and without warning started shooting, but the
appellate court ruled that because petitioner did nothing more, petitioner's presence at
the scene of the crime was insufficient to show
conspiracy.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Based on his acquittal, petitioner filed a claim under Rep. Act No. 7309, sec. 3(a), which
provides for the payment of compensation to "any person who was unjustly accused,
convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal."
1The claim was filed with the Board of Claims of the Department of Justice, but the claim
was denied on the ground that while petitioner's presence at the scene of the killing was
not sufficient to find him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, yet, considering that there was
bad blood between him and the deceased as a result of a land dispute and the fact that
the convicted murderer is his son-in-law, there was basis for finding that he was
"probably guilty."chanrobles virtual law library
On appeal, respondent Secretary of Justice affirmed the Board's ruling. Said the
Secretary of Justice in his resolution dated March 11, 1993:
It is believed therefore that the phrase "any person . . . unjustly accused, convicted and
imprisoned" in Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7309 refers to an individual who was wrongly
accused and imprisoned for a crime he did not commit, thereby making him "a victim of
unjust imprisonment." In the instant case, however, Claimant/Appellant cannot be
deemed such a victim since a reading of the decision of his acquittal shows that his
exculpation is not based on his innocence, but upon, in effect, a finding of reasonable
doubt.
Petitioner brought this petition for review on certiorari. Neither Rule 45 nor Rep. Act No.
7309, however, provides for review by certiorari of the decisions of the Secretary of
Justice. Nonetheless, in view of the importance of the question tendered, the Court
resolved to treat the petition as a special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryPetitioner questions the basis
of the respondent's ruling that to be able to recover under sec. 3(a) of the law the
claimant must on appeal be found to be innocent of the crimes of which he was convicted
in the trial court. Through counsel he contends that the language of sec. 3(a) is clear and
does not call for interpretation. The "mere fact that the claimant was imprisoned for a
crime which he was subsequently acquitted of is already unjust in itself," he contends. To
deny his claim because he was not declared innocent would be to say that his
imprisonment for two years while his appeal was pending was justified. Petitioner argues
that there is only one requirement for conviction in criminal cases and that is proof
beyond reasonable doubt. If the prosecution fails to present such proof, the presumption
that the accused is innocent stands and, therefore, there is no reason for requiring that
he be declared innocent of the crime before he can recover compensation for his
imprisonment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner's contention has no merit. It would require that every time an accused is
acquitted on appeal he must be given compensation on the theory that he was "unjustly
convicted" by the trial court. Such a reading of sec. 3(a) is contrary to petitioner's
professed canon of construction that when the language of the statute is clear it should
be given its natural meaning. It leaves out of the provision in question the qualifying word
"unjustly" so that the provision would simply read: "The following may file claims for
compensation before the Board: (a) any person who was accused, convicted, imprisoned
but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal."chanrobles virtual law
library
But sec. 3(a) requires that the claimant be "unjustly accused, convicted [and]
imprisoned." The fact that his conviction is reversed and the accused is acquitted is not
itself proof that the previous conviction was "unjust." An accused may be acquitted for a
number of reasons and his conviction by the trial court may, for any of these reasons, be
set aside. For example, he may be acquitted not because he is innocent of the crime
charged but because of reasonable doubt, in which case he may be found civilly liable to
the complainant, because while the evidence against him does not satisfy the quantum of
proof required for conviction, it may nonetheless be sufficient to sustain a civil action for
damages. 2In one case the accused, an alien, was acquitted of statutory rape with
homicide because of doubt as to the ages of the offended parties who consented to have
sex with him. Nonetheless the accused was ordered to pay moral and exemplary damages
and ordered deported. 3In such a case to pay the accused compensation for having been
"unjustly convicted" by the trial court would be utterly inconsistent with his liability to
the complainant. Yet to follow petitioner's theory such an accused would be entitled to
compensation under sec. 3(a).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
libraryThe truth is that the presumption of innocence has never been intended as
evidence of innocence of the accused but only to shift the burden of proof that he is guilty
 6

to the prosecution. If "accusation is not synonymous with guilt," 4so is the presumption of
innocence not a proof thereof. It is one thing to say that the accused is presumed to be
innocent in order to place on the prosecution the burden of proving beyond reasonable
doubt that the accused is guilty. It is quite another thing to say that he is innocent and if
he is convicted that he has been "unjustly convicted." As this Court held in a case:
Though we are acquitting the appellant for the crime of rape with homicide, we
emphasize that we are not ruling that he is innocent or blameless. It is only the
constitutional presumption of innocence and the failure of the prosecution to build an
airtight case for conviction which saved him, not that the facts of unlawful conduct do
not exist. 5chanrobles virtual law library
To say then that an accused has been "unjustly convicted" has to do with the manner of
his conviction rather than with his innocence. An accused may on appeal be acquitted
because he did not commit the crime, but that does
not necessarily mean that he is entitled to compensation for having been the victim of an
"unjust conviction." If his conviction was due to an error in the appreciation of the
evidence the conviction while erroneous is not unjust. That is why it is not, on the other
hand, correct to say as does respondent, that under the law liability for compensation
depends entirely on the innocence of the accused.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
The phrase "unjustly convicted" has the same meaning as "knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment" in art. 204 of the Revised Penal Code. What this Court held in In re
Rafael C. Climaco 6applies:
In order that a judge may be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it
must be shown beyond doubt that the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law or is not
supported by the evidence, and the same was made with conscious and deliberate intent
to do an injustice . . . .chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The reason is that under Rule 112, sec. 4, the question for the prosecutor in filing a case
in court is not whether the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt but only whether
"there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and the accused
is probably guilty thereof." Hence, an accusation which is based on "probable guilt" is not
an unjust accusation and a conviction based on such degree of proof is not necessarily
an unjust judgment but only an erroneous one. The remedy for such error is
appeal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In the case at bar there is absolutely no evidence to show that petitioner's conviction by
the trial court was wrongful or that it was the product of malice or gross ignorance or
gross negligence. To the contrary, the court had reason to believe that petitioner and his
co-accused were in league, because petitioner is the father-in-law of Wilfredo Balderrama
and it was petitioner who bore the victim a grudge because of a land dispute. Not only
that. Petitioner and his coaccused arrived together in the hut of the victims and forced
their way into it.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The Court of Appeals ruled there was no conspiracy only because there was no proof that
he did or say anything on the occasion. Said the appellate court.
Both eyewitness testimonies fail to show the appellant Felicito Basbacio to have
committed any act at all. Both fail to show Felicito Basbacio as having said anything at
all. Both fail to show Felicito Basbacio as having committed anything in furtherance of a
conspiracy to commit the crimes charged against the defendants. It seems to be a frail
and flimsy basis on which to conclude that conspiracy existed between actual killer
Wilfredo Balderrama and Felicito Basbacio to commit murder and two frustrated murders
on that night of June 26, 1988. It may be asked: where was the coming together of the
two defendants to an agreement to commit the crimes of murder and frustrated murder
on two counts? Where was Basbacio's contribution to the commission of the said crimes?
Basbacio was - as the record shows - nothing but part of the dark shadows of that night.
...

One may take issue with this ruling because precisely conspiracy may be shown by
To hold a judge liable for the rendition of manifestly unjust judgment by reason of
concert of action and other circumstances. Why was petitioner with his son-in-law? Why
inexcusable negligence or ignorance, it must be shown, according to Groizard, that
did they apparently flee together? And what about the fact that there was bad blood
although he has acted without malice, he failed to observe in the performance of his duty,
between petitioner and the victim Federico Boyon? These questions may no longer be
that diligence, prudence and care which the law is entitled to exact in the rendering of
passed upon in view of the acquittal of petitioner but they are relevant in evaluating his
any public service. Negligence and ignorance are inexcusable if they imply a manifest
claim that he had been unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned before he was
injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation. Inexcusable mistake
released because of his acquittal on appeal. We hold that in view of these circumstances
only exists in the legal concept when it implies a manifest injustice, that is to say, such
respondent Secretary of Justice and the Board of Claims did not commit a grave abuse of
injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation, even though there is
its discretion in disallowing petitioner's claim for compensation under Rep. Act No.
a misunderstanding or error of the law applied, yet in the contrary it results, logically and
7309.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
reasonably, and in a very clear and indisputable manner, in the notorious violation of the
legal precept.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
Indeed, sec. 3(a) does not refer solely to an unjust conviction as a result of which the
accused is unjustly imprisoned, but, in addition, to an unjust accusation. The accused
must have been "unjustly accused, in consequence of which he is unjustly convicted and SO ORDERED.
then imprisoned. It is important to note this because if from its inception the prosecution
of the accused has been wrongful, his conviction by the court is, in all probability, also
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason,
wrongful. Conversely, if the prosecution is not malicious any conviction even though
Puno, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
based on less than the required quantum of proof in criminal cases may be erroneous but
library
not necessarily unjust.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
 7

Feliciano, J., is on leave provided for the powers and functions of their respective governing and administrative
authorities, PAGCOR posits that the grant therein of authority to operate games of
chance is clearly expressed, but it is not similarly so in Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903.
SECOND DIVISION

Thus PAGCOR cites these three statutes and their respective pertinent provisions:
[G.R. NO. 177333 : April 24, 2009]

Republic Act No. 7227, or the "Bases Conversion and Development Authority Act" enacted
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR) represented by
on March 13, 1992:
ATTY. CARLOS R. BAUTISTA, JR., Petitioner, v. PHILIPPINE GAMING JURISDICTION
INCORPORATED (PEJI), ZAMBOANGA CITY SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY,
et al., Respondent. Section 13. The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority.'

DECISION xxx

CARPIO MORALES, J.: (b) Powers and functions of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority. - The Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority, otherwise known as the Subic Authority, shall have the following
powers and functions:
Before the Court is a petition for Prohibition.

xxx
Republic Act No. 7903 (R.A. No. 7903), which was enacted into law on February 23,
1995, created the Zamboanga City Special Economic Zone (ZAMBOECOZONE) and the
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority. Among other things, the law gives the ZAMBOECOZONE (7) To operate directly or indirectly or license tourism-related activities subject to
Authority the following power under Sec. 7 (f), viz: priorities and standards set by the Subic Authority including games and amusements,
except horse-racing, dog-racing and casino gambling which shall continue to be licensed
by the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) upon recommendation
Section 7.
of the Conversion Authority; to maintain and preserve the forested areas as a national
park;
xxx
xxx
(f) To operate on its own, either directly or through a subsidiary entity, or license to
others, tourism-related activities, including games, amusements and recreational and
Republic Act No. 7922 or the "Cagayan Economic Zone Act of 1995" enacted on February
sports facilities;
24, 1995:

xxx
Section 6. Powers and Functions of the Cagayan Economic Zone Authority - The Cagayan
Economic Zone Authority shall have the following powers and functions:
Apparently in the exercise of its power granted under the above provision, public
respondent ZAMBOECOZONE Authority passed Resolution No. 2006-08-03 dated August
xxx
19, 2006 approving the application of private respondent Philippine E-Gaming
Jurisdiction, Inc. (PEJI) to be a Master Licensor/Regulator of on-line/internet/electronic
gaming/games of chance. (f) To operate on its own, either directly or through a subsidiary entity, or license to
others, tourism-related activities, including games, amusements, recreational and sports
facilities such as horse-racing, dog-racing gambling, casinos, golf courses, and others,
PEJI forthwith undertook extensive advertising campaigns representing itself as such
under priorities and standards set by the CEZA;
licensor/regulator to the international business and gaming community, drawing the
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) to file the present petition for
Prohibition which assails the authority of the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, xxx
license, or regulate the operation of games of chance in the ZAMBOECOZONE.
And Republic Act No. 7916 or the "Special Economic Zone Act of 1995," enacted on
PAGCOR contends that R.A. No. 7903, specifically Section 7(f) thereof, does not give February 24, 1995 authorizing other economic zones established under the defunct
power or authority to the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, license, or regulate the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) and its successor Philippine Economic Zone
operation of games of chance in the ZAMBOECOZONE. Citing three (3) statutes, which it Authority (PEZA) to establish casinos and other games of chance under the license of
claims are in pari materia with R.A. No. 7903 as it likewise created economic zones and PAGCOR by way of the ipso facto clause, viz:
 8
SECTION 51. Ipso Facto Clause. - All privileges, benefits, advantages or exemptions
granted to special economic zones under Republic Act No. 7227 shall ipso facto be
accorded to special economic zones already created or to be created under this Act. The
free port status shall not be vested upon the new special economic zones.
PAGCOR maintains that, compared with the above-quoted provisions of the ecozone-
related statutes, Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 does not categorically empower the
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, license, or authorize entities to operate games of
chance in the area, as the words "games" and "amusement" employed therein do not
include "games of chance." Hence, PAGCOR concludes, ZAMBOECOZONE Authority's
grant of license to private respondent PEJI encroached on its (PAGCOR's) authority under
Presidential Decree No. 1869 vis-a-vis the above-stated special laws to centralize and
regulate all games of chance.
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority, in its Comment,1 contends that PAGCOR has no personality
to file the present petition as it failed to cite a superior law which proves its claim of
having been granted exclusive right and authority to license and regulate all games of
chance within the Philippines; and that, contrary to PAGCOR's assertion, the words
"games" and "amusements" in Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 include "games of chance" as
was the intention of the lawmakers when they enacted the law.
In its Reply Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam,2 PAGCOR cites the November 27, 2006 Opinion3
rendered by the Office of the President through Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal
Affairs Manuel B. Gaite, the pertinent portions of which read:
Coming to the issue at hand, the ZAMBOECOZONE Charter simply allows the operation
of tourism-related activities including games and amusements without stating any form
of gambling activity in its grant of authority to ZAMBOECOZONE.
xxx
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that under its legislative franchise (RA
7903), the ZAMBOECOZONE is not authorized to enter into any gaming activity by itself
unless expressly authorized by law or other laws specifically allowing the same.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
The Court finds that, indeed, R.A. No. 7903 does not authorize the ZAMBOECOZONE
Authority to operate and/or license games of chance/gambling.
Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 authorizes the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority "[t]o operate on
its own, either directly or through a subsidiary entity, or license to others, tourism-
related activities, including games, amusements and recreational and sports facilities."
It is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that where the words of a statute are
clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation.4
The plain meaning rule or verba legis, derived from the maxim index animi sermo est
(speech is the index of intention), rests on the valid presumption that the words employed
by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intention or will, and preclude the
court from construing it differently. For the legislature is presumed to know the meaning
of the words, to have used them advisedly, and to have expressed the intent by use of
such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum. From the words
of a statute there should be no departure.5
The words "game" and "amusement" have definite and unambiguous meanings in law
which are clearly different from "game of chance" or "gambling." In its ordinary sense, a
"game" is a sport, pastime, or contest; while an "amusement" is a pleasurable occupation
of the senses, diversion, or enjoyment.6 On the other hand, a "game of chance" is "a game
in which chance rather than skill determines the outcome," while "gambling" is defined as
"making a bet" or "a play for value against an uncertain event in hope of gaining
something of value." 7
A comparison of the phraseology of Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 with similar provisions in
the three cited statutes creating ECOZONES shows that while the three statutes,
particularly R.A. No. 7922 which authorized the Cagayan Economic Zone Authority to
directly or indirectly operate gambling and casinos within its jurisdiction, categorically
stated that such power was being vested in their respective administrative bodies, R.A.
No. 7903 did not.
The spirit and reason of the statute may be passed upon where a literal meaning would
lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.8
Not any of these instances is present in the case at bar, however. Using the literal
meanings of "games" and "amusement" to exclude "games of chance" and "gambling" does
not lead to absurdity, contradiction, or injustice. Neither does it defeat the intent of the
legislators. The lawmakers could have easily employed the words "games of chance" and
"gambling" or even "casinos" if they had intended to grant the power to operate the same
to the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority, as what was done in R.A. No. 7922 enacted a day
after R.A. No. 7903. But they did not.
The Court takes note of the above-mentioned Opinion of the Office of the President which,
after differentiating the grant of powers between the Cagayan Special Economic Zone and
the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority, states that while the former is authorized to, among
other things, operate gambling casinos and internet gaming, as well as enter into
licensing agreements, the latter is not. The relevant portions of said Opinion read:
The difference in the language and grant of powers to CEZA and ZAMBOECOZONE is
telling. To the former, the grant of powers is not only explicit, but amplified, while to the
latter the grant of power is merely what the law (RA 7903) states. Not only are the
differences in language telling, it will be noted that both charters of CEZA and
ZAMBOECOZONE were signed into law only one (1) day apart from each other, i.e.,
February 23, 1995 in the case of ZAMBOECOZONE and February 24, 1995 in the case of
CEZA. x x x Accordingly, both laws have to be taken in the light of what Congress
intended them to be, and the distinction that the lawmakers made when they enacted the
two laws.
Coming to the issue at hand, the ZAMBOECOZONE Charter simply allows the operation
of tourism-related activities including games and amusements without stating any form
of gambling activity in its grant of authority to ZAMBOECOZONE. On the other hand, the
grant to CEZA included such activities as horse-racing, dog-racing and gambling casinos.
 9

xxx - versus - PERALTA, and

In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that under its legislative franchise (RA MENDOZA, JJ.
7903), the ZAMBOECOZONE is not authorized to enter into any gaming activity by itself
unless expressly authorized by law or other laws specifically allowing the same.
(Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary

Both PAGCOR and the Ecozones being under the supervision of the Office of the
President, the latter's interpretation of R.A. No. 7903 is persuasive and deserves respect Promulgated:
under the doctrine of respect for administrative or practical construction. In applying said
doctrine, courts often refer to several factors which may be regarded as bases thereof - DANILO T. BOLOS, October 20, 2010
factors leading the courts to give the principle controlling weight in particular instances,
or as independent rules in themselves. These factors include the respect due the Respondent.
governmental agencies charged with administration, their competence, expertness,
experience, and informed judgment and the fact that they frequently are the
x -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
drafters of the law they interpret; that the agency is the one on which the
legislature must rely to advise it as to the practical working out of the statute, and
practical application of the statute presents the agency with unique opportunity and
experiences for discovering deficiencies, inaccuracies, or improvements in the statute.8
DECISION
In fine, Section 7(f) did not grant to the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority the power to operate
and/or license games of chance/gambling.

MENDOZA, J.:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Public respondent Zamboanga Economic Zone
Authority is DIRECTED to CEASE and DESIST from exercising jurisdiction to operate,
license, or otherwise authorize and regulate the operation of any games of chance. And
private respondent Philippine Gaming Jurisdiction, Incorporated is DIRECTED to CEASE
and DESIST from operating any games of chance pursuant to the license granted to it by
public respondent.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking a
SO ORDERED. review of the December 10, 2008 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in an original
action for certiorari under Rule 65 entitled Danilo T. Bolos v. Hon. Lorifel Lacap Pahimna
and Cynthia S. Bolos, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. N

o. 97872, reversing the January 16, 2007 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
CYNTHIA S. BOLOS, G.R. No. 186400 Branch 69 (RTC), declaring its decision pronouncing the nullity of marriage between
petitioner and respondent final and executory.
Petitioner,
On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the declaration of
Present:
nullity of her marriage to respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family
Code, docketed as JDRC No. 6211.

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment in a Decision,
NACHURA,
dated August 2, 2006, with the following disposition:
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*
 10
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between petitioner
CYNTHIA S. BOLOS and respondent DANILO T. BOLOS celebrated on February 14,
1980 as null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of
both petitioner and respondent under Article 36 of the Family Code with all the legal
consequences provided by law.
Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan as well as the National Statistics Office
(NSO) copy of this decision.
SO ORDERED.[2]
A copy of said decision was received by Danilo on August 25, 2006. He timely filed the
Notice of Appeal on September 11, 2006.
In an order dated September 19, 2006, the RTC denied due course to the appeal for
Danilos failure to file the required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of
Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages.
On November 23, 2006, a motion to reconsider the denial of Danilos appeal was likewise
denied.
On January 16, 2007, the RTC issued the order declaring its August 2, 2006 decision
final and executory and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia.
Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking
to annul the orders of the RTC as they were rendered with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, to wit: 1) the September 19, 2006 Order
which denied due course to Danilos appeal; 2) the November 23, 2006 Order which
denied the motion to reconsider the September 19, 2006 Order; and 3) the January 16,
2007 Order which declared the August 2, 2006 decision as final and executory.Danilo
also prayed that he be declared psychologically capacitated to render the essential
marital obligations to Cynthia, who should be declared guilty of abandoning him, the
family home and their children.
As earlier stated, the CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed
orders of the RTC. The appellate court stated that the requirement of a motion for
reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in
this case as the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14,
1980 before the Family Code took effect. It relied on the ruling of this Court in Enrico v.
Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli[3] to the effect that the coverage [of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC]
extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code
which took effect on August 3, 1988.
Cynthia sought reconsideration of the ruling by filing her Manifestation with Motion for
Extension of Time to File Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Partial
Reconsideration [of the Honorable Courts Decision dated December 10, 2008]. The CA,
however, in its February 11, 2009 Resolution,[4] denied the motion for extension of time
considering that the 15-day reglementary period to file a motion for reconsideration is
non-extendible, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 40, 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure
citing Habaluyas v. Japson, 142 SCRA 208. The motion for partial reconsideration was
likewise denied.
Hence, Cynthia interposes the present petition via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising
the following
ISSUES
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED DECISION
DATED DECEMBER 10, 2008 CONSIDERING THAT:
A. THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN ENRICO V. SPS.
MEDINACELI IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE CONSIDERING THAT THE
FACTS AND THE ISSUE THEREIN ARE NOT SIMILAR TO THE INSTANT CASE.
B. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE
COURT IS APLLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE, ITS RULING IN ENRICO V. SPS.
MEDINACELI IS PATENTLY ERRONEOUS BECAUSE THE PHRASE UNDER THE FAMILY
CODE IN A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC PERTAINS TO THE WORD PETITIONS RATHER THAN
TO THE WORD MARRIAGES.
 11
C. FROM THE FOREGOING, A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC ENTITLED RULE ON
DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF
VOIDABLE MARRIAGES IS APPLICABLE TO MARRIAGES SOLEMNIZED BEFORE THE
EFFECTIVITY OF THE FAMILY CODE. HENCE, A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS A
PRECONDITION FOR AN APPEAL BY HEREIN RESPONDENT.
D. CONSIDERING THAT HEREIN RESPONDENT REFUSED TO COMPLY WITH A
PRECONDITION FOR APPEAL, A RELAXATION OF THE RULES ON APPEAL IS NOT
PROPER IN HIS CASE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED
RESOLUTION DATED FEBRUARY 11, 2009 CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING AND THE
FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
III
THE TENETS OF JUSTICE AND FAIR PLAY, THE NOVELTY AND IMPORTANCE OF THE
ISSUE AND THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS CASE JUSTIFY AND WARRANT A
LIBERAL VIEW OF THE RULES IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER. MOREOVER, THE
INSTANT PETITION IS MERITORIOUS AND NOT INTENDED FOR DELAY.[5]
From the arguments advanced by Cynthia, the principal question to be resolved is
whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, is applicable to the case at bench.
Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages solemnized
before the effectivity of the Family Code. According to Cynthia, the CA erroneously
anchored its decision to an obiter dictum in the aforecited Enrico case, which did not
even involve a marriage solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code.
She added that, even assuming arguendo that the pronouncement in the said case
constituted a decision on its merits, still the same cannot be applied because of the
substantial disparity in the factual milieu of the Enrico case from this case. In the
said case, both the marriages sought to be declared null were solemnized, and the action
for declaration of nullity was filed, after the effectivity of both the Family Code in 1988
and of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC in 2003. In this case, the marriage was solemnized before
the effectivity of the Family Code and A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC while the action was filed
and decided after the effectivity of both.
Danilo, in his Comment,[6] counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable because
his marriage with Cynthia was solemnized on February 14, 1980, years before its
effectivity. He further stresses the meritorious nature of his appeal from the decision of
the RTC declaring their marriage as null and void due to his purported psychological
incapacity and citing the mere failure of the parties who were supposedly remiss, but not
incapacitated, to render marital obligations as required under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
The Court finds the petition devoid of merit.
Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs this case. Her stance is
unavailing. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court
promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact,
reads:
Section 1. Scope This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage
extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code
which took effect on August 3, 1988.[7] The rule sets a demarcation line between
marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code.[8]
The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioners interpretation that the phrase
under the Family Code in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word petitions rather than
to the word marriages.
 12
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any
doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is only
room for application.[9] As the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be
given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is
known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi
sermo, or speech is the index of intention. Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis
non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.[10]
There is no basis for petitioners assertion either that the tenets of substantial justice, the
novelty and importance of the issue and the meritorious nature of this case warrant a
relaxation of the Rules in her favor. Time and again the Court has stressed that the rules
of procedure must be faithfully complied with and should not be discarded with the mere
expediency of claiming substantial merit.[11] As a corollary, rules prescribing the time for
doing specific acts or for taking certain proceedings are considered absolutely
indispensable to prevent needless delays and to orderly and promptly discharge judicial
business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.[12]
The appellate court was correct in denying petitioners motion for extension of time to file
a motion for reconsideration considering that the reglementary period for filing the said
motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. As pronounced in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, [13]
The rule is and has been that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration is non-
extendible. The Court has made this clear as early as 1986 in Habaluyas Enterprises vs.
Japzon. Since then, the Court has consistently and strictly adhered thereto.
Given the above, we rule without hesitation that the appellate courts denial of petitioners
motion for reconsideration is justified, precisely because petitioners earlier motion for
extension of time did not suspend/toll the running of the 15-day reglementary period for
filing a motion for reconsideration. Under the circumstances, the CA decision has already
attained finality when petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration. It follows that the
same decision was already beyond the review jurisdiction of this Court.
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC decision which
denied due course to respondents appeal and denying petitioners motion for extension of
time to file a motion for reconsideration.
Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. Its purpose is to bring up for review a
final judgment of the lower court. The courts should, thus, proceed with caution so as
not to deprive a party of his right to appeal.[14] In the recent case of Almelor v. RTC of
Las Pinas City, Br. 254,[15] the Court reiterated: While the right to appeal is a statutory,
not a natural right, nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system and courts
should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but rather,
ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.
In the case at bench, the respondent should be given the fullest opportunity to establish
the merits of his appeal considering that what is at stake is the sacrosanct institution of
marriage.
No less than the 1987 Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social
institution. This constitutional policy is echoed in our Family Code. Article 1 thereof
emphasizes its permanence and inviolability, thus:
Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is
the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except
that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the
limits provided by this Code.
This Court is not unmindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the
family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the
family.[16]
Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social
institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State finds no stronger anchor
than on good, solid and happy families. The break up of families weakens our social and
moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the concern alone of the family
members.[17]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
 13
STATUTE AS A WHOLE: UT RES MAGIS VALEN WUAM PEREAT
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 109835. November 22, 1993.]
JMM PROMOTIONS & MANAGEMENT, INC., Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION and ULPIANO L. DE LOS SANTOS, Respondents.
Don P. Porciuncula for Petitioner.
Eulogio Nones, Jr. for Private Respondent.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
The sole issue submitted in this case is the validity of the order of respondent National
Labor Relations Commission dated October 30, 1992, dismissing the petitioner’s appeal
from a decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration on the ground of
failure to post the required appeal bond. 1
The respondent cited the second paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended,
providing that:cralawnad
In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be
perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding
company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary
award in the judgment appealed from.
and Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as amended, reading
as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Section 6. Bond. — In case the decision of a Labor Arbiter involves a monetary award, an
appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond
issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission or the
Supreme Court in an amount equivalent to the monetary award.
The petitioner contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in applying
these rules to decisions rendered by the POEA. It insists that the appeal bond is not
necessary in the case of licensed recruiters for overseas employment because they are
already required under Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules not only to pay a
license fee of P30,000.00 but also to post a cash bond of P100,000.00 and a surety bond
of P50,000.00, thus:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Upon approval of the application, the applicant shall pay a license fee of P30,000.00. It
shall also post a cash bond of P100,000.00 and surety bond of P50,000.00 from a
bonding company acceptable to the Administration and duly accredited by the Insurance
Commission. The bonds shall answer for all valid and legal claims arising from violations
of the conditions for the grant and use of the license, and/or accreditation and contracts
of employment. The bonds shall likewise guarantee compliance with the provisions of the
Code and its implementing rules and regulations relating to recruitment and placement,
the Rules of the Administration and relevant issuances of the Department and all
liabilities which the Administration may impose. The surety bonds shall include the
condition that the notice to the principal is notice to the surety and that any judgment
against the principal in connection with matters falling under POEA’s jurisdiction shall
be binding and conclusive on the surety. The surety bonds shall be co-terminus with the
validity period of license. (Emphasis supplied).
In addition, the petitioner claims it has placed in escrow the sum of P200,000.00 with the
Philippine National Bank in compliance with Section 17, Rule II, Book II of the same
Rule, "to primarily answer for valid and legal claims of recruited workers as a result of
recruitment violations or money claims."cralaw virtua1aw library
Required to comment, the Solicitor General sustains the appeal bond requirement but
suggests that the rules cited by the NLRC are applicable only to decisions of the Labor
Arbiters and not of the POEA. Appeals from decisions of the POEA, he says, are governed
by the following provisions of Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules:chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary
Section 5. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. — The appeal shall be filed within the
reglementary period as provided in Section 1 of this Rule; shall be under oath with proof
of payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety bond as
provided in Section 6 of this Rule; shall be accompanied by a memorandum of appeal
which shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support thereof; the
relief prayed for; and a statement of the date when the appellant received the appealed
decision and/or award and proof of service on the other party of such appeal.
A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestated shall not
stop the running of the period for perfecting an appeal.
Section 6. Bond. In case the decision of the Administration involves a monetary award,
an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety
bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in an
amount equivalent to the monetary award. (Emphasis supplied).
The question is, having posted the total bond of P150,000.00 and placed in escrow the
amount of P200,000.00 as required by the POEA Rules, was the petitioner still required
to post an appeal bond to perfect its appeal from a decision of the POEA to the
NLRC?chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
It was.
The POEA Rules are clear. A reading thereof readily shows that in addition to the cash
and surety bonds and the escrow money, an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the
monetary award is required to perfect an appeal from a decision of the POEA. Obviously,
the appeal bond is intended to further insure the payment of the monetary award in favor
of the employee if it is eventually affirmed on appeal to the NLRC.
It is true that the cash and surety bonds and the money placed in escrow are supposed to
guarantee the payment of all valid and legal claims against the employer, but these
claims are not limited to monetary awards to employees whose contracts of employment
have been violated. The POEA can go against these bonds also for violations by the
recruiter of the conditions of its license, the provisions of the Labor Code and its
implementing rules, E.O. 247 (reorganizing the POEA) and the POEA Rules, as well as the
settlement of other liabilities the recruiter may incur.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
 14

As for the escrow agreement, it was presumably intended to provide for a standing fund, Bellosillo, J., is on leave.
as it were, to be used only as a last resort and not to be reduced with the enforcement
against it of every claim of recruited workers that may be adjudged against the employer.
THIRD DIVISION
This amount may not even be enough to cover such claims and, even if it could initially,
may eventually be exhausted after satisfying other subsequent claims.
G.R. No. 75222 July 18, 1991
As it happens, the decision sought to be appealed grants a monetary award of about
P170,000.00 to the dismissed employee, the herein private Respondent. The standby
RADIOLA-TOSHIBA PHILIPPINES, INC., through its assignee-in-insolvency VICENTE
guarantees required by the POEA Rules would be depleted if this award were to be
J. CUNA, Petitioner, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. LEONARDO
enforced not against the appeal bond but against the bonds and the escrow money,
I. CRUZ, as Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch No. LVI,
making them inadequate for the satisfaction of the other obligations the recruiter may
EMILIO C. PATINO, as assignee-in-insolvency of CARLOS and TERESITA
incur.
GATMAYTAN, SHERIFF OF ANGELES CITY, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ANGELES
CITY, SANYO MARKETING CORPORATION, S & T ENTERPRISES INC.,
Indeed, it is possible for the monetary award in favor of the employee to exceed the
REFRIGERATION INDUSTRIES INC., and DELTA MOTOR CORPORATION,
amount of P350,000.00, which is the sum of the bonds and escrow money required of the
Respondents.
recruiter.

It is true that these standby guarantees are not imposed on local employers, as the
petitioner observes, but there is a simple explanation for this distinction. Overseas
recruiters are subject to more stringent requirements because of the special risks to
which our workers abroad are subjected by their foreign employers, against whom there
is usually no direct or effective recourse. The overseas recruiter is solidarily liable with
the foreign employer. The bonds and the escrow money are intended to insure more care
on the part of the local agent in its choice of the foreign principal to whom our overseas
workers are to be sent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in
this case), care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that
it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting
provisions. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat. 2 Under the petitioner’s interpretation, the
appeal bond required by Section 6 of the aforementioned POEA Rule should be
disregarded because of the earlier bonds and escrow money it has posted. The petitioner
would in effect nullify Section 6 as a superfluity but we do not see any such redundancy;
on the contrary, we find that Section 6 complements Section 4 and Section 17. The rule
is that a construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided;
instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as
parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.
Accordingly, we hold that in addition to the monetary obligations of the overseas recruiter
prescribed in Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules and the escrow agreement
under Section 17 of the same Rule, it is necessary to post the appeal bond required
under Section 6, Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules, as a condition for perfecting an
appeal from a decision of the POEA.chanrobles law library : red
Every intendment of the law must be interpreted in favor of the working class,
conformably to the mandate of the Constitution. By sustaining rather than annulling the
appeal bond as a further protection to the claimant employee, this Court affirms once
again its commitment to the interests of labor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so
ordered.
Davide, Jr. and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for petitioner.chanrobles virtual law library
Procopio S. Beltran, Jr. for private respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari of the March 31, 1986 Decision of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court * in A.C-G.R. SP No. 04160 entitled "Radiola-Toshiba Philippines, Inc. vs.
Hon. Leonardo I. Cruz, et al." denying the petition for certiorari and mandamus; and its
Resolution of July 1, 1986 denying the motion for
reconsideration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The antecedent facts of this case, as found by the then Intermediate Appellate Court, are
as follows:
On July 2, 1980, three creditors filed a petition for the involuntary insolvency of Carlos
Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan, the private respondents herein, the case docketed as
Special Proceeding No. 1548 of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court)
of Pampanga and Angeles City.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On July 9, 1980, the respondent court issued an order taking cognizance of the said
petition and stating inter alia that:
. . . the Court forbids the payment of any debts, and the delivery of any property owing
and belonging to said respondents-debtors from other persons, or, to any other persons
for the use and benefit of the same respondents-debtors and/or the transfer of any
property by and for the said respondents-debtors to another, upon petitioners' putting up
a bond by way of certified and reputable sureties. (Annex 1, Comment).
Counsel for the petitioners-creditors informed respondent sheriff Angeles City of the
aforesaid order (Annex 2, Ibid) and on March 26, 1981, also communicated with counsel
for the petitioner herein regarding same order, apprising the latter that "the personal and
real property which have been levied upon and/or attached should be preserved till the
 15
final determination of the petition aforementioned." (Annex 3,
Ibid).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On April 12, 1983, petitioners-creditors filed second urgent motion for issuance of
insolvency order and resolution of the case, alleging among other things, that in
November, 1982, they filed an urgent motion to issue insolvency order; on December 2,
1982, they presented a motion to prohibit the city sheriff of Angeles City from disposing
the personal and real properties of the insolvent debtors, Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita
Gatmaytan; on January 18, 1983, they (sic) appealed in the Bulletin Today issue of even
date a news item to the effect that Radiola-Toshiba Phil. Inc. has already shut down its
factory, sometime in March 1983, through their representative, they caused to be
investigated the real properties in the names of Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita
Gatmaytan and they were surprised to find out that some of the aforesaid properties were
already transferred to Radiola-Toshiba Phil. Inc.; and that in view of such development, it
is their submission that without an insolvency order and a resolution of the case which
was ripe for resolution as early as March 3, 1982, the rights and interest of petitioners-
creditors would be injured and jeopardized. (Annex
"C").chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On April 15, 1983, petitioner filed an opposition to the said motion vis-a-vis the prayer
that the insolvency order (which has not been rendered yet by the court) be annotated on
the transfer certificates of title already issued in its name (Annex
"D").chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On April 22, 1983, judgment was rendered declaring the insolvency of respondents-
debtors Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
On April 28, 1983, petitioner filed a supplemental opposition to the same second urgent
motion and motion to direct respondent sheriff to issue a final certificate of sale for the
properties covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430 in its favor (Annex
"E").chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On February 3, 1984, acting upon petitioner's motion claiming that ownership of certain
real properties of the insolvents had passed to it by virtue of foreclosure proceedings
conducted in Civil Case No. 35946 of the former Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
II, Pasig, Metro Manila, which properties were not redeemed within the period of
redemption, respondent court issued an order disposing, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby, confirms the election of Mr. Emilio C. Patino, as
assignee of all the registered claimants in this case, and, in consequence thereof, the said
assignee is hereby directed to post a bond in the amount of P30,000.00 and to take his
oath thereafter so as to be able to perform his duties and discharge his functions, as
such.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The Court, likewise, sets the meeting of all the creditors with the attendance, of course, of
the assignee, on March 9, 1984, at 8:30., as by that time the proposals, which the
respective representatives of the parties-claimants desire to clear with their principals,
shall have already been reported.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The assignee shall see to it that the properties of the insolvents which are now in the
actual or constructive custody and management of the receiver previously appointed by
the Court on petitioners' and claimants' proposals be placed under this actual or
constructive custody and management, such as he is able to do so, as the Court hereby
dissolves the receivership previously authorized, it having become a superfluity. (Annex
"F").
On May 18, 1984, the Regional Trial Court, Branch CLII, Pasig, Metro Manila, in Civil
Case No. 35946, issued an order directing respondent Sheriff of Angeles City, or whoever
is acting in his behalf, to issue within seven (7) days from notice thereof a final deed of
sale over the two (2) parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Titles Nos. 18905
and 40430 in favor of petitioner. (Annex "G").chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
In said Civil Case No. 35946, a case for collection of sum of money covering the proceeds
of television sets and other appliances, the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
II, Pasig, Metro Manila, issued a writ of preliminary attachment on February 15, 1980
upon application of the petitioner, as plaintiff, which put up a bond of P350,000.00. On
March 4, 1980, 3:00 P.M., levy on attachment was done in favor of petitioner on the real
properties registered in the names of spouses Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan
under TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430 of the Registry of Deeds of Angeles City, per Entry No.
7216 on said titles. (Annex "A" and "B").chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
On December 10, 1980, a decision was rendered in favor of petitioner, ordering private
respondents and their co-defendant Peoples Appliance Center, Inc. to pay petitioner,
jointly and severally, the sum of P721,825.91 plus interest thereon of 14% per annum
from October 12, 1979 until fully paid; P20,000.00, for and attorney's fees; and the costs
of suit (Annex "5", Comment). After the said decision in the aforementioned Civil Case No.
35946 became final and executory, a writ of execution for the satisfaction thereof issued
on March 18, 1981; and on May 4, 1981, respondent sheriff of Angeles City sold at
auction sale the attached properties covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430, to petitioner
as the highest bidder, and the certificate of sale was accordingly issued in its
favor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On September 21, 1982, the court ordered the consolidation of ownership of petitioner
over said properties; but respondent sheriff of Angeles City refused to issue a final
certificate of sale in favor of petitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
On May 30, 1984, petitioners-creditors interposed their opposition, stating among other
things, that subject motion is improper and premature because it treats of matters
foreign to the insolvency proceedings; and premature, for the reason that the properties
covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430-Angeles City were brought to the jurisdiction of
the insolvency court for the determination of the assets of the insolvents available for
distribution to the approved credits/liabilities of the insolvents. Petitioners-creditors
theorized that the insolvency court is devoid of jurisdiction to grant the motion referring
to matters involved in a case pending before a coordinate court in another jurisdiction
(Annex "l").chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Prior thereto or on July 13, 1984, to be precise, respondent court came out with its
assailed extended order with the following decretal portion:
 16
WHEREFORE, and also for the reason stated in the aforequoted order issued in
pursuance of a similar motion of the movant, the Court denies, as it is hereby denied the
motion of Radiola-Toshiba, dated May 28, 1984 and directs the latter to participate in the
supposed meeting of all the creditors/claimants presided by the duly elected assignee.
(Annex "J").
On September 8, 1984, herein petitioner Radiola-Toshiba Philippines, Inc. (RTPI, for
short) filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with respondent Intermediate Appellate
Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The then Intermediate Appellate Court, in a Decision promulgated on March 31, 1986,
denied petitioner's aforesaid petition. On April 19, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated July 1,
1986.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Hence, the instant petition. Herein petitioner raised two issues -chanrobles virtual law
library
1. WHETHER OR NOT CERTIORARI IS A REMEDY DESIGNATED FOR THE CORRECTION
OF ERRORS OF JURISDICTION ONLY; andchanrobles virtual law library
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE REFUSAL OF THE COURTS TO ENFORCE THE LIEN OF
PETITIONER ARISING FROM A LEVY OF ATTACHMENT NOT MADE WITHIN ONE
MONTH NEXT PRECEDING THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE INSOLVENCY
PROCEEDING IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
The main issue in this case is whether or not the levy on attachment in favor of the
petitioner is dissolved by the insolvency proceedings against respondent spouses
commenced four months after said attachment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
On this issue, Section 32 of the Insolvency Law (Act No. 1956, as amended), provides:
Sec. 32 - As soon as an assignee is elected or appointed and qualified, the clerk of the
court shall, by an instrument under his hand and seal of the court, assign and convey to
the assignee all the real and personal property, estate, and effects of the debtor with all
his deeds, books, and papers relating thereto, and such assignment shall relate back to
the commencement of the proceedings in insolvency, and shall relate back to the acts
upon the adjudication was founded, and by operation of law shall vest the title to all such
property, estate, and effects in the assignee, although the same is then attached on
mesne process, as the property of the debtor. Such assignment shall operate to vest in
the assignee all of the estate of the insolvent debtor not exempt by law from execution. It
shall dissolve any attachment levied within one month next preceding the commencement
of the insolvency proceedings and vacate and set aside any judgment entered in any action
commenced within thirty days immediately prior to the commencement of insolvency
proceedings and shall set aside any judgment entered by default or consent of the debtor
within thirty days immediately prior to the commencement of the insolvency proceedings.
(Emphasis supplied)
Relative thereto, the findings of the then Intermediate Appellate Court are undisputed
that the levy on attachment against the subject properties of the Gatmaytans, issued by
the then Court of First Instance of Pasig in Civil Case No. 35946, was on March 4, 1980
while the insolvency proceeding in the then Court of First Instance of Angeles City,
Special Proceeding No. 1548, was commenced only on July 2, 1980, or more than four (4)
months after the issuance of the said attachment. Under the circumstances, petitioner
contends that its lien on the subject properties overrode the insolvency proceeding and
was not dissolved thereby.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Private respondents, on the other hand, relying on Section 79 of the said law, which
reads:
Sec. 79. When an attachment has been made and is not dissolved before the
commencement of proceedings in insolvency, or is dissolved by an undertaking given by
the defendant, if the claim upon which the attachment suit was commenced is proved
against the estate of the debtor, the plaintiff may prove the legal costs and disbursements
of the suit, and of the keeping of the property, and the amount thereof shall be a
preferred debt.
and the fact that petitioner and its counsel have full knowledge of the proceedings in the
insolvent case, argue that the subsequent Certificate of Sale on August 3, 1981, issued in
favor of petitioner over the subject properties, was issued in bad faith, in violation of the
law and is not equitable for the creditors of the insolvent debtors; and pursuant to the
above quoted Section 79, petitioner should not be entitled to the transfer of the subject
properties in its name.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner's contention is impressed with merit. The provision of the above-quoted Section
32, of the Insolvency Law is very clear - that attachments dissolved are those levied
within one (1) month next preceding the commencement of the insolvency proceedings
and judgments vacated and set aside are judgments entered in any action, including
judgment entered by default or consent of the debtor, where the action was filed within
thirty (30) days immediately prior to the commencement of the insolvency proceedings. In
short, there is a cut off period - one (1) month in attachment cases and thirty (30) days in
judgments entered in actions commenced prior to the insolvency proceedings. Section 79,
on the other hand, relied upon by private respondents, provides for the right of the
plaintiff if the attachment is not dissolved before the commencement of proceedings in
insolvency, or is dissolved by an undertaking given by the defendant, if the claim upon
which the attachment suit was commenced is proved against the estate of the debtor.
Therefore, there is no conflict between the two
provisions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
But even granting that such conflict exists, it may be stated that in construing a statute,
courts should adopt a construction that will give effect to every part of a statute, if at all
possible. This rule is expressed in the maxim, ut maqis valeat quam pereat or that
construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute - its every word.
Hence, where a statute is susceptible of more than one interpretation, the court should
adopt such reasonable and beneficial construction as will render the provision thereof
operative and effective and harmonious with each other (Javellana vs. Tayo, 6 SCRA 1042
[1962]; Statutory Construction by Ruben E. Agpalo, p.
182).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
 17

Neither can the sheriff's sale in execution of the judgment in favor of the petitioner be The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition for certiorari assailing the
considered as a fraudulent transfer or preference by the insolvent debtors, which Resolutions1 of the Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, denying petitioner's motion to quash
constitute a violation of Sec. 70 of the Insolvency Law. In the case of Velayo vs. Shell Co. the information and her motion for reconsideration.
of the Philippines (100 Phil. 187, [1956]), this Court ruled that Sections 32 and 70
contemplate only acts and transactions occurring within 30 days prior to the
The Antecedents
commencement of the proceedings in insolvency and, consequently, all other acts outside
of the 30-day period cannot possibly be considered as coming within the orbit of their
operation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of the
Philippines-Cebu. A student of a state university is known as a government scholar. She
was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada on December 21, 1999 as a student
Finally, petitioner correctly argued that the properties in question were never placed
regent of UP, to serve a one-year term starting January 1, 2000 and ending on December
under the jurisdiction of respondent insolvency court so as to be made available for the
31, 2000.
payment of claim filed against the Gatmaytans in the insolvency
proceedings.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with President Estrada the renovation of
Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman.2 On September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her siblings
Hence, the denial by respondent insolvency court to give due course to the attachment
and relatives, registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission the Office of the
and execution of Civil Case No. 35946 of the CFI of Rizal constitutes a freezing of the
Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).3
disposition of subject properties by the former which were not within its jurisdiction;
undeniably, a grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction, correctable by
certiorari.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex.4 President
Estrada gave Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial assistance
for the proposed renovation. The source of the funds, according to the information, was
WHEREFORE, the March 31, 1986 decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court is
the Office of the President.
hereby Reversed and SET ASIDE. The attachment and execution sale in Civil Case No.
35946 of the former CFI of Rizal are given due course and petitioner's ownership of
subject properties covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430 is ordered The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize.5 The succeeding student
consolidated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library regent, Kristine Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of the
KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils within the state university,
consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the
SO ORDERED.
Office of the Ombudsman.6

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to indict
petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No.
27819 of the Sandiganbayan.7 The Information reads:

THIRD DIVISION The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby
accuses HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA and JADE IAN D. SERANA of the crime of Estafa,
defined and penalized under Paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as
[G.R. NO. 162059 - January 22, 2008] amended committed as follows:

HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City,
PHILIPPINES, Respondents. Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-
named accused, HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, a high-ranking public officer, being then
DECISION the Student Regent of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, while in
the performance of her official functions, committing the offense in relation to her office
and taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother,
REYES, R.T., J.: JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud the government by falsely and fraudulently representing to former
CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government scholaran** accused, along with her brother, of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada that the renovation of the Vinzons Hall of the
swindling government funds?cralawred University of the Philippines will be renovated and renamed as "President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada Student Hall," and for which purpose accused HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA
requested the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), Philippine
MAAARI bang litisin ng Sandiganbayan ang isang iskolar ng bayan, at ang kanyang Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter relying and believing on said
kapatid, na kapwa pinararatangan ng estafa ng pera ng bayan? false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to said accused Land Bank
 18

Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS
(P15,000,000.00), which check was subsequently encashed by accused Jade Ian D.
Serana on October 25, 2000 and misappropriated for their personal use and benefit, and
despite repeated demands made upon the accused for them to return aforesaid amount,
the said accused failed and refused to do so to the damage and prejudice of the
government in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not
have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP
student regent.
In a Resolution dated November 14, 2003, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's motion
for lack of merit.15 It ratiocinated:
The focal point in controversy is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over this case.
It is extremely erroneous to hold that only criminal offenses covered by Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code are within the jurisdiction of this
Court. As correctly pointed out by the prosecution, Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249 provides
that the Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other offenses committed by public
officials and employees in relation to their office. From this provision, there is no single
doubt that this Court has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa committed by a public
official in relation to his office.

Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, Accused-movant's claim that being merely a member in representation of the student
enumerates the crimes or offenses over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.8 It has body, she was never a public officer since she never received any compensation nor does
no jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.9 It only has jurisdiction over crimes covered by she fall under Salary Grade 27, is of no moment, in view of the express provision of
Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes Committed by Public Officers), Book II of the Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8249 which provides:
Revised Penal Code (RPC). Estafa falling under Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes Against
Property), Book II of the RPC is not within the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction.
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in
all cases involving:
She also argued that it was President Estrada, not the government, that was duped. Even
assuming that she received the P15,000,000.00, that amount came from Estrada, not
(A) x x x
from the coffers of the government.10

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person.
higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position
As a student regent, she was not a public officer since she merely represented her peers,
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
in contrast to the other regents who held their positions in an ex officio capacity. She
addsed that she was a simple student and did not receive any salary as a student regent.
x x x
She further contended that she had no power or authority to receive monies or funds.
Such power was vested with the Board of Regents (BOR) as a whole. Since it was not (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
alleged in the information that it was among her functions or duties to receive funds, or corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. (Italics supplied)
that the crime was committed in connection with her official functions, the same is
beyond the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan citing the case of Soller v.
It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that the Sandiganbayan has original
Sandiganbayan.11
exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses involving the officials enumerated in subsection (g),
irrespective of their salary grades, because the primordial consideration in the inclusion
The Ombudsman opposed the motion.12 It disputed petitioner's interpretation of the law. of these officials is the nature of their responsibilities and functions.
Section 4(b) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 clearly contains the catch -all phrase
"in relation to office," thus, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the charges against
Is accused-movant included in the contemplated provision of law?cralawred
petitioner. In the same breath, the prosecution countered that the source of the money is
a matter of defense. It should be threshed out during a full-blown trial.13
A meticulous review of the existing Charter of the University of the Philippines reveals
that the Board of Regents, to which accused-movant belongs, exclusively exercises the
According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her protestations, iwas a public officer.
general powers of administration and corporate powers in the university, such as: 1) To
As a member of the BOR, she hads the general powers of administration and exerciseds
receive and appropriate to the ends specified by law such sums as may be provided by
the corporate powers of UP. Based on Mechem's definition of a public office, petitioner's
law for the support of the university; 2) To prescribe rules for its own government and to
stance that she was not compensated, hence, not a public officer, is erroneous.
enact for the government of the university such general ordinances and regulations, not
Compensation is not an essential part of public office. Parenthetically, compensation has
contrary to law, as are consistent with the purposes of the university; and 3) To appoint,
been interpreted to include allowances. By this definition, petitioner was compensated.14
on recommendation of the President of the University, professors, instructors, lecturers
and other employees of the University; to fix their compensation, hours of service, and
Sandiganbayan Disposition such other duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant to them in its discretion
 19
leave of absence under such regulations as it may promulgate, any other provisions of
law to the contrary notwithstanding, and to remove them for cause after an investigation
and hearing shall have been had.
It is well-established in corporation law that the corporation can act only through its
board of directors, or board of trustees in the case of non-stock corporations. The board
of directors or trustees, therefore, is the governing body of the corporation.
It is unmistakably evident that the Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines is
performing functions similar to those of the Board of Trustees of a non-stock corporation.
This draws to fore the conclusion that being a member of such board, accused-movant
undoubtedly falls within the category of public officials upon whom this Court is vested
with original exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that she does not occupy a
position classified as Salary Grade 27 or higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
Finally, this court finds that accused-movant's contention that the same of P15 Million
was received from former President Estrada and not from the coffers of the government,
is a matter a defense that should be properly ventilated during the trial on the merits of
this case.16
On November 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.17 The motion was
denied with finality in a Resolution dated February 4, 2004.18
Issue
Petitioner is now before this Court, contending that "THE RESPONDENT COURT
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN NOT QUASHING THE INFORMATION AND DISMISING THE CASE
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IS HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED
IN THE INFORMATION."19
In her discussion, she reiterates her four-fold argument below, namely: (a) the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa; (b) petitioner is not a public officer with
Salary Grade 27 and she paid her tuition fees; (c) the offense charged was not committed
in relation to her office; (d) the funds in question personally came from President Estrada,
not from the government.
Our Ruling
The petition cannot be granted.
Preliminarily, the denial of a motion to
quash is not correctible by certiorari.
We would ordinarily dismiss this Petition for Certiorari outright on procedural grounds.
Well-established is the rule that when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the
remedy is not a Petition for Certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial, without prejudice to
reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion to quash.20 Remedial measures as
regards interlocutory orders, such as a motion to quash, are frowned upon and often
dismissed.21 The evident reason for this rule is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single
action.22
In Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,23 the Court clearly explained and
illustrated the rule and the exceptions, thus:
As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and cannot
be subject of appeal until final judgment or order is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 41). The
ordinary procedure to be followed in such a case is to file an answer, go to trial and if the
decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment. The same rule
applies to an order denying a motion to quash, except that instead of filing an answer a
plea is entered and no appeal lies from a judgment of acquittal.
This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion to
dismiss or motion to quash, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies. The reason is that it would be unfair to require
the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense, or is not the court of proper venue, or if the
denial of the motion to dismiss or motion to quash is made with grave abuse of discretion or
a whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment. In such cases, the ordinary remedy of
appeal cannot be plain and adequate. The following are a few examples of the exceptions
to the general rule.
In De Jesus v. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter, this Court granted the Petition for Certiorari and
prohibition against the City Court of Manila and directed the respondent court to dismiss
the case.
In Lopez v. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial of a motion to quash based on lack
of jurisdiction over the offense, this Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined
the respondent court from further proceeding in the case.
In Enriquez v. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on
improper venue, this Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent
judge from taking cognizance of the case except to dismiss the same.
In Manalo v. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on bar by
prior judgment, this Court granted the Petition for Certiorari and directed the respondent
judge to dismiss the case.
In Yuviengco v. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on
the Statute of Frauds, this Court granted the Petition for Certiorari and dismissed the
amended complaint.
In Tacas v. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted the Petition for Certiorari after the
motion to quash based on double jeopardy was denied by respondent judge and ordered
him to desist from further action in the criminal case except to dismiss the same.
 20

In People v. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying the motion to quash based on (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
prescription was set aside on certiorari and the criminal case was dismissed by this otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Court.24 Classification Act of 989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a grave abuse of discretion. " (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is
set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by " (b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
R.A. No. 3019, as amended. assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

We first address petitioner's contention that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is "(c ) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
determined by Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as
amended). We note that petitioner refers to Section 4 of the said law yet quotes Section 4 of
" (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
P.D. No. 1606, as amended, in her motion to quash before the Sandiganbayan.25 She
repeats the reference in the instant Petition for Certiorari26 and in her memorandum of
authorities.27 " (e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial
director and those holding the rank of senior superintended or higher;
We cannot bring ourselves to write this off as a mere clerical or typographical error. It bears
stressing that petitioner repeated this claim twice despite corrections made by the " (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in
Sandiganbayan.28 the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended, rather than R.A. No. 3019, " (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
as amended, that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. A brief legislative corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations.
history of the statute creating the Sandiganbayan is in order. The Sandiganbayan was
created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11,
" (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27'" and up under the
1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
officers and employees, based on the concept that public officers and employees shall serve
with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain
at all times accountable to the people.29 " (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on " (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the
December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.30 provisions of the Constitution; andcralawlibrary

P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the " (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27'" and higher under the
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No.
8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As
B. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by
it now stands, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following:
the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to
their office.
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1,
2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of
" In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary
the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the
Grade "27'" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP
following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity,
officer mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper
at the time of the commission of the offense:
regional court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court,
as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
 21
" The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments,
resolutions or order of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original
jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
" The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the
issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and
other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of
similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which
may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That
the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
" The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules
that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may thereafter promulgate, relative to
appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions
for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and
from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its
special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed
pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
" In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with
the public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in
the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
" Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal
action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall, at all times,
be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to
necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing such
civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That
where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet
been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the
criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned."
Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved on August 17, 1960. The
said law represses certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which constitute
graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.31 Pursuant to Section 10 of R.A. No.
3019, all prosecutions for violation of the said law should be filed with the
Sandiganbayan.32
R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases over which the Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction. In fact, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 erroneously cited by petitioner, deals not
with the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but with prohibition on private individuals. We
quote:
Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. - (a) It shall be unlawful for any person having
family or close personal relation with any public official to capitalize or exploit or take
advantage of such family or close personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or
receiving any present, gift or material or pecuniary advantage from any other person having
some business, transaction, application, request or contract with the government, in which
such public official has to intervene. Family relation shall include the spouse or relatives by
consanguinity or affinity in the third civil degree. The word "close personal relation" shall
include close personal friendship, social and fraternal connections, and professional
employment all giving rise to intimacy which assures free access to such public officer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any public official to
commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3 hereof.
In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as amended, defines the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan while R.A. No. 3019, as amended, defines graft and corrupt practices
and provides for their penalties.
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
the offense of estafa.
Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends that estafa is not among those
crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. We note that in hoisting this argument, petitioner
isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, without regard to the succeeding
paragraphs of the said provision.
The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a sensible
construction so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion.33 Interpretatio talis in
ambiguis semper fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is
ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted.
Kung saan mayroong kalabuan, ang pagpapaliwanag ay hindi dapat maging
mahirap at katawa-tawa.
Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to each
other in order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the legislature.34 The intention of the
legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of the act is to
be taken into view.35 In other words, petitioner's interpretation lies in direct opposition to the
rule that a statute must be interpreted as a whole under the principle that the best
interpreter of a statute is the statute itself.36 Optima statuti interpretatrix est ipsum
statutum. Ang isang batas ay marapat na bigyan ng kahulugan sa kanyang
kabuuan sa ilalim ng prinsipyo na ang pinakamainam na interpretasyon ay ang
mismong batas.
Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:
B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by
the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to
their office.
Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public
officials in relation to their office. We see no plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa
as one of the offenses included in Section 4(bB) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one of
those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the
offense is committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office.
 22

In Perlas, Jr. v. People,37 the Court had occasion to explain that the Sandiganbayan has creating and conferring it (Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no such thing as a vested
jurisdiction over an indictment for estafa v. a director of the National Parks Development interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting
Committee, a government instrumentality. The Court held then: constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no
one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary (42 Am. Jur. 881).
The National Parks Development Committee was created originally as an Executive
Committee on January 14, 1963, for the development of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta and In Laurel v. Desierto,41 the Court adopted the definition of Mechem of a public office:
other national parks (Executive Order No. 30). It was later designated as the National Parks
Development Committee (NPDC) on February 7, 1974 (E.O. No. 69). On January 9, 1966,
"A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for
Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos and Teodoro F. Valencia were designated Chairman and Vice-
a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an
Chairman respectively (E.O. No. 3). Despite an attempt to transfer it to the Bureau of Forest
individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be
Development, Department of Natural Resources, on December 1, 1975 (Letter of
exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public
Implementation No. 39, issued pursuant to PD No. 830, dated November 27, 1975), the
officer."42
NPDC has remained under the Office of the President (E.O. No. 709, dated July 27, 1981).

Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations decrees listed NPDC as a regular
government agency under the Office of the President and allotments for its maintenance
and operating expenses were issued direct to NPDC (Exh. 10-A, Perlas, Item Nos. 2, 3).
The Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction over estafa was reiterated with greater firmness in
Bondoc v. Sandiganbayan.38 Pertinent parts of the Court's ruling in Bondoc read:
Furthermore, it is not legally possible to transfer Bondoc's cases to the Regional Trial Court,
for the simple reason that the latter would not have jurisdiction over the offenses. As
already above intimated, the inability of the Sandiganbayan to hold a joint trial of Bondoc's
cases and those of the government employees separately charged for the same crimes, has
not altered the nature of the offenses charged, as estafa thru falsification punishable by
penalties higher than prision correccional or imprisonment of six years, or a fine of
P6,000.00, committed by government employees in conspiracy with private persons,
including Bondoc. These crimes are within the exclusive, original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. They simply cannot be taken cognizance of by the regular courts, apart
from the fact that even if the cases could be so transferred, a joint trial would nonetheless
not be possible.
Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a
regular tuition fee-paying student. This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary
grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has
jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People,43 We
held that while the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and
higher, its second part specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may
not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under
the jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision of law.44
Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over
Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls
under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar
to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation.45 By express mandate of law,
petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public
office.46 At most, it is merely incidental to the public office.47

Petitioner UP student regent

Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an
is a public officer.
individual of some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by
him for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer.48
Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer. She does not receive any salary or
remuneration as a UP student regent. This is not the first or likely the last time that We will
The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with Article XIV of the
be called upon to define a public officer. In Khan, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, We ruled
Constitution. UP performs a legitimate governmental function by providing advanced
that it is difficult to pin down the definition of a public officer.39 The 1987 Constitution does
instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and giving professional and
not define who are public officers. Rather, the varied definitions and concepts are found in
technical training.49 Moreover, UP is maintained by the Government and it declares no
different statutes and jurisprudence.
dividends and is not a corporation created for profit.50

In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court held that:

The offense charged was committed
in relation to public office, according
A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a to the Information.
given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an
individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be
Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she is a public officer, the
exercise by him for the benefit of the public ([Mechem Public Offices and Officers,] Sec. 1).
Sandiganbayan would still not have jurisdiction over the offense because it was not
The right to hold a public office under our political system is therefore not a natural right. It
committed in relation to her office.
exists, when it exists at all only because and by virtue of some law expressly or impliedly
 23

According to petitioner, she had no power or authority to act without the approval of the
BOR. She adds there was no Board Resolution issued by the BOR authorizing her to
contract with then President Estrada; and that her acts were not ratified by the governing
body of the state university. Resultantly, her act was done in a private capacity and not in
relation to public office.
The Court stressed the importance of this rule in Pangan v. Ramos,55 where Atty Dionisio D.
Ramos used the name Pedro D.D. Ramos in connection with a criminal case. The Court
ruled that Atty. Ramos resorted to deception by using a name different from that with
which he was authorized. We severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that a
repetition may warrant suspension or disbarment.56

It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the information.51 More
than that, jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by defendant or
respondent in an answer, a motion to dismiss, or a motion to quash.52 Otherwise,
jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of defendant or
respondent.53
In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain terms that petitioner, being
then a student regent of U.P., "while in the performance of her official functions, committing
the offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain,
conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government x x x." (Underscoring
supplied)cralawlibrary
We admonish petitioner's counsel to be more careful and accurate in his citation. A lawyer's
conduct before the court should be characterized by candor and fairness.57 The
administration of justice would gravely suffer if lawyers do not act with complete candor
and honesty before the courts.58
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, J., Chairperson, Austria-Martinez, Corona* , Nachura, JJ.,
concur.

Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan when it
did not quash the information based on this ground.

Source of funds is a defense that should

be raised during trial on the merits.

It is contended anew that the amount came from President Estrada's private funds and not
from the government coffers. Petitioner insists the charge has no leg to stand on.

We cannot agree. The information alleges that the funds came from the Office of the
President and not its then occupant, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Under the
information, it is averred that "petitioner requested the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos
(P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter
relying and believing on said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to
said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of Fifteen
Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00)."

Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan observation that the source of the
P15,000,000 is a matter of defense that should be ventilated during the trial on the merits
of the instant case.54

A lawyer owes candor, fairness

and honesty to the Court.

As a parting note, petitioner's counsel, Renato G. dela Cruz, misrepresented his reference to
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 as a quotation from Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019. A review of his
motion to quash, the instant Petition for Certiorari and his memorandum, unveils the
misquotation. We urge petitioner's counsel to observe Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, specifically Rule 10.02 of the Rules stating that "a lawyer shall not misquote
or misrepresent."
 24
SPIRIT OF THE LAW: Ratio Legis Est Anima Legis (The reason of the law is the soul
of the law)
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 78687 January 31, 1989
ELENA SALENILLAS AND BERNARDINO SALENILLAS, Petitioners, vs. HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS and HONORABLE RAYMUNDO SEVA, JUDGE OF BRANCH 38
OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CAMARINES NORTE and WILLIAM GUERRA,
Respondents.
Jose L. Lapak for petitioners.chanrobles virtual law library
Jose T. Atienza for private respondent.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari which seeks the reversal and setting aside of the
decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2dismissing the petition for certiorari against Judge
Raymundo Seva of the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Norte and the private
respondent, William Guerra, involves a pure question of law i.e., the coverage and
application of Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, known otherwise
as the Public Land Act.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
The facts are undisputed
The property subject matter of the case was formerly covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. P-1248, issued by virtue of Free Patent Application No. 192765, in favor of the
spouses, Florencia H. de Enciso and Miguel Enciso. The said original certificate of title
was inscribed in the Registration Book for the Province of Camarines Norte on December
10, 1961. On February 28, 1970, the patentees, the Enciso spouses, by an Absolute Deed
of Sale, sold the property in favor of the petitioners, the spouses Elena Salenillas and
Bernardino Salenillas for a consideration of P900.00. Petitioner Elena Salenillas is a
daughter of the Encisos. As a result of the aforementioned sale, Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-8104 of the Register of Deeds of Camarines Norte was issued in the name of
the Salenillas, cancelling Original Certificate of Title No. P-1248. On June 30, 1971, the
petitioners mortgaged the property now covered by T.C.T. No. T-8104 with the Rural
Bank of Daet, Inc. The mortgage was subsequently released on November 22, 1973 after
the petitioners paid the amount of P1,000.00. Later, or on December 4, 1975, the
petitioners again mortgaged the property, this time in favor of the Philippine National
Bank Branch, Daet, Camarines Norte as security for a loan of
P2,500.00.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
For failure of the petitioners to pay their loan, extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding,
pursuant to Act No. 3135, was instituted by the Philippine National Bank against the
mortgage and the property was sold at a public auction held on February 27, 1981. The
private respondent, William Guerra, emerged as the highest bidder in the said public
auction and as a result thereof a "Certificate of Sale" was issued to him by the Ex Officio
Provincial Sheriff of Camarines Norte. Ultimately, on July 12, 1983, a "Sheriff's Final
Deed" was executed in favor of the private respondent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
On August 17,1983, the Philippine National Bank filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Camarines Norte at Daet, a motion for a writ of possession. The public respondent, Judge
Raymundo Seva of the trial court, acting on the motion, issued on September 22, 1983
an order for the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the private respondent. When
the deputy sheriff of Camarines Norte however, attempted on November 17, 1983, to
place the property in the possession of the private respondent, the petitioners refused to
vacate and surrender the possession of the same and instead offered to repurchase it
under Section 119 of the Public Land Act. On August 15, 1984, another motion, this time
for the issuance of an alias writ of possession was filed by the private respondent with the
trial court. The petitioners, on August 31, 1984, opposed the private respondents' motion
and instead made a formal offer to repurchase the property. Notwithstanding the
petitioners' opposition and formal offer, the trial court judge on October 12, 1984 issued
the alias writ of possession prayed for the private respondent. The petitioners moved for a
reconsideration of the order but their motion was denied.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Undeterred by their initial setback, the petitioners elevated the case to the respondent
Court of Appeals by way of a petition for certiorari claiming that the respondent trial court
judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order dated October 12, 1984
granting the writ of possession, and the order dated October 22, 1984, denying their
motion for reconsider consideration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
In a resolution dated January 23, 1985, the respondent appellate court gave due course
to the petition; required the parties to submit simultaneous memoranda in support to
their respective positions; and restrained the trial court and the private respondent from
executing, implementing or otherwise giving effect to the assailed writ of possession until
further orders from the court. 3 However, in a decision promulgated on September 17,
1986, the respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the case for lack of merit. According to
the appellate court:
It must be noted that when the original owner, Florencia H. Enciso whose title, OCT No.
P-1248, was issued on August 9, 1961, executed a deed of absolute sale on February 28,
1970 of the property covered by said title to spouses Elena Salenillas and Bernardino
Salenillas, the five year period to repurchase the property provided for in Section 119 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended could have already started. Prom this fact alone,
the petition should have been dismissed. However, granting that the transfer from parent
to child for a nominal sum may not be the "conveyance" contemplated by the law. We will
rule on the issue raised by the petitioners. 4 chanrobles virtual law library
xxx xxx xxx
Applying the case of Monge, et al. vs. Angeles, et al., 5 the appellate court went on to hold
that the five-year period of the petitioners to repurchase under Section 119 of the Public
Land Act had already prescribed. The point of reckoning, ruled the respondent court in
consonance with Monge is from the date the petitioners mortgaged the property on
December 4, 1973. Thus, when the petitioners made their formal offer to repurchase on
August 31, 1984, the period had clearly expired.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
 25

In an effort to still overturn the decision, the petitioners moved for reconsideration. Their
motion apparently went for naught because on May 7, 1987, the respondent appellate
court resolved to deny the same. Hence, this petition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
Before us, the petitioners maintain that contrary to the rulings of the courts below, their
right to repurchase within five years under Section 119 of the Public Land Act has not yet
prescribed. To support their contention, the petitioners cite the cases of Paras vs. Court of
Appeals 6 and Manuel vs. Philippine National Bank, et al. 7 chanrobles virtual law library
On the other side, the private respondent, in support of the appellate court's decision,
states that the sale of the contested property by the patentees to the petitioners
disqualified the latter from being legal heirs vis-a-vis the said property. As such, they (the
petitioners) no longer enjoy the right granted to heirs under the provisions of Section 119
of the Public Land Act. 8 chanrobles virtual law library
In fine, what need be determined and resolved here are: whether or not the petitioners
have the right to repurchase the contested property under Section 119 of the Public Land
Act; and assuming the answer to the question is in the affirmative, whether or not their
right to repurchase had already prescribed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
We rule for the petitioners. They are granted by the law the right to repurchase their
property and their right to do so subsists.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
Section 119 of the Public Land Act, as amended, provides in full:
Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead
provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or
legal heirs within a period of five years from the date of the conveyance.
From the foregoing legal provision, it is explicit that only three classes of persons are
bestowed the right to repurchase - the applicant-patentee, his widow, or other legal heirs.
Consequently, the contention of the private respondent sustained by the respondent
appellate court that the petitioners do not belong to any of those classes of repurchasers
because they acquired the property not through inheritance but by sale, has no legal
basis. The petitioners-spouses are the daughter and son-in-law of the Encisos, patentees
of the contested property. At the very least, petitioner Elena Salenillas, being a child of
the Encisos, is a "legal heir" of the latter. As such, and even on this score alone, she may
therefore validly repurchase. This must be so because Section 119 of the Public Land Act,
in speaking of "legal heirs," makes no distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemos.
Moreover, to indorse the distinction made by the private respondent and the appellate
court would be to contravene the very purpose of Section 119 of the Public Land Act
which is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his
family the land that the State had gratuitously given him as a reward for his labor in
clearing and cultivating it. 9 Considering that petitioner Salenillas is a daughter of the
spouses Florencia H. Enciso and Miguel Enciso, there is no gainsaying that allowing her
(Elena) and her husband to repurchase the property would be more in keeping with the
spirit of the law. We have time and again said that between two statutory interpretations,
that which better serves the purpose of the law should prevail.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
Guided by the same purpose of the law, and proceeding to the other issue here raised, we
rule that the five-year period for the petitioners to repurchase their property had not yet
prescribed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The case of Monge et al. vs. Angeles, et al., 10 cited as authority by the respondent Court
of Appeals is inapplicable to the present controversy. The facts obtaining there are
substantially different from those in this case. In Monge the conveyance involved was a
pacto de retro sale and not a foreclosure sale. More importantly, the question raised there
was whether the five-year period provided for in Section 119 "should be counted from the
date of the sale even if the same is with an option to repurchase or from the date the
ownership of the land has become consolidated in favor of the purchaser because of the
homesteader's failure to redeem it. 11 It is therefore understandable why the Court ruled
there as it did. A sale on pacto de retro immediately vests title, ownership, and, generally
possession over the property on the vendee a retro, subject only to the right of the vendor
a retro to repurchase within the stipulated period. It is an absolute sale with a resolutory
condition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The cases 12 pointed to by the petitioner in support of their position, on the other hand,
present facts that are quite identical to those in the case at bar. Both cases involved
properties the titles over which were obtained either through homestead or free patent.
These properties were mortgaged to a bank as collateral for loans, and, upon failure of
the owners to pay their indebtedness, the mortgages were foreclosed. In both instances,
the Court ruled that the five-year period to. repurchase a homestead sold at public
auction or foreclosure sale under Act 3135 begins on the day after the expiration of the
period of redemption when the deed of absolute sale is executed thereby formally
transferring the property to the purchaser, and not otherwise. Taking into account that
the mortgage was foreclosed and the mortgaged property sold at a public auction to the
private respondent on February 27, 1981, with the "Sheriff's Final Deed" issued on July
12, 1983, the two offers of the petitioners to repurchase the first on November 17, 1983,
and the second, formally, on August 31, 1984 were both made within the prescribed five-
year period.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Now, as regards the redemption price, applying Sec. 30 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of
Court, the petitioners should reimburse the private respondent the amount of the
purchase price at the public auction plus interest at the rate of one per centum per
month up to November 17, 1983, together with the amounts of assessments and taxes on
the property that the private respondent might have paid after purchase and interest on
the last named amount at the same rate as that on the purchase price. 13 chanrobles
virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 17, 1986, and
the Resolution dated May 7, 1987 of the Court of Appeals, and the Orders dated
September 22, 1983, October 12, 1984, and October 22, 1984 of the Regional Trial Court
of Daet, Camarines Norte, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another one
ENTERED directing the private respondent to reconvey the subject property and to
execute the corresponding deed of reconveyance therefor in favor of the petitioners upon
the return to him by the latter of the purchase price and the amounts, if any, of
assessments or taxes he paid plus interest of one (1%) per centum per month on both
 26
amounts up to November 17, 1983.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
No costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ.,
EN BANC
G.R. No. 93177 August 2, 1991
B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN, MARIELO BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO,
CAPT. MANUEL ISON, COL. LUISITO SANCHEZ, LTC. ROMELINO GOJO, LTC.
ARSENIO TECSON, LTC. RAFAEL GALVEZ, LTC. TIBURCIO FUSILLERO, LTC.
ERICSON AURELIO, LTC. JACINTO LIGOT LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER, MAJ.
ALFREDO OLIVEROS, MAJ. CESAR DE LA PERA, MAJ. LEUVINO VALENCIA, CAPT.
FLORENCIO FLORES, CAPT. JAIME JUNIO, CAPT. DANILO LIM, CAPT. ELMER
AMON, CAPT. VERGEL NACINO, and LT. JOEY SARROZA, Petitioners, vs. GEN.
RENATO S. DE VILLA, CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP, THE PTI INVESTIGATING PANEL
COMPOSED OF: COL. MANUEL S. MENDIOLA, COL. VIRTUD NORBERTO L. DAGZA
MAJ. FELIX V. BALDONADO and MAJ. ESTELITO L. PORNEA and GENERAL COURT-
MARTIAL NO. 14 COMPOSED OF: B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A.
MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL.
DIONY A. VENTURA and CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN, Respondents.
No. 95020 August 2, 1991
B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA, COL. HERMIMO A. MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU,
COL. ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT.
FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN, Petitioners, vs. HON. MIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding
Judge, Branch 104, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Q.C., LTC. JACINTO LIGOT PA.,
Respondents.
No. 96948 August 2, 1991
B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN. MARCELO BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO
PN, CAPT. MANUEL ISON PN, LTC. ROMELINO GOJO PN (M), LTC. ARSENIO TECSON
PA, LTC. RAFAEL GALVEZ PA, LTC. TIBURCIO FUSILLERO PA, LTC. ERICSON
AURELIO PA, LTC. JACINTO LIGOT PA, LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER PA, MAJ.
ALFREDO OLIVEROS PA, MAJ. CESAR DE LA PENA PN (M): MAJ. LEUVINO
VALENCIA PA, CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES PA, CAPT. JAIME JUNIO PA, CAPT.
DANILO LIM PA, CAPT. ELMER AMON PAF CAPT. VERGEL NACINO, and LT. JOEY
SARROZA, Petitioners, vs. B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA,
COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A.
VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN PRESIDENT AND MEMBERS OF
GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL NO. 14, Respondents.
No. 97454 August 2, 1991
AFP CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. RODOLFO BIAZON, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
MAJOR GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, PNP DIRECTOR GENERAL MAJOR GEN.
CESAR NAZARENO and LT. COL. ALBERTO OLARIO, Commanding Officer of the
PNP/INP Detention Center/Jail, Petitioners, vs. HON. ANTONIO P. SOLANO, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 86, CAPTAIN REYNALDO S.
RAFAEL, 1 LT SERVANDO A. BAOANAN PN(M), 1 LT. WILFREDO JIMENEZ PAF 1 LT.
ATANACIO T. MACALAN JR PMM 2LT ELISEO T. RASCO PC, 2LT JONAS CALLEJA
PC, 2LT JAIRUS JS GELVEZON III PMM 2LT JOSELITO CABREROS PMM 2LT
MEMEL ROJAS PN(M) and 2LT HERMINIO L. CANTACO PC, Respondents.
Armando M. Marcelo and Rainier L. Madrid for petitioners Luisito Sanchez, Tiburcio
Fusillero, Ericson Aurelio, Levino Valencia, Danilo Arnon Vergel Nacino, Florencio Flores,
Benigno Junio and Joey Sarroza.chanrobles virtual law library
Manuel Q. Malvar for Rafael Galvez and Danny Lim.chanrobles virtual law library
Manuel E. Valenzuela for Arsenio Tecson
Mariano R. Santiago for Alfredo Oliveros.chanrobles virtual law library
Ricardo J.M. Rivera for Manuel Ison.chanrobles virtual law library
Castillo, Laman, Tan and Pantaleon for Danilo Pizarro.chanrobles virtual law library
Alfredo Lazaro for Romelino Gojo.chanrobles virtual law library
Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr. for Jose Comendador.chanrobles virtual law library
Jonathan B.S. Rebong and Efren C. Carag for Marcelo Blando.chanrobles virtual law
library
Pablito V. Sanidad for Franklin Brawner and Ericson Aurelio.chanrobles virtual law library
Efren C. Moncupa for All Tecson.chanrobles virtual law library
M.M. Lazaro & Associates for respondents Ligot and Ison .chanrobles virtual law library
Baldomero S.P. Gatbonton, Jr. for Jacinto Ligot.chanrobles virtual law library
Salvador B. Britanico for Cesar de la Pena.chanrobles virtual law library
Gilbert R.T. Reyes for Danilo Pizarro.chanrobles virtual law library
Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas for petitioners in G.R. No. 93177.chanrobles
virtual law library
The Solicitor General for respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
These four cases have been consolidated because they involve practically the same
parties and related issues arising from the same incident.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 and the private respondents in G.R. Nos.
95020 and 97454 are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution
for their alleged participation in the failed coup d' etat that took place on December 1 to 9,
1989.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The charges against them are violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96
(Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in
relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (Murder).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
In G.R. No. 93177, which is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, they are
questioning the conduct of the Pre-Trial Investigation PTI Panel constituted to investigate
 27
the charges against them and the creation of the General Court Martial GCM convened to
try them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In G.R. No. 96948, the petitioners, besides challenging the legality of GCM No. 14, seek
certiorari against its ruling denying them the right to peremptory challenge as granted by
Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In G.R. No. 95020, the orders of the respondent judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City are assailed on certiorari on the ground that he has no jurisdiction over GCM
No. 14 and no authority either to set aside its ruling denying bail to the private
respondents.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In G.R. No. 97454, certiorari is also sought against the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City in a petition for habeas corpus directing the release of the private
respondents. Jurisdictional objections are likewise raised as in G.R. No.
95020.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
I chanrobles virtual law library
Before the charges were referred to GCM No. 14, a Pre-Trial Investigation PTI Panel had
been constituted pursuant to Office Order No. 16 dated January 14, 1990, to investigate
the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948. The PTI Panel issued a uniform subpoena
dated January 30, 1990, individually addressed to the petitioners, to wit:
You are hereby directed to appear in person before the undersigned Pre-Trial
Investigating Officers on 12 Feb 90 9:00 a.m. at Kiangan Hall, Camp Crame Quezon City,
then and there to submit your counter-affidavit and the affidavits of your witnesses, if
any, in the pre-trial investigation of the charge/charges against you for violence of AWs
_______________. DO NOT SUBMIT A MOTION TO DISMISS.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
Failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified shall
be deemed a waiver of your right to submit controverting evidence.
On the same date, the petitioners acknowledged receipt of a copy of the charge sheet,
sworn statements of witnesses, and death and medical certificates of victims of the
rebellion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
At the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners challenged the proceedings on various
grounds, prompting the PTI Panel to grant them 10 days within which to file their
objections in writing This was done through a Motion for Summary Dismissal dated
February 21, 1990.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In a resolution dated February 27,1990, the PTI Panel denied the motion and gave the
petitioners 5 days from notice to submit their respective counter-affidavits and the
affidavits of their witnesses.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On March 7, 1990, the petitioners verbally moved for reconsideration of the foregoing
denial and the PTI Panel gave them 7 days within which to reduce their motion to writing.
This was done on March 14,1990.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as
mandated by Article of War 71, which provides:
Art. 71. Charges Action upon. - Charges and specifications must be signed by a person
subject to military law, and under the oath either that he has personal knowledge of, or
has investigated, the matters set forth therein and that the same are true in fact, to the
best of his knowledge and belief.
No charge will be referred to a general court-martial for trial until after a thorough and
impartial investigation thereof shall have been made. This investigation will include
inquiries as to the truth of the matter set forth in said charges, form of charges, and what
disposition of the case should be made in the interest of justice and discipline. At such
investigation full opportunity shall be given to the accused to cross-examine witnesses
against him if they are available and to present anything he may desire in his own behalf,
either in defense or mitigation, and the investigating officer shall examine available
witnesses requested by the accused. If the charges are forwarded after such investigation,
they shall be accompanied by a statement of the substance of the testimony taken on both
sides. (Emphasis supplied.)
They also allege that the initial hearing of the charges consisted merely of a roll call and
that no prosecution witnesses were presented to reaffirm their affidavits. while the motion
for summary dismissal was denied, the motion for reconsideration remains unresolved to
date and they have not been able to submit their counter-
affidavits.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
At the hearing of May 15, 1990, the petitioners in G.R. No. 96948 manifested that they
were exercising their right to raise peremptory challenges against the president and
members of GCM No.14. They invoked Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 for this purpose.
GCM No. 14 ruled, however, that peremptory challenges had been discontinued under
P.D. No. 39.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application
was denied by GCM No.14. He thereupon filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City a petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ
of preliminary injunction. After considering the petition and the answer thereto filed by
the president and members of GCM No.14, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued an
order granting provisional liberty to Ligot.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
On July 28, 1990, Ligot filed an urgent omnibus motion to enforce the order for his
release and to declare in contempt the commanding officer of the PC/INP Jail for disobey
'ng the said order. He later also complained that Generals De Villa and Aguirre had
refused to release him "pending final resolution of the appeal to be taken" to this
Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
After hearing, the trial court reiterated its order for the provisional liberty of Ligot, as well
as of intervenors Ltc Franklin Brawner, Lt/Col. Arsenio Tecson and Maj. Alfredo Oliveros,
 28
and later of additional intervenors Ltc Romelino Gojo and Capt. Manuel
Ison.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On August 22, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment inter alia:
(a) Declaring, that Section 13, Article III of the Constitution granting the right to bail to all
persons with the defined exception is applicable and covers all military men facing court-
martial proceedings. Accordingly, the assailed orders of General Court- Martial No. 14
denying bail to petitioner and intervenors on the mistaken assumption that bail does not
apply to military men facing court-martial proceedings on the ground that there is no
precedent, are hereby set aside and declared null and void. Respondent General Court-
Martial No. 14 is hereby directed to conduct proceedings on the applications of bail of the
petitioner, intervenors and which may as well include other persons facing charges before
General Court-Martial No. 14.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Pending the proceedings on the applications for bail before General Court-Martial No. 14,
this Court reiterates its orders of release on the provisional liberty of petitioner Jacinto
Ligot as well as intervenors Franklin Brawner and Arsenio Tecson.
On February 18, 1991, the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with this Court a
petition for habeas corpus on the ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame
without charges. The petition was referred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
where it was raffled to respondent Judge Antonio P. Solano. Finding after hearing that no
formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a year after their
arrest, the trial court ordered their release.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
II chanrobles virtual law library
The Court has examined the records of this case and rules as
follows.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It appears that the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 were given several
opportunities to present their side at the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled
hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again after the denial of their motion of February
21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit their counter-affidavits.
On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for reconsideration which they were again
asked to submit in writing. This they did on March 13, 1990. The motion was in effect
denied when the PTI Panel resolved to recommend that the charges be referred to the
General Court Martial for trial.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The said petitioners cannot now claim they have been denied due process because the
investigation was resolved against them owing to their own failure to submit their
counter-affidavits. They had been expressly warned In the subpoena sent them that
"failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified shall
be deemed a waiver of (their) right to submit controverting evidence." They chose not to
heed the warning. As their motions appeared to be dilatory, the PTI Panel was justified in
referring the charges to GCM No. 14 without waiting for the petitioners to submit their
defense.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it
is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violation of the Bill of
Rights.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
There was in our view substantial compliance with Article of War 71 by the PTI Panel.
Moreover, it is now settled that "even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does
not deprive a general court- martial of jurisdiction." We so held in Arula v. Espino, 1 thus:
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
But even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court-
martial of jurisdiction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The better accepted concept of pre-trial investigation is that it is directory, not
mandatory, and in no way affects the jurisdiction of a court-martial. In Humphrey v.
Smith, 336 U.S. 695, 93 L ed 986 (1949), the Court said:
We do not think that the pre-trial investigation procedure by Article 70 (The Philippine
counter-part is article of war 71, Commonwealth Act 408) can properly be construed as
an indispensable pre-requisite to the exercise of the Army General court martial
jurisdiction.. The Article does serve important functions in the administration of court-
martial procedures and does provide safeguards to an accused. Its language is clearly
such that a defendant could object to trial in the absence of the required investigation. In
that event the court-martial could itself postpone trial pending the investigation. And the
military reviewing authorities could consider the same contention, reversing a court-
martial conviction where failure to comply with Article 70 has substantially injured an
accused. But we are not persuaded that Congress intended to make otherwise valid
court-martial judgments wholly void because pre-trial investigations fall short of the
standards prescribed by Article 70. That Congress has not required analogous pre-trial
procedure for Navy court-martial is an indication that the investigatory plan was not
intended to be exalted to the jurisdictional level.
xxx xxx xxx
Shortly after enactment of Article 70 in 1920 the Judge Advocate General of the Army did
hold that where there had been no pre-trial investigation, court-martial proceedings were
void ab initio. But this holding has been expressly repudiated in later holdings of the
Judge Advocate General. This later interpretation has been that the pre-trial
requirements of Article 70 are directory, not mandatory, and in no way effect the
jurisdiction of a court-martial. The War Department's interpretation was pointedly called
to the attention of Congress in 1947 after which Congress amended Article 70 but left
unchanged the language here under consideration. compensable pre-requisite to the
exercise of Army general court-martial jurisdiction
A trial before a general court-martial convened without any pretrial investigation under
article of war 71 would of course be altogether irregular but the court-martial might
nevertheless have jurisdiction. Significantly, this rule is similar to the one obtaining in
criminal procedure in the civil courts to the effect that absence of preliminary
investigation does not go into the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of
the proceedings.
 29
As to what law should govern the conduct of the preliminary investigation, that issue was
resolved more than two years ago in Kapunan v. De Villa, 2 where we declared:
The Court finds that, contrary to the contention of petitioners, there was substantial
compliance with the requirements of law as provided in the Articles of War and P.D. No.
77, as amended by P.D. No. 911. The amended charge sheets, charging petitioners and
their co-respondents with mutiny and conduct unbecoming an officer, were signed by
Maj. Antonio Ruiz, a person subject to military law, after he had investigated the matter
through an evaluation of the pertinent records, including the reports of respondent AFP
Board of Officers, and was convinced of the truth of the testimonies on record. The
charge sheets were sworn to by Maj. Ruiz, the "accuser," in accordance with and in the
manner provided under Art. 71 of the Articles of War. Considering that P.D. No. 77, as
amended by P.D. No. 911, is only of suppletory application, the fact that the charge
sheets were not certified in the manner provided under said decrees, i.e., that the officer
administering the oath has personally examined the affiant and that he is satisfied that
they voluntarily executed and understood its affidavit, does not invalidate said charge
sheets. Thereafter, a "pretrial investigation" was conducted by respondent Maj.
Baldonado, wherein, pursuant to P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911, petitioners
were subpoenaed and required to file their counter-affidavit. However, instead of doing
so, they filed an untitled pleading seeking the dismissal of the charges against them. That
petitioners were not able to confront the witnesses against them was their own doing, for
they never even asked Maj. Baldonado to subpoena said witnesses so that they may be
made to answer clarificatory questions in accordance with P. D, No. 77, as amended by
P.D. No. 911.
The petitioners also allege that GCM No. 14 has not been constitute in accordance with
Article 8 of the Articles of War because General Order No. M-6, which supposedly
convened the body, was not signed by Gen. Renato de Villa as Chief of
Staff.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Article of War No. 8 reads:
Art. 8. General Courts-Martial. - The President of the Philippines, the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Chief of Constabulary and, when empowered by the
President, the commanding officer of a major command or task force, the commanding
officer of a division, the commanding officer of a military area, the superintendent of the
Military Academy, the commanding officer of a separate brigade or body of troops may
appoint general courts-martial; but when any such commander is the accuser or the
prosecutor of the person or persons to be tried, the court shall be appointed by superior
competent authority. ...
While it is true that General Order No. M-6 was not signed by Gen. De Villa, there is no
doubt that he authorized it because the order itself said it was issued "By Command of
General De Villa" and it has not been shown to be spurious. As observed by the Solicitor
General, the Summary Disposition Form showed that Gen. De Villa, as Chief of Staff,
AFP, actually constituted GCM No. 14 and appointed its president and members. It is
significant that General De Villa has not disauthorized or revoked or in any way disowned
the said order, as he would certainly have done if his authority had been improperly
invoked. On the contrary, as the principal respondent in G.R. No. 93177, he sustained
General Order No. M 6 in the Comment filed for him and the other respondents by the
Solicitor General.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Coming now to the right to peremptory challenge, we note that this was originally
provided for under Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 (Articles of War), as amended by Rep.
Act No. 242, on June 12, 1948, to wit:
Art. 18. Challenges. - Members of general or special courts-martial may be challenged by
the accused or the trial judge advocate for cause stated to the court. The court shall
determine the relevancy and validity thereof, and shall not receive a challenge to more
than one member at a time. Challenges by the trial judge advocate shall ordinarily be
presented and decided before those by the accused are offered. Each side shall be entitled
to the peremptory challenge, but the law member of the court shall not be challenged
except for cause.
The history of peremptory challenge was traced in Martelino v. Alejandro, 3 thus:
In the early formative years of the infant Philippine Army, after the passage in 1935 of
Commonwealth Act No. 1 (otherwise known as the National Defense Act), except for a
handful of Philippine Scout officers and graduates of the United States military and naval
academies who were on duty with the Philippine Army, there was a complete dearth of
officers learned in military law, its aside from the fact that the officer corps of the
developing army was numerically made equate for the demands of the strictly military
aspects of the national defense program. Because of these considerations it was then felt
that peremptory challenges should not in the meanwhile be permitted and that only
challenges for cause, in any number, would be allowed. Thus Article 18 of the Articles of
War (Commonwealth Act No. 408), as worded on September 14, 1938, the date of the
approval of the Act, made no mention or reference to any peremptory challenge by either
the trial judge advocate of a court- martial or by the accused. After December 17,1958,
when the Manual for Courts-Martial of the Philippine Army became effective, the Judge
Advocate General's Service of the Philippine Army conducted a continuing and intensive
program of training and education in military law, encompassing the length and breadth
of the Philippines. This program was pursued until the outbreak of World War 11 in the
Pacific on December 7, 1941. After the formal surrender of Japan to the allies in 1945,
the officer corps of the Armed Forces of the Philippines had expanded to a very large
number, and a great many of the officers had been indoctrinated in military law. It was in
these environmental circumstances that Article of War 18 was amended on June 12,1948
to entitle "each side" to one peremptory challenge, with the sole proviso that "the law
member of court shall not be challenged except for cause.
On September 27,1972, President Marcos issued General Order No. 8, empowering the
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces to create military tribunals "to try and decide cases of
military personnel and such other cases as may be referred to
them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On November 7,1972, he promulgated P.D. No. 39 (Governing the Creation, Composition,
Jurisdiction, Procedure, and other matters relevant to military Tribunals). This decree
disallowed the peremptory challenge, thus:
No peremptory challenge shall be allowed. Challenges for cause may be entertained to
insure impartiality and good faith. Challenges shall immediately be heard and determined
by a majority of the members excluding the challenged member. A tie vote does not
disqualify the challenged member. A successfully challenged member shall be
immediately replaced.
 30
On June 11, 1978, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 1498, or the National Security
Code, which was a compilation and codification of decrees, general orders, LOI and
policies intended "to meet the continuing threats to the existence, security and stability of
the State." The modified rule on challenges under P.D. No. 39 was embodied in this
decree.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On January 17,1981, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045 proclaiming the
termination of the state of martial law throughout the Philippines. The proclamation
revoked General Order No. 8 and declared the dissolution of the military tribunals
created pursuant thereto upon final determination of the cases pending
therein.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
P.D. No. 39 was issued to implement General Order No. 8 and the other general orders
mentioned therein. With the termination of martial law and the dissolution of the military
tribunals created thereunder, the reason for the existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased
automatically.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases, the
law itself ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. This principle is also expressed in
the maxim ratio legis est anima: the reason of law is its soul.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge in
L P.D. No. 39 became ineffective when the apparatus of martial law was dismantled with
the issuance of Proclamation No. 2045, As a result, the old rule embodied in Article 18 of
Com. Act No. 408 was automatically revived and now again allows the right to
peremptory challenge.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We do not agree with the respondents in G.R. No. 96948 that the right to peremptory
challenge remains withdrawn under P.D. No. 39. To repeat for emphasis, this decree was
itself withdrawn when martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981. Indeed, even if not so
withdrawn, it could still be considered no longer operative, having been cast out under
the new dispensation as, in the words of the Freedom Constitution, one of the "iniquitous
vestiges of the previous regime.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The military tribunal was one of the most oppressive instruments of martial law. It is
curious that the present government should invoke the rules of that discredited body to
justify its action against the accused officers.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The Court realizes that the recognition of the right to peremptory challenge may be
exploited by a respondent in a court-martial trial to delay the proceedings and defer his
deserved Punishment. It is hoped that the accused officers in the cases at bar will not be
so motivated. At any rate, the wisdom of Com. Act No. 408, in the light of present
circumstances, is a matter addressed to the law-makers and not to this Court. The
judiciary can only interpret and apply the laws without regard to its own misgivings on
their adverse effects. This is a problem only the political departments can
resolve.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 question the propriety of the petition for
certiorari and mandamus and the petition for habeas corpus filed by the private
respondents with the Regional Trial Courts of Quezon City. It is argued that since the
private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces accused of violations of the Articles
of War, the respondent courts have no authority to order their release and otherwise
interfere with the court-martial proceedings.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The petitioners further contend that under Sec. 9(3) of BP 1 29, the Court of Appeals is
vested with "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards or commissions." Rather irrelevantly, the petitioners also cite
the case of Yang v. Court of Appeals 4 where this Court held that "appeals from the
Professional Regulation Commission are now exclusively cognizable by the Court of
Appeals.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It should be noted that the aforecited provision and the case cited refer to ordinary
appeals and not to the remedies employed by the accused officers before the respondent
courts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In Martelino, we observed as follows:
It is true that civil courts as a rule exercise no supervision or correcting power over the
proceedings of courts-martial, and that mere errors in their proceedings are not open to
consideration. The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction. But it is equally true that in the
exercise of their undoubted discretion, courts-martial may commit such an abuse of
discretion - what in the language of Rule 65 is referred to as "grave abuse of discretion" -
as to give rise to a defect in their jurisdiction. This is precisely the point at issue in this
action suggested by its nature as one for certiorari and prohibition ... .
The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior
courts and other bodies and on petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto. 5 In the
absence of a law providing that the decisions, orders and ruling of a court-martial or the
Office of the Chief of Staff can be questioned only before the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court, we hold that the Regional Trial Court can exercise similar
jurisdiction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 has
traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to
the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. This much was suggested in Arula, where
we observed that "the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where
the right to bail does not exist.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The justification for this exception was well explained by the Solicitor General as follows:
The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men
from the constitutional coverage on the right to bail.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous soldiers operate within
the framework of democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the
 31
government for the discharge of their duties and responsibilities and are paid out of
revenues collected from the people. All other insurgent elements carry out their activities
outside of and against the existing political system.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
National security considerations should also impress upon this Honorable Court that
release on bail of respondents constitutes a damaging precedent. Imagine a scenario of
say 1,000 putschists roaming the streets of the Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July
25,1990 Order were sustained, on "provisional" bail. The sheer number alone is already
discomforting. But, the truly disquieting thought is that they could freely resume their
heinous activity which could very well result in the overthrow of duly constituted
authorities, including this Honorable Court, and replace the same with a system
consonant with their own concept of government and justice.
The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal
protection clause is not acceptable. This guaranty requires equal treatment only of
persons or things similarly situated and does not apply where the subject of the
treatment is substantially different from others. The accused officers can complain if they
are denied bail and other members of the military are not. But they cannot say they have
been discriminated against because they are not allowed the same right that is extended
to civilians.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On the contention of the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 that they had not been
charged after more than one year from their arrest, our finding is that there was
substantial compliance with the requirements of due process and the right to a speedy
trial.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The petition for habeas corpus was directly filed with this Court on February 18, 1991,
and was referred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for raffle, hearing and
decision. It was heard on February 26, 1991, by the respondent court, where the
petitioners submitted the charge memorandum and specifications against the private
respondents dated January 30, 1991. On February 12, 1991, pursuant to Office Order
No. 31-91, the PTI panel was created and initial investigation was scheduled on March
12, 1991 at 2:00 p.m. On March 20, 1991, the private respondents received the copies of
the charges, charge sheets and specifications and were required to submit their counter-
affidavits on or before April 11, 1991. There was indeed a delay of more than one year in
the investigation and preparation of the charges against the private respondents.
However, this was explained by the Solicitor General thus:
... The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to complete it pre-charge
investigation only after one (1) year because hundreds of officers and thousands of
enlisted men were involved in the failed coup. All of them, as well as other witnesses, had
to be interviewed or investigated, and these inevitably took months to finish. The pre-
charge investigation was rendered doubly difficult by the fact that those involved were
dispersed and scattered throughout the Philippines. In some cases, command units, such
as the Scout Rangers, have already been disbanded. After the charges were completed,
the same still had to pass review and approval by the AFP Chief of Staff.
While accepting this explanation, the Court nevertheless must reiterate the following
admonition:
This Court as protector of the rights of the people, must stress the point that if the
participation of petitioner in several coup attempts for which he is confined on orders of
Adjutant General Jorge Agcaoili cannot be established and no charges can be filed
against him or the existence of a prima facie case warranting trial before a military
commission is wanting, it behooves respondent then Major General Rodolfo Biazon (now
General) to release petitioner. Respondents must also be reminded that even if a military
officer is arrested pursuant to Article 70 of then Articles of War, indefinite confinement is
not sanctioned, as Article 71 thereof mandates that immediate steps must be taken to try
the person accused or to dissmiss the charge and release him. Any officer who is
responsible for unnecessary delay in investigating or carrying the case to a final
conclusion may even be punished as a court martial may direct. 6chanrobles virtual law
library
It should be noted, finally, that after the decision was rendered by Judge Solano on
February 26, 1991, the government filed a notice of appeal ad cautelam and a motion for
reconsideration, the latter was ultimately denied, after hearing, on March 4, 1991. The
48- hour period for appeal under Rule 41, Section 18, of the Rules of Court did not run
until after notice of such denial was received by the petitioners on March 12, 1991.
Contrary to the private respondents' contention, therefore, the decision had not yet
become final and executory when the special civil action in G.R. No. 97454 was filed with
this Court on March 12, 1991.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
IIIchanrobles virtual law library
Regarding the propriety of the petitions at bar, it is well to reiterate the following
observations of the Court in Arula:
The referral of charges to a court-martial involves the exercise of judgment and discretion
(AW 71). A petition for certiorari, in order to prosper, must be based on jurisdictional
grounds because, as long as the respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed
by him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of
judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal. Even an abuse of
discretion is not sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari.
As in that case, we find that the respondents in G.R. No. 93177 have not acted with grave
abuse of discretion or without or in excess of jurisdiction to justify the intervention of the
Court and the reversal of the acts complained of by the petitioners. Such action is
indicated, however, in G.R. No. 96948, where we find that the right to peremptory
challenge should not have been denied, and in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, where the
private respondents should not have been ordered released.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
ACCORDINGLY, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. In G.R.
No. 96948, the petition is GRANTED, and the respondents are DIRECTED to allow the petitioners to exercise the
right of peremptory challenge under Article 18 of the Articles of War. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are
also GRANTED, and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private respondents are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
 32
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. NO. 154598 : August 16, 2004
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
RICHARD BRIAN THORNTON for and in behalf of the minor child SEQUEIRA JENNIFER DELLE
FRANCISCO THORNTON, Petitioner, v. ADELFA FRANCISCO THORNTON, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition to review, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the July 5, 2002 resolution 1 of
the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division, in CA G.R. SP No. 70501 dismissing the petition for
habeas corpus on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of substance. The dispositive
portion2 read:
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for habeas corpus on the grounds that: a) this
Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition; and b) the petition is not
sufficient in substance.
Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married on August 28, 1998 in the
Catholic Evangelical Church at United Nations Avenue, Manila. A year later, respondent gave
birth to a baby girl whom they named Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco Thornton.
However, after three years, respondent grew restless and bored as a plain housewife. She
wanted to return to her old job as a "guest relations officer" in a nightclub, with the freedom to
go out with her friends. In fact, whenever petitioner was out of the country, respondent was
also often out with her friends, leaving her daughter in the care of the househelp.
Petitioner admonished respondent about her irresponsibility but she continued her carefree
ways. On December 7, 2001, respondent left the family home with her daughter Sequiera
without notifying her husband. She told the servants that she was bringing Sequiera to Purok
Marikit, Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan Province.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in Makati City but
this was dismissed, presumably because of the allegation that the child was in Basilan.
Petitioner then went to Basilan to ascertain the whereabouts of respondent and their daughter.
However, he did not find them there and the barangay office of Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan,
issued a certification3 that respondent was no longer residing there.
Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of respondent's cellular phone bills showing
calls from different places such as Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Metro Manila and other provinces.
Petitioner then filed another petition for habeas corpus, this time in the Court of Appeals which
could issue a writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country.
However, the petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that it did not have
jurisdiction over the case. It ruled that since RA 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997) gave
family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly
repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals) and Batas
Pambansa 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980):
Under Sec. 9 (1), BP 129 (1981) the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) has
jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
This conferment of jurisdiction was re-stated in Sec. 1, RA 7902 (1995), an act expanding the
jurisdiction of this Court. This jurisdiction finds its procedural expression in Sec. 1, Rule 102 of
the Rules of Court.
In 1997, RA 8369 otherwise known as Family Courts Act was enacted. It provides:
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Court. - The Family Courts shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
b. Petition for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the latter.
The vital question is, did RA 8369 impliedly repeal BP 129 and RA 7902 insofar as the
jurisdiction of this Court to issue writ of habeas corpus in custody of minor cases is concerned?
The simple answer is, yes, it did, because there is no other meaning of the word "exclusive"
than to constitute the Family Court as the sole court which can issue said writ. If a court other
than the Family Court also possesses the same competence, then the jurisdiction of the former
is not exclusive but concurrent - and such an interpretation is contrary to the simple and clear
wording of RA 8369.
Petitioner argues that unless this Court assumes jurisdiction over a petition for habeas corpus
involving custody of minors, a respondent can easily evade the service of a writ of habeas
corpus on him or her by just moving out of the region over which the Regional Trial Court
issuing the writ has territorial jurisdiction. That may be so but then jurisdiction is conferred by
law. In the absence of a law conferring such jurisdiction in this Court, it cannot exercise it even
if it is demanded by expediency or necessity.
Whether RA 8369 is a good or unwise law is not within the authority of this Court - or any
court for that matter - to determine. The enactment of a law on jurisdiction is within the
exclusive domain of the legislature. When there is a perceived defect in the law, the remedy is
not to be sought form the courts but only from the legislature.
The only issue before us therefore is whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue
writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in the light of the provision in RA
8369 giving family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitions.
In his comment, the Solicitor General points out that Section 20 of the Rule on Custody of
Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors (A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC,
effective May 15, 2003) has rendered the issue moot. Section 20 of the rule provides that a
petition for habeas corpus may be filed in the Supreme Court,4 Court of Appeals, or with any of
its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.5
The petition is granted.
The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that
revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors.
The Court of Appeals opines that RA 8369 impliedly repealed RA 7902 and BP 129 since, by
giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases, the lawmakers intended it
 33
to be the sole court which can issue writs of habeas corpus. To the court a quo, the word
"exclusive" apparently cannot be construed any other way.
We disagree with the CA's reasoning because it will result in an iniquitous situation, leaving
individuals like petitioner without legal recourse in obtaining custody of their children.
Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be helpless
since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs are enforceable only in their
respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place to
another, which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus case will be left
without legal remedy. This lack of recourse could not have been the intention of the lawmakers
when they passed the Family Courts Act of 1997. As observed by the Solicitor General:
Under the Family Courts Act of 1997, the avowed policy of the State is to "protect the rights
and promote the welfare of children." The creation of the Family Court is geared towards
addressing three major issues regarding children's welfare cases, as expressed by the
legislators during the deliberations for the law. The legislative intent behind giving Family
Courts exclusive and original jurisdiction over such cases was to avoid further clogging of
regular court dockets, ensure greater sensitivity and specialization in view of the nature of the
case and the parties, as well as to guarantee that the privacy of the children party to the case
remains protected.
The primordial consideration is the welfare and best interests of the child. We rule therefore
that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction
over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors. Again, to quote the Solicitor General:
To allow the Court of Appeals to exercise jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus
involving a minor child whose whereabouts are uncertain and transient will not result in one of
the situations that the legislature seeks to avoid. First, the welfare of the child is paramount.
Second, the ex parte nature of habeas corpus proceedings will not result in disruption of the
child's privacy and emotional well-being; whereas to deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction
will result in the evil sought to be avoided by the legislature: the child's welfare and well being
will be prejudiced.
This is not the first time that this Court construed the word "exclusive" as not foreclosing resort
to another jurisdiction. As correctly cited by the Solicitor General, in Floresca v. Philex Mining
Corporation,6 the heirs of miners killed in a work-related accident were allowed to file suit in the
regular courts even if, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the Workmen's Compensation
Commissioner had exclusive jurisdiction over such cases.
We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that:
While Floresca involved a cause of action different from the case at bar. it supports petitioner's
submission that the word "exclusive" in the Family Courts Act of 1997 may not connote
automatic foreclosure of the jurisdiction of other courts over habeas corpus cases involving
minors. In the same manner that the remedies in the Floresca case were selective, the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Family Court in the case at bar is concurrent. The
Family Court can issue writs of habeas corpus enforceable only within its territorial
jurisdiction. On the other hand, in cases where the territorial jurisdiction for the enforcement of
the writ cannot be determined with certainty, the Court of Appeals can issue the same writ
enforceable throughout the Philippines, as provided in Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of
Court, thus:
The Writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, or any member thereof, on
any day and at any time, or by the Court of Appeals or any member thereof in the instances
authorized by law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and may
be made returnable before the court or any member thereof, or before a Court of First Instance,
or any judge thereof for hearing and decision on the merits. It may also be granted by a Court of
First Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day and at any time, and returnable before himself,
enforceable only within his judicial district. (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary
In ruling that the Commissioner's "exclusive" jurisdiction did not foreclose resort to the regular
courts for damages, this Court, in the same Floresca case, said that it was merely applying and
giving effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions and implemented by the Civil Code. It also applied the well-established rule that
what is controlling is the spirit and intent, not the letter, of the law:
"Idolatrous reverence" for the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law insures
man's survival and ennobles him. In the words of Shakespeare, "the letter of the law killeth; its
spirit giveth life."
xxx xxx xxx
It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees of the Constitution, as
implemented by the provisions of the New Civil Code, is not an exercise of the power of law-
making, but is rendering obedience to the mandates of the fundamental law and the
implementing legislation aforementioned.
Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in more than one
sense. Sometimes, what the legislature actually had in mind is not accurately reflected in the
language of a statute, and its literal interpretation may render it meaningless, lead to
absurdity, injustice or contradiction.7 In the case at bar, a literal interpretation of the word
"exclusive" will result in grave injustice and negate the policy "to protect the rights and promote
the welfare of children"8 under the Constitution and the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child. This mandate must prevail over legal technicalities and serve as the guiding
principle in construing the provisions of RA 8369.
Moreover, settled is the rule in statutory construction that implied repeals are not favored:
The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before
the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare
et concordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and
brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The
fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the
subject and not have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against
any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all
laws on the subject."9
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors.
Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 and BP 129 are absolutely
incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court
from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of minors. Thus, the
provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 ― that family
courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in
petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue.
In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the adoption of A.M. No. 03-
03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of
Minors. Section 20 of the rule provides that:
 34

Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.' - A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus
involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable
within its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.

xxx xxx xxx

The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its
members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ
may be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within the region where the
petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and decision on the merits.
(Emphasis Ours)

From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court have
concurrent jurisdiction with family courts in habeas corpus cases where the custody of minors
is involved.

One final note. Requiring the serving officer to search for the child all over the country is not an
unreasonable availment of a remedy which the Court of Appeals cited as a ground for
dismissing the petition. As explained by the Solicitor General:10

That the serving officer will have to "search for the child all over the country" does not represent
an insurmountable or unreasonable obstacle, since such a task is no more different from or
difficult than the duty of the peace officer in effecting a warrant of arrest, since the latter is
likewise enforceable anywhere within the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The petition for habeas corpus in CA-G.R.-SP-No.
70501 is hereby REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban,, J., Chairman, and Carpio Morales, JJ., concur.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, on leave.
 35
DOCTRINE OF NECESSARY IMPLICATION: Ex Necessitate Legis (From necessity of
the law)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 88979. February 7, 1992.]
LYDIA O. CHUA, Petitioner, v. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL
IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION, THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; STATUTES; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6683-EARLY RETIREMENT LAW;
ITS COVERAGE AND OBJECTIVE. — Pursuant to the policy of streamlining and
trimming the bureaucracy, Republic Act No. 6683 was approved on 2 December 1988
providing for benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation from the government
service as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Deemed qualified to
avail of its benefits are those enumerated in Sec. 2 of the Act, as follows: "Sec. 2.
Coverage. — This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the National
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters, as well as the personnel of all local government units. The benefits authorized
under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees,
regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of
government service as of the date of separation. Uniformed personnel of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines including those of the PC-INP are excluded from the coverage of
this Act." Republic Act No. 6683 seeks to cover and benefits regular, temporary, casual
and emergency employees who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years
of government service. The objective of the Early Retirement or Voluntary Separation Law
is to trim the bureaucracy, hence, vacated positions are deemed abolished upon
early/voluntary retirement of their occupants.
2. ID.; CIVIL SERVICE; CHARACTERIZATION OF CAREER AND NON-CAREER SERVICE.
— The Administrative Code of 1987 characterizes the Career Service as:" (1) Open Career
positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an appropriate examination is
required; (2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in nature;
these include the faculty and academic staff of state colleges and universities, and
scientific and technical positions in scientific or research institutions which shall
establish and maintain their own merit systems; (3) Positions in the Career Executive
Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau
Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and
other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive Service
Board, all of whom are appointed by the President. (4) Career officers, other than those in
the Career Executive Service, who are appointed by the President, such as the Foreign
Service Officers in the Department of Foreign Affairs; (5) Commission officers and enlisted
men of the Armed Forces which shall maintain a separate merit system;(6) Personnel of
government-owned or controlled corporations, whether performing governmental or
proprietary functions, who do not fall under the non-career service; and (7) Permanent
laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled." The Non-Career Service, on the
other hand, is characterized by: ". . . (1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual
tests of merit and fitness utilized for the career service; and (2) tenure which is limited to
a period specified by law, or which is coterminous with that of the appointing authority or
subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular project for
which purpose employment was made." Included in the non-career service are: 1. elective
officials and their personal or confidential staff; 2. secretaries and other officials of
Cabinet rank who hold their positions at the pleasure of the President and their personal
confidential staff(s); 3. Chairman and Members of Commissions and boards with fixed
terms of office and their personal or confidential staff; 4. contractual personnel or those
whose employment in the government is in accordance with a special contract to
undertake a specific work or job requiring special or technical skills not available in the
employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall
exceed one year and performs or accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own
responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring agency. 5.
emergency and seasonal personnel." There is another type of non-career employee:
"Casual — where and when employment is not permanent but occasional, unpredictable,
sporadic and brief in nature (Caro v. Rilloroza, 102 Phil. 70; Manuel v. P.P. Gocheco
Lumber Co., 96 Phil. 945)."
3. ID.; ID.; CAREER SERVICE; CLASSIFICATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES’
APPOINTMENT STATUS. — The appointment status of government employees in the
career service is classified as follows: 1. permanent — one issued to a person who has
met the requirements of the position to which appointment is made, in accordance with
the provisions of the Civil Service Act and the Rules and Standards promulgated in
pursuance thereof; 2. temporary — In the absence of appropriate eligibles and it becomes
necessary in the public interest to fill a vacancy, a temporary appointment shall be
issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being
appointed except the appropriate civil service eligibility: Provided, That such temporary
appointment shall not exceed twelve months, but the appointee may be replaced sooner if
a qualified civil service eligible becomes available.
4. ID.; ID.; EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF PERSONNEL HIRED UNDER FOREIGN-ASSISTED
PROJECTS, CONSIDERED COTERMINOUS. — The employment status of personnel hired
under foreign assisted projects is considered co-terminous, that is, they are considered
employees for the duration of the project or until the completion or cessation of said
project (CSC Memorandum Circular No. 39, S. 1990, 27 June 1990).
5. ID.; ID.; TENURIAL EMPLOYEES. — What substantial differences exist, if any, between
casual, emergency, seasonal, project, co-terminous or contractual personnel? All are
tenurial employees with no fixed term, non-career, and temporary.
6. ID.; ID.; CO-TERMINOUS EMPLOYEES; ALSO COVERED BY EARLY RETIREMENT
LAW. — CSC Memorandum Circular No. 11, series of 1991 (5 April 1991) characterizes
the status of a co-terminous employee —" (3) Co-terminous status shall be issued to a
person whose entrance in the service is characterized by confidentiality by the appointing
authority or that which is subject to his pleasure or co-existent with his tenure." A co-
terminous employee is a non-career civil servant, like casual and emergency employees.
We see no solid reason why the latter are extended benefits under the Early Retirement
Law but the former are not. Co-terminous or project personnel, on the other hand, who
have rendered years of continuous service should be included in the coverage of the Early
Retirement Law, as long as they file their application prior to the expiration of their term,
and as long as they comply with CSC regulations promulgated for such purpose. After all,
co-terminous personnel are also obligated to the government for GSIS contributions,
medicare and income tax payments, with the general disadvantage of transience.
7. ID.; ID.; NON-PROJECT REGULAR AND PERMANENT EMPLOYEES. — The case of
Fegurin, Et. Al. v. NLRC, Et Al., comes to mind where, workers belonging to a work pool,
hired and re-hired continuously from one project to another were considered non-project-
regular and permanent employees. Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired and re-hired in four
(4) successive projects during a span of fifteen (15) years. Although no proof of the
existence of a work pool can be assumed, her service record cannot be disregarded.
 36
8. ID.; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; LEGAL MAXIMS; EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST
EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS AND CASUS OMISSUS PRO OMISSO HABENDUS EST;
CONSTRUED. — Specifically excluded from the benefits are uniformed personnel of the
AFP including those of the PC-INP. It can be argued that, expressio unius est exclusio
alterius. The legislature would not have made a specific enumeration in a statute had not
the intention been to restrict its meaning and confine its terms and benefits to those
expressly mentioned or casus omissus pro omisso habendus est — A person, object or
thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally.
9. ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE OF NECESSARY IMPLICATION; APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. —
The applicable maxim in this case but the doctrine of necessary implication which holds
that: "No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its
application. There is always an omission that may not meet a particular situation. What
is thought, at the time of enactment, to be an all-embracing legislation may be
inadequate to provide for the unfolding events of the future. So-called gaps in the law
develop as the law is enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction used to fill in
the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication. The doctrine states that what is implied
in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed. Every statute is
understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to
effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or
jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as
may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis. And every
statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right
or privilege. This is so because the greater includes the lesser, expressed in the maxim, in
eo plus sit, simper inest et minus."cralaw virtua1aw library
10. ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE; APPLICABILITY
THEREOF. — Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees: "No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws." ." . . In Felwa v. Salas, L-26511, Oct. 29, 1966,
We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically
situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a
classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make
real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification
applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are
substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those
who belong to the same class."cralaw virtua1aw library
11. LABOR LAW; REGULAR EMPLOYEE; DEFINED UNDER LABOR CODE; NO
EQUIVALENT DEFINITION IN P.D. NO. 807 AND ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987. —
Who are regular employees? The Labor Code in Art. 280 (P.D. No. 492, as amended)
deems an employment regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities
which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer.
No equivalent definition can be found in P.D. No. 807 (promulgated on 6 October 1975,
which superseded the Civil Service Act of 1965 — R.A. No. 2260) or in the Administrative
Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292 promulgated on 25 July 1987).
DECISION
PADILLA, J.:
Pursuant to the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy, Republic Act No.
6683 was approved on 2 December 1988 providing for benefits for early retirement and
voluntary separation from the government service as well as for involuntary separation
due to reorganization. Deemed qualified to avail of its benefits are those enumerated in
Sec. 2 of the Act, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 2. Coverage. — This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the
National Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters, as well as the personnel of all local government units. The benefits
authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency
employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive
years of government service as of the date of separation. Uniformed personnel of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of the PC-INP are excluded from the
coverage of this Act."cralaw virtua1aw library
Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the
program, filed an application on 30 January 1989 with respondent National Irrigation
Administration (NIA) which, however, denied the same; instead, she was offered
separation benefits equivalent to one half (1/2) month basic pay for every years of service
commencing from 1980. A recourse by petitioner to the Civil Service Commission yielded
negative results. 1 Her letter for reconsideration dated 25 April 1989 pleaded
thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x
"With due respect, I think the interpretation of the Honorable Commissioner of RA 6683
does not conform with the beneficent purpose of the law. The law merely requires that a
government employee whether regular, temporary, emergency, or casual, should have two
consecutive years of government service in order to be entitled to its benefits. I more than
meet the requirement. Persons who are not entitled are consultants, experts and
contractual(s). As to the budget needed, the law provides that the Department of Budget
and Management will shoulder a certain portion of the benefits to be alloted to
government corporations. Moreover, personnel of these NIA special projects are entitled to
the regular benefits, such (sic) leaves, compulsory retirement and the like. There is no
reason why we should not be entitled to RA 6683.
x x x" 2
Denying the plea for reconsideration, the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
emphasized:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"x x x
We regret to inform you that your request cannot be granted. The provision of Section 3.1
of Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1 does not only require an application to have
two years of satisfactory service on the date of separation/retirement but further requires
said applicant to be on a casual, emergency, temporary or regular employment status as
of December 2, 1988, the date of enactment of R.A. 6683. The law does not contemplate
contractual employees in the coverage.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Inasmuch as your employment as of December 31, 1988, the date of your separation
from the service, is co-terminus with the NIA project which is contractual in nature, this
Commission shall sustain its original decision.
x x x" 3
In view of such denial, petitioner is before this Court by way of a special civil action for
certiorari, insisting that she is entitled to the benefits granted under Republic Act No.
6683. Her arguments:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is submitted that R.A. 6683, as well as Section 3.1 of the Joint DMB-CSC Circular
Letter No. 89-1 requires an applicant to be on a casual, emergency, temporary or regular
employment status. Likewise, the provisions of Section 23 (sic) of the Joint DBM-CSC
Circular Letter No. 88-1, implementing guidelines of R.A. No. 6683, provides
 37
that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘2.3 Excluded form the benefits under R.A. No. 6683 are the following:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
a) Experts and Consultants hired by agencies for a limited period to perform specific
activities or services with a definite expected output: i.e. membership in Task Force, Part-
Time, Consultant/Employees.
b) Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of the
Philippine Constabulary and Integrated National Police (PC-INP).
c) Appointive officials and employees who retire or elect to be separated from the service
for optional retirement with gratuity under R.A. No. 1616, 4968 or with pension under
R.A. No. 186, as amended by R.A. No. 6680 or P.D. No. 1146, as amended, or vice-versa.
d) Officials and employees who retired voluntarily prior to the enactment of this law and
have received the corresponding benefits of that
retirement/separation.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
e) Officials and employees with pending cases punishable by mandatory separation from
the service under existing civil service laws, rules and regulations; provided that if such
officials and employees apply in writing within the prescriptive period for the availment of
the benefits herein authorized, shall be allowed only if acquitted or cleared of all charges
and their application accepted and approved by the head of office concerned.’
Based on the above exclusions, herein petitioner does not belong to any one of them. Ms.
Chua is a full time employee of NIA entitled to all the regular benefits provided for by the
Civil Service Commission. She had a permanent status as Personnel Assistant A, a
position which belongs to the Administrative Service. . . . If casals and emergency
employees were given the benefit of R.A. 6683 with more reason that this petitioner who
was holding a permanent status as Personnel Assistant A and has rendered almost 15
years of faithful, continuous service in the government should be similarly rewarded by
the beneficient (sic) purpose of the law." 4
The NIA and the Civil Service Commission reiterate in its comment petitioner’s exclusion
from the benefits of Republic Act No. 6683, because:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Petitioner’s employment is co-terminus with the project per appointment papers kept
by the Administrative Service in the head office of NIA (the service record was issued by
the Watershed Management and Erosion Control Project (WMECP), Pantabangan, Nueva
Ecija). The project, funded by the World Bank, was completed as of 31 December 1988,
after which petitioner’s position became functus officio.
2. Petition is not a regular and career employee of NIA — her position is not included in
its regular plantilla. She belongs to the non-career service (Sec. 6, P.D. No. 807) which is
inherently short-lived, temporary and transient; on the other hand, retirement
presupposes employment for a long period. The most that a non-career personnel can
expect upon the expiration of his employment is financial assistance. Petitioner is not
even qualified to retire under the GSIS law.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
3. Assuming arguendo that petitioner’s appointment is permanent, security of tenure is
available only for the term of office (i.e. duration of project).
4. The objective of Republic Act No. 6683 is not really to grant separation or retirement
benefits but reorganization 5 to streamline government functions. The application of the
law must be made consistent with the purpose for which it was enacted. Thus, as the
expressed purpose of the law is to reorganize the government, it will not have any
application to special projects such as the WMECP which exists only for a short and
definite period. This being the nature of special projects, there is no necessity for offering
its personnel early retirement benefits just to induce voluntary separation as a step to
reorganization. In fact, there is even no need for reorganizing the WMECP considering its
short and limited life-span. 6
5. The law applies only to employees of the national government, government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters and local government units.
Due to the impossibility of reconciling the conflicting interpretations of the parties, the
Court is called upon to define the different classes of employees in the public sector (i.e.
government civil servants).
Who are regular employees? The Labor Code in Art. 280 (P.D. No. 492, as amended)
deems an employment regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities
which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer.
No equivalent definition can be found in P.D. No. 807 (promulgated on 6 October 1975,
which superseded the Civil Service Act of 1965 — R.A. No. 2260) or in the Administrative
Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292 promulgated on 25 July 1987). The Early
Retirement Law itself (Rep. Act No. 6683) merely includes such class of employees
(regular employees) in its coverage, unmindful that no such specie is employed in the
public sector.
The appointment status of government employees in the career service is classified as
follows:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
1. permanent — one issued to a person who has met the requirements of the position to
which appointment is made, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Act
and the Rules and Standards promulgated in pursuance thereof; 7
2. temporary — In the absence of appropriate eligibles and it becomes necessary in the
public interest to fill a vacancy, a temporary appointment shall be issued to a person who
meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed except the
appropriate civil service eligibility: Provided, That such temporary appointment shall not
exceed twelve months, but the appointee may be replaced sooner if a qualified civil
service eligible becomes available. 8
The Administrative Code of 1987 characterizes the Career Service
as:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an appropriate
examination is required;
(2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in nature; these
include the faculty and academic staff of state colleges and universities, and scientific
and technical positions in scientific or research institutions which shall establish and
maintain their own merit systems;
(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant
Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant
Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as
may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by
 38
the President.
(4) Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service, who are appointed
by the President, such as the Foreign Service Officers in the Department of Foreign
Affairs;chanrobles law library : red
(5) Commission officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which shall maintain a
separate merit system;
(6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations, whether performing
governmental or proprietary functions, who do not fall under the non-career service; and
(7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled. "9
The Non-Career Service, on the other hand, is characterized by:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . (1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests of merit and fitness utilized
for the career service; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or
which is coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or
which is limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was
made."cralaw virtua1aw library
Included in the non-career service are:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;
2. secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at the pleasure
of the President and their personal confidential staff(s);
3. Chairman and Members of Commissions and boards with fixed terms of office and
their personal or confidential staff;
4. contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in accordance
with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job requiring special or technical
skills not available in the employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific period,
which in no case shall exceed one year and performs or accomplishes the specific work or
job, under his own responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervision from the
hiring agency.
5. emergency and seasonal personnel." 10
There is another type of non-career employee:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Casual — where and when employment is not permanent but occasional, unpredictable,
sporadic and brief in nature (Caro v. Rilloroza, 102 Phil. 70; Manuel v. P.P. Gocheco
Lumber Co., 96 Phil. 945)."
Consider petitioner’s record of service:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Service with the government commenced on 2 December 1974 designated as a laborer
holding emergency status with the NIA — Upper Pampanga River Project, R & R Division.
11 From 24 March 1975 to 31 August 1975, she was a research aide with temporary
status on the same project. On 1 September 1975 to 31 December 1976, she was with
the NIA-FES III, R & R Division, then on 1 January 1977 to 31 May 1980, she was with
NIA - UPR IIS (Upper Pampanga River Integrated Irrigation Systems) DRD. On 1 June
1980, she went to NIA-W.M.E.C.P. (Watershed Management & Erosion Control Project)
retaining the status of temporary employee. While with this project, her designation was
changed to personnel assistant on 5 November 1981, starting 9 July 1982, the status
became permanent until the completion of the project on 31 December 1988. The
appointment paper 12 attached to the OSG’s comment lists her status as co-terminus
with the Project." chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The employment status of personnel hired under foreign - assisted projects is considered
co-terminous, that is, they are considered employees for the duration of the project or
until the completion or cessation of said project (CSC Memorandum Circular No. 39, S.
1990, 27 June 1990).
Republic Act No. 6683 seeks to cover and benefits regular, temporary, casual and
emergency employees who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of
government service.
Resolution No. 87-104 of the CSC, 21 April 1987, provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREAS, pursuant to Executive Order No. 966 dated June 22, 1984, the Civil Service
Commission is charged with the function of determining creditable services for retiring
officers and employees of the national government;
WHEREAS, Section 4 (b) of the same Executive Order No. 966 provides that all previous
services by an officer/employee pursuant to a duly approved appointment to a position in
the Civil Service are considered creditable services, while Section 6 (a) thereof states that
services rendered on contractual, emergency or casual status are non-creditable services;
WHEREAS, there is a need to clarify the aforesaid provisions inasmuch as some
contractual, emergency or casual employment are covered by contracts or appointments
duly approved by the Commission.
NOW, therefore, the Commission resolved that services rendered on contractual,
emergency or casual status, irrespective of the mode or manner of payment therefor shall
be considered as creditable for retirement purposes subject to the following conditions:
(emphasis provided).
‘1. These services are supported by approved appointments, official records and/or other
competent evidence. Parties/agencies concerned shall submit the necessary proof of said
services;
2. Said services are on full time basis and rendered prior to June 22, 1984, the effectivity
date of Executive Order No. 966; and
3. The services for the three (3) years period prior to retirement are continuous and fulfill
the service requirement for retirement."cralaw virtua1aw library
What substantial differences exist, if any, between casual, emergency, seasonal, project,
co-terminous or contractual personnel? All are tenurial employees with no fixed term,
non-career, and temporary. The 12 May 1989 CSC letter of denial 13 characterized herein
petitioner’s employment as co-terminous with the NIA project which in turn was
contractual in nature. The OSG says petitioner’s status is co-terminous with the Project.
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 11, series of 1991 (5 April 1991) characterizes the status
of a co-terminous employee —
"(3) Co-terminous status shall be issued to a person whose entrance in the service is
 39
characterized by confidentiality by the appointing authority or that which is subject to his
pleasure or co-existent with his tenure.
The foregoing status (co-terminous) may be further classified into the
following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘a) co-terminous with the project — when the appointment is co-existent with the
duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made or subject to
the availability of funds for the same;
b) co-terminous with the appointing authority — when appointment is co-existent with
the tenure of the appointing authority.
c) co-terminous with the incumbent — when appointment is co-existent with the
appointee, in that after the resignation, separation or termination of the services of the
incumbent the position shall be deemed automatically abolished; and d) co-terminous
with a specific period, e.g.’co-terminous for a period of 3 years’ — the appointment is for a
specific period and upon expiration thereof, the position is deemed abolished.’
It is stressed, however, that in the last two classification (c) and (d), what is termed co-
terminous is the position, and not the appointee-employee. Further, in (c) the security of
tenure of the appointee is guaranteed during his incumbency; in (d) the security of tenure
is limited to a specific period."cralaw virtua1aw library
A co-terminous employee is a non-career civil servant, like casual and emergency
employees. We see no solid reason why the latter are extended benefits under the Early
Retirement Law but the former are not. It will be noted that Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly
extends its benefits for early retirement to regular, temporary, casual and emergency
employees. But specifically excluded from the benefits are uniformed personnel of the
AFP including those of the PC-INP. It can be argued that, expressio unius est exclusio
alterius. The legislature would not have made a specific enumeration in a statute had not
the intention been to restrict its meaning and confine its terms and benefits to those
expressly mentioned 14 or casus omissus pro omisso habendus est — A person, object or
thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. 15
Yet adherence to these legal maxims can result in incongruities and in a violation of the
equal protection clause of the Constitution.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The case of Fegurin, Et. Al. v. NLRC, Et Al., 16 comes to mind where, workers belonging
to a work pool, hired and re-hired continuously from one project to another were
considered non-project-regular and permanent employees.
Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired and re-hired in four (4) successive projects during a
span of fifteen (15) years. Although no proof of the existence of a work pool can be
assumed, her service record cannot be disregarded.
Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees: "No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws."cralaw virtua1aw library
". . . In Felwa v. Salas, L-26511, Oct. 29, 1966, We ruled that the equal protection clause
applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable
classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is
based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to
the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but
also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the
classification applies only to those who belong to the same class." 17
Applying the criteria set forth above, the Early Retirement Law would violate the equal
protection clause were we to sustain respondents’ submission that the benefits of said
law are to be denied a class of government employees who are similarly situated as those
covered by said law. The maxim of Expressio unius est exclusio alterius should not be the
applicable maxim in this case but the doctrine of necessary implication which holds
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application.
There is always an omission that may not meet a particular situation. What is thought, at
the time of enactment, to be an all-embracing legislation may be inadequate to provide for
the unfolding events of the future. So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is
enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction used to fill in the gap is the doctrine
of necessary implication. The doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much
a part thereof as that which is expressed. Every statute is understood, by implication, to
contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to
make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such
collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its
terms. Ex necessitate legis. And every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is
deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege. This is so because the greater
includes the lesser, expressed in the maxim, in eo plus sit, simper inest et minus." 18
During the sponsorship speech of Congressman Dragon (re: Early Retirement Law), in
response to Congressman Dimaporo’s interpellation on coverage of state university
employees who are extended appointments for one (1) year, renewable for two (2) or three
(3) years, 19 he explained:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"This Bill covers only those who would like to go on early retirement and voluntary
separation. It is irrespective of the actual status or nature of the appointment one
received, but if he opts to retire under this, then he is covered."cralaw virtua1aw library
It will be noted that, presently pending in Congress, is House Bill No. 33399 (a proposal
to extend the scope of the Early Retirement Law). Its wording supports the submission
that Rep. Act No. 6683 indeed overlooked a qualified group of civil servants, Sec. 3 of said
House bill, on coverage of early retirement, would provide:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
"Sec. 3. Coverage. — It will cover all employees of the national government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, as well as the personnel of all local
government units. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular,
temporary, casual, emergency and contractual employees, regardless of age, who have
rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years government service as of the date of
separation. The term ‘contractual employees’ as used in this Act does not include experts
and consultants hired by agencies for a limited period to perform specific activities or
services with definite expected output.
"Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, including those of the PC-
INP are excluded from the coverage of this Act." (Emphasis supplied).
The objective of the Early Retirement or Voluntary Separation Law is to trim the
bureaucracy, hence, vacated positions are deemed abolished upon early/voluntary
retirement of their occupants. Will the inclusion of co-terminous personnel (like the
petitioner) defeat such objective? In their case, upon termination of the project and
separation of the project personnel from the service, the term of employment is
considered expired, the office functus officio. Casual, temporary and contractual
 40
personnel serve for shorter periods, and yet, they only have to establish two (2) years of
continuous service to qualify. This, incidentally, negates the OSG’s argument that co-
terminous or project employment is inherently short-lived, temporary and transient,
whereas, retirement presupposes employment for a long period. Here, violation of the
equal protection claus of the Constitution becomes glaring because casuals are not even
in the plantilla, and yet, they are entitled to the benefits of early retirement. How can the
objective of the Early Retirement Law of trimming the bureaucracy be achieved by
granting early retirement benefits to a group of employees (casuals) without plantilla
positions? There would, in such a case, be no abolition of permanent positions or
streamlining of functions; it would merely be a removal of excess personnel; but the
positions remain, and future appointments can be made thereto.
Co-terminous or project personnel, on the other hand, who have rendered years of
continuous service should be included in the coverage of the Early Retirement Law, as
long as they file their application prior to the expiration of their term, and as long as they
comply with CSC regulations promulgated for such purpose. In this connection,
Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of 1990 (5 March 1990) implementing Rep. Act No.
6850, 20 requires, as a condition to qualify for the grant of eligibility, an aggregate or
total of seven (7) years of government service which need not be continuous, in the career
or non-career service, whether appointive, elective, casual, emergency, seasonal,
contractual or co-terminous, including military and police service, as evaluated and
confirmed by the Civil Service Commission. 21 A similar regulation should be
promulgated for the inclusion in Rep. Act No. 6683 of co-terminous personnel who
survive the test of time. This would be in keeping with the coverage of "all social
legislations enacted to promote the physical and mental well-being of public servants." 22
After all, co-terminous personnel are also obligated to the government for GSIS
contributions, medicare and income tax payments, with the general disadvantage of
transience.
In fine, the Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC
of petitioner’s application for early retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683 is
unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner had filed an application for
voluntary retirement within a reasonable period and she is entitled to the benefits of said
law. While the application was filed after expiration of her term, we can give allowance for
the fact that she originally filed the application on her own without the assistance of
counsel. In the interest of substantial justice, her application must be granted; after all
she served the government not only for two (2) years — the minimum requirement under
the law but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental
projects.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
Let this case be remanded to the CSC-NIA for a favorable disposition of petitioner’s
application for early retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683, in accordance with the
pronouncements in this decision.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-37251 August 31, 1981
CITY OF MANILA and CITY TREASURER, petitioners-appellants, vs. JUDGE AMADOR
E. GOMEZ of the Court of First Instance of Manila and ESSO PHILIPPINES, INC.,
Respondents-Appellees.
AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the legality of the additional one-half percent (%) realty tax imposed by
the City of Manila.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law l
Section 64 of the Revised Charter of Manila, Republic Act No. 409, which took effect on
June 18, 1949, fixes the annual realty tax at one and one-half percent (1-
%).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On the other hand, section 4 of the Special Education Fund Law, Republic Act No. 5447,
which took effect on January 1, 1969, imposed "an annual additional tax of one per
centum on the assessed value of real property in addition to the real property tax
regularly levied thereon under existing laws" but "the total real property tax shall not
exceed a maximum of three per centrum.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
That maximum limit gave the municipal board of Manila the Idea of fixing the realty tax
at three percent. So, by means of Ordinance No. 7125, approved by the city mayor on
December 26, 1971 and effective beginning the third quarter of 1972, the board imposed
an additional one-half percent realty tax. The ordinance reads: chanrobles virtual
SECTION 1. An additional annual realty tax of one-half percent (1/2%), or in short a total
of three percent (3%) realty tax (1-% pursuant to the Revised Charter of Manila; 1% per
Republic Act No. 5447; and % per this Ordinance) on the assessed value ... is hereby
levied and imposed.
Esso Philippines, Inc. paid under protest the sum of P16,092.69 as additional one-half
percent realty tax for the third quarter of 1972 on its land and machineries located in
Manila. library
On November 9, 1972, Esso filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila for
the recovery of the said amount. It contended that the additional one-half percent tax is
void because it is not authorized by the city charter nor by any law (Civil Case No.
88827).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
After hearing, the trial court declared the tax ordinance void and ordered the city
treasurer of Manila to refund to Esso the said tax. The City of Manila and its treasurer
appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440 (which superseded Rule 42 of the
Rules of Court).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
The only issue is the validity of the tax ordinance or the legality of the additional one-half
percent realty tax.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
The petitioners in their manifestation of March 17, 1981 averred that the said tax
ordinance is still in force; that Ordinance No. 7566, which was enacted on September 10,
1974, imposed a two percent tax on commercial real properties (like the real properties of
Esso and that that two percent tax plus the one percent tax under the Special Education
Fund Law gives a total of three percent realty tax on commercial
properties.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Esso Philippines, Inc., now Petrophil Corporation, in its manifestation of March 2, 1981,
revealed that up to this time it has been paying the additional one-half percent tax and
that from 1975 to 1980 it paid the total sum of P4,206,240.71 as three percent tax on its
real properties.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
In this connection, it is relevant to note that section 39(2) of the Real Property Tax Code,
Presidential Decree No. 464, which took effect on June 1, 1974, provides that a city
council may, by ordinance, impose a realty tax "of not less than one half of one percent
but not more than two percent of the assessed value of real
property".chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
 41

Section 41 of the said Code reaffirms the one percent tax on real property for the Special Barredo (Chairman), Concepcion Jr., Fernandez and De Castro, JJ.,
Education Fund in addition to the basic two percent realty tax.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary concur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
chanrobles virtual law Justice Abad Santos is on leave.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
So, there is no question now that the additional one-half percent realty tax is valid under Justice Fernandez was designated to sit in the Second Division.
the Real Property Tax Code. What is in controversy is the legality of the additional one-
half percent realty tax for the two-year period from the third quarter of 1972 up to the
second quarter of 1974.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
We hold that the doctrine of implications in statutory construction sustains the City of
Manila's contention that the additional one-half percent realty tax is sanctioned by the
provision in section 4 of the Special Education Fund Law that "the total real property tax
shall not exceed a maximum of three per centum.
The doctrine of implications means that "that which is plainly implied in the language of
a statute is as much a part of it as that which is expressed" (In re McCulloch Dick, 38
Phil. 41, 45, 90; 82 C.J.S. 632, 73 Am Jur 2nd 404).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law
While the 1949 Revised Charter of Manila fixed the realty tax at one and a half percent,
on the other hand, the 1968 Special Education Fund Law definitively fixed three percent
as the maximum real property tax of which one percent would accrue to the Special
Education Fund.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law ry
The obvious implication is that an additional one-half percent tax could be imposed by
municipal corporations. Inferentially, that law fixed at two percent the realty tax that
would accrue to a city or municipality.c law library
And the fact that the 1974 Real Property Tax Code specifically fixes the real property tax
at two percent confirms the prior intention of the lawmaker to impose two percent as the
realty tax proper. That was also the avowed intention of the questioned
ordinance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
In invalidating the ordinance, the trial court upheld the view of Esso Philippines, Inc, that
the Special Education Fund Law refers to a contingency where the application of the
additional one percent realty tax would have the effect of raising the total realty tax to
more than three percent and that it cannot be construed as an authority to impose an
additional realty tax beyond the one percent fixed by the said
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
At first glance, that appears to be a specious or reasonable contention. But the fact
remains that the city charter fixed the realty tax at 1-% and the later law, the Special
Education Fund Law, provides for three percent as the maximum realty tax of which one
percent would be earmarked for the education fund.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law l
The unavoidable inference is that the later law authorized the imposition of an additional
one-half percent realty tax since the contingency referred to by the complaining taxpayer
would not arise in the City of Manila.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
It is true, as contended by the taxpayer, that the power of a municipal corporation to levy
a tax should be expressly granted and should not be merely inferred. But in this case, the
power to impose a realty tax is not controverted. What is disputed is the amount thereof,
whether one and one-half percent only or two percent. (See sec. 2 of Rep. Act No. 2264.)
chanrobles virtual law library
As repeatedly observed, section 4 of the Special Education Fund Law, as confirmed by the
Real Property Tax Code, in prescribing a total realty tax of three percent impliedly
authorizes the augmentation by one-half percent of the pre-existing one and one- half
percent realty tax.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is reversed and set aside. The complaint of
Esso Philippines, Inc. for recovery of the realty tax paid under protest is dismissed. No
costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
 42
E. Casus Omissus pro omisso habendus est (a person or a thing omitted from an
enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-14129. July 31, 1962.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GUILLERMO MANANTAN,
Defendant-Appellee.
Solicitor General, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Padilla Law Office, for Defendant-Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. ELECTIONEERING; OFFICERS PROHIBITED FROM ENGAGING IN POLITICS;
JUSTICES OF THE PEACE. — A justice of the peace is included among the officers
enjoined from active political participation by Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
There was no need of including justices of the peace in the enumeration in said Section
54 because the Legislature had availed itself of the more generic and broader term
"judge."cralaw virtua1aw library
2. ID.; ID.; TERM "JUDGE" CONSTRUED. — The term "judge" not modified by any word
or phrase, is intended to comprehend all kinds of judges, like judges of the courts of First
Instance, judges of the courts of Agrarian Relations, judges of the courts of Industrial
Relations, and justices of the peace.
3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; RULE OF "CASUS OMISUS" WHEN APPLICABLE. —
The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" can operate and apply only if and
when the omission has been clearly established. In the case at bar, the Legislature did
not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers precluded from
engaging in partisan political activities. Rather, they were merely called by another term -
"judge." The rule, therefore, has no applicability to the instant case.
4. ID.; PENAL STATUTES; RUIN OF STRICT CONSTRUCTION. — The rule that penal
statutes are given strict construction is not the only factor controlling the interpretation
of such laws, instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be
considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws. (3 Sutherland Statutory
Construction, p. 56). The court may consider the spirit and reason of a statute, as in this
particular instance where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction,
injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmaker (Crawford Interpretation of
Laws, Sec. 78, p. 294).
5. ID.; ID.; RULE OF EXCLUSION. — Where a statute appears on its phase to limit the
operation of its provisions to particular persons or things by enumerating them, but no
reason exist why other persons or things not so enumerated should not have been
included and manifest injustice will follow by not so including them, the maxim expresio
unius est exclusio, alterius, should not be invoked. (Blevins v. Mullally, 135 p. 307, 22
CAL. A pp. 519).
6. DOUBLE JEOPARDY; FAILURE OF DEFENDANT TO RAISE ISSUE; WAIVER OF
DEFENSE. — As defendant neither raised the issue of double jeopardy by way of resisting
the appeal of the state, nor argued in his brief the said plea, he is deemed to have waived
this defense.
DECISION
REGALA, J.:
This is an appeal of the Solicitor General from the order of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan dismissing the information against the defendant.
The records show that the statement of the case and of the facts, as recited in the brief of
plaintiff-appellant, is complete and accurate. The same is, consequently, here adopted, to
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of First
Instance of that Province, defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. A preliminary investigation conducted by said
court resulted in the finding of a probable cause that the crime charged was committed
by the defendant. Thereafter, the trial started upon defendant’s plea of not guilty, the
defense moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as justice of the peace, the
defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that a justice of the peace is
within the purview of Section 54. A second motion was filed by defense counsel who cited
in support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals in People v. Macaraeg, (C.A. -G.R.
No. 15613-R, 54 Off. Gaz., pp. 1873-76) where it was held that a justice of the peace is
excluded from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. Acting on this
second motion to dismiss, the answer of the prosecution, the reply of the defense, and the
opposition of the prosecution, the lower court dismissed the information against the
accused upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Both parties are submitting this case upon the determination of this single question of
law: Is a justice of the peace included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code?
Section 54 of the said Code reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of
the Army, no member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force, and
no classified civil service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, or exert any
influence in any manner in any election or take part therein, except to vote, if entitled
thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer."cralaw virtua1aw library
Defendant-appellee argues that a justice of the peace is not comprehended among the
officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. He submits that the
aforecited section was taken from Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, which
provided the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. — No judge of the First
Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no
officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee of the
classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any
election or take part therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote."cralaw virtua1aw
library
When, therefore, Section 54 of the Revised Election Code omitted the words "justice of the
peace," the omission revealed the intention of the Legislature to exclude justice of the
peace from its operation.
The above argument overlooks one fundamental fact. It is to be noted that under Section
449 of the Revised Administrative Code, the word "judge" was modified or qualified by the
 43
phrase "of First Instance," while under Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, no such
modifications exists. In other words, justices of the peace were expressly included in
Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code because the kinds of judges therein were
specified, i.e., judge of the First Instance and justice of the peace. In Section 54, however,
there was no necessity anymore to include justice of the peace in the enumeration
because the legislature had availed itself of the more generic and broader term, "judge." It
was a term not modified by any word or phrase and was intended to comprehend all
kinds of judges, like judges of the courts of First Instance, judges of the courts of
Agrarian Relations, judges of the courts of Industrial Relations, and justices of the peace.
It is a well known fact that a justice of the peace is sometimes addressed as "judge" in
this jurisdiction. It is because a justice of the peace is indeed a judge. A "judge" is a
public officer, who, by virtue of his office, is clothed with judicial authority (U.S. v. Clark
25 Fed. Case. 441, 442). According to Bouvier, Law Dictionary, "a judge is a public officer
lawfully appointed to decide litigated questions according to law. In its most extensive
sense the term includes all officers appointed to decide litigated questions while acting in
that capacity, including justice of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of
facts."cralaw virtua1aw library
A review of the history of the Revised Election Code will help to justify and clarify the
above conclusion.
The first election law in the Philippines was Act No. 1582 enacted by the Philippine
Commission in 1907, and which was later amended by Act Nos. 1669, 1709, 1726 and
1768. (Of these 4 amendments, however, only Act No. 1709 has a relation to the
discussion of the instant case as shall be shown later.) Act No. 1582, with its subsequent
4 amendments were later on incorporated in Chapter 18 of the Administrative Code.
Under the Philippine Legislature, several amendments were made through the passage of
Act Nos. 2310, 3336 and 3387. (Again, of these last 3 amendments, only Act No. 3387
has pertinence to the case at bar as shall be seen later.) During the time of the
Commonwealth, the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 233 and later on
enacted Commonwealth Act No. 357, which was the law enforced until June 21, 1947,
when the Revised Election Code was approved. Included as its basic provisions are the
provisions of Commonwealth Acts Nos. 233, 357, 605, 666, 657. The present Code was
further amended by Republic Acts Nos. 599, 867, 2242 and again, during the session of
Congress in 1960, amended by Rep. Acts Nos. 3036 and 3038. In the history of our
election law, the following should be noted:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Under Act 1582, Section 29, it was provided:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"No public officer shall offer himself as a candidate for elections, nor shall he be eligible
during the time that he holds said public office to election at any municipal, provincial or
Assembly election, except for reelection to the position which he may be holding, and no
judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, provincial fiscal, or officer or employee of
the Philippine Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any candidate or
influence in any manner or take part in any municipal, provincial, or Assembly election
under the penalty of being deprived of his office and being disqualified to hold any public
office whatsoever for a term of 5 years: Provided, however, that the foregoing provisions
shall not be construed to deprive any person otherwise qualified of the right to vote at any
election. (Enacted January 9, 1907; Took effect on January 15, 1907.)
Then, in Act 1709, Sec. 6, it was likewise provided:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . No judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, provincial fiscal or officer or
employee of the Bureau of Constabulary or of the Bureau of Constabulary or of the
Bureau of Education shall aid any candidate or influence in any manner or take part in
any municipal, provincial or Assembly election. Any person violating the provisions of this
section shall be deprived of his office or employment and shall be disqualified to hold any
public office or employment whatever for a term of 5 years. Provided, however, that the
foregoing provisions shall not be construed to deprive any person otherwise qualified or
the right to vote at any election. (Enacted on August 31, 1907; Took effect on September
15, 1907.)
Again, when the existing election laws were incorporated in the Administrative Code on
March 10, 1917, the provisions in question read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. — No judge of the First
Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no
officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee of the
classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any
election or take part therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote. (Emphasis
supplied)
After the Administrative Code, the next pertinent legislation was Act No. 3387. This Act
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 2636. Officers and employees meddling with the election. — Any judge of the First
Instance, justice of the peace, treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province, any officer or
employee of the Philippine Constabulary or of the police of any municipality, or any
officer or employee of any Bureau or the classified civil service, who aids any candidate or
violated in any manner the provisions of this section or takes part in any election
otherwise by exercising the right to vote, shall be punished by a fine of not less than
P100.00 nor more than P2,000.00, or by imprisonment for not less than 2 months nor
more than 2 years, and in all cases by disqualification from public office and deprivation
of the right of suffrage for a period of 5 years." (Approved, December 3, 1927.) (Emphasis
supplied.)
Subsequently, however, Commonwealth Act No. 357 was enacted on August 22, 1938.
This law provided in Section 48:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 48. Active intervention of public officers and employees. — No justice, judge, fiscal,
treasurer or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the Army, the
Constabulary of the National, provincial, municipal or rural police, and no classified civil
service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, nor exert influence in any manner in
any election nor take part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public
peace, if he is a peace officer."cralaw virtua1aw library
The last law was the legislation from which Section 54 of the Revised Election Code was
taken.
It will thus be observed from the foregoing narration of the legislative development or
history of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code that the first omission of the word
"justice of the peace" was effected in Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not in
the present Code as averred by defendant-appellee. Note carefully, however, that in the
two instances when the words "justice of the peace" were omitted (in Com. Act No. 357
and Rep. Act No. 180), the word "judge" which preceded in the enumeration did not carry
the qualification "of the First Instance." In other words, whenever the word "judge" was
qualified by the phrase "of the First Instance," the words "justice of the peace" would
follow; however, if the law simply said "judge," the words "justice of the peace" were
omitted.
 44
The above-mentioned pattern of congressional phraseology would seem to justify the
conclusion that when the legislature omitted the words "justice of the peace" in Rep. Act
No. 180, it did not intend to exempt the said officer from its operation. Rather, it had
considered the said officer as already comprehended in the broader term "judge."
It is unfortunate and regrettable that the last World War had destroyed congressional
records which might have offered some explanation of the discussion of Com. Act No.
357, which legislation, as indicated above, had eliminated for the first time the word
"justice of the peace." Having been completely destroyed, all efforts to seek deeper and
additional clarifications form these records proved futile. Nevertheless, the conclusions
drawn from the historical background of Rep. Act No. 180 is sufficiently borne out by
reason and equity.
Defendant further argues that he cannot possibly be among the officers enumerated in
Section 54 inasmuch as under the said section, the word "judge" is modified or qualified
by the phrase "of any province." The last mentioned phrase, defendant submits, cannot
then refer to a justice of the peace since the latter is not an officer of a province but of a
municipality.
Defendant’s argument in that respect is too strained. If it is true that the phrase "of any
province" necessarily removes justices of the peace from the enumeration for the reason
that they are municipal and not provincial officials, then the same thing may be said of
the Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals. They are national
officials. Yet, can there be any doubt that Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court
of Appeals are not included in the prohibition? The more sensible and logical
interpretation of the said phrase is that it qualifies fiscals, treasurers and assessors who
are generally known as provincial officers.
The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the defendant-
appellee. Under the said rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration
must be held to have been omitted intentionally. If that rule is applicable to the present,
then indeed, justices of the peace must be held to have been intentionally and
deliberately exempted from the operation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
The rule has no applicability to the case at bar. The maxim "casus omisus" can operate
and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established. In the case under
consideration, it has already been shown that the legislature did not exclude or omit
justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in
partisan political activities. Rather, they were merely called by another term. In the new
law, or Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, justices of the peace were just called
"judges."cralaw virtua1aw library
In insisting on the application of the rule of "casus omisus" to this case, defendant-
appellee cites authorities to the effect that the said rule, being restrictive in nature, has
more particular application to statutes that should be strictly construed. It is pointed out
that Section 54 must be strictly construed against the government since proceedings
under it are criminal in nature and the jurisprudence is settled that penal statutes
should be strictly interpreted against the state.
Amplifying on the above argument regarding strict interpretation of penal statutes,
defendant asserts that the spirit of fair play and due process demand such strict
construction in order to give "Fair warning of what the law intends to do, if a certain line
is passed, in language that the common world will understand." (Justice Holmes, in
McBoyle v. U.S. 283, U.S. 25, L. Ed, 816)
The application of the rule of "casus omisus" does not proceed from the mere fact that a
case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular
person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the present
case, and for reasons already mentioned, there has been no such omission. There has
only been a substitution of terms.
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor
controlling the interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely serves as an
additional, single factor to be considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal
laws. This has been recognized time and again by decisions of various courts. (3
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 56.) Thus, cases will frequently be found
enunciating the principle that the intent of the legislature will govern (U.S. v. Corbet, 215,
U.S. 233). It is to be noted that a strict construction should not be permitted to defeat the
policy and purposes of the statute (Ash Sheep Co. v. U.S. 252 U.S. 159). The court may
consider the spirit and reason of a statute, as in this particular instance, where a literal
meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear
purpose of the law makers (Crawford, Interpretation of Laws, Sec. 78, p. 294). A Federal
District court in the U.S. has well said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The strict construction of a criminal statute does not mean such construction of it as to
deprive it of the meaning intended. Penal statutes must be construed in the sense which
best harmonizes with their intent and purpose." (U.S. v. Betteridge, 43 F. Supp. 53, 56,
cited in 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction 56.)
As well stated by the Supreme Court of the United States, the language of criminal
statutes, frequently, has been narrowed where the letter includes situations inconsistent
with the legislative plan (U.S. v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354; See also Ernest Brunchan,
Interpretation of the Written Law [1915] 25 Yale L.J. 129.)
Another reason in support of the conclusion reached herein is the fact that the purpose
of the statute is to enlarge the officers within its purview. Justices of the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals, and various judges, such as the judges of the Court of Industrial
Relations, judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations, etc., who were not included in the
prohibition under the old statute, are now within its encompass. If such were the evident
purpose, can the Legislature intend to eliminate the justice of the peace within its orbit?
Certainly not, this point is fully explained in the brief of the Solicitor General, to
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"On the other hand, when the legislature eliminated the phrases "Judge of the First
Instance" and "justice of the peace", found in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative
Code, and used "judge" in lieu thereof, the obvious intention was to include in the scope
of the term not just one class of judge but all judges, whether of first instance, justices of
the peace or special courts, such as judges of the Court of Industrial Relations.." . .
"The weakest link in our judicial system is the justice of the peace court, and to so
construe the law as to allow a judge thereof to engage in partisan political activities would
weaken rather than strengthen the judiciary. On the other hand, there are cogent
reasons found in the Revised Election Code itself why justices of the peace should be
prohibited from electioneering. Along with justices of the appellate courts and judges of
the Courts of First Instance, they are given authority and jurisdiction over certain
election cases (See Secs. 103, 104, 117-123). Justices of the peace are authorized to hear
and decide inclusion and exclusion cases and if they are permitted to campaign for
candidates for an elective office the impartiality of their decisions in election cases would
be open to serious doubt. We do not believe that the legislature had, in Section 54 of the
 45
Revised Election Code, intended to create such an unfortunate situation." (pp. 7-8,
Appellant’s Brief.)
Another factor which fortifies the conclusion reached herein is the fact that even the
administrative or executive department has regarded justices of the peace within the
purview of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
In Traquilino O. Calo, Jr. v. The Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Justice, etc. (G. R.
No. L-12601), this Court did not give due course to the petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction against the respondents, for not setting aside,
among others, Administrative Order No. 237, dated March 31, 1957, of the President of
the Philippines, dismissing the petitioner as justice of the peace of Carmen, Agusan. It is
worthy of note that one of the causes of the separation of the petitioner was the fact that
he was found guilty in engaging in electioneering, contrary to the provisions of the
Election Code.
Defendant-appellee calls the attention of this Court to House Bill No. 2676, which was
filed on January 25, 1955. In that proposed legislation, under Section 56, justices of the
peace are already expressly included among the officers enjoined from active political
participation. The argument is that with the filing of the said House Bill, Congress
impliedly acknowledged that existing laws do not prohibit justices of the peace from
partisan political activities.
The argument is unacceptable. To begin with, House Bill No. 2676 was a proposed
amendment to Republic Act No. 180 as a whole and not merely to section 54 of said Rep.
Act No. 180. In other words, House Bill No. 2676 was a proposed re-codification of the
existing election laws at the time that it was filed. Besides, the proposed amendment,
until it has become a law, cannot be considered to contain or manifest any legislative
intent. If the motives, opinions, and the reasons expressed by the individual members of
the legislature, even in debates, cannot be properly taken into consideration in
ascertaining the meaning of a statute (Crawford, Statutory Construction, Sec. 213, pp.
375-376), fortiori what weight can we give to mere draft of a bill.
On law, reason and public policy, defendant-appellee’s contention that justice of the
peace are not covered by the injunction of Section 54 must be rejected. To accept it is to
render ineffective a policy so clearly and emphatically laid down by the legislature.
Our law-making body has consistently prohibited justices of the peace from participating
in partisan politics. They were prohibited under the old Election Law since 1907 (Act No.
1582 and Act No. 1709). Likewise, they were so enjoined by the Revised Administrative
Code. Another law which expressed the prohibition to them was Act No. 3387, and later,
Com. Act No. 357.
Lastly, it is observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court applied the rule of
"expressio unius, est exclusio alterius" in arriving at the conclusion that justices of the
peace are not covered by Section 54. Said the Court of Appeals: "Anyway, guided by the
rule of exclusion, otherwise known as expresio unius est exclusio alterius, it would not be
beyond reason to infer that there was an intention of omitting the term "justice of the
peace from Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
The rule has no application. If the legislature had intended to exclude a justice of the
peace from the purview of Section 54, neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals has
given the reason for the exclusion. Indeed, there appears no reason for the alleged
change. Hence, the rule of expresio unius est exclusio alterius has been erroneously
applied (Appellant’s Brief, p. 6.)
"Where a statue appears on its face to limit the operation of its provisions to particular
persons or things by enumerating them, but no reason exists why other persons or things
not so enumerated should not have been included, and manifest injustice will follow by
not so including them, the maxim expresio unius est exclusio alterius, should not be
invoked." (Blevins v. Mullally, 135 p. 307, 22 Cal. App. 519.)
FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, the order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be
set aside and this case is remanded for trial on the merits.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera and Makalintal, JJ.,
concur.
Padilla and Dizon, JJ., took no part.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., is on leave.
SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 166735 : November 23, 2007]
SPS. NEREO & NIEVA DELFINO, Petitioners, v. ST. JAMES HOSPITAL, INC., and THE
HONORABLE RONALDO ZAMORA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT. Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us for Resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration of private respondent St.
James Hospital, Inc., seeking the reversal of Our Decision dated 5 September 2006.
Respondent assails the Decision on the ground that the Court had erroneously
interpreted the 1991 Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP) or the Comprehensive Zoning
Ordinance of the Municipality of Santa Rosa, Laguna, in ruling that the St. James
Hospital is a non-conforming structure under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance and that the
expansion of the St. James Hospital into a four-storey, forty-bed capacity medical
institution within the Mariquita Pueblo Subdivision is prohibited under the provisions of
the 1991 Zoning Ordinance. Moreover, respondent now contends that the case must now
be decided in accordance with the latest Zoning Ordinance passed in 1999 or the Santa
Rosa Zoning Ordinance which was only submitted as evidence in the instant Motion for
Reconsideration.
Respondent now claims that the legislative history of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance shows
that commercial and institutional uses were expressly allowed in Sec. 2, par. 1 of said
Ordinance as it retained uses that are commercial and institutional as well as
recreational in character and those for the maintenance of ecological balance. Thus,
respondent postulates that even if parks, playgrounds and recreation centers which were
expressly provided for in the 1981 Zoning Ordinance under letters (h) and (k) were
excluded in the enumeration in the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, the same cannot, by any
stretch of logic, be interpreted to mean that they are no longer allowed. On the contrary,
respondent explains that what appears is the fact that parks, playgrounds, and
recreation centers are deemed to have been covered by Sec. 2, par. 1 of the 1991 Zoning
Ordinance which speaks of "x x x other spaces designed for recreational pursuit and
maintenance of ecological balance x x x." Hence, respondent concludes that the same
reading applies in the non-inclusion of the words hospitals, clinics, school, churches and
 46
other places of worship, and drugstores which cannot be interpreted to mean that the
aforesaid uses are to be deemed non-conforming under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance as
these uses are allegedly covered by the clause allowing for institutional and commercial
uses.
Arising from this interpretation, respondent maintains that the Court erred in applying
Sec. 1 of Article X of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance which pertains only to existing non-
conforming uses and buildings, since, according to respondent, the St. James Hospital
and its expansion are consistent with the uses allowed under the zoning ordinance.
To address this matter, we deem it necessary to reiterate our discussion in our Decision
dated 5 September 2006, wherein we have thoroughly examined the pertinent provisions
of the 1981 and 1991 Zoning Ordinances, to wit:
Likewise, it must be stressed at this juncture that a comprehensive scrutiny of both
Ordinances will disclose that the uses formerly allowed within a residential zone under
the 1981 Zoning Ordinance such as schools, religious facilities and places of worship,
and clinics and hospitals have now been transferred to the institutional zone under the
1991 Zoning Ordinance1 . This clearly demonstrates the intention of the Sangguniang
Bayan to delimit the allowable uses in the residential zone only to those expressly
enumerated under Section 2, Article VI of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, which no longer
includes hospitals.
It is lamentable that both the Office of the President and the Court of Appeals gave undue
emphasis to the word "institutional" as mentioned in Section 2, Article VI of the 1991
Zoning Ordinance and even went through great lengths to define said term in order to
include hospitals under the ambit of said provision. However, they neglected the fact that
under Section 4, Article VI of said Ordinance2, there is now another zone, separate and
distinct from a residential zone, which is classified as "institutional", wherein health
facilities, such as hospitals, are expressly enumerated among those structures allowed
within said zone.
Moreover, both the Office of the President and the appellate court failed to consider that
any meaning or interpretation to be given to the term "institutional" as used in Section 2,
Article VI must be correspondingly limited by the explicit enumeration of allowable uses
contained in the same section. Whatever meaning the legislative body had intended in
employing the word "institutional" must be discerned in light of the restrictive
enumeration in the said article. Under the legal maxim expression unius est exclusion
alterius, the express mention of one thing in a law, means the exclusion of others not
expressly mentioned3 . Thus, in interpreting the whole of Section 2, Article VI, it must be
understood that in expressly enumerating the allowable uses within a residential zone,
those not included in the enumeration are deemed excluded. Hence, since hospitals,
among other things, are not among those enumerated as allowable uses within the
residential zone, the only inference to be deduced from said exclusion is that said
hospitals have been deliberately eliminated from those structures permitted to be
constructed within a residential area in Santa Rosa, Laguna.
Furthermore, according to the rule of casus omissus in statutory construction, a thing
omitted must be considered to have been omitted intentionally. Therefore, with the
omission of the phrase "hospital with not more than ten capacity" in the new Zoning
Ordinance, and the corresponding transfer of said allowable usage to another zone
classification, the only logical conclusion is that the legislative body had intended that
said use be removed from those allowed within a residential zone. Thus, the construction
of medical institutions, such as St. James Hospital, within a residential zone is now
prohibited under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance.
xxx
Having concluded that the St. James Hospital is now considered a non-conforming
structure under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, we now come to the issue of the legality of
the proposed expansion of said hospital into a four-storey, forty-bed medical institution.
We shall decide this said issue in accordance with the provisions of the 1991 Zoning
Ordinance relating to non-conforming buildings, the applicable law at the time of the
proposal. As stated in Section 1 of Article X of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance:
Section 1. EXISTING NON-CONFORMING USES AND BUILDINGS. The lawful uses of any
building, structure or land at the point of adoption or amendment of this Ordinance may
be continued, although such does not conform with the provisions of this Ordinance.
1. That no non-conforming use shall be enlarged or increased or extended to occupy
a greater area or land that has already been occupied by such use at the time of the
adoption of this Ordinance, or moved in whole or in part to any other portion of the lot
parcel of land where such non-conforming use exist at the time of the adoption of this
Ordinance.4 (Emphasis ours.)
It is clear from the abovequoted provision of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance that the
expansion of a non-conforming building is prohibited. Hence, we accordingly resolve that
the expansion of the St. James Hospital into a four-storey, forty-bed capacity medical
institution within the Mariquita Pueblo Subdivision as prohibited under the provisions of
the 1991 Zoning Ordinance.
From our discussion above, it is clear that the position of respondent is
erroneous.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
As stated in our Decision, a comprehensive scrutiny of both zoning ordinances will
disclose that the uses formerly allowed within a residential zone under the 1981 Zoning
Ordinance such as schools, religious facilities and places of worship, and clinics and
hospitals have been transferred to the institutional zone under the 1991 Zoning
Ordinance. This clearly indicates that the allowable uses in the residential zone have
been delimited only to those expressly enumerated under Section 2, Article VI of the 1991
Zoning Ordinance, which no longer includes hospitals.
With respect to respondent's claim that the controversy must now be decided in light of
latest Zoning Ordinance passed in 1999 or the Santa Rosa Zoning Ordinance, it must be
stressed at this point that the present case arose in 1994 when respondent St. James
Hospital, Inc., applied for a permit with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) to expand its hospital into a four-storey, forty-bed capacity medical institution,
at which time, the zoning ordinance in effect was the 1991 Zoning Ordinance. It is a well-
settled rule that the law in force at the time of the occurrence of the cause of action is the
applicable law notwithstanding its subsequent amendment or repeal.5 Hence, in resolving
the instant case, the zoning ordinance to be used in interpreting the legality or illegality
of said expansion is that which was in full force and effect at the time of the application
 47
for expansion which is the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, regardless of its subsequent
amendment or repeal by the passage of the 1999 Zoning Ordinance.
Moreover, pleadings, arguments and evidence were submitted by both parties as regards
the provisions of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance only. Apparently, the 1999 Zoning
Ordinance was already enacted and in effect by the time the petitioners appealed their
case to this Court on 7 February 2005. Petitioners, however, in their appeal, consistently
maintained their argument that the expansion undertaken by the respondent in 1994
violated the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, and respondent likewise limited itself to the defense
that it had complied therewith. It bears to emphasize that respondent called the attention
of this Court to the enactment of the 1999 Zoning Ordinance and asserted its compliance
with this latest zoning ordinance only in its Motion for Reconsideration before this Court.
Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of
the trial court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court as
they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal because this would be offensive to the
basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.6 This rule holds even more true when the
points of law, theories, issues and arguments are belatedly raised for the first time in the
motion for reconsideration of this Court's decision.
Accordingly, the Motion for Reconsideration of respondent St. James Hospital, Inc., is
hereby DENIED. However, this is without prejudice to respondent St. James Hospital,
Inc.'s reapplication for expansion in accordance with the requirements under zoning
ordinances now in effect.
SO ORDERED.
F. Stare Descisis (Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has already been
settled)
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-33140. October 23, 1978.]
J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., JOSE M. TUASON, NICASIO A. TUASON, TERESA TUASON,
Petitioners, v. HON. HERMINIO C. MARIANO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, MANUELA AQUAL, Spouses JOSE M. CORDOVA and SATURNINA C. CORDOVA,
Respondents.
Sison Law Office and Senensio O. Ortile, for Petitioners.
Hill & Associates Law Office for respondents Aquials.
Antonio E. Pesigan for respondents Cordovas.
SYNOPSIS
Plaintiffs prayed that they be declared the owners of a parcel of land which they claimed was acquired
by their father by means of a Spanish title issued to him on May 10, 1977. They alleged that the land
had been fraudulently included in OCT No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal. To support their
action, they cited the 1965 decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal invalidating OCT No. 735.
That decision, however, was reversed by the Supreme Court which reiterated its ruling in previous
cases upholding the validity of OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom. Defendants move to
dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, prescription, laches and prior
judgment. The trial court denied the motion.
On petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court applying the principle of stare decisis ruled that OCT No.
735 and the titles derived can no longer be questioned.
Petition granted ordering respondent court to dismiss the case with prejudice .
SYLLABUS
1. ACTIONS; STARE DECISIS; SETTLED ISSUE NO LONGER SUBJECT TO RELITIGATION. — Under
the principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (follow past precedents and do not disturb what has
been settled), an action to declare null and void an original certificate of title cannot be maintained
where the issues raised therein, namely the supposed irregularities in the land registration
proceeding, which led to the issuance of the decree upon which said title was issued, are the same
issues in earlier cases upholding the validity of the title. "It is against public policy that matters
already decided on the merits be relitigated again and again, consuming the court’s time and energies
at the expense of other litigants: Interest rei publicae ut finis sit litium."
DECISION
AQUINO, J.:
This is another litigation regarding the validity of the much controverted Original Certificate of
Title No. 735 covering the Santa Mesa and Diliman Estates of the Tuason mayorazgo or Entail
with areas of 877 (879) and 1,625 hectares, respectively (Barretto v. Tuason, 50 Phil. 888;
Benin case, infra).
On October 1, 1965, Manuela Aquial and Maria Aquial filed a complaint in forma pauperis in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch X, wherein they prayed that they be declared
the owners of a parcel of land located at Balara, Marikina, Rizal (now Quezon City) and
bounded on the north by Sapang Mapalad, on the south by the land of Eladio Tiburcio, on the
east by Sapang Kolotkolotan, and on the west by Sapang Kuliat. The land, which has an area of
three hundred eighty-three quiñones, was allegedly acquired by their father by means of a
Spanish title issued to him on May 10, 1877 (Civil Case No. 8943).
They alleged that sometime in 1960, or after J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had illegally entered upon
that land, they discovered that it had been fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No.
 48
735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal and that it was registered in the names of defendants
Mariano, Teresa, Juan, Demetrio and Augusto, all surnamed Tuason, pursuant to a decree
issued on July 6, 1914 in Case No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration.
They further alleged that transfer certificates of title, derived from OCT No. 735, were issued to
defendants J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., University of the Philippines and National Waterworks
and Sewerage Authority (Nawasa) which leased a portion of its land to defendant Capitol Golf
Club.
Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom be declared void due
to certain irregularities in the land registration proceeding. They asked for damages.
Defendant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction, improper venue, prescription, laches and prior judgment. The plaintiffs opposed
that motion. The lower court denied it. The grounds of the motion to dismiss were pleaded as
affirmative defenses in the answer of defendants Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. They
insisted that a preliminary hearing be held on those defenses.chanrobles law library
On January 25, 1967, the spouses Jose M. Cordova and Saturnina C. Cordova, who had
bought eleven hectares of the disputed land from the plaintiffs, were allowed to intervene in the
case.
On September 5, 1970, the lower court issued an order requiring the parties the Register of
Deeds of Rizal to produce in court on October 16, 1970 OCT No. 735 and certain transfer
certificates of title derived from that first or basic title. Later, the court required the production
in court of the plan of the land covered by OCT No. 735 allegedly for the purpose of determining
whether the lands claimed by the plaintiffs and the intervenors are included therein.
On February 11, 1971, the Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed the instant civil actions of
certiorari and prohibition praying, inter alia, that the trial court be ordered to dismiss the
complaint and enjoined from proceeding in the said case. After the petitioners had filed the
proper bond, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued. Respondents Aquial and Cordova
answered the petition. The parties, except the Aquials, filed memoranda in lieu of oral
argument.
The issue is whether OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom can be questioned at this
late hour by respondents Aquial and Cordova. The supposed irregularities in the land
registration proceeding, which led to the issuance of the decree upon which OCT. No. 735 was
based, are the same issues raised in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 of the lower court.
The 1965 decision of Judge Eulogio Mencias in those cases, invalidating OCT No. 735, is
annexed to the complaint of the Aquials. It is cited by them to support their action and it might
have encouraged them to ventilate their action in court.
On appeal to this Court, that decision was reversed and the validity of OCT No. 735 and the
titles derived therefrom was once more upheld. (Benin v. Tuason, L-26127, Alcantara v.
Tuason, L-26128 and Pili v. Tuason, L-26129, all decided on June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 531).
The ruling in the Benin, Alcantara and Pili cases was applied in Mara, Inc. v. Estrella, L-40511,
July 25, 1975, 65 SCRA 471. That ruling is simply a reiteration or confirmation of the holding
in the following cases directly or incidentally sustaining OCT No. 735: Bank of the P. I. v.
Acuña, 59 Phil. 183; Tiburcio v. PHHC, 106 Phil. 477; Galvez and Tiburcio v. Tuason y de la
Paz, 119 Phil. 612; Alcantara v. Tuason, 92 Phil. 796; Santiago v. J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., 110
Phil. 16; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Bolaños, 95 Phil. 106; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v.
Santiago, 99 Phil. 615; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. De Guzman, 99 Phil. 281; J. M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. v. Aguirre, 117 Phil. 110; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Macalindong, 116 Phil. 1227; J.
M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Magdangal, 114 Phil. 42; Varsity Hills, Inc. v. Navarro, L-30889,
February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 503, and People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation v. Mencias,
L-24114, August 16, 1967, 20 SCRA 1031.
Considering the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (follow past
precedents and do not disturb what has been settled) it becomes evident that respondents
Aquial and Cordova cannot maintain their action in Civil Case No. 8943 without eroding the
long settled holding of the courts that OCT No. 735 is valid and no longer open to
attack.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
"It is against public policy that matters already decided on the merits be relitigated again and
again, consuming the courts’ time and energies et the expense of other litigants: Interest rei
publicae ut finis sit litium." (Varsity Hills, Inc. v. Navarro, supra).
Finding the petition for certiorari and prohibition to be meritorious, the trial court is directed to
dismiss Civil Case No. 8943 with prejudice and without costs. No costs.
SO ORDERED
Barredo (Actg. Chairman) Antonio, Concepcion Jr., and Santos, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 132051 - June 25, 2001
TALA REALTY SERVICES CORP., petitioner, v. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND
MORTGAGE BANK, Respondent.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Stare decisis et non quieta movere. This principle of adherence to precedents has not lost
its luster and continues to guide the bench in keeping with the need to maintain stability
in the law.
The principle finds application to the case now before us.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, assailing the Resolution dated December 23, 1997 of the Court
of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 44257.
Under Republic Act No. 337 (General Banking Act), commercial banks are allowed to
invest in real property subject to the limitation that:
"Sec. 25. Any commercial bank may purchase, hold and convey real estate for the
following purposes:
"(a) such as shall be necessary for its immediate accommodation in the transaction of its
business: Provided, however, that the total investment in such real estate and
improvements thereof, including bank equipment, shall not exceed fifty percent (50%) of
net worth x x x x x x ." (Emphasis Ours)
Investments in real estate made by savings and mortgage banks are likewise subject to
the same limitation imposed by the aforequoted provision.1
Bound by such limitation, the management of Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank
(Banco Filipino for brevity) devised means to pursue its endeavor to expand its banking
 49
operations. To this end, Tala Realty Services Corporation (Tala for brevity) was organized
by Banco Filipino's four (4) major stockholders namely, Antonio Tiu, Tomas B. Aguirre,
Nancy Lim Ty and Pedro B. Aguirre. Tala and Banco Filipino agreed on this scheme -
Tala would acquire the existing branch sites and new branch sites which it would lease
out to Banco Filipino.
On August 25, 1981, pursuant to their agreement, Banco Filipino sold its eleven (11)
branch sites all over the country to Tala. In turn Tala leased those sites to Banco Filipino
under contracts of lease executed by both parties on the same day.
Years after, dissension between Tala and Banco Filipino arose in connection with their
lease contracts resulting in a chain of lawsuits for illegal detainer. Some of these cases
are still pending in courts. At present, three of the illegal detainer cases have been passed
upon by the Supreme Court.
The case at bar, involving Banco Filipino's Iloilo City branch site, is one of those cases for
illegal detainer filed by Tala against Banco Filipino based on these grounds: (a) expiration
of the period of lease and (b) non-payment of rentals.
The facts of the present controversy may be summed up as follows:
In its complaint in Civil Case No. 51(95) filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Iloilo City on March 29, 1995, Tala alleged that on the basis of a contract of lease
executed on August 25, 1981 which provides in part:
"1. That the term of this LEASE shall be for a period of eleven (11) years, renewable for
another period of nine (9) years at the option of the LESSEE under terms and conditions
mutually agreeable to both parties."2,
its contract with Banco Filipino expired on August 31, 1992. However, Banco Filipino has
continued to occupy the premises even after the expiration of the lease.
On June 2, 1993, Tala imposed upon Banco Filipino the following terms and conditions:
that the bank should pay P70,050.00 as monthly rental retroactive as of September 1,
1992, with rental escalation of 10% per year; and advance deposit equivalent to rents for
four months, plus a goodwill of P500,000.00.
Banco Filipino did not comply and in April 1994, it stopped paying rents.
In its letter dated April 14, 1994, Tala notified Banco Filipino that the lease contract
would no longer be renewed; that it should pay its back rentals, including goodwill,
deposit and adjusted rentals in the amount of P2,059, 540.00 and vacate the premises on
or before April 30, 1994.3 In its second letter dated May 2, 1994, Tala demanded upon
Banco Filipino to pay the rents and vacate the premises.4
In answer to Tala's complaint, Banco Filipino denied having executed the lease contract
providing for a term of eleven (11) years; claiming that its contract with Tala is for twenty
(20) years, citing the Contract of Lease executed on August 25, 1981 providing:
"That the term of this LEASE shall be for a period of twenty (20) years, renewable for
another period of twenty (20) years at the option of the LESSEE under terms and
conditions mutually agreeable to both parties."5
On July 1, 1996, the MTC rendered judgment holding that the eleven (11)-year lease
contract superseded the twenty (20)-year lease contract. Thus, the court ordered the
ejectment of Banco Filipino from the premises on these grounds: expiration of the eleven
(11)-year lease contract and non-payment of the adjusted rental. Banco Filipino was
likewise ordered to pay back rentals in the amount of P79,050.00 corresponding to the
period from May 1994 up to the time that it shall have surrendered to Tala possession of
the premises.6
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Iloilo City affirmed the MTC decision.7
Banco Filipino elevated the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
challenged decision.8
Banco Filipino sought for a reconsideration of the Court of Appeals Decision, invoking in
its Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration the Decisions of the same court in two of the
other illegal detainer cases initiated by Tala against Banco Filipino, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP Nos. 39104 and 40524. In these cases, the Court of Appeals upheld the validity of the
lease contract providing for a period of twenty (20) years. Finding Banco Filipino's
motions for reconsideration meritorious, the Court of Appeals issued the herein assailed
Resolution, thus:
"This Court agrees with petitioner that its Decision of August 30, 1996 in CA-G.R. SP No.
39104, having been declared final and executory by no less than the Supreme Court in
G.R. No. 127586, now constitutes the law of the case between the parties in the present
case. Accordingly, this Court is not at liberty to disregard or abandon the same at will
without wreaking havoc on said legal principle.
"WHEREFORE, petitioner's motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion for
reconsideration are hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court's Decision of August 25,
1997 is hereby SET ASIDE and, in lieu thereof, a new one is rendered REVERSING and
SETTING ASIDE the appealed decision and DISMISSING the complaint for ejectment filed
against herein petitioner in the Municipal Trial Court of Iloilo City."9
Tala now comes to this Court on the lone ground that:
"The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in considering that principle of 'the law of the
case' finds application in the instant case."10
Petitioner Tala contends that its complaint for illegal detainer should not have been
dismissed by the Court of Appeals on the basis of its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 39104.
Petitioner claims that this decision is not a precedent.
The first in the series of illegal detainer cases filed by Tala against the bank which
reached the Supreme Court is CA-G.R. SP No. 39104. This involves the site in Malabon.
The Court of Appeals held that Banco Filipino cannot be ejected from the subject
premises considering that the twenty (20)-year lease contract has not expired. Tala
 50
elevated this Court of Appeals decision to the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 127586. In a
Resolution dated March 12, 1997, the Supreme Court dismissed Tala's petition as the
"appeal" was not timely perfected, thus:
"Considering the manifestation dated January 31, 1997 filed by petitioner that it is no
longer pursuing or holding in abeyance recourse to the Supreme Court for reasons stated
therein, the Court Resolved to DECLARE THIS CASE TERMINATED and DIRECT the Clerk
of Court to INFORM the parties that the judgment sought to be reviewed has become final
and executory, no appeal therefrom having been timely perfected."11
We agree with petitioner Tala that the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
39104 holding that the twenty (20)-year contract of lease governs the contractual
relationship between the parties is not a precedent considering that the Supreme Court
in G.R. No. 127586 did not decide the case on the merits. The petition was dismissed on
mere technicality. It is significant to note, however, that the Supreme Court in G.R. No.
129887,12 through Mr. Justice Sabino R. de Leon, resolved the identical issue raised in
the present petition, i.e., whether the period of the lease between the parties is twenty
(20) or eleven (11) years, thus:
"Second. Petitioner Tala Realty insists that its eleven (11)-year lease contract controls. We
agree with the MTC and the RTC, however, that the eleven (11)-year contract is a forgery
because (1) Teodoro O. Arcenas, then Executive Vice-President of private respondent
Banco Filipino, denied having signed the contract; (2) the records of the notary public
who notarized the said contract, Atty. Generoso S. Fulgencio, Jr., do not include the said
document; and (3) the said contract was never submitted to the Central Bank as required
by the latter's rules and regulations (Rollo, pp. 383-384.).
"Clearly, the foregoing circumstances are badges of fraud and simulation that rightly
make any court suspicious and wary of imputing any legitimacy and validity to the said
lease contract.
"Executive Vice-President Arcenas of private respondent Banco Filipino testified that he
was responsible for the daily operations of said bank. He denied having signed the eleven
(11)-year contract and reasoned that it was not in the interest of Banco Filipino to do so
(Rollo, p. 384). The fact was corroborated by Josefina C. Salvador, typist of Banco
Filipino's Legal Department, who allegedly witnessed the said contract and whose initials
allegedly appear in all the pages thereof. She disowned the said marginal initials (id., p.
385).
"The Executive Judge of the RTC supervises a notary public by requiring submission to
the Office of the Clerk of Court of his monthly notarial report with copies of acknowledged
documents thereto attached. Under this procedure and requirement of the Notarial Law,
failure to submit such notarial report and copies of acknowledged documents has dire
consequences including the possible revocation of the notary's notarial commission.
"The fact that the notary public who notarized petitioner Tala Realty's alleged eleven (11)-
year lease contract did not retain a copy thereof for submission to the Office of the Clerk
of Court of the proper RTC militates against the use of said document as a basis to
uphold petitioner's claim. The said alleged eleven (11)-year lease contract was not
submitted to the Central Bank whose strict documentation rules must be complied with
by banks to ensure their continued good standing. On the contrary, what was submitted
to the Central Bank was the twenty (20)-year lease contract.
"Granting arguendo that private respondent Banco Filipino deliberately omitted to submit
the eleven (11)-year contract to the Central Bank, we do not consider that fact as violative
of the res inter alios acta aliis non nocet (Section 28, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court
provides, viz.: 'Sec. 28. Admission by third party - The rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided.';
Compania General de Tabacos v. Ganson, 13 Phil. 472, 477 [1909]) rule in evidence.
Rather, it is an indication of said contract's inexistence.
"It is not the eleven (11)-year lease contract but the twenty (20)-year lease contract which
is the real and genuine contract between petitioner Tala Realty and private respondent
Banco Filipino. Considering that the twenty (20)-year lease contract is still
subsisting and will expire in 2001 yet, Banco Filipino is entitled to the possession
of the subject premises for as long as it pays the agreed rental and does not
violate the other terms and conditions thereof (Art. 1673, New Civil Code)."
(Emphasis supplied)
The validity of the twenty (20) year lease contract was further reinforced on June 20,
2000 when the First Division of this Court, this time, speaking through Madame Justice
Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, rendered a Decision in G.R. No. 137980, likewise upholding
the twenty (20)-year lease contract, thus:
"In light of the foregoing recent Decision of this Court (G.R. No. 129887), we have no
option but to uphold the twenty-year lease contract over the eleven-year contract
presented by petitioner. It is the better practice that when a court has laid down a
principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and
apply it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same. 'Stare decisis et
non quieta movere.'
"That the principle of stare decisis applies in the instant case, even though the subject
property is different, may be gleaned from the pronouncement in Negros Navigation Co.,
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 110398, 281 SCRA 534, 542-543 (1997)], to wit-
'Petitioner criticizes the lower court's reliance on the Mecenas case, arguing that although
this case arose out of the same incident as that involved in Mecenas, the parties are
different and trial was conducted separately. Petitioner contends that the decision in this
case should be based on the allegations and defenses pleaded and evidence adduced in it,
or, in short, on the record of this case.
'The contention is without merit. What petitioner contends may be true with respect to
the merits of the individual claims against petitioner but not as to the cause of the
sinking of its ship on April 22, 1980 and its liability for such accident, of which there is
only one truth. Otherwise, one would be subscribing to the sophistry: truth on one side of
the Pyrenees, falsehood on the other!
'Adherence to the Mecenas case is dictated by this Court's policy of maintaining stability
in jurisprudence in accordance with the legal maxim 'stare decisis et non quieta movere'
(Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled.) Where, as in this case,
the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by parties similarly
 51

situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of
stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue (J.M. Tuason & Corp. v.
Mariano, 85 SCRA 644 [1978]). In Woulfe v. Associated Realties Corporation (130 N.J. Eq.
519, 23 A. 2d 399, 401 [1942]), the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that where
substantially similar cases to the pending case were presented and applicable principles
declared in prior decisions, the court was bound by the principle of stare decisis.
Similarly, in State ex rel. Tollinger v. Gill (75 Ohio App., 62 N.E. 2d 760 [1944]), it was
held that under the doctrine of stare decisis a ruling is final even as to parties who are
strangers to the original proceeding and not bound by the judgment under the res
judicata doctrine. The Philadelphia court expressed itself in this wise: 'Stare decisis
simply declares that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should
be applied to those which follow, if the facts are substantially the same, even though the
parties may be different' (Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 274 Pa. 448, 452, 118A, 394,
395 [1922]. Manogahela Street Ry, Co. v. Philadelphia Co., 350 Pa 603, 39 A. 2d 909, 916
[1944]; In re Burtt's Estate, 353 Pa. 217, 4 A. 2d 670, 677 [1945]). Thus, in J.M. Tuason
v. Mariano, supra, this Court relied on its rulings in other cases involving different parties
in sustaining the validity of a land title on the principle of 'stare decisis et non quieta
movere.'(underscoring, Ours)
"Here, therefore, even if the property subject of the Decision of G.R. No. 129887 is located
in Urdaneta, Pangasinan while that in the instant case is located in Davao, we can very
well apply the conclusion in G.R. No. 129887 that it is the twenty-year lease contract
which is controlling inasmuch as not only are the parties the same, but more
importantly, the issue regarding its validity is one and the same and, hence, should no
longer be relitigated."
Considering the above rulings, we hold that the term of the lease in the present case is
also twenty (20) years.
Resolving now the issue of whether or not respondent Banco Filipino should be ejected
for non-payment of rentals, the First Division of this Court in the same G.R. No. 137980
held:
"Coming now to the issue of whether or not respondent should be ejected for non-
payment of rentals, we do not agree with the ruling in G.R. No 129887 that since the
unpaid rentals demanded by petitioner were based on a new rate which it unilaterally
imposed and to which respondent did not agree, there lies no ground for ejectment. In
such a case, there could still be ground for ejectment based on non-payment of rentals.
The recent case of T & C Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals13 is instructional
on this point. It was there cautioned that-
'The records reveal that the new rentals demanded since 1979 (P150.00 per month)
exceed that allowed by law so refusal on the part of the lessor to accept was justified.
However, what the lessee should have done was to deposit in 1979 the previous rent.
This deposit in the Bank was made only in 1984 indicating a delay of more than four
years.
'From the foregoing facts, it is clear that the lessor was correct in asking for the ejectment
of the delinquent lessee. Moreover, he should be granted not only the current rentals but
also all the rentals in arrears. This is so even if the lessor himself did not appeal because
as ruled by this Court, there have been instances when substantial justice demands the
giving of the proper reliefs.' x x x
"While advance rentals appear to have been made to be applied for the payment of rentals
due from the eleventh year to the twentieth year of the lease, to wit-
'3. That upon the signing and execution of this Contract, the LESSEE shall pay the
LESSOR ONE MILLION TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS ONLY (P1,020,000.00) Philippine
Currency representing advance rental to be applied on the monthly rental for period from
the eleventh to the twentieth year',
"the records show that such advance rental had already been applied for rent on the
property for the period of August, 1985 to November, 1989.
"Thus, when respondent stopped paying any rent at all beginning April, 1994, it gave
petitioner good ground for instituting ejectment proceedings. We reiterate the ruling in T
& C Development Corporation, supra, that if ever petitioner took exception to the
unilateral or illegal increase in rental rate, it should not have completely stopped paying
rent but should have deposited the original rent amount with the judicial authorities or
in a bank in the name of, and with notice to, petitioner. This circumstance, i.e.,
respondent's failure to pay rent at the old rate, does not appear in G.R. No. 129887.
Thus, while we are bound by the findings of this Court's Second Division in that case
under the principle of stare decisis, the fact that respondent's failure to pay any rentals
beginning April 1994, which provided ground for its ejectment from the premises,
justifies our departure from the outcome of G.R. No. 129887. In this case, we uphold
petitioner's right to eject respondent from the leased premises."
It bears stressing that the facts of the instant case and those of G.R. Nos. 129887 and
137980 are substantially the same. The only difference is the site of respondent bank.
The opposing parties are likewise the same.

'The trial court found that private respondent had failed to pay the monthly rental of Clearly, in light of the Decisions of this Court in G.R. Nos. 129887 and 137980, which we
P1,800.00 from November 1992 to February 16, 1993, despite demands to pay and to follow as precedents, respondent Banco Filipino may not be ejected on the ground of
vacate the premises made by petitioner. Even if private respondent deposited the rents in expiration of the lease. However, since it stopped paying the rents beginning April 1994,
arrears in the bank, this fact cannot alter the legal situation of private respondent since its eviction from the premises is justified.
the account was opened in private respondent's name. Clearly, there was cause for the
ejectment of private respondent. Although the increase in monthly rentals from P700.00
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the Court of Appeals
to P1,800.00 was in excess of 20% allowed by B.P. Blg. 877, as amended by R.A. No.
in CA- G.R. SP No. 44257 is MODIFIED insofar as it denies petitioner Tala's prayer for
6828, what private respondent could have done was to deposit the original rent of
ejectment of respondent Banco Filipino.
P700.00 either with the judicial authorities or in a bank in the name of, and with notice
to, petitioner. As this Court held in Uy v. Court of Appeals (178 SCRA 671, 676 [1989]):
 52

Judgment is rendered ordering respondent Banco Filipino to vacate the subject premises 2nd quarter 2,528,126.02
and to restore possession thereof to petitioner Tala. Respondent is also ordered to pay
Tala the monthly rental of P21,100.00 computed from April 1994 up to the time it vacates
3rd quarter 1,918,015.38
the premises.

4th quarter 1,413,073.977chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Costs against respondent.SO ORDERED.
Melo, Vitug, Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, J., no part, former counsel of a party. The claim for credit/refund, however, remained unacted by the respondent. Hence,
petitioner was constrained to file a petition before the CTA.
FIRST DIVISION
Proceedings before the Second Division of the Court of Tax Appeals
G.R. NO. 177127 : October 11, 2010
On April 16, 2002, petitioner filed a Petition for Review8cra1aw with the CTA for the
refund/credit of the same input VAT which was docketed as CTA Case No.
J.R.A. PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Respondent.cralaw
6454 and raffled to the Second Division of the CTA.
DECISION
In his Answer,9cra1aw respondent interposed the following special and affirmative
defenses, to wit:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

4. Petitioners alleged claim for refund is subject to administrative routinary

Stare decisis et non quieta movere.
investigation/examination by the Bureau;

Courts are bound by prior decisions. Thus, once a case has been decided one way, courts
5. Being allegedly registered with the Philippine Economic Zone Authority as an export
have no choice but to resolve subsequent cases involving the same issue in the same
enterprise, petitioners business is not subject to VAT pursuant to Section 24 of R.A. No.
manner.1cra1aw We ruled then, as we rule now, that failure to print the word "zero-rated"
7916 in relation to Section 109 (q) of the Tax Code. Hence, it is not entitled to tax credit
in the invoices/receipts is fatal to a claim for credit/refund of input value-added tax (VAT)
of input taxes pursuant to Section 4.103-1 of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95;
on zero-rated sales.

6. The amount of P8,228,276.34 being claimed by petitioner as alleged unutilized VAT

This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to set
input taxes for the year 2000 was not properly documented;
aside the January 15, 2007 Decision2cra1aw and the March 16, 2007

7. In an action for refund, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer to establish its right to
Resolution3cra1aw of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) En Banc.
refund, and failure to [do so] is fatal to the claim for refund/ credit;

Factual Antecedents
8. Petitioner must show that it has complied with the provisions of Section 204 (c) and
229 of the Tax Code on the prescriptive period for claiming tax refund/credit;
Petitioner J.R.A. Philippines, Inc., a domestic corporation, is engaged in the manufacture
and wholesale export of jackets, pants, trousers, overalls, shirts, polo shirts, ladies wear,
9. Claims for refund are construed strictly against the claimant for the same partake the
dresses and other wearing apparel.4cra1aw It is registered with the Bureau of Internal
nature of exemption from taxation.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Revenue (BIR) as a VAT taxpayer5cra1aw and as an Ecozone Export Enterprise with the
Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA).6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
After trial, the Second Division of the CTA rendered a Decision11cra1aw denying
petitioners claim for refund/credit of input VAT attributable to its zero-rated sales due to
On separate dates, petitioner filed with the Revenue District Office (RDO) No. 54 of the
the failure of petitioner to indicate its Taxpayers Identification Number-VAT (TIN-V) and
BIR, Trece Martires City, applications for tax credit/refund of unutilized input VAT on its
the word "zero-rated" on its invoices.12cra1aw Thus, the fallo
zero-rated sales for the taxable quarters of 2000 in the total amount of P8,228,276.34,
reads:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
broken down as follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED DUE

1st quarter P 2,369,060.97
COURSE, and, accordingly, DISMISSED for lack of merit.
 53
SO ORDERED.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Aggrieved by the Decision, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration14cra1aw to which
respondent filed an Opposition.15cra1aw Petitioner, in turn, tendered a
Reply.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Second Division of the CTA, however, stood firm on its Decision and denied
petitioners Motion for lack of merit in a Resolution17cra1aw dated October 5, 2005. This
prompted petitioner to elevate the matter to the CTA En
Banc.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Ruling of the CTA En Banc
On January 15, 2007, the CTA En Banc denied the petition, reiterating that failure to
comply with invoicing requirements results in the denial of a claim for refund.19cra1aw
Hence, it disposed of the petition as follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit. ACCORDINGLY, the
Decision dated June 30, 2005 and Resolution dated October 5, 2005 of Second Division
of the Court of Tax Appeals in C.T.A Case No. 6454 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Presiding Justice Ernesto D. Acosta (Presiding Justice Acosta) concurred with the
findings of the majority that there was failure on the part of petitioner to comply with the
invoicing requirements;21cra1aw he dissented, however, to the outright denial of
petitioners claim since there are other pieces of evidence proving petitioners transactions
and VAT status.22chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioner sought reconsideration23cra1aw of the Decision but the CTA En Banc
denied the same in a Resolution24cra1aw dated March 16, 2007. Presiding Justice Acosta
maintained his dissent.
Issue
Hence, the instant Petition with the solitary issue of whether the failure to print the word
"zero-rated" on the invoices/receipts is fatal to a claim for credit/ refund of input VAT on
zero-rated sales.
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioner submits that:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS ERRED BY DECIDING QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE IN A
MANNER THAT IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, IN
THAT:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. THE INVOICING REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE 1997 TAX CODE DO NOT REQUIRE
THAT INVOICES AND/OR RECEIPTS ISSUED BY A VAT-REGISTERED TAXPAYER,
SUCH AS THE PETITIONER, SHOULD BE IMPRINTED WITH THE WORD "ZERO-RATED."
B. THE INVOICING REQUIREMENTS PRESCRIBED BY THE 1997 TAX CODE AND THE
REQUIREMENT THAT THE WORDS "ZERO-RATED" BE IMPRINTED ON THE SALES
INVOICES/OFFICIAL RECEIPTS UNDER REVENUE REGULATIONS NO. 7-95 ARE NOT
EVIDENTIARY RULES AND THE ABSENCE THEREOF IS NOT FATAL TO A TAXPAYERS
CLAIM FOR REFUND.
C. RESPONDENTS REGULATIONS ARE INVALID BECAUSE THEY DO NOT IMPLEMENT
THE 1997 TAX CODE BUT INSTEAD, [EXCEED] THE LIMITATIONS OF THE LAW.
D. PETITIONER PRESENTED SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT UNEQUIVOCALLY
PROVED PETITIONERS ZERO-RATED TRANSACTIONS FOR THE YEAR 2000.
E. NO PREJUDICE CAN RESULT TO THE GOVERNMENT BY REASON OF THE FAILURE
OF PETITIONER TO IMPRINT THE WORD "ZERO-RATED" ON ITS INVOICES.
PETITIONERS CLIENTS FOR ITS ZERO-RATED TRANSACTIONS CANNOT UNDULY
BENEFIT FROM ITS "OMISSION" CONSIDERING THAT THEY ARE NON-RESIDENT
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS [that] ARE NOT COVERED BY THE PHILIPPINE VAT
SYSTEM.
F. IN CIVIL CASE[S], SUCH AS CLAIMS FOR REFUND, STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH
TECHNICAL RULES OF EVIDENCE IS NOT REQUIRED. MOREOVER, A MERE
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE WILL SUFFICE TO JUSTIFY THE GRANT OF A
CLAIM.25chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Respondents Arguments
Emphasizing that tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions which are strictly
construed against the claimant, respondent seeks the affirmance of the assailed Decision
and Resolution of the CTA En Banc. 26cra1aw He insists that the denial of petitioners
claim for tax credit/refund is justified because it failed to comply with the invoicing
requirements under Section 4.108-127cra1aw of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95.
Our Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
The absence of the word "zero-rated" on the invoices/receipts is fatal to a claim for
credit/refund of input VAT
The question of whether the absence of the word "zero-rated" on the invoices/receipts is
fatal to a claim for credit/refund of input VAT is not novel. This has been squarely
resolved in Panasonic Communications Imaging Corporation of the Philippines (formerly
Matsushita Business Machine Corporation of the Philippines) v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue.28cra1aw In that case, we sustained the denial of petitioners claim for tax
credit/refund for non-compliance with Section 4.108-1 of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95,
 54

which requires the word "zero rated" to be printed on the invoices/receipts covering zero- Section 4.108-1 of RR 7-95 proceeds from the rule-making authority granted to the
rated sales. We explained that:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary Secretary of Finance under Section 245 of the 1977 NIRC (Presidential Decree 1158) for
the efficient enforcement of the tax code and of course its amendments. The requirement
is reasonable and is in accord with the efficient collection of VAT from the covered sales of
Zero-rated transactions generally refer to the export sale of goods and services. The tax
goods and services. As aptly explained by the CTAs First Division, the appearance of the
rate in this case is set at zero. When applied to the tax base or the selling price of the
word "zero-rated" on the face of invoices covering zero-rated sales prevents buyers from
goods or services sold, such zero rate results in no tax chargeable against the foreign
falsely claiming input VAT from their purchases when no VAT was actually paid. If,
buyer or customer. But, although the seller in such transactions charges no output tax,
absent such word, a successful claim for input VAT is made, the government would be
he can claim a refund of the VAT that his suppliers charged him. The seller thus enjoys
refunding money it did not collect.
automatic zero rating, which allows him to recover the input taxes he paid relating to the
export sales, making him internationally competitive.
Further, the printing of the word "zero-rated" on the invoice helps segregate sales that are
subject to 10% (now 12%) VAT from those sales that are zero-rated. Unable to submit the
For the effective zero rating of such transactions, however, the taxpayer has to be VAT-
proper invoices, petitioner Panasonic has been unable to substantiate its claim for
registered and must comply with invoicing requirements. x x x
refund.29chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

xxxx
Consistent with the foregoing jurisprudence, petitioners claim for credit/ refund of input
VAT for the taxable quarters of 2000 must be denied. Failure to print the word "zero-
Petitioner Panasonic points out, however, that in requiring the printing on its sales rated" on the invoices/receipts is fatal to a claim for credit/ refund of input VAT on zero-
invoices of the word "zero-rated," the Secretary of Finance unduly expanded, amended, rated sales.
and modified by a mere regulation (Section 4.108-1 of RR 7-95) the letter and spirit of
Sections 113 and 237 of the 1997 NIRC, prior to their amendment by R.A. 9337.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated January 15,
Panasonic argues that the 1997 NIRC, which applied to its payments specifically Sections
2007 and the Resolution dated March 16, 2007 of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc are
113 and 237 required the VAT-registered taxpayers receipts or invoices to indicate only
hereby AFFIRMED.
the following information:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

SO ORDERED.
(1) A statement that the seller is a VAT-registered person, followed by his taxpayers
identification number (TIN);
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
(2) The total amount which the purchaser [paid] or is obligated to pay to the seller with
the indication that such amount includes the value-added tax;
WE CONCUR:
(3) The date of transaction, quantity, unit cost and description of the goods or properties
or nature of the service; and RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
(4) The name, business style, if any, address and taxpayer's identification number (TIN) of
the purchaser, customer or client.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, TERESITA J. LEONARDO-
Petitioner Panasonic points out that Sections 113 and 237 did not require the inclusion JR. DE CASTRO
of the word "zero-rated" for zero-rated sales covered by its receipts or invoices. The BIR Associate Justice Associate Justice
incorporated this requirement only after the enactment of R.A. 9337 on November 1,
2005, a law that did not yet exist at the time it issued its invoices.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
But when petitioner Panasonic made the export sales subject of this case, i.e., from April
1998 to March 1999, the rule that applied was Section 4.108-1 of RR 7-95, otherwise
CERTIFICATION
known as the Consolidated Value-Added Tax Regulations, which the Secretary of Finance
issued on December 9, 1995 and [which] took effect on January 1, 1996. It already
required the printing of the word "zero-rated" on the invoices covering zero-rated sales. Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
When R.A. 9337 amended the 1997 NIRC on November 1, 2005, it made this particular conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
revenue regulation a part of the tax code. This conversion from regulation to law did not assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
diminish the binding force of such regulation with respect to acts committed prior to the
enactment of that law.
 55

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice