1
Fernando Collantes v. Viente Renomeron
200 SCRA 584
Facts: This complaint for disbarment is relative to the administrative case
filed by Atty. Collantes, house counsel for V& G Better Homes
Subdivision, Inc. (V&G), against Atty. Renomeron, Register of Deeds of
Tacloban City, for the latter’s irregular actuations with regard to the
application of V&G for registration of 163 pro forma Deed of Absolute
Sale with Assignment (in favor of GSIS) of lots in its subdivision.
Although V&G complied with the desired requirements, respondent
suspended the registration of the documents with certain “special
conditions” between them, which was that V&G should provide him with
weekly round trip ticket from Tacloban to Manila plus P2,000.00 as pocket
money per trip, or, in lieu thereof, the sale of respondent’s Quezon City
house and lot by V&G or GSIS representatives.
Eventually, respondent formally denied the registration of the documents.
He himself elevated the question on the registrability of the said documents
to Administrator Bonifacio (of the National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Administration-NLTDRA). The Administrator then resolved
in favor of the registrability of the documents. Despite the resolution of the
Administrator, the respondent still refused the registration thereof but
demanded from the parties interested the submission of additional
requirements not adverted in his previous denial.
Issues: (1) WON the respondent, as a lawyer, may also be disciplined by
the Court for his malfeasance as a public official, and (2) WON the Code of
Professional Responsibility applies to government service in the discharge
of official tasks.
Held: (1) Yes, a lawyer’s misconduct as a public official also constitutes a
violation of his oath as a lawyer. The lawyer’s oath imposes upon every
lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer’s oath is
a source of obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension,
disbarment or other disciplinary action.
(2) Yes, the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to government
service in the discharge of their official tasks (Canon 6). The Code forbids
a lawyer to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct
(Rule 1.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), or delay any man’s cause
“for any corrupt motive or interest” (Rule 1.03).
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Ladaga
350 SCRA 326, January 26, 2001
Facts:
Atty. Misael M. Ladaga as Branch Clerk of the Court of Makati
Regional Trial Court, requested the Court Administrator, Justice Benepayo,
to allow him to appear as counsel on behalf of his cousin who is more like
a sister to him who was charged with falsification. While waiting for the
approval, he already made severeal appearances for his cousin as his cousin
has no enough resources to pay for legal services of other lawyers. On
December 8, RTC Makati denied the request of the respondent and directed
the Office of the Court Administrator to file administrative charges against
him for violating R.A. 6713 which prohibits practice of law by public
officials. A Resolution was submitted to the Executive Judge of RTC
Makati and she recommended since it was the first time fir the respondent
to do it, without securing first the permission from the head of the office
which is the Court. The respondent is reprimanded and warned that any
repetition would yield to severe charges.
Issue:
Whether Atty. Ladaga’s appearances as a pro bono counsel for a relative
constitutes practice of law as prohibited by the Administrative Code.
HELD: No. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of the statute
should be customarily or habitually holding one’s self to the public as a
lawyer and demanding payment for such services. It does not pertain to
isolated court appearances as in this case. Nevertheless, for his failure to
obtain a prior permission from the head of the Department (CJ) as required
by law, respondent was reprimanded.
Lahm v. Mayor
A.C. No. 7430; 15 February 2012
Facts:
On 5 September 2006, a certain David Edward Toze filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbitration Branch of the National Labor
Relations Commission against the members of the Board of Trustees of the
International School, Manila. The case was raffled to the sala of the
respondent, Labor Arbiter Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr. During the proceedings,
Toze filed a Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, to which the complainants, Martin
Lahm III and James P. Concepcion, opposed. Thereafter, the respondent
issued an Order directing the parties in the said case to maintain the status
quo ante, which consequently reinstated Toze to his former position as
superintendent of the International School Manila. Despite the
complainants’ motion for an early resolution of their motion to dismiss the
said case, respondent maintained his Order. Thus, the complaint praying for
the respondent’s disbarment for alleged gross misconduct and violation of
lawyer’s oath.
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Issue:
Is the respondent guilty for the gross misconduct and violation of lawyer’s
oath?
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court concurred with the conclusion of the Investigating
Commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline that respondent
guilty for the gross misconduct and violation of lawyer’s oath. Gross
misconduct is any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on
the part of a person concerned with the administration of justice; i.e.,
conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination
of the cause. The motive behind this conduct is generally a premeditated,
obstinate or intentional purpose.
Under the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the labor arbiters no
longer have the authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining orders. However, the respondent, in violation of the
said rule, vehemently insist that he has the authority to issue writs of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order.
Further, the unfounded insistence of the respondent on his supposed
authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order, taken together with the delay in the resolution of the said
motion for reconsideration, would clearly show that the respondent
deliberately intended to cause prejudice to the complainants.
In stubbornly insisting that he has the authority to issue writs of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order contrary to the
clear import of the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the respondent
violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
mandates lawyers to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law
and legal processes.
Vitriolo v. Dasig
Facts: This is an administrative case for disbarment filed against Atty.
Felina S.Dasig, an official of the Commission on Higher Education(CHED).
The charge involves gross misconduct of respondent in violation of the
Attorneys Oath for having used her public office to secure financial spoils
to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the CHED.
Almost all complainants in the instant case are high-ranking officers
of the CHED. In their sworn Complainant-affidavit filed with this court on
December 4, 1998, complainants alleged that respondent, while she was
OIC of Legal Affairs Services, CHED, committed acts that are grounds for
disbarment under Section 27, Rules 138 of Rules of Court. Complainant
likewise aver that respondent violated her oath as attorney-at-law by filing
eleven baseless, groundless, and unfounded suits before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City, which were subsequently dismissed.
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended that respondent be
suspended from practice of law for the maximum period allowable three (3)
years with a further warning that similar action in the future will be a
ground for disbarment of respondent.
IBP Board of Governors approved the recommendation.
ISSUE: WON respondent attorney-at-law as an Officer-in-Charge of Legal
Services, (CHED) may be disciplined by this court considering that her
position, at the time of filing of the complaint, was Chief Education
Program Specialist, Standards Development Division, Office of Programs
and Standards CHED.
Held: Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may
not be disciplined as a memver of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge
of his duties as a government official. However, if said misconduct as a
government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then
he may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar.
In this, case the record shows that the respondent, on various
occasions, during her tenure as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, attempted to
extort from Betty C. Mangohon, Rosalie B. Dela Torre, Rocella G. Eje, and
Jacqueline N. Ng, sums of money as consideration for her favorable action
on their pending applications or requests before her office. We find that
respondents misconduct as a lawyer of the CHED is of such a character as
to affect her qualification as a member of the Bar, for as a lawyer, she
ought to have known that it was patently illegal for her to demand sums of
money as consideration for the approval of applications and requests
awaiting action by her office.
A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his
professional obligations. Hence, the Code of Professional Responsibility,
was not meant to govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of
all lawyers including those in government service. This is clear from
CANON 6 of Said Code, Lawyers in government are public servants who
owe the utmost fidelity to the public service. Respondents attempts to
extort money from persons with applications or requests pending before her
office are violative of Rule 1.01 of Code of Professional Responsibility,
which prohibits members of the Bar from engaging or participating in any
unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts.
Moreover, Rule 6.02 of the Code which bars lawyers in government
service from promoting their private interests. Promotion of private
interests includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any
transaction requiring the approval of his office or which may be affected by
the functions of his office.
For her violation of the Attorneys Oath as well as Rule 1.01 and Rule
1.03 of Canon 1 and Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Respondent Atty. Felina S. Dasig is found liable for gross
misconduct and dishonesty in violation of the Attorneys Oath as well as the
code of Professional Responsibility, and is hereby ordered DISBARRED.
Gisela Huyssen vs Atty. Fred Gutierrez
Facts:
The Investigating Commissioner recommended the disbarment of the
respondent. The IBP Board of Governors further approved the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Complainant’s Contention:
The complainant and her three sons were American Citizens seeking to
apply for a Philippine Visa under Section 13(g) of the Immigration Law.
The respondent advised the complainant to deposit $20,000 for one year so
that their visa application will be in their favor. The respondent further
promised that the amount deposited will be returned after one year. The
complainant gave $20,000 to the respondent for the money to be deposited
due to the belief that it was required by the law. After the duration of one
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year, the complainant has done several actions to collect the $20,000
deposit, but the respondent failed to give it back.
Respondent’s Contention:
The respondent denied the complainant’s allegation. He contended that he
merely advised the complainant regarding the action that they should do for
their visa application. He was even asked to recommend a lawyer to work
for their application. He recommended the late Atty. Mendoza to take the
job. The respondent contended that Atty. Mendoza was the one who
physically accepted the $20,000 deposit. The complainant wanted to
recover the deposit from the respondent because they couldn’t recover from
the deceased Atty. Mendoza. The respondent tried to raise funds to return
the complainant’s deposit because the obligation attached when he signed
the vouchers.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Fred Gutierrez should be disbarred on the grounds of
affixing his signature in the petty cash vouchers and receipts he prepared
for the complainant’s application for visa with the BID.
Held:
The respondent should be disbarred. The respondent issued personal
postdated checks as his moral obligation. This is an indirect action of
admitting guilt to using the complainant’s money for the respondent’s
personal use. There was also no evidence to prove that Atty. Mendoza
assisted the complainant regarding to their visa application and no evidence
was submitted to prove Atty. Mendoza’s death. Respondent’s acts
constitute gross misconduct; and consistent with the need to maintain the
high standards of the Bar and thus preserve the faith of the public in the
legal profession, respondent deserves the ultimate penalty of expulsion
from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers.
RE: RESOLUTION OF THE COURT DATED 1 JUNE 2004 IN G.R.
NO. 72954 AGAINST, ATTY. VICTOR C. AVECILLA, Respondent.
Sometime in 1985, respondent Atty. Victor C. Avecilla (Atty.
Avecilla) and a certain Mr. Louis C. Biraogo (Mr. Biraogo) filed
a petition before this Court impugning the constitutionality of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 883, i.e., the law that called for the holding
of a presidential snap election on 7 February 1986. The petition
was consolidated with nine (9) other petitions1 voicing a similar
concern.
RESPONDENT:
On 19 December 1985, the Court En banc issued a Resolution
dismissing the consolidated petitions, effectively upholding the
validity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 883. On 8 January 1986, after
the aforesaid resolution became final, the rollo of G.R. No.
72954 was entrusted to the Court’s Judicial Records Office (JRO)
for safekeeping.
On 14 July 2003, the respondent and Mr. Biraogo sent a letter 5 to
the Honorable Hilario G. Davide, Jr., then Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court (Chief Justice Davide), requesting that they be
furnished several documents6 relative to the expenditure of the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). In order to show that they
have interest in the JDF enough to be informed of how it was
being spent, the respondent and Mr. Biraogo claimed that they
made contributions to the said fund by way of the docket and
legal fees they paid as petitioners in G.R No. 72954.
On 28 July 2003, Chief Justice Davide instructed8 Atty. Teresita
Dimaisip (Atty. Dimaisip), then Chief of the JRO, to forward the
rollo of G.R. No. 72954 for the purpose of verifying the claim of
the respondent and Mr. Biraogo. Following a diligent search for
the rollo of G.R. No. 72954, Atty. Dimaisip apprised Chief
Justice Davide that the subject rollo could not be found in the
archives.
The tracer card of G.R. No. 72954, Atty. Dimaisip discovered
that the subject rollo had been borrowed from the JRO but,
unfortunately, was never since returned. The tracer card named
the respondent, although acting through a certain Atty. Salvador
Banzon (Atty. Banzon), as the borrower of the subject rollo.
The next day, or on 31 July 2003, Chief Justice Davide took
prompt action by directing Atty. Dimaisip to supply information
about how the respondent was able to borrow the rollo of G.R.
No. 72954 and also to take necessary measures to secure the
return of the said rollo.
Reporting her compliance with the foregoing directives, Atty.
Dimaisip sent to Chief Justice Davide a Memorandum14 on 13
August 2003. In substance, the Memorandum relates that:
1. At the time the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 was borrowed from
the JRO, the respondent was employed with the Supreme Court
as a member of the legal staff of retired Justice Emilio A.
Gancayco (Justice Gancayco). Ostensibly, it was by virtue of his
confidential employment that the respondent was able to gain
access to the rollo of G.R. No. 72954.
2. Atty. Dimaisip had already contacted the respondent about the
possible return of the subject rollo. Atty. Dimaisip said that the
respondent acknowledged having borrowed the rollo of G.R. No.
72954 through Atty. Banzon, who is a colleague of his in the
office of Justice Gancayco.
On 18 August 2003, almost twelve (12) years after it was
borrowed, the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 was finally turned over by
Atty. Avecilla to the JRO.
On 20 November 2003, the OCAT submitted a
Memorandum20 to the Chief Justice opining that the respondent
may be administratively charged, as a lawyer and member of the
bar. For these following reasons:
for taking out the rollo of G.R. No. 72954.
the respondent clearly abused his confidential position for which
he may be administratively sanctioned - the respondent borrowed
the subject rollo not for any official business related to his duties
as a legal researcher for Justice Gancayco, but merely to fulfill a
personal agenda, since the respondent is presently no longer in
the employ of the Supreme Court, he can no longer be
sanctioned as such employee.
The respondent maintained that he neither borrowed nor
authorized anyone to borrow the rollo of G.R. No.
72954. Instead, the respondent shifts the blame on the person
whose signature actually appears on the tracer card of G.R. No.
72954 and who, without authority, took the subject rollo in his
name.
the respondent, however, intimated that the same might have
belonged to Atty. Banzon.
For some unknown reason, the subject rollo just ended up in his
box of personal papers and effects, which he brought home
following the retirement of Justice Gancayco.The respondent can
only speculate that the one who actually borrowed the rollo
might have been a colleague in the office of Justice Gancayco
and that through inadvertence, the same was misplaced in his
personal box.
The respondent also denounced any ill-motive for failing to
return the rollo, professing that he had never exerted effort to
examine his box of personal papers and effects up until that time
when he was contacted by Atty. Dimaisip inquiring about the
missing rollo
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The respondent claimed that after finding out that the missing
rollo was, indeed, in his personal box, he immediately extended
his cooperation to the JRO and wasted no time in arranging for
its return.
OCAT, the OBC dismissed the defenses of the respondent and found the
latter to be fully accountable for taking out the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 and
failing to return it timely. The OBC, thus, recommended that the respondent
be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year.
ISSUE:
WON the respondent should be held liable for borrowing the rollo and
for failing to return the same for period of almost 12 years.
HELD:
it was the respondent, and no one else, who is responsible for taking out the
subject rollo.
The tracer card of G.R. No. 72954 bears the following information:
1. The name of the respondent, who was identified as borrower
of the rollo, and
2. The signature of Atty. Banzon who, on behalf of the
respondent, actually received the rollo from the JRO.47
The respondent sought to discredit the foregoing entries by insisting that he
never authorized Atty. Banzon to borrow the subject rollo on his
behalf.48 We are, however, not convinced.
First. Despite the denial of the respondent, the undisputed fact remains that
it was from his possession that the missing rollo was retrieved about twelve
(12) years after it was borrowed from the JRO. This fact, in the absence of
any plausible explanation to the contrary, is sufficient affirmation that, true
to what the tracer card states, it was the respondent who borrowed the rollo
of G.R. No. 72954.
Second. The respondent offered no convincing explanation how the subject
rollo found its way into his box of personal papers and effects. The
respondent can only surmise that the subject rollo may have been
inadvertently placed in his personal box by another member of the staff of
Justice Gancayco. However, the respondent’s convenient surmise remained
just that—a speculation incapable of being verified definitively.
Third. If anything, the respondent’s exceptional stature as a lawyer and
former confidante of a Justice of this Court only made his excuse
unacceptable, if not totally unbelievable. As adequately rebuffed by the
OCAT in its Report dated 12 April 2004:
x x x However, the excuse that the rollo "inadvertently or accidentally"
found its way to his personal box through his officemates rings hollow in
the face of the fact that he was no less than the confidential legal assistance
of a Member of this Court. With this responsible position, Avecilla is
expected to exercise extraordinary diligence with respect to all matters,
including seeing to it that only his personal belongings were in that box for
taking home after his term of office in this Court has expired. 50
Verily, the tracer card of G.R. No. 72954 was never adequately
controverted. We, therefore, sustain its entry and hold the respondent
responsible for borrowing the rollo of G.R. No. 72954.
Respondent’s Administrative Liability
Having settled that the respondent was the one who borrowed the rollo of
G.R. No. 72954, We next determine his administrative culpability.
We begin by laying the premises:
1. The respondent is presently no longer in the employ of this
Court and as such, can no longer be held administratively
sanctioned as an employee. However, the respondent, as a lawyer
and a member of the bar, remains under the supervisory and
disciplinary aegis of this Court.
2. The respondent was already nearing the expiration of his
"extended tenure" when he borrowed the rollo of G.R. No.
72954 on 13 September 1991. We must recall that Justice
Gancayco already retired as of 20 April 1991. Hence, it may be
concluded that for whatever reason the respondent borrowed the
subject rollo, it was not for any official reason related to the
adjudication of pending cases.
3. The respondent’s unjustified retention of the subject rollo for a
considerable length of time all but confirms his illicit motive in
borrowing the same. It must be pointed out that the subject rollo
had been in the clandestine possession of the respondent for
almost twelve (12) years until it was finally discovered and
recovered by the JRO.
Given the foregoing, We find that there are sufficient grounds to hold
respondent administratively liable.
First. Taking judicial records, such as a rollo, outside court premises,
without the court’s consent, is an administratively punishable act. In
Fabiculana, Sr. v. Gadon,55 this Court previously sanctioned a sheriff for
the wrongful act of bringing court records home, thus:
Likewise Ciriaco Y. Forlales, although not a respondent in complainant's
letter-complaint, should be meted the proper penalty, having admitted
taking the records of the case home and forgetting about them. Court
employees are, in the first place, not allowed to take any court records,
papers or documents outside the court premises. It is clear that Forlales was
not only negligent in his duty of transmitting promptly the records of an
appealed case to the appellate court but he also failed in his duty not to take
the records of the case outside of the court and to subsequently forget about
them.56 (Emphasis supplied)
Second. The act of the respondent in borrowing a rollo for unofficial
business entails the employment of deceit not becoming a member of the
bar.1awphi1 It presupposes the use of misrepresentation and, to a certain
extent, even abuse of position on the part of the respondent because the
lending of rollos are, as a matter of policy, only limited to official purposes.
As a lawyer then employed with the government, the respondent clearly
violated Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to
wit:
Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public
position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to
interfere with his public duties. (Emphasis supplied).
Third. However, We find the recommended penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for one (1) year as too harsh for the present case. We
consider the following circumstances in favor of the respondent:
1. G.R. No. 72954 was already finally resolved when its rollo
was borrowed on 13 September 1991. Thus, the act of
respondent in keeping the subject rollo worked no prejudice
insofar as deciding G.R. No. 72954 is concerned.
2. It was never established that the contents of the rollo, which
remained confidential despite the finality of the resolution in
G.R. No. 72954, were disclosed by the respondent.
3. After his possession of the subject rollo was discovered, the
respondent cooperated with the JRO for the return of the rollo.
We, therefore, temper the period of suspension to only six (6) months.
QUERY OF ATTY. KAREN M. SILVERIO-BUFFE, FORMER Clerk
of Court – BRANCH 81, ROMBLON, ROMBLON – ON THE
PROHIBITION FROM ENGAGING IN THE PRIVATE PRACTICE
Facts:
The query, which became an administrative matter, was related to Section
7(b)(2) of RA No. 6713, as amended (or the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees). This provision places a
limitation on public officials and employees during their incumbency, and
those already separated from government employment for a period of one
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(1) year after separation, in engaging in the private practice of their
profession.
The query arose because Atty. Buffe previously worked as Clerk of Court
VI of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 81 of Romblon; she resigned
from her position effective February 1, 2008. Thereafter (and within the
one-year period of prohibition mentioned in the above-quoted provision),
she engaged in the private practice of law by appearing as private counsel
in three cases before RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon.
Atty. Buffe alleged that Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 gives preferential
treatment to an incumbent public employee, who may engage in the private
practice of his profession so long as this practice does not conflict or tend
to conflict with his official functions. In contrast, a public official or
employee who has retired, resigned, or has been separated from
government service like her, is prohibited from engaging in private practice
on any matter before the office where she used to work, for a period of one
(1) year from the date of her separation from government employment.
Per Deputy Court Admin., the prohibition was intended to avoid any
impropriety or the appearance of impropriety which may occur in any
transaction between the retired government employee and his former
colleagues, subordinates or superiors brought about by familiarity, moral
ascendancy or undue influence, as the case may be.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Buffe may practice her profession before the office
she used to be with which was the RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon within the
1 year prohibition.
Held:
NO. Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713 generally provides for the prohibited acts
and transactions of public officials and employees. Subsection (b)(2)
prohibits them from engaging in the private practice of their profession
during their incumbency. As an exception, a public official or employee
can engage in the practice of his or her profession under the following
conditions: first, the private practice is authorized by the Constitution or by
the law; and second, the practice will not conflict, or tend to conflict, with
his or her official functions.
The Section 7 prohibitions continue to apply for a period of one year after
the public official or employee's resignation, retirement, or separation from
public office, except for the private practice of profession under subsection
(b)(2), which can already be undertaken even within the one-year
prohibition period. As an exception to this exception, the one-year
prohibited period applies with respect to any matter before the office the
public officer or employee used to work with.
The Section 7 prohibitions are predicated on the principle that public office
is a public trust; and serve to remove any impropriety, real or imagined,
which may occur in government transactions between a former government
official or employee and his or her former colleagues, subordinates or
superiors. The prohibitions also promote the observance and the efficient
use of every moment of the prescribed office hours to serve the public.
As stated in the facts, Atty. Buffe immediately engaged in private practice
of law within the one-year period of prohibition stated in Section 7(b)(2) of
R.A. No. 6713. As we discussed above, a clerk of court can already engage
in the practice of law immediately after her separation from the service and
without any period limitation that applies to other prohibitions under
Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713. However, she cannot practice her profession
within one year before the office where he or she used to work with
(RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon). In a comparison between a resigned, retired
or separated official or employee, on the one hand, and an incumbent
official or employee, on the other, the former has the advantage because the
limitation is only with respect to the office he or she used to work with and
only for a period of one year. The incumbent cannot practice at all, save
only where specifically allowed by the Constitution and the law and only in
areas where no conflict of interests exists. This analysis again disproves
Atty. Buffe's basic premises.
By acting in a manner that R.A. No. 6713 brands as "unlawful," Atty. Buffe
contravened Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION,
OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR
LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES
The Court also held that Atty. Buffe violated the lawyer’s oath and Canon
7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when she blatantly and
unlawfully practised law within the prohibited period by appearing before
the RTC Branch she had just left. Canon 7 states:
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE
INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
Accordingly, Atty. Buffe was found guilty of professional misconduct for
violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and was fined in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00), and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of her violation
and the commission of other acts of professional misconduct shall be dealt
with more severely.
PNB vs CEDO
FACTS:
Atty. Telesforo S. Cedo, former Asst. Vice-President of the Asset
Management Group of complainant bank(PNB).
Philippine National Bank charged respondent with violation of Canon 6,
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus:
“A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement
or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened
while in said service.”
PNB Contentions:
that while respondent was still in its employ, he participated in arranging
the sale of steel sheets in favor of Milagros Ong Siy for P200,000.
Respondent, Atty. Cedo, who had left the employ of the complainant bank,
appeared as one of the counsels of Mrs. Ong Siy when a civil action arose
out of the transaction between Mrs. Ong Siy and complainant bank.
Moreover, while respondent was still the Asst. Vice President of
complainant’s Asset Management Group, he intervened in the handling of
the loan account of the spouses Ponciano and Eufemia Almeda with
complainant bank by writing demand letters to the couple.
When a civil action ensued between complainant bank and the Almeda
spouses as a result of this loan account, the latter were represented by the
law firm "Cedo, Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates" of which respondent is one
of the Senior Partners.
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Atty. Cedo’s Defense:
Ong Siy’s Case: admitted that he appeared as counsel for Mrs. Ong Siy but
only with respect to the execution pending appeal of the RTC decision. He
alleged that he did not participate in the litigation of the case before the
trial court.
Almeda spouses’ Case: He contended that while the law firm "Cedo Ferrer,
Maynigo & Associates" is designated as counsel of record, the case is
actually handled only by Atty. Pedro Ferrer. Respondent averred that he did
not enter into a general partnership with Atty. Pedro Ferrer nor with the
other lawyers named therein. Each one of them handles their own cases
independently and individually receives the revenues therefrom which are
not shared among them.
ISSUE:
WON respondent violated the Canon 6, Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
RULING:
YES.
IBP FINDINGS:
Ong Siy’s Case: It was discovered that respondent was previously fined by
this Court in the amount of P1,000.00 in connection with G.R. No. 94456
entitled "Milagros Ong Siy vs. Hon. Salvador Tensuan, et al." for forum
shopping, where respondent appeared as counsel for petitioner Milagros
Ong Siy "through the law firm of Cedo Ferrer Maynigo and Associates."
Almeda Spouses’ Case: that in one of the hearings of the Almeda spouses'
case, respondent attended the same with his partner Atty. Ferrer, and
although he did not enter his appearance, he was practically dictating to
Atty. Ferrer what to say and argue before the court. Furthermore, during the
hearing of the application for a writ of injunction in the same case,
respondent impliedly admitted being the partner of Atty. Ferrer, when it
was made of record that respondent was working in the same office as Atty.
Ferrer.
SUPREME COURT:
The Court cited Nobrado vs Hernandez ruled:
"Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of
litigations, a complicated affair, consisting of entangled relevant and
irrelevant, secret and well-known facts. In the complexity of what is said in
the course of dealings between an attorney and client, inquiry of the nature
suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other
matters that might only further prejudice the complainant's cause."
Whatever may be said as to whether or not respondent utilized against his
former client information given to him in a professional capacity, the
mere fact of their previous relationship should have precluded him from
appearing as counsel for the other side in the forcible entry case
Having been an executive of complainant bank, respondent now seeks to
litigate as counsel for the opposite side, a case against his former employer
involving a transaction which he formerly handled while still an employee
of complainant, in violation of Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics on adverse influence and conflicting interests, to wit:
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express
conflicting consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interest
when, in behalf on one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty
to another client requires him to oppose.
The Court suspends respondent Atty. Cedo from the practice of law for
three (3) years.
PCGG v. SANDIGANBAYAN
April 12, 2005
FACTS:
In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered
financial difficulties due to considerable financial support the former had
extended to Filcapital Development Corporation. As a bailout, the Central
Bank extended emergency loans to GENBANK which reached a total of
P310 million.[3] Despite the mega loans, GENBANK failed to recover
from its financial woes. On March 25, 1977, the Central Bank issued a
resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business
with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering
its liquidation.[4] A public bidding of GENBANKs assets was held from
March 26 to 28, 1977, wherein the Lucio Tan group submitted the winning
bid.[5] Subsequently, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a
petition with the then Court of First Instance praying for the assistance and
supervision of the court in GENBANKs liquidation as mandated by Section
29 of Republic Act No. 265.
Pursuant to its creation and mandate, the PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed
with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion, reconveyance,
restitution, accounting and damages against respondents Lucio Tan, et al.
In connection therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on
properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by taking
advantage of their close relationship and influence with former President
Marcos.
Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions for
certiorari, prohibition and injunction to nullify, among others, the writs of
sequestration issued by the PCGG. In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al.
were represented by their counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza, who has then resumed his private practice of law.
On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent
Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. with the Second Division of
the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0005 and 0096-0099. The motions
alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General and counsel to
Central Bank, actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK, which
was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied
Banking Corporation. Respondent Mendoza allegedly intervened in the
acquisition of GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al. when, in his capacity
as then Solicitor General, he advised the Central Banks officials on the
procedure to bring about GENBANKs liquidation and appeared as counsel
for the Central Bank in connection with its petition for assistance in the
liquidation of GENBANK which he filed with the Court of First Instance
 7
(now Regional Trial Court) of Manila and was docketed as Special
Proceeding No. 107812.
The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from
accepting engagement or employment in connection with any matter in
which he had intervened while in said service.
On April 22, 1991 the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution denying PCGGs motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza in
Civil Case No. 0005. It found that the PCGG failed to prove the existence
of an inconsistency between respondent Mendozas former function as
Solicitor General and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan
group. It noted that respondent Mendoza did not take a position adverse to
that taken on behalf of the Central Bank during his term as Solicitor
General. It further ruled that respondent Mendozas appearance as counsel
for respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited period under
Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor
General in the year 1986. The said section prohibits a former public official
or employee from practicing his profession in connection with any matter
before the office he used to be with within one year from his resignation,
retirement or separation from public office. The PCGG did not seek any
reconsideration of the ruling.
It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from the
Sandiganbayans Second Division to the Fifth Division. In its resolution
dated July 11, 2001, the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the
other PCGGs motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza. It adopted the
resolution of its Second Division dated April 22, 1991, and observed that
the arguments were the same in substance as the motion to disqualify filed
in Civil Case No. 0005. The PCGG sought reconsideration of the ruling but
its motion was denied in its resolution dated December 5, 2001.
ISSUES:
WON Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to
respondent Mendoza.
WON Mendoza’s act of advising the Central Bank on the legal procedure
to liquidate GENBANK is included within the concept of matter under
Rule 6.03.
RULING:
Rule 6.03: A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in the said service.
The SC held that the advice given by respondent Mendoza on the
procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the matter contemplated by Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No.
342 is clear as daylight in stressing that the drafting, enforcing or
interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or
briefing abstract principles of law are acts which do not fall within the
scope of the term matter and cannot disqualify.
Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that the above
act of respondent Mendoza falls within the definition of matter per ABA
Formal Opinion No. 342. Be that as it may, the said act of respondent
Mendoza which is the matter involved in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is entirely
different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096. Again, the plain
facts speak for themselves. It is given that respondent Mendoza had
nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate
GENBANK. It is also given that he did not participate in the sale of
GENBANK to Allied Bank. The matter where he got himself involved was
in informing Central Bank on the procedure provided by law to liquidate
GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary petition in Sp. Proc.
No. 107812 in the then Court of First Instance. The subject matter of Sp.
Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the same nor is related to but is different
from the subject matter in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096
involves the sequestration of the stocksowned by respondents Tan, et al., in
Allied Bank on the alleged ground that they are ill-gotten.
The Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the prejudice
to the client which will be caused by its misapplication. It cannot be
doubted that granting a disqualification motion causes the client to lose not
only the law firm of choice, but probably an individual lawyer in whom the
client has confidence.[51] The client with a disqualified lawyer must start
again often without the benefit of the work done by the latter.
No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former
government lawyer of the freedom to exercise his profession. Given the
current state of our law, the disqualification of a former government lawyer
may extend to all members of his law firm.[55] Former government
lawyers stand in danger of becoming the lepers of the legal profession.
The act of respondent Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on the
procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is a different matter from the
subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about the sequestration of
the shares of respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. Consequently, the
danger that confidential official information might be divulged is nil, if not
inexistent. To be sure, there are no inconsistent sides to be bothered about
in the case at bar. For there is no question that in lawyering for respondents
Tan, et al., respondent Mendoza is not working against the interest of
Central Bank. On the contrary, he is indirectly defending the validity of the
action of Central Bank in liquidating GENBANK and selling it later to
Allied Bank. Their interests coincide instead of colliding. It is for this
reason that Central Bank offered no objection to the lawyering of
respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005 in defense of respondents Tan,
et al. There is no switching of sides for no two sides are involved.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions dated July 11,
2001 and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan in
Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 is denied.
In Re: IBP Elections AM No 491 06 October 1989
Facts:
After the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (hereafter “IBP”) held on June 3, 1989, the newly-elected
officers were set to take the their oath of office before the Supreme Court
en banc. However, disturbed by the widespread reports from lawyers who
had witnessed or participated in the proceedings and the adverse comments
published in the columns of some newspapers about the intensive
electioneering and overspending by the candidates, led by the main
protagonists for the office of president of the association, namely,
Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged
use of government planes, and the officious intervention of certain public
officials to influence the voting, all of which were done in violation of the
IBP By-Laws which prohibit such activities. The Supreme Court en banc,
exercising its power of supervision over the Integrated Bar, resolved to
suspend the oath-taking of the IBP officers-elect and to inquire into the
veracity of the reports.
The election process itself (i.e. the voting and the canvassing of votes on
June 3, 1989) was unanimously adjudged by the participants and observers
to be above board. What the Court viewed with considerable concern was
the reported electioneering and extravagance that characterized the
campaign conducted by the three candidates for president of the IBP.
 8
The Court en banc formed a committee and total of forty-nine (49)
witnesses appeared and testified in response to subpoenas issued by the
Court to shed light on the conduct of the elections.
Issue: Whether or not IBP by-laws were violated.
Decision: IBP by-laws were violated. Elections held on June 3,1989 be
annulled, relevant by-laws be amended as per the court’s resolution and
new elections be held such that the persons named in the resolution cannot
contest for any IBP position.
Fernandez Vs Grecia
42 SCAD 438 – Legal Ethics – Gross Misconduct
In 1990, Linda Aves was admitted to St. Lukes Hospital. Among the
doctors who treated her was Dr. Alberto Fernandez. She was treated well
hence she was sent home but then the next day she died together with her
unborn child. Damaso Aves, husband, then filed a damage suit against the
hospital and he impleaded the attending doctors which included Fernandez.
Aves hired Atty. Benjamin Grecia to represent him.
Grecia requested St. Luke to surrender before the court the medical records
of Linda Aves. St. Luke complied and the medical records were delivered
to the Clerk of Court. In the morning of July 16, 1991, Grecia went to the
office of the clerk of court to borrow the said medical records. While
Grecia was examining the said medical records, he tore in front of the
Clerk and one office staff two pages from the medical records and then
handed it back to the Clerk. The Clerk was stunned as she watched Grecia
walk away. She then reported the incident to the judge. The judge
immediately took action and the torn pages were eventually recovered as it
turned out that Grecia handed the torn pages to someone else.
Grecia was then administratively charged by Dr. Fernandez. Apparently,
Grecia has been disbarred before. However, he was able to get to the good
side of the Supreme Court hence he was reinstated to the profession.
ISSUE: Whether or not Grecia should be disbarred again.
HELD: Yes. Grecia violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. As a
lawyer, he should not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful
conduct. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. A lawyer is
an officer of the courts; he is “like the court itself, an instrument or agency
to advance the ends of justice”. Considering that this is his second offense,
an incorrigible practitioner of “dirty tricks,” like Grecia would be ill-suited
to discharge the role of “an instrument to advance the ends of justice.” By
descending to the level of a common thief, respondent Grecia has
demeaned and disgraced the legal profession. He has demonstrated his
moral unfitness to continue as a member of the honorable fraternity of
lawyers. He has forfeited his membership in the BAR.
SANTOS, JR. VS. ATTY. LLAMAS, AC 4749 dated January 20, 2000
FACTS:
Soliman Santos (Santos) filed a complaint against Atty. Llamas for
misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues where it was
alleged that Atty. Llamas has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP OR
Nos and date & place of issuance in his pleadings except for “IBP Rizal
259060” which he has been using for at least three years (1995, 1996 and
1997). The complaint was sought by Santos for clarification and
appropriate action on the bar standing of Llamas both with the Bar
Confidant and with the IBP, especially its Rizal Chapter of which Llamas
purports to be a member.
According to Santos, that since 1992, he already made it clear as per his
ITR, up to present (year 2000), he had only a limited practice of law since
he filled up the principal occupation as “farmer” of which he is. Moreover,
he alleged that as a senior citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt in the
payment of taxes under Section 4 of RA 7432 which took effect in 1992.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Llamas is guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
HELD:
YES. Even if he had “limited” practice of law, it does not relieve him of the
duties such as payment of IBP dues. Section 10 Rule 139-A Rule of Court
provides:
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of
Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six
months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and
default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of
the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
Invoking and citing that being a senior citizen since 1992, is legally exempt
in the payment of taxes under RA 7432 is not applicable in this case. He is
still not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the IBP.
Further, by indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby
misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues
to the Rizal Chapter, Atty. Llamas is guilty of Rule 1.01, CANON 7, and
Rule 10.01 CANON 10 which provides:
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE
INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
CANON 10 — A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD
FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by
any artifice.
Atty. LLmas failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the
pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However,
in view of respondent's advanced age, his express willingness to pay his
dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law, the Court
believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or until
he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.
LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING
EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES.
FACTS: In his letter, dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought
exemption from payment of IBP dues in the amount of P12,035.00 as
alleged unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that after
being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the
Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to, and
worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his retirement in the year 2003.
He maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that he
was working in the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law
prohibits the practice of one's profession while in government service, and
neither can he be assessed for the years when he was working in the USA.
ISSUES:
 9

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment 2. Never attended Quisumbing College
of his dues during the time that he was inactive in the practice of
law? 3. Never obtained a diploma.

Whether or not the enforcement of penalty of removal amount to DIAO admitting first charge but claims that although he had left high
deprivation of property without due process? school in his third year, he entered the service of the U.S. Army, passed the
General Classification Test given therein, which (according to him) is
HELD: equivalent to a high school diploma
1. No. The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification Upon return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army
of the entire lawyer population. This requires membership and financial service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.
support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of law
and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme
Court.
No certification. However, it is unnecessary to dwell on this, since the
If the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an second charge is clearly meritorious:
incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It
would not be possible to put on an integrated Bar program without means i. Never obtained his diploma. from Quisumbing College; and yet
to defray the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries his application for examination represented him as an A.A. graduate.
with it the power to impose such exaction.
ii. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano
Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the
IBP, of which no one is exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of University in April, 1949
payment of dues subsists for as long as one's membership in the IBP
remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the
member is engaged in. 1. He said erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment Quisumbing College, in his school records.
of membership dues. At most, as correctly observed by the IBP, he could
have informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay
abroad before he left. In such case, his membership in the IBP could have
been terminated and his obligation to pay dues could have been
discontinued. ISSUE:
2. No. Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its WON DIAO still continue admission to the Bar, for passing the Bar despite
being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do
not completing pre-law requirements? NO.
not here pause to consider at length, as it [is] clear that under the police
power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to
perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practice law before the
courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and HELD:
inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is
recognize[d], then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty STRIKE OUT NME OF DIAO IN ROLL OF ATTORNEYS. DIAO
may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or REQUIRED TO RETURN HIS LAWYER’S DIPLOMA WITHIN 30
arbitrary. DAYS.
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right Explanation of error or confusion is not acceptable. Had his application
but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory
disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would also
power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public
have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he began
responsibilities.
his law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before obtaining
his Associate in Arts degree.

He would not have been permitted to take the bar tests:

In the matter of the Petition for Disbarment of Telesforo Diao vs.

Severino Martinez
i. Bar applicant must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law,
he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal
education (A.A.).
FACTS:
ii. Therefore, Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations
DIAO was admitted to the Bar.
iii. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be,
2 years later, Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his and is hereby revoked.
application for the Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic
qualifications.

Solicitor General investigated and recommended that Diao's name be Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to become an
erased from the roll of attorneys attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular
manner is equally essential.
i. DIAO did not complete pre-law subjects:

1. Did not complete his high school training

 10
CARMELITA ZAGUIRRE VS ATTY. ALFREDO CASTILLO
Facts:
● Complainant, Carmelita and Respondent, Atty. Castillo were officemates
at the National Bureau of Investigation when the latter promised the
complainant to marry her while representing himself as ‘single’.
● During the affair respondent was preparing for his bar examinations,
which he passed.
● Carmelita found out that Atty. Castillo was already married.
● Their relationship only lasted for one year (1996-1997). However,
complainant got pregnant and gave birth to a baby girl Aletha Jessa, which
the respondent hereby refused to recognize and give support.
● Hence, a petition for Disbarment filed by Carmelita Zaguirre was filed on
the ground of Gross Immoral Conduct.
RESPONDENT’S
● Claimed that he never courted the complainant and what was transpired
was nothing but mutual lust and desire.
● He never represented himself as single because it was evident in the NBI
that he was married with children.
● He’s not the father of the child borne by complainant since the latter is
seeing another man instead of him.
● He signed the affidavit to save the complainant from embarrassment.
IBP’s
● Found Atty. Castillo guilty of gross immoral conduct and recommended
the penalty of indefinite suspension from practice of law.
ISSUE:
● Whether or not, Atty Castillo is guilty of gross immoral conduct, and
thus be suspended to practice law?
RULING:
● Yes, respondent having extramarital affair with complainant and saying
that what happened between them was ‘nothing but mutual lust and desire’
is reprehensible.
● The illicit relationship with Carmelita although took place while he was
only preparing for bar examinations was not a defense, because a
possession of good moral character is not a condition precedent to
admission to the legal profession but a continued possession and essential
to maintain one’s good standing.
● Respondent also engaged in sexual congress with a woman other that his
wife and refused to recognize and support a child, whom he should
recognize and support.
● Therefore, Herein respondent, was suspended to the practice of law until
he is able to show to the full satisfaction of the Court, that he has instilled
himself a firm conviction of maintaining moral integrity and uprightness
required of every member of the profession.
(Canon 7, Rule 7.03: A Lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice of law, nor shall he, whether
in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the Legal profession)
-SJBasilla ♥
Guevara v. Eala
Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for
Disbarment before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee
on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli
Eala (respondent) for grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of
the lawyers oath.
In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:
He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainants)
then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene) introduced respondent to him as her friend
who was married to Marianne (sometimes spelled Mary Ann) Tantoco with
whom he had three children.
After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that
from January to March 2001, Irene had been receiving from respondent
cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read I love you, I miss
you, or Meet you at Megamall. Complainant also noticed that Irene
habitually went home very late at night or early in the morning of the
following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked
about her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parents house in
Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.
In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and Respondent
together on two occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted them
following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house. On April 22, 2001
complainant went uninvited to Irene’s birthday celebration at which he saw
her and the respondent celebrating with her family and friends. Out of
embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the venue immediately.
Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all
her personal belongings. Complainant later found a handwritten letter dated
October 7, 2007, the day of his wedding to Irene, Complainant soon saw
respondent’s car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B11 Street,
New Manila where as he was later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was
already residing. He also learned still later that when his friends saw Irene
on about January 18, 2002 together with respondent during a concert, she
was pregnant.
Respondent:
admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card on which the above-quoted
letter was handwritten.
Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous
relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the
truth of the matter being that their relationship was low profile and known
only to the immediate members of their respective families, and that
Respondent, as far as the general public was concerned, was still known to
be legally married to Mary Anne Tantoco.
Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15 of the
Complaint regarding his adulterous relationship and that his acts
demonstrate gross moral depravity thereby making him unfit to keep his
membership in the bar, the reason being that Respondents relationship with
Irene was not under scandalous circumstances and that as far as his
relationship with his own family:
Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful relationship with
[his wife] Mary Anne as in fact they still occasionally meet in public, even
if Mary Anne is aware of Respondents special friendship with Irene.
Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to the institution
of marriage by calling the institution of marriage a mere piece of paper
because his reference [in his above-quoted handwritten letter to Irene] to
the marriage between Complainant and Irene as a piece of paper was
 11
merely with respect to the formality of the marriage contract.[7] (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Issue: WON Concubinage or Adulterous relationship, be the reason for the
disbarment of Atty. Jose Emmanuel Eala.
HELD:
After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San
Juan, in a 12-page REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION dated October
26, 2004, found the charge against respondent sufficiently proven.
The Commissioner thus recommended that respondent be disbarred for
violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
reading:
Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct (Underscoring supplied),and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the
same Code reading:
Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
(Underscoring supplied)
The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment
or suspension uses the phrase grossly immoral conduct, not under
scandalous circumstances. Sexual intercourse under scandalous
circumstances is, following Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code reading:
ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the
conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous
circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her
in any other place, shall be punished by prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods.
an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual
intercourse with a woman elsewhere.
Whether a lawyers sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without
the benefit of marriage should be characterized as grossly immoral conduct
depends on the surrounding circumstances. The case at bar involves a
relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his
wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly.
While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual
relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant
administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so with respect to
betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of
extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations
outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests
deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows
protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.[37] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Respondent in fact also violated the lawyers oath he took before admission
to practice law which goes:
I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in
the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority
of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitutionand obey
the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I
will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for
money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best
of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the
courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
(Underscoring supplied)
Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of
the Constitution reading:
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of
the family and shall be protected by the State.
In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which
echoes this constitutional provision, obligates the husband and the wife to
live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual
help and support.
Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct, and Rule 7.03 of Canon
7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any
conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.
Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly
immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1,
Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part
of the records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme
Court of the Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.
This Decision takes effect immediately. SO ORDERED.