CLARO E. NARTE vs.

COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 132442

FACTS:
Petitioner Claro Narte was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati for having violated Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (Anti-
Bouncing Check Law) and was convicted of nine counts of violation of the latter with subsidiary imprisonment incase of insolvency in
each case.
The facts of the case show that Claro Narte is the General Manager of Norphil Transport Corporation while accused
Winston Tomas Cadhit is the maintenance and purchasing manager of Norphil Trasnportation Corporation; that spouses Delia and
Emilio Cabrera sold three (3) air conditioned buses to Norphil Transport Corporation on May 12, 1994 for P2,220,000.00 cash upon
delivery by virtue of which a deed of absolute sale was executed; that the buses were delivered; that payment for the buses was
made in postdated checks issued by accused Claro Narte and Winston Tomas L. Cadhit at their office, all of which are payable to
Emilio Cabrera, that the checks are marked Exhibits E, F, H, J, K, L, were deposited on August 18, 1994 with Solid Bank, Paco Branch;
that the checks marked Exhibit G and Exhibit I were presented for payment with PNB on July 5, 1994 and September 2, 1994,
respectively; that the checks marked Exhibit M and N were deposited with Solid Bank on August 31, 1994 and September 18, 1994,
respectively; that the check marked Exhibit G was dishonored for being drawn against insufficient funds while the rest of the checks
marked Exhibits E to F and H to N were dishonored by reason of account closed as per corresponding letter advice from the banks
concerned; that the spouses accepted check payments upon the request of accused; that they informed accused that the checks had
bounced; that the accused promised to pay the bank upon return of their boss who was then in Canada; that the boss arrived
without any payment being made; that she consulted a lawyer, Atty. Gaudencio Lagua, who sent demand letters; that despite their
promise and receipt of the demand letters, accused failed to settle the obligation.
Trial for the case commenced and petitioners then appealed to the CA by way of a petition or review, wherein the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Comment dated September 15, 1998, arguing that the mere issuance of a check which is
subsequently dishonored is prohibited. Countering the petitioners claim that there was no valid consideration for the issuance of the
checks, the OSG points out that the petitioners themselves admitted that the checks were issued in payment of the buses purchased
from Delia and Emilio Cabrera. Finally, the OSG avers that the RPC has supplementary application to special laws such as B.P.
22. Hence, as the RPC provides for subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment of fine, subsidiary imprisonment may be
imposed in the instant case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the the trial court erred in ordering subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment of fine on the part of
the petitioner;

HELD:
The Courts ruled in the negative and the importunate claim that the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment as improper by
the petitioners is thus dispelled. At any rate, the Courts have pronounced that the clear intention of the framers of B.P. 22 is to make
the mere act of issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum.
The agreement surrounding the issuance of the checks need not be first looked into since the law itself provides that
regardless of the intent of the parties, the mere issuance of any kind of check which is subsequently dishonored makes the person
who issued the check liable. It is worth noting that the RPC has supplementary application to special laws such as B.P. 22. Hence, as
the RPC provides for subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment of fine, subsidiary imprisonment may be imposed in the
instant case. WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 28, 1998, the instant
petition for review is DENIED. Costs against petitioners.

PEOPLE vs. ARTURO PUNZALAN, JR.

G.R. No. 199892

FACTS:
On August 10, 2002, at around 10:00 in the evening, the accused together with his colleagues went to a nearby videoke bar,
"Aquarius," where they had a drinking session. Shortly thereafter, a heated argument between SN1 Bacosa and appellant ensued
regarding a flickering light bulb inside "Aquarius.” When SN1 Bacosa suggested that the light be turned off ("Patayin ang ilaw"),
appellant who must have misunderstood and misinterpreted SN1 Bacosa’s statement belligerently reacted asking, "Sinong
papatayin?," thinking that SN1 Bacosa’s statement was directed at him. SN1 Cuya tried to pacify SN1 Bacosa and appellant, while
SN1 Bundang apologized to appellant in behalf of SN1 Bacosa. However, appellant was still visibly angry, mumbling unintelligible
words and pounding his fist on the table. To avoid further trouble, the navy personnel decided to leave "Aquarius" and return to the
NETC camp.
 Along the way, they passed by the NETC sentry gate which was being manned by SN1 Noel de Guzman and F1EN Alejandro
Dimaala at that time. SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna even stopped by to give the sentries some barbecue before proceeding to follow
their companions. Soon after the navy personnel passed by the sentry gate, SN1 De Guzman and F1EN Dimaala flagged down a
rushing and zigzagging maroon Nissan van with plate number DRW 706. The sentries approached the van and recognized appellant,
who was reeking of liquor, as the driver. Appellant angrily uttered, "kasi chief, gago ang mga ‘yan!," while pointing toward the
direction of the navy personnel’s group. Even before he was given the go signal to proceed, appellant shifted gears and sped away
while uttering, "papatayin ko ang mga ‘yan!” SN1 De Guzman saw how the van sped away towards the camp and suddenly swerved
to the right hitting the group of the walking navy personnel. When they were hit by the vehicle from behind, SN1 Cuya and SN1
Bacosa were thrown away towards a grassy spot on the roadside. They momentarily lost consciousness. When they came to, they
saw SN1 Duclayna lying motionless on the ground. SN1 Cuya tried to resuscitate SN1 Duclayna, while SN1 Bacosa tried to chase the
van, but to no avail.
As a result, SN1 Andal died of cardiorespiratory arrest as a result of massive blunt traumatic injuries to the head, thorax and
abdomen. On the other hand, SN1 Duclayna sustained fatal injuries to the head and liver. The head and neck injuries were such that
a lot of blood vessels were ruptured and the fractures were embedded in the brain. The laceration on the liver, also a mortal injury,
was a blunt traumatic injury As regards the other navy personnel, SN1 Cuya suffered lacerated wounds on the head and different
parts of the body for which he was confined at the infirmary for about eighteen (18) days; SN1 Bacosa sustained injuries on his knee
and left hand and stayed in the infirmary for a day; and SN1 Bundang suffered injuries to his right foot.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant is guilty of the complex crime of murder with frustrated murder;

HELD:
The courts ruled in the affirmative. The felony committed by appellant as correctly found by the RTC and the Court of
Appeals, double murder with multiple attempted murder, is a complex crime contemplated under Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code:
Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. – When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be
applied in its maximum period.
Appellant was animated by a single purpose, to kill the navy personnel, and committed a single act of stepping on the
accelerator, swerving to the right side of the road ramming through the navy personnel, causing the death of SN1 Andal and SN1
Duclayna and, at the same time, constituting an attempt to kill SN1 Cuya, SN1 Bacosa, SN1 Bundang and SN1 Domingo. The crimes of
murder and attempted murder are both grave felonies as the law attaches an afflictive penalty to capital punishment (reclusion
perpetua to death) for murder while attempted murder is punished by prision mayor, an afflictive penalty.

PEOPLE vs. CELERINO CASTROMERO

G.R. No. 118992

FACTS:
The facts of the case show that on or about the 6th day of February, 1993, at about 2:00 oclock in the morning, at Barangay
Tanggoy, Municipality of Balayan, Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, Celerino Castromero, armed with a knife (balisong) and by means of force and intimidation did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the offended party, Josephine Baon, against her will and consent and
as a consequence thereof, the said offended party suffered serious physical injuries which injuries required medical attendance and
incapacitated her from performing her customary work for a period of more than ninety (90) days by jumping down through the
window of her house.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant is guilty and liable for the complex crime of rape with serious physical injuries;

HELD:
The Courts ruled in the affirmative. To consummate rape, perfect or complete penetration of the complainants private
organ is not essential. Even the slightest penetration by the male organ of the lips of the female organ, or labia of the pudendum, is
sufficient. Josephine’s testimony that appellants organ touched the opening of her vagina can lead to no other conclusion than that
the appellants manhood legally invaded, however slightly, the lips of her private organ. Clearly, rape was consummated in this
case. Because the sexual assault was perpetrated by force and intimidation, it is reiterated that appellant Castromero is thus guilty
of rape pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.
 In relation to the charge that rape was complexed with the crime of serious physical injuries, we stress the settled principle
that a person who creates in another’s mind an immediate sense of danger that causes the latter to try to escape is responsible for
whatever the other person may consequently suffers. In this case, Josephine jumped from a window of her house to escape from
Appellant Castromero; as a result, she suffered serious physical injuries, specifically a broken vertebra which required medical
attention and surgery for more than ninety days. This being the case, the court a quo correctly convicted Appellant Castromero of
the complex crime of rape with serious physical injuries.

PEOPLE vs. IRENEO JUGUETA

G.R. No. 202124

FACTS:
The facts of the case show that on or about 9:00 o’clock in the evening of 6th day of June, 2002, at Barangay Caridad Ilaya,
Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, armed with short firearms of undetermined
calibres, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery, with evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot with the said firearms the house occupied by the family of Norberto
Divina, thereby commencing the commission of the crime of Murder, directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of
execution which would have produced it by reason of some cause or accident other than the spontaneous desistance of the
accused, that is, the occupants Norberto Divina, his wife Maricel Divina and children Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina, both
elementary pupils and who are minors, were not hit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the act committed by the appellant is that of a complex crime of murder;

HELD:
The Courts ruled in the negative. In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however, in the eyes of the
law and in the conscience of the offender they constitute only one crime, thus, only one penalty is imposed. There are two kinds of
complex crime. The first is known as a compound crime, or when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies while
the other is known as a complex crime proper, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The classic example
of the first kind is when a single bullet results in the death of two or more persons. A different rule governs where separate and distinct
acts result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shot, such acts constitute
separate and distinct crimes.
As is evident from the shooting incident, it clearly shows that appellant and the two others, in firing successive and
indiscriminate shots at the family of Norberto from their respective firearms, intended to kill not only Norberto, but his entire family.
When several gunmen, as in this case, indiscriminately fire a series of shots at a group of people, it shows their intention to kill several
individuals. Hence, they are committing not only one crime. What appellant and his cohorts committed cannot be classified as a
complex crime because as held in People v. Nelmida, “each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming
each particular moment at different persons constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise to a complex crime.”