People of the Philippines vs Gerardo Sazon, alias INSIK

GR. No. 89684 September 18, 1990

Facts:

Ernesto Romualdez was confronted by Sazon for circulating a rumor that Sazon and his companions
were engaged in stealing, upon confrontation however, Romualdez boxed Sazon and threatened to kill
him. 2 days later, Sazon and his cousin followed Romualdez after seeing the latter pass by. Sazon again
confronted Romualdez, and Romualdez allegedly provoked Sazon to just shoot. To which Sazon shot
Romualdez dead.

Issue: WON Sazon was justified in killing Romualdez because there was provocation

Held: No. The alleged provocation of Romualdez was insufficient to justify Sazon's actions.
Furthermore, there was evident premeditation when Sazon and his cousin followed the victim in
an attempt to overpower him

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 89684 September 18, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GERARDO SAZON, alias "INSIK," accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Benjamin P. Sorongon for accused-appellant.

REGALADO, J.:

For the death of Wilfredo Longno, alias, "Inday," on September 17, 1983 at Barangay Progreso, Lapuz, La Paz, Iloilo City, herein accused-
appellant Gerardo Sazon, alias "Insik," and Cornelio Altejos, alias "Toto," were charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo, 1 in an amended information dated October 18, 1983.2 However, only herein accused was arraigned, and pleaded not guilty, since
Cornelio Altejos was not apprehended and has since remained at large.

After trial, appellant was found guilty and sentenced to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He
was further ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased the amount of P16,628.40 representing hospital
bills, expenses for the coffin, tomb, wake and attorney's fees, and P30,000.00 as indemnity for the
death of the victim.

The antecedental facts which led to the filing of the criminal action below are herein under set forth
as synthesized by the court a quo from the testimonies of the witnesses, 3 and as clarified and
amplified by us from the transcripts of the notes of the hearings.
On September 15, 1983, in the barangay aforementioned, a certain Ernesto Romualdez was
accosted by appellant near the barangay hall for allegedly circulating the rumor that appellant and
his companions were engaged in stealing. Upon confrontation, appellant boxed Romualdez which
caused the latter to fall. Wilfredo Longo, who was then present at the scene, approached and helped
the fallen Romualdez and pushed appellant away. This apparently angered appellant who, in his
native dialect said "Andam ka lang Inday kay patyon ta guid," ("Watch out Inday for I will kill you") to
which Longno retorted, "Just do it."

Two days later, or on September 17, 1983, at about 8:00 o'clock P.M., appellant and his cousin,
Cornelio Altejos, were drinking softdrinks at the shire of Gloria Aposaga when Longno passed by.
Thereupon, appellant and Altejos left their softdrinks half-assumed and followed Longno.

Longno eventually reached the bench near the public faucet where the group of Massulini Dullete,
Samuel Canoso and Nathaniel Ramos were sitting. He joined the group in their conversation by
saying, "Upon ako dira." ("I'll go with what you say."). Shortly thereafter, appellant and Altejos arrived
and appellant accosted and pointed a gun at Longno, saying, "Maano ka?" ("What are you going to
do?"). Longno then faced appellant and said, "Brod, tiruha lang." ("Brod, just shoot.")

Apparently irked by the response, appellant fired the gun, hitting Longno in the left forearm. Dullete,
Canoso and Ramos then scampered for safety as appellant and the wounded Longno grappled for
the gun. It was while the two were thus struggling that Altejos stabbed Longno in the chest, after
which both appellant and Altejos ran away.

Longno then came out of the footwalk shouting, "Tay tiniro ako ni Insik, binuno ako ni Toto."
("Father, I was shot by Insik and stabbed by Toto."). He was able to run about thirty (30) meters
before he fell. His father, Julio Longno, ran to his son who was then lying sprawled on the ground.
Rushed to the St. Paul's Hospital, Wilfredo Longno died. Later, it was established that the cause of
death was hemorrhage, secondary to stab wound.

Appellant's version of the incident, however, differs. He admits having shot Longno but pleads self-
defense. He claims that on September 17, 1983, he left the house of his father-in-law at about 8:00
o'clock P.M. with his cousin, Altejos. The latter had asked for help to have a .22 caliber revolver
repaired and appellant was taking the revolver to a policeman friend of his. On their way, appellant
saw Longno from a distance. Upon his approach, Longno allegedly said, "Insik, I heard that you are
not afraid of me. Maybe you want to be taught a lesson." 4

Appellant claims that the deceased had a revolver tucked in his waist and was about to draw the
same. He, therefore, parried the gun but it fired hitting one of appellant's left fingers which was later
amputated. It was then that appellant pulled out his gun and shot Longno in the forearm. Appellant
and Longno afterwards grappled for the gun. Altejos allegedly tried to separate appellant and
Longno but he was brushed aside by the latter. In the course of their struggle, Altejos then shouted
to appellant, "I stabbed Inday, run," and so he and Altejos ran away. 5

Appellant, in his brief, makes the following assignment of errors:

1. The trial court erred in not acquitting the accused-appellant for having acted in
complete self-defense.

2. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of murder and
in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua when the prosecution has not
established by competent evidence the existence of conspiracy and the presence of
 the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength. 6

Appellant's version does not inspire credence. Well-entrenched is the rule that where the accused
invokes self-defense, it is incumbent upon him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he
indeed acted in defense of himself. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of the prosecution. For, even if the prosecution evidence is weak, it could not be
disbelieved after the accused himself had admitted the killing. 7

It is a statutory and doctrinal requirement that for the justifying circumstance of self-defense, the
presence of unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non. There can be no self-defense,
complete or incomplete, unless the victim has committed an unlawful aggression against the person
defending himself.8

In the present case, the burden of evidence having been shifted, we hold that the defense failed to
establish the primary element of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim and, therefore, the
plea of self-defense must fail. The narrations of the sequence of events by the accused, and by the
lone alleged eyewitness for the defense, Jose Randera, are unconvincing primarily on account of
their inherent inconsistency and conflict with each other.

Appellant on cross-examination testified as follows:

Q How far were you from Inday Longno when he allegedly fired a
shot at you?

A One (1) meter.

Q At one (1) meter distance did (sic) you not able to recognize what
kind of a gun was that allegedly used by Inday Longno?

A No, sir, at first I only saw the handle of the gun and I did not see the
body of the gun.

Q But you can recognize between a pistol and a revolver?

A Yes, sir.

Q What was that allegedly used by Inday Longno, was that a pistol or
a revolver?

A Because immediately after he said those words 'Maybe you want to

learn a lesson he immediately drew his gun and I was able to parry.

xxx xxx xxx

Q When you fired at Inday Longno hitting him on his left arm near the
elbow, was he still holding that gun he used in shooting you hitting
you at the left palm?

A No, sir, because of too much force the gun fell.

 Q Did you not pick up the gun?

A No, sir.9

On the other hand, defense eyewitness Jose Randera stated in his testimony:

ATTY. SORONGON: (To the witness)

Q While Wilfredo Longno alias Inday was pointing a gun at Gerardo

Sazon alias Insik, what was Gerardo Sazon doing?

WITNESS JOSE RANDERA:

A When Inday said something, Insik Sazon brushed aside the gun
and the gun fired.

xxx xxx xxx

Q You said, that Wilfredo Longno alias Inday pointed a gun at

Gerardo Sazon alias Insik, with what hand was he holding that gun
when he was pointing that gun to Gerardo Sazon?

WITNESS JOSE RANDERA:

A His right hand.

ATTY. SORONGON (To the witness)

Q You said that Gerardo Sazon brushed aside the gun which was
being pointed to him, what hand did Gerardo Sazon used (sic) in
brushing that gun?

A His left hand.

Q When Gerardo Sazon brushed aside the gun pointed to him, what
else if any did he do?

A Insik also drew a gun and shot Inday,

COURT: (To the witness)

Q What hand?

A Right hand. He drew a gun with his right hand and shot Inday.

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. SORONGON (To the witness)

 Q You said that there was a brushing, who was brushing aside and
who was brushed aside?

WITNESS JOSE RANDERA:

Q Inday parried Cornelio Artejos (sic).

COURT: (To the witness)

Q And, what happened next?

Cornelio Artejos (sic) pulled out a knife and stabbed Inday.

Q This happened when Inday was already hit by Sazon?

A Yes, sir.

ATTY. SORONGON (To the witness)

Q When Cornelio Artejos (sic) stabbed Wilfredo Longno alias Inday,

what was Gerardo Sazon and Wilfredo Longno doing if they were
doing anything.?

A They were graffling of (sic) the weapon.

Q You are referring to whose weapon they were graffling (sic) at that
time?

A Inday's weapon.10

The testimonies aforequoted reveal an inconsistency on the matter of the gun for which appellant
and the victim supposedly grappled. While appellant claimed that the victim's weapon fell to the
ground, witness Randera stated that appellant and the victim still grappled for the latter's gun. The
latter statement is itself difficult to imagine since appellant at that precise moment was also allegedly
holding with his right hand the gun which he used in shooting Longno.

It is necessary to stress that such inconsistency cannot be considered a minor detail since the
homogeneity of the answers to the inquiry could very well have established the existence of not only
a single gun. Had this prevarication not been exposed, said testimonies could have bolstered the
defense theory that the victim himself carried a gun which he used to assault the appellant and thus
establish the element of unlawful aggression contrived by the defense.

Furthermore, the credibility of witness Randera is shattered by this finding of the trial court which is
sustained by the evidence:

The testimony of security guard Jose Randera deserves scant consideration not only
because he admitted that he was one of those threatened by the deceased Wilfredo
Longno but also because he wilfully falsified the truth when he testified that the
deceased was shot and hit by the accused on the body and that he saw blood come
out just below the right breast of the deceased. The physical evidence in this case
showed that there was no wound on the right breast of the deceased nor on any part
 of his body. The gunshot wound sustained by the deceased was only on his left
forearm. Considering that he testified that there were no other persons there during
the incident except the accused, the deceased and Cornelio Altejos when the
overwhelming weight of evidence is that there were a lot of other people during the
incident (this) showed that this witness had small regard for the truth. 11

Coming back to appellant's representations in court, his vacillation as to what he allegedly did after
Altejos stabbed the victim is another instance which renders his version highly suspect. While stating
on direct examination that he ran to the main road, 12 he claimed on cross-examination that he only
walked a short distance and then went to the hospital upon seeing that his hand was
wounded. 13 The latter statement is itself inconsistent with his earlier declaration during the same
proceeding that he was brought by a policeman to the hospital. 14 This irresolution on the part of the
appellant was obviously to avoid any imputation of guilt against him arising from his flight. 15

At any rate, unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is further negated by the physical evidence
in the case. Again, we quote the trial court with approval:

The testimony of the accused Gerardo Sazon that the deceased was armed with a
gun and fired at him is not borne out by the physical evidence in this case. The
paraffin test conducted on the cadaver of the deceased showed that the hands of the
deceased were negative for gunpowder residues indicating that he did not fire a gun
during the incident. The other parts of his body like his forearm and his abdomen
bore strong traces of gunpowder residues because of the burst of the gun of the
accused. The court is convinced beyond reasonable doubt that there was only one
gun during the incident and that the gun belonged to and/or was used by the
accused Gerardo Sazon. That a part of one of his fingers was blown off at very close
range, according to Dr. Ely Canja strongly indicated that the accused accidentally hit
his finger when he and the deceased grappled for the possession of the gun. 16

In contrast, appellant was found positive for the presence of gunpowder residues (nitrates). While
the presence or absence of nitrates cannot indeed be considered conclusive proof that one has or
has not fired a gun, the following testimony on direct examination by prosecution witness Zenaida
Sinfuego a forensic chemist whose expertise on the matter was sufficiently established, yields this
verification:

Atty. E. Original:

Q Now, have you conducted also a paraffin examination on the

person of Wilfredo Longno?

COURT:

Q On the cadaver?

Atty. E. Original:

Q On the cadaver?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Have you brought with you the result of that examination?

 A Yes, Sir.

Q Now I have here a carbon original of Chemistry Report No. C-200-

83, result of the paraffin test on the cadaver of Wilfredo Longno,
please compare this carbon original to the original copy in your
possession whether it is the same?

A The same.

xxx xxx xxx

Q This report says specimen submitted, one pair of paraffin casts

taken from the left and right hands of the cadaver of one Wilfredo
Longno, one piece of paraffin cast taken from left forearm of same
subject and one piece paraffin last taken from the left side of the
abdomen. Purpose of laboratory examination: to determine the
presence of gunpowder residues (nitrates) on the above-mentioned
specimens. Findings, cast from hands-negative for the presence of
gunpowder residues (nitrates). Cast from forearm-positive for the
presence of gunpowder residues (nitrates) in the 1 1/2 in, 2 1/2 in, 3
in, and 4 in radius. Cast from the left side of the abdomen-positive for
the presence of gunpowder residues (nitrates) in the center and in the
1 and 2 in radius. In the layman's language Mrs. Sinfuego, will you
please explain to the Honorable Court these findings 1, 2 and 3?

A Casts from the hands, negative for the presence of gunpowder

residues that means that, no blue specks were found in the hands of
the cadaver.

COURT:

Q Before we go on, what is the implication when the finding is

negative?

A Probably, the subject never fired a gun.

Q Within what time-span?

A The gunpowder will stay only within three days.

Q When was this examination conducted?

A Last September 18,1983.

Q Now before we go on, on that Chemistry Report which has been

marked as Exhibit 'D' regarding the paraffin test conducted on the
right hand of the accused Gerardo Sazon, your finding there states,
positive for gunpowder residues, what is the implication?

A The implication states positive, that Sazon have (sic) fired a gun.
 Q Within what time-span?

A Within three days.

Q Within three days?

A Within three days.

Q From the examination?

A Three days from the subject firing of a gun.

Q And when was the examination conducted?

A Last September 19,1983, Your Honor.

Q September?

A Nineteen.

Q So he could have fired a gun on September 17,1983?

A I think that depends, Your Honor on the requesting party.

Q I am asking you if it was possible that he fired a gun which left the
powder burns, was it possible that he fired a gun on September 17?

A Yes, Your Honor. 17

On cross-examination, Sinfuego further testified as follows:

Q Is it possible for a person who has not fired a firearm and could be
(sic) positive for nitrates?

A Yes, Sir.

Q In what instance?

A For example, if he is near to the person firing a gun it is possible

that it was carried by the wind.

Q So that is the only case wherein you find nitrates on the person
who has not fired a gun?

A Also from the fertilizer.

Q You mean, a person handling fertilizers could also be positive for

nitrates?
 A Yes, Sir but we have to consider also the time of reaction, from
contaminance (sic) for the nitrates will take effect between two to
three minutes.

COURT:

Q Can you determine on your examination whether the nitrates found

was (sic) the nitrates left by gunpowder residues or by fertilizer can
you distinguish that?

A Yes, Sir.

Q And this (sic) nitrates found on the hands of the accused, could you
determine where did it (sic) come from?

A Gunpowder residues. 18

Parenthetically, it is true that the bad moral character of the offended party may be proven in
evidence to establish in any reasonable degree the probability of the offense charged, 19 e.g., the
quarrelsome nature of the victim may tend to establish that he started the unlawful aggression.
Nonetheless, such evidence, seeking to establish as it does only a probability, cannot prevail over
facts sufficiently proven by the prosecution during the trial belying such aggression. These
observations find application in the instant case where the defense presented and now argue on
character evidence consisting of criminal charges involving minor offenses which had been filed
against the deceased, but not one of which resulted in conviction and were in fact dismissed except
for one case which was sent to the archives. 20

Obviously, whether or not appellant acted in self-defense is essentially a question of fact. Being so
and in the absence of any showing that the Court a quo failed to appreciate facts or circumstances
of weight and substance that would have altered its conclusion, the court below, having seen and
heard the witnesses during the trial, is in a better position to evaluate their testimonies. No
compelling reason, therefore, lies for this Court to disturb the trial court's finding that appellant did
not act in self-defense. 21

The Court, however, holds that appellant, albeit guilty, can only be convicted of homicide and not
murder. The trial court correctly held that the killing was not accompanied by treachery. It, however,
ruled that there was evident premeditation on the part of appellant. We find the records sorely
wanting in evidence to support the latter conclusion.

The fact that appellant told the deceased that he would kill him and that two days later, after the
deceased passed by the store where appellant and Altejos were drinking softdrinks the latter
followed the former and inflicted the fatal blows, cannot adequately sustain a conclusion of
premeditated killing.

To justify its attendance, the prosecution must prove (1) the time when the offender determined to
commit the crime, (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination, and
(3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the execution to allow him to reflect
upon the consequences of his act. 22

In the case at bar, the first and second elements are lacking. The angry outburst of appellant in that
incident of September 15, 1983, warning the victim that the former would kill him, does not convince
us that, under the circumstances therein, appellant as of that time had already decided to kill the
victim. A homicidal premeditation is studiedly conceived and not impulsively adopted just like that
and, worse, publicly announced. It was more of a spontaneous expression of resentment or bravado
on the part of appellant.

Again, the circumstance that appellant and Altejos were by chance at the store when the victim
passed by cannot be taken as manifestly indicating that appellant had clung to his determination to
kill the victim. No evidence was presented to show that appellant purposely waited there for the
deceased. Nor was there any showing that the deceased frequently passed by the same route as to
warrant and explain appellant's waiting for the former at that place. Indeed, that the meeting may
have been purely accidental is not a remote possibility. We are more inclined to believe that it was
the belligerent and defiant demeanor of the victim when confronted by appellant near the public
faucet that precipitated assault.

Under such considerations and there being no other evidence to prove that the death of the victim
was the result of meditation, calculation or reflection, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated to
qualify the killing to murder. 23The circumstances qualifying or aggravating the act must be proved in
an evident and incontestable manner. They must be proved as conclusively as the acts constituting
the offense.24 Thus, for the same reason, the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength
cannot be appreciated in this case. Superior strength may aggravate or qualify a crime, only if it is
clearly shown that there was deliberate intent to take advantage of it.25 In the absence of any
evidence to show that the accused purposely sought to use their superior strength to their advantage
in the present case, a finding to that effect by the trial court cannot be sustained.

Finally, the fact that appellant did not inflict the mortal wound upon the deceased is of no moment,
since the existence of conspiracy was satisfactorily shown by the evidence. The coordinated acts of
appellant and Altejos of immediately following the victim and jointly confronting him thereafter reveal
a concordance and unity of thought which resulted in the encounter. The circumstances that after
the accused shot the victim in the forearm and, while he and the victim were grappling for appellant's
gun, Altejos stabbed the victim to death, indicate closeness and coordination of their action geared
towards a common purpose, that is, to kill the victim. 26 Proof of a previous agreement to commit the
crime is not absolutely essential to establish a conspiracy. It is sufficient that the accused be shown
to have acted in concert pursuant to the same objective, 27 as such circumstance is invariably
indicative of a conspiratorial agreement.

It bears mention, at this point, that while we have ruled out evident premeditation in the case, this
does not negate the existence of a conspiracy. True, conspiracy generally involves evident
premeditation, but this circumstance requires for its raison d' etre a sufficient time in a juridical sense
for the accused to meditate and reflect on the consequences of his intended action. Such time
element is not an indispensable requirement for a conspiracy to exist. 28 Consequently, we find that
there was a conspiracy between appellant and Altejos although, for lack of conclusive showing, we
cannot consider evident premeditation against appellant.

The rule is that where a conspiracy is proven, a showing as to who inflicted the fatal wound is not
required to sustain a conviction. 29 The act of one in killing the victim becomes the act of all the
accused. Insofar as Cornelio Altejos is concerned, however, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction
over him and he can neither be convicted nor exculpated herein. References in this judgment to him
are, therefore, obiter and with no binding effect on him. 30

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Gerardo Sazon is
declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal.

The award by the lower court of the items of civil liability to be paid by accused-appellant to the heirs
of the deceased is hereby MODIFIED by disallowing the grant of attorney's fees for lack of basis,
and increasing the death indemnity to P50,000.00 in accordance with the policy adopted by the
Court en banc on August 30,1990.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Paras, J., is on leave.

November 22, 2017

G.R. No. 218574

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
RAUL MACAPAGAL y MANALO, Accused-appellant

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated August 8, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 05495 which affirmed with modification the Decision2 dated July 19, 2011 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, Branch 20, finding appellant Raul Macapagal y Manalo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of rape through sexual intercourse, and one (1) count of rape
through sexual assault.

In three (3) separate Informations, appellant Raul Macapagaly Manalo was charged with three (3)
counts of violation of Article 266-A and Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code,3 (RPC) in relation to
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610,4the accusatory portions of which read:

In Criminal Case No. RTC-2003-0294:

That on or about a week after April 13, 1998 at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening and for several
similar occasions thereafter in the Municipality of Camaligan, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused, with grave abuse of confidence
being the father of the private offended party, by means of force and intimidation did, then and there,
with lewd designs, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in inserting his finger inside the
vagina of "BBB,"5 his 11-year-old daughter who is a minor, against her will and without her consent
to her damage and prejudice in such amount as may be awarded by the Honorable Court.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.

In Criminal Case No. RTC-2003-0295:

That sometime during summer vacation in the year 1999 at about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon and
for several occasions thereafter in the Municipality of Camaligan, Province of Camarines Sur,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused, with grave abuse of
confidence being the father of the private offended party, by means of force and intimidation did,
then and there, with lewd designs, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having sexual
intercourse with "BBB," his 13-year-old daughter who is a minor, against her will and without her
consent to her damage and prejudice in such amount as may be awarded by the Court.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.

In Criminal Case No. RTC-2003-0296:

That sometime on March 30, 2003, at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening in the Municipality of
Camaligan, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable
Court, the said accused, with grave abuse of confidence being the father of the private offended
party, by means of force and intimidation did, then and there, with lewd designs, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously succeed in having intercourse with "BBB," his 16-year-old daughter who is a minor,
against her will and without her consent to her damage and prejudice in such amount as may be
awarded by the Honorable Court.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.6

Before appellant was arraigned, a motion to quash was filed on the ground that the Informations
charged more than one offense. The prosecution opted to amend the Informations by deleting the
phrase "and for several similar occasions thereafter," which the court granted.

On March 25, 2004, appellant, assisted by counsel, was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to all rape
charges. During pre-trial, the parties stipulated on the identities of the parties, the fact that the birth
certificate7 shows that BBB is the daughter of appellant and a minor at the time of the alleged rape
incidents. Joint trial of the cases followed.

In Criminal Case No. RTC-2003-0294, the incident of rape through sexual assault happened in April
1998 when BBB was only 11 years old. While sleeping with her mother and appellant in the sala of
their house, BBB was awakened by someone rubbing her back. BBB did not recognize appellant at
first because it was dark until he threatened her with a knife and told her not to make any noise.
Appellant then forcibly removed BBB's shorts and panty, and inserted his finger into her genital,
causing her to feel pain. Appellant also lifted BBB's shirt, held her breasts and molested her for an
hour, during which she only cried.

In Criminal Case No. RTC-2003-0295, the incident rape through carnal knowledge occurred in
March 1999 when BBB was 13 years old. While BBB was alone in their house watching TV,
appellant told her to get inside the room, but she refused. Appellant got mad, slapped her face and
dragged her inside the room. He then removed her shorts, slapped her again and covered her mouth
when she tried to shout for help. After removing her bra and panty, appellant laid BBB on the bed,
held her breasts and inserted his penis in her vagina, causing her to feel severe pain. BBB kept
mum about the incident as she was afraid that he might kill her.

In Criminal Case No. RTC-2003-0296, the other incident of rape through carnal knowledge took
place on March 30, 2003 when BBB was already 16 years old. Only appellant and BBB were at
home that day since her mother and siblings went to Naga City. At about 8:00 p.m., BBB was
preparing her beddings in their sala when appellant told her to undress herself. Since appellant
threated to kill her, BBB obeyed, Appellant also undressed himself, held BBB's breasts, kissed her
and inserted his penis into her vagina for an hour.

When BBB's mother learned of the rape incidents, she accompanied BBB at NBI Naga City to file a
complaint against appellant. Dr. Jane Fajardo conducted a medico-legal examination and came up
with these findings: (1) old, deep, but healed hymenal lacerations at the 6 and 9 o'clock positions, (2)
the edges are round and coaptible, and; (3) the hymenal orifice measures 2.5 cms as to allow
complete penetration by an average-sized adult Filipino male organ in full erection without producing
hymenal injury.

Appellant denied all the rape charges against him for the following reasons: (1) after his wife gave
birth on April 13, 1998, the lights in their bedroom were turned on all night; (2) in the summer of
1999, all his children stayed home all the time for no one among them took summer classes, and he
was busy taking care of his one-year-old daughter; (3) in September 2002, he only required her
daughter BBB to take a urine test because he learned that she missed her period.8 He dismissed the
allegations against him as a mere fabrication of his wife's relatives who were against their marriage.
He also claimed that BBB allowed herself to be part of such malicious scheme, as she was angry at
him for having slapped and hurt her when he learned that she has a boyfriend and she missed two
menstruation periods. He also denied having caused the abortion of BBB's baby in Manila, but
admitted that he went there with BBB to visit his sister Rebecca who had arrived from the United
States.

On July 19, 2011, the RTC rendered a judgment, convicting appellant of one (1) count of rape by
sexual assault and two (2) counts of rape by sexual intercourse, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment is hereby rendered finding

accused RaulMacapagal y Manalo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape, on two counts, through
sexual intercourse and one count of rape through sexual assault.

As regards rape through sexual intercourse, accused is hereby sentenced to suffer Reclusion
Perpetuafor each count without eligibility for parole and to pay the offended party civil indemnity in
the amount of ₱75,000.00, moral damages of ₱75,000.00 and exemplary damages of ₱30,000.00, in
each of the two cases.

As regards the rape committed through sexual assault, accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prisi6n mayor, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, and to indemnify the offended party civil indemnity of ₱30,000.00, moral damages of
₱30,000.00 and exemplary damages of ₱15,000.00.

SO ORDERED.9

The RTC found BBB's testimony credible as she was able to narrate clearly and unwaveringly how
each of the rape incidents was done to her by appellant, her very own father, despite rigid cross-
examinations conducted by the defense. The RTC noted that the genital examination conducted on
BBB, showing the presence of old hymenal lacerations, is consistent with the finding of previous
sexual intercourse.

With respect to appellant's defenses, the RTC held that his lame excuses of presence of other family
members, lights turned on overnight and open bedroom door during the rape incidents, cannot
prevail over the categorical narration of BBB of her defloration in the hands of appellant. As to the
claim that BBB was angry at appellant as she suffered severe bruises when appellant learned that
she was impregnated by her boyfriend, the R TC pointed out that he failed to prove that BBB indeed
had a boyfriend that time. The RTC was also not impressed by appellant's claim that the malicious
accusations against him are orchestrated by the family of his wife, considering that his in-laws even
gave his family material and financial support. Anent the delay in the reporting of the incidents, the
RTC found the same as justified in view of appellant's constant showing of his knife to BBB, and his
verbal threat upon her while she was being raped to the effect that he would kill her should she tell
anyone about the incidents. Although BBB cannot state precisely the dates of the rape incidents, the
RTC stressed that the supposed inconsistencies merely refer to minor details, which have no effect
on her credibility, and that the exact dates of the commission of the crime are not the element of the
offense.

Aggrieved by the RTC judgment, appellant, through the Public Attorney's Office, filed an
appeal. Appellant argued that while the last rape incident as testified to by BBB happened on March
1âwphi1

30, 2003, the hymenal lacerations diagnosed by Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Jane Fajardo on April 3,
2003 are old and healed lacerations which were inflicted more than a month or a year before.
Faulting BBB's credibility, appellant contended that not only did she tell anyone about the rape
incident, she also tolerated similar incidences for the past five (5) years from April 1998 to April 3,
2004, which is rather odd because there were times when she was only with her mother at the clinic.
Assuming that she was raped by her father, appellant claimed that BBB could have found solace in a
safe house or in government institutions rendering social services for rape victims.

The Office of the Solicitor General insisted that appellant's guilt for the crimes charged had been
proven beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution's testimonial and documentary evidence.

On August 8, 2014, the CA rendered a Decision affirming the RTC judgment with modification on the
damages awarded:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated July 19, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court
of Naga City, Branch 20, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, to read as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. RTC-2003-0294, appellant Raul Macapagal is hereby held GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape Through Sexual Assault and he is hereby sentenced to suffer
the Indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Ten (10) years and one (1) day of prisi6n mayor, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, and to indemnify the offended party civil indemnity of Thirty Thousand Pesos
(₱30,000.00), moral damages of Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) and exemplary damages of
Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00);

2. In Criminal Case No. RTC Nos. 2003-0295 and 2003-0296, appellant Raul Macapagal is hereby
held GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Rape Through Sexual Intercourse and
that, for each count, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole, and ordered to pay the private offended party civil indemnity in the amount of
SeventyFive Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00), moral damages also in the amount of Seventy-Five
Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00), and exemplary damages in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos
(₱30,000.00);

3. Appellant Raul Macapagal is further ordered to pay the private offended party interest on all
damages awarded at the legal rate of Six Percent (6%) per annum until the same are fully paid.

SO ORDERED.10
The CA agreed with the RTC that BBB's testimony is credible, as she was firm and unwavering in
her narration of her traumatic experience during the rape incidents perpetrated by her own father.
The CA also ruled that the medical report and the testimony of the medico-legal officer on BBB's
deep and healed hymenal lacerations are consistent with BBB' s allegations of rape against
appellant. The CA observed that prior to the last rape incident, BBB had been victimized by
appellant to countless sexual abuses which started in 1998, which explains the healed lacerations in
BBB's genitals. The CA noted that BBB initially preferred to conceal her dishonor because the culprit
was her own flesh and blood, who even threatened her life should she report the rape incidents to
anyone. With respect to the inconsistencies pointed out by appellant, the CA ruled that they even
tend to bolster her credibility as they are proofs of an unrehearsed testimony. Anent the claim that
BBB could have avoided the rape incident by finding solace in a safe house or in a government
institution, the CA stressed that BBB could hardly be expected to know what to do under such
circumstances as she was only 11 years old when the first rape incident took place. The CA also
ruled that it is unnatural for grandparents to use their grandchild in a scheme of malice against her
own father, not to mention that it will subject the child to embarrassment and stigma.

Dissatisfied with the CA Decision, appellant filed a notice of appeal.

The appeal is devoid of merit.

After a careful review of the records, the Court finds no reason to reverse the RTC's judgment of
conviction, but a modification of the penalty imposed, the damages awarded, and the nomenclature
of the offense committed, are in order.

In Criminal Case No. RTC-2003-0294, appellant should be held liable for acts of lasciviousness
under Art. 33611 of the RPC, in relation to Section(b), Art. III of R.A. No. 761012 instead of rape
through sexual assault under Art. 266-A, paragraph 2 of the RPC.13

In Dimakuta v. People,14 the Court stressed that in instances where the lascivious conduct is
covered by the definition under R.A. No. 7610, where the penalty is reclusion temporal medium, and
the act is likewise covered by sexual assault under Art. 266-A, paragraph 2 of the RPC, which is
punishable by prision mayor, the offender should be liable for violation of Section 5 (b ), Art. III of
R.A. No. 7610, where the law provides for the higher penalty of reclusion temporal medium, if the
offended party is a child victim. But if the victim is at least eighteen (18) years of age, the offender
should be liable under Art. 266-A, par. 2 of the RPC and not R.A. 7610, unless the victim is at least
18 years old and she is unable to fully take care of herself or protect herself from abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation or discrimination· because of a physical or mental disability or condition, in which
case, the offender may still be held liable of sexual abuse under R.A. No. 7610. The reason for the
foregoing is that, aside from the affording special protection and stronger deterrence against child
abuse, R.A. No. 7610 is a special law which should clearly prevail over R.A. 8353, which is a mere
general law amending the RPC.15

In People v. Chingh,16 the Court noted that "it was not the intention of the framers of R.A. No. 8353
to have disallowed the applicability of R.A. No. 7610 to sexual abuses committed to children. Despite
the passage of R.A. No. 8353, R.A. No. 7610 is still good law, which must be applied when the
victims are children or those 'persons below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are unable
to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or
discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition."'

In People v. Noel Go Caoili,17 the Court prescribed guidelines in designating or charging the proper
offense in case lascivious conduct is committed under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, and in
determining the imposable penalty. "If the victim of lascivious conduct is under twelve (12) years of
age, the nomenclature of the crime should be 'Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the
Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610' and pursuant to the
second proviso thereof, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period." In this
case, it was alleged in the information, stipulated during pre-trial and indicated in her birth
certificate18 that BBB was 11 years old at the time of the commission of the crime charged in Criminal
Case No. RTC-2003-0294.

However, before an accused can be held criminally liable for lascivious conduct under Section 5(b),
Art. III of R.A. No. 7610, the Court held in Quimvel v. People19 that the requisites of acts of
lasciviousness as penalized under Art. 336 of the RPC must be met in addition to the requisites for
sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Art. III of R.A. No. 7610, namely:

1. The offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;

2. That it be done under any of the following circumstances:

a. Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of
the circumstances mentioned above be present;

3. That said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse;
and

4. That the offended party is a child, whether male or female, below 18 years of age.

Regarding the first requisite, intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia
of any person, with intent to abuse or gratify sexual desire falls under the definition of "lascivious
conduct"20 under Section 2 (h) of the rules and regulations of R.A. No. 7610. With respect to the
second requisite, "force and intimidation" is said to be subsumed under "coercion and influence" and
such terms are used almost synonymously.21 This can be gleaned from Black's Law Dictionary
definitions of "coercion" as "compulsion; force; duress", of "influence" as ''persuasion carried over to
the point of overpowering the will", and of "force" as "constraining power, compulsion; strength
directed to an end'; as well as from jurisprudence which defines "intimidation" as "unlawful coercion;
extortion; duress; putting in fear".22 Anent the third requisite, a child is deemed exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse when the child indulges in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit or any other consideration; or (b) under the coercion or any
influence of any adult, syndicate or group.23 As for the fourth requisite, "children" refers to a person
below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are unable to fully take care of themselves or
protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical
or mental disability or condition.24

All the elements of acts of lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to
Section 5(b), Art. III of R.A. No. 7610, were established by the prosecution through the credible
testimony of BBB to the effect that appellant, her father, showed a knife and threatened to kill her
should she make any noise, then forcibly removed her shorts and panty, and inserted his finger in
her vagina, causing her to feel pain.
As the trial court aptly observed, BBB was able to describe how each of the rape incidents was done
to her by her father, and her narration of the incidents were clear and detailed as she was able to
clearly and unwaveringly narrate her ordeal in the hands of her very own father, thus:

[PROS. ZHELLA M. MANRIQUE]

Q: In this incident [on April 13, 1998] which you remember what time is it?

A: 10:00 o'clock in the evening.

Q: While you were in your sala at 10:00 o'clock in the evening, who were your companions inside the
house?

A: My mother, me and my father.

Q: What were you doing at that time at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening?

A: I was awakened when I felt somebody rubbing my back.

Q: You said, you were awakened because somebody was rubbing or holding your back, who was
that person holding your back?

A: My father.

Q: You said you were sleeping with your mother, where was your mother at that time when you were
awakened?

A: When I was awakened my mother was no louger around.

Q: Do you know where was your (sic) mother at that time when you were awakened?

A: I learned that she transferred in another room.

Q: When you were awakened and saw your father holding your back, what happened next?

A: He threatened me not to make any noise because he will kill me.

Q: After he threatened you, what was your reaction?

A: I was afraid, I know that he will really kill me and in fact he threatened and showed me a knife.

Q: After that, what happened next?

A: After that he removed my shorts and my panty.

Q: And after removing your shorts and your panty what did he do?

A: He told me that he will just insert his finger in my vagina.

Q: What did you feel when he told you that he will insert his finger into your vagina?
A: I did not like it ma'am. (sic)

Q: And then what did he say?

A: He told me that he will really insert his finger.

Q: And then what did he do?

A: He inserted his finger into my vagina.

Q: When he inserted his finger into your vagina, what did you feel?

A: I felt pain.

Q: Because you felt pain, what was your reaction?

A: I was crying at that time.

Q: Did you not try to shout because it is painful?

A: No ma'am, because I was afraid that he could kill me.

xxxx

Q: You said that aside from inserting his finger into your vagina, what else did he do to you?

A: He lifted my t-shirt and he is holding my breast.

Q: On that day of April 1998, how old are you?

A: 11 years old.25

With respect to Criminal Cases Nos. RTC-2003-0295 and RTC-2003- 0296, the prosecution was,
likewise, able to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of qualified rape as defined under
paragraph 1, Art. 266-A26 and penalized under paragraph 1, Art. 266-B27 of the RPC, as amended,
namely: (1) sexual congress; (2) with a woman; (3) done by force and without consent; (4) the victim
is under 18 years of age at the time of the rape; (5) the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse
of the parent of the victim.28

Through the categorical and consistent testimony of BBB, the prosecution established that appellant,
her father, threatened to kill and undressed her, then inserted his penis in her vagina for about an
hour, sometime in the summer of 1999 and on March 30, 2003, to wit:

Q: You said that you remember something in the year 1999 about what time is that when said
incident happened?

A: The incident that happened in the year 1999 happened at about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon.

Q: Can you tell us, what was the month if you can remember?
A: I think it was in the month of March.

Q: Why do you say March?

A: The incident happened shortly after summer vacation.

Q: You said that an incident transpired between you and your father shortly after summer vacation,
where did this transpire?

A: At that time I was at the sala watching television.

Q: In your house?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: Who were your companions at that time in your house?

A: None, ma'am.

Q: Aside from you there was no one else?

A: In our house my father was there.

Q: How about your mother?

A: My mother was in her clinic and my brother and sisters were not also around at that time.

Q: To clarify, it was only you and your father inside your house?

A: Yes, sir. (sic)

Q: You said you were watching t.v. what happened?

A: He called me inside the room.

Q: Who called you inside the room?

A: My father.

Q: Did you go to that room?

A: I did not like to enter the room but he forced me to enter the room.

Q: How did he force you to enter the room?

A: He was angry and he was hurting me.

Q: How did he hurt you?

A: He slapped me.

Q: Was he able to drag you inside your parents' room?

A: He forcibly took-off my shorts but I tried to resist back and escape but he was strong.

Q: How did you try to resist?

A: I tried to shout for help at that time but he slapped me and covered my mouth.

(Witness demonstrating to the Court using her right hand covering her mouth)

Q: When he slapped you and covered your mouth and you said he removed your short pants what
else did he do to you?

A: He also removed my panty.

Q: What else did he do to you?

A: He inserted his sex organ into my vagina.

xxxx

Q: You said he removed your panty and short, what else did he do to you?

A: He removed my bra.

Q: And then after that, what happened?

A: He raped me.

Q: When you said, he raped you, can you tell us, step-by-step on how he succeeded in raping you,
after he removed your shorts, your panty and your bra, what happened next?

A: He held my arms because I was trying to resist him, he slapped me and inserted his penis into my
vagina.

Q: How many times did he inserted (sic) his penis?

A: He inserted his penis about an hour.

Q: When he inserted his penis into your vagina, what did you feel?

A: I felt pain.

Q: Because you felt pain, what was your reaction?

A: I was crying at that time.

Q: Aside from inserting his penis into your vagina, did he do anything else to you?
A: He was holding my breasts.

xxxx

Q: On March 30, 2003, do you recall where were you at that time?

A: Also at the sala.

Q: About what time was this when you were at the sala?

A: Eight o'clock in the evening.

Q: Who were your companions in your sala at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of March 30, 2003?

A: I was the only one together with my father.

Q: How about your mother where was she at that time?

A: She was in Naga.

Q: How about your brother and your sisters, where were they, if you know?

A: They were also in Naga.

Q: So on March 30, 2003, you said, you were in the sala, can you tell us, what happened when you
were in the sala?

A: I was at the sala preparing the beddings at that time.

Q: What happened when you and your father were there?

A: He ordered me to undress myself.

Q: Did you follow him?

A: Yes, ma'am, because I am afraid of him.

Q: Again, why are you afraid of him?

A: He would kill me.

Q: After you undressed yourself, what did he do to you?

A: He inserted his penis into my vagina.

Q: Did he also undress himself?

A: Yes sir.
Q: You said that he inserted his penis into your vagina, where were you at that time and your father?

A: We were at the sala.

Q: For how long did he insert his penis to (sic) your vagina?

A: I think it took about an hour.

Q: Aside from inserting his penis to (sic) your vagina, what else did he do to you?

A: He was holding my breast and he was kissing me.

Q: After an hour your father inserting his penis into your vagina, what did you feel?

A: I felt bad because he is my biological father and he was doing such thing to me, "nababoy ako."

Q: After he finished what he was doing to you, what did he do next?

A: He dressed up and he went to sleep.

Q: What about you?

A: I just also went to sleep because I cannot do anything.29

In cases of offended parties who are young and immature girls, there is considerable receptivity on
the part of the courts to lend credence to their testimonies, considering not only their relative
vulnerability, but also the shame and embarrassment to which such a grueling experience as a court
trial, where they are called upon to lay bare what perhaps should be shrouded in secrecy, did
expose them to.30 Indeed, no woman, much less a child, would willingly submit herself to the rigors,
the humiliation and the stigma attendant upon the prosecution of rape, if she were not motivated by
an earnest desire to put the culprit behind bars.31 Hence, BBB's testimony is entitled to full faith and
credence.

All the arguments and issues raised in the appellant's brief- which the Public Attorney's Office
adopted instead of filing a supplemental appeal brief32 - have been properly addressed in full and in
detail in the appealed CA decision. Appellant's denial is a self-serving defense that cannot be given
greater weight than the declaration of a credible witness, like BBB, who testified on affirmative
matters33 and positively identified her father as the perpetrator of the crimes charged.

When the trial court's findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally
binding upon the Court, unless there is a clear showing that they were reached arbitrarily or it
appears from the records that certain facts of weight, substance, or value are overlooked,
misapprehended or misappreciated by the lower court which, if properly considered, would alter the
result of the case.34 After a circumspect study of the records, the Court sees no compelling reason to
depart from the fore going principle.

As to the penalty for the crime charged in Criminal Case No. RTC 2003-0294, considering that BBB
was under 12 years old when appellant threatened her with a knife, forcibly removed her shorts and
panty, and inserted his finger into her vagina on April 13, 1998, the imposable penalty for acts of
lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the RPC, in relation to Section 5(b), Art. III of R.A. No. 7610,
is reclusion temporal in its medium period which ranges from Fourteen (14) years, Eight (8) months
and One (1) day to Seventeen (17) years and Four (4) months. Since the perpetrator of the offense
is the father of the victim, and such alternative circumstance of relationship was alleged in the
Information and proven during trial, the same should be considered as an aggravating circumstance
for the purpose of increasing the period of the imposable penalty. There being no mitigating
circumstance to offset the said alternative aggravating circumstance, the penalty provided shall be
imposed in its maximum period. This is also in consonance with Section 31(c),35 Art. XII of R.A. No.
7610. Accordingly, appellant should be sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Fourteen
(14) years and Eight (8) months of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, as minimum, to
Seventeen (17) years and Four (4) months of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.
A fine in the amount of ₱15,000.00 should also be imposed upon appellant in accordance with
Section 3 l(f),36 Art. XII of the same law. The award of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary
damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00 each is reduced to ₱20,000.00 for civil indemnity, and to ₱l
5,000.00 each for moral and exemplary damages, in line with Quimvel v. People.37

On the other hand, in Criminal Case Nos. RTC 2003-0295 and RTC 2003-0296, the imposable
penalty for the two (2) counts of qualified rape under Art. 266-A(l )(d), in relation to Art. 266-B(l) of
the RPC, is death. However, in view of R.A. No. 934638 and A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC,39 the CA properly
sustained the RTC in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole in lieu of
death. In light of recent jurisprudence40 where it was held that in cases of qualified rape where the
imposable penalty is death but the same is reduced to reclusion perpetuabecause of R.A. No. 9346,
the award of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages should be increased from
₱75,000.00 to ₱l00,000.00.41

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED, and the Decision dated August 8,
2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05495 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION:

1. In Criminal Case No. RTC-2003-0294, appellant Raul Macapagal y Manalo is guilty of one (1)
count of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to
Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, and is sentenced to suffer Fourteen (14) years and Eight
(8) months of reclusion temporal minimum, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years and Four (4)
months of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, in view of the presence of the alternative
aggravating circumstance of relationship. He is, likewise, ordered to pay the victim civil indemnity in
the amount of ₱20,000.00, as well as moral damages, exemplary damages and fine in the amount of
₱15,000.00 each.

2. In Criminal Case Nos. RTC-2003-0295 and RTC-2003-0296, appellant is guilty of two (2) counts
of qualified rape, and is sentenced for each count to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole. He is also ordered to pay the victim civil indemnity, moral damages and
exemplary damages in the amount of ₱l00,000.00 each for both counts of qualified rape.

All damages awarded shall incur legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from finality
of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

On wellness leave
ANDRES B. REYES, JR.*
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decisionhad been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation,
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

*
On wellness leave.

1
Penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon, with Associate Justices Fiorito S.
Macalino and Leoncia R. Dimagiba, concurring; rollo, pp. 2-31.

2
Penned by Presiding Judge Erwin Virgilio P. Ferrer; CA rollo, pp. 50-63.

3
Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. - Rape is committed -

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman ...:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

 c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented,
even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1

hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another
person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal
orifice of another person.

xxxx

Article 266-8. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall
be punished by reclusion perpetua.

xxxx

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of
the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent victim;

xxxx

4
An Act Providing For Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection Against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination, and For Other Purposes.

5
The identity of the victim or any information to establish or compromise her identity, as well
as those of her immediate family or household members, shall be withheld pursuant to
Republic Act No. 7610, "An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination, and for Other Purposes"; Republic Act
No. 9262, "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for
Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes";
Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, known as the "Rule on Violence Against Women and
Their Children," effective November 5, 2004; People v. Cabalquinto, 533 Phil. 703, 709
(2006); and Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015 dated September 5, 2017,
Subject: Protocols and Procedures in the Promulgation, Publication, and Posting on the
Websites of Decisions, Final Resolutions, and Final Orders Using Fictitious Names/Personal
Circumstances.

6
Rollo, pp. 36-37.

7
Records, p. 52.

8
CA rollo p. 40.

9
Id. at 63.

10
Rollo, pp. 30-31.
11
Art. 336. Acts of lasciviousness. - Any person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness
upon other persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned in the preceding
article, shall be punished by prisi6n correccional.

Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female,
12

who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any
adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to
be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon the following:

xxxx

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse of lascivious conduct with a child
exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the
victims is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under
Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the
Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided,
That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of
age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period.

13
Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. - Rape is committedx

xx

2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1

hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another
person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal
orifice of another person.

14
G.R. No. 206513, October 20, 2015, 733 SCRA 228.

See Separate Concurring Opinion of Justice Diosdado M. Peralta in Quimvel v.

15

People, G.R No. 214497, April 18, 2017.

16
661 Phil. 208, 224 (2011).

17
G.R. Nos 196342 and 196848, August 8, 2017.

18
Records, p. 52; Date of Birth: September 12, 1986.

19
Supra.

20
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin,
breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or
mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse,
humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality,
masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.

21
Quimvel v. People, supra note 15.
22
Id. (Citations omitted)

23
Olivarez v. Court of Appeals, 503 Phil. 421, 432 (2005).

24
R.A. No. 7610, Section 3.

25
TSN, July 28, 2004, pp. 6-8.

ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. - Rape is committed - 1. By a man who
26

shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a. Through force, threat or intimidation;

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise

unconscious;

c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented,
even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

If committed by a parent against his child under eighteen (18) years of age, the rape
is qualified under paragraph 1, Article 266-B of the same Code, viz.:

ART. 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph I of the next preceding article shall be
27

punished by reclusion perpetua.

xxxx

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of
the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the
victim.

xxxx

28
People v. Lagbo, G.R. No. 207535, February 10, 2016, 784 SCRA 1, 11 (2016),
citing People v. Colentava,753 Phil. 361, 372-373 (2015); and People v. Candellada, 713
Phil. 623, 63 5 (2013).

29
TSN, July 28, 2004, pp. 10-17.

30
People v. Sumarago, 466 Phil. 956, 978 (2004).

31
Id.

32
Rollo, p. 46.
33
People of the Philippines v. Felipe Bugho y Rompal, G.R. No. 208360, April 6, 2016.

34
People v. Tuboro, G.R. No. 220023, August 8, 2016.

35
Section 31. Common Penal Provisions.-

xxxx

(c) The penalty provided herein shall be imposed in its maximum period when the
perpetrator is an ascendant, parent, guardian, stepparent or collateral relative· within
the second degree of consanguinity or affinity, or a manager or owner of an
establishment which has no license to operate or its license has expired or has been
revoked.

36
Section. 31. Common Penal Provisions.-

xxxx

(t) A fine to be imposed by the court shall be imposed and administered as a cash
fund by the Department of Social Welfare and Development and disbursed for the
rehabilitation of each child victim, or any immediate member of his family if the latter
is the perpetrator of the offense.

37
Supra note 15.

AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENAL TY IN THE PHILIPPINES.

38

Enacted on 24 June 2006. Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346 states:

SEC. 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose

sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be
eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, as amended.

39
Guidelines For the Proper Use of the Phrase "Without Eligibility For Parole" in Indivisible
Penalties dated August 4, 2015; II (2) When the circumstances are present warranting the
imposition of the death penalty, but this penalty is not imposed because of R.A. No. 9346,
the qualification "without eligibility for parole" shall be used to qualify reclusion perpetua in
order to emphasize that the accused should have been sentenced to suffer the death penalty
had it not been for R.A. No. 9346.

40
People v. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016, 788 SCRA 331.

41
People v. Aycardo, G.R. No. 218114, June 5, 2017.