Eduardo Cojuangco, he is not aware of the extent and coverage thereof.
It was for that
C. Liabilities
1. In general RA 6713
2. Administrative Liability
3. Civil Liability
COJUANGCO V. CA | Panganiban, 1999
FACTS
 Eduardo Cojuangco is a known businessman-sportsman owning several racehorses which
he entered in the sweepstakes races. Several of his horses won the races on various dates,
landing first, second or third places.
 Cojuangco sent letters of demand to PCSO for the collection of the prizes due him.
 PCSO replied that the demanded prizes are being withheld on advice of Commissioner
Ramon A. Diaz of the PCGG.
 This case was filed before the RTC. But before receipt of the summons PCGG advised PCSO
that it poses no more objection to the remittance of the prize winnings.
 The prize winning were refused by Cojuangco on the ground that the case was already filed
in court.
 RTC: PCSO had no authority to withhold winnings since no writ of sequestration had been
issued by the PCGG. Carrascoso had acted in bad faith amounting to the persecution and
harassment of Cojuangco and his family. Carrascoso was asked to pay moral and exemplary
damages.
 CA: reversed finding of bad faith on the part of Carrascoso as he was merely obeying
instructions.
ISSUES
(1) WON the award for damages against Carrascoso is warranted by evidence and the law? Partly
meritorious.
(2) WON he was properly represented by the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel
(OGCC) in the appeal.
HELD/RATIO
(1) PARTLY YES. To hold public officers personally liable for moral and exemplary damages and
for attorney's fees for acts done in the performance of official functions, the plaintiff must
prove that these officers exhibited acts characterized by evident bad faith, malice, or gross
negligence. But even if their acts had not been so tainted, public officers may still be held
liable for nominal damages if they had violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights.
 Carrascoso did not act in bad faith. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or
simple negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious
doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty due to some motive or interest or ill will that
partakes of the nature of fraud.
 CA’s decision quoted: “The letter of Carrascoso to PCGG Chair Jovito Salonga, readily
display uncertainties in the mind of Carrascoso as to the extent of the sequestration against
the properties of the plaintiff. In the said letter the first prize xxx were, in the meantime,
being withheld to "avoid any possible violation of your sequestration order on the matter"
because while he is aware of the sequestration order issued against the properties of
reason that, in the same letter, Carrascoso requested for a clarification whether the prizes
are covered by the order and if it is in the affirmative, for instructions on the proper
disposal of the 2 prizes taking into account the shares of the trainer and the groom.”
 Carrascoso's decision to withhold petitioner's winnings could not be characterized as
arbitrary or whimsical, or even the product of ill will or malice. He had particularly sought
from PCGG a clarification of the extent and coverage of the sequestration order issued
against the properties of petitioner.
 The extant rule is that a public officer shall not be liable by way of moral and exemplary
damages for acts done in the performance of official duties, unless there is a clear showing
of bad faith, malice or gross negligence. Attorney's fees and expenses of litigation cannot
be imposed either, in the absence of a clear showing of any of the grounds provided
therefor under the Civil Code. TC’s award of these kinds of damages must perforce be
deleted, as ruled by the Court of Appeals.
 However, under Art. 32 CC, he may still be held liable for damages. it is not necessary that
the public officer acted with malice or bad faith. To be liable, it is enough that there was a
violation of the constitutional rights of petitioner, even on the pretext of justifiable motives
or good faith in the performance of one's duties. petitioner's right to the use of his property
was unduly impeded. While Carrascoso may have relied upon the PCGG's instructions, he
could have further sought the specific legal basis therefor. A little exercise of prudence
would have disclosed that there was no writ issued specifically for the sequestration of the
racehorse winnings of petitioner. There was apparently no record of any such writ covering
his racehorses either. The issuance of a sequestration order requires the showing of a
prima facie case and due regard for the requirements of due process. 38 The withholding
of the prize winnings of petitioner without a properly issued sequestration order clearly
spoke of a violation of his property rights without due process of law.
(2) YES. -The representation of the OGCC on behalf of the PCSO and Mr. Carrascoso is pursuant
to its basic function to "act as the principal law office of all government-owned or
controlled corporations, their subsidiaries, other corporate offsprings and government
acquired asset corporations and . . . [to] exercise control and supervision over all legal
departments or divisions maintained separately and such powers and functions as are now
or may hereafter be provided by law."
 The OGCC was therefore duty-bound to defend the PCSO because the latter, under its
charter, is a government-owned corporation. The government counsel's representation
extends to the concerned government functionary's officers when the issue involves the
latter's official acts or duties. Granting that upon his separation from the government,
Carrascoso ceased to be entitled to the legal services of the government corporate
counsel, this development does not automatically revoke or render ineffective his notice
of appeal of the trial court's Decision.
1
TECSON V. SANDIGANBAYAN | Quisumbing, 1999
FACTS
 Salvacion Luzana is a resident of Poblacion, Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur. She is a neighbor
of the Demetrio Tecson. She claims to be a housewife who occasionally dabbles in farming.
 Upon the offer of Tecson, he and Mrs. Luzana agreed to engage in an investment business.
They would sell tickets at P100.00 each which after 30 days would earn P200.00 or more.
She would buy appliances and cosmetics at a discount, with the use of the proceeds of the
sales of tickets, and resell them. No other details were disclosed on how the business
would operate, and Tecson does not appear to have contributed any monetary
consideration to the capital.
 Tecson also acted as agent selling tickets. He got on that day early in the morning two
booklets of tickets, for which he signed the covers of the booklets to acknowledge receipt.
Before noon of the same day he returned after having already sold 40 tickets in the amount
of P4,000.00, bringing with him a Mayor’s Permit in the name of Mrs. Luzana for their
business called ‘LD Assurance Privileges.’ He asked for a cash advance of P4,000.00 which
he would use during the fiesta on September 29, 1989, and he would not release the
Mayor’s Permit unless the cash advance was given him. Mrs. Luzana reluctantly acceded,
saying that it was not the due date yet, so he was getting the cash advances on his share.
Tecson signed for the cash advance.
 Mrs. Luzana secured a Business Permit in accordance with the instructions of Tecson. The
permit was in her name but the same was for the operation of ‘Prosperidad Investment
and Sub-Dealership,’ the new name of the business. In the session of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur on October 17, 1989 presided over by Tecson,
Resolution No. 100 was passed revoking the business permit at the instance of the
Provincial Director of the Department of Trade and Industry.
 With the revocation of her business permit, private complainant below filed an
administrative case against petitioner, for violation of Section 3 [c], R.A. No. 3019 and
Section 60 of B.P. Blg. 337 (then Local Government Code) with the Department of Interior
and Local Government (DILG).
 private complainant below also filed a civil case against petitioner for damages with the
Regional Trial Court
 A complaint was likewise filed with the Ombudsman for violation of R.A. No. 3019,
otherwise known as the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.”
 It was subsequently referred to the Sandiganbayan, which took jurisdiction.
 (in the Municipality of Prosperidad, Province of Agusan del Sur, the accused, a public
officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur, while in the
performance of his administrative and official functions and committing the offense in
relation to his office, requested and received for his benefit the amount of P4,000.00, for
and in consideration of the issuance of a permit to operate an investment business, in favor
of Salvacion Luzana, a person for whom the accused has in fact received and obtained a
mayor’s permit or license.)
 The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur dismissed the administrative case.
 A compromise agreement was reached between the litigants in Civil Case. The trial court
approved the same.
 The Sandiganbayan issued an order for petitioner’s arrest.
 The Sandiganbayan, First Division rendered the assailed decision convicting appellant of
violating R.A. No. 3019. Petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration. The
respondent court denied the same.
 Hence, this instant petition. Petitioner contends that the respondent court/sandiganbayan
(1st division) gravely abused its discretion, tantamount to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction
in proceeding with the trial and conviction despite the existence of judgment of acquittal
rendered by the sangguniang panlalawigan exonerating the accused.
ISSUES
(1) WON Sangguniang Panlalawigan’s decision exonerating the accused serves as a bar by prior
judgment to the decision of the SB.
(2) WON there was a violation of the Constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy.
HELD/RATIO
(1) NO.
- Petitioner: Dismissal of the admin case before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur
is conclusive and binding upon the parties. Relying on our ruling in B.F. Goodrich Philippines, Inc.
v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, he theorizes that the rule, which prohibits the
reopening of matters already determined by competent judicial authority, applies to quasi-
judicial bodies or administrative offices. Having been exonerated by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur in the administrative case, he now submits the same is res
judicata and thus bars the Sandiganbayan from hearing his case.
 SC says: Your theory has no leg to stand on. [1] Res judicata is a doctrine of civil law. It thus
has no bearing in the criminal proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. [2] it is a basic
principle of the law on public officers that a public official or employee is under a three-
fold responsibility for violation of duty or for a wrongful act or omission. This simply means
that a public officer may be held civilly, criminally, and administratively liable for a wrongful
doing. Thus, if such violation or wrongful act results in damages to an individual, the public
officer may be held civilly liable to reimburse the injured party. If the law violated attaches
a penal sanction, the erring officer may be punished criminally. [3] Such violation may also
lead to suspension, removal from office, other administrative sanctions. This
administrative liability is separate and distinct from the penal and civil liabilities. Thus, the
dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily bar the filing of a criminal
prosecution for the same or similar acts, which were the subject of the administrative
complaint. We conclude, therefore, that the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Agusan del Sur exonerating petitioner in Administrative Case No. SP 90-01 is no bar to the
criminal prosecution before the Sandiganbayan.
 As to the amicable settlement: A complaint for misconduct, malfeasance or misfeasance
against a public officer or employee cannot just be withdrawn at any time by the
complainant. This is because there is a need to maintain the faith and confidence of the
people in the government and its agencies and instrumentalities. The inescapable
conclusion, therefore, is that the order of the trial court dismissing Civil Case No. 716 did
not bar the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan.
2
 Petitioner: Being tried before the Sandiganbayan violated his constitutional protection
against double jeopardy since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur had already
cleared him of all charges.
(2) NO. Double jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon a valid indictment; (2) before a competent
court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the
defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused. None of the foregoing applies to the hearings
conducted by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur in Adm. Case No. SP 90-01.
It must be stressed that the said proceedings were not criminal, but administrative in
nature. Hence, double jeopardy will not lie.

3
OCAMPO V. OMBUDSMAN | Buena, 2000 which merely requires such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of
FACTS evidence, as well as the procedure followed and the sanctions imposed in criminal and
 Jesus Ocampo is the Training Coordinator of. NIACONSULT, INC., a subsidiary of the administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should not necessarily be
National Irrigation Administration. K.N. Paudel of the Agricultural Development Bank of binding on the other.
Nepal (ADBN) wrote a letter to NIACONSULT requesting a training proposal on small-scale
community irrigation development. petitioner as the training coordinator of the
NIACONSULT, sent a letter-proposal requested by ABDN. Another letter was sent by
petitioner to Dr. Peiter Roeloffs of ADBN confirming the availability of NIACONSULT to
conduct the training program and formally requesting advance payment of thirty (30%)
percent of the training fees
 NIACONSULT conducted the training program for six Nepalese Junior Engineers from
February 6 to March 7, 1989. ADBN, thru its representative, Deutsche Gesselschaft )
Technische Zusummenarbeit (GTZ) Gmbh Technical Cooperation of the Federal Republic
of Germany paid to the petitioner the agreed training fee in two installments
 NIACONSULT, through its president, Wilfredo S. Tiongco, wrote a letter to petitioner
demanding the turn-over of the total training fee paid by ADBN which petitioner personally
received. petitioner failed to remit the said amount prompting NIACONSULT through its
president, Maximino Eclipse, to file an administrative case before respondent
OMBUDSMAN for serious misconduct and/or fraud or willful breach of trust.
 The Ombudsman issued a resolution recommending that respondent Jesus C. Ocampo be
discharged from the service, with forfeiture of benefits and special perpetual
disqualification to hold office in the government or any government-owned or controlled
corporation; without prejudice to any civil action NIACONSULT, Inc., may institute to
recover the amount so retained by the respondent.
 Petitioner moved for reconsideration and to re-open the case which the Ombudsman
denied.
 Petitioner moved for reconsideration and to re-open the case. While the case is pending,
petitioner filed a Manifestation stating that the criminal complaint for estafa and
falsification filed against him based on the same facts or incidents which gave rise to the
administrative case, was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court. With the dismissal of the
criminal case, petitioner manifests that the administrative case can no longer stand on its
own and therefore should be dismissed.

ISSUE
WON the dismissal of the criminal case precludes the continuation of the administrative case.

HELD/RATIO
NO. They require different quantum of evidence.
 The dismissal of the criminal case will not foreclose administrative action filed against
petitioner or give him a clean bill of health in all respects. The RTC, in dismissing the
criminal complaint, was simply saying that the prosecution was unable to prove the guilt
of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt, a condition sine qua non for conviction. The lack
or absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean an absence of any evidence
whatsoever for there is another class of evidence which, though insufficient to establish
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, is adequate in civil cases; this is preponderance of
evidence. Then too, there is the "substantial evidence" rule in administrative proceedings

4
LACSON V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY | Martinez, 1999
FACTS
 11 persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang were slain along
Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and
Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG.
 Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the CIC, that what
actually transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995 was a summary execution (or a rub out) and
not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG,
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators headed by the Deputy
Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido Blancaflor, to investigate the incident. This
panel later absolve from any criminal liability all the PNP officers and personnel allegedly
involved in the May 18, 1995 incident, with a finding that the said incident was a legitimate
police operation.
 A review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified the Blancaflor
panel’s finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six
(26) respondents, including herein petitioner and intervenors. This recommendation was
approved by the Ombudsman.
 All the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act No. 7975.
They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases
where one or more of the "principal accused" are government officials with Salary Grade
(SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General)
or higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has the rank
of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27.
 While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, and even before the
issue of jurisdiction cropped up with the filing of the amended informations on March 1,
1996, House Bill No. 229910 as well as Senate Bill No. 84412 were introduced in Congress,
defining/expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said bills sought
to amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word "principal" form the
phrase "principal accused" in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975. These bills
were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. No. 824913
 Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution denying
the motion for reconsideration—Considering that three of the accused in each of these
cases are PNP Chief Superintendents: namely, Jewel T. Canson, Romeo M. Acop and Panfilo
M. Lacson, and that trial has not yet begun in all these cases - in fact, no order of arrest
has been issued - this court has competence to take cognizance of these cases.
 Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 R.A. No. 8249, including Section
7 thereof which provides that the said law "shall apply to all cases pending in any court
over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof."
ISSUES
(1) WON Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 — an act which further defines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan are unconstitutional.
(2) WON the offense of multiple murder was committed in relation to the office of the
accussed PNP officers.
HELD/RATIO
NO. Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder which is
a felony punishable under Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the governing on the jurisdictional
offense is not paragraph a but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains to
"other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of (Section 4, R.A. 8249) in relation to
their office. "The phrase" other offen ses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of
murder, provided it was committed in relation to the accused's officials functions. Thus, under
said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official position or
rank of the offender — that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees
enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses mentioned in pargraphs a, b and c of the
same Section 4 do not make any reference to the criminal participation of the accused public
officer as to whether he is charged as a principal, accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249,
the Congress simply restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not mention the
criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to determine the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
 The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the presumption of
constitutionality and reasonableness of the questioned provisions. The classification
between those pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not
yet commence and whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of the
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had already
started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real
differences. In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas
in the latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs, examined witnesses
and presented documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to define the
jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, it can be reasonably
anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases,
which is why it has to privide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. Thus,
petitioner and intervenors cannot now claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed them under a
different category from those similarly situated as them. Precisely, paragraph a of Section
4 provides that it shall apply to "all case involving" certain public officials and, under the
transitory provision in Section 7, to "all cases pending in any court." Contrary to petitioner
and intervenors' argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong
Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the
Sandiganbayan but also in "any court." It just happened that Kuratong Baleleng cases are
one of those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where trial had already begun are
not affected by the transitory provision under Section 7 of the new law
 In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy reliance is premised on what is
perceived as bad faith on the part of a Senator and two Justices of the Sandiganbayan for
their participation in the passage of the said provisions. In particular, it is stressed that the
Senator had expressed strong sentiments against those officials involved in the Kuratong
Baleleng cases during the hearings conducted on the matter by the committee headed by
the Senator. Petitioner further contends that the legislature is biased against him as he
claims to have been selected from among the 67 million other Filipinos as the object of the
deletion of the word "principal" in paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, and
of the transitory provision of R.A. 8249. R.A 8249, while still a bill, was acted, deliberated,
5
 considered by 23 other Senators and by about 250 Representatives, and was separately
approved by the Senate and House of Representatives and, finally, by the President of the
Philippines.
 A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the SB, the ff concur:
1. the offense committed is a violation of
a. R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act),
b. R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth),
c. Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery)
d. Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases)
e. other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes;
2. the offender committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or
employee holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and 3. the
offense committed is in relation to the office.
(2) NO. Citing People vs. Montejo: An offense is said to have been committed in relation to the
office if it (the offense) is "intimately
connected"withtheofficeoftheoffenderandperpetratedwhilehewasintheperformanceofhisoffici
alfunctions. Thisintimate
relation between the offense charged and the discharge of official duties "must be alleged in the
informations.”
 While the above-quoted information states that the above-named principal accused
committed the crime of murder "in relation to their public office, there is, however, no
specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was
 intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the
amended information does not indicate that
 the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in
their custody.
 For failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately
connected with the discharge of official
 functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is
plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court, not the Sandiganbayan.

4. Criminal Liability
H. Disabilities and Inhibitions
1. Under the Constitution
2. Under existing laws
IV. Termination of Official Relations
A. Expiration of Term
B. Retirement
C. Death or Permanent disability
D. Resignation

6
ORTIZ V. COMELEC | Fernan, 1988 power. A stringent interpretation of courtesy resignations must therefore be observed,
particularly in cases involving constitutional officials like the petitioner whose removal
FACTS from office entails an impeachment proceeding. For even if working for the government
 Mario Ortiz was appointed Commissioner of the COMELEC by Pres. Marcos “for a term is regarded as no more than a privilege, discharge for disloyalty or for doubt about loyalty
expiring May 17, 1992” and took his oath of office. On 5 Mar 1986, he and the other may involve such legal rights as those in reputation and eligibility for other employment.
commissioners sent Pres. Aquino a letter: "Following the example of Honorable Justices  The curtailment of his term not being attributable to any voluntary act on the part of the
of the Supreme Court, on the premise that we have now a revolutionary government, we petitioner, equity and justice demand that he should be deemed to have completed his
hereby place our position at your disposal." term albeit much ahead of the date stated in his appointment paper. Petitioner's case
 Thereafter, or on March 25, 1986, the Freedom Constitution was promulgated through should be placed in the same category as that of an official holding a primarily confidential
Proclamation No. 3, Article III thereof provides that “All elective and appointive officials position whose tenure ends upon his superior's loss of confidence in him. His cessation
and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise from the service entails no removal but an expiration of his term.
provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and
qualification of their successors,xxx.”
 The resignation of Ortiz was accepted by the Pres.
 The COMELEC denied the application for retirement of Ortiz on the ground that he was
not entitled to retirement benenfits under R.A. 1568 am by R.A. 3595 and re-enacted by
R.A. 6118, to be entitled to retirement benefits in case of resignation, a member of the
COMELEC must have rendered not less than 20 years of service in the government.
 The respondents posit the view that petitioner's "voluntary resignation" prevented the
completion of his term of office, and, therefore, having rendered only sixteen years of
service to the government, he is not entitled to retirement benefits.

ISSUE
WON a constitutional official whose "courtesy resignation" was accepted by the President of
the Philippines during the effectivity of the Freedom Constitution may be entitled to retirement
benefits under Republic Act No. 1568, as amended.

HELD
YES. Petitioner's separation from government service as a result of the reorganization ordained
by the then nascent Aquino government may not be considered a resignation within the
contemplation of the law. Resignation is defined as the act of giving up or the act of an officer
by which he declines his office and renounces the further right to use it. To constitute a
complete and operative act of resignation, the officer or employee must show a clear intention
to relinquish or surrender his position accompanied by the act of relinquishment. Resignation
implies an expression of the incumbent in some form, express or implied, of the intention to
surrender, renounce and relinquish the office, and its acceptance by competent and lawful
authority.
 Ortiz’ “resignation” lacks the element of clear intention to surrender his position. We
cannot presume such intention from his statement in his letter of March 5, 1986 that he
was placing his position at the disposal of the President. He did not categorically state
therein that he was unconditionally giving up his position. It should be remembered that
said letter was actually a response to Proclamation No. 1 which President Aquino issued
on February 25, 1986 when she called on all appointive public officials to tender their
"courtesy resignation" as a "first step to restore confidence in public administration.
 A “courtesy resignation” cannot properly be interpreted as resignation in the legal sense
for it is not necessarily a reflection of a public official's intention to surrender his position.
Rather, it manifests his submission to the will of the political authority and the appointing

7
ESTRADA V. ARROYO | Puno, 2001
FACTS
 January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. At 12:20 a.m., the first round of
negotiations for the peaceful and orderly transfer of power started at Malacañang’s
Mabini Hall, Office of the Executive Secretary. The negotiations consumed all morning
until the news broke out that Chief Justice Davide would administer the oath to
respondent Arroyo at high noon at the EDSA Shrine.
 At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as
President of the Philippines.
 At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacañang Palace. He issued the
following press statement:
At twelve o’clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as
President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of
our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of
her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration
of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this
country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I
leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service
to our people. I will not shirk from any future challenges that may come ahead in the
same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.
MABUHAY!
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA”
 It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following letter:
By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby
transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my
office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting
President.
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA”
 On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately
discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency. On the same day, this Court issued
a Resolution in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05-SC confirming the authority given by
the twelve (12) members of the Court then present to the Chief Justice on January 20,
2001 to administer the oath of office to Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as
President of the Philippines, at noon of January 20, 2001. Recognition of respondent
Arroyo’s government by foreign governments swiftly followed.
 Meanwhile, in a survey conducted by Pulse Asia, President Arroyo’s public acceptance
rating jacked up from 16% on January 20, 2001 to 38% on January 26, 2001.[49] In another
survey conducted by the ABS-CBN/SWS from February 2-7, 2001, results showed that 61%
of the Filipinos nationwide accepted President Arroyo as replacement of petitioner
Estrada. The survey also revealed that President Arroyo is accepted by 60% in Metro
Manila, by also 60% in the balance of Luzon, by 71% in the Visayas, and 55% in Mindanao.
Her trust rating increased to 52%. Her presidency is accepted by majorities in all social
classes.
 Petitioner, on February 6, filed a petition for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment
“confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the
Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring
respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only
in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.”
 Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent disability.
Hence, he submits that the office of the President was not vacant when respondent
Arroyo took her oath as president.
 It is urged that the petitioner did not resign but only took a temporary leave of absence
due to his inability to govern. In support of this thesis, the letter dated January 20, 2001
of the petitioner sent to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella is cited.
ISSUE
WON Erap resigned as a president or only took a temporary leave of absence due to his inability
to govern.
HELD/RATIO
YES. The issue brings under the microscope of the meaning of section 8, Article VII of the
Constitution which provides: “Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office
or resignation of the President, the Vice President shall become the President to serve the
unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of
both the President and Vice President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability,
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then acts as President until President or Vice
President shall have been elected and qualified.xxx”
 The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President or should be considered
resigned as of January 20, 2001 when respondent took her oath as the 14th President of
the Republic. Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and
its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must
be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by any
formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can
be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
 In the cases at bar, the facts shows that petitioner did not write any formal letter of
resignation before he evacuated Malacañang Palace in the Afternoon of January 20, 2001
after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner
resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during and after
January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and
circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. Using this totality test,
we hold that petitioner resigned as President.
As to Erap’s letter:
 To say the least, the above letter is wrapped in mystery. The pleadings filed by the
petitioner in the cases at bar did not discuss, nay even intimate, the circumstances that
led to its preparation. Neither did the counsel of the petitioner reveal to the Court these
circumstances during the oral argument. It strikes the Court as strange that the letter,
despite its legal value, was never referred to by the petitioner during the week-long crisis.
To be sure, there was not the slightest hint of its existence when he issued his final press
8
 release. It was all too easy for him to tell the Filipino people in his press release that he
was temporarily unable to govern and that he was leaving the reins of government to
respondent Arroyo for the time being. Under any circumstance, however, the mysterious
letter cannot negate the resignation of the petitioner. If it was prepared before the press
release of the petitioner clearly showing his resignation from the presidency, then the
resignation must prevail as a later act. If, however, it was prepared after the press release,
still, it commands scant legal significance. Petitioner’s resignation from the presidency
cannot be the subject of a changing caprice nor of a whimsical will especially if the
resignation is the result of his repudiation by the people.
Resignation of a public officer with pending investigation or prosecution against him.
 After petitioner contended that as a matter of fact he did not resign, he also argues that
he could not resign as a matter of law. He relies on section 12 of RA No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which allegedly prohibits his
resignation, viz: “Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an
investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any
offense under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.”
 The intent of the law ought to be obvious. It is to prevent the act of resignation or
retirement from being used by a public official as a protective shield to stop the
investigation of a pending criminal or administrative case against him and to prevent his
prosecution undertheAnti-GraftLaworprosecutionforbriberyundertheRevisedPenalCode.
Tobesure,nopersoncanbecompelledtorender service for that would be a violation of his
constitutional right. A public official has the right not to serve if he really wants to retire
or resign. Nevertheless, if at the time he resigns or retires, a public official is facing
administrative or criminal investigation or prosecution, such resignation or retirement
will not cause the dismissal of the criminal or administrative proceedings against him. He
cannot use his resignation or retirement to avoid prosecution.
 There is another reason why petitioner’s contention should be rejected. In the cases at
bar, the records show that when petitioner resigned on January 20, 2001, the cases filed
against him before the Ombudsman were OMB Case Nos. 0-00-1629, 0-00-1755, 0-00-
1756, 0-00-1757 and 0-00-1758. While these cases have been filed, the respondent
Ombudsman refrained from conducting the preliminary investigation of the petitioner for
the reason that as the sitting President then, petitioner was immune from
 suit. Technically, the said cases cannot be considered as pending for the Ombudsman
lacked jurisdiction to act on them. Section 12 of RA No. 3019 cannot therefore be invoked
by the petitioner for it contemplates of cases whose investigation or prosecution do not
suffer from any insuperable legal obstacle like the immunity from suit of a sitting
President.
 Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation
that, under section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning. We hold otherwise. The exact
nature of an impeachment proceeding is debatable. But even assuming arguendo that it
is an administrative proceeding, it can not be considered pending at the time petitioner
resigned because the process already broke down when a majority of the senator-judges
voted against the opening of the second envelope, the public and private prosecutors
walked out, the public prosecutors filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of
Appearance, and the proceedings were postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no
impeachment case pending against petitioner when he resigned.
Temporarily unavailable?
 - What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have
recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the
premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has
clearly rejected petitioner’s claim of inability. In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that
he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the
ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to
rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made
by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
WON Erap enjoys immunity from suit. Assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the
immunity
 “The principle of nonliability, as herein enunciated, does not mean that the judiciary has
no authority to touch the acts of the Governor-General; that he may, under cover of his
office, do what he will, unimpeded and unrestrained. Such a construction would mean
that tyranny, under the guise of the execution of the law, could walk defiantly abroad,
destroying rights of person and of property, wholly free from interference of courts or
legislatures. This does not mean, either, that a person injured by the executive authority
by an act unjustifiable under the law has no remedy, but must submit in silence. On the
contrary, it means, simply, that the Governor-General, like the judges of the courts and
the members of the Legislature, may not be personally mulcted in civil damages for the
consequences of an act executed in the performance of his official duties. The judiciary
has full power to, and will, when the matter is properly presented to it and the occasion
justly warrants it, declare an act of the Governor-General illegal and void and place as
nearly as possible in status quo any person who has been deprived his liberty or his
property by such act. This remedy is assured to every person, however humble or of
whatever country, when his personal or property rights have been invaded, even by the
highest authority of the state. The thing which the judiciary can not do is mulct the
Governor-General personally in damages which result from the performance of his official
duty, any more that it can a member of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine
Assembly. Public policy forbids it.
 Neither does this principle of nonliability mean that the chief executive may not be
personally sued at all in relation to acts which he claims to perform as such official. On
the contrary, it clearly appears from the discussion heretofore had, particularly that
portion which touched the liability of judges and drew an analogy between such liability
and that of the Governor-General, that the latter is liable when he acts in a case so plainly
outside of his power and authority that he can not be said to have exercise discretion in
determining whether or not he had the right to act. What is held here is that he will be
protected from personal liability for damages not only when he acts within his authority,
but also when he is without authority, provided he actually used discretion and judgment,
that is, the judicial faculty, in determining whether he had authority to act or not. In other
words, he is entitled to protection in determining the question of his authority. If he
decide wrongly, he is still protected provided the question of his authority was one over
which two men, reasonably qualified for that position, might honestly differ; but he is not
protected if the lack of authority to act is so plain that two such men could not honestly
differ over its determination. In such case, he acts, not as Governor-General but as a
private individual, and, as such, must answer for the consequences of his act.”