EN BANC

G.R. No. 110249 August 21, 1997

ALFREDO TANO, BALDOMERO TANO, DANILO TANO, ROMUALDO TANO, TEOCENES MIDELLO, ANGEL
DE MESA, EULOGIO TREMOCHA, FELIPE ONGONION, JR., ANDRES LINIJAN, ROBERT LIM, VIRGINIA LIM,
FELIMON DE MESA, GENEROSO ARAGON, TEODORICO ANDRE, ROMULO DEL ROSARIO, CHOLITO
ANDRE, ERICK MONTANO, ANDRES OLIVA, VITTORIO SALVADOR, LEOPOLDO ARAGON, RAFAEL RIBA,
ALEJANDRO LEONILA, JOSE DAMACINTO, RAMIRO MANAEG, RUBEN MARGATE, ROBERTO REYES,
DANILO PANGARUTAN, NOE GOLPAN, ESTANISLAO ROMERO, NICANOR DOMINGO, ROLDAN TABANG,
ADRIANO TABANG, FREDDIE SACAMAY, MIGUEL TRIMOCHA, PACENCIO LABABIT, PABLO H. OMPAD,
CELESTINO A. ABANO, ALLAN ALMODAI, BILLY D. BARTOLAY, ALBINO D. LIQUE, MECHOR J. LAYSON,
MELANIE AMANTE, CLARO E. YATOC, MERGELDO B. BALDEO, EDGAR M. ALMASETA, JOSELITO
MANAEG, LIBERATO ANDRADA, JR., ROBERTO BERRY, RONALD VILLANUEVA, EDUARDO VALMORIA,
WILFREDO MENDOZA, NAPOLEON BABANGGA, ROBERTO TADEPA, RUBEN ASINGUA, SILVERIO GABO,
JERRY ROMERO, DAVID PANGGARUTAN, DANIEL PANGGARUTAN, ROMEO AGAWIN, FERNANDO EQUIZ,
DITO LEQUIZ, RONILO MODERABLE, BENEDICTO TORRES, ROSITO A. VALDEZ, CRESENCIO A. SAYANG,
NICOMEDES S. ACOSTA, ERENEO A. SEGARINO, JR., WILFREDO A. RAUTO, DIOSDADO A. ACOSTA,
BONIFACIO G. SISMO, TACIO ALUBA, DANIEL B. BATERZAL, ELISEO YBAÑEZ, DIOSDADO E. HANCHIC,
EDDIE ESCALICAS, ELEAZAR B. BATERZAL, DOMINADOR HALICHIC, ROOSEVELT RISMO-AN, ROBERT C.
MERCADER, TIRSO ARESGADO, DANIEL CHAVEZ, DANILO CHAVEZ, VICTOR VILLAROEL, ERNESTO C.
YBAÑEZ, ARMANDO T. SANTILLAN, RUDY S. SANTILLAN, JODJEN ILUSTRISIMO, NESTOR SALANGRON,
ALBERTO SALANGRON, ROGER L. ROXAS, FRANCISCO T. ANTICANO, PASTOR SALANGRON,
BIENVENIDO SANTILLAN, GILBUENA LADDY, FIDEL BENJAMIN, JOVELITO BELGANO, HONEY PARIOL,
ANTONIO SALANGRON, NICASIO SALANGRON, & AIRLINE SHIPPERS ASSOCIATION OF
PALAWAN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. GOV. SALVADOR P. SOCRATES, MEMBERS OF SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF PALAWAN,
namely, VICE-GOVERNOR JOEL T. REYES, JOSE D. ZABALA, ROSALINO R. ACOSTA, JOSELITO A.
CADLAON, ANDRES R. BAACO, NELSON P. PENEYRA, CIPRIANO C. BARROMA, CLARO E. ORDINARIO,
ERNESTO A. LLACUNA, RODOLFO C. FLORDELIZA, GILBERT S. BAACO, WINSTON G. ARZAGA,
NAPOLEON F. ORDONEZ and GIL P. ACOSTA, CITY MAYOR EDWARD HAGEDORN, MEMBERS OF
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD NG PUERTO PRINCESA, ALL MEMBERS OF BANTAY DAGAT, MEMBERS
OF PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE OF PALAWAN, PROVINCIAL AND CITY PROSECUTORS OF PALAWAN
and PUERTO PRINCESA CITY, and ALL JUDGES OF PALAWAN, REGIONAL, MUNICIPAL AND
METROPOLITAN, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Petitioners caption their petition as one for "Certiorari, Injunction With Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction, with
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order" and pray that this Court: (1) declare as unconstitutional: (a) Ordinance No.
15-92, dated 15 December 1992, of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Puerto Princesa; (b) Office Order No. 23,
Series of 1993, dated 22 January 1993, issued by Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero of Puerto Princesa City; and
(c) Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, dated 19 February 1993, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Palawan; (2) enjoin the enforcement thereof; and (3) restrain respondents Provincial and City Prosecutors of
Palawan and Puerto Princesa City and Judges of the Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts 1 and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in Palawan from assuming jurisdiction over and hearing cases concerning the violation of the Ordinances and of the Office Order.

More appropriately, the petition is, and shall be treated as, a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition.

The following is petitioners' summary of the factual antecedents giving rise to the petition:

1. On December 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City enacted Ordinance No.
15-92 which took effect on January 1, 1993 entitled: "AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL
LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY
1, 1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF", the full
text of which reads as follows:

Sec. 1. Title of the Ordinance. — This Ordinance is entitled: AN ORDINANCE BANNING

THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY
FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS,
PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF.

Sec. 2. Purpose, Scope and Coverage. — To effectively free our City Sea Waters from
Cyanide and other Obnoxious substance[s], and shall cover all persons and/or entities
operating within and outside the City of Puerto Princesa who is are (sic) directly or indirectly
in the business or shipment of live fish and lobster outside the City.

Sec. 3. Definition of terms. — For purpose of this Ordinance the following are hereby
defined:
 A. SEA BASS — A kind of fish under the family of
Centropomidae, better known as APAHAP;

B. CATFISH — A kind of fish under the family of Plotosidae,

better known as HITO-HITO;

C. MUDFISH — A kind of fish under the family of

Orphicaphalisae better known as DALAG;

D. ALL LIVE FISH — All alive, breathing not necessarily

moving of all specie[s] use[d] for food and for aquarium
purposes.

E. LIVE LOBSTER — Several relatively, large marine

crusteceans [sic] of the genus Homarus that are alive and
breathing not necessarily moving.

Sec. 4. It shall be unlawful [for] any person or any business enterprise or company to ship
out from Puerto Princesa City to any point of destination either via aircraft or seacraft of any
live fish and lobster except SEA BASS, CATFISH, MUDFISH, AND MILKFISH FRIES.

Sec. 5. Penalty Clause. — Any person/s and or business entity violating this Ordinance shall
be penalized with a fine of not more than P5,000.00 or imprisonment of not more than twelve
(12) months, cancellation of their permit to do business in the City of Puerto Princesa or all of
the herein stated penalties, upon the discretion of the court.

Sec. 6. If the owner and/or operator of the establishment found violating the provisions of this
ordinance is a corporation or a partnership, the penalty prescribed in Section 5 hereof shall
be imposed upon its president and/or General Manager or Managing Partner and/or
Manager, as the case maybe [sic].

Sec. 7. Any existing ordinance or any provision of any ordinance inconsistent to [sic] this
ordinance is deemed repealed.

Sec. 8. This Ordinance shall take effect on January 1, 1993.

SO ORDAINED.

xxx xxx xxx

2. To implement said city ordinance, then Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero issued Office Order No. 23,
Series of 1993 dated January 22, 1993 which reads as follows:

In the interest of public service and for purposes of City Ordinance No. PD 426-14-74, otherwise known as
"AN ORDINANCE REQUIRING ANY PERSON ENGAGED OR INTENDING TO ENGAGE IN ANY
BUSINESS, TRADE, OCCUPATION, CALLING OR PROFESSION OR HAVING IN HIS POSSESSION ANY
OF THE ARTICLES FOR WHICH A PERMIT IS REQUIRED TO BE HAD, TO OBTAIN FIRST A MAYOR'S
PERMIT" and "City Ordinance No. 15-92, AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH
AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998,
you are hereby authorized and directed to check or conduct necessary inspections on cargoes containing
live fish and lobster being shipped out from the Puerto Princesa Airport, Puerto Princesa Wharf or at any
port within the jurisdiction of the City to any point of destinations [sic] either via aircraft or seacraft.

The purpose of the inspection is to ascertain whether the shipper possessed the required Mayor's Permit
issued by this Office and the shipment is covered by invoice or clearance issued by the local office of the
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and as to compliance with all other existing rules and
regulations on the matter.

Any cargo containing live fish and lobster without the required documents as stated herein must be held for
proper disposition.

In the pursuit of this Order, you are hereby authorized to coordinate with the PAL Manager, the PPA
Manager, the local PNP Station and other offices concerned for the needed support and cooperation.
Further, that the usual courtesy and diplomacy must be observed at all times in the conduct of the
inspection.

Please be guided accordingly.

xxx xxx xxx

3. On February 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted
Resolution No. 33 entitled: "A RESOLUTION PROHIBITING THE CATCHING, GATHERING,
POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLING AND SHIPMENT OF LIVE MARINE CORAL DWELLING AQUATIC
ORGANISMS, TO WIT: FAMILY: SCARIDAE (MAMENG), EPINE PHELUS
FASCIATUS (SUNO). CROMILEPTES ALTIVELIS(PANTHER OR SENORITA), LOBSTER BELOW 200
GRAMS AND SPAWNING, TRIDACNA GIGAS(TAKLOBO), PINCTADA MARGARITEFERA (MOTHER
PEARL, OYSTERS, GIANT CLAMS AND OTHER SPECIES), PENAEUS MONODON (TIGER PRAWN-
BREEDER SIZE OR MOTHER), EPINEPHELUS SUILLUS (LOBA OR GREEN GROUPER) AND
FAMILY: BALISTIDAE (TROPICAL AQUARIUM FISHES) FOR A PERIOD FIVE (5) YEARS IN AND
COMING FROM PALAWAN WATERS", the full text of which reads as follows:

WHEREAS, scientific and factual researches [sic] and studies disclose that only five (5)
percent of the corals of our province remain to be in excellent condition as [a] habitat of
marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms;

WHEREAS, it cannot be gainsaid that the destruction and devastation of the corals of our
province were principally due to illegal fishing activities like dynamite fishing, sodium cyanide
fishing, use of other obnoxious substances and other related activities;

WHEREAS, there is an imperative and urgent need to protect and preserve the existence of
the remaining excellent corals and allow the devastated ones to reinvigorate and regenerate
themselves into vitality within the span of five (5) years;

WHEREAS, Sec. 468, Par. 1, Sub-Par. VI of the [sic] R.A. 7160 otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991 empowers the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to protect the
environment and impose appropriate penalties [upon] acts which endanger the environment
such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing, among others.

NOW, THEREFORE, on motion by Kagawad Nelson P. Peneyra and upon unanimous

decision of all the members present;

Be it resolved as it is hereby resolved, to approve Resolution No. 33, Series of 1993 of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan and to enact Ordinance No. 2 for the purpose, to wit:

ORDINANCE NO. 2
Series of 1993

BE IT ORDAINED BY THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN IN SESSION ASSEMBLED:

Sec. 1. TITLE — This Ordinance shall be known as an "Ordinance Prohibiting the catching,
gathering, possessing, buying, selling and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic
organisms, to wit: 1. Family: Scaridae (Mameng), 2. Epinephelus Fasciatus (Suno) 3.
Cromileptes altivelis (Panther or Senorita), lobster below 200 grams and spawning), 4.
Tridacna Gigas (Taklobo), 5. Pinctada Margaretefera (Mother Pearl, Oysters, Giant Clams
and other species), 6. Penaeus Monodon (Tiger Prawn-breeder size or mother), 7.
Epinephelus Suillus (Loba or Green Grouper) and 8. Family: Balistidae (T[r]opical Aquarium
Fishes) for a period of five (5) years in and coming from Palawan Waters.

Sec. II. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

1. Sec. 2-A (Rep. Act 7160). It is hereby declared, the policy of the state that the territorial
and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to
enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them
more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall
provide for [a] more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more
powers, authority, responsibilities and resources.

2. Sec. 5-A (R.A. 7160). Any provision on a power of [a] local Government Unit shall be
liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved
in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower government units. "Any fair and reasonable
doubts as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the Local Government
Unit concerned."

3. Sec. 5-C (R.A. 7160). The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally
interpreted to give more powers to local government units in accelerating economic
development and upgrading the quality of life for the people in the community.

4. Sec. 16 (R.A. 7160). General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the
powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers
necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance; and those
which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare.

Sec. III. DECLARATION OF POLICY. — It is hereby declared to be the policy of the

Province of Palawan to protect and conserve the marine resources of Palawan not only for
the greatest good of the majority of the present generation but with [the] proper perspective
and consideration of [sic] their prosperity, and to attain this end, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan henceforth declares that is (sic) shall be unlawful for any person or any
business entity to engage in catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling and shipment of
 live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms as enumerated in Section 1 hereof in and
coming out of Palawan Waters for a period of five (5) years;

Sec. IV. PENALTY CLAUSE. — Any person and/or business entity violating this Ordinance
shall be penalized with a fine of not more than Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), Philippine
Currency, and/or imprisonment of six (6) months to twelve (12) months and confiscation and
forfeiture of paraphernalias [sic] and equipment in favor of the government at the discretion
of the Court;

Sec. V. SEPARABILITY CLAUSE. — If for any reason, a Section or provision of this

Ordinance shall be held as unconditional [sic] or invalid, it shall not affect the other provisions
hereof.

Sec. VI. REPEALING CLAUSE. — Any existing Ordinance or a provision of any ordinance
inconsistent herewith is deemed modified, amended or repealed.

Sec. VII. EFFECTIVITY — This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days after its publication.

SO ORDAINED.

xxx xxx xxx

4. The respondents implemented the said ordinances, Annexes "A" and "C" hereof thereby depriving all the
fishermen of the whole province of Palawan and the City of Puerto Princesa of their only means of livelihood
and the petitioners Airline Shippers Association of Palawan and other marine merchants from performing
their lawful occupation and trade;

5. Petitioners Alfredo Tano, Baldomero Tano, Teocenes Midello, Angel de Mesa, Eulogio Tremocha, and
Felipe Ongonion, Jr. were even charged criminally under criminal case no. 93-05-C in the 1st Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Cuyo-Agutaya-Magsaysay, an original carbon copy of the criminal complaint dated April
12, 1993 is hereto attached as Annex "D"; while xerox copies are attached as Annex "D" to the copies of the
petition;

6. Petitioners Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, on the other hand, were charged by the respondent PNP with the
respondent City Prosecutor of Puerto Princess City, a xerox copy of the complaint is hereto attached as
Annex "E";

Without seeking redress from the concerned local government units, prosecutor's office and courts, petitioners
directly invoked our original jurisdiction by filing this petition on 4 June 1993. In sum, petitioners contend that:

First, the Ordinances deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the
practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987
Constitution.

Second, Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation nor condition under which the Mayor's permit could be granted
or denied; in other words, the Mayor had the absolute authority to determine whether or not to issue the permit.

Third, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan "altogether prohibited the catching, gathering, possession,
buying, selling and shipping of live marine coral dwelling organisms, without any distinction whether it was caught or
gathered through lawful fishing method," the Ordinance took away the right of petitioners-fishermen to earn their
livelihood in lawful ways; and insofar as petitioners-members of Airline Shippers Association are concerned, they
were unduly prevented from pursuing their vocation and entering "into contracts which are proper, necessary, and
essential to carry out their business endeavors to a successful conclusion."

Finally, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is null and void, the criminal cases based thereon
against petitioners Tano and the others have to be dismissed.

In the Resolution of 15 June 1993 we required respondents to comment on the petition, and furnished the Office of
the Solicitor General with a copy thereof.

In their comment filed on 13 August 1993, public respondents Governor Socrates and Members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Palawan defended the validity of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, as a valid exercise of the
Provincial Government's power under the general welfare clause (Section 16 of the Local Government Code of
1991 [hereafter, LGC]), and its specific power to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts
which endanger the environment, such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing under Section 447
(a) (1) (vi), Section 458 (a) (1) (vi), and Section 468 (a) (1) (vi), of the LGC. They claimed that in the exercise of such
powers, the Province of Palawan had "the right and responsibility . . . to insure that the remaining coral reefs, where
fish dwells [sic], within its territory remain healthy for the future generation." The Ordinance, they further asserted,
covered only live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms which were enumerated in the ordinance and excluded
other kinds of live marine aquatic organisms not dwelling in coral reefs; besides the prohibition was for only five (5)
years to protect and preserve the pristine coral and allow those damaged to regenerate.

Aforementioned respondents likewise maintained that there was no violation of the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Constitution. As to the former, public hearings were conducted before the enactment of the
Ordinance which, undoubtedly, had a lawful purpose and employed reasonable means; while as to the latter, a
substantial distinction existed "between a fisherman who catches live fish with the intention of selling it live, and a
fisherman who catches live fish with no intention at all of selling it live," i.e., "the former uses sodium cyanide while
the latter does not." Further, the Ordinance applied equally to all those belonging to one class.

On 25 October 1993 petitioners filed an Urgent Plea for the Immediate Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order,
claiming that despite the pendency of this case, Branch 50 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan was bent on
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 11223 against petitioners Danilo Tano, Alfredo Tano, Eulogio Tremocha,
Romualdo Tano, Baldomero Tano, Andres Linijan and Angel de Mesa for violation of Ordinance No. 2 of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan. Acting on said plea, we issued on 11 November 1993 a temporary
restraining order directing Judge Angel Miclat of said court to cease and desist from proceeding with the
arraignment and pre-trial of Criminal Case No. 11223.

On 12 July 1994, we excused the Office of the Solicitor General from filing a comment, considering that as claimed
by said office in its Manifestation of 28 June 1994, respondents were already represented by counsel.

The rest of the respondents did not file any comment on the petition.

In the resolution of 15 September 1994, we resolved to consider the comment on the petition as the Answer, gave
due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. 2

On 22 April 1997 we ordered impleaded as party respondents the Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and required the
Office of the Solicitor General to comment on their behalf. But in light of the latter's motion of 9 July 1997 for an extension of time to file the comment which would
only result in further delay, we dispensed with said comment.

After due deliberation on the pleadings filed, we resolved to dismiss this petition for want of merit, and on 22 July
1997, assigned it to the ponente to write the opinion of the Court.

There are actually two sets of petitioners in this case. The first is composed of Alfredo Tano, Baldomero Tano,
Danilo Tano, Romualdo Tano, Teocenes Midello, Angel de Mesa, Eulogio Tremocha, Felipe Ongonion, Jr., Andres
Linijan, and Felimon de Mesa, who were criminally charged with violating Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolution
No. 33 and Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, of the Province of Palawan, in Criminal Case No. 93-05-C of the 1st
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Palawan; 3 and Robert Lim and Virginia Lim who were charged with violating City Ordinance No. 15-92
of Puerto Princesa City and Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, of the Province of Palawan before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa. 4 All of them,
with the exception of Teocenes Midello, Felipe Ongonion, Jr., Felimon de Mesa, Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, are likewise the accused in Criminal Case No. 11223
for the violation of Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan, pending before Branch 50 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan. 5

The second set of petitioners is composed of the rest of the petitioners numbering seventy-seven (77), all of whom, except the Airline Shippers Association of
Palawan — an alleged private association of several marine merchants — are natural persons who claim to be fishermen.

The primary interest of the first set of petitioners is, of course, to prevent the prosecution, trial and determination of
the criminal cases until the constitutionality or legality of the Ordinances they allegedly violated shall have been
resolved. The second set of petitioners merely claim that being fishermen or marine merchants, they would be
adversely affected by the ordinance's.

As to the first set of petitioners, this special civil for certiorari must fail on the ground of prematurity amounting to a
lack of cause of action. There is no showing that said petitioners, as the accused in the criminal cases, have filed
motions to quash the informations therein and that the same were denied. The ground available for such motions is
that the facts charged therein do not constitute an offense because the ordinances in question are
unconstitutional. 6It cannot then be said that the lower courts acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion to justify recourse to
the extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition. It must further be stressed that even if petitioners did file motions to quash, the denial thereof would not
forthwith give rise to a cause of action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The general rule is that where a motion to quash is denied, the remedy therefrom is
not certiorari, but for the party aggrieved thereby to go to trial without prejudice to reiterating special defenses involved in said motion, and if, after trial on the
merits an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law. 7 And, even where in an exceptional circumstance such denial may
be the subject of a special civil action for certiorari, a motion for reconsideration must have to be filed to allow the court concerned an opportunity to correct its
errors, unless such motion may be dispensed with because of existing exceptional circumstances. 8 Finally, even if a motion for reconsideration has been filed and
denied, the remedy under Rule 65 is still unavailable absent any showing of the grounds provided for in Section 1 thereof. 9 For obvious reasons, the petition at
bar does not, and could not have, alleged any of such grounds.

As to the second set of petitioners, the instant petition is obviously one for DECLARATORY RELIEF, i.e., for a
declaration that the Ordinances in question are a "nullity . . . for being unconstitutional."10 As such, their petition must
likewise fail, as this Court is not possessed of original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief even if only
questions of law are involved,11 it being settled that the Court merely exercises appellate jurisdiction over such
petitions.12

II

Even granting arguendo that the first set of petitioners have a cause of action ripe for the extraordinary writ
of certiorari, there is here a clear disregard of the hierarchy of courts, and no special and important reason or
exceptional and compelling circumstance has been adduced why direct recourse to us should be allowed. While we
have concurrent jurisdiction with Regional Trial courts and with the Court of Appeals to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence gives petitioners no
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum, so we held in People v. Cuaresma.13

This concurrence of jurisdiction is not . . . to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an
absolute unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is
after all hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve
 as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming
regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs
against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter,
with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs
should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set
out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the
Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to
prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket. . . .

The Court feels the need to reaffirm that policy at this time, and to enjoin strict adherence thereto in the light
of what it perceives to be a growing tendency on the part of litigants and lawyers to have their applications
for the so-called extraordinary writs, and sometimes even their appeals, passed upon and adjudicated
directly and immediately by the highest tribunal of the land. . . .

In Santiago v. Vasquez,14 this Court forcefully expressed that the propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the
hierarchy of courts must be put to a halt, not only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court, but
also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often
has to be remanded or referred to the lower court, the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better
equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We reiterated "the judicial policy that this Court
will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where
exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of [its]
primary jurisdiction."

III

Notwithstanding the foregoing procedural obstacles against the first set of petitioners, we opt to resolve this case on
its merits considering that the lifetime of the challenged Ordinances is about to end. Ordinance No. 15-92 of the City
of Puerto Princesa is effective only up to 1 January 1998, while Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan,
enacted on 19 February 1993, is effective for only five (5) years. Besides, these Ordinances were undoubtedly
enacted in the exercise of powers under the new LGC relative to the protection and preservation of the environment
and are thus novel and of paramount importance. No further delay then may be allowed in the resolution of the
issues raised.

It is of course settled that laws (including ordinances enacted by local government units) enjoy the presumption of
constitutionality. 15 To overthrow this presumption, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution,
not merely a doubtful or argumentative contradiction. In short, the conflict with the Constitution must be shown
beyond reasonable doubt.16 Where doubt exists, even if well-founded, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality.
To doubt is to sustain.17

After a scrutiny of the challenged Ordinances and the provisions of the Constitution petitioners claim to have been
violated, we find petitioners' contentions baseless and so hold that the former do not suffer from any infirmity, both
under the Constitution and applicable laws.

Petitioners specifically point to Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7, Article XIII of the Constitution as having
been transgressed by the Ordinances.

The pertinent portion of Section 2 of Article XII reads:

Sec. 2. . . .

The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive
economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as
cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and
lagoons.

Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII provide:

Sec. 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create economic
opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 7. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities,
to the preferential use of the communal marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It
shall provide support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and research, adequate
financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The State shall also protect,
develop, and conserve such resources. The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of
subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their
labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.

There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman.
In their petition, petitioner Airline Shippers Association of Palawan is self-described as "a private association
composed of Marine Merchants;" petitioners Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, as "merchants;" while the rest of
the petitioners claim to be "fishermen," without any qualification, however, as to their status.

Since the Constitution does not specifically provide a definition of the terms "subsistence" or "marginal"
fishermen,18 they should be construed in their general and ordinary sense. A marginal fisherman is an
individual engaged in fishing whose margin of return or reward in his harvest of fish as measured by existing
price levels is barely sufficient to yield a profit or cover the cost of gathering the fish,19 while a subsistence
fisherman is one whose catch yields but the irreducible minimum for his livelihood.20 Section 131(p) of the
LGC (R.A. No. 7160) defines a marginal farmer or fisherman as "an individual engaged in subsistence
farming or fishing which shall be limited to the sale, barter or exchange of agricultural or marine products
produced by himself and his immediate family." It bears repeating that nothing in the record supports a
finding that any petitioner falls within these definitions.

Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay
stress on the duty of the State to protect the nation's marine wealth. What the provision merely recognizes is
that the State may allow, by law, cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and
fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays and lagoons. Our survey of the statute books reveals that the only
provision of law which speaks of a preferential right of marginal fishermen is Section 149 of the LGC, which
pertinently provides:

Sec. 149. Fishery Rentals, Fees and Charges. — . . .

(b) The sangguniang bayan may:

(1) Grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or

other aquatic beds or bangus fry areas, within a definite zone of the
municipal waters, as determined by it: Provided, however, That duly
registered organizations and cooperatives of marginal fishermen shall
have the preferential right to such fishery privileges . . . .

In a Joint Administrative Order No. 3 dated 25 April 1996, the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and
the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government prescribed guidelines concerning the
preferential treatment of small fisherfolk relative to the fishery right mentioned in Section 149. This case,
however, does not involve such fishery right.

Anent Section 7 of Article XIII, it speaks not only of the use of communal marine and fishing resources, but
of their protection, development and conservation. As hereafter shown, the ordinances in question are
meant precisely to protect and conserve our marine resources to the end that their enjoyment may be
guaranteed not only for the present generation, but also for the generations to come.

The so-called "preferential right" of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not
at all absolute. In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the State, and,
pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their "exploration, development
and utilization . . . shall be under the full control and supervision of the State." Moreover, their mandated
protection, development and conservation as necessarily recognized by the framers of the Constitution,
imply certain restrictions on whatever right of enjoyment there may be in favor of anyone. Thus, as to the
curtailment of the preferential treatment of marginal fishermen, the following exchange between
Commissioner Francisco Rodrigo and Commissioner Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., took place at the plenary
session of the Constitutional Commission:

MR. RODRIGO:

Let us discuss the implementation of this because I would not raise the hopes of our
people, and afterwards fail in the implementation. How will this be implemented? Will
there be a licensing or giving of permits so that government officials will know that
one is really a marginal fisherman? Or if policeman say that a person is not a
marginal fisherman, he can show his permit, to prove that indeed he is one.

MR. BENGZON:

Certainly, there will be some mode of licensing insofar as this is concerned and this
particular question could be tackled when we discuss the Article on Local
Governments — whether we will leave to the local governments or to Congress on
how these things will be implemented. But certainly, I think our congressmen and our
local officials will not be bereft of ideas on how to implement this mandate.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. RODRIGO:

So, once one is licensed as a marginal fisherman, he can go anywhere in the

Philippines and fish in any fishing grounds.

MR. BENGZON:
 Subject to whatever rules and regulations and local laws that may be passed, may
be existing or will be passed.21 (emphasis supplied)

What must likewise be borne in mind is the state policy enshrined in the Constitution regarding the duty of
the State to protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with
the rhythm and harmony of nature. 22 On this score, in Oposa v. Factoran, 23 this Court declared:

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles
the State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any
of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of
rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and
fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the
Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly
mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that
unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by
the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a
solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too
far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come —
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it a correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment. . . .

The LGC provisions invoked by private respondents merely seek to give flesh and blood to the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology. In fact, the General Welfare Clause, expressly mentions this
right:

Sec. 16. General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly
granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental
for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the
general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure
and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and
safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the
development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public
morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their
residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
(emphasis supplied).

Moreover, Section 5(c) of the LGC explicitly mandates that the general welfare provisions of the LGC "shall
be liberally interpreted to give more powers to the local government units in accelerating economic
development and upgrading the quality of life for the people of the community."

The LGC vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters and impose
rentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or
poisonous substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methods of fishing; and to prosecute any
violation of the provisions of applicable fishery laws.24 Further, the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang
panlungsod and the sangguniang panlalawigan are directed to enact ordinances for the general welfare of
the municipality and its inhabitants, which shall include, inter alia, ordinances that "[p]rotect the environment
and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and
other forms of destructive fishing . . . and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of
eutrophication of rivers and lakes, or of ecological
imbalance."25

Finally, the centerpiece of LGC is the system of decentralization26 as expressly mandated by the
Constitution.27 Indispensable to decentralization is devolution and the LGC expressly provides that "[a]ny
provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of
doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local
government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor
of the local government unit concerned."28 Devolution refers to the act by which the National Government
confers power and authority upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and
responsibilities.29

One of the devolved powers enumerated in the section of the LGC on devolution is the enforcement of
fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves.30 This necessarily includes the
enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters.

The term "municipal waters," in turn, includes not only streams, lakes, and tidal waters within the
municipality, not being the subject of private ownership and not comprised within the national parks, public
forest, timber lands, forest reserves, or fishery reserves, but also marine waters included between two lines
drawn perpendicularly to the general coastline from points where the boundary lines of the municipality or
city touch the sea at low tide and a third line parallel with the general coastline and fifteen kilometers from
it.31 Under P.D. No. 704, the marine waters included in municipal waters is limited to three nautical miles from
the general coastline using the above perpendicular lines and a third parallel line.
These "fishery laws" which local government units may enforce under Section 17(b)(2)(i) in municipal waters
include: (1) P.D. No. 704; (2) P.D. No. 1015 which, inter alia, authorizes the establishment of a "closed
season" in any Philippine water if necessary for conservation or ecological purposes; (3) P.D. No. 1219
which provides for the exploration, exploitation, utilization and conservation of coral resources; (4) R.A. No.
5474, as amended by B.P. Blg. 58, which makes it unlawful for any person, association or corporation to
catch or cause to be caught, sell, offer to sell, purchase, or have in possession any of the fish specie
called gobiidae or "ipon" during closed season; and (5) R.A. No. 6451 which prohibits and punishes
electrofishing, as well as various issuances of the BFAR.

To those specifically devolved insofar as the control and regulation of fishing in municipal waters and the
protection of its marine environment are concerned, must be added the following:

1. Issuance of permits to construct fish cages within municipal waters;

2. Issuance of permits to gather aquarium fishes within municipal waters;

3. Issuance of permits to gather kapis shells within municipal waters;

4. Issuance of permits to gather/culture shelled mollusks within municipal waters;

5. Issuance of licenses to establish seaweed farms within municipal waters;

6. Issuance of licenses to establish culture pearls within municipal waters;

7. Issuance of auxiliary invoice to transport fish and fishery products; and

8. Establishment of "closed season" in municipal waters.

These functions are covered in the Memorandum of Agreement of 5 April 1994 between the Department of
Agriculture and the Department of Interior and Local Government.

In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers
granted therein to local government units under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause), and under
Sections 149, 447(a) (1) (vi), 458 (a) (1) (vi) and 468 (a) (1) (vi), which unquestionably involve the exercise
of police power, the validity of the questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted.

Parenthetically, we wish to add that these Ordinances find full support under R.A. No. 7611, otherwise
known as the Strategic Environmental Plan (SEP) for Palawan Act, approved on 19 June 1992. This statute
adopts a "comprehensive framework for the sustainable development of Palawan compatible with protecting
and enhancing the natural resources and endangered environment of the province," which "shall serve to
guide the local government of Palawan and the government agencies concerned in the formulation and
implementation of plans, programs and projects affecting said province."32

At this time then, it would be appropriate to determine the relation between the assailed Ordinances and the
aforesaid powers of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the Province of Palawan to protect the environment. To begin, we ascertain the purpose of
the Ordinances as set forth in the statement of purposes or declaration of policies quoted earlier.

It is clear to the Court that both Ordinances have two principal objectives or purposes: (1) to establish a
"closed season" for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a period of five years; and (2)
to protect the coral in the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan from
further destruction due to illegal fishing activities.

The accomplishment of the first objective is well within the devolved power to enforce fishery laws in
municipal waters, such as P.D. No. 1015, which allows the establishment of "closed seasons." The
devolution of such power has been expressly confirmed in the Memorandum of Agreement of 5 April 1994
between the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Interior and Local Government.

The realization of the second objective clearly falls within both the general welfare clause of the LGC and
the express mandate thereunder to cities and provinces to protect the environment and impose appropriate
penalties for acts which endanger the environment.33

The destruction of coral reefs results in serious, if not irreparable, ecological imbalance, for coral reefs are
among nature's life-support systems.34 They collect, retain and recycle nutrients for adjacent nearshore
areas such as mangroves, seagrass beds, and reef flats; provide food for marine plants and animals; and
serve as a protective shelter for aquatic organisms.35 It is said that "[e]cologically, the reefs are to the oceans
what forests are to continents: they are shelter and breeding grounds for fish and plant species that will
disappear without them."36

The prohibition against catching live fish stems, in part, from the modern phenomenon of live-fish trade
which entails the catching of so-called exotic species of tropical fish, not only for aquarium use in the West,
but also for "the market for live banquet fish [which] is virtually insatiable in ever more affluent Asia.37 These
exotic species are coral-dwellers, and fishermen catch them by "diving in shallow water with corraline
habitats and squirting sodium cyanide poison at passing fish directly or onto coral crevices; once affected
the fish are immobilized [merely stunned] and then scooped by hand."38 The diver then surfaces and dumps
his catch into a submerged net attached to the skiff. Twenty minutes later, the fish can swim normally. Back
on shore, they are placed in holding pens, and within a few weeks, they expel the cyanide from their system
and are ready to be hauled. They are then placed in saltwater tanks or packaged in plastic bags filled with
seawater for shipment by air freight to major markets for live food fish.39 While the fish are meant to survive,
the opposite holds true for their former home as "[a]fter the fisherman squirts the cyanide, the first thing to
perish is the reef algae, on which fish feed. Days later, the living coral starts to expire. Soon the reef loses its
function as habitat for the fish, which eat both the algae and invertebrates that cling to the coral. The reef
becomes an underwater graveyard, its skeletal remains brittle, bleached of all color and vulnerable to
erosion from the pounding of the waves."40 It has been found that cyanide fishing kills most hard and soft
corals within three months of repeated application.41

The nexus then between the activities barred by Ordinance No. 15-92 of the City of Puerto Princesa and the
prohibited acts provided in Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993 of the Province of Palawan, on one hand, and
the use of sodium cyanide, on the other, is painfully obvious. In sum, the public purpose and
reasonableness of the Ordinances may not then be controverted.

As to Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993, issued by Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero of the City of
Puerto Princesa, we find nothing therein violative of any constitutional or statutory provision. The Order
refers to the implementation of the challenged ordinance and is not the Mayor's Permit.

The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo relies upon the lack of authority on the part of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of Puerto Princesa to enact Ordinance No. 15, Series of 1992, on the theory that
the subject thereof is within the jurisdiction and responsibility of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources (BFAR) under P.D. No. 704, otherwise known as the Fisheries Decree of 1975; and that, in any
event, the Ordinance is unenforceable for lack of approval by the Secretary of the Department of Natural
Resources (DNR), likewise in accordance with P.D. No. 704.

The majority is unable to accommodate this view. The jurisdiction and responsibility of the BFAR under P.D.
No. 704, over the management, conservation, development, protection, utilization and disposition of all
fishery and aquatic resources of the country is not all-encompassing. First, Section 4 thereof excludes from
such jurisdiction and responsibility municipal waters, which shall be under the municipal or city government
concerned, except insofar as fishpens and seaweed culture in municipal centers are concerned. This section
provides, however, that all municipal or city ordinances and resolutions affecting fishing and fisheries and
any disposition thereunder shall be submitted to the Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources for
appropriate action and shall have full force and effect only upon his approval.42

Second, it must at once be pointed out that the BFAR is no longer under the Department of Natural
Resources (now Department of Environment and Natural Resources). Executive Order No. 967 of 30 June
1984 transferred the BFAR from the control and supervision of the Minister (formerly Secretary) Of Natural
Resources to the Ministry of Agriculture and Food (MAF) and converted it into a mere staff agency thereof,
integrating its functions with the regional offices of the MAF.

In Executive Order No. 116 of 30 January 1987, which reorganized the MAF, the BFAR was retained as an
attached agency of the MAF. And under the Administrative Code of 1987,43 the BFAR is placed under the
Title concerning the Department of Agriculture.44

Therefore, it is incorrect to say that the challenged Ordinance of the City of Puerto Princesa is invalid or
unenforceable because it was not approved by the Secretary of the DENR. If at all, the approval that should
be sought would be that of the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture. However, the requirement of
approval by the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture (not DENR) of municipal ordinances affecting
fishing and fisheries in municipal waters has been dispensed with in view of the following reasons:

(1) Section 534 (Repealing Clause) of the LGC expressly repeals or amends Sections 16 and 29 of P.D. No.
70445 insofar as they are inconsistent with the provisions of the LGC.

(2) As discussed earlier, under the general welfare clause of the LGC, local government units have the
power, inter alia, to enact ordinances to enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology. It likewise
specifically vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters, and impose
rentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or
poisonous substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methods of fishing; and to prosecute any
violation of the provisions of applicable fishery laws.46 Finally, it imposes upon the sangguniang bayan, the
sangguniang panlungsod, and the sangguniang panlalawigan the duty to enact ordinances to "[p]rotect the
environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite
fishing and other forms of destructive fishing . . . and such other activities which result in pollution,
acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of ecological imbalance."47

In closing, we commend the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Puerto Princesa and Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the Province of Palawan for exercising the requisite political will to enact urgently needed
legislation to protect and enhance the marine environment, thereby sharing in the herculean task of arresting
the tide of ecological destruction. We hope that other local government units shall now be roused from their
lethargy and adopt a more vigilant stand in the battle against the decimation of our legacy to future
generations. At this time, the repercussions of any further delay in their response may prove disastrous, if
not, irreversible.
 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the temporary restraining order
issued on 11 November 1993 is LIFTED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Romero, Melo, Vitug, Francisco Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Regalado, J., is on leave.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 119619 December 13, 1996

RICHARD HIZON, SILVERIO GARGAR, ERNESTO ANDAYA, NEMESIO GABO, RODRIGO ABRERA, CHEUNG
TAI FOOK, SHEK CHOR LUK, EFREN DELA PENA, JONEL AURELIO, GODOFREDO VILLAVERDE,
ANGELITO DUMAYBAG, DEOMEDES ROSIL, AMADO VILLANUEVA, FRANCISCO ESTREMOS, ANGEL
VILLAVERDE, NEMESIO CASAMPOL, RICHARD ESTREMOS, JORNIE DELA PENA, JESUS MACTAN,
MARLON CAMPORAZO, FERNANDO BIRING, MENDRITO CARPO, LUIS DUARTE, JOSEPH AURELIO,
RONNIE JUEZAN, BERNARDO VILLACARLOS, RICARDO SALES, MARLON ABELLA, TEODORO DELOS
REYES, IGNACIO ABELLA, JOSEPH MAYONADO, JANAIRO LANGUYOD, DODONG DELOS REYES, JOLLY
CABALLERO and ROPLANDO ARCENAS, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

PUNO, J.:p

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15417 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
52, Palawan in Criminal Case No. 10429 convicting petitioners of the offense of illegal fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance penalized under
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 704, the Fisheries Decree of 1975.

In an Information dated October 15, 1992, petitioners were charged with a violation of P.D. 704 committed as
follows:

That on or about the 30th day of September 1992, at Brgy. San Rafael, Puerto Princesa City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused crew
members and fishermen of F/B Robinson owned by First Fishermen Fishing Industries, Inc.,
represented by Richard Hizon, a domestic corporation duly organized under the laws of the
Philippines, being then the owner, crew members and fishermen of F/B Robinson and with the use
of said fishing boat, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously the said accused
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another catch, take or gather or
cause to be caught, taken or gathered fish or fishery aquatic products in the coastal waters of Puerto
Princess City, Palawan, with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance (sodium cyanide), of
more or less one (1) ton of assorted live fishes which were illegally caught thru the use of
obnoxious/poisonous substance (sodium cyanide). 1

The following facts were established by the prosecution: In September 1992, the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Maritime Command of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan received reports of illegal fishing operations in the coastal
waters of the city. In response to these reports, the city mayor organized Task Force Bantay Dagat to assist the
police in the detection and apprehension of violators of the laws on fishing.

On September 30, 1992 at about 2:00 in the afternoon, the Task Force Bantay Dagat reported to the PNP Maritime
Command that a boat and several small crafts were fishing by "muro ami" within the shoreline of Barangay San
Rafael of Puerto Princesa. The police, headed by SPO3 Romulo Enriquez, and members of the Task Force Bantay
Dagat, headed by Benito Marcelo, Jr., immediately proceeded to the area and found several men fishing in
motorized sampans and a big fishing boat identified as F/B Robinson within the seven-kilometer shoreline of the
city. They boarded the F/B Robinson and inspected the boat with the acquiescence of the boat captain, Silverio
Gargar. In the course of their inspection, the police saw two foreigners in the captain's deck. SP03 Enriquez
examined their passports and found them to be mere photocopies. The police also discovered a large aquarium full
of live lapu-lapu and assorted fish weighing approximately one ton at the bottom of the boat. 2 They checked the
license of the boat and its fishermen and found them to be in order. Nonetheless, SP03 Enriquez brought the boat
captain, the crew and the fishermen to Puerto Princesa for further investigation.

At the city harbor, members of the Maritime Command were ordered by SP03 Enriquez to guard the F/B Robinson.
The boat captain and the two foreigners were again interrogated at the PNP Maritime Command office. Thereafter,
an Inspection/Apprehension Report was prepared and the boat, its crew and fishermen were charged with the
following violations:

1. Conducting fishing operations within Puerto Princesa coastal waters without mayor's permit;

2. Employing excess fishermen on board (Authorized — 26; On board — 36);

 3. Two (2) Hongkong nationals on board without original passports. 3

The following day, October 1, 1992, SPO3 Enriquez directed the boat captain to get random samples of fish from
the fish cage of F/B Robinson for laboratory examination. As instructed, the boat engineer, petitioner Ernesto
Andaya, delivered to the Maritime Office four (4) live lapu-lapu fish inside a plastic shopping bag filled with water.
SPO3 Enriquez received the fish and in the presence of the boat engineer and captain, placed them inside a large
transparent plastic bag without water. He sealed the plastic with heat from a lighter. 4

The specimens were brought to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) sub-office in the city for examination "to
determine the method of catching the same for record or evidentiary purposes." 5 They were received at the NBI
office at 8:00 in the evening of the same day. The receiving clerk, Edna Capicio, noted that the fish were dead and
she placed the plastic bag with the fish inside the office freezer to preserve them. Two days later, on October 3,
1992, the chief of the NBI sub-office, Onos Mangotara, certified the specimens for laboratory examination at the NBI
Head Office in Manila. The fish samples were to be personally transported by Edna Capicio who was then
scheduled to leave for Manila for her board examination in Criminology. 6 On October 4, 1992, Ms. Capicio, in the
presence of her chief, took the plastic with the specimens from the freezer and placed them inside two shopping
bags and sealed them with masking tape. She proceeded to her ship where she placed the specimens in the ship's
freezer.

Capicio arrived in Manila the following day, October 5, 1992 and immediately brought the specimens to the NBI
Head Office. On October 7, 1992, NBI Forensic Chemist Emilia Rosaldes conducted two tests on the fish samples
and found that they contained sodium cyanide, thus:

FINDINGS:

Weight of Specimen. . . . . . 1.870 kilograms

Examinations made on the above-mentioned
specimen gave POSITIVE RESULTS to the
test for the presence of SODIUM CYANIDE. . . .

REMARKS:

Sodium Cyanide is a violent poison. 7

In light of these findings, the PNP Maritime Command of Puerto Princesa City filed the complaint at bar against the
owner and operator of the F/B Robinson, the First Fishermen Fishing Industries, Inc., represented by herein
petitioner Richard Hizon, the boat captain, Silverio Gargar, the boat engineer, Ernesto Andaya, two other crew
members, the two Hongkong nationals and 28 fishermen of the said boat.

Petitioners were arraigned and they pled not guilty to the charge. As defense, they claimed that they are legitimate
fishermen of the First Fishermen Industries, Inc., a domestic corporation licensed to engage in fishing. They alleged
that they catch fish by the hook and line method and that they had used this method for one month and a half in the
waters of Cuyo Island. They related that on September 30, 1992 at about 7:00 A.M., they anchored the F/B
Robinson in the east of Podiado Island in Puerto Princesa City. The boat captain and the fishermen took out and
boarded their sampans to fish for their food. They were still fishing in their sampans at 4:00 P.M. when a rubber boat
containing members of the PNP Maritime Command and the Task Force Bantay Dagat approached them and
boarded the F/B Robinson. The policemen were in uniform while the Bantay Dagat personnel were in civilian
clothes. They were all armed with guns. One of the Bantay Dagat personnel introduced himself as Commander Jun
Marcelo and he inspected the boat and the boat's documents. Marcelo saw the two foreigners and asked for their
passports. As their passports were photocopies, Marcelo demanded for their original. The captain explained that the
original passports were with the company's head office in Manila. Marcelo angrily insisted for the originals and
threatened to arrest everybody. He then ordered the captain, his crew and the fishermen to follow him to Puerto
Princesa. He held the magazine of his gun and warned the captain "Sige, huwag kang tatakas, kung hindi babarilin
ko kayo!" 8 The captain herded all his men into the boat and followed Marcelo and the police to Puerto Princesa.

They arrived at the city harbor at 7:45 in the evening and were met by members of the media. As instructed by
Marcelo, the members of the media interviewed and took pictures of the boat and the fishermen. 9

The following day, October 1, 1992, at 8:00 in the morning, Amado Villanueva, one of the fishermen at the F/B
Robinson, was instructed by a policeman guarding the boat to get five (5) fish samples from the fish cage and bring
them to the pier. Villanueva inquired whether the captain knew about the order but the guard replied he was taking
responsibility for it. Villanueva scooped five pieces of lapu-lapu, placed them inside a plastic bag filled with water
and brought the bag to the pier. The boat engineer, Ernesto Andaya, received the fish and delivered them to the
PNP Maritime Office. Nobody was in the office and Andaya waited for the apprehending officers and the boat
captain. Later, one of the policemen in the office instructed him to leave the bag and hang it on a nail in the wall.
Andaya did as he was told and returned to the boat at 10:00 A.M. 10

In the afternoon of the same day, the boat captain arrived at the Maritime office. He brought along a representative
from their head office in Manila who showed the police and the Bantay Dagat personnel the original passports of the
Hongkong nationals and other pertinent documents of the F/B Robinson and its crew. Finding the documents in
order, Marcelo approached the captain and whispered to him "Tandaan mo ito, kapitan, kung makakaalis ka dito,
magkikita pa rin uli tayo sa dagat, kung hindi kayo lulubog ay palulutangin ko kayo!" It was then that SP03 Enriquez
informed the captain that some members of the Maritime Command, acting under his instructions, had just taken
five (5) pieces of lapu-lapu from the boat. SP03 Enriquez showed the captain the fish samples. Although the captain
saw only four (4) pieces of lapu-lapu, he did not utter a word of protest. 11 Under Marcelo's threat, he signed the
"Certification" that he received only four (4) pieces of the fish. 12

Two weeks later, the information was filed against petitioners. The case was prosecuted against thirty-one (31) of
the thirty-five (35) accused. Richard Hizon remained at large while the whereabouts of Richard Estremos, Marlon
Camporazo and Joseph Aurelio were unknown.

On July 9, 1993, the trial court found the thirty one (31) petitioners guilty and sentenced them to imprisonment for a
minimum of eight (8) years and one (1) day to a maximum of nine (9) years and four (4) months. The court also
ordered the confiscation and forfeiture of the F/B Robinson, the 28 sampans and the ton of assorted live fishes as
instruments and proceeds of the offense, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused SILVERIO
GARGAR, ERNESTO ANDAYA, NEMESIO GABO, RODRIGO ABRERA, CHEUNG TAI FOOK,
SHEK CHOR LUK, EFREN DELA PENA, JONEL AURELIO, GODOFREDO VILLAVERDE,
ANGELITO DUMAYBAG, DEOMEDES ROSIL, AMADO VILLANUEVA, FRANCISCO ESTREMOS,
ARNEL VILLAVERDE, NEMESIO CASAMPOL, JORNIE DELA CRUZ, JESUS MACTAN,
FERNANDO BIRING, MENDRITO CARPO, LUIS DUARTE, RONNIE JUEZAN, BERNARDO
VLLLACARLOS, RICARDO SALES, MARLON ABELLA, TEODORO DELOS REYES, IGNACIO
ABELLA, JOSEPH MAYONADO, JANAIRO LANGUYOD, DODONG DELOS REYES, ROLANDO
ARCENAS and JOLLY CABALLERO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Fishing
with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance commonly known as sodium cyanide, committed
in violation of section 33 and penalized in section 38 of Presidential Decree No. 704, as amended,
and there being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances appreciated and applying the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, each of the aforenamed accused is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from a minimum of EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY to a maximum of NINE (9) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS and to pay the costs.

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 45, in relation to the second sentence of Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended:

a) Fishing Boat (F/B) Robinson;

b) The 28 motorized fiberglass sampans; and

c) The live fishes in the fish cages installed in the F/B Robinson, all of which have been respectively
shown to be tools or instruments and proceeds of the offense, are hereby ordered confiscated and
declared forfeited in favor of the government.

SO ORDERED. 13

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.

Petitioners contend that:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE MERE "POSITIVE
RESULTS TO THE TEST FOR THE PRESENCE OF SODIUM CYANIDE" IN THE FISH
SPECIMEN, ALBEIT ILLEGALLY SEIZED ON THE OCCASION OF A WARRANTLESS SEARCH
AND ARREST, IS ADMISSIBLE AND SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR THE PETITIONERS' CONVICTION
OF THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL FISHING.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE STATUTORY
PRESUMPTION OF GUILT UNDER SEC. 33 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 704 CANNOT
PREVAIL AGAINST THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE, SUCH THAT THE
GRAVAMEN OF THE OFFENSE OF ILLEGAL FISHING MUST STILL BE PROVED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.

III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT REVERSING THE JUDGMENT OF THE
TRIAL COURT AND ACQUITTING THE PETITIONERS. 14

The Solicitor General submitted a "Manifestation in Lieu of Comment" praying for petitioners' acquittal. 15

The petitioners, with the concurrence of the Solicitor General, primarily question the admissibility of the evidence
against petitioners in view of the warrantless search of the fishing boat and the subsequent arrest of petitioners.
More concretely, they contend that the NBI finding of sodium cyanide in the fish specimens should not have been
admitted and considered by the trial court because the fish samples were seized from the F/B Robinson without a
search warrant.
Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure and the arrest of persons without a judicial warrant. 16 As a general
rule, any evidence obtained without a judicial warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The rule is,
however, subject to certain exceptions. Some of these are: 17 (1) a search incident to a lawful of arrest; 18 (2) seizure
of evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving motor vehicle; 19 and (4) search in violation of customs laws. 20

Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations of customs laws have been the
traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant. It is rooted on the recognition that a
vessel and an aircraft, like motor vehicles, can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search
warrant must be sought and secured. Yielding to this reality, judicial authorities have not required a search warrant
of vessels and aircrafts before their search and seizure can be constitutionally effected. 21

The same exception ought to apply to seizures of fishing vessels and boats breaching our fishery laws. These
vessels are normally powered by high-speed motors that enable them to elude arresting ships of the Philippine
Navy, the Coast Guard and other government authorities enforcing our fishery laws. 22

We thus hold as valid the warrantless search on the F/B Robinson, a fishing boat suspected of having engaged in
illegal fishing. The fish and other evidence seized in the course of the search were properly admitted by the trial
court. Moreover, petitioners failed to raise the issue during trial and hence, waived
their right to question any irregularity that may have attended the said search and seizure. 23

Given the evidence admitted by the trial court, the next question now is whether petitioners are guilty of the offense
of illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances. Again, the petitioners, joined by the Solicitor General, submit
that the prosecution evidence cannot convict them.

We agree.

Petitioners were charged with illegal fishing penalized under sections 33 and 38 of P.D. 704 24 which provide as
follows:

Sec. 33. Illegal fishing, illegal possession of explosives intended for illegal fishing; dealing in illegally
caught fish or fishery/aquatic products.— It shall be unlawful for any person to catch, take or gather
or cause to be caught, taken or gathered fish or fishery/aquatic products in Philippine waters with the
use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance, or by the use of electricity as defined in
paragraphs (l), (m) and (d), respectively, of section 3 hereof: Provided, That mere possession of
such explosives with intent to use the same for illegal fishing as herein defined shall be punishable
as hereinafter provided: Provided, That the Secretary may, upon recommendation of the Director
and subject to such safeguards and conditions he deems necessary, allow for research, educational
or scientific purposes only, the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance or electricity to
catch, take or gather fish or fishery/aquatic products in the specified area: Provided, further, That the
use of chemicals to eradicate predators in fishponds in accordance with accepted scientific fishery
practices without causing deleterious effects in neighboring waters shall not be construed as the use
of obnoxious or poisonous substance within the meaning of this section: Provided, finally, That the
use of mechanical bombs for killing whales, crocodiles, sharks or other large dangerous fishes, may
be allowed, subject to the approval of the Secretary.

It shall, likewise, be unlawful for any person knowingly to possess, deal in, sell or in any manner
dispose of, for profit, any fish or fishery/aquatic products which have been illegally caught, taken or
gathered.

The discovery of dynamite, other explosives and chemical compounds containing combustible
elements, or obnoxious or poisonous substance, or equipment or device for electric fishing in any
fishing boat or in the possession of a fisherman shall constitute a presumption that the same were
used for fishing in violation of this Decree, and the discovery in any fishing boat of fish caught or
killed by the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance or by electricity shall constitute a
presumption that the owner, operator or fisherman were fishing with the use of explosives,
obnoxious or poisonous substance or electricity.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 38. Penalties. — (a) For illegal fishing and dealing in illegally caught fish or fishery/aquatic
products. — Violation of Section 33 hereof shall be punished as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) By imprisonment from eight (8) to ten (10) years, if obnoxious or poisonous substances are
used: Provided, That if the use of such substances results 1) in physical injury to any person, the
penalty shall be imprisonment from ten (10) to twelve (12) years, or 2) in the loss of human life, then
the penalty shall be imprisonment from twenty (20) years to life or death;

xxx xxx xxx 25

The offense of illegal fishing is committed when a person catches, takes or gathers or causes to be caught,
taken or gathered fish, fishery or aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use of explosives, electricity,
obnoxious or poisonous substances. The law creates a presumption that illegal fishing has been committed
when: (a) explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substances or equipment or device for electric fishing are
 found in a fishing boat or in the possession of a fisherman; or (b) when fish caught or killed with the use of
explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substances or by electricity are found in a fishing boat. Under these
instances, the boat owner, operator or fishermen are presumed to have engaged in illegal fishing.

Petitioners contend that this presumption of guilt under the Fisheries Decree violates the presumption of innocence
guaranteed by the Constitution. 26 As early as 1916, this Court has rejected this argument by holding that: 27

In some States, as well as in England, there exist what are known as common law offenses. In the
Philippine Islands no act is a crime unless it is made so by statute. The state having the right to
declare what acts are criminal, within certain well-defined limitations, has the right to specify what act
or acts shall constitute a crime, as well as what proof shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt,
and then to put upon the defendant the burden of showing that such act or acts are innocent and are
not committed with any criminal intent or intention. 28

The validity of laws establishing presumptions in criminal cases is a settled matter. It is generally conceded
that the legislature has the power to provide that proof of certain facts can constitute prima facie evidence of
the guilt of the accused and then shift the burden of proof to the accused provided there is a rational
connection between the facts proved and the ultimate fact presumed. 29 To avoid any constitutional infirmity,
the inference of one from proof of the other must not be arbitrary and unreasonable. 30 In fine, the
presumption must be based on facts and these facts must be part of the crime when committed. 31

The third paragraph of section 33 of P.D. 704 creates a presumption of guilt based on facts proved and hence is not
constitutionally impermissible. It makes the discovery of obnoxious or poisonous substances, explosives, or devices
for electric fishing, or of fish caught or killed with the use of obnoxious and poisonous substances, explosives or
electricity in any fishing boat or in the possession of a fisherman evidence that the owner and operator of the fishing
boat or the fisherman had used such substances in catching fish. The ultimate fact presumed is that the owner and
operator of the boat or the fisherman were engaged in illegal fishing and this presumption was made to arise from
the discovery of the substances and the contaminated fish in the possession of the fisherman in the fishing boat.
The fact presumed is a natural inference from the fact proved. 32

We stress, however, that the statutory presumption is merely prima

facie. 33 It can not, under the guise of regulating the presentation of evidence, operate to preclude the accused from
presenting his defense to rebut the main fact presumed. 34 At no instance can the accused be denied the right to
rebut the presumption. 35 thus:

The inference of guilt is one of fact and rests upon the common experience of men. But the
experience of men has taught them that an apparently guilty possession may be explained so as to
rebut such an inference and an accused person may therefore put witnesses on the stand or go on
the witness stand himself to explain his possession, and any reasonable explanation of his
possession, inconsistent with his guilty connection with the commission of the crime, will rebut the
inference as to his guilt which the prosecution seeks to have drawn from his guilty possession of the
stolen goods. 36

We now review the evidence to determine whether petitioners have successfully rebutted this presumption. The
facts show that on November 13, 1992, after the Information was filed in court and petitioners granted bail,
petitioners moved that the fish specimens taken from the F/B Robinson be reexamined. 3 7 The trial court granted
the motion. 38 As prayed for, a member of the PNP Maritime Command of Puerto Princesa, in the presence of
authorized representatives of the F/B Robinson, the NBI and the local Fisheries Office, took at random five (5) live
lapu-lapu from the fish cage of the boat. The specimens were packed in the usual manner of transporting live fish,
taken aboard a commercial flight and delivered by the same representatives to the NBI Head Office in Manila for
chemical analysis.

On November 23, 1992, Salud Rosales, another forensic chemist of the NBI in Manila conducted three (3) tests on
the specimens and found the fish negative for the presence of sodium cyanide, 39 thus:

Gross weight of specimen = 3.849 kg.

Examinations made on the above-mentioned specimens gave NEGATIVE RESULTS to the tests for
the presence of SODIUM CYANIDE. 40

The Information charged petitioners with illegal fishing "with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance (sodium
cyanide), of more or less one (1) ton of assorted live fishes" There was more or less one ton of fishes in the F/B
Robinson's fish cage. It was from this fish cage that the four dead specimens examined on October 7, 1992 and the
five specimens examined on November 23, 1992 were taken. Though all the specimens came from the same
source allegedly tainted with sodium cyanide, the two tests resulted in conflicting findings. We note that after its
apprehension, the F/B Robinson never left the custody of the PNP Maritime Command. The fishing boat was
anchored near the city harbor and was guarded by members of the Maritime Command. 41 It was later turned over to
the custody of the Philippine Coast Guard Commander of Puerto Princesa City. 42

The prosecution failed to explain the contradictory findings on the fish samples and this omission raises a
reasonable doubt that the one ton of fishes in the cage were caught with the use of sodium cyanide.

The absence of cyanide in the second set of fish specimens supports petitioners' claim that they did not use the
poison in fishing. According to them, they caught the fishes by the ordinary and legal way, i.e., by hook and line on
board their sampans. This claim is buttressed by the prosecution evidence itself. The apprehending officers saw
petitioners fishing by hook and line when they came upon them in the waters of Barangay San Rafael. One of the
apprehending officers, SPO1 Demetrio Saballuca, testified as follows:

ATTY. TORREFRANCA ON CROSS-EXAMINATION:

Q: I get your point therefore, that the illegal fishing supposedly conducted at San
Rafael is a moro ami type of fishing [that] occurred into your mind and that was made
to understand by the Bantay Dagat personnel?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Upon reaching the place, you and the pumpboat, together with the two Bantay
Dagat personnel were SPO3 Romulo Enriquez and Mr. Benito Marcelo and SPO1
Marzan, you did not witness that kind of moro ami fishing, correct?

A: None, sir.

Q: In other words, there was negative activity of moro ami type of fishing on
September 30, 1992 at 4:00 in the afternoon at San Rafael?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And what you saw were 5 motorized sampans with fishermen each doing a hook
and line fishing type?

A: Yes, sir. More or less they were five.

Q: And despite the fact you had negative knowledge of this moro ami type of fishing,
SP03 Enriquez together with Mr. Marcelo boarded the vessel just the same?

A: Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx 43

The apprehending officers who boarded and searched the boat did not find any sodium cyanide nor any poisonous
or obnoxious substance. Neither did they find any trace of the poison in the possession of the fishermen or in the
fish cage itself. An Inventory was prepared by the apprehending officers and only the following items were found on
board the boat:

ITEMS QUANTITY REMARKS

F/B Robinson (1) unit operating

engine (1) unit ICE-900-BHP

sampans 28 units fiberglass

outboard motors 28 units operating

assorted fishes more or less 1 ton live

hooks and lines assorted

xxx xxx xxx 44

We cannot overlook the fact that the apprehending officers found in the boat assorted hooks and lines for
catching fish. 45 For this obvious reason, the Inspection/Apprehension Report prepared by the apprehending
officers immediately after the search did not charge petitioners with illegal fishing, much less illegal fishing
with the use of poison or any obnoxious substance. 46

The only basis for the charge of fishing with poisonous substance is the result of the first NBI laboratory test on the
four fish specimens. Under the circumstances of the case, however, this finding does not warrant the infallible
conclusion that the fishes in the F/B Robinson, or even the same four specimens, were caught with the use of
sodium cyanide.

Prosecution witness SPO1 Bernardino Visto testified that for the first laboratory test, boat engineer Ernesto Andaya
did not only get four (4) samples of fish but actually got five (5) from the fish cage of the F/B Robinson. 4 7 The
Certification that four (4) fish samples were taken from the boat shows on its face the number of pieces as originally
"five (5)" but this was erased with correction fluid and "four (4)" written over it. 48 The specimens were taken, sealed
inside the plastic bag and brought to Manila by the police authorities in the absence of petitioners or their
representative. SP02 Enriquez testified that the same plastic bag containing the four specimens was merely sealed
with heat from a lighter. 49 Emilia Rosales, the NBI forensic chemist who examined the samples, testified that when
she opened the package, she found the two ends of the same plastic bag knotted. 50 These circumstances as well as
the time interval from the taking of the fish samples and their actual examination 51 fail to assure the impartial mind
that the integrity of the specimens had been properly safeguarded.

Apparently, the members of the PNP Maritime Command and the Task Force Bantay Dagat were the ones engaged
in an illegal fishing expedition. As sharply observed by the Solicitor General, the report received by the Task Force
Bantay Dagat was that a fishing boat was fishing illegally through "muro ami" on the waters of San Rafael. "Muro
ami" according to SPO1 Saballuca is made with "the use of a big net with sinkers to make the net submerge in the
water with the fishermen surround[ing] the net." 52 This method of fishing needs approximately two hundred (200)
fishermen to execute. 53 What the apprehending officers instead discovered were twenty eight (28) fishermen in their
sampans fishing by hook and line. The authorities found nothing on the boat that would have indicated any form of
illegal fishing. All the documents of the boat and the fishermen were in order. It was only after the fish specimens
were tested, albeit under suspicious circumstances, that petitioners were charged with illegal fishing with the use of
poisonous substances.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15417 is
reversed and set aside. Petitioners are acquitted of the crime of illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances
defined under Section 33 of Republic Act No. 704, the Fisheries Decree of 1975. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 110120 March 16, 1994

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL JN. SERAPIO, Presiding Judge RTC, Branch 127, Caloocan City, HON.
MACARIO A. ASISTIO, JR., City Mayor of Caloocan and/or THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF
CALOOCAN, respondents.

Alberto N. Hidalgo and Ma. Teresa T. Oledan for petitioner.

The City Legal Officer & Chief, Law Department for Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr. and the City Government of
Caloocan.

ROMERO, J.:

The clash between the responsibility of the City Government of Caloocan to dispose off the 350 tons of garbage it
collects daily and the growing concern and sensitivity to a pollution-free environment of the residents of Barangay
Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City where these tons of garbage are dumped everyday is the hub of this
controversy elevated by the protagonists to the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) for adjudication.

The instant case stemmed from an earlier petition filed with this Court by Laguna Lake Development Authority
(LLDA for short) docketed as G.R.
No. 107542 against the City Government of Caloocan, et al. In the Resolution of November 10, 1992, this Court
referred G.R. No. 107542 to the Court of Appeals for appropriate disposition. Docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP
No. 29449, the Court of Appeals, in a decision1 promulgated on January 29, 1993 ruled that the LLDA has no power
and authority to issue a cease and desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage in Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate,
Caloocan City. The LLDA now seeks, in this petition, a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts, as disclosed in the records, are undisputed.

On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan
City, filed a letter-complaint2 with the Laguna Lake Development Authority seeking to stop the operation of the 8.6-
hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City due to its harmful effects on the
health of the residents and the possibility of pollution of the water content of the surrounding area.

On November 15, 1991, the LLDA conducted an on-site investigation, monitoring and test sampling of the
leachate3that seeps from said dumpsite to the nearby creek which is a tributary of the Marilao River. The LLDA
Legal and Technical personnel found that the City Government of Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite at
the Camarin area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, as required under
Presidential Decree No. 1586,4 and clearance from LLDA as required under Republic Act No. 4850,5 as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.6

After a public hearing conducted on December 4, 1991, the LLDA, acting on the complaint of Task Force Camarin
Dumpsite, found that the water collected from the leachate and the receiving streams could considerably affect the
quality, in turn, of the receiving waters since it indicates the presence of bacteria, other than coliform, which may
have contaminated the sample during collection or handling.7 On December 5, 1991, the LLDA issued a Cease and
Desist Order8 ordering the City Government of Caloocan, Metropolitan Manila Authority, their contractors, and other
entities, to completely halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste matter at the
Camarin dumpsite.

The dumping operation was forthwith stopped by the City Government of Caloocan. However, sometime in August
1992 the dumping operation was resumed after a meeting held in July 1992 among the City Government of
Caloocan, the representatives of Task Force Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA at the Office of Environmental
Management Bureau Director Rodrigo U. Fuentes failed to settle the problem.

After an investigation by its team of legal and technical personnel on August 14, 1992, the LLDA issued another
order reiterating the December 5, 1991, order and issued an Alias Cease and Desist Order enjoining the City
Government of Caloocan from continuing its dumping operations at the Camarin area.

On September 25, 1992, the LLDA, with the assistance of the Philippine National Police, enforced its Alias Cease
and Desist Order by prohibiting the entry of all garbage dump trucks into the Tala Estate, Camarin area being
utilized as a dumpsite.

Pending resolution of its motion for reconsideration earlier filed on September 17, 1992 with the LLDA, the City
Government of Caloocan filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an action for the declaration of nullity of
the cease and desist order with prayer for the issuance of writ of injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. C-15598. In
its complaint, the City Government of Caloocan sought to be declared as the sole authority empowered to promote
the health and safety and enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its territorial
jurisdiction.9

On September 25, 1992, the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the LLDA from enforcing its cease and desist order. Subsequently, the case was raffled
to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 126 of Caloocan which, at the time, was presided over by Judge Manuel Jn.
Serapio of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 127, the pairing judge of the recently-retired presiding judge.

The LLDA, for its part, filed on October 2, 1992 a motion to dismiss on the ground, among others, that under
Republic Act No. 3931, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 984, otherwise known as the Pollution Control Law,
the cease and desist order issued by it which is the subject matter of the complaint is reviewable both upon the law
and the facts of the case by the Court of Appeals and not by the Regional Trial Court. 10

On October 12, 1992 Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio issued an order consolidating Civil Case No. C-15598 with Civil
Case No. C-15580, an earlier case filed by the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite entitled "Fr. John Moran, et al. vs.
Hon. Macario Asistio." The LLDA, however, maintained during the trial that the foregoing cases, being independent
of each other, should have been treated separately.

On October 16, 1992, Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, after hearing the motion to dismiss, issued in the consolidated
cases an order11 denying LLDA's motion to dismiss and granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining the LLDA, its agent and all persons acting for and on its behalf, from enforcing or implementing its cease
and desist order which prevents plaintiff City of Caloocan from dumping garbage at the Camarin dumpsite during the
pendency of this case and/or until further orders of the court.

On November 5, 1992, the LLDA filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for restraining
order with the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. 107542, seeking to nullify the aforesaid order dated October
16, 1992 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 127 of Caloocan City denying its motion to dismiss.

The Court, acting on the petition, issued a Resolution12 on November 10, 1992 referring the case to the Court of
Appeals for proper disposition and at the same time, without giving due course to the petition, required the
respondents to comment on the petition and file the same with the Court of Appeals within ten (10) days from notice.
In the meantime, the Court issued a temporary restraining order, effective immediately and continuing until further
orders from it, ordering the respondents: (1) Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 127, Caloocan City to cease and desist from exercising jurisdiction over the case for declaration of nullity of
the cease and desist order issued by the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA); and (2) City Mayor of
Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate,
Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City.

Respondents City Government of Caloocan and Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr. filed on November 12, 1992 a motion
for reconsideration and/or to quash/recall the temporary restraining order and an urgent motion for reconsideration
alleging that ". . . in view of the calamitous situation that would arise if the respondent city government fails to collect
350 tons of garbage daily for lack of dumpsite (i)t is therefore, imperative that the issue be resolved with dispatch or
with sufficient leeway to allow the respondents to find alternative solutions to this garbage problem."

On November 17, 1992, the Court issued a Resolution13 directing the Court of Appeals to immediately set the case
for hearing for the purpose of determining whether or not the temporary restraining order issued by the Court should
be lifted and what conditions, if any, may be required if it is to be so lifted or whether the restraining order should be
maintained or converted into a preliminary injunction.

The Court of Appeals set the case for hearing on November 27, 1992, at 10:00 in the morning at the Hearing Room,
3rd Floor, New Building, Court of Appeals.14 After the oral argument, a conference was set on December 8, 1992 at
10:00 o'clock in the morning where the Mayor of Caloocan City, the General Manager of LLDA, the Secretary of
DENR or his duly authorized representative and the Secretary of DILG or his duly authorized representative were
required to appear.
It was agreed at the conference that the LLDA had until December 15, 1992 to finish its study and review of
respondent's technical plan with respect to the dumping of its garbage and in the event of a rejection of respondent's
technical plan or a failure of settlement, the parties will submit within 10 days from notice their respective
memoranda on the merits of the case, after which the petition shall be deemed submitted for
resolution.15Notwithstanding such efforts, the parties failed to settle the dispute.

On April 30, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision holding that: (1) the Regional Trial Court has no
jurisdiction on appeal to try, hear and decide the action for annulment of LLDA's cease and desist order, including
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in relation thereto, since appeal therefrom is
within the exclusive and appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under Section 9, par. (3), of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129; and (2) the Laguna Lake Development Authority has no power and authority to issue a cease and desist
order under its enabling law, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order
No. 927, series of 1983.

The Court of Appeals thus dismissed Civil Case No. 15598 and the preliminary injunction issued in the said case
was set aside; the cease and desist order of LLDA was likewise set aside and the temporary restraining order
enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its
garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City was lifted, subject, however, to the condition that any
future dumping of garbage in said area, shall be in conformity with the procedure and protective works contained in
the proposal attached to the records of this case and found on pages 152-160 of the Rollo, which was thereby
adopted by reference and made an integral part of the decision, until the corresponding restraining and/or injunctive
relief is granted by the proper Court upon LLDA's institution of the necessary legal proceedings.

Hence, the Laguna Lake Development Authority filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, now docketed as
G.R. No. 110120, with prayer that the temporary restraining order lifted by the Court of Appeals be re-issued until
after final determination by this Court of the issue on the proper interpretation of the powers and authority of the
LLDA under its enabling law.

On July, 19, 1993, the Court issued a temporary restraining order16 enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the
City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin,
Caloocan City, effective as of this date and containing until otherwise ordered by the Court.

It is significant to note that while both parties in this case agree on the need to protect the environment and to
maintain the ecological balance of the surrounding areas of the Camarin open dumpsite, the question as to which
agency can lawfully exercise jurisdiction over the matter remains highly open to question.

The City Government of Caloocan claims that it is within its power, as a local government unit, pursuant to the
general welfare provision of the Local Government Code, 17 to determine the effects of the operation of the dumpsite
on the ecological balance and to see that such balance is maintained. On the basis of said contention, it questioned,
from the inception of the dispute before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, the power and authority of the
LLDA to issue a cease and desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage in the Barangay Camarin over which the
City Government of Caloocan has territorial jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals sustained the position of the City of Caloocan on the theory that Section 7 of Presidential
Decree No. 984, otherwise known as the Pollution Control law, authorizing the defunct National Pollution Control
Commission to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order was not incorporated in Presidential Decree No. 813 nor in
Executive Order No. 927, series of
1983. The Court of Appeals ruled that under Section 4, par. (d), of Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, the LLDA is
instead required "to institute the necessary legal proceeding against any person who shall commence to implement
or continue implementation of any project, plan or program within the Laguna de Bay region without previous
clearance from the Authority."

The LLDA now assails, in this partition for review, the abovementioned ruling of the Court of Appeals, contending
that, as an administrative agency which was granted regulatory and adjudicatory powers and functions by Republic
Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, it
is invested with the power and authority to issue a cease and desist order pursuant to Section 4 par. (c), (d), (e), (f)
and (g) of Executive Order No. 927 series of 1983 which provides, thus:

Sec. 4. Additional Powers and Functions. The authority shall have the following powers and
functions:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with the provisions of this Executive Order and
its implementing rules and regulations only after proper notice and hearing.

(d) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution specifying the conditions
and the time within which such discontinuance must be accomplished.

(e) Issue, renew, or deny permits, under such conditions as it may determine to be reasonable, for
the prevention and abatement of pollution, for the discharge of sewage, industrial waste, or for the
installation or operation of sewage works and industrial disposal system or parts thereof.

(f) After due notice and hearing, the Authority may also revoke, suspend or modify any permit issued
under this Order whenever the same is necessary to prevent or abate pollution.
 (g) Deputize in writing or request assistance of appropriate government agencies or instrumentalities
for the purpose of enforcing this Executive Order and its implementing rules and regulations and the
orders and decisions of the Authority.

The LLDA claims that the appellate court deliberately suppressed and totally disregarded the above provisions of
Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, which granted administrative quasi-judicial functions to LLDA on pollution
abatement cases.

In light of the relevant environmental protection laws cited which are applicable in this case, and the corresponding
overlapping jurisdiction of government agencies implementing these laws, the resolution of the issue of whether or
not the LLDA has the authority and power to issue an order which, in its nature and effect was injunctive,
necessarily requires a determination of the threshold question: Does the Laguna Lake Development Authority, under
its Charter and its amendatory laws, have the authority to entertain the complaint against the dumping of garbage in
the open dumpsite in Barangay Camarin authorized by the City Government of Caloocan which is allegedly
endangering the health, safety, and welfare of the residents therein and the sanitation and quality of the water in the
area brought about by exposure to pollution caused by such open garbage dumpsite?

The matter of determining whether there is such pollution of the environment that requires control, if not prohibition,
of the operation of a business establishment is essentially addressed to the Environmental Management Bureau
(EMB) of the DENR which, by virtue of Section 16 of Executive Order No. 192, series of 1987,18 has assumed the
powers and functions of the defunct National Pollution Control Commission created under Republic Act No. 3931.
Under said Executive Order, a Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) under the Office of the DENR Secretary now
assumes the powers and functions of the National Pollution Control Commission with respect to adjudication of
pollution cases. 19

As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB),
except in cases where the special law provides for another forum. It must be recognized in this regard that the
LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its
amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the declared national policy20 of promoting and accelerating the
development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and
the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan21 with due regard and adequate provisions for
environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the
prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant and power and
authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the
Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the
surrounding areas. In carrying out the aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA is mandated, among others, to
pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans, programs, and projects proposed by local government
offices/agencies within the region, public corporations, and private persons or enterprises where such plans,
programs and/or projects are related to those of the LLDA for the development of the region. 22

In the instant case, when the complainant Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay
Camarin, Caloocan City, filed its letter-complaint before the LLDA, the latter's jurisdiction under its charter was
validly invoked by complainant on the basis of its allegation that the open dumpsite project of the City Government
of Caloocan in Barangay Camarin was undertaken without a clearance from the LLDA, as required under Section 4,
par. (d), of Republic Act. No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927. While there is also
an allegation that the said project was without an Environmental Compliance Certificate from the Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR, the primary jurisdiction of the LLDA over this case was recognized by the
Environmental Management Bureau of the DENR when the latter acted as intermediary at the meeting among the
representatives of the City Government of Caloocan, Task Force Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA sometime in July
1992 to discuss the possibility of
re-opening the open dumpsite.

Having thus resolved the threshold question, the inquiry then narrows down to the following issue: Does the LLDA
have the power and authority to issue a "cease and desist" order under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory
laws, on the basis of the facts presented in this case, enjoining the dumping of garbage in Tala Estate, Barangay
Camarin, Caloocan City.

The irresistible answer is in the affirmative.

The cease and desist order issued by the LLDA requiring the City Government of Caloocan to stop dumping its
garbage in the Camarin open dumpsite found by the LLDA to have been done in violation of Republic Act No. 4850,
as amended, and other relevant environment laws,23 cannot be stamped as an unauthorized exercise by the LLDA of
injunctive powers. By its express terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order
No. 927, series of 1983, authorizes the LLDA to "make, alter or modify order requiring the discontinuance or
pollution."24 (Emphasis supplied) Section 4, par. (d) explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make whatever order may be
necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction.

To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred the power "to issue and ex-parte cease and desist order" in a
language, as suggested by the City Government of Caloocan, similar to the express grant to the defunct National
Pollution Control Commission under Section 7 of P.D. No. 984 which, admittedly was not reproduced in P.D. No.
813 and E.O. No. 927, series of 1983. However, it would be a mistake to draw therefrom the conclusion that there is
a denial of the power to issue the order in question when the power "to make, alter or modify orders requiring the
discontinuance of pollution" is expressly and clearly bestowed upon the LLDA by Executive Order No. 927, series of
1983.
Assuming arguendo that the authority to issue a "cease and desist order" were not expressly conferred by law, there
is jurisprudence enough to the effect that the rule granting such authority need not necessarily be express.25 While it
is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is
likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise
of its express powers.26 In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter as a regulatory and quasi-
judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease
and desist order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a "toothless" paper agency.

In this connection, it must be noted that in Pollution Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals, et al.,27 the Court ruled
that the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) has the power to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order when there
isprima facie evidence of an establishment exceeding the allowable standards set by the anti-pollution laws of the
country. The ponente, Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, declared:

Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here
presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents
into the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted
litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course, including
multiple and sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take
several years. The relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and
promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and
general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life,
commonly designated as the police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary
requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests
like those here involved, through the exercise of police power. . . .

The immediate response to the demands of "the necessities of protecting vital public interests" gives vitality to the
statement on ecology embodied in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies or the 1987 Constitution. Article
II, Section 16 which provides:

The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the correlative duty of non-impairment. This is but in
consonance with the declared policy of the state "to protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill
health consciousness among them."28 It is to be borne in mind that the Philippines is party to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the Alma Conference Declaration of 1978 which recognize health as a
fundamental human right. 29

The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a practical matter of procedure under the
circumstances of the case, is a proper exercise of its power and authority under its charter and its amendatory laws.
Had the cease and desist order issued by the LLDA been complied with by the City Government of Caloocan as it
did in the first instance, no further legal steps would have been necessary.

The charter of LLDA, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, instead of conferring upon the LLDA the means of
directly enforcing such orders, has provided under its Section 4 (d) the power to institute "necessary legal
proceeding against any person who shall commence to implement or continue implementation of any project, plan
or program within the Laguna de Bay region without previous clearance from the LLDA."

Clearly, said provision was designed to invest the LLDA with sufficiently broad powers in the regulation of all
projects initiated in the Laguna Lake region, whether by the government or the private sector, insofar as the
implementation of these projects is concerned. It was meant to deal with cases which might possibly arise where
decisions or orders issued pursuant to the exercise of such broad powers may not be obeyed, resulting in the
thwarting of its laudabe objective. To meet such contingencies, then the writs of mandamus and injunction which are
beyond the power of the LLDA to issue, may be sought from the proper courts.

Insofar as the implementation of relevant anti-pollution laws in the Laguna Lake region and its surrounding
provinces, cities and towns are concerned, the Court will not dwell further on the related issues raised which are
more appropriately addressed to an administrative agency with the special knowledge and expertise of the LLDA.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on July 19, 1993
enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan from dumping their garbage at the
Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 110286 April 2, 1997

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RENERIO P. VERGARA, ERNESTO T. CUESTRA, JR., PEDRO G. DAGAÑO and BERNARDO P. CUESTRA,
accused. RENERIO P. VERGARA, accused-appellant.

VITUG, J.:
From the decision, dated 10 February 1993, of the Regional Trial Court, 8th Judicial Region, Branch 7, in Tacloban
City, finding accused Renerio P. Vergara guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 92-09-508 of a
violation of Section 33 of Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 704, as amended by P.D. No. 1508, an appeal to this
Court has been interposed.

Vergara was charged, together with his three co-accused, namely Ernesto T. Cuesta, Jr., Pedro G. Dagaño and
Bernardo P. Cuesta, on 25 September 1992, in an information that read:

The undersigned Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte accuses Ernesto T. Cuesta, Jr., Pedro G. Dagaño,
Renerio P. Vergara and Bernardo P. Cuesta of the crime of Violation of Section 33, Presidential
Decree No. 704, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1058, committed as follows:

That on or about the 4th day of July, 1992, in the Municipal waters of Palo, Province of Leyte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, without
any authority of law, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally catch, take and gather fish belonging to the
anchovies species known locally as "bolinao", with the use of explosives contained in a bottle and
called in the vernacular as "badil", which bottled explosives after being ignited and hurled to the sea,
produced explosion and caused the death of the said fish which were hit or affected by such
explosion.

CONTRARY TO LAW.1

Vergara alone was arraigned and brought to trial; his co-accused escaped and remained at larger.

It would appear that at about 7:30 in the morning of 04 July 1992, a team composed of deputized Fish Warden and
President of the Leyte Fish Warden Association Jesus P. Bindoy, Police Officers Casimiro Villas and Diosdado
Moron of the Palo PNP Station, Leyte, Fish Wardens Mario Castillote and Estanislao Cabreros and Fish Examiner
Nestor Aldas of the Department of Agriculture were on board, "Bantay-Dagat," a pumpboat, on "preventive patrol"
along the municipal waters fronting barangays Baras and Candahug of Palo, Leyte, when they chanced upon a
blue-colored fishing boat at a distance of approximately 200 meters away. The boat, 30 feet long, had on board
appellant Renerio Vergara and his three co-accused Bernardo Cuesta, Pedro Dagaño and Ernesto Cuesta, Jr., and
was on parallel course toward the general direction of Samar.2 Momentarily, the team saw appellant throw into the
sea a bottle known in the locality as "badil" containing ammonium nitrate and having a blasting cap on top which,
when ignited and thrown into the water, could explode. The explosion would indiscriminately kill schools and various
species of fish within a certain radius. Approximately three seconds after appellant had thrown the "badil" into the
sea, the explosion occurred. Vergara and Cuesta dove into the sea with their gear while Dagaño and Cuesta, Jr.,
stayed on board to tend to the air hose for the divers.3

The team approached the fishing boat. SP02 Casimiro Villas boarded the fishing boat while Fish Warden Jesus
Bindoy held on to one end of the boat. Moments later, Vergara and Cuesta surfaced, each carrying a fishnet or
"sibot" filled with about a kilo of "bolinao" fish scooped from under the water. Having been caught red-handed, the
four accused were apprehended and taken by the patrol team to the "Bantay-Dagat" station at Baras, and later to
the police station in Palo, Leyte. The fishing boat and its paraphernalia, as well as the two fishnets of "bolinao," were
impounded. The accused, however, refused to sign and acknowledge the corresponding receipts therefor.

On 10 February 1993, following the submission of the evidence, the trial court rendered judgment convicting
Vergara, viz:

WHEREFORE, said Renerio Vergara is hereby sentenced to a penalty of Twenty (20) years to, life
imprisonment as punished under Sec. 2, of PD 1058.

This Court further orders the confiscation of the fishing boat of Mario Moraleta including the following
equipments: 1 air compressor, 3 sets of air hoses, and the 3 pieces of "sibot" having been found to
be instruments of the crime.

SO ORDERED.4

In his appeal, Vergara submitted the following assignment of errors:

1. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF AUTHORITY WHEN IT COMPLETELY

IGNORED THE TESTIMONY OF EMILIO LINDE.

2. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF AUTHORITY WHEN IT GAVE MUCH
WEIGHT TO BIASED WITNESSES WHOSE TESTIMONIES WERE GLARINGLY INCONSISTENT.

3. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF AUTHORITY WHEN

IT OPENLYSHOWED BIAS AGAINST THE ACCUSED DURING THE TRIAL OF THIS CASE. 5

Emilio Linde sought to corroborate the claim of appellant that it was another unidentified group of fishermen who
threw the bottle of explosives at a school of "bolinao" fish. It was obvious, however, said the trial court, that the
statement of this defense witness was incredulous since he apparently had not at ail been on board the fishing boat
in the company of the accused at the time of the incident. Even the rather lengthy counter-affidavit of the four
accused completely missed to mention Linde. The court a quo went on to observe that the demeanor of the accused
at the witness stand and the substance of his testimony failed to elicit belief.

Trial courts are tasked to initially rule on the credibility of witnesses for both the prosecution and the defense.
Appellate courts seldom would subordinate, with their own, the findings of trial courts which concededly have good
vantage points in assessing the credibility of those who take the witness stand. Nevertheless, it is not all too
uncommon for this Court, in particular, to peruse through the transcript of proceedings in order to satisfy itself that
the records of a case do support the conclusions of trial courts.

Fish Warden Jesus Bindoy gave a detailed account of the 4th July 992 incident. Thus —

FISCAL DAGANDAN:

Q In the morning of the 4th day of July, 1992 do you recall where you were?

A We were on the sea fronting barangays Baras and Candahug.

Q What municipality?

A Palo, Leyte.

Q Did you have anyone with you in this particular incident?

A Yes, sir.

Q Who were they?

A Two policemen Casimiro Villas, Jr. and Diosdado Moron and my fellow fish warden
and one from the Department of Agriculture.

Q Will you identify your co-fish warden who were present at that time?

A Mario Castillote, Estanislao Cabreros, Jr.

Q How about that employee from the Department of Agriculture, who was he?

A Nestor Aldas.

Q What were you doing at that particular time on this place fronting barangay Baras
and Barangay Candahug, Palo, Leyte?

A We were watching for illegal fishers.

Q What is your authority in this particular task?

A We are the bantay dagat members of Palo.

A Do you have any written authoriting evidencing that position?

A Yes, maam, our deputized ID (witness is showing ID No. 1432-91)

FISCAL DAGANDAN:

For the records your honor I will quote this ID: This is to certify that Jesus P. Bindoy
is a deputy fish warden vested with full power and authority to enforce all existing
fishery laws, rules and regulations (SGD). Leopoldo Romano, [D]irector, Department
of Agriculture, Region 8.

FISCAL DAGANDAN:

Q Since you claimed that you were on the sea fronting barangays Baras and
Candahug in what vehicle were you in at that moment?

A We were in a motorized pumpboat.

Q So, what unusual incident if any that transpired?

A In that morning we saw a blue pump boat which is about 200 meters away from us.

COURT

What time in the morning?

A About 7:30 in the morning more or less.

FISCAL DAGANDAN:

Q About how long is this colored blue pumpboat?

A More or less 30 feet.

Q At about this distance of 200 meters were you able to visualize or see if there were
any passengers in that blue colored pumpboat?

A Yes, maam.

Q Were you able to identify them?

A Yes, sir.

Q Who were they?

A The one infront of the pumpboat was Renerio Vergara, Bernardo Cuesta, Pedro
Dagaño and Ernesto Cuesta, Jr.

Q You mentioned of Renerio Vergara, whom you saw in that blue colored pumpboat
and you identified earlier Renerio Vergara. Is he the same person?

A Yes, they are one and the same person.

Q At the time you saw these persons loaded in that color blue pumpboat what were
they doing?

A I saw them paddling.

Q Towards what direction?

A Towards the direction of Samar.

Q And where were you in relation with that pumpboat that was paddled towards
Samar area?

A We were situated parallel to them.

Q So what happened at this particular time?

A That was when we saw Renerio Vergara threw a bottle to the sea and after that we
heard an explosion.

Q Did you come to know what particular bottle was it thrown to the sea?

A It was a dynamite (badil).

Q As a member of this bantay dagat are you familiar with this "badil" which you
earlier mentioned?

A Yes, sir.

Q Will you describe this particular device?

A This bottle is filled with ammonium nitrate and on top is a blasting cap.

Q So in case this is used by fishermen, how do they operate this "badil"?

A It is ignited and then thrown to the sea and this result in the killing. of fishes at the
sea.

Q In this particular instance when you heard the explosion how far were you to this
blue pumpboat?

A About 200 meters.

Q So what did you do after you heard this explosion?

A After the explosion we slowly approached them.

Q From the time you saw this bottle being thrown to the sea by Vergara up to the
time you heard this explosion about how many minutes elapsed?

A About 3 seconds.

Q At about how near were you to this blue pumpboat?

A We went near to a distance of one hundred meters.

Q So, what did you do at this distance?

A We kept on watching them first and after we knew that the two persons dived to
the sea that was the time that we approached the pumpboat.

Q Where you able to recognize these two persons who dived?

A Yes, maam.

Q Who were they?

A Renerio Vergara and Bernardo Cuesta.

Q You said there were four persons loaded in that pumpboat. How about the other
two what were they doing?

A The two persons were there, one watching the hose that was used by the two
persons who dived for breathing.

Q So, what else did you do?

A When we approached the pumpboat it was Casimiro Villas, a policeman who

boarded the pumpboat.

Q How about you what did you do when Casimiro Villas boarded the pumpboat?

A I was the one holding on to the blue pumpboat.

Q So, what else was done if any by the members of your team?

A While we were there we let the two persons who dived surface and they were
carrying with them fishnet filled with "bolinao" fish and then we told them that we will
bring them to our temporary station at Baras, Palo.

Q Do you know the specie of this bolinao?

A Anchovies.

Q About how heavy were these fishes of bolinao in the fishnet?

A About one kilo per fishnet.

Q How many contraption were carried by them?

A Each one of them was carrying one "sibot" (fishnet).

COURT:

So, two divers two nets?

A Yes, sir.

Q And each has a catch of one kilo?

A. Almost one kilo.

Q So, two nets two kilos more or less?

A Yes, sir.

FISCAL DAGANDAN:

Q So, after that what did you do?

 Q When we arrived at our temporary station at Baras, Palo we gave the fishes to the
fish examiner and we had the pumpboat inventoried and told them to sign the receipt
we made.

Q Do you recall if you made an apprehension report of the incident you witnessed?

A Yes, maam.

Q I show you a original copy of apprehension report dated July 4, 1992 addressed to
the Regional Director, Department of Agriculture, Tacloban City stating that the
following offenders namely Renerio Vergara y Prisno, Pedro Dagaño y Gadin,
Ernesto Cueta y Tobilla and Bernardo Cuesta y Pedrero were apprehended and the
violation is fishing with the use of dynamite, the original of which is found on page 4
of the records. Will you examine the same and tell this court what relation has that to
the report you said you made?

A This is the apprehension report that we prepared on July 4, 1992.6

Nestor Aldas, an Agricultural Technologist and Fish Examiner working with the Department of Agriculture, Palo,
Leyte, who examined the fish samples taken from the accused, testified that he was with the team patrolling, on 04
July 1992, the waters of San Pedro Bay, Baras, Palo, Leyte, when he, like the other members of his team,
witnessed the use of explosives by the accused. Fish samples from the catch showed ruptured capillaries, ruptured
and blooded abdominal portion, and crushed internal organs indicating that explosives were indeed used.

The Court is convinced that the trial court has acted correctly in finding accused-appellant guilty of the offense
charged.

Sections 33 and 38 of P.D. No. 704, as amended by P.D. No. 1058, read:

Sec. 33. Illegal fishing; illegal possession of explosives intended for illegal fishing; dealing in illegally
caught fish or fishery/aquatic products. — It shall be unlawful for any person to catch, take or gather
or cause to be caught, taken or gathered fish or fishery/aquatic products in Philippine waters with the
use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance, or by the use of electricity as defined in
paragraphs (1), (m) and (d), respectively, of section 3 hereof: Provided, That mere possession of
such explosives with intent to use the same for illegal fishing as herein defined shall be punishable
as hereinafter provided: Provided, That the Secretary may, upon recommendation of the Director
and subject to such safeguards and conditions he deems necessary, allow for research, educational
or scientific purposes only, the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance or electricity to
catch, take or gather fish or fishery/aquatic products in specified area: Provided further, That the use
of chemicals to eradicate predators in fishponds in accordance with accepted scientific fishery
practices without causing deleterious effects in neighboring waters shall not be construed as the use
of obnoxious or poisonous substance within the meaning of this section: Provided, finally, That the
use of mechanical bombs for killing whales, crocodiles, sharks or other large dangerous fishes, may
be allowed, subject to the approval of the Secretary.

Sec. 38. (1) By the penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years to twenty-five (25) years
in the case of mere possession of explosives intended for illegal fishing; by imprisonment ranging
from twenty (20) years to life imprisonment, if the explosive is actually used: Provided, That if the
use of the explosive results in 1) physical injury to any person, the penalty shall be imprisonment
ranging from twenty-five (25) years to life imprisonment, or 2) in the loss of human life, then the
penalty shall be life imprisonment to death.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo appealed from is affirmed in toto. Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.