Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Parungo
Remedial Law Review 1 SAT 8:00am-12:00pm
Assignment 2
1. Upon the filing of a civil or criminal action, the court shall issue an order
a. Contents:
i. declaring whether or not the case shall be governed by this Rule.
b. Note: A patently erroneous determination to avoid the application of the Rule on Summary
Procedure is a ground for disciplinary action. (Sec. 2)
RULES ON APPEAL
FACTS:
Appellant Mario Serzo was convicted of murder by the lower court for the stabbing/killing of Alfredo
Casabal after the latter rescued minors being held by the former.
Pre-trial was waived and the case proceeded to trial on the merits.
The accused alleged that he was denied the right to counsel. During the arraignment he appeared without
counsel,so the court appointed a counsel de officio. Thereafter, he moved that the arraignment be reset so
he can engage the services of his own counsel however, during the arraignment, he still appeared without
one. The arraignment proceeded with him being assisted by the counsel de officio.
During the trial, the same counsel appeared and cross-examined for the accused.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused was denied of his right to counsel
HELD:
NO. Herein, the accused was provided with a counsel de officio who assisted him in all stages of the
proceedings.The option to hire ones counsel cannot be used to sanction reprehensible dilatory tactics, trifle
with the Rules or prejudice the equally important right of the State and the offended party to speedy and
adequate justice.
The right to counsel is guaranteed by the Constitution to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial system
where an accused is pitted against the awesome prosecution machinery of the state. It is also a recognition
of the accused not having the skill to protect himself before a tribunal which has the power to take his life
or liberty.
The right covers the period from custodial investigation until judgment is rendered, even on appeal. RA
7438 provides that any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be
assisted by counsel.
The right is however not absolute and is waivable; a) the state must balance the private against the state's
and offended party's equally important right to speedy and adequate justice, and b) the right is waivable as
long as the waiver is unequivocal, knowing, and intelligently made.
FACTS:
On January 6, 1996, Paula and Albert Bandibas were killed and robbed. As a part of the investigation and
as a result of a witness’ testimony, Edwin and Leandro Morial were asked several questions by the
policemen and were invited to the police station for continuing investigation. They were turned over to
SPO4 Andres Fernandez and later interrogated again after they woke up at past 6 in the morning. That
investigation conducted by SPO4 Fernandez resulted into the admission by Leandro that he was one of
those who participated in the robbery with homicide. With the latter’s consent, his statements were reduced
into writing. SPO4 Fernandez then advised him of his right to remain silent and to have a counsel,
whatever will be his answer will be used as evidence in court. SPO4 Fernandez volunteered to obtain a
lawyer for the suspect, to which Leandro consented. Atty. Aguilar was contacted by the former and he first
met the latter at January 9, 1996 at about 8:00 in the morning. After Leandro agreed to answer voluntarily
knowing that the same can be used against him as evidence in court, the investigation was conducted by
SPO4 Fernandez with the presence of the counsel. After “all the material points” were asked, Atty. Aguilar
asked the investigator if he can leave due to very important engagement. The latter agreed to the lawyer’s
request. But before leaving, Atty. Aguilar asked Leonardo if he was willing to answer questions in
his absence, the latter agreed. During and despite Atty. Aguilar’s absence, SPO4 Fernandez continued with
the investigation and propounded several more questions to Leonardo, which the latter answered.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Leonardo Morial’s right to counsel was waived during the investigation.
RULING:
Leonardo was effectively deprived of his right to counsel during the custodial investigation; therefore his
quasi-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence against him and his other co-accused. The Court
stressed out that an accused under custodial interrogation must continuously have a counsel assisting him
from the very start thereof. SPO4 Fernandez cannot justify that Atty. Aguilar only left after Leonardo had
admitted that he and his companions committed the crime. Neither can Atty. Aguilar rationalize that he
only left after Leonardo had admitted the “material points”, referring to the participation of the three
accused to the crime. Both are invalid since Section 2 of R.A. No. 7438 requires that “any person arrested,
detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel.” Furthermore, the last
paragraph of Section 3 states that “in the absence of any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be
conducted.”
Even granted that Leonardo consented Atty. Aguilar’s departure during the investigation and to answer
questions during the lawyer’s absence, such consent was an invalid waiver of his right to counsel and his
right to remain silent. Under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, these rights cannot be waived
unless the same is made in writing and in the presence of the counsel. In the case at bar, no such written
and counseled waiver of these rights was presented as evidence.
3.3
3.4
CRESPO VS MOGUL
FACTS:
On April 18, 1977 the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo.
When the case was set for arraignment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the
ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice. In an order,
the presiding judge, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion.
A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was filed
by the accused in the CA which was eventually granted while perpetually restraining the judge
from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in the case until the
Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for review.
The Undersecretary of Justice reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and
directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused.
But the respondent judge denied the motion.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the
Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for
review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits.
HELD: YES.
Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the
fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the
Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require
that the trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case.
The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as we all know is to see that justice is done and not necessarily
to secure the conviction of the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite of his opinion to
the contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of evidence of the
prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to
whether the accused should be convicted or acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk from the
responsibility of appearing for the People of the Philippines even under such circumstances much
less should he abandon the prosecution of the case leaving it to the hands of a private prosecutor
for then the entire proceedings will be null and void. The least that the fiscal should do is to
continue to appear for the prosecution although he may turn over the presentation of the evidence
to the private prosecutor but still under his direction and control.
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion
on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The
determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss
the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or
deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the
accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the
Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.
5.2. Tatad doctrine
TATAD VS SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
In 1974, Antonio de los Reyes (Head Executive Assistant of Department of Public Information)
filed a formal report with the Legal Panel, Presidential Security Command against Tatad (who was
then Secretary of the Dept. of Public Information). Allegations therein relate to alleged violations
of RA 3019 (anti-graft). No action was taken on said report. 5 years later (1979), Tatad resigned
from his post as department head. 2 months later, de los Reyes filed a complaint with the
Tanodbayan against Tatad alleging the same things. In 1980, the resignation of Tatad was
accepted by Pres. Marcos. In the same year, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the
Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) for fact finding investigation. Thereafter, an investigation
report was made stating that based on evidence gathered, Tatad violated RA 3019.
Tatad filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that he has immunity from
prosecution (PD 1791). This was denied. So pleadings were instead submitted. By 1982, all
affidavits and counter-affidavits were already with the Tanodbayan for final disposition. Note that
it was only in 1985 when the Tanodbayan made a resolution recommending that informations be
filed with the Sandiganbayan against Tatad. 2 months after, Five informations were filed with the
Sandiganbayan (3 informations for failure to file SALN, the other two relate to bribery and giving
undue advantage to a private corporation).
Tatad filed a motion to quash with the Sandiganbayan alleging, among other things, that the
prosecution deprived him of due process of law and of the right to a speedy disposition of the
cases filed against him, amounting to loss of jurisdiction to file the information and that the
offenses charged had already prescribed. On the other hand, Tanodbayan submitted that based on
jurisprudence, the filing of the complaint with them interrupted that prescription period so the
offenses are not really prescribed yet. Moreover, Tanodbayan pointed out that a law such as BP
195, extending the period of limitation with respect to criminal prosecution, unless the right to
acquittal has been acquired, is constitutional.
Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash. It held that based on the Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure, the defect in the information can be cured by amendment. So several
months after this resolution, an amended information was filed by the Tanodbayan changing the
dates of the commission of the offenses.
MR filed by Tatad – also denied. Hence, this certiorari and prohibition (Rule 65) was filed with
the SC. Tatad claims that the Tanodbayan culpably violated the constitutional mandate of due
process and speedy disposition of cases in unduly prolonging the termination of the preliminary
investigation and in filing the corresponding information only after more than a decade from the
alleged commission of the purported offenses, which amounted to loss of jurisdiction and
authority to file the informations.
The Sandiganbayan dismissed this by saying that the applicability of the authorities cited by Tatad
to the case at bar was "nebulous;" that it would be premature for the court to grant the "radical
relief" prayed for at this stage of the proceeding; that the mere allegations of "undue delay" do not
suffice to justify acceptance thereof without any showing "as to the supposed lack or omission of
any alleged procedural right granted or allowed to the respondent accused by law or administrative
fiat" or in the absence of "indubitable proof of any irregularity or abuse" committed by the
Tanodbayan in the conduct of the preliminary investigation; that such facts and circumstances as
would establish petitioner's claim of denial of due process and other constitutionally guaranteed
rights could be presented and more fully threshed out at the trial.
ISSUE:
Was Tatad deprived of his constitutional right to due process and the right to "speedy disposition"
of the cases against him as guaranteed by the Constitution? (YES)
HELD:
In a number of cases, the SC has not hesitated to grant the so-called "radical relief" and to spare
the accused from undergoing the rigors and expense of a full-blown trial where it is clear that the
accused has been deprived of due process of law or other constitutionally guaranteed rights. Of
course, it goes without saying that in the application of the doctrine enunciated in those cases,
particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. A review of
the facts at hand cannot but leave the impression that political motivations played a vital role in
activating and propelling the prosecutorial process in this case. First, the complaint came to life
only after Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos. Second, departing from established
procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which require the submission of
affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, the
Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for finding investigation
and report.
SC held that there was a blatant departure from the established procedure as a dubious, but
revealing attempt to involve an office directly under the President in the prosecution was
politically motivated. Prosecutors should not allow, and should avoid, giving the impression that
their noble office is being used or prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends or other
purposes alien to, or subversive of, the basic and fundamental objective of serving the interest of
justice evenhandedly, without fear or favor to any and all litigants alike, whether rich or poor,
weak or strong, powerless or mighty. Only by strict adherence to the established procedure may
the public's perception of the impartiality of the prosecutor be enhanced.
Moreover, the long delay in resolving the case under preliminary investigation cannot be justified
on the basis of the facts on record. PD 911 prescribes a10 day period for the prosecutor to resolve
a case under preliminary investigation by him from its termination. While this period fixed by law
is merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it cannot be disregarded or ignored completely, with
absolute impunity. It certainly cannot be assumed that the law has included a provision that is
deliberately intended to become meaningless and to be treated as a dead letter.
The long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the
instant case is violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial
adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation,
including substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution
of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by
the fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the
constitutionally guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill
of Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the
petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years cannot be deemed reasonable
or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. It has been suggested that
the long delay in terminating the preliminary investigation should not be deemed fatal, for even
the complete absence of a preliminary investigation does not warrant dismissal of the information.
True — but the absence of a preliminary investigation can be corrected by giving the accused such
investigation. But an undue delay in the conduct of a preliminary investigation cannot be
corrected, for until now, man has not yet invented a device for setting back time.