Vietnam and the South China Sea

Carlyle A. Thayer

A Vietnamese naval soldier stands guard in the Spratly archipelago

Emeritus Professor Carlyle A. Thayer

Presentation to Vietnam Update 2018
Co-sponsored by
Department of Political and Social Change and
Strategic and Defense Studies Centre
Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs
ANU College of Asia and the Pacific
The Australian National University and the
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
Canberra, A.C.T.
November 13, 2017
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Vietnam and the South China Sea

Carlyle A. Thayer
Introduction
The organisers of Vietnam Update asked me to address three questions:
 What strategies have Vietnam pursued in the face of territorial disputes and
wider strategic and security partnerships?
 How has Vietnam worked with neighbouring countries to engage in broader
regional and global alliances?
 How have broader strategic alliances impacted on Vietnam at home?
This presentation is divided into five parts. Part 1 provides an historical overview of
Vietnam interaction and engagement with the maritime domain and land features of its
East Sea (Biển đông).
Part 2 provides an overview of Vietnam’s political-diplomatic strategies in general. Four
major strategies are highlighted: independence and self-reliance, “diversification and
multilateralization” (đa phương hóa, đa dạng hóa), and “cooperation and struggle” (vừa
hợp tác vừa đấu tranh) and “active and proactive international integration.”
Through these four strategies Vietnam seeks to give major powers equity in Vietnam’s
independent stance and constructive role in regional security affairs.
Part 3 discusses Vietnam’s operationalization of its strategy of “diversification and
muiltilateralization” through strategic and comprehensive partnerships with the major
powers and how these partnerships are used to advance Vietnam’s interests in the
South China Sea.
Part 4 addresses Vietnam’s self-help efforts to modernize its armed forces and develop
a modern national-defence industry primarily in response to growing security challenges
in the South China Sea.
Part 5 analyses Vietnam’s multilateral diplomacy with China, Southeast Asian states, and
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) after the Award by the Arbitral
Tribunal that heard the claims brought by the Philippines against China.
The paper concludes with a discussion of Vietnam and the current ASEAN-China Single
Draft South China Sea Code of Conduct Negotiating Text.

Part 1 Vietnam and the East Sea

This section provides a chronological overview of Vietnam’s engagement with the South
China Sea.
Pre-colonial. Vietnam’s claims to features (islands, rocks and low-tide elevations) in the
South China Sea date to the pre-colonial era. In the first half of the seventeenth century
the ruling Nguyen Lords commissioned a small naval flotilla known as the Hoang Sa
 3

Brigade to sail to the present-day Paracel islands on an annual - and later intermittent -
basis. The Hoang Sa Brigade comprised between five and eight boats with a crew of
seventy men recruited from present day Quang Ngai province.1
The Hoang Sa Brigade ordinarily spent up to five months carrying out mapping,
hydrographic surveys, erecting markers, fishing, planting trees, and recovering the cargo
from merchant ships that had run aground. During the first half of the eighteenth
century the Nguyen Lords also organized the North Sea Brigade (Doi Bac Hai) to carry
out the same mission in the Spratly islands.2 The North Sea Brigade was under the
command of the Hoang Sa Brigade.
Vietnam was reunified in 1802 under the rule of the Nguyen Dynasty and was known as
the Kingdom of An Nam. Emperor Gia Long (1802-1820) dispatched the Hoang Sa
Brigade to the Paracels during the early years of his reign but this was suspended
subsequently. In 1816, Emperor Gia Long formally took possession of the Paracels. His
successor, Emperor Minh Mang (1820-1841), ordered the Royal Navy to conduct
navigational surveys, plant stone stele, and construct a temple the Paracels in 1835.
Colonial Era. 1884 the Kingdom of Annam and France signed a treaty under which An
Nam became a protectorate. France assumed responsibility for An Nam’s external
affairs, including defending the Kingdom’s territorial integrity and sovereignty claims
over the Paracels. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and National Boundary Commission 2012:
30-38). In 1925 and 1927, France conducted surveys and naval patrols in the Paracel
Islands. In 1931 and 1932, France protested to the Government of China on behalf of
the Kingdom of An Nam when authorities in Guangdong province called for bids to
exploit guano in the Paracel islands. During the 1920s and 1930s French Navy warships
and Customs vessels made frequent visits to the Paracels.
French forces were stationed in the Spratly Islands from 1930-33. The French Institute of
Oceanography in Nha Trang carried out scientific surveys in this period as well. In 1933,
France incorporated the Spratly Islands into Ba Ria province for administrative purposes.
In 1938, the Paracels Islands were declared an administrative unit of Thua Thien
province. France constructed a lighthouse, a meteorological post and a radio station on
Pattle Island in the Crescent group in the Paracels as well as similar facilities in the
Spratlys.
French authority was eclipsed briefly during the Second World War when Japan
occupied French Indochina including the Paracel and Spratly Islands.3 In 1947, French

1
Bo Ngoai Giao (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and Uy Ban Bien Gioi Quoc Gia (National Boundary
Commission), Chu Quyen cua Viet Nam Doi Voi Hai Quan Dao Hoang Sa va Truong Sa (Vietnam’s
Sovereignty over the Two Archipelagoes Hoang Sa and Truong Sa). Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Tri Thuc, 2013.
2
Vietnam was divided between the Trinh Lords in the North and the Nguyen Lords in the South from
1558-1783.
3
The French Vichy Government collaborated with Japan until March 1945.
 4

authority was restored in Indochina and French armed forces returned to the Spratly
islands and restored meteorological services in the Paracels.
In 1949, the Kingdom of Vietnam became the State of Vietnam and a member of the
French Union. The following year France officially handed over administration of the
Paracels to the State of Vietnam under Emperor Bao Dai. Also in 1950, the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) occupied the Amphitrite group in the eastern Paracels following
the withdrawal of the Republic of China (Nationalist China). In 1951, at the San Francisco
Peace Conference, the head of the delegation from the State of Vietnam affirmed
Vietnam’s “right to the Spratly and Paracel Islands, which have always belonged to
Vietnam.”4 No objections were recorded.
Between 1946 and 1954, Vietnamese communist forces fought a war for independence
against France. A cease-fire and political settlement were reached at the Geneva
Conference in 1954. Vietnam was provisionally divided into two zones roughly along the
seventeenth parallel. The north was officially known as the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam (DRV). The south came under the administrative control of the State of
Vietnam, including the Paracel and Spratly islands. In October 1955, the State of
Vietnam was officially renamed Republic of Vietnam (RVN).
Post-colonial Era. In 1956, the RVN replaced French forces on islets in the Crescent
group and maintained a continuous presence for eighteen years. In 1956, the RVN
protested the PRC’s occupation of the Amphitrite group. In the late 1950s and 1960s
Chinese fishermen began arriving in RVN waters and came ashore on unoccupied islets
in the Paracels. This led to a number of confrontations. By 1966, the RVN presence on
Pattle Island had been reduced to a single garrison and a weather station. After the
signing of the Paris Agreement on ending the Vietnam War in January 1973 the RVN
reduced its presence in the Paracels to a single platoon of soldiers.
Key Turning Points. Three key turning points have shaped Vietnam’s current maritime
strategy in the South China Sea. The first turning point was China’s armed attack and
seizure of RVN-occupied Drummond, Duncan and Robert islands in the western Paracels
in January 1974.5 The following year, Vietnam People’s Army Special Forces seized
features in the Spratlys occupied by the RVN. On April 30, 1975 Vietnam People’s Army
forces occupied Saigon and the RVN collapsed. The following year Vietnam was
reunified as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.
The second turning point was the clash between Chinese and Vietnamese naval forces
at Johnson South Reef in 1988. 6 In late 1987 China dispatched scientific vessels

4
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and National Boundary Commission, Viet Nam’s Sovereignty Over Hoang Sa
and Truong Sa Archipelagoes. Hanoi: National Political Publishing House, 2012.
5
Thế Giới Lên Án Trung Cộng Xâm Lăng Hoàng Sa Của VNCH 1974.
http://nghiencuuquocte.org/forums/topic/sach-the-gioi-len-an-trung-cong-xam-lang-hoang-sa-cua-viet-
nam-ch/.
6
Bill Hayton, The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia (New Haven, Yale University Press,
2014), 80-84.
 5

accompanied by warships to carry out surveys of the Spratly islands. As a result of

confrontations at sea between Chinese and Vietnamese naval ships Vietnam dispatched
soldiers to occupy Johnson South, Lansdowne, and Collins Reefs in March 1988. This
precipitated a clash on March 14, 1988 when armed Chinese forces confronted
Vietnamese engineers on Johnson South Reef. In the ensuing skirmish, two Vietnamese
transport vessels were sunk and sixty-four service personnel were killed.
The third turning point occurred in 1992, as a result of two inter-related developments.
First, on February 25, the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress
adopted the Law of the People's Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone that covered island features in the South China Sea. Second, in May,
China signed a contract with the Crestone Energy Corporation of the United States to
explore an area known as Wen’an Bei 21 (WAB 21) comprising 25,155 sq. km in waters
claimed by Vietnam.7
During May-June 1994 a series of incidents took place in the waters around Vanguard
Bank (Tu Chinh Reef) when Crestone and PetroVietnam both deployed seismic survey
ships to waters where their claims overlapped. Both survey ships were subject to
harassment by naval forces from the other side. At the same time, on May 19,
PetroVietnam signed a production-sharing contract with Mobil for Block 5-1b (Blue
Dragon); this was in an area where Crestone had planned to a conduct seismic survey.
Vietnamese Occupied Features. Vietnam presently occupies twenty-one features in the
Spratlys of which nine are above water at high tide and twelve are low tide elevations
on which Vietnam has erected structures.8 Vietnam’s largest feature, Spratly Island (Đảo
Trường Sa Lớn), is 0.15 square kilometers in area. It houses a fishing port, a 500-metre
airstrip, a meteorological station, medical clinic and classrooms. In addition, Vietnam
erected eighteen platforms or technical support services structures (nhà giàn dịch vụ kỹ
thuật) in waters near Vanguard Bank (Tư Chính). Vietnam has posted navy marines to
thirty-three garrisons on its land features, some features host more than one garrison.
The United States claims that Vietnam has forty-eight outposts in the Spratlys including
personnel on the technical support services structures.
In January 2007, the VCP Central Committee’s fourth plenum decreed that a maritime
strategy should be drawn up to integrate Vietnam’s 3,444 kilometre long coast with its
maritime zones, 12 nautical mile (nm) territorial sea, 12 nm contiguous zone, 200 nm
exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and continental shelf. The result was a document
entitled “Vietnam’s Maritime Strategy to 2020,” Vietnam’s first comprehensive

7
Hayton, The South China Sea, 124-130 and Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnam: Coping with China,” in Daljit
Singh ed., Southeast Asian Affairs 1994 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), 356-359.
8
“Danh sách các đảo do Việt Nam kiểm soát ở quần đảo Trường Sa,” (List of islands controlled by Vietnam
in the Spratly Islands), http://nguyentandung.org/danh-sach-cac-dao-do-viet-nam-kiem-soat-o-quan-dao-
truong-sa.html and Address to the National Assembly by Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung quoted in Tien
Dung and Nguyen Hung, ‘'Việt Nam đòi chủ quyền Hoàng Sa bằng hòa bình.” (Vietnam Claims the Spratlys
Are in a Peaceful State), VNExpress, 25 November 2011; http://vnexpress.net/tin-tuc/thoi-su/viet-nam-
doi-chu-quyen-hoang-sa-bang-hoa-binh-2212051.html \
 6

maritime strategy that included economic, defence and security objectives. 9 This
strategy laid out plans to integrate Vietnam’s coastal economy with the marine and
hydrocarbon resources in its EEZ, continental shelf and waters surrounding Vietnamese-
occupied features in the South China Sea. Vietnamese economists estimated that by
2020 the maritime economy would contribute between 53-55 per cent of GDP and 55-
60 per cent of exports.10
According to the U.S. Department of Defense, between 2009 and 2015, Vietnam
improved the civilian infrastructure on five outposts, installed communications and
radar equipment on fifteen outposts, made point defence improvements on eighteen
outposts and carried out quality of life improvements on nineteen outposts. The
Defense Department reports that the only infrastructure improvements carried out
from 2011-2015 were the construction of helipads on six outposts.11
In late 2014/early 2015 Vietnam began converting Corwallis South Reef into small
artificial islands by shifting sand and dredging the seabed to enlarge the channel into the
reef’s lagoon.12 By August 2015 Vietnam created a land area of 16,000 square metres
and began laying the foundations for several buildings. The pre-existing infrastructure
on Corwallis South Reef consists of several pillboxes, four buildings, four docks, solar
panels, communications antenna and satellite dishes.
In mid-2015, Minister of National Defence General Quang Thanh revealed that Vietnam
recently reinforced embankments on some of its Spratly features that were above water
at high tide to prevent erosion by wind and water. Minister Thanh also stated that
Vietnam only built small houses that can accommodate a few people on its low tide
elevations. He claimed, “(t)he scope and characteristic of our work is purely civilian.” 13
During the first half of 2016 Vietnam reportedly placed EXTRA rocket launchers on five
of its features in the Spratlys. Vietnam also extended the length of its airfield on Truong
Sa Lon island so it could handle maritime patrol aircraft.
This overview presented a brief historical account of Vietnam’s claim to sovereignty
over the Paracels and Spratlys from the seventeenth century under the Nguyen Lords
and subsequently under the Kingdom of An Nam and its successors, the State of
Vietnam (1949-55), the Republic of Vietnam (1955-75) and the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam (1976-present). Vietnamese authorities claim that archival documents

9
"Chiến lược Biển Việt Nam đến năm 2020" (Vietnam’s Maritime Strategy to 2020), Resolution 09-NQ/TW,
9 February 2007. Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung later approved Decision 568, 28 April 2010, to develop
Vietnam’s sea and islands-based economy by 2020.
10
Vietnam Communist Party, “Thông báo Hội nghị” (Plenum Communiqué), Tap chi Cong san, no. 772, 4-6.
11
U.S. Department of Defense, Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, 2015.
12
Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Center for Strategic and International Studies, ‘Washed Away:
Typhoon Melor Spotlights Vietnamese Island Building’, December 2015. http://amti.csis.org/typhoon-
spotlights-island-building/.
13
David Alexander, “Vietnam, U.S. Discuss Land Reclamation In South China Sea.” Reuters, 2 June 2015.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/06/02/vietnam-us-south-china-sea_n_7482252.html.
 7

demonstrate Vietnam undertook mapping and other surveys, exploited the marine
resources, carried out meteorological services, erected lighthouses, and garrisoned the
islands and other features as evidence for Vietnam’s claim to continuous effective
occupation and administration.

Part 2 Vietnam’s Four Political-Diplomatic Strategies

This section discusses four major strategies that shape Vietnam’s external relations:
independence and self-reliance; diversification and multilateralization of external
relations; struggle and cooperation; and active, proactive international integration.
Independence and Self-Reliance. Vietnam strategy of independence and self-reliance
was shaped by three historical experiences: resistance to foreign intervention during the
colonial and post-colonial eras; as a developing member of the socialist camp caught in
the crossfire of the Sino-Soviet dispute; and as a dependent ally that was left isolated
when the socialist system disintegrated and the Soviet Union suddenly collapsed in 1991.
Vietnam’s strategy of independence and self-reliance is buttressed by a robust program
of military modernization (see Part 4 below) and a defence policy of three no’s.
According to Vietnam’s Defense White Paper, “Vietnam consistently realizes the foreign
guideline of independence [and] self-reliance…”14 This is exemplified by its national
defense policy of three no’s: “Vietnam consistently advocates neither joining any
military alliances nor giving any other countries permission to have military bases or use
its soil to carry out military activities against other countries.”15 The three no’s policy
aims to keep Vietnam from becoming entrapped in great power rivalries, particularly
between the United States and China.
Diversification and Multilateralization. Vietnam’s second strategy of diversification and
multilateralization (đa phương hóa, đa dạng hóa), of its external relations originated at a
time when Vietnam was isolated by the international community as a result of its
invasion and occupation of Cambodia, conducting a counter-insurgency campaign in
Cambodian against Chinese-backed Khmer Rouge forces and facing Chinese military
pressures in the South China Sea.
On May 20, 1988, the Politburo of the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) adopted a
seminal policy document known as Resolution No. 13 entitled, "On the Tasks and
Foreign Policy in the New Situation." This document called for Vietnam’s extrication
from the Cambodian conflict, gave priority to economic development, and set out a
“multi-directional foreign policy” with the goal of making “more friends, fewer enemies”
(thêm bạn, bớt thù). Resolution 13 also set the objective of normalizing relations with

14
Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Ministry of National Defence, Vietnam National Defence (Hanoi: Nha Xuat
Ban The Gioi, December 2009), 23.
15
Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Vietnam National Defence, 21-22.
 8

China; developing relations with ASEAN members, Japan, and Europe; and “step-by-step”
opening relations with the United States.16
The next iteration of Vietnam’s “multi-directional foreign policy” took place at the VCP’s
Seventh National Congress held from June 24-27, 1991. The Seventh Congress now
called for Vietnam to “diversify and multilateralize economic relations with all countries
and economic organizations . . . regardless of different socio-political systems.”17 The
Political Report gave priority to relations with the Soviet Union, Laos, Cambodia, China,
Cuba, other “communist and workers’ parties,” the “forces struggling for peace, national
independence, democracy and social progress,” India, and the Non-Aligned Movement.
Significantly the Political Report also called for the development of
relations of friendship with other countries in South-East Asia and the Asia-
Pacific region… To expand equal and mutually beneficial co-operation with
northern [sic] and Western European countries, Japan and other developed
countries. To promote the process of normalization of relations with the United
States.18
Vietnam achieved success in meeting these objectives. During the period from 1991-95
Vietnam normalized its relations China, Japan, Europe and the United States and
became the seventh member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.19 By 1995
Vietnam expanded the number of countries it had diplomatic relations with from
twenty-three in 1989 to 163.
Vietnam’s policy of multilateralizing and diversifying its foreign relations was endorsed
by all subsequent national party congresses from the eighth (1996) to the most recent.
For example, the Political Report to the twelfth national congress held in January 2016
stated, “To ensure successful implementation of foreign policy and international
integration… consistently carry out the foreign policy of independence, autonomy,
peace, cooperation and development... [and] diversify and multilateralize external
relations.”

16
Nguyen Huu Cat, “Viet Nam Hoi Nhap vao Khu Vuc vi Hoa Binh va Phat Trien [Vietnam’s Integration into
the Region for Peace and Development],” Nghien Cuu Dong Nam A, February 1996, 28-29; Chu Van Chuc,
“Qua trinh doi moi tu duy doi ngoai va hinh thanh duong loi doi ngoai doi moi [The Process of Renovating
Thinking in Foreign Activities and Forming a Pathway to a Renovated Foreign Policy],” Nghien Cuu Quoc Te,
2004, 3:58, 9, 3-11; Nguyen Dy Nien, “Chinh Sach Va Hoat Dong Doi Ngoai Trong Thoi Ky Doi Moi [Foreign
Policies and Activities in the Period of doi moi],”Tap Chi Cong San, 17(740), September 2005, 31-37; and
Phan Doan Nam, “Ngoai Giao Viet Nam Sau 20 Nam Doi Mo [Vietnamese Diplomacy After 20 Years of Doi
Moi],” Tap Chi Cong San, July 2006, 14(760), 26-30.
17
Communist Party of Vietnam, 7th National Congress Documents (Hanoi: Vietnam Foreign Languages
Publishing House. 1991), 134 and Vu Khoan, “Mot so van de quoc te cua dai hoi VII quan den [Some
International Issues of the Recent VII Congress],” in Bo Ngoai Giao, Hoi nhap quoc te va giu vung ban sac
[International Integration and Preserving Identity] (Hanoi: Nha xuat ban chinh tri quoc te, 1995), 75.
18
Communist Party of Vietnam, 7th National Congress Documents, 135.
19
Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnamese Diplomacy, 1975-2015: From Member of the Socialist Camp to Proactive
International Integration,” Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities, 2015, 1(3), 194-214.
 9

Vietnam’s policy of diversifying and multilateralizing its foreign relations was endorsed
by all subsequent national party congresses from the Eighth Congress (1996) to the
most recent. For example, the Political Report to the Twelfth National Congress held in
January 2016 stated, “To ensure successful implementation of foreign policy and
international integration… consistently carry out the foreign policy of independence,
autonomy, peace, cooperation and development... [and] diversify and multilateralize
external relations.”20
Cooperation and Struggle. Vietnam third strategy of “cooperation and struggle” (vừa
hợp tác vừa đấu tranh) involved a major conceptual shift from ideology to national
interest. Resolution No. 13 used the concept of national interest (lợi ích dân tộc) for the
first time. By 1992, after relations with China had been normalized, it became apparent
that despite shared ideology there were growing differences in national interests,
particularly with respect to the South China Sea. Equally, after normalization of relations
with the United States in 1995, it was apparent that the two shared a growing
convergence in national interests despite difference in ideology. In sum, the shift away
from socialist solidarity based on ideology to national interest was a fundamental
change in Vietnam’s strategic thinking that would pave the way for a dramatic re-
orientation of the country’s external relations.
In July 2003, the VCP Central Committee issued Resolution No. 8, “On Defense of the
Homeland in the New Situation.” This resolution noted that there were often instances
of friction and disagreement with friendly countries and areas of cooperation and
convergent interests with opposing countries. Resolution No. 8 adopted the twin
concepts of “objects or partners of cooperation” and “objects of struggle,” đối tác and
đối tượng, respectively.21 Prior to the adoption of Resolution No. 8 China was classified
as a friendly country because it was socialist and the United States was viewed as an
opponent. Resolution No. 8 sanctioned cooperation with both friendly and opposing
countries and struggling against any country that harmed Vietnam’s national interests.
In 2013, on the tenth anniversary of Resolution No. 8, the VCP Politburo reaffirmed the
policy of “cooperation and struggle.”
Active, Proactive International Integration. Vietnam’s fourth strategy is the promotion of
“active, proactive international integration.” Vietnam first gave priority to economic
integration in the late 1980s and then expanded this to political-economic integration.

20
Nguyen Phu Trong, “Redouble Efforts to Build Our Party Clean and Strong; Promote the Entire Nation’s
Strength and Socialist Democracy; Push Forward Comprehensively and Harmoniously the Renewal
Process; Defend Firmly the Homeland and Maintain Sturdily a Peaceful and Stable Environment; and
Strive for Ours to Soon Become Basically an Industrialized Country Toward Modernity,” Political Report to
the Twelfth National Party Congress, January 2016. https://m.vietnambreakingnews.com/2016/01/11th-
party-central-committees-report-on-congress-documents/.
21
Carlyle A. Thayer, “The Tyranny of Geography: Vietnamese Strategies to Constrain China in the South
China Sea,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, 2011, 33(3), 348-369 and Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnam’s
Strategy of ‘Cooperating and Struggling’ with China over Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea,”
Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 2016, 3(2), 200-220.
 10

In 2011, the eleventh national party congress endorsed Vietnam’s pro-active

international integration. Integration. In April 2013 the VCP Politburo adopted
Resolution No. 22-NQ/TW on International Integration. It declared that, “Proactive and
active international integration is a major strategic orientation of the Party aimed to
successfully implement the task of building and protecting the socialist Fatherland of
Viet Nam.”22
The Political Report to the twelfth national party congress stated, “To ensure successful
implementation of foreign policy and international integration… [Vietnam must] be
proactive and active in international integration; to be a friend, reliable partner, and a
responsible member of the international community…”
Vietnam’s strategy of “active, proactive international integration” is aimed at opening
its domestic economy to the world economy through bi- and multi-lateral free trade
agreements with the aim of becoming a modern industrial country.

Part 3 Strategic Partnerships

One key mechanism Vietnam’s foreign policy of diversifying and multilateralizing is the
promotion of strategic partnerships. Between 2001 and 2016 Vietnam reached strategic
partnership agreements with sixteen countries and comprehensive partnerships with
nine other countries, including the United States and Australia (later raised to a strategic
partnership).
In January 2016 Vietnam’s Cabinet approved the Overall Strategy for International
Integration Through 2020, Vision to 2030.23 This document reviewed Vietnam’s bilateral
strategic and comprehensive partnerships with twenty-five countries. It concluded that
Vietnam had to make greater efforts to implement political commitments and to
deepen cooperation under these agreements, including defence cooperation.
The purpose of strategic partnerships is to promote comprehensive cooperation across
a number of areas and to give each major power equity in Vietnam’s stability and
development in order to ensure Vietnam’s non-alignment and strategic autonomy.
Russia. Vietnam negotiated its first strategic partnership agreement with the Russian
Federation in March 2001 during the visit of President Vladimir Putin to Hanoi.24 This
agreement set out broad-ranging cooperation in eight major areas including military

22
“Nghị quyết 22-NQ/TW nâng cao năng lực lãnh đạo, sức chiến đấu của tổ chức cơ sở đảng và chất
lượng đội ngũ cán bộ, đảng viên,” https://thuvienphapluat.vn/van-ban/Bo-may-hanh-chinh/Nghi-quyet-
22-NQ-TW-nang-cao-nang-luc-lanh-dao-suc-chien-dau-cua-to-chuc-co-so-dang-va-chat-luong-doi-ngu-
can-bo-dang-vien-69805.aspx.
23
“Chiến lược tổng thể hội nhập quốc tế đến năm 2020, tầm nhìn 2030,” January 2016.
24
Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnam On the Road to Global Integration: Forging Strategic Partnerships Through
International Security Cooperation,” in Vietnam on the Road to Integration and Sustainable Development,
The Fourth International Conference on Vietnamese Studies (Hanoi: Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences
and Vietnam National University, 2012), 206-214.
 11

equipment and technology.25 In July 2012, Vietnam and Russia raised their strategic
partnership to a comprehensive strategic partnership on the occasion of a state visit to
Moscow by President Truong Tan Sang.26 Russian arms sales to Vietnam are the largest
and most significant component of the strategic partnership, followed by energy (oil,
gas, hydropower and nuclear). 27 Russian arms sales (see section below on force
modernization) enable Vietnam to build up modern navy and air force to defend
sovereignty in the South China Sea.
Japan. Vietnam signed its second strategic partnership agreement with Japan. In
October 2006, Prime Ministers Shinzo Abe and Nguyen Tan Dung issued a Joint
Statement entitled “Toward a Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in Asia.”28
A year later, during an official visit by Vietnam’s president, Japan and Vietnam issued a
Joint Statement that included a forty-four point Agenda Toward a Strategic Partnership.
The Agenda was divided into seven substantive areas, including security and defence
cooperation.29 In March 2014, Vietnam and Japan raised their bilateral relations to an
Extensive Strategic Partnership in an agreement running to sixty-nine paragraphs. With
respect to the South China Sea, Japan has donated ships and other vessels to the
Vietnam Coast Guard, provided assistance in capacity building, and Japan’s Maritime
Self-Defense Force ships, including its largest vessel and a submarine, have also made
ports call to Vietnam. In joint statements by senior government leaders both sides
support the peaceful resolution of disputes and the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
India. In July 2007, Vietnam concluded its third strategic partnership with India. Their
Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership ran to thirty-three points and set out five
areas for cooperation, including defense and security cooperation30 India has long

25
The other areas of cooperation included: political-diplomatic, oil and gas cooperation, energy
cooperation for hydro and nuclear power, trade and investment, science and technology, education and
training, and culture and tourism.
26
Carlyle A. Thayer, “The Russia-Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership,” East Asia Forum, 9 October 2012.
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/10/09/the-russia-vietnam-comprehensive-partnership/.
27
Carlyle A. Thayer, “Russia-Vietnam Relations,” Global Insider, World Politics Review, 8 June, 2011.
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/9099/global-insider-russia-vietnam-relations; Carlyle A.
Thayer, “Russian Subs in Vietnam,” U.S. Naval Institute, 21 August 2012. http://news.usni.org/news-
analysis/news/russian-subs-vietnam; Carl Thayer, “With Russia’s Help, Vietnam Adopts A2/AD Strategy,”
The Diplomat, 8 October 2013. http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2013/10/08/with-russias-help-
vietnam-adopts-a2ad-strategy/.
28
Carl Thayer “Vietnam’s Extensive Strategic Partnership with Japan,” The Diplomat, 14 October 2014.
http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/vietnams-extensive-strategic-partnership-with-japan/.
29
Point four of the Agenda addressed defence cooperation exchanges, cooperation in policy dialogue,
comprehensive economic partnership; improvement of the legal system and administrative reforms;
science and technology; climate change, environment, natural resources and technology; mutual
understanding between the peoples of the two countries; and cooperation in the international arena
30
The other areas of included: closer economic cooperation and commercial engagement; science and
technology cooperation, cultural and technical cooperation and multilateral and regional cooperation.
 12

provided Vietnam with assistance in developing and modernizing its armed forces,
including training in India for pilots and submariners, the provision of spare parts for
Soviet-era naval craft, repair and upgrading of naval ships, and a line of credit for several
hundred million dollars for the purchase of made-to-order warships.
China. In 2008, seventeen years after the normalization of relations, Vietnam and China
raised their bilateral relations to a strategic partnership. A year later this was upgraded
to a strategic cooperative partnership. 31 In 2013, Vietnam and China raised their
bilateral relations to a comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership, the highest
designation among all of Vietnam’s strategic partners. As strategic partners China and
Vietnam have developed a dense network of party, state, defense and multilateral
mechanisms to manage their relations. A Joint Steering Committee at deputy prime
minister level oversees their bilateral relations. China and Vietnam reached an
agreement to delimit the Gulf of Tonkin, established a joint fishing area and conduct
annual joint patrols. In March 2014, and Vietnam and China inaugurated an annual
Border Defence Friendship Exchange program at deputy minister level.
South China Sea matters are dealt with at working- and senior-official levels and by high-
level government leaders. For example, in August 2016, newly appointed Minister for
National Defence General Ngo Xuan Lich visited Beijing and met with his counterpart
General Chang Wanquan. The Vietnamese media reported General Lich’s discussion
with General Chang as follows:
Regarding the East Sea issue, Lich affirmed Viet Nam’s consistent stance that the two
countries should observe common perceptions reached by their high-ranking leaders
and solve disputes by peaceful means in line with international law, especially the
1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982 UNCLOS).
They should seriously follow the Viet Nam-China agreement on basic principles
guiding the settlement of sea-related matters and the Declaration on the Conduct of
Parties in the East Sea [sic] (DOC), and work to reach a Code of Conduct in the East
Sea (COC) as soon as possible.
The two sides should take no actions that complicate and expand the disputes,
particularly not to use or threaten to use force to address this disputes, and maintain
peace and stability in the East Sea.32
A month later, Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc made an official visit to meet his
counterpart Premier Li Keqing on 12 September. 33 They repeated past formulaic

See: Carl Thayer, “How Vietnam Woos China and India Simultaneously,” The Diplomat, October 28, 2014.
http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/how-vietnam-woos-china-and-india-simultaneously/; and Carl Thayer,
“India and Vietnam Advance Their Strategic Partnership,” The Diplomat, December 11, 2014.
http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/india-and-vietnam-advance-their-strategic-partnership/.
31
Thayer, “How Vietnam Woos China and India Simultaneously.”
32
“VN, China agree to deepen defence ties,” Viet Nam News, 31 August 2016;
http://vietnamnews.vn/politics-laws/302032/vn-china-agree-to-deepen-defence-ties.html.
 13

expressions about effectively implementing the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in

the South China Sea (DOC) and moving expeditiously towards a Code of Conduct in the
South China Sea (COC). Phuc told Li that Vietnam would cooperate with China on the
South China Sea
on the basis of equality and mutual respect, properly resolve maritime issues in a
peaceful manner, well manage differences, maintain maritime stability and conduct
maritime cooperation in areas of low sensitivity to prevent maritime issues from
casting a shadow over bilateral relations.34
The joint communiqué issued after their meeting stated with respect to the South China
Sea that the two leaders “agreed to continue complying with the important common
perceptions reached by leaders of the two parties and nations along with the agreement
on basic principles guiding the settlement of sea-related issues.”35
When Prime Minister Phuc met President Xi Jinping, Xi pressed him to move forward
with joint exploration in waters outside the mouth of the Gulf of Tonkin and “to achieve
substantial progress on the joint development of a wider area of the South China Sea at
an early date…”36 Phuc responded guardedly by stating that Vietnam is willing to work
with China to enhance political trust, pragmatic cooperation and “properly manage and
control differences.”37
When Phuc met with representatives of the Chinese People’s Friendship Association
with Foreign Countries and the China-Vietnam Friendship Association he was more
forthright. He was quoted as saying that the two sides should resolve their disputes
peacefully “and in line with international law, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) and respect for diplomatic and legal procedures (emphasis added).”38
United States. In July 2013, Vietnam and the United States adopted a Joint Statement on
Comprehensive Partnership during the state visit by President Truong Tan Sang to
Washington.39 Nine major areas of cooperation were listed including defence and

33
For an analysis of Phuc’s visit see: Carlyle A. Thayer, “China-Vietnam Relations: Visit by PM Nguyen Xuan
Phuc,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, 19 September 2016.
34
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Li Keqiang Holds Talks with Prime Minister
Nguyen Xuan Phuc of Viet Nam,” 13 September 2016,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1397433.shtml.
35
“Vietnam, China issue joint communiqué,” VietNamNet Bridge, 4 September 2016.
http://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/government/127668/vietnam--china-issue-joint-communique.html.
36
Xinhua, “Xi urges China, Vietnam to solve South China Sea issue through consultation,” Crienglish.com
News, 13 September 2016, http://english.cri.cn/12394/2016/09/14/2021s940227.htm.
37
Xinhua, “Xi urges China, Vietnam to solve South China Sea issue through consultation.”
38
Vietnam News Agency, “PM meets banking, corporate executives in China.” VietNamNet Bridge, 13
September 2016, http://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/government/163645/pm-meets-banking--corporate-
executives-in-china.html.
39
Carl Thayer, “The U.S.-Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership: What’s in a Name?,” The Strategist,
Australian Strategic Policy Institute Blog, 31 July 2013, http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-us-vietnam-
 14

security cooperation through an annual Defense Policy Dialogue and a Political, Security,
and Defense Dialogue. Earlier, in 2011, Vietnam and the United States adopted a
Memorandum of Understanding on Advancing Bilateral Defense Cooperation adopted in
2011.40 The United States provides Vietnam with assistance in professional military
education and training, maritime domain awareness, capacity building for the Coast
Guard, donated Shark-metal fast patrol boats, an sold a former Hamilton-Class U.S.
Coast Guard cutter.

Part 4 Defence Self-Help: Force Modernization

Force Modernization. Vietnam’s efforts to modernize its armed forces took place in
three distinct phases. The first phase took place from the mid-1990s to 2005 largely in
response to South China Sea sovereignty disputes with China. Priority was placed on
modernizing Vietnam’s air force and navy. Between 1994-1999, Vietnam purchased four
modified Tarantul 2-type corvettes from Russia and In 2004 Vietnam took delivery of
four Su-30MK multirole jet fighters. Russia provides the bulk of military sales to
Vietnam; Belarus, Ukraine, India, Israel and Spain are important suppliers.
During the second phase, from 2006-2015, priority was placed the modernization of the
Navy (Quân chủng Hải quân), Air Defence Air Force (Phòng không Không quân), but also
for technical surveillance (Trinh sát kỹ thuật), electronic warfare (Tác chiến điện tử), and
information systems (Thông tin liên lạc).41
In December 2006, Vietnam reached agreement with Rosoboronexport (Russian
Defence Exports) for the purchase of two Gepard 3.9-class guided missile frigates. The
following year Vietnam contracted for six Svetlyak-class Fast Attack Craft armed with
anti-ship missiles and the K-300 P Bastion coastal defence missile system. In 2009, in a
major step towards power projection, Vietnam purchased and later took delivery of six
Varshavyanka-class (enhanced Kilo-class) diesel submarines from Russia. Between 2009
and 2014 Vietnam purchased an additional thirty-two Su-30MKs. These planes extended
Vietnam’s reach to cover all of the features that it occupied in the Spratly islands. In
March 2014, Vietnam signed an agreement for ten Tarantul V or Molniya (Project 1241)
corvettes armed with SS-N-25 (Kh 35 Uran) missiles.42

comprehensive-partnership-whats-in-a-name/ and Carl Thayer, “The U.S.-Vietnam Comprehensive

Partnership: What’s in a Name?,” cogitASIA, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 30 July 2013.
http://cogitasia.com/the-u-s-vietnam-comprehensive-partnership-whats-in-a-name/.
40
The other areas included: political and diplomatic relations, trade and economic ties, science and
technology, education and training, environment and health, war legacy issues, protection and promotion
of human rights, and culture, sports, and tourism.
41
Bạch Dương, ‘Được ưu tiên hiện đại hóa, Lục quân VN sắp thay đổi lớn về chất’ (Priority to
Modernisation: The Army is About to Change Dramatically) Soha.vn, 22 December 2015.
http://soha.vn/quan-su/duoc-uu-tien-hien-dai-hoa-luc-quan-vn-sap-thay-doi-lon-ve-chat-
20151222003129668.htm.
42
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Arms Transfer Database,
http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers.
 15

In 2015, Vietnam’s leaders concluded that sufficient progress had been made in
modernizing the navy and air force to shift priority to the modernization of the army.
During the period 2012-16, Vietnam was the tenth largest importer of arms globally.43
This is an impressive figure given that Vietnam ranked thirty-seventh in the world in
terms of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in purchasing power parity terms and forty-
eighth in the world in nominal terms.44 In summary, Vietnam’s military modernization
programme was clearly aimed at improving its capacity to monitor its territorial waters,
Exclusive Economic Zone and continental shelf; protect its offshore oil and gas
platforms; defend occupied maritime features; develop anti-shipping, anti-submarine
warfare (ASW) and mine counter-measure capabilities; and project limited naval power
into the South China Sea.
National Defence Industry Self-Help. In addition to arms procurement from Russia and
other states, Vietnam also embarked on self-help modernization of its naval, air and
missile forces by raising the capacity of it national defence industry. 45 Two
developments are noteworthy: the co-production of missile systems and the expansion
and upgrading of Vietnam’s shipbuilding industry.
With respect to technology transfer and co-production of weapons, as early as 2002,
Vietnam and the Russian defense enterprise LOMO began producing the Igla (SA-18
Grouse) low altitude surface-to-air missile. In 2006, Vietnam and Russia began co-
production of Yakhont (SS-N-26 Strobile) ship-to-ship missiles. In February 2012, Russia
and Vietnam announced they would co-produce three versions of the Kh-35 Ural-E (SS-
N-25 Switchblade) anti-ship missile to be deployed on aircraft, helicopters, ships and
fired from coastal batteries. Vietnam also has sought a license to produce the Russia-
India manufactured BrahMos anti-ship cruise missile.
With respect to shipbuilding, in November 2006, Vietnam announced the launch of the
largest made-in-Vietnam rescue boat at the Da Nang military port. The boat was built in
eighteen months utilizing technology transferred by the Damen Corporation in the
Netherlands.46 The Hong Ha shipyard in Hai Phong successfully produced Vietnam’s first
400-ton TT-400TP-class gunboat that was commissioned in 2012; three other gunboats

43
A. Fleurant, P.D. Wezeman, S.T. Wezeman and N. Tian, Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2016.
SIPRI Fact Sheet, February 2017. Vietnam’s main sources were: Russia (88%) Belarus (3.5%) and the
Ukraine (2.8%). https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Trends-in-international-arms-transfers-2016.pdf.
44
United States Central Intelligence Agency, “Vietnam”, World Fact Book, 3 January 2018,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/vm.html and International Monetary
Fund, World Economic Outlook (October 2006), http://statisticstimes.com/economy/projected-world-
gdp-ranking.php.
45
Carlyle A. Thayer, “Force Modernization: Vietnam,” in Malcolm Cook and Daljit Singh, eds., Southeast
Asian Affairs 2018 (Singapore ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, 2018), 429-444.
46
Robert Karniol, “Vietnam’s defence industry stutters along,” The Straits Times, 14 July 2008
 16

of the same class were commissioned between 2012-14.47

Since 2008, Russia has provided kits that Vietnam has used to assemble ships and
related weapon systems for the coast guard and navy at the Hong Ha and Ba Son
shipyard in Ho Chi Minh City. In 2013-14, under the terms of a co-production agreement,
Vietnam and Russia assembled one KBO 2000/BPS 500 missile patrol boat at the Ba Son
shipyard. This vessel failed to meet the technical requirements of Vietnam’s navy and
the project was terminated. However, by the end of 2016, Vietnam successfully
assembled six Tarantul-5 (Molniya-class) guided missile fast attack craft at the Ba Son
shipyard.
In 2015, relocated the Ba Son shipyard to more modern facilities at Ba Ria-Vung Tau.
When complete, the new facility is expected to have the capacity to build ships
displacing 500 to 2,000 tons and repair naval ships displacing up to 5,000 tons.
In October 2016, the National Assembly approved a long-term modernisation program
for the Vietnam Coast Guard that included the domestic construction of eight 1,500-ton
TT-1500 offshore patrol vessels, four 2,200-ton DN 2000-class cutters and four 4,300 ton
Damen DN 4000-class multirole patrol vessels. These ships are being built at the Song
Thu Shipyard in Da Nang with support from the Damen Group of the Netherlands.
Currently, Vietnam’s national defence industry is capable of maintaining and repairing
existing stocks of naval and air weapons and platforms, depot-level reverse engineering
of aircraft spares, assembling patrol boats from kits, building light aircraft, constructing
patrol boats and small surface combatants, co-producing a variety of missiles through
technology transfer, and, most recently, manufacturing indigenous UAVs.

Part 5 Vietnam and China, Southeast Asia, and ASEAN

Part 5 analyses Vietnam’s multilateral diplomacy with China, strategic partnerships with
Southeast Asian states, and ASEAN after the announcement of the Award by the Arbitral
Tribunal in the case of the Philippines v China.
Vietnam and China. Between 1994 and 1996, there were sporadic confrontations
between Vietnam and China in the waters near Vanguard reef. It came as no surprise
when Vietnam’s foreign ministry supported ASEAN’s second statement of concern on
the South China Sea in March 1995. In July 1995, Vietnam became ASEAN’s seventh
member. At that time the Philippines took the initiative in ASEAN to promote a code of
conduct with China. As noted above, this effort was unsuccessful. ASEAN members and
China agreed to the DOC in 2002 and over the next several years situation in the South
China Sea appeared comparatively stable.

47
TT, tuan tra, stands for patrol, while TP, tau phao, stands for gunship. These vessels displace
approximately 480 tons. They are armed with 14.5 mm anti-aircraft guns, one AK-176 76mm automatic
cannon, and a six-barreled 30 mm AK-630 radar controlled gun. The gunboats are also equipped with the
MANPAD SA-N-14 GROUSE anti-missile system.
 17

In 2007, China extended its annual unilateral fishing ban from May-August in waters
north of twelve degrees north latitude to include Vietnamese and other foreign fishing
vessels. This resulted in Chinese harassment; seizure of fish catches; confiscation of
navigational equipment, radios, tools and spares; and physical violence against
Vietnamese fishing crews. In 2007-08, responding to Vietnam’s adoption of its Maritime
Strategy, China put pressure on foreign oil companies to pull out of any deals with
Vietnam to develop its offshore oil and gas reserves.48
The year 2009 marked a seminal turning point. The United Nations Commission of the
on the Limits Continental Shelf set May as the deadline for littoral states to make claims
beyond 200 nm. Malaysia and Vietnam tabled a joint submission, and Vietnam also
issued a separate submission. China (and the Philippines) protested. China then tabled a
map containing nine dash lines marking out its historical claims to all the land features
and adjacent waters contained within this map. Subsequently, China’s navy and
maritime law enforcement agencies began conducting patrols to assert Chinese
sovereignty. Chinese fishermen were encouraged by provincial authorities to fish in
Vietnam’s EEZ.
China’s attempt to enforce its sovereignty claims led to series of serious incidents
involving Vietnamese fishermen and commercial enterprises. In mid-2011, for example,
Chinese paramilitary maritime enforcement vessels cut the cables of two ships carrying
out seismic surveys in Vietnam’s EEZ.49
In an effort to prevent further escalation China and Vietnam negotiated an Agreement
on Basic Principles Guiding the Settlement of Maritime-Related Issues in October 2011.
Both sides committed themselves “to seek basic and long-standing solutions acceptable
to both sides for sea-related disputes on the basis of international law” and to resolve
their maritime disputes “through friendly talks and negotiations.”50 China and Vietnam
also agreed, pending the settlement of their disputes, to “actively discuss transitional
and temporary measures that do not affect the stances and policies of the two sides,
including studies and discussions on cooperation for mutual development.”
In sum, it appeared that Hanoi and Beijing had succeeded in compartmentalizing their
maritime territorial disputes from their larger bilateral relationship. But three years later,
in May 2014, without any forewarning, China deployed the mega oil exploration
platform the Hai Yang Shi You (HYSY) 981 in Vietnam’s EEZ. This action was extremely
provocative and precipitated the most severe crisis in bilateral relations since the 1979
border war.

48
Greg Torode, “Tussle for oil in the South China Sea,” South China Morning Post 20 July 2008.
http://www.viet-studies.info/kinhte/Tussle_for_oil_SCMP.htm
49
Carlyle A. Thayer “Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea and Southeast Asian Responses,”
Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 2011, 30(2), 85.
50
“VN-China basic principles on settlement of sea issues,” Vietnam+, 12 October 2011.
http://en.vietnamplus.vn/vnchina-basic-principles-on-settlement-of-sea-issues/31776.vnp
 18

The HYSY 981 was accompanied by an armada of People’s Liberation Army Navy
warships, Coast Guard vessels, tugs boats and fishing trawlers. The size of the armada
rapidly increased from fifty to over one hundred ships in a few days. China also
dispatched military and other aircraft.51 Vietnam sent its much smaller Coast Guard
ships and Fishery Surveillance Force vessels to confront the Chinese and order them out
of Vietnam’s EEZ. China responded aggressively by ramming Vietnamese ships and
vessels and used high-powered water canons to de-mast radio communications
antennae from the bridges of Vietnamese ships. Vietnam embedded foreign journalists
on its ships and won a global propaganda war against China.
On 15 July 2014 China announced that it was withdrawing the HYSY 981 from
Vietnamese waters and, in a separate statement, released thirteen Vietnamese
fishermen it had arrested earlier. This signalled the end of confrontation at sea and a
shift to diplomacy.52 In August, Vietnam dispatched senior Politburo member Le Hong
Anh as a special envoy of the VCP Secretary General Nguyen Phu Trong to Beijing. Anh
delivered an invitation from Secretary General Trong for Xi Jinping to visit Vietnam.
Anh’s visit was followed soon after by a high-powered Vietnamese military delegation of
thirteen generals including the Minister of National Defence to meet their Chinese
counterparts to discuss how to stabilise the situation.53 The following year Secretary
General Trong and Xi Jinping paid reciprocal visits.
Another serious incident occurred in mid-2017 during Senior Lieutenant General Fan
Changlong, Vice Chairman of China’s Central Military Commission, visit to Hanoi.
General Fan reportedly criticized Vietnam’s decision to resume oil exploration in waters
near Vanguard reef. When General Fan was rebuffed he abruptly terminated his visit
and cancelled an impending fourth friendly border exchange. Under intense Chinese
pressure, in July Vietnam stood down its operations.
Vietnam and Southeast Asia – Strategic Partnerships. In the midst of on again, off again
tensions with China over disputes in the South China Sea, Vietnam gave priority to
expanding its network of strategic partners with Southeast Asian states. During this
period Vietnam negotiated strategic partnership agreements with five ASEAN members:
Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines.
In June 2013, Vietnam and Thailand agreed to elevate bilateral relations to a strategic
partnership during a meeting between Prime Minister Yingluck Shinwatra and VCP
Secretary General Nguyen Phu Trong. This marked Vietnam’s first strategic partnership

51
Carlyle A. Thayer, Thayer, “China's Oil Rig Gambit: South China Sea Game-Changer,” The Diplomat, 12
May 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/chinas-oil-rig-gambit-south-china-sea-game-changer/.
52
Carlyle A. Thayer, “4 Reasons China Removed Oil Rig HYSY-981 Sooner Than Planned,” The Diplomat, 22
July 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/4-reasons-china-removed-oil-rig-hysy-981-sooner-than-
planned/.
53
Carlyle A. Thayer “China-Vietnam Defense Hotline Agreed: What Next?,” The Diplomat, October 20,
2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/china-vietnam-defense-hotline-agreed-what-next/.
 19

with an ASEAN member. The agreement included five areas: political cooperation (high-
level visits and strategic political dialogues); defence and security cooperation
(traditional and non-traditional security challenges and consular affairs); economic
cooperation (trade, investment, agriculture, energy, telecommunications, information
technology and transport); social, cultural, people-to-people cooperation; and regional
and international cooperation (particularly ASEAN centrality, ASEAN Community, and
the Mekong Forum). Vietnam and Thailand also agreed on a Plan of Action to implement
the strategic partnership; the first meeting of their Joint Commission was held in
November 2013.
In June 2013, immediately after Secretary General Trong’s trip to Thailand, President
Truong Tan Sang made a state visit to Indonesia where he and President Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono agreed to raise bilateral relations to a strategic partnership involving
cooperation the following areas: defence and security; trade and investment;
sustainable food and energy; fisheries and aquaculture; people-to-people links; ASEAN
Community-building and the peaceful resolution of South China Sea disputes.
In September 2013, Vietnam and Singapore raised their bilateral relations to a strategic
partnership during the course of an official visit to Hanoi by Prime Minister Lee Hisen
Loong. This agreement covered five major areas: deepening mutual trust in political
relations; boosting economic cooperation; increasing cooperation in security-defence;
promoting bilateral ties in education, law, health, culture, art and sports; and
intensifying cooperation at regional and international forums.
In August 2015, Prime Minister Dung met with his Malaysian counterpart Najib Tun
Abdul Razak in Kuala Lumpur. The two leaders agreed to establish a Strategic
Partnership, including defence cooperation. And in November 2015, the Philippines’
Secretary of Foreign Affairs Albert del Rosario and his Vietnamese counterpart Foreign
Minister Pham Binh Minh signed an agreement on strategic partnership on the sidelines
of a bilateral meeting between Presidents Aquino and Sang at the APEC Summit in
Manila.
Vietnam’s strategic partnerships with five ASEAN member states are aimed at
promoting bilateral defence cooperation and upholding a common position on the
South China Sea. This is exemplified by the joint statement issued by Prime Ministers
Najib and Dung According to this statement:
21. The two Prime Ministers exchanged views on matters relating to the South
China Sea and expressed concern over the recent developments, and reaffirmed
the importance of maintaining peace, stability, security and freedom of
navigation in and over-flight over the South China Sea. Both Prime Ministers
shared the views that upholding ASEAN’s unity and centrality is of utmost
importance in addressing/managing these matters.
22. The two Prime Ministers further reaffirmed the importance for all parties
concerned to settle all their maritime disputes and differences through peaceful
means, in accordance with universally recognised principles of international law,
 20

including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS
1982), and to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that could
complicate the situation or escalate the tension, as well as to not resort to threat
or use of force in handling their disputes and differences in the South China Sea.
23. The two Prime Ministers underscored the importance of the full and effective
implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the East Sea
(DOC) in its entirety, and expressed the commitment of Malaysia and Vietnam
towards that end. Both Prime Ministers emphasised the importance for the early
establishment of an effective Code of Conduct in the East Sea (COC). Both Prime
Ministers urged all parties to increase consultations and intensified efforts
towards building, maintaining and enhancing mutual trust as well as finding
durable solution to the disputes in the East Sea.54
Vietnam and ASEAN After the Arbitral Tribunal Award. In 2013, the Philippines – without
prior consultations with other ASEAN members – unilaterally filed a claim against China
with respect to its entitlements under UNCLOS. An Arbitral Tribunal set up under Annex
VII of UNCLOS heard these claims. Vietnam requested and was given observer status as
an interested party.
As soon as the Philippines filed its claim, China adopted an extremely belligerent view of
the Arbitral Tribunal arguing that it was illegal and had no competence to hear the
matter. Although China absented itself from the proceedings, which it was entitled to, it
never ceased its attacks on the Tribunal and its judges.
On July 12, 2016 the Arbitral Tribunal rendered its Award that gave the Philippines
overwhelming legal support for its claims. Rodrigo Duterte, who took office as president
of the Philippines on 30 June, set aside the Arbitral Tribunal’s Award in order to improve
relations with China. As of this writing the Award is dead in the water.
After the final Award was issued, China went into high gear denouncing the Award and
the probity of its judges. Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam were the only ASEAN
members to mention the Arbitral Tribunal Award by name. For example, a spokesperson
for Vietnam’s Foreign Ministry stated, “Viet Nam welcomes the fact that, on 12 July
2016, the Tribunal issued its Award in the arbitration between the Philippines and
China. Viet Nam will make a statement on the content of this Award… Viet Nam strongly
supports the settlement of disputes in the East Sea by peaceful means, including legal
and diplomatic processes…”55

54
Vietnam News Agency, “Vietnam-Malaysia joint statement on strategic partnership,” Embassy of the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam in Malaysia, 7 August 2015. https://vnembassy-
kualalumpur.mofa.gov.vn/en-us/News/EmbassyNews/Pages/Vietnam-Malaysia-joint-statement-on-
strategic-partnership.aspx.
55
See: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Remarks of the Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Viet
Nam on Viet Nam’s reaction to the issuance of the Award by the Tribunal constituted under Annex VII to
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in the arbitration between the Philippines and
China,” 12 July 2016; http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/pbnfn/ns160712211059.
 21

Nearly two weeks after the July 2016 Award ASEAN foreign ministers met in Vientiane,
Laos for their 49th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM), and ASEAN and related meetings
with their dialogue partners. In a demonstration of unity ASEAN ministers adopted four
statements:
 ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Statement on the Occasion of the 40th Anniversary of
the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC);
 Joint Communiqué of the 49th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Vientiane, 24
July 2016;
 Joint Statement of the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN Member States and China on
the Full and Effective Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of
Parties in the South China Sea (25 July 2016); and
 Joint Statement of the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN Members States on the
Maintenance of Peace, Security and Stability in the Region, July 25, 2018.
The ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ new consensus was endorsed by the combined 28th and
29th ASEAN Summits held in Vientiane in September. ASEAN leaders took note of and
endorsed the four key documents issued after the 49th AMM.
Also in September, Chinese and ASEAN Senior Officials met in China for their third
meeting of the year and made notable progress in three areas. First, they approved
guidelines for a hotline for use during maritime emergencies. Second, they agreed that
the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) applied to the South China Sea. Third,
they agreed to complete a draft framework for the COC by mid-2017.
In August 2017, ASEAN members and China adopted the Framework for the Code of
Conduct, a brief document that outlined the three-part structure of a future Code of
Conduct - pre-ambular provisions, general provisions and final clauses. A year later, on
August 3, 2018, the Foreign Ministers from ASEAN members and China adopted the
Single Draft South China Sea Code of Conduct Negotiating Text (Single Draft Negotiating
Text) based on the Framework for the Code of Conduct.

Conclusion
The Single Draft Negotiating Text (SDNT) is an unwiedly document that cobbles together
proposals from nine countries identified in the text as BN (Brunei), CA (Cambodia), CH
(China), ID (Indonesia), MY (Malaysia), PH (Philippines, SG (Singapore), TH (Thailand) and
VN (Vietnam). Laos and Myanmar did not table any proposals for inclusion in the SDNT.
Table 1 below summarizes the number of submissions made individually (unilaterally)
and jointly to the SDNT. Malaysia tops the list with 19 individual submissions followed
by China (16) and Vietnam (12).
As noted above, the SDNT is divided into three parts: Part 1 Preambular provisions, Part
2 General Provisions and Part 3 Final Clauses.
Vietnam made a major contribution to Part 1 with seven separate submissions offering
definitions of the following terms: contracting states, third states, militarize, relevant
feature in the South China Sea, uninhabited features, and self-restraint. Vietnam’s
 22

seventh submission defined the COC’s area of coverage as including “all disputed
features and overlapping maritime areas claimed under the 1982 UNCLOS in the South
China Sea.”
Table 1
Submissions to the Single Draft Negotiating Text By Country

Country Unilateral* Joint** Total

Brunei (BN) 3 18 21
Cambodia (CA) 2 17 19
China (CH) 16 20 36
Indonesia (ID) 10 19 29
Laos 0 0 0
Malaysia (MY) 19 6 25
Myanmar (MM) 0 0 0
Philippines (PH) 6 17 23
Singapore (SG) 3 18 21
Thailand (TH) 10 6 16
Vietnam (VN) 12 14 26
Sub-total 81 135 216
*A submission by a single country without endorsement from other parties.
**A submission supported by two or more countries.
Part 2, General Provisions, Section 2.c included four options on the promotion of
practical maritime cooperation submitted by the Philippines, Indonesia and Singapore,
China, and Cambodia. Vietnam proposed replacing all of these four options with a set of
twenty-one detailed proposals. Most of Vietnam’s proposals overlapped with various
provisions of options 1-4 and could easily be merged when the SDNT is revised. In
addition, Vietnam also proposed the following specific guidance on what the
Contracting States should not do:
a. Resort to threat or use of force, coercive actions or any other cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment and punishment against persons from other
Contracting States while conducting law enforcement activities;
b. Conduct construction of any artificial island in the South China Sea;
c. Initiate, participating in, or allow the use of its territories for any policy or
activity that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and
stability;
d. Militarize occupied features in the South China Sea;
e. Blockade vessels carrying provisions or personnel for rotation;
f. Declare an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the South China Sea;
g. Conduct simulated attacks that aim guns, missile launches, inter alia, at
 23

targets of other countries.

The SDNT is characterized as a “living document” subject to further revision that is
expected to pass through three readings before adoption. A proposal by the Philippines,
if agreed, would permit “agreed processes, guidelines and protocols” to be annexed to
the final COC.
At least six major issues must be resolved before the COC can be completed.
1. Geographic Scope and Disputed Areas
Vietnam proposed that, “the present Code of Conduct shall apply to all disputed
features and overlapping maritime areas claimed under the 1982 UNCLOS in the
South China Sea.”
2. Military Activities, Exercises and Militarization
One of the major differences in proposals between Vietnam and China in the SDNT
related to the conduct of military exercises. Vietnam proposed that the contracting
states provide sixty days notice of “impending joint/combined military exercise/drill”
in the South China Sea. China, on the other hand, sought to retain a veto over
military exercises with states outside the region. China proposed advanced
notification with the right of a regional state to object.
3. Cooperation Among Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies
The SDNT contains a number of proposals for cooperation among maritime law
enforcement agencies. These proposals need to be operationalized in guidelines and
protocols attached to the final text of the COC.
4. Dispute Resolution
The SDNT does not contain any specific reference to the binding dispute mechanisms
included in UNCLOS Annex VII. Indonesia suggested that the High Council of the Treaty
of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) serve as the dispute settlement mechanism on a
voluntary basis.
5. Legal Status of the COC
Vietnam proposed that the Contracting States “have consented to be bound by the
present Code of Conduct…” and that the COC “be subject to ratification in accordance
with the respective internal procedure of the signatory States” and the instrument of
ratification be deposited with the ASEAN Secretary General who “shall register” the COC
pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
6. Role of Third Parties
There is no reference in the SDNT about accession to the COC by third parties.
In conclusion, the present draft SDNT is an incomplete work-in-progress that does not
authoritatively address Vietnam’s major concerns over sovereign jurisdiction,
development, cooperation, and peace, security and stability in the South China Sea.
 24

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