Professional Documents
Culture Documents
RODRIGO R. DUTERTE and BENJAMIN C. DE GUZMAN, petitioners, vs. THE computers manufactured by Goldstar Information and Communication, Ltd., South Korea
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent. and exclusively distributed in the Philippines by Systems Plus, Inc. (SPI).
DECISION
After obtaining prior clearance from COA Auditor Kintanar, the Committee proceeded to
KAPUNAN, J.: negotiate with SPI, represented by its President Rodolfo V. Jao and Executive Vice President
Manuel T. Asis, for the acquisition and installation of the computer hardware and the
training of personnel for the Electronic Data-Processing Center. The total contract cost
The right to preliminary investigation is not a mere formal right, it is a substantive right. To
amounted to P11,656,810.00
deny the accused of such right would be to deprive him of due process.
On 5 November 1990, the City Council (Sangguniang Panlungsod) of Davao unanimously
In this special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction, petitioners seek to set passed Resolution No. 1402 and Ordinance No. 173 approving the proposed contract for
aside the Order of the Sandiganbayan dated 27 June 1997 denying the Motion to Quash the computerization between Davao City and SPI. The Sanggunian, likewise, authorized the
information filed against them for violating Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as City Mayor (petitioner Duterte) to sign the said contract for and in behalf of Davao City.[3]
the Anti-Graft And Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioners similarly impugn the Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan dated 5 August 1997 which denied their Motion for Reconsideration thereof.
On the same day, the Sangguniang issued Resolution No. 1403 and Ordinance No. 174, the
Pertinent to this case are the following facts: General Fund Supplemental Budget No. 07 for CY 1990 appropriating P3,000,000.00 for
the citys computerization project.
In 1990, the Davao City Local Automation Project was launched by the city government of
Davao. The goal of said project was to make Davao City a leading center for computer
systems and technology development. It also aimed to provide consultancy and training Given the go-signal, the contract was duly signed by the parties thereto and on 8 November
services and to assist all local government units in Mindanao set up their respective 1990, petitioner City Administrator de Guzman released to SPI PNB Check No. 65521 in the
computer systems. amount of P1,748,521.58 as downpayment.
On 14 October 1991, Judge Paul T. Arcangel, issued an Order dismissing Civil Case No.
On 31 May 1991, the team submitted its Special Audit Report (SAR) No. 91-05 20,550-91. The dispositive portion reads, thus:
recommending rescission of the subject contract. A copy of the report was sent to petitioner WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this case is hereby dismissed on the ground of
Duterte by COA Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo on 7 June 1991. In the latters transmittal prematurity and that it has become moot and academic with the mutual cancellation of the
letter, Chairman Domingo summarized the findings of the special audit team, thus: contract. The other claims of the parties are hereby denied. No pronouncement as to costs.
1. The award of the contract for the Davao City Local Automation Project to Systems Plus, SO ORDERED.[10]
Inc., for P11,656,810 was done thru negotiated contract rather than thru
competitive public bidding in violation of Sections 2 and 8 of PD 526. Moreover,
there was no sufficient appropriation for this particular contract in violation of Sec. On 12 November 1991, Graft Investigator Manriquez issued an order in OMB-3-91-1768
85 of PD 1445. directing petitioners, Jorge Silvosa (City Treasurer), Mariano Kintanar (City Auditor) and
Manuel T. Asis of SPI to:
2. Advance payment of P1.7M was made to Systems Plus, Inc. covering 15% of the contract
cost of P11.6M in violation of Sec. 45 of PD 477 and Sec. 88 of PD 1445.
3. The cost of computer hardware and accessories under contract with Systems Plus, Inc. xxx file in ten (10) days (1) their respective verified point-by-point comment under oath
(SPI) differed from the teams canvass by as much as 1200% or a total of P1.8M. upon every allegation of the complaint in Civil Case No. 20,550-91 in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 12, Davao City Dean Pilar C. Braga, et al. vs. Illegality of City Council
4. The City had no Information System Plan (ISP) prior to the award of the contract to SPI of Davao Resolutions and Ordinances, and the Computer Contract executed Pursuant
in direct violation of Malacaang Memo. Order No. 287 and NCC Memo. Circular 89- Thereto, for Recovery of Sum of Money, Professional Fees and Costs with Injunctive Relief,
1 dated June 22, 1989. This omission resulted in undue disadvantage to the City including the Issuance of a Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory
Government.
Injunction in which they filed a motion to dismiss, not an answer and (2) the respective
5. To remedy the foregoing deficiencies, the team recommends that the contract with comments, also under oath, on the Special Audit Report No. 91-05, a copy of which is
Systems Plus, Inc. be rescinded in view of the questionable validity due to attached.[11]
insufficient funding. Further, the provisions of NCC-Memorandum Circular 89-1
dated June 22, 1989 regarding procurement and/or installation of computer
hardware/system should be strictly adhered to.[7] On 4 December 1991, the Ombudsman received the affidavits of the Special Audit Team
but failed to furnish petitioners copies thereof.
The city government, intent on pursuing its computerization plan, decided to follow the
audit teams recommendation and sought the assistance of the National Computer Center On 18 February 1992, petitioners submitted a manifestation adopting the comments filed
(NCC).After conducting the necessary studies, the NCC recommended the acquisition of by their co-respondents Jorge Silvosa and Mariano Kintanar dated 25 November 1991 and
Philips computers in the amount of P15,792,150.00. Davao City complied with the NCCs 17 January 1992, respectively.
advice and hence, was finally able to obtain the needed computers.
Four years after, or on 22 February 1996, petitioners received a copy of a Memorandum On 18 June 1997, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash which was denied by the
prepared by Special Prosecution Officer I, Lemuel M. De Guzman dated 8 February 1996 Sandiganbayan in its Order dated 27 June 1997. The Sandiganbayan ruled:
addressed to Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto regarding OMB-MIN-90-0425 and OMB-3-91-
1768. Prosecutor De Guzman recommended that the charges of malversation, violation of It appears, however, that the accused were able to file motions for the reconsideration of
Sec. 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 and Art. 177, Revised Penal Code against petitioners and their co- the Resolution authorizing the filing of the Information herein with the Ombudsman in
respondents be dismissed. He opined that any issue pertaining to unwarranted benefits or Manila. This would mean, therefore, that whatever decision which might have occurred with
injury to the government and malversation were rendered moot and academic by the respect to the preliminary investigation would have been remedied by the motion for
mutual rescission of the subject contract before the COA submitted its findings (SAR No. consideration in the sense that whatever the accused had to say in their behalf, they were
91-05) or before the disbursement was disallowed. However, Prosecutor De Guzman able to do in that motion for reconsideration.
recommended that petitioners be charged under Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 for having Considering the denial thereof by the Office of the Ombudsman, the Court does not believe
entered into a contract manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government, the itself empowered to authorize a reinvestigation on the ground of an inadequacy of the basic
elements of profit, unwarranted benefits or loss to government being immaterial.[12] preliminary investigation nor with respect to a dispute as to the proper appreciation by the
prosecution of the evidence at that time.
Accordingly, the following information dated 8 February 1996 was filed against petitioners In view hereof, upon further representation by Atty. Medialdea that he represents not only
before the Sandiganbayan (docketed as Criminal Case No. 23193): Mayor Duterte but City Administrator de Guzman as well, upon his commitment, the
arraignment hereof is now set for July 25, 1997 at 8:00 oclock in the morning.[14]
That on or about November 5, 1990, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, both public officers, accused On 15 July 1997, petitioners moved for reconsideration of the above order but the same
Benjamin C. De Guzman being then the City Administrator of Davao City, committing the was denied by the Sandiganbayan for lack of merit in its Resolution dated 5 August 1997.[15]
crime herein charged in relation to, while in the performance and taking advantage of their
official functions, and conspiring and confederating with each other, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into a negotiated contract for the purchase of Hence, the present recourse.
computer hardware and accessories with the Systems Plus, Incorporated for and in
consideration of the amount of PESOS: ELEVEN MILLION SIX HUNDRED FIFTY-SIX
THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED TEN (P11,656,810.00), which contract is manifestly and Petitioners allege that:
grossly disadvantageous to the government, said accused knowing fully-well that the said
acquisition cost has been overpriced by as much as twelve hundred (1200%) percent and
without subjecting said acquisition to the required public bidding. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION
CONTRARY TO LAW.[13] TO QUASH AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, CONSIDERING THAT:
A
On 27 February 1996, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and on 29 March 1996,
a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration on the following grounds: (1) PETITIONERS WERE EFFECTIVELY DEPRIVED OF THEIR RIGHT TO A PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO SEC. 4, RULE II OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER
NO. 07 (RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN); AND
1. Petitioners were deprived of their right to a preliminary investigation, due process and
(2) ASSUMING THAT A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION WAS PROPERLY CONDUCTED,
the speedy disposition of their case;
THERE WAS AN INORDINATE DELAY IN TERMINATING THE SAME THEREBY
2. Petitioner Duterte acted in good faith and was clothed with authority to enter into the DEPRIVING THEM OF THEIR RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND SPEEDY
subject contract; DISPOSITION OF THE CASE.
3. There is no contract manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government since B
the subject contract has been duly rescinded.
THERE IS NO SUFFICIENT BASIS, IN FACT AND IN LAW, TO CHARGE PETITIONERS
On 19 March 1996, the Ombudsman issued a Resolution denying petitioners motion for DUTERTE AND DE GUZMAN OF VIOLATING SEC. 3 (G) OF R.A. 3019 IN THAT:
reconsideration.
(1) PETITIONER DUTERTE ACTED IN GOOD FAITH AND WAS CLOTHED WITH FULL c) endorsed to the proper government office or agency which has jurisdiction over the case;
LEGAL AUTHORITY FROM THE CITY COUNCIL TO ENTER INTO A CONTRACT
d) forwarded to the appropriate office or official for fact-finding investigation;
WITH SYSTEMS PLUS, INC.,
e) referred for administrative adjudication; or
(2) THERE IS NO CONTRACT MANIFESTLY AND GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE
GOVERNMENT TO SPEAK OF AS THE SAME HAS BEEN RESCINDED AND NO f) subjected to a preliminary investigation
DAMAGE WAS SUFFERED BY THE CITY GOVERNMENT; Sec. 4. Procedure. The preliminary investigation of cases falling under the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan and Regional Trial Courts shall be conducted in the manner prescribed
in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following provisions:
(3) ASSUMING THAT THE CONTRACT WAS NOT RESCINDED, THE SAME CANNOT BE a) If the complaint is not under oath or is based only on official reports, the investigating
CONSIDERED AS MANIFESTLY AND GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE officer shall require the complainant or supporting witnesses to execute affidavits to
GOVERNMENT.[16] substantiate the complaints.
b) After such affidavits have been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order,
attaching thereto a copy of the affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the
On 4 September 1997, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the respondent to submit, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits and
Sandiganbayan from further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 23193. controverting evidence with proof of service thereof on the complainant. The complainant
may file reply affidavits within ten (10) days after service of the counter-affidavits.
Indeed, since a preliminary investigation is designed to screen cases for trial, only evidence
Note that in preliminary investigation, if the complaint is unverified or based only on official
may be considered. While reports and even raw information may justify the initiation of an
reports (which is the situation obtaining in the case at bar), the complainant is required to
investigation, the stage of preliminary investigation can be held only after sufficient
submit affidavits to substantiate the complaint. The investigating officer, thereafter, shall
evidence has been gathered and evaluated warranting the eventual prosecution of the case
issue an order, to which copies of the complaint-affidavit are attached, requiring the
in court. As this Court held in Cojuangco, Jr. v. PCGG:
respondent to submit his counter-affidavits. In the preliminary investigation, what the
respondent is required to file is a counter-affidavit, not a comment. It is only when the
respondent fails to file a counter-affidavit may the investigating officer consider the
Although such a preliminary investigation is not a trial and is not intended to usurp the
respondents comment as the answer to the complaint. Against the foregoing backdrop,
function of the trial court, it is not a casual affair. The officer conducting the same
there was a palpable non-observance by the Office of the Ombudsman of the fundamental
investigates or inquires into the facts concerning the commission of the crime with the end
requirements of preliminary investigation.
in view of determining whether or not an information may be prepared against the accused.
Indeed, a preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of
the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be adduced so that when the case
is tried, the trial court may not be bound as a matter of law to order an acquittal. A in the conduct of the preliminary investigation can not be corrected, for until now, man has
preliminary investigation has then been called a judicial inquiry. It is a judicial proceeding. not yet invented a device for setting back time.
An act becomes judicial when there is opportunity to be heard and for the production and
weighing of evidence, and a decision is rendered thereof.
In the recent case of Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman,[24] the Court upheld Angchangcos
II right to the speedy disposition of his case. Angchangco was a sheriff in the Regional Trial
Court of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City. In 1990 criminal complaints were filed against
Compounding the deprivation of petitioners of their right to a preliminary investigation was
him which remained pending before the Ombudsman even after his retirement in 1994. The
the undue and unreasonable delay in the termination of the irregularity conducted
Court thus ruled:
preliminary investigation. Petitioners manifestation adopting the comments of their co-
respondents was filed on 18 February 1992. However, it was only on 22 February 1996 or
four (4) years later, that petitioners received a memorandum dated 8 February 1996
Here, the Office of the Ombudsman, due to its failure to resolve the criminal charges against
submitted by Special Prosecutor Officer I Lemuel M. De Guzman recommending the filing
petitioner for more than six years, has transgressed on the constitutional right of petitioner
of information against them for violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and
to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases against him, as well as the
Corrupt Practices Act). The inordinate delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation
Ombudsmans own constitutional duty to act promptly on complaints filed before it. For all
infringed upon their constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy disposition of their
these past 6 years, petitioner has remained under a cloud, and since his retirement in
case.[22] In Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan,[23] we held that an undue delay of close to three (3)
September 1994, he has been deprived of the fruits of his retirement after serving the
years in the termination of the preliminary investigation in the light of the circumstances
government for over 42 years all because of the inaction of respondent Ombusman. If we
obtaining in that case warranted the dismissal of the case:
wait any longer, it may be too late for petitioner to receive his retirement benefits, not to
We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan speak of clearing his name. This is a case of plain injustice which calls for the issuance of
in the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process. the writ prayed for.[25]
Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary
investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the
law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process We are not persuaded by the Ombudsmans argument that the Tatad ruling does not apply
constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of to the present case which is not politically motivated unlike the former, pointing out the
the due process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of speedy disposition of following findings of the Court in the Tatad decision:
cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and 1987
Constitution), the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioners constitutional rights. A delay
of close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the A painstaking review of the facts can not but leave the impression that political motivations
circumstances obtaining in the case at bar. We are not impressed by the attempt of the played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutional process in this case. Firstly,
Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by indulging in the speculative assumption that the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with
the delay may be due to a painstaking and grueling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed by law for
whether the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution preliminary investigation, which require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits
of a former high-ranking government official. In the first place, such a statement suggests by the complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the
a double standard of treatment, which must be emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out complaint to the Presidential Security Command for fact-finding investigation and report.
of the five charges against the petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn We find such blatant departure from the established procedure as dubious, but revealing
statement of assets and liabilities required by Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly did attempt to involve an office directly under the President in the prosecutional process lending
not involve complicated legal and factual issues necessitating such painstaking and grueling credence to the suspicion that the prosecution was politically motivated. We cannot
scrutiny as would justify a delay of almost three years in terminating the preliminary emphasize too strongly that prosecutors should not allow, and should avoid, giving the
investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged bribery and alleged giving of impression that their noble office is being used or prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for
unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more substantial legal and factual political ends, or other purposes alien to, or subversive of, the basic and fundamental
issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the period of three years, which it took the objective observing the interest of justice evenhandedly, without fear or favor to any and
Tanodbayan to resolve the case.
all litigants alike whether rich or poor, weak or strong, powerless or mighty. Only by strict
adherence to the established procedure may be publics perception of the impartiality of the
prosecutor be enhanced.[26]
It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary investigation
should not be deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a preliminary investigation
does not warrant dismissal of the information. True but the absence of a preliminary The Ombudsman endeavored to distinguish the present suit from the Angchangco case by
investigation can be corrected by giving the accused such investigation. But an undue delay arguing that in the latter, Angchangco filed several motions for early resolution, implying
that in the case at bar petitioners were not as vigilant in asserting or protecting their rights.
for violation of Sec. 3(g), the following elements must be present: (1) the offender is a
public officer; (2) he entered into a contract or transaction in behalf of the government; (3)
We disagree. The constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases does not come into play
the contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
only when political considerations are involved. The Constitution makes no such
government. The second element of the crime that the accused public officers entered into
distinction.While political motivation in Tatad may have been a factor in the undue delay in
a contract in behalf of the government is absent. The computerization contract was
the termination of the preliminary investigation therein to justify the invocation of their
rescinded on 6 May 1991 before SAR No. 91-05 came out on 31 May 1991 and before the
right to speedy disposition of cases, the particular facts of each case must be taken into
Anti-Graft League filed its complaint with the Ombudsman on 1 August 1991. Hence, at
consideration in the grant of the relief sought. In the Tatad case, we are reminded:
that time the Anti-Graft League instituted their complaint and the Ombudsman issued its
In a number of cases, this Court has not hesitated to grant the so-called radical relief and Order on 12 November 1991, there was no longer any contract to speak of. The contract,
to spare the accused from the undergoing the rigors and expense of a full-blown trial where after 6 May 1991 became in contemplation of the law, non-existent, as if no contract was
it is clear that he has been deprived of due process of law or other constitutional guaranteed ever executed.
rights. Of course, it goes without saying that in the application of the doctrine enunciated
in those cases, particularly regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to
its case.[27]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED and Criminal Case No. 23193
is hereby DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued on 4 September 1997 is
made PERMANENT.
In Alviso vs. Sandiganbayan,[28] the Court observed that the concept of speedy disposition
of cases is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept and that the factors
that may be considered and balanced are the length of the delay, the assertion or failure
to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay.
Petitioners in this case, however, could not have urged the speedy resolution of their case
because they were completely unaware that the investigation against them was still on-
going.Peculiar to this case, we reiterate, is the fact that petitioners were merely asked to
comment, and not file counter-affidavits which is the procedure to follow in a preliminary
investigation.After giving their explanation and after four long years of being in the dark,
petitioners, naturally, had reason to assume that the charges against them had already
been dismissed.
On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman failed to present any plausible, special or
even novel reason which could justify the four-year delay in terminating its investigation. Its
excuse for the delay-the many layers of review that the case had to undergo and the
meticulous scrutiny it had to entail has lost its novelty and is no longer appealing, as was
the invocation in the Tatad case. The incident before us does not involve complicated
factual and legal issues, specially in view of the fact that the subject computerization
contract had been mutually cancelled by the parties thereto even before the Anti-Graft
League filed its complaint.
The Office of the Ombudsman capitalizes on petitioners three motions for extension of the
time to file comment which it imputed for the delay. However, the delay was not caused by
the motions for extension. The delay occurred after petitioners filed their
comment. Between 1992-1996, petitioners were under no obligation to make any move
because there was no preliminary investigation within the contemplation of Section 4, Rule
II of A.O. No. 07 to speak of in the first place.
III
Finally, under the facts of the case, there is no basis in the law or in fact to charge petitioners
for violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019. To establish probable cause against the offender
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, DIRECTOR GENERAL effectivity of the new rule. According to the Court, if the cases were revived only after the
OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR JOVENCITO two-year bar, the State must be given the opportunity to justify its failure to comply with
ZUO, STATE PROSECUTORS PETER L. ONG and RUBEN A. ZACARIAS; 2ND the said time-bar. It emphasized that the new rule fixes a time-bar to penalize the State
ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR CONRADO M. JAMOLIN and CITY PROSECUTOR OF for its inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases already filed in court. However, the State is
QUEZON CITY CLARO ARELLANO, petitioners, vs. PANFILO M. LACSON, respondent. not precluded from presenting compelling reasons to justify the revival of cases beyond the
two-year bar.
RESOLUTION
CALLEJO, SR., J.: In support of their Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioners contend that (a) Section 8,
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to Criminal Cases Nos.
Before the Court is the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration[1] of the Resolution[2] dated Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689; and (b) the time-bar in said rule should not be applied
May 28, 2002, remanding this case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch retroactively.
81, for the determination of several factual issues relative to the application of Section 8 of
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 filed against the respondent and his co-accused with the said The Court shall resolve the issues seriatim.
court. In the aforesaid criminal cases, the respondent and his co-accused were charged
with multiple murder for the shooting and killing of eleven male persons identified as Manuel I. SECTION 8, RULE 117 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IS NOT
Montero, a former Corporal of the Philippine Army, Rolando Siplon, Sherwin Abalora, who APPLICABLE TO CRIMINAL CASES NOS. Q-99-81679 TO Q-99-81689.
was 16 years old, Ray Abalora, who was 19 years old, Joel Amora, Jevy Redillas, Meleubren
Sorronda, who was 14 years old,[3] Pacifico Montero, Jr., of the 44th Infantry Batallion of The petitioners aver that Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is
the Philippine Army, Welbor Elcamel, SPO1 Carlito Alap-ap of the Zamboanga PNP, and Alex not applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 because the essential
Neri, former Corporal of the 44th Infantry Batallion of the Philippine Army, bandied as requirements for its application were not present when Judge Agnir, Jr., issued his
members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang. The respondent opposed petitioners motion for resolution of March 29, 1999. Disagreeing with the ruling of the Court, the petitioners
reconsideration.[4] maintain that the respondent did not give his express consent to the dismissal by Judge
Agnir, Jr., of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. The respondent allegedly
admitted in his pleadings filed with the Court of Appeals and during the hearing thereat that
he did not file any motion to dismiss said cases, or even agree to a provisional dismissal
The Court ruled in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered that the provisional dismissal thereof. Moreover, the heirs of the victims were allegedly not given prior notices of the
of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 were with the express consent of the dismissal of the said cases by Judge Agnir, Jr. According to the petitioners, the respondents
respondent as he himself moved for said provisional dismissal when he filed his motion for express consent to the provisional dismissal of the cases and the notice to all the heirs of
judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of witnesses. The Court also the victims of the respondents motion and the hearing thereon are conditions sine qua
held therein that although Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph of the new rule.
could be given retroactive effect, there is still a need to determine whether the requirements
for its application are attendant. The trial court was thus directed to resolve the following:
The petitioners further submit that it is not necessary that the case be remanded to the
RTC to determine whether private complainants were notified of the March 22, 1999 hearing
(1) whether the provisional dismissal of the cases had the express consent of the accused; on the respondents motion for judicial determination of the existence of probable
(2) whether it was ordered by the court after notice to the offended party; (3) whether the cause. The records allegedly indicate clearly that only the handling city prosecutor was
2-year period to revive it has already lapsed; (4) whether there is any justification for the furnished a copy of the notice of hearing on said motion. There is allegedly no evidence that
filing of the cases beyond the 2-year period; (5) whether notices to the offended parties private prosecutor Atty. Godwin Valdez was properly retained and authorized by all the
were given before the cases of respondent Lacson were dismissed by then Judge Agnir; (6) private complainants to represent them at said hearing. It is their contention that Atty.
whether there were affidavits of desistance executed by the relatives of the three (3) other Valdez merely identified the purported affidavits of desistance and that he did not confirm
victims; (7) whether the multiple murder cases against respondent Lacson are being the truth of the allegations therein.
revived within or beyond the 2-year bar.
The respondent, on the other hand, insists that, as found by the Court in its Resolution and
The Court further held that the reckoning date of the two-year bar had to be first determined Judge Agnir, Jr. in his resolution, the respondent himself moved for the provisional dismissal
whether it shall be from the date of the order of then Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the cases, of the criminal cases. He cites the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. stating that the respondent
or from the dates of receipt thereof by the various offended parties, or from the date of and the other accused filed separate but identical motions for the dismissal of the criminal
cases should the trial court find no probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of dismissal shall
against them. become permanent one year after the issuance thereof without the case having been
revived, the provision should be construed to mean that the order of dismissal shall become
permanent one year after service of the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor who
has control of the prosecution[6] without the criminal case having been revived. The public
The respondent further asserts that the heirs of the victims, through the public and private
prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served with a copy
prosecutors, were duly notified of said motion and the hearing thereof. He contends that it
of the order of dismissal.
was sufficient that the public prosecutor was present during the March 22, 1999 hearing on
the motion for judicial determination of the existence of probable cause because criminal
actions are always prosecuted in the name of the People, and the private complainants
Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing. It is a
merely prosecute the civil aspect thereof.
positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to supply its
meaning.[7]Where the accused writes on the motion of a prosecutor for a provisional
dismissal of the case No objection or With my conformity, the writing amounts to express
The Court has reviewed the records and has found the contention of the petitioners consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of the case.[8] The mere inaction or silence
meritorious. of the accused to a motion for a provisional dismissal of the case[9] or his failure to object
to a provisional dismissal[10]does not amount to express consent.
The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar
in the second paragraph of the new rule. The raison d etre for the requirement of the In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the first and second requisites of the
express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is to bar him first paragraph of the new rule were present when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases
from subsequently asserting that the revival of the criminal case will place him in double Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Irrefragably, the prosecution did not file any motion for
jeopardy for the same offense or for an offense necessarily included therein.[5] the provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases. For his part, the respondent merely filed
a motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of prosecution
witnesses alleging that under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and the decision of JUSTICE SALONGA: And it is expressly provided under Section 8 that a case shall
this Court in Allado v. Diokno,[17] among other cases, there was a need for the trial court to not be provisionally dismissed except when it is with the express conformity of the
conduct a personal determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest accused.
against respondent and to have the prosecutions witnesses summoned before the court for
its examination. The respondent contended therein that until after the trial court shall have ATTY. FORTUN: That is correct, Your Honor.
personally determined the presence of probable cause, no warrant of arrest should be
JUSTICE SALONGA: And with notice to the offended party.
issued against the respondent and if one had already been issued, the warrant should be
recalled by the trial court. He then prayed therein that: ATTY. FORTUN: That is correct, Your Honor.
1) a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the JUSTICE SALONGA: Was there an express conformity on the part of the accused?
Constitution be conducted by this Honorable Court, and for this purpose, an order be issued
directing the prosecution to present the private complainants and their witnesses at a ATTY. FORTUN: There was none, Your Honor. We were not asked to sign any
hearing scheduled therefor; and order, or any statement, which would normally be required by the Court on
pre-trial or on other matters, including other provisional dismissal. My very
2) warrants for the arrest of the accused-movants be withheld, or, if issued, recalled in the
limited practice in criminal courts, Your Honor, had taught me that a judge must be
meantime until the resolution of this incident.
very careful on this matter of provisional dismissal. In fact they ask the accused to
Other equitable reliefs are also prayed for.[18] come forward, and the judge himself or herself explains the implications of a
provisional dismissal. Pumapayag ka ba dito. Puwede bang pumirma ka?
The respondent did not pray for the dismissal, provisional or otherwise, of Criminal Cases JUSTICE ROSARIO: You were present during the proceedings?
Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Neither did he ever agree, impliedly or expressly, to a ATTY. FORTUN: Yes, Your Honor.
mere provisional dismissal of the cases. In fact, in his reply filed with the Court of Appeals,
respondent emphasized that: JUSTICE ROSARIO: You represented the petitioner in this case?
ATTY. FORTUN: That is correct, Your Honor. And there was nothing of that
... An examination of the Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and for sort which the good Judge Agnir, who is most knowledgeable in criminal
Examination of Prosecution Witnesses filed by the petitioner and his other co-accused in law, had done in respect of provisional dismissal or the matter of Mr. Lacson
the said criminal cases would show that the petitioner did not pray for the dismissal of the agreeing to the provisional dismissal of the case.
case. On the contrary, the reliefs prayed for therein by the petitioner are: (1) a judicial
JUSTICE GUERRERO: Now, you filed a motion, the other accused then filed a motion
determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the Constitution; and
for a judicial determination of probable cause?
(2) that warrants for the arrest of the accused be withheld, or if issued, recalled in the
meantime until the resolution of the motion. It cannot be said, therefore, that the dismissal ATTY. FORTUN: Yes, Your Honor.
of the case was made with the consent of the petitioner. A copy of the aforesaid motion is
hereto attached and made integral part hereof as Annex A.[19] JUSTICE GUERRERO: Did you make any alternative prayer in your motion that if
there is no probable cause what should the Court do?
During the hearing in the Court of Appeals on July 31, 2001, the respondent, through ATTY. FORTUN: That the arrest warrants only be withheld. That was the only
counsel, categorically, unequivocally, and definitely declared that he did not file any motion prayer that we asked. In fact, I have a copy of that particular motion, and if I may
to dismiss the criminal cases nor did he agree to a provisional dismissal thereof, thus: read my prayer before the Court, it said: Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that (1)
a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the
JUSTICE SALONGA: And it is your stand that the dismissal made by the Court was Constitution be conducted, and for this purpose, an order be issued directing the
provisional in nature? prosecution to present the private complainants and their witnesses at the scheduled
hearing for that purpose; and (2) the warrants for the arrest of the accused be
ATTY. FORTUN: It was in (sic) that the accused did not ask for it. What they withheld, or, if issued, recalled in the meantime until resolution of this incident.
wanted at the onset was simply a judicial determination of probable cause
for warrants of arrest issued. Then Judge Agnir, upon the presentation by the JUSTICE GUERRERO: There is no general prayer for any further relief?
parties of their witnesses, particularly those who had withdrawn their affidavits,
made one further conclusion that not only was this case lacking in probable cause ATTY. FORTUN: There is but it simply says other equitable reliefs are prayed for.
for purposes of the issuance of an arrest warrant but also it did not justify proceeding
to trial.
JUSTICE GUERRERO: Dont you surmise Judge Agnir, now a member of this Court, provisional dismissal of the criminal case. Such notice may be served on the offended party
precisely addressed your prayer for just and equitable relief to dismiss the case or the heirs of the victim through the private prosecutor, if there is one, or through the
because what would be the net effect of a situation where there is no warrant of public prosecutor who in turn must relay the notice to the offended party or the heirs of the
arrest being issued without dismissing the case? victim to enable them to confer with him before the hearing or appear in court during the
hearing. The proof of such service must be shown during the hearing on the motion,
ATTY. FORTUN: Yes, Your Honor. I will not second say (sic) yes the Good otherwise, the requirement of the new rule will become illusory. Such notice will enable the
Justice, but what is plain is we did not agree to the provisional dismissal, offended party or the heirs of the victim the opportunity to seasonably and effectively
neither were we asked to sign any assent to the provisional dismissal. comment on or object to the motion on valid grounds, including: (a) the collusion between
the prosecution and the accused for the provisional dismissal of a criminal case thereby
JUSTICE GUERRERO: If you did not agree to the provisional dismissal did you not
depriving the State of its right to due process; (b) attempts to make witnesses unavailable;
file any motion for reconsideration of the order of Judge Agnir that the case should
or (c) the provisional dismissal of the case with the consequent release of the accused from
be dismissed?
detention would enable him to threaten and kill the offended party or the other prosecution
ATTY. FORTUN: I did not, Your Honor, because I knew fully well at that time witnesses or flee from Philippine jurisdiction, provide opportunity for the destruction or loss
that my client had already been arraigned, and the arraignment was valid of the prosecutions physical and other evidence and prejudice the rights of the offended
as far as I was concerned. So, the dismissal, Your Honor, by Judge Agnir party to recover on the civil liability of the accused by his concealment or furtive disposition
operated to benefit me, and therefore I did not take any further step in of his property or the consequent lifting of the writ of preliminary attachment against his
addition to rocking the boat or clarifying the matter further because it property.
probably could prejudice the interest of my client.
The Court also agrees with the petitioner’s contention that no notice of any motion for the
provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or of the hearing Since the conditions sine qua non for the application of the new rule were not present when
thereon was served on the heirs of the victims at least three days before said hearing as Judge Agnir, Jr. issued his resolution, the State is not barred by the time limit set forth in
mandated by Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. It must be borne in mind that in the second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
crimes involving private interests, the new rule requires that the offended party or parties Procedure. The State can thus revive or refile Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-
or the heirs of the victims must be given adequate a priori notice of any motion for the 81689 or file new Informations for multiple murder against the respondent.
Penal Code. Prescription under the Revised Penal Code simply becomes irrelevant upon the
application of Section 8, Rule 117 because a complaint or information has already been filed
II. THE TIME-BAR IN SECTION 8, RULE 117 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL against the accused, which filing tolls the running of the prescriptive period under Article
PROCEDURE SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY. 90.[32]
The petitioners contend that even on the assumption that the respondent expressly The Court agrees with the respondent that the new rule is not a statute of
consented to a provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 and limitations. Statutes of limitations are construed as acts of grace, and a surrender by the
all the heirs of the victims were notified of the respondents motion before the hearing sovereign of its right to prosecute or of its right to prosecute at its discretion. Such statutes
thereon and were served with copies of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the are considered as equivalent to acts of amnesty founded on the liberal theory that
eleven cases, the two-year bar in Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal prosecutions should not be allowed to ferment endlessly in the files of the government to
Procedure should be applied prospectively and not retroactively against the State. To apply explode only after witnesses and proofs necessary for the protection of the accused have
the time limit retroactively to the criminal cases against the respondent and his co-accused by sheer lapse of time passed beyond availability.[33] The periods fixed under such statutes
would violate the right of the People to due process, and unduly impair, reduce, and are jurisdictional and are essential elements of the offenses covered.[34]
diminish the States substantive right to prosecute the accused for multiple murder. They
posit that under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the State had twenty years within
which to file the criminal complaints against the accused. However, under the new rule, the
State only had two years from notice of the public prosecutor of the order of dismissal of On the other hand, the time-bar under Section 8 of Rule 117 is akin to a special procedural
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 within which to revive the said limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute making the time-bar an essence of
cases. When the new rule took effect on December 1, 2000, the State only had one year the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of the time-bar operates to
and three months within which to revive the cases or refile the Informations. The period for extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the accused.[35]
the State to charge respondent for multiple murder under Article 90 of the Revised Penal
Code was considerably and arbitrarily reduced. They submit that in case of conflict between
the Revised Penal Code and the new rule, the former should prevail. They also insist that The time-bar under the new rule does not reduce the periods under Article 90 of the Revised
the State had consistently relied on the prescriptive periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, a substantive law.[36] It is but a limitation of the right of the State to revive a
Penal Code. It was not accorded a fair warning that it would forever be barred beyond the criminal case against the accused after the Information had been filed but subsequently
two-year period by a retroactive application of the new rule.[28] Petitioners thus pray to the provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused. Upon the lapse of the
Court to set aside its Resolution of May 28, 2002. timeline under the new rule, the State is presumed, albeit disputably, to have abandoned
or waived its right to revive the case and prosecute the accused. The dismissal
becomes ipso facto permanent. He can no longer be charged anew for the same crime or
For his part, the respondent asserts that the new rule under Section 8 of Rule 117 of the another crime necessarily included therein.[37] He is spared from the anguish and anxiety
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure may be applied retroactively since there is no as well as the expenses in any new indictments.[38] The State may revive a criminal case
substantive right of the State that may be impaired by its application to the criminal cases beyond the one-year or two-year periods provided that there is a justifiable necessity for
in question since [t]he States witnesses were ready, willing and able to provide their the delay.[39] By the same token, if a criminal case is dismissed on motion of the accused
testimony but the prosecution failed to act on these cases until it became politically because the trial is not concluded within the period therefor, the prescriptive periods under
expedient in April 2001 for them to do so.[29] According to the respondent, penal laws, either the Revised Penal Code are not thereby diminished.[40] But whether or not the prosecution
procedural or substantive, may be retroactively applied so long as they favor the of the accused is barred by the statute of limitations or by the lapse of the time-line under
accused.[30] He asserts that the two-year period commenced to run on March 29, 1999 and the new rule, the effect is basically the same. As the State Supreme Court of Illinois held:
lapsed two years thereafter was more than reasonable opportunity for the State to fairly
indict him.[31] In any event, the State is given the right under the Courts assailed Resolution
to justify the filing of the Information in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 This, in effect, enacts that when the specified period shall have arrived, the right of the
beyond the time-bar under the new rule. state to prosecute shall be gone, and the liability of the offender to be punished to be
deprived of his liberty shall cease. Its terms not only strike down the right of action which
The respondent insists that Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
the state had acquired by the offense, but also remove the flaw which the crime had created
does not broaden the substantive right of double jeopardy to the prejudice of the State
in the offenders’ title to liberty. In this respect, its language goes deeper than statutes
because the prohibition against the revival of the cases within the one-year or two-year
barring civil remedies usually do. They expressly take away only the remedy by suit, and
periods provided therein is a legal concept distinct from the prohibition against the revival
that inferentially is held to abate the right which such remedy would enforce, and perfect
of a provisionally dismissed case within the periods stated in Section 8 of Rule
the title which such remedy would invade; but this statute is aimed directly at the very right
117. Moreover, he claims that the effects of a provisional dismissal under said rule do not
which the state has against the offender the right to punish, as the only liability which the
modify or negate the operation of the prescriptive period under Article 90 of the Revised
offender has incurred, and declares that this right and this liability are at an end. [41]
The Court agrees with the respondent that procedural laws may be applied retroactively. As In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one
applied to criminal law, procedural law provides or regulates the steps by which one who year or two years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express
has committed a crime is to be punished. In Tan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[42] this Court held consent of the accused and with a priori notice to the offended party. The time-bar may
that: appear, on first impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under Article 90 of the
Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions interests and those of the accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in with minimum prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into account the substantial
that sense and to that extent. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the rights of both the State and of the accused to due process. The Court believed that the time
litigant’s rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the
retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court
feel that he is adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive application of procedural statutes must be respected unless it is shown that the period is manifestly short or insufficient that
constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may the rule becomes a denial of justice.[50] The petitioners failed to show a manifest shortness
attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. It has been held that a person has no vested or insufficiency of the time-bar.
right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of
his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure.
The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules and
approved by the Court en banc primarily to enhance the administration of the criminal
It further ruled therein that a procedural law may not be applied retroactively if to do so justice system and the rights to due process of the State and the accused by eliminating
would work injustice or would involve intricate problems of due process or impair the the deleterious practice of trial courts of provisionally dismissing criminal cases on motion
independence of the Court. In a per curiam decision in Cipriano v. City of Houma,[43] the of either the prosecution or the accused or jointly, either with no time-bar for the revival
United States Supreme Court ruled that where a decision of the court would produce thereof or with a specific or definite period for such revival by the public prosecutor. There
substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis for avoiding the were times when such criminal cases were no longer revived or refiled due to causes beyond
injustice of hardship by a holding of nonretroactivity.[44] A construction of which a statute the control of the public prosecutor or because of the indolence, apathy or the lackadaisical
is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, attitude of public prosecutors to the prejudice of the State and the accused despite the
wrongful, and injurious consequences.[45] This Court should not adopt an interpretation of mandate to public prosecutors and trial judges to expedite criminal proceedings.[51]
a statute which produces absurd, unreasonable, unjust, or oppressive results if such
interpretation could be avoided.[46] Time and again, this Court has decreed that statutes are
to be construed in light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be It is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes delay as it usually operates
remedied. In construing a statute, the reason for the enactment should be kept in mind in his favor,[52] especially if he greatly fears the consequences of his trial and conviction. He
and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose.[47] is hesitant to disturb the hushed inaction by which dominant cases have been known to
expire.[53]
Remedial legislation, or procedural rule, or doctrine of the Court designed to enhance and
implement the constitutional rights of parties in criminal proceedings may be applied The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases may impair or reduce the
retroactively or prospectively depending upon several factors, such as the history of the capacity of the State to prove its case with the disappearance or non availability of its
new rule, its purpose and effect, and whether the retrospective application will further its witnesses. Physical evidence may have been lost. Memories of witnesses may have grown
operation, the particular conduct sought to be remedied and the effect thereon in the dim or have faded. Passage of time makes proof of any fact more difficult.[54] The accused
administration of justice and of criminal laws in particular.[48] In a per curiam decision may become a fugitive from justice or commit another crime. The longer the lapse of time
in Stefano v. Woods,[49] the United States Supreme Court catalogued the factors in from the dismissal of the case to the revival thereof, the more difficult it is to prove the
determining whether a new rule or doctrine enunciated by the High Court should be given crime.
retrospective or prospective effect:
(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law
On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a criminal case does not
enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of
justice of a retroactive application of the new standards. terminate a criminal case. The possibility that the case may be revived at any time may
disrupt or reduce, if not derail, the chances of the accused for employment, curtail his
association, subject him to public obloquy and create anxiety in him and his family. He is
unable to lead a normal life because of community suspicion and his own anxiety. He
In this case, the Court agrees with the petitioners that the time-bar of two years under the
continues to suffer those penalties and disabilities incompatible with the presumption of
new rule should not be applied retroactively against the State.
innocence.[55] He may also lose his witnesses or their memories may fade with the passage
of time. In the long run, it may diminish his capacity to defend himself and thus eschew the filament. We are to keep the balance true. In Dimatulac v. Villon,[59] this Court emphasized
fairness of the entire criminal justice system.[56] that the judges action must not impair the substantial rights of the accused nor the right of
the State and offended party to due process of law. This Court further said:
The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the
the administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused alone. The interests of society and the offended parties which have been wronged
accused; not for the accused only. must be equally considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is not necessarily a denial of
justice; and an acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice, for, to the society offended
The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar retroactively so that the and the party wronged, it could also mean injustice. Justice then must be rendered even-
two-year period commenced to run on March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received handedly to both the accused, on one hand, and the State and offended party, on the other.
his copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent
with the intendment of the new rule. Instead of giving the State two years to revive In this case, the eleven Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 were
provisionally dismissed cases, the State had considerably less than two years to do filed with the Regional Trial Court on June 6, 2001 well within the two-year period.
so. Thus, Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 on
March 29, 1999. The new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. If the Court applied the
new time-bar retroactively, the State would have only one year and three months or until In sum, this Court finds the motion for reconsideration of petitioners meritorious.
March 31, 2001 within which to revive these criminal cases. The period is short of the two-
year period fixed under the new rule. On the other hand, if the time limit is applied
prospectively, the State would have two years from December 1, 2000 or until December
1, 2002 within which to revive the cases. This is in consonance with the intendment of the IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is
new rule in fixing the time-bar and thus prevent injustice to the State and avoid absurd, GRANTED. The Resolution of this Court, dated May 28, 2002, is SET ASIDE. The Decision
unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and wrongful results in the administration of justice. of the Court of Appeals, dated August 24, 2001, in CA-G.R. SP No. 65034 is REVERSED. The
Petition of the Respondent with the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 01-100933 is
DISMISSED for being moot and academic. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
81, is DIRECTED to forthwith proceed with Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112
The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, 1999 should be excluded in the computation with deliberate dispatch.
of the two-year period because the rule prescribing it was not yet in effect at the time and
the State could not be expected to comply with the time-bar. It cannot even be argued that
the State waived its right to revive the criminal cases against respondent or that it was
negligent for not reviving them within the two-year period under the new rule. As the United
States Supreme Court said, per Justice Felix Frankfurter, in Griffin v. People:[57]
We should not indulge in the fiction that the law now announced has always been the law
and, therefore, that those who did not avail themselves of it waived their rights.
The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State and the
accused. It should not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive application
of the time-bar therein provided merely to benefit the accused. For to do so would cause
an injustice of hardship to the State and adversely affect the administration of justice in
general and of criminal laws in particular.
To require the State to give a valid justification as a condition sine qua non to the
revival of a case provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused before the
effective date of the new rule is to assume that the State is obliged to comply with the
time-bar under the new rule before it took effect. This would be a rank denial of justice. The
State must be given a period of one year or two years as the case may be from December
1, 2000 to revive the criminal case without requiring the State to make a valid justification
for not reviving the case before the effective date of the new rule. Although in criminal
cases, the accused is entitled to justice and fairness, so is the State. As the United States
Supreme Court said, per Mr. Justice Benjamin Cardozo, in Snyder v. State of
Massachussetts,[58] the concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.SPO4 EMILIANO ANONAS, Respondent. reinvestigation. The trial court then directed him to terminate the reinvestigation within
thirty (30) days.
DECISION
On February 16, 2001, Prosecutor Formoso manifested before the trial court that the
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
reinvestigation had been terminated and that evidence exist to sustain the allegations in
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision1 of the Informations against respondent.
the Court of Appeals dated October 11, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 67531.
On August 9, 2001, the trial court issued an Order denying respondent’s motion to dismiss
On November 19, 1996, SPO4 Emiliano Anonas, respondent, assigned at the Western Police the Informations. His motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in an Order dated
District, was apprehended by his colleagues during a raid in Sta. Cruz, Manila. The September 7, 2001.
apprehending police officers claimed that he and four other persons were sniffing
Respondent then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-
methamphetamine hydrochloride, more popularly known as shabu, a regulated drug; and
G.R. SP No. 67531, contending that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
that he was in possession of an unlicensed .38 caliber revolver
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying his motion to dismiss both
On December 9, 1996, the City Prosecutor of Manila filed with the Regional Trial Court Informations.
(RTC), Branch 53, same city, two separate Informations against respondent, one for illegal
On October 11, 2002, the Court of Appeals granted the petition and set aside the Order of
possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride, docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-154398,
the trial court dated August 9, 2001 and dismissed the criminal charges against respondent.
and another for illegal possession of firearm, docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-154399,
reproduced as follows: The Court of Appeals ruled that having been made to wait for the resolution of his motion
for reinvestigation for almost five years while being detained, violated his right to due
Criminal Case No. Case 96-154398
process. The Court of Appeals then ordered that respondent be released from custody.
That on or about November 19, 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
The Government, represented by the Solicitor General, moved for reconsideration, but in
without being authorized by law to possess or use any regulated drug, did then and there
its Resolution dated January 10, 2003, the Court of Appeals denied the same.
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control
white crystalline substance separately contained in five (5) plastic bags marked "AJ" to The only issue before us is whether the appellate court erred in holding that respondent’s
"AJ4" weighting two hundred twenty and .2462 (222.2462) grams known as "Shabu" right to due process has been violated.
containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the corresponding
Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions,
license or prescription thereof.
the accused shall enjoy his right to a speedy trial. Section 16, Article III of the 1987
Criminal Case No. 96-154399, Constitution provides that "All persons shall have the right to speedy disposition of their
cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies." This is reinforced by
That on or about November 19, 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
Section 3(f), Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, which requires
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his/her possession and under
that "the investigating officer shall resolve the case within ten (10) days from the conclusion
his/her custody and control .38 caliber revolver without serial number with six (6) live
of the investigation." To ensure a speedy trial of all criminal cases before the
ammos and carrying the same outside his residence without first having secured from the
Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial
proper authorities the necessary license therefore.
Court, Republic Act No. 8493 (The Speedy Trial Act of 1998) was enacted on February 4,
No bail was recommended in Criminal Case No. 96-154398. 1998. To implement its provisions, the Court issued SC Circular No. 38-98 dated September
15, 1998 setting a time limit for arraignment and pre-trial for thirty (30) days from the date
On December 18, 1996, respondent filed with the trial court a motion for reinvestigation on
the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
grounds that he was apprehended without a warrant of arrest and that no preliminary
investigation was conducted. The earliest rulings of the Court on speedy trial were rendered in Conde v. Judge of First
Instance,[2] Conde v. Rivera, et al.,[3] and People v. Castañeda.4 These cases held that
On January 28, 1997, the trial court granted respondent’s motion.
accused persons are guaranteed a speedy trial by the Bill of Rights and that such right is
On April 14, 1998, Prosecutor Virgilio Patag, designated to conduct the reinvestigation, was denied when an accused person, through the vacillation and procrastination of prosecuting
appointed judge of the RTC in Iloilo. Apparently, he did not inform the prosecutor who took officers, is forced to wait many months for trial. Specifically in Castañeda, the Court called
his place about the pending reinvestigation. Meanwhile, respondent has remained in on courts to be the last to set an example of delay and oppression in the administration of
detention. justice and it is the moral and legal obligation of the courts to see to it that the criminal
proceedings against the accused come to an end and that they be immediately discharged
On January 4, 2001, respondent filed with the trial court a motion to dismiss the
from the custody of the law.
Informations, contending that the delay in the reinvestigation violated his right to due
process. In Angcangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman,5 the Court found the delay of six years by the
Ombudsman in resolving the criminal complaints to be violative of the constitutionally
On January 12, 2001, the trial court heard the motion to dismiss. It turned out that
guaranteed right to a speedy disposition of cases. Similarly, in Roque v. Office of the
Prosecutor Danilo Formoso, who took over the case, was not aware of the pending
Ombudsman,6 the Court ruled that the delay of almost six years disregarded the
Ombudsman’s duty to act promptly on complaints before him. In Cervantes v.
Sandiganbayan,7 it was held that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in not
quashing the Information filed six years after the initiatory complaint, thereby depriving
petitioner of his right to a speedy disposition of the case.
The inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation of an accused violates his
constitutional right to due process. Thus, in Roque v. Sandiganbayan,8 the Court, restating
the pronouncement in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan,9held:
We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan
in the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process.
Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary
investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the
law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process
constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of
due process clause, but under the constitutional guaranty of "speedy disposition" of cases
as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions),
the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner’s constitutional rights. A delay of close to
three (3) years cannot be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstances
obtaining in the case at bar. We are not impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to
sanitize the long delay by indulging in the speculative assumption that "delay may be due
to a painstaking and grueling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence
presented during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high-ranking
government official." In the first place, such a statement suggests a double standard of
treatment, which must be emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges
against the petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and
liabilities required by Republic Act 3019, which certainly did not involve complicated legal
and factual issues necessitating such "painstaking and grueling scrutiny" as would justify a
delay of almost three years in terminating the preliminary investigation. The other two
charges relating to alleged bribery and alleged giving [of] unwarranted benefits to a
relative, while presenting more substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not warrant
or justify the period of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the case.
(Emphasis supplied).
The preliminary investigation of the respondent for the offenses charged took more than
four years. He was apprehended for the offenses charged on November 19, 1996. Having
been arrested without a warrant of arrest and not having been afforded a formal
investigation, he prayed for reinvestigation of the cases. The trial court, in an Order dated
January 28, 1997 ordered a reinvestigation which was terminated only on February 16,
2001. In fact, even the Solicitor General admitted "it took some time for the City Prosecutor
to terminate and resolve the reinvestigation.
There can be no question that respondent was prejudiced by the delay, having to be
confined for more than four oppressive years for failure of the investigating prosecutors to
comply with the law on preliminary investigation. As aptly held by the Court of Appeals,
respondent’s right to due process had been violated.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67531. No costs.
ROBERTA S. SALDARIEGA, Petitioner, v. HON. ELVIRA D.C. PANGANIBAN, death of his father-in-law.6 He further averred that PO3 Rionaldo Sabulaan, one of the
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 227, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL arresting officers, is no longer assigned at the Cubao Police Station and had been
REGION, QUEZON CITY AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. transferred at the Batasan Police Station since November 2012, thus, could not have
received his subpoena which is directed at his former place of assignment.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.: In the disputed Order7 dated June 14, 2013, respondent Judge granted the motion and
ordered the re-opening of the cases against petitioner and set the cases for continuation of
hearing.
Before us is a special civil action for certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, dated
April 21, 2014 filed by Roberta S. Saldariega (petitioner), through counsel, assailing the Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She argued that the provisional dismissal of the
Order dated June 14, 2013 issued by respondent Presiding Judge Elvira D.C. Panganiban, criminal cases is considered an acquittal and PO2 Villas had no personality to file the motion
which granted the motion to reopen Criminal Case Nos. Q-1 1-173055 and Q-1 1-173056, to re-open the case.8
for allegedly having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. In an Order9 dated February 18, 2014, respondent denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On April 29, 2014, the Court resolved to require respondents to comment on the instant
On November 8, 2011, the Office of the City Prosecutor, Quezon City filed two (2) petition.10
Informations against petitioner Roberta S. Saldariega for violation of Sections 5 and 11,
Article 2, Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs In their Comment11 dated June 11, 2014, the Office of the Solicitor General, through then
Act of 2002, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-1 1-173055 and Q-1 1-173056, Solicitor General Francis H. Jardeleza,12 maintained that respondent judge committed no
respectively.2 Said cases were raffled to Branch 227, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Orders dated June 14, 2013 and February
presided by herein respondent Judge Elvira D.C. Panganiban. 18, 2014. It argued that petitioner did not expressly object to the motion to revive the
criminal cases.
Court hearings were set for the subject cases, however, the prosecution's principal witness
PO2 Nelson Villas (PO2 Villas), one of the arresting officers, failed to attend said scheduled Thus, the instant petition raising the following issues:
hearings, specifically on October 22, 2012 and October 25, 2012.3 Thus, during the May I
16, 2013 hearing, respondent judge issued an Order provisionally dismissing the cases with WHETHER OR NOT WITNESS PO2 NELSON VILLAS CAN FILE A MOTION TO REOPEN A
the express consent of the accused-petitioner,4the dispositive portion of which reads as PROVISIONALLY DISMISSED CASE WITHOUT THE PARTICIPATION OF A PUBLIC
follows: PROSECUTOR.
II
xxxx WHETHER OR NOT THE BRANCH CLERK OF COURT HAS THE RIGHT TO RECEIVE A
MOTION TO RE-OPEN THAT DOES NOT CONTAIN A NOTICE OF HEARING AND A
Today is supposedly set for the continuation of the direct testimony of PO2 Nelson Villas. SHOWING THAT THE OTHER PARTY WAS GIVEN A COPY THEREOF.
However, although notified, said witness failed to appear simply on the ground that there III
is a deceased relative, the body of whom, he will accompany to the province. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS THE AUTHORITY TO ACT FAVORABLY
UPON SAID MOTION.
The records show that on December 10, 2012, he testified partially on direct examination IV
and he was notified of the March 26, 2013 continuation of his testimony, but despite Notice WHETHER OR NOT THE PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL OF CRIMINAL CASES NOS. Q-1 1-
in open Court, he failed to appear. Likewise, the Court noticed that the other prosecution 173055-56 WITH THE CONSENT OF THE ACCUSED BUT PREDICATED ON FAILURE TO
witness, PO3 Rionaldo Sabulaan never appeared despite Notice received. It appears from PROSECUTE WHICH VIOLATES THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO SPEEDY TRIAL IS NOT
the records that only the Forensic Chemist testified on September 13, 2012, but the EQUIVALENT TO AN ACQUITTAL, SUCH THAT ITS REVIVAL WOULD CONSTITUTE DOUBLE
Forensic Chemist does not have any personal knowledge of the source of the evidence she JEOPARDY.
examined, and also on the facts and circumstances affecting the arrest of the accused. V
Thus, the defense counsel invoked the right of the accused to speedy trial. The Public WHETHER OR NOT THE ABSENCE OF PROSECUTION'S PRINCIPAL WITNESS PO2 NELSON
Prosecutor did not object to the dismissal, provided the dismissal is only provisional. Hence, VILLAS FOR FOUR (4) CONSECUTIVE HEARINGS HAD BEEN CONSIDERED WAIVER
let these cases be ordered PROVISIONALLY DISMISSED WITH THE EXPRESS CONSENT OF PURSUANT TO A.M. NO. 11-6-10-SC.
THE ACCUSED AND HER COUNSEL. SO ORDERED.
RULING
On June 5, 2013, PO2 Villas filed a Motion to Re-open the Case against petitioner. PO2 Villas
explained that his failure to appear during the hearings of the cases was due to the untimely
crime, hence, it is a victim-less crime. Unlike in private crimes where the participation of
We deny the petition. the private offended party is generally required for the recovery of civil liability, in the
The Court notes that the instant case suffers from procedural infirmities which this Court instant case, there is no particular private offended party who can actually file the motion
cannot ignore. While this petition is to be treated as one for certiorari under Rule 65, it is to revive. Hence, in some instances, as in this case, it is the arresting officer, PO2 Villas,
still dismissible for violation of the hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court has who filed the motion to revive the case out of his sense of duty as a police officer and
concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC and the CA to issue writs of certiorari, this should not compelled by his sense of obligation considering that he knew his absence was the cause
be taken as granting parties the absolute and unrestrained freedom of choice of the court why the complaint was provisionally dismissed.
to which an application will be directed. Direct resort to this Court is allowed only if there
are special, important and compelling reasons clearly and specifically spelled out in the We could not entirely blame PO2 Villas in filing the motion to revive since we are aware
petition, which are not present in this case.13 that in drug-related cases, the arresting officers are usually required to explain by their
superiors when a case is provisionally dismissed due to their failure to appear during trial.
Moreover, this being a petition on certiorari under Rule 65, the issues raised herein should Thus, in order to exonerate themselves from a possible administrative and criminal liability,
be confined solely to questions of jurisdiction. Thus, while in the course of the discussion, the arresting officers would then opt instead to file the motion to revive on their own.
it may be necessary to thresh out pertinent factual issues, the same is limited for the
purpose of resolving the issue on jurisdiction, that is, whether the trial court committed The provisional dismissal of the case does not operate as an acquittal since its dismissal
grave abuse of discretion resulting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. was made with the express consent of the accused, thus, there is no double jeopardy.
When a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused, Further, the proscription against double jeopardy presupposes that an accused has been
the case may be revived by the State within the periods provided under the 2nd paragraph previously charged with an offense, and the case against him is terminated either by his
of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. acquittal or conviction, or dismissed in any other manner without his consent. As a general
rule, the following requisites must be present for double jeopardy to attach: (1) a valid
A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused indictment, (2) before a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) the arraignment of the accused,
and with notice to the offended party. Here, a perusal of the Order, dated May 16, 2013, (4) a valid plea entered by him, and (5) the acquittal or conviction of the accused, or the
stresses in no uncertain terms that the dismissal of the case was provisional, i.e., the case dismissal or termination of the case against him without his express consent. However,
could be revived at some future time. If petitioner believed that the case against her should there are two (2) exceptions to the foregoing rule, and double jeopardy may attach even if
be dismissed with prejudice, she should not have agreed to a provisional dismissal. She the dismissal of the case was with the consent of the accused: first, when there is
should have moved for a dismissal with prejudice so that the court would have no insufficiency of evidence to support the charge against him; and second, where there has
alternative but to require the prosecution to present its evidence. There was nothing in the been an unreasonable delay in the proceedings, in violation of the accused's right to speedy
records showing the accused's opposition to the provisional dismissal nor was there any trial.16
after the Order of provisional dismissal was issued. She cannot claim now that the dismissal
was with prejudice. Thus, if a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express In the instant case, while the first four requisites are present, the last requisite is lacking,
consent of the accused, as in this case, the case may be revived by the State within the considering that here the dismissal was merely provisional and it was done with the express
periods provided under the 2nd paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal consent of the accused-petitioner. Petitioner is not in danger of being twice put in jeopardy
Procedure. There is no violation of due process as long as the revival of a provisionally with the reopening of the case against her as it is clear that the case was only provisionally
dismissed complaint was made within the time-bar provided under the law. dismissed by the trial court. The requirement that the dismissal of the case must be without
the consent of the accused is not present in this case. Neither does the case fall under any
Generally, the prosecutor should have been the one who filed the motion to revive because of the aforementioned exceptions because, in fact, the prosecution had failed to continue
it is the prosecutor who controls the trial. But in this particular case, the defect, if there the presentation of evidence due to the absence of the witnesses, thus, the fact of
was any, was cured when the public prosecutor later actively participated in the denial of insufficiency of evidence cannot be established. Likewise, we find no unreasonable delay in
the accused's motion for reconsideration when she filed her Comment/Objection thereto. the proceedings that would be tantamount to violation of the accused's right to speedy trial.
In the Order denying the motion, the trial court stated that "in her Comment/Objection, the
Public Prosecutor begged to disagree primarily on the ground that double jeopardy has not This Court has emphasized that "'speedy trial' is a relative term and necessarily a flexible
set in, because the provisional dismissal of the case was with the express consent of the concept." In determining whether the accused's right to speedy trial was violated, the delay
accused."14 The court even went further when it stated that "although the Motion to Re- should be considered in view of the entirety of the proceedings. The factors to balance are
open the case was filed by the witness without securing the conformity of the Public the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or
Prosecutor, in effect, the prosecutor has conformed to the re-opening of the case because failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay. In the instant case, petitioner
she (the prosecutor) finds that the failure of the witness to appear on two (2) hearings was failed to show any evidence that the alleged delay in the trial was attended with malice or
due to the death of the father in law on March 23, 2013 and the death of his aunt on May that the same was made without good cause or justifiable motive on the part of the
12, 2013, as substantiated by the respective Certificates of Death of the said relatives."15 prosecution. Mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not suffice as the
realities of everyday life must be regarded in judicial proceedings.17
Moreover, in the case at bar, it must be noted that the accused is charged with a public
Here, the delay in the proceedings, which ran from October 25, 2012 until the provisional
dismissal of the case on May 13, 2013, is not the kind of delay contemplated under the law
as to violate the accused's right to speedy trial. More so, when the cause of the delay is
valid, as in the instant case. Likewise, a perusal of the Order dated May 16, 2013 would
show that the order was categorical in stating that the dismissal of the complaint was
provisional with the express consent of the accused and her counsel. The court merely
stated in the Order as to what transpired during the proceedings of the case and not that
the dismissal was based on the accused's right to speedy trial.
While the Court recognizes the accused's right to speedy trial and adheres to a policy of
speedy administration of justice, we cannot, however, deprive the State of a reasonable
opportunity to fairly prosecute criminals. We reiterate that unjustified postponements which
prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the accused
to speedy trial.18
In a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, petitioner should establish that the court or
tribunal acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its
jurisdiction as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
In view of the foregoing, we, thus, find no basis for issuing the extraordinary writs
of certiorari with injunction, as there was no showing that the alleged error in judgment
was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Nowhere in the petition did petitioner show that
the issuance of the assailed orders was patent and gross that would warrant striking it down
through a petition for certiorari. No argument was shown that the trial court exercised its
judgment capriciously, whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically by reason of passion and
hostility.
It is well settled that a petition for certiorari against a court which has jurisdiction over a
case will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is manifested. The burden is on the part
of the petitioner to prove not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent issuing the
impugned order. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave. The term grave
abuse of discretion is defined as a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
because of passion or hostility.19Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction,
and not errors or mistakes in the findings and conclusions of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Orders dated June 14, 2013
and February 18, 2014 in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-1 1-173055 and Q-1 1-173056
entitled People of the Philippines v. Roberta Saldariega are AFFIRMED. Let the case be
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings with dispatch.
ARTEMIO T. TORRES, JR.,Petitioner, - versus – SPS. DRS. EDGARDO AGUINALDO &
NELIA T. TORRES-AGUINALDO, Respondents. I.
G.R. No. 164268June 28, 2005 WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER OF THE MTC-MANILA DATED 11 JUNE 2003
RENDERED MOOT AND ACADEMIC THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE
DECISION 65 FILED BY RESPONDENTS BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE PURPOSE
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: OF REINSTATING THE RESOLUTION OF THE OCP-MANILA DATED 30 APRIL 2001.
II.
This petition for review on certiorari[1] assails the decision[2] of the Court of Appeals dated WHETHER OR NOT THE ASSAILED DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
March 22, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 77818, and its resolution[3] dated June 28, 2004 denying REINSTATING THE RESOLUTION OF THE OCP-MANILA DATED 30 APRIL 2001
reconsideration thereof. VIOLATED THE DOCTRINE THAT THE DETERMINATION OF A CRIMINAL CASE IS
WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT ONCE THE
The facts are as follows: INFORMATION HAS BEEN FILED THEREIN.
Respondent-spouses Edgardo and Nelia Aguinaldo filed before the Office of the City III.
Prosecutor (OCP) of Manila,[4] a complaint against petitioner Artemio T. Torres, Jr. (Torres) WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE OF A RESPONDENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE
for falsification of public document. They alleged that titles to their properties covered by SHOULD BE CONSIDERED DURING THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IN
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-93596, T-87764, and T-87765, were transferred without DETERMINING IF PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS TO INDICT HIM FOR THE CRIME
their knowledge and consent in the name of Torres through a forged Deed of Sale[5] dated CHARGED.
July 21, 1979.
IV.
Torres denied the allegations of forgery and claimed that Aguinaldo sold the subject WHETHER OR NOT THE OCP-MANILA HAS ABSOLUTE DISCRETION IN
properties to him[6] as evidenced by the March 10, 1991 Deed of Absolute Sale.[7] DETERMINING IF PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS TO INDICT THE PETITIONER FOR
THE CRIME CHARGED.
Finding probable cause, the OCP recommended the filing of an information for falsification
of public document against Torres,[8] which was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of V.
Manila (MTC), Branch 8, on October 3, 2001. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS WENT BEYOND THE OFFICE OF A
WRIT OF CERTIORARI WHEN IT SUBSTITUTED ITS OWN JUDGMENT FOR THAT
Torres moved for reconsideration[9] but was denied.[10] OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE.
On appeal,[11] the Secretary of Justice reversed the findings of the investigating prosecutor VI.
and ordered the withdrawal of the information.[12] The motion for reconsideration filed by WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SANCTIONED THE DELIBERATE
Aguinaldo was denied.[13] DISREGARD OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE WHEN IT IGNORED THE FINAL
ORDER OF THE MTC-MANILA DATED 11 JUNE 2003 AND ORDERED THE
A Motion to Withdraw Information[14] was filed which the MTC granted on June 11, REINSTATEMENT OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE OCP-MANILA DATED 30 APRIL
2003.[15] It should be noted that petitioner has not been arraigned. 2001.
Meanwhile, Aguinaldo filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari[16] which was VII.
granted in the assailed decision dated March 22, 2004. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS ENGAGED IN FORUM SHOPPING
WARRANTING THE OUTRIGHT DISMISSAL OF THE PETITIONER (sic) FOR
The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads: CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 WHICH THEY FILED BEFORE THE COURT OF
APPEALS.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the
Secretary of Justice dated November 12, 2002 and April 30, 2003 in IS No. 01B-05485 are VIII.
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The April 30, 2001 Resolution of the City Prosecutor of Manila
finding probable cause against private respondent Artemio Torres, Jr. is REINSTATED. No WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SANCTIONED THE DISREGARD OF
costs. SO ORDERED.[17] SECTION 3, RULE 46 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WHEN IT
ENTERTAINED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 FILED BY
Torres motion for reconsideration was denied,[18] hence, the instant petition for review on RESPONDENTS.[20]
certiorari[19] on the following grounds:
Information was filed by the Assistant City Prosecutor and approved by the City Prosecutor
The foregoing assignment of errors may be summarized into three issues: without the conformity of the accused, herein petitioner Torres. Thus, it cannot be said that
the motion was filed with his express consent as required under Section 8, Rule 117.
I. Whether the order of the MTC-Manila dated June 11, 2003 granting the motion to
withdraw the information rendered moot the petition for certiorari filed by Aguinaldo for Respondent-spouses are not guilty of forum shopping. The cases they filed against
the purpose of reinstating the April 30, 2001 resolution of the OCP of Manila; and in the petitioner are based on distinct causes of action. Besides, a certificate of non-forum
alternative, whether the rule on provisional dismissal under Section 8, Rule 117 applies. shopping is required only in civil complaints under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure. In People v. Ferrer,[23] we held that such certificate is not even necessary
II. Whether Aguinaldo committed forum shopping. in criminal cases and distinct causes of action.
III. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the Secretary of Justice gravely Be that as it may, what is principally assailed is the Court of Appeals decision reversing the
abused his discretion in reinstating the April 30, 2001 order of the OCP of Manila finding resolution of the Justice Secretary and reinstating the April 30, 2001 resolution of the OCP
probable cause against petitioner. of Manila.
Anent the first issue, Torres contends that the order granting the withdrawal of the The issue, therefore, is whether the Secretary of Justice gravely abused his discretion in
information rendered moot the petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals. reversing the investigating prosecutors findings on the existence of probable cause.
Citing Baares II v. Balising,[21] Torres insists that an order dismissing a case without
prejudice is final if no motion for reconsideration or appeal therefrom is timely filed. Section 1, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure defines preliminary
investigation as an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to
The contention is untenable. A motion to withdraw information differs from a motion to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent
dismiss. While both put an end to an action filed in court, their legal effect varies. The is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The officers authorized to conduct a
order granting the withdrawal of the information attains finality after fifteen (15) days from preliminary investigation are the: (a) Provincial or city fiscals and their assistants; (b)
receipt thereof, without prejudice to the re-filing of the information upon Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts Judges; (c) National and Regional
reinvestigation. state prosecutors; and (d) Such other officers as may be authorized by law.[24]
On the other hand, the order granting a motion to dismiss becomes final fifteen (15) days Preliminary investigation is executive in character. It does not contemplate a judicial
after receipt thereof, with prejudice to the re-filing of the same case once such order function. It is essentially an inquisitorial proceeding, and often, the only means of
achieves finality. In Baares II v. Balising, a motion to dismiss was filed thus putting into ascertaining who may be reasonably charged with a crime. It is not a trial on the merits
place the time-bar rule on provisional dismissal. and has no purpose except to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether
there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. It does not place the
In the case at bar, a motion to withdraw information was filed and not a motion to dismiss. person against whom it is taken in jeopardy.
Hence, Baares II v. Balising would not apply. Unlike a motion to dismiss, a motion to
withdraw information is not time-barred and does not fall within the ambit of Section 8, Generally, preliminary investigation falls under the authority of the prosecutor. However,
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that the law on since there are not enough prosecutors, this function was also assigned to judges of
provisional dismissal becomes operative once the judge dismisses, with the express consent Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. Their findings are reviewed by the
of the accused and with notice to the offended party: (a) a case involving a penalty of provincial or city prosecutor whose findings, in turn, may be reviewed by the Secretary of
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, where such Justice in appropriate cases. After conducting preliminary investigation, the investigating
provisional dismissal shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order judge must transmit within ten (10) days the resolution of the case together with the entire
without the case having been revived; or (b) a case involving a penalty of imprisonment of records to the provincial or city prosecutor.[25]
more than six (6) years, where such provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2)
years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. In Crespo v. Mogul,[26] we underscored the cardinal principle that the public prosecutor
controls and directs the prosecution of criminal offenses whose resolutions may be reviewed
There is provisional dismissal[22] when a motion filed expressly for that purpose complies by the Secretary of Justice.[27] We held that where there is a clash of views between a judge
with the following requisites, viz.: (1) It must be with the express consent of the accused; who did not investigate and a fiscal who conducted a reinvestigation, those of the prosecutor
and (2) There must be notice to the offended party. Section 8, Rule 117 contemplates the should normally prevail.[28]
filing of a motion to dismiss, and not a motion to withdraw information. Thus, the law on
provisional dismissal does not apply in the present case. We ruled in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals[29] that when a motion to withdraw an information
is filed on the ground of lack of probable cause based on a resolution of the Secretary of
Even assuming that the Motion to Withdraw Information is the same as a Motion to Dismiss, Justice, the bounden duty of the trial court is to independently assess the merits of the
we do not find that it complied with the above requisites. The Motion to Withdraw motion. The judge is not bound by the resolution of the Justice Secretary but must evaluate
it before proceeding with the trial. While the ruling of the Justice Secretary is persuasive, it that the 1979 Deed of Sale was falsified, there is no showing that petitioner was the author
is not binding on courts. thereof. We cannot discern direct and personal participation by the petitioner in the alleged
forged deed. While a finding of probable cause rests on evidence showing that, more likely
In sum, prosecutors control and direct the prosecution of criminal offenses, including the than not, a crime has been committed and was committed by the accused, the existence of
conduct of preliminary investigation, subject to review by the Secretary of Justice. While such facts and circumstance must be strong enough to create a rational and logical nexus
his resolution is persuasive, it is not binding on the courts. The trial court must at all times between the acts and omissions and the accused.
make its own independent assessment of the merits of each case.
The allegation that petitioner effectuated the illicit transfer of the disputed properties in his
Thus, it is only where the decision of the Justice Secretary, or the trial court, as the case name is without factual basis. He was not in possession of the alleged forged deed which
may be, is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction does not even bore his signature. We find merit in his contention that the subject properties
that the Court of Appeals may take cognizance of the case in a petition for certiorari under were sold to him on March 10, 1991 considering that the new TCTs were issued in his name
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure whose decision may then be appealed to only on March 26, 1991. His address mentioned in the 1979 Deed of Sale was non-existent
this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari. yet in 1979, thus giving the impression that it was executed on a later date. It would be
absurd for petitioner to use the 1979 Deed of Sale to facilitate the transfer on March 26,
The Court of Appeals held that the Justice Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion 1991 considering his possession of the March 10, 1991 Deed of Sale.
because he based his findings on the lack of probable cause on the 1991 Deed of Sale when
what was assailed was the 1979 Deed of Sale.[30] It ruled that the defenses raised by Torres Respondents never denied the allegation that they assumed the obligation of transferring
should not have been considered during the preliminary investigation but should be the Tanza properties in petitioners name. Considering that they wanted to cancel the sale
threshed out only during trial.[31] Only the evidence presented by the complainant should and that they were in possession of the forged deed, it is not far-fetched to assume that
be considered in determining probable cause or the lack thereof. they facilitated the transfer of the properties using the allegedly 1979 forged deed. It
appears that the conveyance of the questioned properties in favor of petitioner was made
We are not persuaded. at the instance of the respondents.
The Court of Appeals erred in relying solely on the affidavit-complaint and the NBI Torres has no reason to falsify the 1979 Deed of Sale when he had in his possession the
report[32] and disregarding totally the counter-affidavit and documentary evidence of 1991 Deed of Sale which he claims to be authentic. By presenting the alleged forged deed
petitioner. of sale, respondents cast a cloud of doubt on petitioners title. While motive is not reasonable
basis in determining probable cause, the absence thereof further obviates the probability
It is well to note that Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure not of petitioners guilt.
only requires the submission of the complaint and the affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses, as well as other supporting documents, but also directs the respondent to submit Besides, Nelia Aguinaldo admitted in her letter dated November 12, 1998 the sale of the
his counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon properties although she wanted the sale cancelled. This admission is consistent with
for his defense. Section 4 thereof also mandates the investigating prosecutor to certify petitioners declaration that the sale took place.
under oath in the information that the accused was informed of the complaint and the
evidence against him, and that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting In their complaint, respondents claimed that they discovered the alleged illegal conveyance
evidence. in November 2000.[33] This was, however, belied by their Adverse Claim dated December
18, 1999 which appeared as Entry No. 5856-115 and annotated on the new titles issued in
Thus, in determining the existence or absence of probable cause, the investigating officer the name of Torres in February 2000.[34] In November 1998, Nelia was claiming her share
shall examine the complaint and documents in support thereof as well as the controverting in the property that was sold by Torres to Porfirio and Yolanda Dones in 1993.[35]
evidence presented by the defense. While the validity and merits of a partys defense or
accusation and the admissibility of the testimonies and evidence are best ventilated in a full In D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Esguerra,[36] grave abuse of discretion is defined:
blown trial, still, in a preliminary investigation, a proper consideration of the complaint and
supporting evidence as well as the controverting evidence, is warranted to determine the By grave abuse of discretion is meant, such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
persons who may be reasonably charged with the crime. The determination must be based as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where
on the totality of evidence presented by both parties. the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
Prescinding from these premises, we find that the Justice Secretary did not abuse his hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or
discretion in examining both the evidence presented by the complainant and the accused to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of
in determining the existence or the lack of probable cause. law.
There is basis in his finding that no probable cause exists. The complaint and the 1979 Deed The Secretary of Justice did not whimsically and capriciously exercise his discretion. His
of Sale do not connect petitioner with the crime of falsification. While the NBI report showed findings was grounded on sound statutory and factual basis. Chief Justice Andres Narvasa
in his separate opinion in Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals[37] declared that the determination
of probable cause to warrant the prosecution in court should be consigned and entrusted
to the Department of Justice, as reviewer of the findings of the public prosecutors. To do
otherwise is to usurp a duty that exclusively pertains to an executive official.
We also find that the trial court independently assessed the merits of the motion to withdraw
information. Before it was granted, respondents were allowed to submit their
opposition[39] and the petitioner to comment[40] thereon, which were both considered. The
trial judge also considered the basis of the Justice Secretarys resolution before finding that
no probable cause exists, thus:
The two DOJ Resolutions absolving the accused from incipient criminal liability were
premised on the ground that the herein accused had no participation in the preparation
of the alleged falsified Deed of Sale dated July 29, 1979, which deed, in effect, transferred
ownership of private complainants three parcels of land located in Tanza, Cavite to the
accused. This finding was based on the argument that it would be highly irregular for the
accused to effect the transfer of the property through a falsified deed when accused had
in his possession a valid and genuine Deed of Sale dated March 10, 1991 executed by the
spouses-complainants transferring ownership of the aforesaid property to him.
The issues which the court has to resolve in the instant case had been amply discussed
in the aforesaid resolutions of the DOJ and it is convinced that, indeed, no probable cause
exists against the accused.[41]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March
22, 2004 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Secretary of Justice dated
November 12, 2002 is REINSTATED. No costs.
JAIME U. GOSIACO Petitioner, - versus - LETICIA CHING and EDWIN CASTA, Both petitioner and Ching appealed the ruling to the RTC. Petitioner appealed to the RTC
Respondents. on the ground that the MTC failed to hold ASB and Roxas either jointly or severally liable
G.R. No. 173807 April 16, 2009 with Ching. On the other hand, Ching moved for a reconsideration which was subsequently
DECISION denied. Thereafter, she filed her notice of appeal on the ground that she should not be held
TINGA, J.: civilly liable for the bouncing checks because they were contractual obligations of ASB.
The right to recover due and demandable pecuniary obligations incurred by juridical persons On 12 July 2005, the RTC rendered its decision sustaining Ching's appeal. The RTC affirmed
such as corporations cannot be impaired by procedural rules. Our rules of procedure the MTCs ruling which denied the motion to implead ASB and Roxas for lack of jurisdiction
governing the litigation of criminal actions for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22) over their persons. The RTC also exonerated Ching from civil liability and ruled that the
have given the appearance of impairing such substantive rights, and we take the subject obligation fell squarely on ASB. Thus, Ching should not be held civilly liable.[10]
opportunity herein to assert the necessary clarifications.
Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals on the grounds that the RTC
Before us is a Rule 45 petition[1] which seeks the reversal of the Decision[2] of the Court of erred in absolving Ching from civil liability; in upholding the refusal of the MTC to implead
Appeals in CA-GR No. 29488. The Court of Appeals' decision affirmed the decision[3] of the ASB and Roxas; and in refusing to pierce the corporate veil of ASB and hold Roxas liable.
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 68 in Criminal Case No. 120482. The RTC's decision
reversed the decision[4] of the Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan, Branch 58 in Criminal On 19 July 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC and stated that the
Case No. 70445 which involved a charge of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against respondents amount petitioner sought to recover was a loan made to ASB and not to Ching. Roxas
Leticia Ching (Ching) and Edwin Casta (Casta). testimony further bolstered the fact that the checks issued by Ching were for and in behalf
of ASB. The Court of Appeals ruled that ASB cannot be impleaded in a B.P. Blg. 22 case
On 16 February 2000, petitioner Jaime Gosiaco (petitioner) invested P8,000,000.00 with since it is not a natural person and in the case of Roxas, he was not the subject of a
ASB Holdings, Inc. (ASB) by way of loan. The money was loaned to ASB for a period of 48 preliminary investigation. Lastly, the Court of Appeals ruled that there was no need to pierce
days with interest at 10.5% which is equivalent to P112,000.00. In exchange, ASB through the corporate veil of ASB since none of the requisites were present.[11]
its Business Development Operation Group manager Ching, issued DBS checks no.
0009980577 and 0009980578 for P8,000,000.00 and P112,000.00 respectively. The Hence this petition.
checks, both signed by Ching, were drawn against DBS Bank Makati Head Office branch.
ASB, through a letter dated 31 March 2000, acknowledged that it owed petitioner the Petitioner raised the following issues: (1) is a corporate officer who signed a bouncing check
abovementioned amounts.[5] civilly liable under B.P. Blg. 22; (2) can a corporation be impleaded in a B.P. Blg. 22 case;
and (3) is there a basis to pierce the corporate veil of ASB?
Upon maturity of the ASB checks, petitioner went to the DBS Bank San Juan Branch to
deposit the two (2) checks. However, upon presentment, the checks were dishonored and B.P. Blg. 22 is popularly known as the Bouncing Checks Law. Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22
payments were refused because of a stop payment order and for insufficiency of funds. provides:
Petitioner informed respondents, through letters dated 6 and 10 April 2000,[6] about the
dishonor of the checks and demanded replacement checks or the return of the money xxx xxx xxx
placement but to no avail. Thus, petitioner filed a criminal complaint for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan against the private respondents. Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity,
the person or persons, who actually signed the check in behalf
Ching was arraigned and tried while Casta remained at large. Ching denied liability and of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.
claimed that she was a mere employee of ASB. She asserted that she did not have
knowledge as to how much money ASB had in the banks. Such responsibility, she claimed B.P. Blg. 22 was enacted to address the rampant issuance of bouncing checks as
belonged to another department. payment for pre-existing obligations. The circulation of bouncing checks adversely
affected confidence in trade and commerce. The State criminalized such practice
On 15 December 2000, petitioner moved[7] that ASB and its president, Luke Roxas, be because it was deemed injurious to public interests[12] and was found to be
impleaded as party defendants. Petitioner, then, paid the corresponding docket fees. pernicious and inimical to public welfare.[13] B.P. Blg. 22 punishes the act of
However, the MTC denied the motion as the case had already been submitted for final making and issuing bouncing checks. It is the act itself of issuing the checks which
decision.[8] is considered malum prohibitum. The law is an offense against public order and
not an offense against property.[14] It penalizes the issuance of a check without
On 8 February 2001, the MTC acquitted Ching of criminal liability but it did not absolve her regard to its purpose. It covers all types of checks.[15] Even checks that were
from civil liability. The MTC ruled that Ching, as a corporate officer of ASB, was civilly liable issued as a form of deposit or guarantee were held to be within the ambit of B.P.
since she was a signatory to the checks.[9] Blg. 22.[16]
When a corporate officer issues a worthless check in the corporate name he may be held awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall
personally liable for violating a penal statute.[17] The statute imposes criminal penalties on constitute a first lien on the judgment.
anyone who with intent to defraud another of money or property, draws or issues a check
on any bank with knowledge that he has no sufficient funds in such bank to meet the check Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not
on presentment.[18] Moreover, the personal liability of the corporate officer is predicated on yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon
the principle that he cannot shield himself from liability from his own acts on the ground application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is
that it was a corporate act and not his personal act.[19] As we held in Llamado v. Court of granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section
Appeals:[20] 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.[23]
Petitioner's argument that he should not be held personally liable for the amount of the We are unable to agree with petitioner that he is entitled to implead ASB in the B.P. Blg.
check because it was a check of the Pan Asia Finance Corporation and he signed the same 22 case, or any other corporation for that matter, even if the Rules require the joint trial of
in his capacity as Treasurer of the corporation, is also untenable. The third paragraph of both the criminal and civil liability. A basic maxim in statutory construction is that the
Section 1 of BP Blg. 22 states: Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or interpretation of penal laws is strictly construed against the State and liberally construed
entity, the person or persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall against the accused. Nowhere in B.P. Blg. 22 is it provided that a juridical person may be
be liable under this Act. impleaded as an accused or defendant in the prosecution for violations of that law, even in
the litigation of the civil aspect thereof.
The general rule is that a corporate officer who issues a bouncing corporate check can only
be held civilly liable when he is convicted. In the recent case of Bautista v. Auto Plus Traders Nonetheless, the substantive right of a creditor to recover due and demandable obligations
Inc.,[21] the Court ruled decisively that the civil liability of a corporate officer in a B.P. Blg. against a debtor-corporation cannot be denied or diminished by a rule of procedure.
22 case is extinguished with the criminal liability. We are not inclined through this case to Technically, nothing in Section 1(b) of Rule 11 prohibits the reservation of a separate civil
revisit so recent a precedent, and the rule of stare decisis precludes us to discharge Ching action against the juridical person on whose behalf the check was
of any civil liability arising from the B.P. Blg. 22 case against her, on account of her acquittal issued. What the rules prohibit is the reservation of a separate civil action against the
in the criminal charge. natural person charged with violating B.P. Blg. 22, including such corporate officer who had
signed the bounced check.
We recognize though the bind entwining the petitioner. The records clearly show that it is
ASB is civilly obligated to petitioner. In the various stages of this case, petitioner has been In theory the B.P. Blg. 22 criminal liability of the person who issued the bouncing check in
proceeding from the premise that he is unable to pursue a separate civil action against ASB behalf of a corporation stands independent of the civil liability of the corporation itself, such
itself for the recovery of the amounts due from the subject checks. From this premise, civil liability arising from the Civil Code. B.P. Blg. 22 itself fused this criminal liability of the
petitioner sought to implead ASB as a defendant to the B.P. Blg. 22 case, even if such case signer of the check in behalf of the corporation with the corresponding civil liability of the
is criminal in nature.[22] corporation itself by allowing the complainant to recover such civil liability not from the
corporation, but from the person who signed the check in its behalf. Prior to the
What supplied the notion to the petitioner that he was unable to pursue a separate civil amendments to our rules on criminal procedure, it though clearly was permissible to pursue
action against ASB? He cites the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly the the criminal liability against the signatory, while going after the corporation itself for the
provisions involving B.P. Blg. 22 cases, which state that: civil liability.
Rule 111, Section 1Institution of criminal and civil action. However, with the insistence under the amended rules that the civil and criminal liability
attaching to the bounced check be pursued jointly, the previous option to directly pursue
xxx the civil liability against the person who incurred the civil obligationthe corporation itselfis
no longer that clear. In theory, the implied institution of the civil case into the criminal case
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be for B.P. Blg. 22 should not affect the civil liability of the corporation for the same check,
deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file since such implied institution concerns the civil liability of the signatory, and not of the
such civil action separately shall be allowed. corporation.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended
party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check
involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed.
Where the complainant or information also seeks to recover liquidated, Let us pursue this point further. B.P. Blg. 22 imposes a distinct civil liability on the signatory
moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party of the check which is distinct from the civil liability of the corporation for the amount
shall pay the filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the represented from the check. The civil liability attaching to the signatory arises from
amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently the wrongful act of signing the check despite the insufficiency of funds in the
account, while the civil liability attaching to the corporation is itself the very
obligation covered by the check or the consideration for its execution. Yet these be exempted from paying the filing fees based on the amount of the checks should he
civil liabilities are mistaken to be indistinct. The confusion is traceable to the pursue the civil action against ASB. In a similar vein and for a similar reason, we likewise
singularity of the amount of each. find that petitioner should not be barred by prescription should he file the civil action as the
period should not run from the date the checks were issued but from the date this decision
If we conclude, as we should, that under the current Rules of Criminal Procedure, the civil attains finality. The courts should not be bound strictly by the statute of limitations or the
action that is impliedly instituted in the B.P. Blg. 22 action is only the civil liability of the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest wrong or injustice would result.[25]
signatory, and not that of the corporation itself, the distinctness of the cause of action
against the signatory and that against the corporation is rendered beyond dispute. It follows WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without prejudice to the right of petitioner Jaime U.
that the actions involving these liabilities should be adjudged according to their respective Gosiaco to pursue an independent civil action against ASB Holdings Inc. for the amount of
standards and merits. In the B.P. Blg. 22 case, what the trial court should determine the subject checks, in accordance with the terms of this decision. No pronouncements as
whether or not the signatory had signed the check with knowledge of the insufficiency of to costs.
funds or credit in the bank account, while in the civil case the trial court should ascertain
whether or not the obligation itself Let a copy of this Decision be REFERRED to the Committee on Revision of the Rules
is valid and demandable. The litigation of both questions could, in theory, proceed for the formulation of the formal rules of procedure to govern the civil action for
independently and simultaneously without being ultimately conclusive on one or the other. the recovery of the amount covered by the check against the juridical person
which issued it.
It might be argued that under the current rules, if the signatory were made liable for the SO ORDERED.
amount of the check by reason of the B.P. Blg. 22 case, such signatory would have the
option of recovering the same amount from the corporation. Yet that prospect does not
ultimately satisfy the ends of justice. If the signatory does not have sufficient assets to
answer for the amount of the checka distinct possibility considering the occasional large-
scale transactions engaged in by corporations the corporation would not be subsidiarily
liable to the complainant, even if it in truth the controversy, of which the criminal case is
just a part, is traceable to the original obligation of the corporation. While the Revised Penal
Code imposes subsidiary civil liability to corporations for criminal acts engaged in by their
employees in the discharge of their duties, said subsidiary liability applies only
to felonies,[24] and not to crimes penalized by special laws such as B.P. Blg. 22. And
nothing in B.P. Blg. 22 imposes such subsidiary liability to the corporation in whose name
the check is actually issued. Clearly then, should the check signatory be unable to pay the
obligation incurred by the corporation, the complainant would be bereft of remedy unless
the right of action to collect on the liability of the corporation is recognized and given flesh.
There are two prevailing concerns should civil recovery against the corporation be pursued
even as the B.P. Blg. 22 case against the signatory remains extant. First, the possibility
that the plaintiff might be awarded the amount of the check in both the B.P. Blg. 22 case
and in the civil action against the corporation. For obvious reasons, that should not be
permitted. Considering that petitioner herein has no chance to recover the amount of the
check through the B.P. Blg. 22 case, we need not contend with that possibility through this
case. Nonetheless, as a matter of prudence, it is best we refer the matter to the Committee
on Rules for the formulation of proper guidelines to prevent that possibility.
The other concern is over the payment of filing fees in both the B.P. Blg. 22 case and the
civil action against the corporation. Generally, we see no evil or cause for distress if the
plaintiff were made to pay filing fees based on the amount of the check in both the B.P.
Blg. 22 case and the civil action. After all, the plaintiff therein made the deliberate option
to file two separate cases, even if the recovery of the amounts of the check against the
corporation could evidently be pursued through the civil action alone.