CHURCH STUDIES

Annual Journal of the Centre of Church Studies

Year I Number 1

The Centre of Church Studies

Ni{, 2004.

2
Godi{wak Centra za crkvene studije

Godina I Broj 1

Centar za crkvene studije

Ni{, 2004.

3
 CRKVENE STUDIJE / CHURCH STUDIES

ISSN 1820-2446

Izdava~
Centar za crkvene studije, Ni{

Redakcija

Dr Angeliki Delikari (Solun), dr Vera Georgieva (Skopqe), dr Ivan

Hristov (Veliko Trnovo), dr Rostislav Stankov (Sofija), dr Jon Petrulesku
(Temi{var), dr Branislav Todi} (Beograd), dr Boris Brajovi} (Nik{i}),
dr Predrag Mateji} (Kolumbus), dr Nenad @ivanovi} (Ni{),
dr Grozdanko Grbe{a (Ni{), dr Sla|ana Risti} Gorgiev (Ni{),
mr Vladimir Cvetkovi} (Ni{), sekretar

Urednik
Dr Dragi{a Bojovi} (Ni{)

Adresa

Centar za crkvene studije

18000 Ni{, Branka Radi~evi}a br. 1
(MK „Gavrilo Princip”)
telefoni: 063 847 84 99 i 063 445 131
e-mail: bodra@ptt.yu
vcvetkovic@bankerinter.net
`iro ra~un: 160-19684-97

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Ilustracija na korici
Zastavica u de~anskom ^etvorojevan|equ
(posledwa ~etvrtina XIV veka, br. 6)

Univerzalna decimalna klasifikacija

Sne`ana Bojovi} i Vesna Risti}

[tampa
PUNTA -Ni{

Tira`
500 primeraka

Radovi se recenziraju.

4
 SADR@AJ

Uz prvi broja ~asopisa Crkvene studije .................................................................... 9

I
@an-Klod Lar{e
[ta je bogoslovqe?
Qu’est-ce que la théologie? ................................................................................................. 13

Valentina Gulevska
^ove~kata priroda i nejzinata sposobnost za bogopoznanie
spored u~eweto na kapadokiskite otci
^ovekova priroda i wena sposobnost za bogospoznawe prema u~ewu
kapadokijskih otaca ...................................................................................................... 25

Karmen Cvetkovi}
The Gnostic as Christian Teacher
Gnostik kao hri{}anski u~iteq .............................................................................. 37

Branko Gorgiev
Odnosot me÷u blagodatta i slobodnata volja
spored na u~eweto bl. Avgustin i sv. Kasijan
Odnos izme|u blagodati i slobodne voqe
po u~ewu bl. Avgustina i sv. Jovana Kasijana ......................................................... 47

Boris B. Brajovi}
Osmi dan
Teolo{ke osnove vremena i prostora
The Eight Century
Theological Foundation of Time and Space ....................................................................... 65

Vladimir Cvetković
The concepts of time and eternity from Plato to Saint Maximus the Confessor
Poimawa vremena i ve~nosti od
Platona do Svetog Maksima Ispovednika ............................................................ 73

Sla|ana Risti} Gorgiev

Odre|ewa filosofije Sv. Jovana Damaskina
The Definitions of Philosophy by st. John of Damascus ..................................................... 83

5
 II
Aleksandar Naumov
Kult svetog Benedikta Nursijskog kod pravoslavnih Slovena
Po~itanie Sv. Benedikta Nursiyskogo pravoslavn∫h SlavÔn ........................ 95

Радослава Станкова
Kirilo-metodievoto nasledstvo v rannata srÍbska kni`ovna tradiciÔ
Kirilo-metodijevsko nasle|e u ranoj srpskoj kwi`evnoj tradiciji ............. 105

Dragi{a Bojovi}
Projekcija mitarstava u “@itiju Svetoga Petra Kori{kog”
ProekciÔ m∫‚ars‚va v “@i‚ii SvÔ‚o”o Petra Kori{sko”o” ................... 121

Мария В. Корогодина
Исповедные тексты в Сербии и на Руси
(по рукописным материалам, хранящимся на территории России)
Ispovedni tekstovi u Srbiji i u Rusiji
(po rukopisnom materijalu koji se ~uva na teritoriji Rusije) ..................... 131

Епископ бивши Захумско-херцеговачки

Атанасије (Јевтић)
Ispovedawe Vere Nikona Jerusalimqanina
La confession de la foi de Nikon de Jérusalem ................................................................. 137

Petar Milosavqevi}
Molitve na jezeru Вladike Nikolaja Velimirovi}a
Molitvi na ozere Vladiki NikolaÔ Velimirovi~a .......................................... 145

III
Ivica @ivkovi}
Propovedni{tvo mitropolita Mihaila
The preachiness of Metropolitan Mihailo (Jovanovic) ..................................................... 161

Слободан Костић
Pou~ewe prepodobnog oca Justina ]elijskog o prosveti
Pou~enie prepodobnogo otca Áustina ^eliŸsko”o o prosveçenii .............. 187

6
Ivica Lazovi}
Proces upravqawa u Srpskoj pravoslavnoj crkvi
The menagement in the Serbian orthodox church ............................................................. 289

VI
Ε. Ν. Κυριακούδης
Ο αρχιεπίσκοπος Αχρίδας Νικόλαος και η κτητορική του δραστηριότητα στα μέσα του 14ου
αιώνα
Arhiepiskop ohridski Nikola i
wegova ktitorska aktivnost sredinom XIV veka ............................................... 309

Irina Antanasievi~
Simvoli~eskoe svoeobrazie ikon∫ “Uspenie PresvÔtoŸ Bogorodic∫”
Simboli~ka specifika ikone “Uspewe Presvete Bogorodice” ...................... 339

VII
Vladeta Jeroti}
Hri{}anstvo i medicina
Christianity and medicine ................................................................................................. 351

Dragan Stamenkovi}
Izle~ewe i isceqewe
Treatment and salvation .................................................................................................... 359

Slobodanka Ili} Tasi}

Epilepsija kod svetiteqa
Epilepsy of the Saints ........................................................................................................ 363

Budimir Pavlovi}
Manastirske bolnice u sredwovekovnoj Srbiji
The hospitals of the monasteries in the medieval Serbia .................................................. 381

VIII
Sun~ica Deni} Mihailovi}
Pomenik - Otac Pajsije (Tanasijevi}) ................................................................... 391

8
Crkvene studije, Ni{ / Church Studies, Nis 1-2004, 73-82.
UDK 111.6:27-1"652/653"

Vladimir Cvetković
University of Niš
The Centre of Church Studies, Ni{ - Serbia and Montenegro

THE CONCEPTS OF TIME AND ETERNITY FROM

PLATO TO SAINT MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR

Abstract: The ultimate concern of this article is to show the transformation of

time-eternity relation through history from the Greek philosophical tradition Plato,
Aristotle and Plotinus, to Origen and patristic Christian thought, represented by St.
Gregory of Nyssa and St. Maximus the Confessor. Christian writers tried to solve the
problem of time according to the Scripture. Christian concept of time is released from the
necessity of eternal circling and established as linear concept of time, with its beginning,
middle and end. If time was the image of eternity for Plato, measure or the creative life of a
universal for Aristotle, divine principle of soul for Plotinus, for Christian authors time
became the medium for the history of salvation.
Gregory of Nyssa defines time as an extension (diastema), which is characteristic
of creation and marks off the creature from the Creator. In a contrary there is no extension
or temporal sequence in divine being which is self-sufficient and eternal.
Maximus the Confessor has changed the perspective of looking on the origin of
time, placing it not on the beginning but at the end. Everything in the history of salvation
according to Maximus is made for the recapitulation in Christ, which is at the end of time.
Thus, time becomes the only passage to eternity, or moreover the general movement of all
created creatures towards God. Christian concept of time established a new ontology,
completely different from the Greek one.
Key words: time, eternity, distance, everlasting movement, ever-moving rest

The aim of my research, presented briefly here, is to show the transformation of

time-eternity relation through history from the Greek philosophical tradition, Plato,
Aristotle and Plotinus, to Origen and patristic Christian thought, represented by St Gregory
of Nyssa and St Maximus the Confessor. The fulfillment of this task is intended to
contribute to the research about ancient and patristic philosophy in two ways.
First, it will distinguish between Greek and Christian ontology and it will argue
that the theory according to which the development of Christianity implies the continuity of
the Platonic way of thinking in Christian circles does not stand. Second, it will argue that
Platonic tradition is ontologically enclosed in a cosmological pattern of time and eternity of
intelligible world and that Christian thought is based on eternity of God, which goes beyond
the opposition of mobile time and immobile eternity.
According to Genesis “In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth”.
Time, having its beginning according to the Scripture has its end as well. The end of time is
in Parousia (Parous¤a) or the Second coming of Christ. Time is limited in both
directions, in the backward direction by creation and in the forward direction by the

73
eschatological event. Time can be described by a linear line from the point A (beginning) to
the point B (Parousia). Eternity here does not stand in contrast to time but it must rather be
taken as endless time. Such eternity is divided in two parts by time. The first part of
eternity, metaphorically speaking is unlimited on the one side but limited on the other side
by creation. The second part or the coming age is limited on the side by eschatological
drama but unlimited on the other side. The straight line can be applied to both, to time and
to eternity. Thus, eternity surrounds time on all sides.

Before Creation Between Creation After Parousia

and Parousia

Firstly it arises the problem of two beginnings, one eternal and one temporal. “In
the beginning was the Word,” says St. John Divine, but he evokes the absolute or eternal
beginning, the beginning of the Word. Such beginning is the logical beginning of the divine
communion or of the Father - Son relationship in the divine nature. God the Father gives
birth to his Son, divine Logos or the Word. God is eternal, his essence or nature is eternal
and it does not deal with time. If the beginning of the Word is the eternal beginning, we
have as an opposite idea the temporal beginning. The temporal beginning or the beginning
of time is in the creation. Secondly, the eternal beginning cannot be described in this way
by defying the point from which eternity starts. Or generally speaking the notion of eternity
does not allow any limitation.
The Christian conception of time and eternity has been developed by means of
Platonic or Hellenic philosophy in general and it was not reduced on bare text of the Bible,
like some modern philosophers do. If we reduce eternity to linear line, like time, even if this
line is indefinite then we reduce eternity to a time without beginning and end, and the
indefinite reduces to definite. But what become then of transcendence?
The idea of time it was a very important one for the Greek philosophers. The
perpetual change and process defined by the idea of time was the passage to grasp
something that is not subjected to change and corruption. The reality beyond change,
becoming and decay was the world of eternal realities. Thus the relationship time – eternity
was established very early.
According to Heraclitus: “Nothing ever is, everything is becoming; all things are
in motion, like streams; so that, to use his image, you cannot step twice into same river, for
fresh waters are always flowing in upon you”1. Zeno reduced time to absurd, since it was at
once movement and rest, time and timeless eternity.
Plato in his work Timaeus distinguishes what exists always and never comes into
being, and what is always in process of coming to be. He establishes the idea of cosmos as
a harmonious relationship between beings, and even God cannot avoid the influence of the
ontological necessity of this Unity. Cosmos signifies beauty and harmony, but it is a world
of “coming to be” and it cannot be eternal and stable. This cosmos must have some arche
(érxÆ). Plato states that ‘it is necessary that cosmos should be a Copy of something’2. The
Maker or Demiurge of the cosmos must have something according to which he will create.

1 Heraclitus, Fragments, in Charles H. Kahn, The Art and thought of Heraclitus. An edition of the
fragments with translation and commentary (Cambridge, 1979), B12 and B49a, or in Diels-Kranz,
Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker 154, 161
2 Plato, Timaeus, 28b.

74
Cosmos is modeled upon what is higher and better. The higher and better has to be only
something what is eternal and always exists and that is the world of ideas. The world of
ideas known by logos serves as a pattern for the creation of the world3.
But the Demiurge cannot produce out of nothing and He has as a material hyle
(Ïlh), or disorderly world of visible and tangible realities which he brings from chaos to
order. The Demiurge of the cosmos produces the rational system of heavenly bodies,
which reflect the world of ideas. “We must declare that this Cosmos has truly come into
existence as a Living Creature endowed with soul and reason owing to the providence of
God”4. The living creatures reflect the rationality of the higher reality and their movements
are regulated by creating time. For Plato’s Demiurge the pattern of time is eternity. He has
to express the eternity of model in the temporality of copy. Time becomes the moving
image of eternity5. The circular motion of the heavenly bodies is the condition for the
existence of time and the closest imitation of eternity. The temporal process is circular like
the perfect movement of heavenly bodies.
Aristotle rejects Plato’s idea that the universe has its beginning and that in the
same time the universe last for ever by God’s providence. If we ascribed the beginning to
the universe, according to Aristotle, then the universe is capable of non-existing and there is
a time at which cosmos can not-be. If there is a time when cosmos have not existed it is
capable for non-existing in “infinite time”. On the other hand if we admit that the world
exists endlessly, there is no time at which it is true that it might earlier have not existed and
it must exists for ever. If world exists now, then is not capable for everlasting non-existence
and it cannot be “capable of earlier non-existence” and must be agenetos6. Thus, Aristotle
logically demonstrates that it is impossible the existence of the universe that has a
beginning and no end. His God as the ‘first mover’ eternally regulates rotation of the
heavenly bodies what is the cyclical time.
Plotinus, the great successor of Plato, the problem of the relationship between time
and eternity stars with defining the concept of eternity. Following Aristotle7, Plotinus
identifies eternity with ever-being finding the etymological similarity between the words
“eternity” and “ever being”(ai¹wÜn ga\r a)po\ tou= a)eiì oÃntoj)))8. Thus, eternity has to be
connected with the One. Plotinus defines eternity as “of the order supremely great” and
“identical with God” and “existence without jolt or change, and therefore as also the firmly
living”9.
He repudiates Plato’s and Aristotle’s conception of the eternity of matter ‘over
against’ God. Plotinus' theory of emanation does not suppose the pre-existence of matter,
but considers it to be a product of higher levels of reality. Thus, matter is derived from the
One, through the intermediary stages of Intellect and Soul. Plotinus tries to solve this
dilemma.
“If, therefore, Matter has always existed, that existence is enough to ensure its
participation in the being which, according to each receptivity, communicates the supreme
receptivity, communicates the supreme Good universally: if on the contrary, Matter has

3 Plato, Timaeus, 28c-29a

4 Plato, Timaeus, 30b.
5 Plato, Timaeus, 37d.
6 Aristotle, De Cealo, 281b2-282a25.
7 Aristotle, De Cealo, 279a27.
8 Plotinus, Enneads, III, 7, 4, 43.
9 Plotinus, Enneads, III, 7, 5, 19-24.

75
come into being as a necessary sequence of the causes preceding it, that origin would
similarly prevent it standing apart from the scheme as though it were out of reach of the
principle to whose grace it owes its existence.”10
This section from Enneads is a matter of dispute among many scholars. Does
Plotinus really solve the problem of matter by denying its pre-existence? The eternal
existence of matter can be interpreted in such a way that matter is distinct from the realities
which are derived from the One, namely Intellect and Soul. The alternative to this is that
matter is the last sequence in the process of emanations from the One in which the
productive force of the One dies. Thus, matter can be independent of the process of
emanation or it can be its last stage. This kind of interpretation is given by Brehier11.
Professor Rist rejects Brehier’s view, suggesting that Plotinus does not claim that matter is
independent of the One. According to Rist12, Plotinus sets the problem in the context of the
distinction between eternal matter and matter created in time. Thus, the first alternative
according to which matter has always existed, does not suppose the existence of matter as a
separate reality, but the existence of matter as ultimately connected to the process of
emanation. In the second case, where matter has come into being as a necessary sequence
of causes (pro\ au)th=j ai¹ti¿oij), the term pro\ au)th=j refers to the temporal creation of
matter. Plotinus emphasizes that even in this case matter is not separate
(ou)d' wÑj eÃdei xwriìj) from the One. Thus, in both cases matter is not independent of the
One.
What according to Plotinus causes the creation of matter in time? Plotinus
develops his argument in the context of a “one-and-many” distinction. The multiplicity of
Forms, which exist at the level of Intellect is reflected on a lower level, or level of Soul.
The particular Forms are represented in the world of matter as particular souls. Soul by its
nature overflows and creates material universe. The creation of the world is similar to the
creation of Intellect from the One, and Soul from Intellect. The correlative of the Intellect in
the material universe is World Soul, which relates to Intellect in the same way as Intellect
relates to the One. This is not the case with individual souls. The difference between World
Soul and particular souls is in their relationship to body or different bodies. World Soul
organizes and governs the world, but always remains pure. The individual souls are capable
of a ‘fall’ in their lower aspects, namely in the bodies.
The souls imprisoned in the bodies represent particular parts of reality. The cause
of the ‘fall’ is a desire to be itself. Thus, the centre of soul is no longer in the true centre of
all, the One, but in soul’s own nature. However, soul cannot be capable of a ‘fall’ apart
from matter. Matter is the weakness of the soul. When the soul’s governing activity over
matter starts to fill it with pleasure, soul deliberately moves not to World Soul, but to the
material world. Professor Armstrong defines this movement of the soul as ‘a desire not to
have all things at once so that it can pass from one to another’13. In her movement the soul
spreads out from the unified life of intellect and creates time. Plotinus defines time as ‘the
life of the soul in movement as it passes from one stage of act or experience to another’14
Soul remains timeless, because it is eternal, without beginning or end in time. But the

10 Plotinus, Enneads, IV, 8, 6, 18-23.

11 E. Brehier, The Philosophy of Plotinus, (translated by J. Thomas, Chicago, 1985.), p. 180.
12 J.M. Rist, Plotinus; The Road to Reality, Cambridge, 1980, pp. 118-9.
13 A.H. Armstrong, Plotinus in The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval
Philosophy, edited by A.H. Armstrong, Cambridge, 1967, p. 251.
14 Plotinus, Enneads, III, 7, 11, 23-7.

76
movement of soul downward creates the image of soul, which is within time.
Origen, the Christian colleague of Plotinus was caught between the vision of
biblical beliefs according to which “world is created out of nothing” and the idea of eternal
generation of matter. Thus, he failed to distinguish between the ontological and
cosmological dimensions15. For him it is not possible to think of God without conceiving
Him as Creator. Origen teaches that there was the unity of the limited number of rational
beings with God, which pre-existed from all eternity. The rational beings or
tå logikã were participated in God’s essence. The characteristic of rational beings was
freedom and mutability. In that monad all rational beings, including the Holy Trinity were
equal16 in accordance to their free choice. The difference between God and other rational
being was mutability of later. According to Origen there is nothing potential in God and He
never advanced toward something he had not been before. It means an eternal actualization
of the world. God is Almighty (Pantokra/twr)) and He always exercises his power over
the rational beings. God is unable to exercise his power if τα πάντα do not exist from
eternity. Origen borrows this concept from Middle Platonism, according to which God must
always have had a world on which He exercises his power.
Thus, God is the Creator in the eternal cosmos, which is eternal companion of his
being. If God and number of rational beings are from eternity how did time come into
being? The second creation or creation in time happened when the rational beings moved
untoward God. The punishment of God was in dependence of the degree in which the
rational beings have moved from God. Thus, some beings who sinned less became the
Archangels and Angels and those who sinned heavily became the demons. The man sinned
more than Angels and Archangels, but less than demons. For a punishment his soul was
bounded with physical body and he was settled in the material and temporal world17. It is
impossible to make distinction between the creation and the generation in Origen’s thought.
Both are eternal and necessary.
According to Origen, Logos or Son of God came into being by the will of the
Father, and at the same time he is identified with the will of the Father. In the first case,
when ‘the birth from the Father is as it were an act of his will proceeding from the mind’18,
must be conceived as a free act of the Father. This free act of Father should not be
interpreted in the categories of human freedom, because then the existence of Son is
completely dependent of the Father’s will. The fact that God is Father from all eternity
implies that the freedom and the necessity in God are not opposite notions.
God as Father begets his Son from eternity. The relationship between the Father
and the Son has an essential importance because it is the ground for the relationship
between God and the creation. One of the main principles of the Origen’s cosmology is that
at the end is like at the beginning. The similarity between beginning and the end is in the
unity of all in God. Thus, all creation at the end will be freely submitted to God. The whole
conception of apocatastasis or the universal restoration puts in question the free will of
created beings to submit themselves to God. Therefore Origen gives to Logos the main role

15 Georges Florovsky, St. Athanasius’ Concept of Creations, in Aspects of Church History, Collected
works, volume four, Northland Publishing Company, Belmont, Massachusetts, 1975, p. 42.
16 Jean Danielou, Origen, (translated by Walter Mitchell, Shed and Ward, London, New York,
1955.), p. 206.
17 Origen, On the First Principles, II, 9, 2 (being Koetschau’s Text of the De principiis translated
into English by G.W. Butterworth, London, 1936.)
18 Origen, On the First Principles, I, 2, 6.

77
in the apokatastasis as well as in the creation. The Son of God as Logos needs to persuade
the created beings without violation of their free will. The submission of the crated being to
the God and attaining the union with God is return in the same state as it was in pre-
existence.
The generation of Son is not only eternal but also continuous. This leads us to the
notion of eternity conceived not only as a time without beginning or end, but also as a
recapitulation of everything in a timeless present.
The main distinction used in the work of Gregory of Nyssa is the distinction
between uncreated and created nature. God or the Holy Trinity belongs to the uncreated
order and the intelligible and sensible beings belong to the created order. The ontological
gulf divides God from the creatures. To describe the nature of this ontological gulf St.
Gregory of Nyssa employs the term already used by Stoics and Plato19, as well as his
fellow the bishop of Olympus, Methodius, diastema (diãsthma)20. God created everything
in time and space as a receptacle for becoming and created all things in them. Time
embraces all creation21.
The creation comes into existence according to a sequence (ékouliy¤a) of order
(tãjiw) and St. Gregory refers to time as an extension or distance (diãsthma) accompanying
the universe of becoming. The notion of diastema marks off the creature from the Creator.
St. Gregory emphasized that world above creation, being removed from all conception of
distance (diastema), eludes all sequence of time.
In his lengthy treatise Against Eunomius Gregory of Nyssa develops at some
length the concept of diastema or temporal interval in conjunction with that sphere of
divine life which transcends it and to which he attributes the adjective adiastatos.
There is no extension or temporal sequence in the Holly Trinity. It is clear even
with a moderate insight into the nature of things, that there is nothing by which we can
measure the divine and blessed Life. The supreme and blessed life has no time-extension
(diastema) accompanying its course, and therefore no span nor measure. The divine nature
as self-sufficient, eternal, and all embracing is not in place or in time, but before and above
these.
At the contrary created thing are confined within the fitting measures as within a
boundary. But, diastema cannot be understood as a spatial gap between the Creator and the
Creation, for that would mean that the diastema is the limit of the Creator as well. It is a
unilateral gap - from the side of the creation.22 St. Gregory of Nyssa uses the notion of
diastema in two different ways, the negative one that is applied to God and the positive one,
applied to creation. When is applied to God, it has the negative connotations as the lack of
any interval or extension in God’s being. When is applied to Creation, diastema is not just
the interval between the beginning and the end but between inception and perfection.
Diastema or time in the created world has the special significance for the life of
men, because he alone possesses anticipation and memory as the manifestations of the
soul’s divided life. The soul reveals not just the nature, which resembles material creation,
but also the nature, which is spiritual, immaterial, invisible, incorporeal and unchangeable.

19 Plato, Timaeus, 37de, 39 a-d

20 Gregory of Nyssa, De Ressurectione, II.25, 380.19-382.15
21 Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomius, I, 370
22 T. Paul Verghese, Diastema and Diastasis in Gregory of Nyssa: Introduction to a Concept and the
Posing of a Problem in Gregor von Nyssa und Die Philosophie, Leiden, 1976, p.253.

78
The perfection of the soul will consist in imitating the higher kind of life23.
Time in St. Gregory does not have the same function like in Plotinus. In Plotinus
the time is in relation with the motion and it has the creative power. St. Gregory conceives
time as something what does not create motions, but it is the means by which man makes
his way in life in order to attain a higher one. Time, thus became for St. Gregory the main
characteristic of the creature. And also, as the universal diastema, time is the way to
highlight the central position of men in the divine economy. St. Gregory conceives time as
a universal diastema that becomes self-conscious in man. The concept of diastema is
Gregory's most original and daring contribution to Christian thought. All creation is in
movement, and all creation is diastema, as a journey from one point to another, ordered and
sequential, a taxis kai akolouthia. All creation is in time, and has a beginning and an end, an
arche and a telos and an hodos from arche to telos24.
We can conclude that St. Gregory transferred time from the universal principle of
soul to the soul of man and the life of God, which is eternal, tends to be balanced by the
temporal kind of life. Thus, St. Gregory offers the psychological approach to time, before
St. Augustine of Hippo, who is commonly accepted as an originator of such an approach25.
The same spirit which animated St. Gregory of Nyssa also permeates the works of
St. Maximus the Confessor. Over the long period of anti-Arian and anti-Eunomian
polemics St. Gregory of Nyssa and his fellows Cappadocians have developed and widely
used an apophatic vocabulary in reference to God26. For St. Gregory of Nyssa the utter
transcendence assures his transcendent freedom. He says: ‘To be God is to be free’27.
According to St. Gregory ‘God always wants to be what he is, and he is absolutely what he
wants to be’28. A similar standpoint about God, who is free of every definition, and whose
nature is best defined by freedom, we find in St. Maximus the Confessor:
‘aÈtejoÊsiow d¢ fÊsei ≤ ye¤a fÊsiw’29. St. Maximus, like Plato, Aristotle and Stoics divides
organic life into plant, animal and rational. The property of plants to grow, of animals to
follow their instincts and the properties of intelligent beings are to be independent and self-
moving (aÈtejoÊsiow)30. Thus, man’s independence is subjected to time (xronik«w)31,
while God’s independence is complete, subject to no conditioning factor. Time is, for St.
Maximus, one of the elements which constitute a basic gulf between created and the
uncreated nature. He employs as St. Gregory the term diastema. But he does not use the
term diastema just in the meaning in which St Gregory uses it, as the distance in time and

23 Gregory of Nyssa, De anima et ressurectione, 93b-c

24 T. Paul Verghese, Diastema and Diastasis in Gregory of Nyssa in Gregor von Nyssa und Die
Philsophie, Leiden, 1976, p.251.
25 J.F. Callahan, Gregory of Nyssa and the psychological view of time, in Atti del XII
Congresso Internazionale di Filosofia 12-18 Sept. 1958 (Venezia 1958) vol. XI. pp.59-66
(Storia della filosofia antica e medievale, Firenze, Sansoni, 1960.
26 Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunom. II, 61; 105;130;142;192; De Vita Moysis II,
158;162,163,180,188. See also G.C. Berthold, The Cappadocian Roots of Maximus, in Maximus
Confessor: Actes du Symposium sur Maxime le Confesseur, Fribourg, 2-5 septembre 1980
27 Gregory of Nyssa, De Mortius, in Jaeger IX, 54.
28 Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunom. II, 1, 25 (Jaeger II, 45-46).
29 Maximus the Confessoris, Dispute with Pyrrhus, PG 91, 304c.
30 Maximus the Confessor, Dispute with Pyrrhus, PG 91, 301b.
31 Maximus the Confessor, Dispute with Pyrrhus, PG 91, 325a.

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space, which is characteristic of creation as a whole and by which God alone remains
unaffected. For him it is also the abyss which separates God from creation. The distinction
between God and creation cuts across distinction eternal and temporal. St. Maximus
maintains that is beyond all beings and completely unrelated to anything. He is beyond the
nature and the categories of it like time, eternity and space32.
God, who exists beyond all infinity is “maker and fashioner of all eternity in time
and everything what exists in eternity and time”33. Thus, St Maximus claims that God is the
creator of the eternal beings like angels.
All the beings have a diastema because they have a beginning and they are moved.
In the first case they are “under nature” and in the second case “under time”34.
Diastema has the temporal sense and it is intimately connected with the motion. In
exposing his idea of motion as essentially directed to an end, St. Maximus follows
Aristotle35. St. Maximus applies Aristotle’s theory of motion according to which
everything is moving for the sake of something. Thus, God is the sake of all moving
beings36. Like the end, which is the impassionate (tÚ épay°w) and the self-perfect
(tÚ aÈtolet°w) and God becomes an end as unmoved, full and impassionate37. God is the
limit (p°raw) and the end (t°low) of all creaturely motion. He “who terminates the very
terminative infinity of every motion, as an end and cause”38, is the limit as a termination
and the end as a goal to be striven for.
The doctrine of motion is the backbone of the refutation of Origenism39. As we
have seen above, Origen’s cosmology is based on the theory that rational beings originally
had been in a state of perfection, of rest, from which they fell. The rational beings from
their beginning (g°nesiw) contemplated the divine essence and they enjoyed in the state of
rest (stãsiw). Cooling from the love of God initiated movement (k¤nhsiw).
St. Maximus replaced Origen’s triad: becoming-rest-movement by another one:
becoming-movement-rest. For St. Maximus becoming immediately issues the movement,
the state in which all creation is now. God is immovable and the created beings are movable
and moving to a cause. The desire-movement does not come to stop so long as they reach
their goal. To find rest is the final state. God is “the end of the movement of everything
that moves towards it, and the firm and unmoved rest of everything that is carried towards
it, being the undermined and infinite limit and definition of every definition and law and
ordinance, of reason and mind and nature”40.
For St. Maximus is unacceptable the idea of everlasting movement toward
something what is not God, like Origen maintains it. If created beings are moving away

32 Maximus the Confessor, Ambig.10 , PG 91, 1153b.

33 Maximus the Confessor, Ambig.10 , PG 91, 1188b.
34 Maximus the Confessor, Ambig. 67 , PG 91, 1397a.
35 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 999b8ff : “But granted becoming and motion, there must still be a limit;
for no motion is infinite, but each has is ending” and Physics, 224 b1: “For every motion is from
something to something”.
36 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 994b9f; Maximus, Ambig. 7, 1072c4f.
37 Maximus, Ambig. 7, 1073b4.
38 Maximus, Ambig. 15, 1217c14.
39 See P. Sherwood, The Earlier Ambigua of Saint Maximus the Confessor, Orbis Catholicus, Herder,
Rome, 1955, pp. 92-103.
40 Maximus, Ambig. 41, 1308c1-3.

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from God then they are condemned on continuous movement, which leads to further
movement and not to an ultimate rest at all. But, apart of the idea of everlasting movement
(éeikinhs¤a) St. Maximus employs the oxymoron ever-moving rest (éeik¤nhtow stãsiw).
Thus, Gregorian concept of diastema as characteristic of the creature becomes a
framework for Maximian concept of motion. diãsthma or the more preferred term of St.
Maximus diãstasiw is a positive presupposition for God-ward movement. In St.
Maximus diãstasiw disappears in stãsiw, though the basic natural diãsthma in relation
to God, about which St. Gregory was thinking, remains41. But, diastema is a distance,
which has to be passed in soul’s way towards God. In that way, soul eternally advances in
the divine contemplation (tª prokipª t«n ye¤vn yevrhmãtvn)42 and this describes
the term ever-moving rest.
St. Maximus states that Moses is the first one who started to count time from the
creation of the world and without entering bodily into rest he knew about the divine life in
the age to come. Thus, “the logoi of time abide in God” and “time is eternity when
movement is stilled, and eternity is time, when is measured by movement”43.
We can finally conclude that St. Maximus’ approach to time is completely
different than the concepts of time in his Hellenistic and early Christian predecessors and is
more then the psychological one found in the writings of St. Gregory of Nyssa. By his
concept of time as a movement towards God, St. Maximus realized a complete break-up
with the Hellenistic inheritance. With the refutation of Origenism he entails the
fundamental rebuttal of Neoplatonism, which saw the whole reality as subject to circular
sequence of rest-procession-return. Then, according to St. Maximus, beings are created by
God with a view to finally resting in him. What distinguishes St. Maximus from St.
Gregory is the “cosmic” dimension of his teachings. St. Maximus extends his concept of
time, nor referring just to activity of man’s soul, but to a general movement of all created
creatures towards God. All created things (including time) have their own logoi, which are
“firmly fixed, preexist in God, in accordance with which all things are and have become
and abide, ever drawing near through natural motion to their proposed logoi”44. All logoi
of created being are present in Logos and they present the divine wills and the ultimate rest
of their movements.
Therefore, instead to speak of the psychological concept of time presented by St.
Gregory, we rather speak about the eschatological concept of time in St. Maximus the
Confessor.
I hope that I could briefly describe the significance of this topic and the depth of
the philosophical problematic of time is able to give an answer to the question which
preoccupies all our existence. Thus, our existence becomes something more than the
interval between birth and death and our being something more than that of being-toward-
death.

41 L. Thunberg, Macrocosm and mediator, Open Court, Chicago, 1995 (2nd edition), pp. 57-60.
42 Maximus, Th. Oec. 2.77.
43 Maximus, Ambig. 10, 1164bc.
44 Maximus, Ambig. 42, 1329a1-3

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Vladimir Cvetkovi}

POIMAWE VREMENA I VE^NOSTI OD

PLATONA DO SVETOG MAKSIMA ISPOVEDNIKA

Основна сврха овог чланка је да покаже трансформацију односа време –

вечност кроз историју од античке филозофске традиције Платона, Аристотела и
Плотина, до Оригена и светоотачких мислилаца, пре свега Светог Григорија Ниског
и Светог Максима Исповедника. Хришћански писци су хтели да реше проблем
времена у сагласности са Светим Писмом. Хришћанско поимање времена је
ослобођено нужности вечног кружења и успостављен је концепт линеарног времена,
са својим почетком, средином и крајем. Ако је време за Платона било покретна слика
вечности, мера или стваралачки живот космоса за Аристотела, или божански
принцип душе код Плотина, за хришћанске мислиоце време је постало место на коме
се одигравала историја спасења.
Свети Григорије Ниски описује време као раздаљину, која постоји између
Творца и творевине и карактерише све створено. Свети Максим Исповедник је
преокренуо перспективу гледања на почетак времена, смештајући извор времена не у
почетак већ у његов крај. Све је у историји спасења према Светом Максиму створено
да се возглави у Христу, а то ће бити на крају времена. Тако, време представља пут
ка вечности или још боље општи покрет свега створеног ка Богу. На хришћанском
поимању времена је заснована нова онтологија, различита од постојеће античке.

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