Leticia.
With respect to their properties in the Philippines,
DAVID A. NOVERAS v. LETICIA T. NOVERAS, GR No.
188289, 2014-08-20
Facts:
Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia
filed a petition for divorce with the Superior Court of California,
County of San Mateo, USA. The California court granted the
divorce on 24 June 2005 and judgment was duly entered on 29
June 2005.[6] The California court granted to Leticia the
custody of her two children, as well as all the couple's
properties in the USA.[7]
On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial
Separation of Conjugal Property before the RTC of Baler,
Aurora. She relied on the 3 December 2003 Joint Affidavit and
David's failure to comply with his obligation under the same.
She prayed for: 1) the power to administer... all conjugal
properties in the Philippines; 2) David and his partner to cease
and desist from selling the subject conjugal properties; 3) the
declaration that all conjugal properties be forfeited in favor of
her children; 4) David to remit half of the purchase price as
share of
Leticia from the sale of the Sampaloc property; and 5) the
payment of P50,000.00 and P100,000.00 litigation expenses.[8]
In his Answer, David stated that a judgment for the dissolution
of their marriage was entered on 29 June 2005 by the Superior
Court of California, County of San Mateo. He demanded that
the conjugal partnership properties, which also include the
USA properties, be liquidated and... that all expenses of
liquidation, including attorney's fees of both parties be charged
against the conjugal partnership.
David and Leticia are US citizens who own properties in the
USA and in the Philippines. Leticia obtained a decree of divorce
from the Superior Court of California in June 2005 wherein the
court awarded all the properties in the USA to
Leticia filed a petition for judicial separation of conjugal
properties.
Leticia and David had indeed separated for more than a year
and that reconciliation is highly improbable. First, while actual
abandonment had not been proven, it is undisputed that the
spouses had been living separately... since 2003 when David
decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his own
business. Second, Leticia heard from her friends that David has
been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who represented
herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who worked in
the hospital... where David was once confined, testified that she
saw the name of Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the
Consent for Operation form.[20] Third and more significantly,
they had filed for divorce and it was granted by the California
court in June 2005.
Having established that Leticia and David had actually
separated for at least one year, the petition for judicial
separation of absolute community of property should be
granted.
Issues:
Whether or not respondent Davi d A. Noveras committed acts of
abandonment and marital infidelity which can result into the
forfeiture of the parties' properties in favor of the petitioner and
their two (2) children.
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the properties
in California, U.S.A. and the same can be included in the
judicial separation prayed for.
Whether or not the "Joint Affidavit" x x x executed by petitioner
Leticia T. Noveras and respondent David A. Noveras will
amount to a waiver or forfeiture of the latter's property rights
over their conjugal properties.
Whether or not Leticia T. Noveras is entitled to reimbursement
of one-half of the P2.2 [M]illion sales proceeds of their property
in Sampaloc, Manila and one -half of the P1.5 [M]illion used to
redeem the property of Atty. Isaias Noveras, including interests
and... charges.
How the absolute community properties should be distributed.
Whether or not the attorney's fees and litigation expenses of the
parties were chargeable against their conjugal properties.
Leticia and David had indeed separated for more than a year
and that reconciliation is highly improbable. First, while actual
abandonment had not been proven, it is undisputed that the
spouses had been living separately... since 2003 when David
decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his own
business. Second, Leticia heard from her friends that David has
been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who represented
herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who worked in
the hospital... where David was once confined, testified that she
saw the name of Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the
Consent for Operation form.[20] Third and more significantly,
they had filed for divorce and it was granted by the California
court in June 2005.
Having established that Leticia and David had actually
separated for at least one year, the petition for judicial
separation of absolute community of property should be
granted.
Ruling:
We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did
not acquire jurisdiction over the California properties of David
and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states
that real property as well as personal property is subject to the
law of the country... where it is situated. Thus, liquidation shall
only be limited to the Philippine properties.
We affirm the modification made by the Court of Appeals with
respect to the share of the spouses in the absolute community
properties in the Philippines, as well as the payment of their
children's presumptive legitimes, which the appellate court
explained in this wise:
Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the
proceeds of the Sampaloc property. While both claimed to have
contributed to the redemption of the Noveras property, absent
a clear showing where their contributions came from, the same
is presumed to have... come from the community property.
Thus, Leticia is not entitled to reimbursement of half of the
redemption money.
David's allegation that he used part of the proceeds from the
sale of the Sampaloc property for the benefit of the absolute
community cannot be given full credence. Only the amount of
P120,000.00 incurred in going to and from the U.S.A. may be
charged thereto. Election expenses... in the amount of
P300,000.00 when he ran as municipal councilor cannot be
allowed in the absence of receipts or at least the Statement of
Contributions and Expenditures required under Section 14 of
Republic Act No. 7166 duly received by the Commission on
Elections. Likewise,... expenses incurred to settle the criminal
case of his personal driver is not deductible as the same had
not benefited the family. In sum, Leticia and David shall share
equally in the proceeds of the sale net of the amount of
P120,000.00 or in the respective amounts of
P1,040,000.00.
xxxx
Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he
legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one -
half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother."
The children are therefore entitled to half of the share of each
spouse in the net... assets of the absolute community, which
shall be annotated on the titles/documents covering the same,
as well as to their respective shares in the net proceeds from
the sale of the Sampaloc property including the receivables
from Sps. Paringit in the amount of P410,000.00.
Consequently, David and Leticia should each pay them the
amount of P520,000.00 as their presumptive legitimes
therefrom.[21]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 88686 is AFFIRMED.
At the risk of being repetitious, we will not remand the case to
the trial court. Instead, we shall adopt the modifications made
by the Court of Appeals on the trial court's Decision with
respect to liquidation.
We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did
not acquire jurisdiction over the California properties of David
and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states
that real property as well as personal property is subject to the
law of the country... where it is situated. Thus, liquidation shall
only be limited to the Philippine properties.
We affirm the modification made by the Court of Appeals with
respect to the share of the spouses in the absolute community
properties in the Philippines, as well as the payment of their
children's presumptive legitimes, which the appellate court
explained in this wise:
Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the
proceeds of the Sampaloc property. While both claimed to have
contributed to the redemption of the Noveras property, absent
a clear showing where their contributions came from, the same
is presumed to have... come from the community property.
Thus, Leticia is not entitled to reimbursement of half of the
redemption money.
David's allegation that he used part of the proceeds from the
sale of the Sampaloc property for the benefit of the absolute
community cannot be given full credence. Only the amount of
P120,000.00 incurred in going to and from the U.S.A. may be
charged thereto. Election expenses... in the amount of
P300,000.00 when he ran as municipal councilor cannot be
allowed in the absence of receipts or at least the Statement of
Contributions and Expenditures required under Section 14 of
Republic Act No. 7166 duly received by the Commission on
Elections. Likewise,... expenses incurred to settle the criminal
case of his personal driver is not deductible as the same had
not benefited the family. In sum, Leticia and David shall share
equally in the proceeds of the sale net of the amount of
P120,000.00 or in the re spective amounts of
P1,040,000.00.
xxxx
Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he
legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one -
half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother."
The children are therefore entitled to half of the share of each
spouse in the net... assets of the absolute community, which
shall be annotated on the titles/documents covering the same,
as well as to their respective shares in the net proceeds from
the sale of the Sampaloc property including the receivables
from Sps. Paringit in the amount of P410,000.00.
Consequently, David and Leticia should each pay them the
amount of P520,000.00 as their presumptive legitimes
therefrom.[21]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 88686 is AFFIRMED.
DEL SOCORRO VS. W ILSEM
G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014
FACTS:
Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted
marriage in Holland. They were blessed with a son named
Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage bond
ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate
Court of Holland. Thereafter, Norma and her son came home to
the Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst made a promise to
provide monthly support to their son. However, since the arrival
of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, Ernst never gave
support to Roderigo. Responde nt remarried again a Filipina
and resides again the Philippines particulary in Cebu where the
petitioner also resides. Norma filed a complaint against Ernst
for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to
support his minor child with peti tioner. The trial court
dismissed the complaint since the facts charged in the
information do not constitute an offense with respect to the
accused, he being an alie n
ISSUES:
1. Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his
minor child unde r the Philippine law?
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally
liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to support
his minor child.
RULING:
1. YES. While it is true that Respondent Ernst is a citizen of
Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC that he is
subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to
whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the
consequences of his failure to do so. This does not, however,
mean that Ernst i s not obliged to support Norma’s son
altogether. In international law, the party who wants to have a
foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of
proving the foreign law. In the present case, Ernst hastily
concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is
governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and
capacity to support. While Ernst pleaded the laws of the
Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to
support his son, he never proved the same. It is incumbent
upon Ernst to plead and prove that the national law of the
Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation
to support their child. Foreign laws do not prove themselves in
our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged
and proved. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when
its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens
or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important
function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is
obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict
of Laws. Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the
Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his
child nor penalize the non-compliance therewith, such
obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it
would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial
support when the latter is entitled thereto.
2. YES. The court has jurisdiction over the offense (R.A 9262)
because the foreigner is living here in the Philippines and
committed the offense here.
REPUBLIC v. M ARELYN TANEDO M ANALO, G.R. NO.
221029
24 April 2018
Facts:
On January 20, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo
(Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of entry of marriage in
the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a
judgment of divorce rendered by a Japanese court. The petition
was later amended and captioned as a petition for recognition
and enforcement of a foreign judgment.
The petition alleged, among others, that:
 Petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a
Japanese national named YOSHIDO MINORO;
  Recently, a case for divorce was filed by petitioner in
Japan and after due proceeding, a divorce decree was
rendered by the Japanese Court;
The trial court (RTC) denied the petition for lack of merit. In
ruling that the divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should not
be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the New
Civil Code, the Philippine law “does not afford Filipinos the right
to file a divorce, whether they are in the country or living
abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if
they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another
country” and that unless Filipinos “are naturalized as citizens
of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over
issues related to Filipino family rights and duties, together with
determination of their condition and legal capacity to enter into
contracts and civil relations, including marriages”.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) overturned the RTC
decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the
Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo
who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because
the decree they obtained makes the latter no longer married to
the former, capacitating him to remarry. Conformably
with Navarro, et al. v. Exec. Secretary, et al. [663 Phil. 546
(2011)] ruling that the meaning of the law should be based on
the intent of the lawmakers and in view of the legislative intent
behind Article 26, it would be the height of injustice to consider
Manalo as still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn,
is no longer married to her. For the appellate court, the fact
that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is
inconsequential.
Issue: Whether a Filipino citizen, who initiated a divorce
proceeding abroad and obtained a favorable judgment against
his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry, has the
capacity to remarry pursuant to Article 26 (2) of the Family
Code.
Ruling:
Yes.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of “a divorce x x x validl y
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry”. Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision,
it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad.
The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse
should be the one who initi ated the proceeding wherein the
divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the
Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign
divorce proceeding.
The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective
in the country where it is rendered, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse...
The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective
in the country where it is rendered, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to
address the anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the
marriage while the foreign spouse is free to remarry under the
laws of his or her country. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated
the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree
dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien
spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse
will effectively be without a husband or a wife. A Filipino who
initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and
in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of
an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision
should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended
as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce
decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are
severed by operation of the latter’s national law.
There is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino
who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding and a Filipino who
obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien
spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are
considered Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations
in an alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are
alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still
married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer their
wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them
are based merely on superficial difference of whether they
initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair.
Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly
discriminate against the other.
Thus, a Filipino citizen, who initiated a divorce proceeding
abroad and obtained a favorable judgment against his or her
alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry, has the
capacity to remarry pursuant to Article 26 (2) of the Family
Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26
of the Family Code.
HELD:
The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative
intent and applying the rule of reason, Article 26 Par.2 should
be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the
time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens,
but later on, one of them becomes naturalize d as a foreign
citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse
should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were
a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.
Hence, the court’s unanimous decision in holding Arti cle 26 Par
2 be interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been
divorced by a spouse who had acquired a citizenship and
remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.

Republic vs Orbecido
Republic vs. Orbecido
GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005

FACTS:

Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva

on May 24, 1981 at the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son and a daughter
named Kristoffer and Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the wife
left for US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later,
Orbecido discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an
American citizen and learned from his son that his wife
sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and married a
certain Stanley. He thereafter filed with the trial court a
petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article
26 of the Family Code.