SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 133000. October 2, 2001]

PATRICIA NATCHER, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND

THE HEIRS OF GRACIANO DEL ROSARIO LETICIA DEL
ROSARIO, EMILIA DEL ROSARIO-MANANGAN, ROSALINDA
FUENTES LLANA, RODOLFO FUENTES, ALBERTO FUENTES,
EVELYN DEL ROSARIO, and EDUARDO DEL
ROSARIO, respondents.

DECISION
BUENA, J.:

May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for
reconveyance and annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement
of the estate of a deceased person particularly in questions as to advancement of property made
by the decedent to any of the heirs?
Sought to be reversed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the
decision[1] of public respondent Court of Appeals, the decretal portion of which declares:

Wherefore in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment appealed from is

reversed and set aside and another one entered annulling the Deed of Sale executed by
Graciano Del Rosario in favor of defendant-appellee Patricia Natcher, and ordering
the Register of Deeds to Cancel TCT No. 186059 and reinstate TCT No. 107443
without prejudice to the filing of a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of Graciano Del Rosario in a proper court. No costs.

So ordered.

Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of
land with an area of 9,322 square meters located in Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 11889. Upon the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six children,
namely: Bayani, Ricardo, Rafael, Leticia, Emiliana and Nieves, entered into an extrajudicial
settlement of Gracianas estate on 09 February 1954 adjudicating and dividing among themselves
the real property subject of TCT No. 11889. Under the agreement, Graciano received 8/14 share
while each of the six children received 1/14 share of the said property. Accordingly, TCT No.
11889 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 35980 was issued in the name of Graciano
and the six children.
 Further, on 09 February 1954, said heirs executed and forged an Agreement of
Consolidation-Subdivision of Real Property with Waiver of Rights where they subdivided
among themselves the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 35980 into several lots. Graciano then
donated to his children, share and share alike, a portion of his interest in the land amounting to
4,849.38 square meters leaving only 447.60 square meters registered under Gracianos name, as
covered by TCT No. 35988. Subsequently, the land subject of TCT No. 35988 was further
subdivided into two separate lots where the first lot with a land area of 80.90 square meters was
registered under TCT No. 107442 and the second lot with a land area of 396.70 square meters
was registered under TCT No. 107443. Eventually, Graciano sold the first lot[2]to a third person
but retained ownership over the second lot.[3]
On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their
marriage, Graciano sold the land covered by TCT No. 107443 to his wife Patricia as a result of
which TCT No. 186059[4] was issued in the latters name. On 07 October 1985, Graciano died
leaving his second wife Patricia and his six children by his first marriage, as heirs.
In a complaint[5] filed in Civil Case No. 71075 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 55, herein private respondents alleged that upon Gracianos death, petitioner Natcher,
through the employment of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443, by
making it appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale dated 25 June 1987[6] in favor of herein
petitioner resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. 107443 and the issuance of TCT No. 186059
in the name of Patricia Natcher. Similarly, herein private respondents alleged in said complaint
that as a consequence of such fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired.
In her answer[7] dated 19 August 1994, herein petitioner Natcher averred that she was legally
married to Graciano on 20 March 1980 and thus, under the law, she was likewise considered a
compulsory heir of the latter. Petitioner further alleged that during Gracianos lifetime, Graciano
already distributed, in advance, properties to his children, hence, herein private respondents may
not anymore claim against Gracianos estate or against herein petitioners property.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, rendered a decision dated 26
January 1996 holding:[8]
1) The deed of sale executed by the late Graciano del Rosario in favor of Patricia Natcher is
prohibited by law and thus a complete nullity. There being no evidence that a separation of
property was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or that there has been decreed a
judicial separation of property between them, the spouses are prohibited from entering (into)
a contract of sale;
2) The deed of sale cannot be likewise regarded as a valid donation as it was equally prohibited
by law under Article 133 of the New Civil Code;
3) Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a donation, it may however be
regarded as an extension of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a compulsory heir
of the deceased.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the lower courts decision
ratiocinating, inter alia:

It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal
distribution of the estate. The court a quo, trying an ordinary action for
reconveyance/annulment of title, went beyond its jurisdiction when it performed the
acts proper only in a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased
person. XXX

X X X Thus the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as an advance
inheritance. What the court should have done was merely to rule on the validity of
(the) sale and leave the issue on advancement to be resolved in a separate proceeding
instituted for that purpose. X X X

Aggrieved, herein petitioner seeks refuge under our protective mantle through the
expediency of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and assails the appellate courts decision for being
contrary to law and the facts of the case.
We concur with the Court of Appeals and find no merit in the instant petition.
Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action and special
proceedings, in this wise:

X X X a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.

A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are governed by the rules for
ordinary civil actions, subject to specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.

XXX

c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a

right or a particular fact.

As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction between an action
and a special proceeding. An action is a formal demand of ones right in a court of justice in the
manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies
according to definite established rules. The term special proceeding may be defined as an
application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually,
in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless the statute expressly so
provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an application or
motion.[9]
Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial Law expounds further:

It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those proceedings which
are instituted and prosecuted according to the ordinary rules and provisions relating to
actions at law or suits in equity, and that special proceedings include those
proceedings which are not ordinary in this sense, but is instituted and prosecuted
according to some special mode as in the case of proceedings commenced without
summons and prosecuted without regular pleadings, which are characteristics of
ordinary actions. X X X A special proceeding must therefore be in the nature of a
distinct and independent proceeding for particular relief, such as may be instituted
independently of a pending action, by petition or motion upon notice.[10]

Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages
is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as
advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding,
which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of
Court.
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall
within the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or
alleged to have been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by
the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon
shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir.
While it may be true that the Rules used the word may, it is nevertheless clear that the same
provision[11] contemplates a probate court when it speaks of the court having jurisdiction of the
estate proceedings.
Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is
devoid of authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real
property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 71075 for
reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to
thresh out said question. Moreover, under the present circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch
55 was not properly constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass upon the question of
advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.
At this point, the appellate courts disquisition is elucidating:

Before a court can make a partition and distribution of the estate of a deceased, it must
first settle the estate in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose. In the case at
hand, the court a quo determined the respective legitimes of the plaintiffs-appellants
and assigned the subject property owned by the estate of the deceased to defendant-
appellee without observing the proper proceedings provided (for) by the Rules of
Court. From the aforecited discussions, it is clear that trial courts trying an ordinary
action cannot resolve to perform acts pertaining to a special proceeding because it is
subject to specific prescribed rules. Thus, the court a quo erred in regarding the
subject property as an advance inheritance.[12]

In resolving the case at bench, this Court is not unaware of our pronouncement in Coca vs.
Borromeo[13] and Mendoza vs. Teh[14] that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the
Regional Trial Court (then Court of First Instance) in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its
limited probate jurisdiction is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure. In
essence, it is a procedural question involving a mode of practice which may be waived.[15]
Notwithstanding, we do not see any waiver on the part of herein private respondents
inasmuch as the six children of the decedent even assailed the authority of the trial court, acting
in its general jurisdiction, to rule on this specific issue of advancement made by the decedent to
petitioner.
Analogously, in a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated the long standing
principle that although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership,
yet if the interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or
the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third
parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question of
ownership.[16]
Similarly in Mendoza vs. Teh, we had occasion to hold:

In the present suit, no settlement of estate is involved, but merely an allegation

seeking appointment as estate administratrix which does not necessarily involve
settlement of estate that would have invited the exercise of the limited
jurisdiction of a probate court.[17] (emphasis supplied)

Of equal importance is that before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory
heir may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken first.[18] The net estate of the
decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of
the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to
collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitime of the
compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only thereafter can it be ascertained whether or
not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes.[19]
A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and proceedings in the present case,
reveals that the trial court failed to observe established rules of procedure governing the
settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario. This Court sees no cogent reason to sanction
the non-observance of these well-entrenched rules and hereby holds that under the prevailing
circumstances, a probate court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is indeed the best forum
to ventilate and adjudge the issue of advancement as well as other related matters involving the
settlement of Graciano Del Rosarios estate.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER, G.R. No. 157912

Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER, REYES, JJ.
VICTORIA S. MEDINA-
Administratrix, Promulgated:
Respondent. December 13, 2007
x------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the
Order[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 (RTC) dated January
15, 2003 and its Omnibus Order dated April 9, 2003.

The undisputed facts are as follows.

The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and
thereafter issued an order for all the creditors to file their respective claims against
the estate. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed on October 7, 2002 a
contingent claim for agent's commission due him amounting to
approximately P206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land
belonging to the estate, and the amount of P275,000.00, as reimbursement for
expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by petitioner in the course of negotiating
the sale of said realties.

The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent) moved for the
dismissal of said money claim against the estate on the grounds that (1) the
requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court,
had not been paid; (2) petitioner failed to attach a certification against non-forum
shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach a written explanation why the money
claim was not filed and served personally.

On January 15, 2003, the RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing without
prejudice the money claim based on the grounds advanced by
respondent. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied per Omnibus Order
dated April 9, 2003.

Petitioner then filed the present petition for review on certiorari, raising the
following questions:

(a) must a contingent claim filed in the probate proceeding contain a

certification against non-forum shopping, failing which such claim
should be dismissed?

(b) must a contingent claim filed against an estate in a probate

proceeding be dismissed for failing to pay the docket fees at the time of
its filing thereat?

(c) must a contingent claim filed in a probate proceeding be dismissed

because of its failure to contain a written explanation on the service and
filing by registered mail?[2]
 Petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a
probate proceeding the rules requiring a certification of non-forum shopping, a
written explanation for non-personal filing, and the payment of docket fees upon
filing of the claim. He insists that Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court provides
that rules in ordinary actions are applicable to special proceedings only in
a suppletory manner.

The Court gave due course to the petition for review on certiorari although
directly filed with this Court, pursuant to Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court.[3]

The petition is imbued with merit.

However, it must be emphasized that petitioner's contention that rules in ordinary

actions are only supplementary to rules in special proceedings is not entirely
correct.

Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In the absence of

special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as
far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings.

Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules of Court

govern special proceedings; but in the absence of special provisions, the rules
provided for in Part I of the Rules governing ordinary civil actions shall be
applicable to special proceedings, as far as practicable.

The word practicable is defined as: possible to practice or perform; capable

of being put into practice, done or accomplished.[4] This means that in the absence
of special provisions, rules in ordinary actions may be applied in special
proceedings as much as possible and where doing so would not pose an obstacle to
said proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it categorically say that rules
in ordinary actions are inapplicable or merely suppletory to special
proceedings. Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a certification of non-
forum shopping for complaints and initiatory pleadings, a written explanation
for non-personal service and filing, and the payment of filing fees for money
claims against an estate would not in any way obstruct probate proceedings, thus,
they are applicable to special proceedings such as the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person as in the present case.

Thus, the principal question in the present case is: did the RTC err in
dismissing petitioner's contingent money claim against respondent estate for failure
of petitioner to attach to his motion a certification against non-forum shopping?

The Court rules in the affirmative.

The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints

and other initiatory pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent money
claim against the estate of a decedent is an initiatory pleading. In the present
case, the whole probate proceeding was initiated upon the filing of the petition
for allowance of the decedent's will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all
persons having money claims against the decedent are mandated to file or notify
the court and the estate administrator of their respective money claims; otherwise,
they would be barred, subject to certain exceptions.[5]

Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a motion for
creditors' claims to be recognized and taken into consideration in the proper
disposition of the properties of the estate. In Arquiza v. Court of Appeals,[6] the
Court explained thus:

x x x The office of a motion is not to initiate new litigation, but to

bring a material but incidental matter arising in the progress of the
case in which the motion is filed. A motion is not an independent
right or remedy, but is confined to incidental matters in the progress of
a cause. It relates to some question that is collateral to the main
object of the action and is connected with and dependent upon the
principal remedy.[7] (Emphasis supplied)

A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the settlement of
the decedent's estate; more so if the claim is contingent since the claimant cannot
even institute a separate action for a mere contingent claim. Hence, herein
petitioner's contingent money claim, not being an initiatory pleading, does not
require a certification against non-forum shopping.

On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of Appeals,[8] that
the trial court has jurisdiction to act on a money claim (attorney's fees) against an
estate for services rendered by a lawyer to the administratrix to assist her in
fulfilling her duties to the estate even without payment of separate docket fees
because the filing fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to Section 2,
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, or the trial court may order the payment of such
filing fees within a reasonable time.[9]After all, the trial court had already assumed
jurisdiction over the action for settlement of the estate. Clearly, therefore, non-
payment of filing fees for a money claim against the estate is not one of the
grounds for dismissing a money claim against the estate.

With regard to the requirement of a written explanation, Maceda v. De

Guzman Vda. de Macatangay[10] is squarely in point. Therein, the Court held thus:

In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort, this Court, passing upon

Section 11 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, held that a court has the
discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if said rule is not
complied with.
Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons. Plainly, such should
expedite action or resolution on a pleading, motion or other paper; and conversely,
minimize, if not eliminate, delays likely to be incurred if service or filing is done by mail,
considering the inefficiency of the postal service. Likewise, personal service will do
away with the practice of some lawyers who, wanting to appear clever, resort to the
following less than ethical practices: (1) serving or filing pleadings by mail to catch
opposing counsel off-guard, thus leaving the latter with little or no time to prepare, for
instance, responsive pleadings or an opposition; or (2) upon receiving notice from the
post office that the registered mail containing the pleading of or other paper from the
adverse party may be claimed, unduly procrastinating before claiming the parcel, or,
worse, not claiming it at all, thereby causing undue delay in the disposition of such
pleading or other papers.

If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of adjective rules
requiring personal service whenever practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the
court the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of
service or filing were not resorted to and no written explanation was made as to why
personal service was not done in the first place. The exercise of discretion must,
necessarily consider the practicability of personal service, for Section 11 itself begins
with the clause whenever practicable.
 We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other
modes of service and filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or
filing is practicable, in the light of the circumstances of time, place and person, personal
service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not practicable
may resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written
explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with. In
adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the
importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and the prima
facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11. (Emphasis
and italics supplied)

In Musa v. Amor, this Court, on noting the impracticality of personal

service, exercised its discretion and liberally applied Section 11 of Rule
13:

As [Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court] requires, service and filing
of pleadings must be done personally whenever practicable. The court
notes that in the present case, personal service would not be
practicable. Considering the distance between the Court of Appeals
and Donsol, Sorsogon where the petition was posted, clearly, service
by registered mail [sic] would have entailed considerable time, effort
and expense. A written explanation why service was not done
personally might have been superfluous. In any case, as the rule is so
worded with the use of may, signifying permissiveness, a violation
thereof gives the court discretion whether or not to consider the
paper as not filed. While it is true that procedural rules are
necessary to secure an orderly and speedy administration of
justice, rigid application of Section 11, Rule 13 may be relaxed in this
case in the interest of substantial justice. (Emphasis and italics supplied)

In the case at bar, the address of respondents counsel is Lopez, Quezon,

while petitioner Sonias counsels is Lucena City. Lopez, Quezon is 83
kilometers away from Lucena City. Such distance makes personal
service impracticable. As in Musa v. Amor, a written explanation why
service was not done personally might have been superfluous.

As this Court held in Tan v. Court of Appeals, liberal construction of a

rule of procedure has been allowed where, among other
cases, the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with the
degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
prescribed.[11] (Emphasis supplied)

In the present case, petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village, Makati City, while
counsel for respondent and the RTC which rendered the assailed orders are both
in Iligan City.The lower court should have taken judicial notice of the great
distance between said cities and realized that it is indeed not practicable to serve
and file the money claim personally. Thus, following Medina v. Court of
Appeals,[12] the failure of petitioner to submit a written explanation why service has
not been done personally, may be considered as superfluous and the RTC should
have exercised its discretion under Section 11, Rule 13, not to dismiss the money
claim of petitioner, in the interest of substantial justice.

The ruling spirit of the probate law is the speedy settlement of estates of
deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and those entitled to residue by way of
inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of administration have been
paid.[13] The ultimate purpose for the rule on money claims was further explained
in Union Bank of the Phil. v. Santibaez,[14] thus:

The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate
court is mandatory. As we held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v.
Herrera:

x x x This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by
informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to
examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed.
The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the
deceased and the early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. The
law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of the claims against
the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible,
pay off its debts and distribute the residue.[15] (Emphasis supplied)

The RTC should have relaxed and liberally construed the procedural rule on the
requirement of a written explanation for non-personal service, again in the interest
of substantial justice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial

Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 dated January 15, 2003 and April 9, 2003,
respectively,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Iligan City,
Branch 6, is hereby DIRECTED to give due course and take appropriate action on
petitioner's money claim in accordance with Rule 82 of the Rules of Court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. NO. 129242 January 16, 2001

PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO, ORLANDO S. MANALO, and ISABELITA

MANALO ,petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA (BRANCH 35),
PURITA S. JAYME, MILAGROS M. TERRE, BELEN M. ORILLANO, ROSALINA M. ACUIN,
ROMEO S. MANALO, ROBERTO S. MANALO, AMALIA MANALO and IMELDA
MANALO, respondents.

DE LEON, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners Pilar S. Vda De Manalo, et. Al., seeking
to annul the Resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 affirming the Orders 3 of the Regional Trial Court
and the Resolution 4 which denied petitioner' motion for reconsideration.

The antecedent facts 5 are as follows:

Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1996 Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc, Manila died intestate on February
14, 1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children, namely: Purita
M. Jayme, Antonio Manalo, Milagros M. Terre, Belen M. Orillano, Isabelita Manalo, Rosalina M.
Acuin, Romeo Manalo, Roberto Manalo, Amalia Manalo, Orlando Manalo and Imelda Manalo, who
are all of legal age.
1âwphi1.nêt

At the time of his death on February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left several real properties located in
Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a business under the name and style Manalo's
Machine Shop with offices at No. 19 Calavite Street, La Loma, Quezon City and at NO. 45 General
Tinio Street, Arty Subdivision, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the surviving children of the late
Troadio Manalo, namely; Purita, Milagros, Belen Rocalina, Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and Imelda
filed a petition 6 with the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila 7 of the judicial settlement of the
estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo,
as administrator thereof.

On December 15, 1992, the trial court issued an order setting the said petition for hearing on
February 11, 1993 and directing the publication of the order for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, and further directing service by registered mail of
the said order upon the heirs named in the petition at their respective addresses mentioned therein.

On February 11, 1993, the date set for hearing of the petition, the trial court issued an order
'declaring the whole world in default, except the government," and set the reception of evidence of
the petitioners therein on March 16, 1993. However, the trial court upon motion of set this order of
general default aside herein petitioners (oppositors therein) namely: Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo,
Antonio, Isabelita and Orlando who were granted then (10) days within which to file their opposition
to the petition.

Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through counsel, culminating in the
filling of an Omnibus Motion8 on July 23, 1993 seeking; (1) to seat aside and reconsider the Order of
the trial court dated July 9, 1993 which denied the motion for additional extension of time file
opposition; (2) to set for preliminary hearing their affirmative defenses as grounds for dismissal of
the case; (3) to declare that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the
oppositors; and (4) for the immediate inhibition of the presiding judge.

On July 30, 1993, the trial court issued an order9 which resolved, thus:

A. To admit the so-called Opposition filed by counsel for the oppositors on July 20, 1993,
only for the purpose of considering the merits thereof;

B. To deny the prayer of the oppositors for a preliminary hearing of their affirmative defenses
as ground for the dismissal of this proceeding, said affirmative defenses being irrelevant and
immaterial to the purpose and issue of the present proceeding;

C. To declare that this court has acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors;

D. To deny the motion of the oppositors for the inhibition of this Presiding Judge;

E. To set the application of Romeo Manalo for appointment as regular administrator in the
intestate estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo for hearing on September 9, 1993 at 2:00
o'clock in the afternoon.

Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 39851, after the trial court in its Order 10 dated September
15, 1993. In their petition for improperly laid in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626; (2) the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over their persons; (3) the share of the surviving spouse was included in the
intestate proceedings; (4) there was absence of earnest efforts toward compromise among members
of the same family; and (5) no certification of non-forum shopping was attached to the petition.

Finding the contentions untenable, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari in its
Resolution11promulgated on September 30, 1996. On May 6, 1997 the motion for reconsideration of
the said resolution was likewise dismissed.12

The only issue raised by herein petitioners in the instant petition for review is whether or not the
respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the questioned orders of the respondent trial court
which denied their motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for judicial settlement of estate
despite the failure of the petitioners therein to aver that earnest efforts toward a compromise
involving members of the same family have been made prior to the filling of the petition but that the
same have failed.

Herein petitioners claim that the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is actually an ordinary civil
action involving members of the same family. They point out that it contains certain averments,
which, according to them, are indicative of its adversarial nature, to wit:

X X X

Par. 7. One of the surviving sons, ANTONIO MANALO, since the death of his father,
TROADIO MANALO, had not made any settlement, judicial or extra-judicial of the properties
of the deceased father TROADIO MANALO.
 Par. 8. xxx the said surviving son continued to manage and control the properties
aforementioned, without proper accounting, to his own benefit and advantage xxx.

X X X

Par. 12. That said ANTONIO MANALO is managing and controlling the estate of the
deceased TROADIO MANALO to his own advantage and to the damage and prejudice of the
herein petitioners and their co-heirs xxx.

X X X

Par. 14. For the protection of their rights and interests, petitioners were compelled to bring
this suit and were forced to litigate and incur expenses and will continue to incur expenses of
not less than, P250,000.00 and engaged the services of herein counsel committing to pay
P200,000.00 as and attorney's fees plus honorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance in court
xxx.13

Consequently, according to herein petitioners, the same should be dismissed under Rule 16, Section
1(j) of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that a motion to dismiss a complaint may be filed
on the ground that a condition precedent for filling the claim has not been complied with, that is, that
the petitioners therein failed to aver in the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626, that earnest efforts
toward a compromise have been made involving members of the same family prior to the filling of
the petition pursuant to Article 222 14 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

The instant petition is not impressed with merit.

It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the
averments15 and the character of the relief sought 16 in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at
bar, shall be controlling. A careful srutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration,
Settlement and Distribution of Estatein SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 belies herein petitioners' claim that
the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional
facts required in a petition for the settlement of estate of a deceased person such as the fat of death
of the late Troadio Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the City of Manila at the
time of his said death. The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within he country are
foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate
rest.17 The petition is SP.PROC No. 92-63626 also contains an enumeration of the names of his
legal heirs including a tentative list of the properties left by the deceased which are sought to be
settled in the probate proceedings. In addition, the relief's prayed for in the said petition leave no
room for doubt as regard the intention of the petitioners therein (private respondents herein) to seek
judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased father, Troadio Manalo, to wit;

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed for of this Honorable Court:

a. That after due hearing, letters of administration be issued to petitioner ROMEO MANALO
for the administration of the estate of the deceased TROADIO MANALO upon the giving of a
bond in such reasonable sum that this Honorable Court may fix.

b. That after all the properties of the deceased TROADIO MANALO have been inventoried
and expenses and just debts, if any, have been paid and the legal heirs of the deceased fully
 determined, that the said estate of TROADIO MANALO be settled and distributed among the
legal heirs all in accordance with law.

c. That the litigation expenses of these proceedings in the amount of P250,000.00 and
attorney's fees in the amount of P300,000.00 plus honorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance
in court in the hearing and trial of this case and costs of suit be taxed solely against
ANTONIO MANALO.18

Concededly, the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 contains certain averments which may be
typical of an ordinary civil action. Herein petitioners, as oppositors therein, took advantage of the
said defect in the petition and filed their so-called Opposition thereto which, as observed by the trial
court, is actually an Answer containing admissions and denials, special and affirmative defenses and
compulsory counterclaims for actual, moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney's fees and
costs 19 in an apparent effort to make out a case of an ordinary civil action and ultimately seek its
dismissal under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis-à-vis, Article 222 of civil of the Civil
Code.

It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentially valid
petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Troadio Manalo by raising matters that as
irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition. It must be emphasized that the trial court, siting as a
probate court, has limited and special jurisdiction 20and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters
and issues which may be properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action. In addition, the rule
has always been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant nature of an
action, is determined by the averments in the complaint and not by the defenses contained in the
answer. If it were otherwise, it would not be too difficult to have a case either thrown out of court or
its proceedings unduly delayed by simple strategem.21 So it should be in the instant petition for
settlement of estate.

Herein petitioners argue that even if the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 were to be considered
as a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person, Rule 16, Section 1(j) of
the Rules of Court vis-à-visArticle 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines would nevertheless apply
as a ground for the dismissal of the same by virtue of ule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court which
provides that the 'rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the
parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceedings.'
Petitioners contend that the term "proceeding" is so broad that it must necessarily include special
proceedings.

The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge under the provisions of
Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio
Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough. To wit:

Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should
appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed,
subject to the limitations in Article 2035(underscoring supplied).22

The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear from
the term 'suit' that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or other in a court
of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an
injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. 23 A civil action is thus an action filed
in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong.24 Besides, an excerpt form the Report of the Code Commission unmistakably
reveals the intention of the Code Commission to make that legal provision applicable only to civil
actions which are essentially adversarial and involve members of the same family, thus:

It is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between
members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort should be made toward a
compromise before litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is know
that lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than stranger.25

It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being sued in SP. PROC. No.
92-63626 for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was imploded therein. The Petition for
issuance of letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-
63626 is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. 26 the petitioners therein (private respondents herein)
merely seek to establish the fat of death of their father and subsequently to be duly recognized as
among the heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly exercise their right to participate in the
settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and special
jurisdiction of the probate court.
1âw phi 1.nêt

WHEREFORE, the petition in the above-entitled case, is DENIED for lack of merit, Costs against
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-31979 August 6, 1980

FILOMENA G. PIZARRO, MISAEL G. PIZARRO, AURELIO

PIZARRO, JR., LUZMINDA G. PIZARRO, DELIA-THELMA G.
PIZARRO, ROGELIO G. PIZARRO, VIRGILIO G. PIZARRO,
ROSALINDA G. PIZARRO, JOSE ELVIN G. PIZARRO and
MARIA EVELYN G. PIZARRO, Petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE MANASES G. REYES, JUDGE
OF BRANCH III OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
DAVAO, HONORABLE VICENTE P. BULLECER, JUDGE OF
BRANCH IV OF THE COURT OF INSTANCE OF DAVAO,
ALFONSO L. ANGLIONGTO JR., FELICITAS YAP ANGLIONGTO,
GAUDENCIO A. CORIAS, REGALADO C. SALAVADOR, ALICIA
P. LADISLA and LYDIA P. GUDANI, Respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

A review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.

42507-R, entitled Filomena Pizarro, et al. vs. Hon. Manases G.
Reyes, et al., dismissing the petition for certiorari and mandamus
with Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction which sought to nullify
the Order of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch III, dated
April 10, 1968, dismissing Civil Case No. 5762. chanroblesvi rtualaw lib raryc han robles v irt ual law li bra ry

The controversy stemmed from the following facts: chanrobles vi rtual l aw libra ry

Petitioner Filomena G. Pizarro, is the surviving spouse of the late

Aurelio Pizarro, Sr., while the other petitioners, Misael, Aurelio, Jr.,
Luzminda, Delia-Thelma, Rogelio, Virgilio, Rosalinda, Jose Elvin and
Maria Evelyn, all surnamed Pizarro, as well as respondents Alicia P.
Ladisla and Lydia P. Gudani, are their children. Upon the death of
Aurelio Pizarro, Sr., Special Proceedings No. 1421 entitled "In the
Intestate Estate of the Deceased Aurelio Pizarro, Sr.," was instituted
by petitioners through Atty. Regalado C. Salvador on September 21,
1965 in the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch I, presided by
Judge Vicente P. Bullecer. Listed among the properties of the estate
were parcels of land situated in Agdao, J. Palma Gill, and Claro M.
Recto Streets, Davao City. On December 23, 1965, the Court, upon
agreement of the parties, appointed Gaudencio A. Corias, Clerk of
Court of said Court, as Administrator of the estate. chanroblesv irtualawli bra ry chanroble s virtual law lib rary
On January 11, 1967, the Administrator, through Atty. Regalado C.
Salvador, filed a Motion for Authority to Sell the properties located
at Agdao and Jose Palma Gil Streets, Davao City, to settle the debts
of the estate initially estimated at P257,361.23, including
inheritance and estate taxes. The heirs, Alicia P. Ladisla and Lydia P.
Gudani, opposed the Motion stating that the claims against the
estate had not yet been properly determined and that the sale of
the Agdao lot with an area of 13,014 sq. ms. would be more than
sufficient to cover the supposed obligations of the estate, which
they claimed were exaggerated. chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra ry chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

The Court, in its Order dated February 7, 1967, authorized the sale
"in the interest of the parties" and since majority of the heirs were
in favor of the sale "to avoid unnecessary additional burden of about
P2,000.00 every month. 1 On February 8, 1967, the Administrator
moved for the approval of the conditional sale of the Agdao property
to Alfonso L. Angliongto for a total consideration of P146,820.00
payable in six installments including the down payment. 2 The
document of sale stipulated that the vendor was to cause the
ejectment of all occupants in the property on or before July 31,
1967, otherwise, the vendee was to have the right to rescind the
sale and demand reimbursement of the price already paid. The heirs
filed a Motion, also dated February 8, 1967, to set aside or hold in
abeyance the Order authorizing the sale on the ground that they
were negotiating for the sale of said lot to Mr. Benjamin Gonzales,
whose theatre was being constructed on a 1,187 square meter
portion thereof. 3chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

The Court, in its Order dated February 9, 1967, denied the "Motion
to Set Aside" stating that the grounds relied upon by the heirs were
"nothing but speculations and had no legal basis." 4 The heirs
moved for reconsideration alleging that they were being deprived of
the right to a more beneficial sale. 5 On February 11, 1967, a
hearing was held on the Motion for approval of the sale of the Agdao
lot to Alfonso Angliongto. 6 The heirs maintained their objection on
the grounds that 1) the sale would be improvident and greatly
prejudicial; 2) there has been no determination of the debts or
obligations of the estate as yet; and 3) the terms of the sale were
very prejudicial to them. The Court denied reconsideration on
February 20, 1967, 7 and approved the sale on the same date
stating that "the sale sought to be approved was more beneficial."
libra ry
chanrob les vi rtua l law

On February 22, 1967, the Administrator presented another Motion

for Authority to Sell the Claro M. Recto lot stating that the proceeds
from the sale of the Agdao lot were not sufficient to settle the
obligations of the estate and that the sale of the property on J.
Palma Gil Street was unanimously opposed by the heirs. Authority
was granted by the Court o March 6, 1967. 8 chanrobles vi rtua l law li bra ry

Prior to this, the heirs, in a Motion dated February 27, 1967 prayed
that Administrator Gaudencio A. Corias be asked to resign or be
removed for having abused his powers and duties is such and that,
Letters of Administration be granted instead to Filomena
Pizarro. 9 They also terminated the services of Atty. Regalado C.
Salvador, who had acted likewise as counsel for the
Administrator. chanroble svi rtualaw lib rary chan rob les vi rt ual law lib rary

On March 11, 1967, the Administrator moved that he be allowed to

resign. chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary cha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

On June 22, 1967, the heirs, except Alicia P. Ladisla and Lydia P.
Gudani, filed a "Motion for Cancellation or Rescission of Conditional
Contract of Sale" of the Agdao lot in favor of Alfonso L. Angliongto
reiterating that it was unnecessary and prejudicial to their interests,
that the sale of the lot in Claro M. Recto Street for P370.000.00 was
more than sufficient to settle the obligations of the estate, that it
was impossible to eject all nineteen tenants, not later than July 31,
1967, and that the vendee had failed to pay the last four
installments due despite repeated demands. 10 Angliongto's counsel
countered that the condition of the sale requiring the prior
ejectment of squatters had not been complied with so that the
vendee would hold in abeyance payment of the balance of the
purchase price until all the squatters were ejected. 11 The Court
denied rescission of the sale in its Order, dated July 3, 1967, stating
that the relief prayed for is not within its power to grant, and that
the heirs "should file the necessary action before a competent Court
not before this Court, and much less by mere motion." 12 The heirs
moved to reconsider the said Order. In the meantime, Judge
Bullecer was transferred to the Court of First Instance at Mati,
Davao Oriental. chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary chanrob les vi rtual law lib rary

On July 6, 1967, the Administrator presented a "Motion to Approve

Final Sale" of the Agdao lot to spouses Angliongtos stating that the
latter had paid the full balance of P58,728.00. On the same date,
the Court approved the same. 13 It appears that Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-19342 was issued in favor of Alfonso Angliongto on
July 10, 1967. 14 chanrobles vi rtual law lib rary

On July 13, 1967, Gaudencio Corias ceased to be Administrator.

law libra ry
15
chanroble s virtual

Without waiting for the resolution of their Motion for

Reconsideration of the Order denying rescission of the sale, the
heirs, except Alicia P. Ladisla and Lydia P. Gudani, filed on October
5, 1967, a verified Complaint for "Cancellation of Authority to Sell
and Rescission and Annulment of Deed of Sale and Damages with
Preliminary Injunction" (Civil Case No. 5762, hereinafter called the
Rescission Case) in the Court of First Instance of Davao (raffled to
Branch III), against the Angliongto spouses, Administrator
Gaudencio A. Corias, Judge Vicente P. Bullecer, Atty. Regalado C.
Salvador, Alicia P. Ladisla and Lydia P. Gudani, 16 the latter two
having refused to join as plaintiffs. Petitioners contended inter
alia that despite all their efforts to block the sale "the Administrator
taking advantage of the name and influence of the presiding Judge"
succeeded in inducing Angliongto to purchase the lot at a price
allegedly much higher than the reported P12.00 per square meter;
that the sale contained an impossible condition which was the
ejectment of the tenants before a certain date; that there was
connivance between the Administrator and the vendee with the
knowledge of the Judge and Atty. Regalado Salvador; and that they
had suffered actual and moral damages by reason of the sale. They
also prayed that since the vendees had entered the lot and
destroyed improvements thereon, that they be enjoined from doing
so. Attached to the Complaint was a letter 17 addressed to the
surviving spouse, Filomena G. Pizarro, from Atty. Raul Tolentino to
the effect that the sum of P58,728.00 issued by Alfonso Angliongto
in favor of the estate and which was deposited by virtue of a Court
Order had been dishonored by the Bank because of a stop-payment
order of Angliongto. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

All the defendants except Judge Bullecer and Atty. Corias who filed
a Motion to Dismiss, presented their respective Answers. Eventually,
however, they all adopted the same Motion predicated mainly on
plaintiffs' lack of legal capacity to sue and lack of cause of
action. 18 In addition, the Angliongtos pleaded res judicata, the sale
having been approved by the Court as far back as February 20,
1967 and the final deed on July 6, 1967, and the corresponding title
issued in the name of Alfonso Angliongto on July 10, 1967. Plaintiffs
filed an Opposition 19 as well as a supplemental Opposition. 20 chanrob les vi rtual law lib rary

On October 17, 1967, Judge Alfredo I. Gonzales, as Executive

Judge, issued an Order enjoining the Angliongtos, their agents,
laborers, representatives, from further cutting and destroying
coconuts, other fruits and improvements on the property pending
the final termination of the action or until a contrary order is issued
by the Court, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of
P25,000.00. 21 chanrobles v irt ual law li bra ry

On April 10, 1968, the trial Court (respondent Judge Manases G.

Reyes presiding) dismissed the Rescission Case (Civil Case No.
5762) on the ground that it could not review the actuations of a
coordinate Branch of the Court besides the fact that a Motion for
Reconsideration was still pending resolution before the Probate
Court. 22 Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal Order
was denied on October 10, 1968. chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra ry chanrob les vi rtual law lib rary

While the Rescission Case was pending, the Angliongtos filed Civil
Case No. 5849 for Damages (the Angliongtos Case) against the
heirs.
chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

On November 25, 1968, petitioners elevated their cause to the

Court of Appeals on "Certiorari and mandamus with Prohibition and
Injunction," charging that respondent Judge Manases G. Reyes
gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the Rescission Case and
prayed that he be required to take cognizance thereof and that the
Angliongtos be enjoined from exercising rights of ownership over
the property. chanroble svi rtualaw lib rary chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary
On February 11, 1970, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition
opining that the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IV, did not
abuse its discretion in approving the sale in the Intestate Case (Sp.
Proc. No. 1421), and even granting that it did, the proper remedy
was appeal not Certiorari; that the Court of First Instance, Branch
III, neither abused its discretion in dismissing the Rescission Case
(Civil Case No. 5762) as that case sought to review the actuations
of a coordinate Branch which is beyond its judicial competence; and
that since said dismissal was final, the proper remedy was appeal. It
also observed that copies of the Orders sought to be reviewed were
not certified true copies and, therefore, violative of Section 1, Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. chanroblesvi rtu alawlib ra ry chanro bles vi rt ual law li bra ry

The present Petition before us seeks a reversal of the aforestated

findings of the Appellate Court anchored on the principal contentions
that the sale of the Agdao property should be rescinded for failure
of the vendees to pay the purchase price, and that actually no
review of the actuations of a co-equal Branch of the Court is being
sought. We gave due course to the Petition on June 8, 1970. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

In a Manifestation filed by petitioners on March 29, 1976, 23 they

disclosed that the Angliongtos had mortgaged the Agdao property to
the Development Bank of the Philippines in Davao City, in violation
of the injunctive Order of the lower Court, and after redeeming the
same caused the property to be subdivided into three lots and titled
in their names. Subsequently, they allegedly sold the biggest
portion containing 11,500 sq. ms. to Yu Cho Khai and Cristina Sy Yu
for P250,000.00 on October 25, 1975. Title to said portion has been
allegedly transferred in favor of said vendees. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

The primary point, tendered for resolution is the correctness of the

ruling of the Court of Appeals upholding the opinion of the trial
Court that the latter was devoid of authority to review the
actuations of a coordinate Branch of the Court. Secondarily, the
propriety of the extra-ordinary remedy of certiorari despite the
existence of the remedy of appeal is also in issue. chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra ry chan roble s virt ual law li bra ry

Certiorari should lie. cha nro blesvi rtua lawlib rary c hanro bles vi rtu al law li bra ry
While an Order of dismissal is, indeed, final and appealable as it
puts an end to litigation and leaves nothing more to be done on the
merits in the lower Court, 24so that certiorari is ordinarily
unavailable, that general rule allows of exceptions, namely, when
appeal is inadequate and ineffectual or when the broader interest of
justice so requires. 25 In this case, appeal would not have afforded
the heirs an effective and speedy recourse. It would have entailed a
protracted litigation and in the interim, the heirs stood to suffer as a
consequence of the approval of the sale. The prompt stoppage of
that sale was vital to them. Thusly, appeal not being speedy enough
to bring about the desired objective and to be of any utility to the
heirs, their availment of certiorari must be held to have been
proper.chanroble svi rtualawl ib rary chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

We come now to the question of correctness of the Order of

dismissal of the trial Court which the Appellate Tribunal had upheld.
As a strict legal proposition, no actuation of the Probate Court had
to be reviewed. There is no judicial interference to speak of by one
Court in the actuations of another co-equal Court. The Order
authorizing the sale was issued on February 20, 1967, and on July
6, 1967, the Court gave its stamp of approval to the final sale. Title
was issued in favor of the vendees on July 10, 1967. To all intents
and purposes, therefore, that sale had been consummated; the
Order approving the sale, final. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry chan roble s virtual law lib rary

But, what petitioners sought to achieve in filing the Rescission Case

was to rescind the sale mainly for failure of the vendees to pay the
full consideration thereof, 26 which is a valid ground for rescission.
That cause of action was within the judicial competence and
authority of the trial Court (Branch III) as a Court of First Instance
with exclusive original jurisdiction over civil cases the subject
matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation. It was
beyond the jurisdictional bounds of the Probate Court (Branch IV)
whose main province was the settlement of the estate. As a matter
of fact, the Rescission Case was instituted after the Probate Court
itself had stated that petitioners' cause of action was not within its
authority to resolve but should be filed with the competent Court.
The cause of action in one is different from that obtaining in the
other. It behooved the trial Court, therefore, to have taken
cognizance of and to have heard the Rescission Case on the merits
and it was reversible error for the Court of Appeals to have upheld
its dismissal.
chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra ry chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

In so far as the non-presentation of a certified true copy of the

Order of April 10, 1968, sought to be reviewed, its concerned, there
seems to have been substantial compliance with section 1, Rule 65,
of the Rules of Court since the copy of the Order submitted is a
duplicate copy of the original and bears the seal of the Trial Court.
Lawyers should bear in mind, however, that a faithful compliance
with the Rules is still the better practice. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry chan roble s vi rtual law lib rary

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and

the incumbent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch
III, is hereby ordered to take cognizance of and hear and decide
Civil Case No. 5762 as expeditiously as possible. chan roblesv irtualawli bra ry chan roble s virtual law libra ry

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 124320 March 2, 1999

HEIRS OF GUIDO YAPTINCHAY AND ISABEL YAPTINCHAY, NAMELY: LETICIA ENCISO-

GADINGAN, EMILIO ENCISO, AURORA ENCISO, AND NORBERTO ENCISO, REPRESENTED
BY LETICIA ENCISO-GADINGAN, ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ROY S. DEL ROSARIO, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BRANCH 21, IMUS, CAVITE; THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR TRECE MARTIRES CITY, GEORGE T. CHUA, SPS. ALFONSO NG
AND ANNABELLE CHUA, SPS. ROSENDO L. DY AND DIANA DY, SPS. ALEXANDER NG AND
CRISTINA NG, SPS. SAMUEL MADRID AND BELEN MADRID, SPS. JOSE MADRID AND
BERNARDA MADRID, SPS. DAVID MADRID AND VIOLETA MADRID, JONATHAN NG, SPS.
VICTORIANO CHAN, JR. AND CARMELITA CHAN, SPS. MARIE TES C. LEE AND GREGORIE
W.C. LEE, JACINTO NG, JR., SPS. ADELAIDO S. DE GUZMAN AND ROSITA C. DE GUZMAN,
SPS. RICARDO G. ONG AND JULIE LIM-IT, SPS. MISAEL ADELAIDA P. SOLIMAN AND
FERDINAND SOLIMAN, SPS. MYLENE T. LIM AND ARTHUR LIM, EVELYN K. CHUA, GOLDEN
BAY REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

PURISIMA, J.:

At bar is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the Orders
dated October 25, 1995 and February 23, 1996, respectively, of Branch 21 of the Regional Trial
Court in Imus, Cavite ("RTC").

The facts that matter are, as follows:

Petitioners claim that they are the legal heirs of the late Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the owners-
claimants of Lot No. 1131 with an area of 520,638 and Lot No. 1132 with an area of 96,235 square
meters, more or less situated in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite.

On March 17, 1994, petitioners executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the estate of the deceased
Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay.

On August 26, 1994, petitioners discovered that a portion, if not all, of the aforesaid properties were
titled in the name of respondent Golden Bay Realty and Development Corporation ("Golden Bay")
under Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. ("TCT") 225254 and 225255. With the discovery of what
happened to subject parcels of land, petitioners filed a complaint for ANNULMENT and/or
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF TCT NO. 493363, 493364, 493665, 493366, 493367; and its
Derivatives; As Alternative Reconveyance of Realty WITH A PRAYER FOR A WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION and/or RESTRAINING ORDER WITH DAMAGES, docketed as RTC
BCV-94-127 before Branch 21 of the Regional Trial Court in Imus, Cavite.

Upon learning that "Golden Bay" sold portions of the parcels of land in question, petitioners filed with
the "RTC" an Amended Complaint to implead new and additional defendants and to mention the
TCTs to be annulled. But the respondent court dismissed the Amended Complaint.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the Order dismissing the Amended Complaint. The motion
was granted by the RTC in an Order 1 dated July 7, 1995, which further allowed the herein
petitioners to file a Second Amended Complaint, 2 which they promptly did.
On August 12, 1995, the private respondents presented a Motion to Dismiss 3 on the grounds that
the complaint failed to state a cause of action, that plaintiffs did not have a right of action, that they
have not established their status as heirs, that the land being claimed is different from that of the
defendants, and that plaintiffs' claim was barred by laches. The said Motion to Dismiss was granted
by the respondent court in its Order 4 dated October 25, 1995, holding that petitioners "have not
shown any proof or even a semblance of it — except the allegations that they are the legal heirs of
the above-named Yaptinchays — that they have been declared the legal heirs of the deceased
couple."

Petitioners interposed a Motion for Reconsideration 5 but to no avail. The same was denied by the
RTC in its Order 6of February 23, 1996.

Undaunted, petitioners have come before this Court to seek relief from respondent court's Orders
under attack.

Petitioners contend that the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the
issue of heirship should first be determined before trial of the case could proceed. It is petitioners'
submission that the respondent court should have proceeded with the trial and simultaneously
resolved the issue of heirship in the same case.

The petition is not impressed with merit.

To begin with, petitioners' Petition for Certiorari before this Court is an improper recourse. Their
proper remedy should have been an appeal. An order of dismissal, be it right or wrong, is a final
order, which is subject to appeal and not a proper subject of certiorari. 7 Where appeal is available as
a remedy certiorari will not lie. 8

Neither did the respondent court commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned Order
dismissing the Second Amended Complaint of petitioners, as it aptly ratiocinated and ruled:

But the plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and Isabel
Yaptinchay have not shown any proof or even a semblance of it — except the
allegations that they are the legal heirs of the aforementioned Yaptinchays — that
they have been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple. Now, the
determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased couple must be made in the
proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance of
property. This must take precedence over the action for reconveyance (Elena c.
Monzon, et al., v. Angelita Taligato, CA-G-R- No. 33355, August 12, 1992).

In Litam, etc., et. al. v. Rivera 9 this court opined that the declaration of heirship must be made in an
administration proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated
in Solivio v. Court of Appeals 10where the court held:

In Litam, et al. v. Rivera, 100 Phil. 364, where despite the pendency of the special
proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased Rafael Litam,
the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action in which they claimed that they were the
children by a previous marriage of the deceased to a Chinese woman, hence,
entitled to inherit his one-half share of the conjugal properties acquired during his
marriage to Marcosa Rivera, the trial court in the civil case declared that the
plaintiffs-appellants were not children of the deceased, that the properties in question
were paraphernal properties of his wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that the latter was his
only heir. On appeal to this Court, we ruled that "such declarations (that Marcosa
 Rivera was the only heir of the decedent) is improper, in Civil Case No. 2071, it being
within the exclusive competence of the court in Special Proceedings No. 1537, in
which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the
presentation of the project of partition." (p. 378).

The trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a
declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as "one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong" while a special proceeding is "a remedy
by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." It is then decisively clear
that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners
here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.

We therefore hold that the respondent court did the right thing in dismissing the Second Amended
Complaint, which stated no cause of action. In Travel Wide Associated Sales (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 11 it was ruled that:

. . . If the suit is not brought in the name of or against the real party in interest, a
motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground that the complaint states no cause of
action.

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition under consideration is hereby DISMISSED. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
HEIRS OF TEOFILO G.R. No. 150206
GABATAN, namely: LOLITA
GABATAN, POMPEYO GABATAN,
PEREGRINO GABATAN, REYNALDO Present:
GABATAN, NILA
GABATAN and JESUS JABINIS,
RIORITA GABATAN PUNO, C.J.,*
TUMALA and FREIRA GABATAN,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,**
Petitioners,
CARPIO,***

CORONA,
-versus-
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and

BRION,**** JJ.
HON. COURT OF
APPEALS andLOURDES EVERO
PACANA,

Respondents.

Promulgated:

March 13, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

 Assailed and sought to be set aside in the instant petition for review on
certiorari are the Decision[1] dated April 28, 2000, and
[2]
Resolution dated September 12, 2001 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA G.R.
CV No. 52273. The challenged Decision affirmed the decision[3] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 19, dated October 20, 1995
in Civil Case No. 89-092, an action for Recovery of Property and Ownership and
Possession, thereat commenced by respondent Lourdes Evero Pacana against
petitioners, heirs of Teofilo Gabatan, Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado.

Subject of the present controversy is a 1.1062 hectare parcel of land,

identified as Lot 3095 C-5 and situated at Calinugan, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro
City. This lot was declared for taxation in the name of Juan Gabatan. In the
complaint before the RTC, respondent alleged that she is the sole owner of Lot
3095 C-5, having inherited the same from her deceased mother, Hermogena
Gabatan Evero (Hermogena). Respondent further claimed that her mother,
Hermogena, is the only child of Juan Gabatan and his wife, Laureana
Clarito. Respondent alleged that upon the death of Juan Gabatan, Lot 3095 C-5
was entrusted to his brother, Teofilo Gabatan (Teofilo), and Teofilos wife, Rita
Gabatan, for administration. It was also claimed that prior to her death
Hermogena demanded for the return of the land but to no avail. After
Hermogenas death, respondent also did the same but petitioners refused to heed
the numerous demands to surrender the subject property. According to
respondent, when Teofilo and his wife died, petitioners Jesus Jabinis and Catalino
Acantilado took possession of the disputed land despite respondents demands for
them to vacate the same.

In their answer, petitioners denied that respondents mother Hermogena

was the daughter of Juan Gabatan with Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena or
respondent is the rightful heir of Juan Gabatan. Petitioners maintained that Juan
Gabatan died single in 1934 and without any issue and that Juan was survived by
one brother and two sisters, namely: Teofilo (petitioners predecessor-in-interest),
Macaria and Justa. These siblings and/or their heirs, inherited the subject land
from Juan Gabatan and have been in actual, physical, open, public, adverse,
continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof in the concept of owners for
more than fifty (50) years and enjoyed the fruits of the improvements thereon, to
the exclusion of the whole world including respondent. Petitioners clarified that
Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado have no interest in the subject land; the
former is merely the husband of Teofilos daughter while the latter is just a
caretaker. Petitioners added that a similar case was previously filed by
respondent against Teofilos wife, Rita Vda. de Gabatan, on February 21, 1978,
docketed as Civil Case No. 5840 but the case was dismissed on May 3, 1983 for
lack of interest. Finally, petitioners contended that the complaint lacks or states
no cause of action or, if there was any, the same has long prescribed and/or has
been barred by laches.

On June 20, 1989, the complaint was amended wherein the heirs of Teofilo
were individually named, to wit: Lolita Gabatan, Pompeyo Gabatan, Peregrino
Gabatan, Reynaldo Gabatan, Nila Gabatan and Jesus Jabinis, Riorita Gabatan
Tumal and Freira Gabatan.

On July 30, 1990, petitioners filed an amended answer, additionally alleging

that the disputed land was already covered by OCT No. P-3316 in the name of the
heirs of Juan Gabatan represented by petitioner Riorita Gabatan (Teofilos
daughter).

On October 20, 1995, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent,

the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the

plaintiff and against the defendants, declaring the plaintiff the owner of
Lot No. 3095 C-5 situated at Calinugan, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City;
and ordering the defendants represented by Riorita Gabatan Tumala
to RECONVEY Original Certificate of Title No. P-3316 in favor of plaintiff
Lourdes Evero Pacana, free of any encumbrance; ordering the
 defendants to pay P10,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as
Attorneys fees; and P2,000.00 for litigation expenses.

SO ORDERED.[4]

Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the CA whereat their recourse was

docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 52273.

On April 28, 2000, the CA rendered the herein challenged Decision

affirming that of the RTC. Dispositively, the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the questioned decision of

the lower court dated October 20, 1995 is hereby AFFIRMED. With
costs against appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Discounting petitioners argument that respondent is not related to Juan

Gabatan, the CA declared that respondents claim of filiation with Juan Gabatan
was sufficiently established during trial. Thus, the CA echoed a long line of
jurisprudence that findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great weight
and are not disturbed except for cogent reasons, such as when the findings of fact
are not supported by evidence.

The CA likewise gave weight to the Deed of Absolute Sale[5] executed by

Macaria Gabatan de Abrogar, Teofilo, Hermogena and heirs of Justa Gabatan,
wherein Hermogena was identified as an heir of Juan Gabatan:
 x x x HERMOGENA GABATAN, of legal age, married, Filipino
citizen and presently residing at Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte,
Philippines, as Heir of the deceased, JUAN GABATAN; x x x.

To the CA, the Deed of Absolute Sale on July 30, 1966 containing such
declaration which was signed by Teofilo and the latters nearest relatives by
consanguinity, is a tangible proof that they acknowledged Hermogenas status as
the daughter of Juan Gabatan. Applying Section 38, Rule 130[6] of the Rules of
Court on the declaration against interest, the CA ruled that petitioners could not
deny that even their very own father, Teofilo formally recognized Hermogenas
right to heirship from Juan Gabatan which ultimately passed on to respondent.

As to the issue of prescription, the CA ruled that petitioners possession of

the disputed property could not ripen into acquisitive prescription because their
predecessor-in-interest, Teofilo, never held the property in the concept of an
owner.

Aggrieved, petitioners are now with this Court via the present recourse
principally contending that the CA committed the following reversible errors:

FIRST ERROR: The lower court erred in not declaring that Juan Gabatan
died single and without issue;

SECOND ERROR: The lower court erred in declaring the plaintiff-

appellee (respondent) as the sole and surviving heir of Juan Gabatan,
the only child of a certain Hermogena Clareto GABATAN;

THIRD ERROR: The lower court erred in declaring that a certain

Hermogena Clareto GABATAN is the child and sole heir of Juan
Gabatan;
 FOURTH ERROR: The lower court erred in failing to appreciate by
preponderance of evidence in favor of the defendants-appellants
(petitioners) claim that they and the heirs of Justa and Macaria both
surnamed Gabatan are the sole and surviving heirs of Juan Gabatan
and, therefore, entitled to inherit the land subject matter hereof;

FIFTH ERROR: The lower court erred in not declaring that the cause of
action of plaintiff-appellee (respondent) if any, has been barred by
laches and/or prescription.[7]

Before proceeding to the merits of the case, we must pass upon certain
preliminary matters.

In general, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on

certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Questions of fact cannot be the
subject of this particular mode of appeal, for this Court is not a trier of facts. [8] It is
not our function to examine and evaluate the probative value of the evidence
presented before the concerned tribunal upon which its impugned decision or
resolution is based.[9]

However, there are established exceptions to the rule on conclusiveness of

the findings of fact by the lower courts, such as (1) when the findings are grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are
conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the
issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8)
when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the
findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted
by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.[10]
 Moreover, our rules recognize the broad discretionary power of an appellate
court to waive the lack of proper assignment of errors and to consider errors not
assigned.Thus, the Court is clothed with ample authority to review rulings even if
they are not assigned as errors in the appeal in these instances: (a) grounds not
assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) matters not
assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within
contemplation of law; (c) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but
consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete
resolution of the case or to serve the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing
piecemeal justice; (d) matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but
raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue
submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored; (e)
matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned;
and (f) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination
of a question properly assigned, is dependent. [11]

In the light of the foregoing established doctrines, we now proceed to

resolve the merits of the case.

The respondents main cause of action in the court a quo is the recovery of
ownership and possession of property. It is undisputed that the subject
property, Lot 3095 C-5, was owned by the deceased Juan Gabatan, during his
lifetime.[12] Before us are two contending parties, both insisting to be the legal
heir(s) of the decedent.

Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the
deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an
ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property. This must take
precedence over the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court
has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in
the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special
proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil
action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be
made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the
establishment of a status or right.[13]
 In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera,[14] this Court ruled that the
declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding, and not in an
independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of
Appeals[15] where the Court held:

xxx where despite the pendency of the special proceedings for

the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased Rafael Litam, the
plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action in which they claimed that they
were the children by a previous marriage of the deceased to a Chinese
woman, hence, entitled to inherit his one-half share of the conjugal
properties acquired during his marriage to Marcosa Rivera, the trial
court in the civil case declared that the plaintiffs-appellants were not
children of the deceased, that the properties in question were
paraphernal properties of his wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that the latter
was his only heir. On appeal to this Court, we ruled that such
declarations (that Marcosa Rivera was the only heir of the decedent) is
improper, in Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the exclusive
competence of the court in Special Proceedings No. 1537, in which it is
not as yet, in issue, and, will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the
presentation of the project of partition.

In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes,[16] the Court
reiterated its ruling that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship
must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted
precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. Citing the case of Agapay v.
Palang,[17] this Court held that the status of an illegitimate child who claimed to
be an heir to a decedents estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil
action which, as in this case, was for the recovery of property.

However, we are not unmindful of our decision in Portugal v. Portugal-

Beltran,[18] where the Court relaxed its rule and allowed the trial court in a
proceeding for annulment of title to determine the status of the party therein as
heirs, to wit:
 It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property
of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still
subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding
which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the
status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome
to the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration
proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to
the civil case subject of the present case, could and had already in fact
presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction
over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.

In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being

no compelling reason to still subject Portugals estate to administration
proceedings since a determination of petitioners status as heirs could
be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners (Vide Pereira v. Court of
Appeals, 174 SCRA 154 [1989]; Intestate Estate of Mercado v. Magtibay,
96 Phil. 383 [1955]), the trial court should proceed to evaluate the
evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision
thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial, x x x. (emphasis
supplied)

Similarly, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land
being claimed by the contending parties as their inheritance from Juan Gabatan. It
would be more practical to dispense with a separate special proceeding for the
determination of the status of respondent as the sole heir of Juan Gabatan,
specially in light of the fact that the parties to Civil Case No. 89-092, had
voluntarily submitted the issue to the RTC and already presented their evidence
regarding the issue of heirship in these proceeding. Also the RTC assumed
jurisdiction over the same and consequently rendered judgment thereon.

We GRANT the petition.

 After a meticulous review of the records of this case, we find insufficient
and questionable the basis of the RTC in conferring upon respondent the status of
sole heir of Juan Gabatan.

Respondent, in asserting to be entitled to possession and ownership of the

property, pinned her claim entirely on her alleged status as sole heir of Juan
Gabatan. It was incumbent upon her to present preponderant evidence in
support of her complaint.

Under the Civil Code, the filiation of legitimate children is established by

any of the following:

ART. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of

birth appearing in the Civil Register, or by an authentic document or a
final judgment.

ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article,
the filiation shall be proved by the continuous possession of status of a
legitimate child.

ART. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final

judgment or possession of status, legitimate filiation may be proved by
any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Here, two conflicting birth certificates[19] of respondent were presented at

the RTC. Respondent, during her direct testimony, presented and identified a
purported certified true copy of her typewritten birth certificate which indicated
that her mothers maiden name was Hermogena Clarito Gabatan. Petitioners, on
the other hand, presented a certified true copy of respondents handwritten birth
certificate which differed from the copy presented by respondent. Among the
differences was respondents mothers full maiden name which was indicated as
Hermogena Calarito in the handwritten birth certificate.

In resolving this particular issue, the trial court ruled in this wise:

The parties are trying to outdo with (sic) each other by

presenting two conflicting Certificate (sic) of Live Birth of plaintiff
herein, Lourdes Evero Pacana, which are Exhibit A for the plaintiff and
Exhibit 1 for the defendants. Which of this (sic) is genuine, and which is
falsified. These (sic) issue is crucial and requires serious scrutiny. The
Court is of the observation that Exhibit A for the plaintiff which is a
certified true copy is in due form and bears the as is and where is rule.
It has the impression of the original certificate. The forms (sic) is an old
one used in the 1950s. Her mothers maiden name appearing thereof is
Hermogina (sic) Clarito Gabatan. While Exhibit 1, the entries found
thereof (sic) is handwritten which is very unusual and of dubious
source. The form used is of latest vintage. The entry on the space for
mothers maiden name is Hermogena Calarito. There seems to be an
apparent attempt to thwart plaintiffs mother filiation with the omission
of the surname Gabatan. Considering these circumstances alone the
Court is inclined to believe that Exhibit A for the plaintiff is far more
genuine and authentic certificate of live birth.[20]

Having carefully examined the questioned birth certificates, we simply

cannot agree with the above-quoted findings of the trial court. To begin with,
Exhibit A, as the trial court noted, was an original typewritten document, not a
mere photocopy or facsimile. It uses a form of 1950s vintage[21] but this Court is
unable to concur in the trial courts finding that Exhibit 1[22] was of a later vintage
than Exhibit A which was one of the trial courts bases for doubting the
authenticity of Exhibit 1. On the contrary, the printed notation on the upper left
hand corner of Exhibit 1 states Municipal Form No. 102 (Revised, January 1945)
which makes it an older form than Exhibit A. Thus, the trial courts finding
regarding which form was of more recent vintage was manifestly contradicted by
the evidence on record. No actual signature appears on Exhibit A except that of a
certain Maximo P. Noriga, Deputy Local Civil Registrar of the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar, Cagayan de Oro City, who purportedly certified on July 6, 1977 that
Exhibit A was a true copy of respondents birth certificate. The names of the
attendant at birth (Petra Sambaan) and the local civil registrar (J.L. Rivera) in 1950
were typewritten with the notation (Sgd.) also merely typewritten beside their
names. The words A certified true copy: July 6, 1977 above the signature of
Maximo P. Noriga on Exhibit A appear to be inscribed by the same typewriter as
the very entries in Exhibit A. It would seem that Exhibit A and the information
stated therein were prepared and entered only in 1977. Significantly, Maximo P.
Noriga was never presented as a witness to identify Exhibit A. Said document and
the signature of Maximo P. Noriga therein were identified by respondent herself
whose self-serving testimony cannot be deemed sufficient authentication of her
birth certificate.

We cannot subscribe to the trial courts view that since the entries in Exhibit
1 were handwritten, Exhibit 1 was the one of dubious credibility. Verily, the
certified true copies of the handwritten birth certificate of respondent
(petitioners Exhibits 1 and 8) were duly authenticated by two competent
witnesses; namely, Rosita Vidal (Ms. Vidal), Assistant Registration Officer of the
Office of the City Civil Registrar, Cagayan de Oro City and Maribeth E. Cacho (Ms.
Cacho), Archivist of the National Statistics Office (NSO), Sta. Mesa, Manila. Both
witnesses testified that: (a) as part of their official duties they have custody of
birth records in their respective offices,[23] and (b) the certified true copy of
respondents handwritten birth certificate is a faithful reproduction of the original
birth certificate registered in their respective offices.[24] Ms. Vidal, during her
testimony, even brought the original of the handwritten birth certificate before
the trial court and respondents counsel confirmed that the certified true copy
(which was eventually marked as Exhibit 1) was a faithful reproduction of the
original.[25] Ms. Vidal likewise categorically testified that no other copy of
respondents birth certificate exists in their records except the handwritten birth
certificate.[26] Ms. Cacho, in turn, testified that the original of respondents
handwritten birth certificate found in the records of the NSO Manila (from which
Exhibit 8 was photocopied) was the one officially transmitted to their office by the
Local Civil Registry Office of Cagayan de Oro.[27] Both Ms. Vidal and Ms. Cacho
testified and brought their respective offices copies of respondents birth
certificate in compliance with subpoenas issued by the trial court and there is no
showing that they were motivated by ill will or bias in giving their
testimonies. Thus, between respondents Exhibit A and petitioners Exhibits 1 and
8, the latter documents deserve to be given greater probative weight.

Even assuming purely for the sake of argument that the birth certificate
presented by respondent (Exhibit A) is a reliable document, the same on its face is
insufficient to prove respondents filiation to her alleged grandfather, Juan
Gabatan. All that Exhibit A, if it had been credible and authentic, would have
proven was that respondents mother was a certain Hermogena Clarito Gabatan. It
does not prove that same Hermogena Clarito Gabatan is the daughter of Juan
Gabatan. Even the CA held that the conflicting certificates of live birth of
respondent submitted by the parties only proved the filiation of respondent to
Hermogena.[28]

It was absolutely crucial to respondents cause of action that she

convincingly proves the filiation of her mother to Juan Gabatan. To reiterate, to
prove the relationship of respondents mother to Juan Gabatan, our laws dictate
that the best evidence of such familial tie was the record of birth appearing in the
Civil Register, or an authentic document or a final judgment. In the absence of
these, respondent should have presented proof that her mother enjoyed the
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. Only in the absence of
these two classes of evidence is the respondent allowed to present other proof
admissible under the Rules of Court of her mothers relationship to Juan Gabatan.

However, respondents mothers (Hermogenas) birth certificate, which

would have been the best evidence of Hermogenas relationship to Juan Gabatan,
was never offered as evidence at the RTC. Neither did respondent present any
authentic document or final judgment categorically evidencing Hermogenas
relationship to Juan Gabatan.

Respondent relied on the testimony of her witnesses, Frisco Lawan,

Felicisima Nagac Pacana and Cecilia Nagac Villareal who testified that they
personally knew Hermogena (respondents mother) and/or Juan Gabatan, that
they knew Juan Gabatan was married to Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena
was the child of Juan and Laureana.However, none of these witnesses had
personal knowledge of the fact of marriage of Juan to Laureana or the fact of
birth of Hermogena to Juan and Laureana. They were not yet born or were very
young when Juan supposedly married Laureana or when Hermogena was born
and they all admitted that none of them were present at Juan and Laureanas
wedding or Hermogenas birth. These witnesses based their testimony on what
they had been told by, or heard from, others as young children. Their testimonies
were, in a word, hearsay.

Other circumstances prevent us from giving full faith to respondents

witnesses testimonies. The records would show that they cannot be said to be
credible and impartial witnesses. Frisco Lawan testified that he was the son of
Laureana by a man other than Juan Gabatan and was admittedly not at all related
to Juan Gabatan.[29] His testimony regarding the relationships within the Gabatan
family is hardly reliable. As for Felicisima Nagac Pacana and Cecilia Nagac Villareal
who are children of Justa Gabatan Nagac,[30] this Court is wary of according
probative weight to their testimonies since respondent admitted during her cross-
examination that her (respondents) husband is the son of Felicisima Nagac
Pacana.[31] In other words, although these witnesses are indeed blood relatives of
petitioners, they are also the mother and the aunt of respondents husband. They
cannot be said to be entirely disinterested in the outcome of the case.

Aside from the testimonies of respondents witnesses, both the RTC and the
CA relied heavily on a photocopy of a Deed of Absolute Sale[32] (Exhibit H)
presented by respondent and which appeared to be signed by the siblings and the
heirs of the siblings of Juan Gabatan. In this document involving the sale of a lot
different from Lot 3095 C-5, Hermogena Gabatan as heir of the deceased Juan
Gabatan was indicated as one of the vendors. The RTC deemed the statement
therein as an affirmation or recognition by Teofilo Gabatan, petitioners
predecessor in interest, that Hermogena Gabatan was the heir of Juan
Gabatan.[33] The CA considered the same statement as a declaration against
interest on the part of Teofilo Gabatan.[34]

However, the admission of this Deed of Absolute Sale, including its

contents and the signatures therein, as competent evidence was vigorously and
repeatedly objected to by petitioners counsel for being a mere photocopy and not
being properly authenticated.[35] After a close scrutiny of the said photocopy of
the Deed of Absolute Sale, this Court cannot uphold the admissibility of the same.

Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry is the contents of
a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document
itself.[36]Although the best evidence rule admits of exceptions and there are
instances where the presentation of secondary evidence would be allowed, such
as when the original is lost or the original is a public record, the basis for the
presentation of secondary evidence must still be established. Thus, in Department
of Education Culture and Sports v. Del Rosario,[37] we held that a party must first
satisfactorily explain the loss of the best or primary evidence before he can resort
to secondary evidence. A party must first present to the court proof of loss or
other satisfactory explanation for non-production of the original instrument.

In the case at bar, a perusal of the transcript of the testimony of Felicisima

Nagac Pacana (who identified the photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale) plainly
shows that she gave no testimony regarding the whereabouts of the original,
whether it was lost or whether it was recorded in any public office.
 There is an ostensible attempt to pass off Exhibit H as an admissible public
document. For this, respondent relied on the stamped notation on the photocopy
of the deed that it is a certified true xerox copy and said notation was signed by a
certain Honesto P. Velez, Sr., Assessment Officer, who seems to be an officer in
the local assessors office.Regarding the authentication of public documents, the
Rules of Court[38] provide that the record of public documents, when admissible
for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy. [39] The
attestation of the certifying officer must state, in substance, that the copy is a
correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be.[40]

To begin with, no proof whatsoever was presented by respondent that an

original of Exhibit H was registered or exists in the records of the local assessors
office.Furthermore, the stamped certification of Honesto P. Velez is insufficient
authentication of Exhibit H since Velezs certification did not state that Exhibit H
was a true copy from the original. Even worse, Velez was not presented as a
witness to attest that Exhibit H was a true copy from the original. Indeed, it is
highly doubtful that Velez could have made such an attestation since the
assessors office is not the official repository of original notarized deeds of sale
and could not have been the legal custodian contemplated in the rules.

It is the notary public who is mandated by law to keep an original of the

Deed of Absolute Sale in his notarial register and to forward the same to the
proper court. It is the notary public or the proper court that has custody of his
notarial register that could have produced the original or a certified true copy
thereof. Instead, the Deed of Absolute Sale was identified by Felicisima Nagac
Pacana who, despite appearing to be a signatory thereto, is not a disinterested
witness and as can be gleaned from her testimony, she had no personal
knowledge of the preparation of the alleged certified true copy of the Deed of
Absolute Sale. She did not even know who secured a copy of Exhibit H from the
assessors office.[41] To be sure, the roundabout and defective manner of
authentication of Exhibit H renders it inadmissible for the purpose it was
offered, i.e. as proof that Teofilo Gabatan acknowledged or admitted the status of
Hermogena Gabatan as heir of Juan Gabatan.

Even if we are to overlook the lack of proper authentication of Exhibit H

and consider the same admissible, it still nonetheless would have only provided
proof that a certain Hermogena Gabatan was the heir of Juan Gabatan. Exhibit H
does not show the filiation of respondent to either Hermogena Gabatan or Juan
Gabatan. As discussed above, the only document that respondent produced to
demonstrate her filiation to Hermogena Gabatan (respondents Exhibit A) was
successfully put in doubt by contrary evidence presented by petitioners.

As for the issue of laches, we are inclined to likewise rule against

respondent. According to respondents own testimony,[42] Juan Gabatan died
sometime in 1933 and thus, the cause of action of the heirs of Juan Gabatan to
recover the decedents property from third parties or to quiet title to their
inheritance accrued in 1933. Yet, respondent and/or her mother Hermogena, if
they were truly the legal heirs of Juan Gabatan, did not assert their rights as
such. It is only in 1978 that respondent filed her first complaint to recover the
subject property, docketed as Civil Case No. 5840, against Rita Gabatan, the
widow of Teofilo Gabatan.[43] However, that case was dismissed without prejudice
for failure to prosecute.[44] Again, respondent waited until 1989 to refile her cause
of action, i.e. the present case.[45] She claimed that she waited until the death of
Rita Gabatan to refile her case out of respect because Rita was then already
old.[46]

We cannot accept respondents flimsy reason. It is precisely because Rita

Gabatan and her contemporaries (who might have personal knowledge of the
matters litigated in this case) were advancing in age and might soon expire that
respondent should have exerted every effort to preserve valuable evidence and
speedily litigate her claim. As we held in Republic of the Philippines v.
Agunoy: Vigilantibus, sed non dormientibus, jura subveniunt, the law aids the
vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights[O]ne may not sleep on a right while
expecting to preserve it in its pristine purity.[47]

All in all, this Court finds that respondent dismally failed to substantiate,
with convincing, credible and independently verifiable proof, her assertion that
she is the sole heir of Juan Gabatan and thus, entitled to the property under
litigation. Aggravating the weakness of her evidence were the circumstances that
(a) she did not come to court with clean hands for she presented a
tampered/altered, if not outright spurious, copy of her certificate of live birth and
(b) she unreasonably delayed the prosecution of her own cause of action. If the
Court cannot now affirm her claim, respondent has her own self to blame.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision in

CA-G.R. CV No. 52273, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil
Case No. 89-092, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint and
amended complaint in Civil Case No. 89-092 are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 198680 July 8, 2013

HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO YPON, ERUDITA Y. BARON, CICERO

YPON, WILSON YPON, VICTOR YPON, AND HINIDINO Y. PEÑALOSA, PETITIONERS,
vs.
GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE A.K.A. "GAUDIOSO E. YPON," AND THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF TOLEDO CITY, RESPONDENTS.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Branch 59 (RTC),
through a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising a pure
question of law. In particular, petitioners assail the July 27, 20112 and August 31, 20113 Orders of
the RTC, dismissing Civil Case No. T-2246 for lack of cause of action.

The Facts

On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their cousins,4 filed a complaint for Cancellation
of Title and Reconveyance with Damages (subject complaint) against respondent Gaudioso
Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a. "Gaudioso E. Ypon" (Gaudioso), docketed as Civil Case No. T-2246.5 In
their complaint, they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) died intestate and childless on June
28, 1968, leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J which were then covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-44 and T-77-A.6 Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno,
Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the cancellation of the
aforementioned certificates of title, leading to their subsequent transfer in his name under TCT Nos.
T-2637 and T-2638,7 to the prejudice of petitioners who are Magdaleno’s collateral relatives and
successors-in-interest.8

In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as evidenced by: (a) his
certificate of Live Birth; (b) two (2) letters from Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified true copy of his
passport.9 Further, by way of affirmative defense, he claimed that: (a) petitioners have no cause of
action against him; (b) the complaint fails to state a cause of action; and (c) the case is not
prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that the petitioners have been
judicially declared as Magdaleno’s lawful heirs.10

The RTC Ruling

On July 27, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed July 27, 2011 Order,11 finding that the subject
complaint failed to state a cause of action against Gaudioso. It observed that while the plaintiffs
therein had established their relationship with Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding for the
issuance of letters of administration,12 this did not mean that they could already be considered as the
decedent’s compulsory heirs. Quite the contrary, Gaudioso satisfactorily established the fact that he
is Magdaleno’s son – and hence, his compulsory heir – through the documentary evidence he
submitted which consisted of: (a) a marriage contract between Magdaleno and Epegenia
Evangelista; (b) a Certificate of Live Birth; (c) a Letter dated February 19, 1960; and (d) a passport.13

The plaintiffs therein filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied on August 31,
2011 due to the counsel’s failure to state the date on which his Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education Certificate of Compliance was issued.14

Aggrieved, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. T-2246,15 sought direct
recourse to the Court through the instant petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The core of the present controversy revolves around the issue of whether or not the RTC’s dismissal
of the case on the ground that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action was proper.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition has no merit.

Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.16 It is
well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the
complaint.17 In this relation, a complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what
appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed
for.18Accordingly, if the allegations furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained,
the same should not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the
defendants.19

As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs therein, alleged that
they are the lawful heirs of Magdaleno and based on the same, prayed that the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be declared null and void and that the transfer certificates of title
issued in the latter’s favor be cancelled. While the foregoing allegations, if admitted to be true, would
consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the said complaint, the rule that the determination of a
decedent’s lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special proceeding20 precludes the
RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the same. In the
case of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA,21 the Court, citing several other precedents, held that the
determination of who are the decedent’s lawful heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding
for such purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in this
case:

Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be
made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of
ownership and possession of property. This must take precedence over the action for recovery of
1âw phi1

possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a
declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a
special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is
defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of
heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the
establishment of a status or right.
In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled that the declaration of heirship must be
made in a special proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated in
Solivio v. Court of Appeals x x x:

In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court reiterated its ruling that
matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in
a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. Citing the case
of Agapay v. Palang, this Court held that the status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir
to a decedent's estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was
for the recovery of property.22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of
heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had
voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the
issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon,23 or when a special
proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-
opened.24

In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist. Hence,
there lies the need to institute the proper special proceeding in order to determine the heirship of the
parties involved, ultimately resulting to the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246.

Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining whether the same fails to state
a cause of action, a court cannot disregard decisions material to the proper appreciation of the
questions before it.25 Thus, concordant with applicable jurisprudence, since a determination of
heirship cannot be made in an ordinary action for recovery of ownership and/or possession, the
dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 was altogether proper. In this light, it must be pointed out that the
RTC erred in ruling on Gaudioso’s heirship which should, as herein discussed, be threshed out and
determined in the proper special proceeding. As such, the foregoing pronouncement should
therefore be devoid of any legal effect.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 is hereby
AFFIRMED, without prejudice to any subsequent proceeding to determine the lawful heirs of the late
Magdaleno Ypon and the rights concomitant therewith.

SO ORDERED.
SOCORRO LIMOS, ROSA DELOS REYES and G.R. No. 186979
SPOUSES ROLANDO DELOS REYES and
EUGENE DELOS REYES
Present:
Petitioners,

CARPIO, J.,

Chairperson,
- versus -
NACHURA,

PERALTA,

ABAD, and
SPOUSES FRANCISCO P. ODONES and
MENDOZA, JJ.
ARWENIA R. ODONES,

Respondents.
Promulgated:

August 11, 2010

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the August 14, 2008 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A. GR.
SP No. 97668 and its Resolution[2] dated March 9, 2009 denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration.

The impugned Decision affirmed the resolution dated November 16,

2006 and Order dated January 5, 2007[4] of the trial court, which respectively
[3]

denied petitioners Motion to Set for Preliminary Hearing the Special and
Affirmative Defenses[5] and motion for reconsideration.[6]

The antecedents:

On June 17, 2005, private respondents-spouses Francisco Odones and Arwenia

Odones, filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed, Title and Damages against
petitioners Socorro Limos, Rosa Delos Reyes and Spouses Rolando Delos Reyes
and Eugene Delos Reyes, docketed as Civil Case No. 05-33 before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Camiling, Tarlac, Branch 68.

The complaint alleged that spouses Odones are the owners of a 940- square
meter parcel of land located at Pao 1st, Camiling, Tarlac by virtue of an
Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale dated, January 29, 2004, executed by
the surviving grandchildren and heirs of Donata Lardizabal in whom the original
title to the land was registered. These heirs were Soledad Razalan Lagasca,
Ceferina Razalan Cativo, Rogelio Lagasca Razalan and Dominador Razalan.

It took a while before respondents decided to register the document of

conveyance; and when they did, they found out that the lands Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) was cancelled on April 27, 2005 and replaced by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 329427 in the name of herein petitioners.
 Petitioners were able to secure TCT No. 329427 by virtue of a Deed of
Absolute Sale allegedly executed by Donata Lardizabal and her husband Francisco
Razalan on April 18, 1972.

Petitioners then subdivided the lot among themselves and had TCT No.
329427 cancelled. In lieu thereof, three new TCTs were issued: TCT No. 392428 in
the names of Socorro Limos and spouses Rolando Delos Reyes and Eugene Delos
Reyes, TCT No. 392429 in the names of Spouses delos Reyes and TCT No. 392430
in the name of Rosa Delos Reyes.

Respondents sought the cancellation of these new TCTs on the ground that
the signatures of Donata Lardizabal and Francisco Razalan in the 1972 Deed of
Absolute Sale were forgeries, because they died on June 30, 1926 and June 5,
1971, respectively.[7]

In response, petitioners filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars[8] claiming

ambiguity in respondents claim that their vendors are the only heirs of Donata
Lardizabal. Finding no merit in the motion, the trial court denied the same and
ordered petitioners to file their answer to the complaint.[9]

In their answer,[10] petitioners pleaded affirmative defenses, which also

constitute grounds for dismissal of the complaint. These grounds were: (1) failure
to state a cause of action inasmuch as the basis of respondents alleged title is
void, since the Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale was not published and it
contained formal defects, the vendors are not the legal heirs of Donata
Lardizabal, and respondents are not the real parties-in-interest to question the
title of petitioners, because no transaction ever occurred between them; (2) non-
joinder of the other heirs of Donata Lardizabal as indispensable parties; and (3)
respondents claim is barred by laches.
 In their Reply, respondents denied the foregoing affirmative defenses, and
insisted that the Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale was valid. They
maintained their standing as owners of the subject parcel of land and the nullity
of the 1972 Absolute Deed of Sale, upon which respondents anchor their
purported title.[11] They appended the sworn statement of Amadeo Razalan
declaring, among other things that:

(2) Na hindi ko minana at ibinenta ang nasabing lupa kay Socorro

Limos at Rosa delos Reyes at hindi totoo na ako lang ang tagapagmana
ni Donata Lardizabal;

xxxx

(4) Ang aming lola na si Donata Lardizabal ay may tatlong (3)

anak na patay na sina Tomas Razalan, Clemente Razalan at Tomasa
Razalan;

(5) Ang mga buhay na anak ni Tomas Razalan ay sina; 1. Soledad

Razalan; 2. Ceferina Razalan; 3. Dominador Razalan; at 4. Amadeo
Razalan. Ang mga buhay na anak ni Clemente Razalan ay sina 1. Rogelio
Lagasca (isang abnormal). Ang mga buhay na anak ni Tomasa Razalan
ay sina 1. Sotera Razalan at 2 pang kapatid;

x x x x[12]

Thereafter, petitioners served upon respondents a Request for Admission

of the following matters:
1. That the husband of the deceased Donata Lardizabal is Francisco
Razalan;

2. That the children of the deceased Sps. Donata Lardizabal and Francisco
Razalan are Mercedes Razalan, Tomasa Razalan and Tomas Razalan;

3. That this Tomasa Razalan died on April 27, 1997, if not when? [A]nd her
heirs are (a) Melecio Partido surviving husband, and her surviving
children are (b) Eduardo Partido married to Elisa Filiana, (c) Enrique
Razalan Partido married to Lorlita Loriana, (d) Eduardo Razalan Partido,
(e) Sotera Razalan Partido married to James Dil-is and (f) Raymundo
Razalan Partido married to Nemesia Aczuara, and all residents of
Camiling, Tarlac.

4. That Amadeo Razalan is claiming also to be a grandchild and also

claiming to be sole forced heir of Donata Lardizabal pursuant to the
Succession by a Sole Heir with Sale dated January 24, 2000, executed
before Atty. Rodolfo V. Robinos.

5. That Amadeo Razalan is not among those who signed the Extra[j]udicial
Succession of Estate and Sale dated January 29, 2004 allegedly executed
in favor of the plaintiffs, Sps. Francisco/Arwenia Odones;

6. That as per Sinumpaang Salaysay of Amadeo Razalan which was

submitted by the plaintiffs, the children of Tomasa Razalan are Sotera
Razalan and 2 brothers/sisters. These children of Tomasa Razalan did not
also sign the Extra[j]udicial Succession of Estate and Sale;

7. That there is/are no heirs of Clemente Razalan who appeared to have

executed the Extra[j]udicial Succession of Estate and Sale;

8. That Soledad Razalan Lagasca, Ceferina Razalan Cativo, Rogelio Lagasca

Razalan and Dominador Razalan did not file any letters (sic) of
 administration nor declaration of heirship before executing the alleged
Extra[j]udicial Succession of Estate and Sale in favor of plaintiffs.[13]

Respondents failed to respond to the Request for Admission, prompting

petitioners to file a Motion to Set for Preliminary Hearing on the Special and
Affirmative Defenses,[14] arguing that respondents failure to respond or object to
the Request for Admission amounted to an implied admission pursuant to Section
2 of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. As such, a hearing on the affirmative defenses
had become imperative because petitioners were no longer required to present
evidence on the admitted facts.
Respondents filed a comment on the Motion, contending that the facts
sought to be admitted by petitioners were not material and relevant to the issue
of the case as required by Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. Respondents emphasized
that the only attendant issue was whether the 1972 Deed of Absolute Sale upon
which petitioners base their TCTs is valid.[15]

In its Resolution dated November 16, 2006, the RTC denied the Motion and held
that item nos. 1 to 4 in the Request for Admission were earlier pleaded as
affirmative defenses in petitioners Answer, to which respondents already replied
on July 17, 2006. Hence, it would be redundant for respondents to make another
denial. The trial court further observed that item nos. 5, 6, and 7 in the Request
for Admission were already effectively denied by the Extrajudicial Succession of
Estate and Sale appended to the complaint and by the Sinumpaang Salaysay of
Amadeo Razalan attached to respondents Reply.[16] Petitioners moved for
reconsideration[17] but the same was denied in an Order dated January 5, 2007.[18]

Petitioners elevated this incident to the CA by way of a special civil action for
certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in issuing the
impugned resolution and order.
On August 14, 2008, the CA dismissed the petition ruling that the affirmative
defenses raised by petitioners were not indubitable, and could be best proven in a
full-blown hearing.[19]

Their motion for reconsideration[20] having been denied,[21] petitioners are now
before this Court seeking a review of the CAs pronouncements.

In essence, petitioners contend that the affirmative defenses raised in their

Motion are indubitable, as they were impliedly admitted by respondents when
they failed to respond to the Request for Admission. As such, a preliminary
hearing on the said affirmative defenses must be conducted pursuant to our
ruling in Gochan v. Gochan.[22]

We deny the petition.

Pertinent to the present controversy are the rules on modes of discovery set forth
in Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, viz:

Section 1. Request for admission. At any time after issues have been
joined, a party may file and serve upon any other party a written
request for the admission by the latter of the genuineness of any
material and relevant document described in and exhibited with the
request or of the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact set
forth in the request. Copies of the documents shall be delivered with
the request unless copies have already been furnished.

SEC. 2 Implied admission. Each of the matters of which an

admission is requested shall be deemed admitted unless, within a
 period designated in the request, which shall be not less than fifteen
(15) days after service thereof, or within such further time as the court
may allow on motion, the party to whom the request is directed files
and serves upon the party requesting the admission a sworn statement
either denying specifically the matters for which an admission is
requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully
either admit or deny those matters.

xxxx

Under these rules, a party who fails to respond to a Request for Admission
shall be deemed to have impliedly admitted all the matters contained therein. It
must be emphasized, however, that the application of the rules on modes of
discovery rests upon the sound discretion of the court.

As such, it is the duty of the courts to examine thoroughly the circumstances of

each case and to determine the applicability of the modes of discovery, bearing
always in mind the aim to attain an expeditious administration of justice.[23]
The determination of the sanction to be imposed upon a party who fails to
comply with the modes of discovery also rests on sound judicial
discretion.[24] Corollarily, this discretion carries with it the determination of
whether or not to impose the sanctions attributable to such fault.

As correctly observed by the trial court, the matters set forth in petitioners
Request for Admission were the same affirmative defenses pleaded in their Answer
which respondents already traversed in their Reply. The said defenses were
likewise sufficiently controverted in the complaint and its annexes. In effect,
petitioners sought to compel respondents to deny once again the very matters they
had already denied, a redundancy, which if abetted, will serve no purpose but to
delay the proceedings and thus defeat the purpose of the rule on admission as a
mode of discovery which is to expedite trial and relieve parties of the costs of
proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be
ascertained by reasonable inquiry.[25]

A request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the

allegations of the requesting partys pleading but should set
forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact described in the request, whose

purpose is to establish said partys cause of action or defense. Unless it serves that
purpose, it is pointless, useless, and a mere redundancy.[26]
Verily then, if the trial court finds that the matters in a Request for
Admission were already admitted or denied in previous pleadings by the requested
party, the latter cannot be compelled to admit or deny them anew. In turn, the
requesting party cannot reasonably expect a response to the request and thereafter,
assume or even demand the application of the implied admission rule in Section 2,
Rule 26.

In this case, the redundant and unnecessarily vexatious nature of

petitioners Request for Admission rendered it ineffectual, futile, and irrelevant so
as to proscribe the operation of the implied admission rule in Section 2, Rule 26 of
the Rules of Court. There being no implied admission attributable to respondents
failure to respond, the argument that a preliminary hearing is imperative loses its
point.

Moreover, jurisprudence[27] has always been firm and constant in declaring

that when the affirmative defense raised is failure to state a cause of action, a
preliminary hearing thereon is unnecessary, erroneous, and improvident.

In any event, a perusal of respondents complaint shows that it was

sufficiently clothed with a cause of action and they were suited to file the same.
In an action for annulment of title, the complaint must contain the following
allegations: (1) that the contested land was privately owned by the plaintiff prior
to the issuance of the assailed certificate of title to the defendant; and (2) that the
defendant perpetuated a fraud or committed a mistake in obtaining a document
of title over the parcel of land claimed by the plaintiff.[28]

Such action goes into the issue of ownership of the land covered by a
Torrens title, hence, the relief generally prayed for by the plaintiff is to be
declared as the lands true owner.[29] Thus, the real party-in-interest is the person
claiming title or ownership adverse to that of the registered owner.[30]

The herein complaint alleged: (1) that respondents are the owners and occupants
of a parcel of land located at Pao 1st Camiling, Tarlac, covered by OCT No. 11560
in the name of Donata Lardizabal by virtue of an Extrajudicial Succession of Estate
and Sale; and (2) that petitioners fraudulently caused the cancellation of OCT No.
11560 and the issuance of new TCTs in their names by presenting a Deed of
Absolute Sale with the forged signatures of Donata Lardizabal and her husband,
Francisco Razalan.

The absence of any transaction between petitioners and respondents over the
land is of no moment, as the thrust of the controversy is the respondents adverse
claims of rightful title and ownership over the same property, which arose
precisely because of the conflicting sources of their respective claims.

As to the validity of the Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale and the
status of petitioners predecessors-in-interest as the only heirs of Donata
Lardizabal, these issues go into the merits of the parties respective claims and
defenses that can be best determined on the basis of preponderance of the
evidence they will adduce in a full-blown trial. A preliminary hearing, the
objective of which is for the court to determine whether or not the case should
proceed to trial, will not sufficiently address such issues.

Anent the alleged non-joinder of indispensable parties, it is settled that the

non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action.
The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may
be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at
any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. It is only when the plaintiff
refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that the
latter may dismiss the complaint.[31] In this case, no such order was issued by the
trial court.

Equally settled is the fact that laches is evidentiary in nature and it may not
be established by mere allegations in the pleadings and can not be resolved in a
motion to dismiss.[32]

Finally, we cannot subscribe to petitioners contention that the status of the heirs
of Donata Lardizabal who sold the property to the respondents must first be
established in a special proceeding. The pronouncements in Heirs of Yaptinchay v.
Hon. Del Rosario[33] and in Reyes v. Enriquez[34] that the petitioners invoke do not
find application in the present controversy.

In both cases, this Court held that the declaration of heirship can be made
only in a special proceeding and not in a civil action. It must be noted that
in Yaptinchay andEnriquez, plaintiffs action for annulment of title was anchored
on their alleged status as heirs of the original owner whereas in this case, the
respondents claim is rooted on a sale transaction. Respondents herein are
enforcing their rights as buyers in good faith and for value of the subject land and
not as heirs of the original owner. Unlike in Yaptinchay and Enriquez, the filiation
of herein respondents to the original owner is not determinative of their right to
claim title to and ownership of the property.

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the instant Petition

is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 14, 2008 and
its Resolution dated March 9, 2009 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
[G.R. No. 139587. November 22, 2000]

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF DECEASED ISMAEL REYES, THE HEIRS
OF OSCAR R. REYES, petitioners, vs. CESAR R. REYES, respondent.

DECISION

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to annul the decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 46761[1] which affirmed the Order[2]
dated January 26, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, in Special
Proceeding No. 89-2519, a petition for issuance of letters of administration, and the
resolution dated July 28, 1999 denying their motion for reconsideration.[3]

Spouses Ismael Reyes and Felisa Revita Reyes are the registered owners of parcels of
land situated in Arayat Street, Cubao, Quezon City covered by Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. 4983 and 3598 (39303). The spouses have seven children, namely: Oscar,
Araceli, Herminia, Aurora, Emmanuel, Cesar and Rodrigo, all surnamed Reyes.

On April 18, 1973, Ismael Reyes died intestate. Prior to his death, Ismael Reyes was
notified by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) of his income tax deficiency which
arose out of his sale of a parcel land located in Tandang Sora, Quezon City. For failure
to settle his tax liability, the amount increased to about P172,724.40 and since no
payment was made by the heirs of deceased Ismael Reyes, the property covered by
TCT No. 4983 was levied[4] sold and eventually forfeited by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue in favor of the government.[5]
Sometime in 1976, petitioners predecessor Oscar Reyes availed of the BIRs tax
amnesty and he was able to redeem the property covered by TCT No. 4983[6] upon
payment of the reduced tax liability in the amount of about P18,000.[7]

On May 18, 1982, the Office of the City Treasurer of Quezon City sent a notice to
Felisa Revita Reyes informing her that the Arayat properties will be sold at public
auction on August 25, 1982 for her failure to settle the real estate tax delinquency
from 1974-1981.[8]

On December 15, 1986, petitioners predecessor Oscar Reyes entered into an

amnesty compromise agreement with the City Treasurer and settled the accounts of
Felisa R. Reyes.[9]

On May 10, 1989, private respondent Cesar Reyes, brother of Oscar Reyes, filed a
petition for issuance of letters of administration with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City praying for his appointment as administrator of the estate of the
deceased Ismael Reyes which estate included 50% of the Arayat properties covered
by TCT Nos. 4983 and 3598.[10] Oscar Reyes filed his conditional opposition thereto
on the ground that the Arayat properties do not form part of the estate of the
deceased as he (Oscar) had acquired the properties by redemption and or
purchase.[11]

The probate court subsequently issued letters of administration in favor of Cesar

Reyes where the latter was ordered to submit a true and complete inventory of
properties pertaining to the estate of the deceased and the special powers of
attorney executed by the other heirs who reside in the USA and that of Aurora
Reyes-Dayot conforming to his appointment as administrator.[12] Cesar Reyes filed
an inventory of real and personal properties of the deceased which included the
Arayat properties with a total area of 1,009 sq. meters.[13] On the other hand, Oscar
Reyes filed his objection to the inventory reiterating that the Arayat properties had
been forfeited in favor of the government and he was the one who subsequently
redeemed the same from the BIR using his own funds.[14]
A hearing on the inventory was scheduled where administrator Cesar Reyes was
required to present evidence to establish that the properties belong to the estate of
Ismael Reyes and the oppositor to adduce evidence in support of his objection to the
inclusion of certain properties in the inventory.[15] After hearing the parties
respective arguments, the probate court issued its Order dated January 26, 1994, the
dispositive portion of which reads:[16]

WHEREFORE, pursuant to the foregoing findings, the Court hereby modifies the
inventory submitted by the administrator and declares to belong to the estate of the
late Ismael Reyes the following properties, to wit:

1. One half (1/2) of the agricultural land located in Montalban, Rizal containing an
area of 31,054 square meters, covered by TCT 72730 with an approximate value of
P405,270.00;

2. One half (1/2) of two (2) adjoining residential lots located on Arayat Street, Cubao,
Quezon City, with total area of 1,009 square meters, more or less, covered by TCTs
No. 4983 AND 3598 (39303), with an approximate value of P3,027,000.00; but this
determination is provisional in character and shall be without prejudice to the
outcome of any action to be brought hereafter in the proper Court on the issue of
ownership of the properties; and,

3. The building constructed by and leased to Sonny Bernardo and all its rental
income from the inception of the lease, whether such income be in the possession of
oppositor, in which case he is hereby directed to account therefor, or if such income
be still unpaid by Bernardo, in which case the administrator should move to collect
the same.

Consistent with the foregoing things, either of the administrator oppositor, or heir
Felisa R. Reyes, in her personal capacity as apparent co-owner of the Arayat Street
properties, may commence the necessary proper action for settling the issue of
ownership of such properties in the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City and to inform
the Court of the commencement thereof by any of them as soon as possible.
The administrator is hereby directed to verify and check carefully on whether other
properties, particularly the real properties allegedly situated in Montalban, Rizal; in
Marikina, Metro Manila (near Boys Town); and in Bulacan, otherwise referred to as
the Hi-Cement property truly pertained to the estate; to determine their present
condition and the status of their ownership; and to render a report thereon in
writing within thirty (30) days from receipt of this Order.

The motion demanding for accounting to be done by oppositor Oscar Reyes is hereby
denied for being unwarranted, except whatever incomes he might have received
from Sonny Bernardo, which he is hereby directed to turn over to the administrator
within thirty (30) days from finality of this Order.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by Oscar Reyes which was denied in an Order
dated May 30, 1994.[17] He then filed his appeal with the respondent Court of
Appeals. While the appeal was pending, Oscar died and he was substituted by his
heirs, herein petitioners.

On May 6, 1999, the respondent Court issued its assailed decision which affirmed the
probate courts order. It ruled that the probate courts order categorically stated that
the inclusion of the subject properties in the inventory of the estate of the deceased
Ismael Reyes is provisional in character and shall be without prejudice to the
outcome of any action to be brought hereafter in the proper court on the issue of
ownership of the properties; that the provisional character of the inclusion of the
contested properties in the inventory as stressed in the order is within the
jurisdiction of intestate court. It further stated that although the general rule that
question of title to property cannot be passed upon in the probate court admits of
exceptions, i.e. if the claimant and all other parties having legal interest in the
property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the
probate court for adjudication, such has no application in the instant case since
petitioner-appellee and oppositor-appellant are not the only parties with legal
interest in the subject property as they are not the only heirs of the decedent; that it
was never shown that all parties interested in the subject property or all the heirs of
the decedent consented to the submission of the question of ownership to the
intestate court.
Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration which was denied in a resolution
dated July 28, 1999. Hence this petition for review on certiorari alleging that the
respondent Court erred (1) in ruling that the court a quo correctly included one half
(1/2) of the Arayat properties covered by TCT Nos. 4983 and 3598 (39303) in the
inventory of the estate of the deceased Ismael Reyes (2) in upholding that the court
a quo has no jurisdiction to determine the issue of ownership.

Petitioners argue that a probate courts jurisdiction is not limited to the

determination of who the heirs are and what shares are due them as regards the
estate of a deceased person since the probate court has the power and competence
to determine whether a property should be excluded from the inventory of the
estate or not, thus the Court a quo committed a reversible error when it included the
Arayat properties in the inventory of the estate of Ismael Reyes despite the
overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner-oppositor Oscar Reyes proving his
claim of ownership. Petitioners contend that their claim of ownership over the
Arayat properties as testified to by their predecessor Oscar Reyes was based on two
(2) grounds, to wit (1) his redemption of the Arayat properties and (2) the
abandonment of the properties by his co-heirs; that his act of redeeming the
properties from the BIR in 1976 and therefter from the City Treasurer of Quezon City
using his own funds have the effect of vesting ownership to him. Petitioners claim
that private respondent is already barred from claiming the Arayat properties since
he only filed this petition 16 years after the death of Ismael Reyes and after the
prices of the real properties in Cubao have already escalated tremendously.

We find no merit in this argument.

The jurisdiction of the probate court merely relates to matters having to do with the
settlement of the estate and the probate of wills of deceased persons, and the
appointment and removal of administrators, executors, guardians and trustees.[18]
The question of ownership is as a rule, an extraneous matter which the Probate
Court cannot resolve with finality.[19] Thus, for the purpose of determining whether
a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate
proceeding, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such
determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a
separate action to resolve title.[20]

We find that the respondent Court did not err in affirming the provisional inclusion
of the subject properties to the estate of the deceased Ismael Reyes without
prejudice to the outcome of any action to be brought thereafter in the proper court
on the issue of ownership considering that the subject properties are still titled
under the torrens system in the names of spouses Ismael and Felisa Revita Reyes
which under the law is endowed with incontestability until after it has been set aside
in the manner indicated in the law.[21] The declaration of the provisional character
of the inclusion of the subject properties in the inventory as stressed in the order is
within the jurisdiction of the Probate Court.

Petitioners next claim that as an exception to the rule that the probate court is of
limited jurisdiction, the court has jurisdiction to resolve the issue of ownership when
the parties interested are all heirs of the deceased and they submitted the question
of title to the property, without prejudice to third persons. Petitioners allege that the
parties before the probate court were all the heirs of deceased Ismael Reyes and
they were allowed to present evidence proving ownership over the subject
properties, thus private respondent cannot argue that he did not in any way consent
to the submission of the issue of ownership to the probate court as the records of
this case is replete with evidence that he presented evidence in an attempt to prove
ownership of the subject properties.

We are not persuaded.

Settled is the rule that the Regional Trial Court acting as a probate court exercises
but limited jurisdiction, thus it has no power to take cognizance of and determine
the issue of title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent,
unless the claimant and all other parties having legal interest in the property
consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the Probate
Court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby
prejudiced.[22]
The facts obtaining in this case, however, do not call for the application of the
exception to the rule. It bears stress that the purpose why the probate court allowed
the introduction of evidence on ownership was for the sole purpose of determining
whether the subject properties should be included in the inventory which is within
the probate courts competence. Thus, when private respondent Cesar Reyes was
appointed as administrator of the properties in the courts Order dated July 26, 1989,
he was ordered to submit a true inventory and appraisal of the real and personal
properties of the estate which may come into his possession or knowledge which
private respondent complied with. However, petitioner Oscar Reyes submitted his
objection to the inventory on the ground that it included the subject properties
which had been forfeited in favor of the government on April 21, 1975 and which he
subsequently redeemed on August 19, 1976. The Court resolved the opposition as
follows:

At the hearing today of the pending incidents, it was agreed that the said incidents
could not be resolved without introduction of evidence.

Accordingly, the hearing on the inventory of real and personal properties is hereby
set on April 24, 1990 at 10:00 A.M. at which date and time the
petitioner/administrator shall be required to present evidence to establish that the
properties stated in the inventory belong to the estate of Ismael Reyes. The
oppositor shall thereafter adduce his evidence in support of his objection to the
inclusion of certain properties of the estates in the inventory.

Notably, the Probate Court stated, from the start of the hearing, that the hearing
was for the merits of accounting and inventory, thus it had jurisdiction to hear the
opposition of Oscar Reyes to the inventory as well as the respective evidence of the
parties to determine for purposes of inventory alone if they should be included
therein or excluded therefrom. In fact, the probate court in its Order stated that for
resolution is the matter of the inventory of the estate, mainly to consider what
properties should be included in the inventory and what should not be included.
There was nothing on record that both parties submitted the issue of ownership for
its final resolution. Thus the respondent Court did not err in ruling that the trial court
has no jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of ownership conclusively.
In fact, the probate court, aware of its limited jurisdiction declared that its
determination of the ownership was merely provisional and suggested that either
the administrator or the widow Felisa Reyes may commence the proper action in the
Regional Trial Court. Moreover, the court admitted that it was not competent to pass
upon the ownership of the subject properties, thus:

Although the testimony of the oppositor should have greater persuasive value than
that of the petitioner/administrator, mainly because it agrees closely with the
recitals of facts found in the several public documents submitted as evidence in this
case and is corroborated to the greatest extent by the fact that the properties were,
indeed, abandoned in his possession since 1975 until the present, his alleged
ownership of the Arayat Street properties cannot still be sustained in a manner
which would warrant their exclusion from the administrators inventory.

To begin with, there are portions in the records which show that the oppositor
himself was somehow uncertain about his rights on the properties and the basis
therefor. During his cross-examination (tsn, Oct. 4, 1991), he gave the following
statements:

xx xx xx

(Atty. Habitan)

Q: And if we will add the other taxes you have paid, (you) are now claiming to be the
owner of the Arayat property because you have paid all these taxes?

A: The amounts I have paid and all the expenses I have and if I had not paid all these
amounts the property in question would have been lost, sir.
Q: So, in effect, you are now claiming ownership over the property, I want a
categorical answer, Mr. Witness?

A: If I am going to sum up all these expenses, my share in the Hi-Cement property,

my share in the Bulacan property, the amount of the property in Cubao is small and
also all my sufferings because of the property in Cubao, this cannot be paid in terms
of money, sir. (tsn, Oct. 4, 1991, pp. 10-12)

On re-direct examination (tsn, Sept. 18, 1992), he clarified his statements as follows:

xx xx xx

(Atty, Javellana)

Q: Mr. Reyes, on cross-examination, you were asked by the petitioners counsel

whether because you had paid the BIR P17,872.44 you are now claiming to be the
owner of the property in Arayat Street to which you answered no, will you explain
your answer?

A: When I paid almost P18,000.00, it does not mean that I claim the property
already; on the contrary, I have my own reasons to claim it now on other conditions
which are the following: number one, there was a levy by the BIR on the property, it
was forfeited due to delinquency of real estate taxes; number two, for
abandonment, when my mother, brother(s) and sisters left the property, they told
me it is my problem and I should take care of it. Number three, the disposition, my
mother, my brothers and sisters sold the property of my father, the Hi-Cement and
the property in Visayas Street without giving my share. And another thing I have to
sell my own property, my own assets so that I can redeem from the BIR the Arayat
property and which I did with my personal funds, and number five, nobody helped
me in my problems regarding those properties, I was alone and so I felt that the
property in Arayat is mine.
xx xx xx

(tsn, Sept. 18, 1992, pp. 2-3)

Notwithstanding his clarifying statements on redirect examination, the impression of

the Court on the issue is not entirely favorable to him. Apart from the absence of a
specific document of transfer, the circumstances and factors he gave may not suffice
in and by themselves to convey or transfer title, for, at best, they may only be the
basis of such transfer. They may be considered as proof of the intention to dispose in
his favor or as evidence of a set off among the heirs, which seems to be what he has
in mind. There might also be substance in his assertions about the abandonment in
his favor, which, if raised in the proper action, could constitute either prescription or
laches. It is hardly needed to stress, therefore, that more than these are required to
predicate the exclusion of the properties from the inventory.

Another obtrusive reality stands out to invite notice: the BIR levy was only made on
the property covered in TCT 4983 and did not include the property covered in TCT
3598 (39303). This somehow detracts from the logic of the oppositors assertion of
ownership of the entire Arayat Street properties; even if his assertion is valid and
true, it can encompass, at most, only the property subject of the BIRs levy and
declaration of forfeiture (i.e., TCT 4983), not the property covered by TCT 3598
(39303).

These pronouncements should not by any means diminish or deprive the oppositor
of whatever rights or properties he believes or considers to be rightfully his.
Although the circumstances and factors he has given to the Court herein may have
legal consequences that could have defeated opposing-claims and rendered
oppositors claim on the properties unassailable, this Courts competence to
adjudicate thus in this proceedings is clearly non-existent. In Baybayan vs. Aquino
(149 SCRA 186), it was held that the question of ownership of a property alleged to
be part of the estate must be submitted to the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of
its general jurisdiction.
This ruling then, cannot be a final adjudication on the present and existing legal
ownership of the properties. Whatever is declared herein ought not to preclude
oppositor from prosecuting an ordinary action for the purpose of having his claims or
rights established over the properties. If he still cares hereafter to prosecute such
claim of ownership adversely to the estate and the apparent co-owner, his mother
Felisa. As stated in Valera, et al. vs. Judge Inserto, et al. (149 SCRA 533), this Court,
acting as a probate court, exercises but limited jurisdiction; accordingly, its
determination that property should be included in the inventory or not is within its
probate jurisdiction, but such determination is only provisional in character, not
conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action that may be
instituted by the parties.

xx xx xx

The aforecited findings clarify that there were several reasons for having the issue of
ownership ventilated elsewhere. Apart from the fact that only one-half of the two
lots known as the Arayat property (i.e., the half that could pertain to the estate)
could be settled herein, there was the realization that the evidence adduced so far
(including that bearing on the oppositors basis for excluding from the estate the
property) was inadequate or otherwise inconclusive.

A practical way of looking at the problem is that this Court, sitting herein as an
intestate court, does not consider itself competent to rule on the ownership of the
entire Arayat property.

Finally, anent private respondents allegation that the instant petition was filed one
day late, hence should be dismissed, we find the same to be devoid of merit.
Petitioners received copy of the decision denying their motion for reconsideration on
August 13, 1999, thus they have until August 28, 1999 within which to file petition
for review. Petitioners filed their motion for extension on August 27, 1999 praying
for 30 days extension from August 28, 1999 or until September 27, 1999 to file their
petition which this Court granted. Petitioners filed their petition on September 27,
1999, which is within the period given by the Court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 123486. August 12, 1999]

EUGENIA RAMONAL CODOY, and MANUEL

RAMONAL, petitioners, vs. EVANGELINE R. CALUGAY,
JOSEPHINE SALCEDO, and EUFEMIA PATIGAS, respondents.

DECISION
PARDO, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals[1] and
its resolution denying reconsideration, ruling:

Upon the unrebutted testimony of appellant Evangeline Calugay and witness Matilde
Ramonal Binanay, the authenticity of testators holographic will has been established
and the handwriting and signature therein (exhibit S) are hers, enough to probate said
will. Reversal of the judgment appealed from and the probate of the holographic will
in question be called for. The rule is that after plaintiff has completed presentation of
his evidence and the defendant files a motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence
on the ground that upon the facts and the law plaintiff has shown no right to relief, if
the motion is granted and the order to dismissal is reversed on appeal, the movant
loses his right to present evidence in his behalf (Sec. 1 Rule 35 Revised Rules of
Court). Judgment may, therefore, be rendered for appellant in the instant case.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is REVERSED and judgment rendered allowing
the probate of the holographic will of the testator Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal.[2]

The facts are as follows:

On April 6, 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees
and legatees of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal, filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 18, a petition[3] for probate of the holographic
will of the deceased, who died on January 16, 1990.
In the petition, respondents claimed that the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal, was of
sound and disposing mind when she executed the will on August 30, 1978, that there was no
fraud, undue influence, and duress employed in the person of the testator, and the will was
written voluntarily.
The assessed value of the decedents property, including all real and personal property was
about P400,000.00, at the time of her death.[4]
On June 28, 1990, Eugenia Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed an opposition[5] to
the petition for probate, alleging that the holographic will was a forgery and that the same is even
illegible. This gives an impression that a third hand of an interested party other than the true hand
of Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal executed the holographic will.
Petitioners argued that the repeated dates incorporated or appearing on the will after every
disposition is out of the ordinary. If the deceased was the one who executed the will, and was not
forced, the dates and the signature should appear at the bottom after the dispositions, as regularly
done and not after every disposition. And assuming that the holographic will is in the
handwriting of the deceased, it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on
the part of the beneficiaries, or through fraud and trickery.
Respondents presented six (6) witnesses and various documentary evidence. Petitioners
instead of presenting their evidence, filed a demurrer[6] to evidence, claiming that respondents
failed to establish sufficient factual and legal basis for the probate of the holographic will of the
deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal.
On November 26, 1990, the lower Court issued an order, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the Demurrer to Evidence

having being well taken, same is granted, and the petition for probate of the document
(Exhibit S) on the purported Holographic Will of the late Matilde Seo Vda. de
Ramonal, is denied for insufficiency of evidence and lack of merits.[7]

On December 12, 1990, respondents filed a notice of appeal,[8] and in support of their appeal,
the respondents once again reiterated the testimony of the following witnesses, namely: (1)
Augusto Neri; (2) Generosa Senon; (3) Matilde Ramonal Binanay; (4) Teresita Vedad; (5) Fiscal
Rodolfo Waga; and (6) Evangeline Calugay.
To have a clear understanding of the testimonies of the witnesses, we recite an account of
their testimonies.
Augusto Neri, Clerk of Court, Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, where the
special proceedings for the probate of the holographic will of the deceased was filed. He
produced and identified the. records of the case. The documents presented bear the signature of
the deceased, Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal, for the purpose of laying the basis for comparison
of the handwriting of the testatrix, with the writing treated or admitted as genuine by the party
against whom the evidence is offered.
Generosa Senon, election registrar of Cagayan de Oro, was presented to produce and
identify the voters affidavit of the decedent. However, the voters affidavit was not produced for
the same was already destroyed and no longer available.
Matilde Ramonal Binanay, testified that the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal was
her aunt, and that after the death of Matildes husband, the latter lived with her in her parents
house for eleven (11) years, from 1958 to 1969. During those eleven (11) years of close
association with the deceased, she acquired familiarity with her signature and handwriting as she
used to accompany her (deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal) in collecting rentals from her
various tenants of commercial buildings, and the deceased always issued receipts. In addition to
this, she (witness Matilde Binanay) assisted the deceased in posting the records of the accounts,
and carried personal letters of the deceased to her creditors.
Matilde Ramonal Binanay further testified that at the time of the death of Matilde Vda. de
Ramonal, she left a holographic will dated August 30, 1978, which was personally and entirely
written, dated and signed, by the deceased and that all the dispositions therein, the dates, and the
signatures in said will, were that of the deceased.
Fiscal Rodolfo Waga testified that before he was appointed City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro,
he was a practicing lawyer, and handled all the pleadings and documents signed by the deceased
in connection with the intestate proceedings of her late husband, as a result of which he is
familiar with the handwriting of the latter. He testified that the signature appearing in the
holographic will was similar to that of the deceased, Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal, but he can
not be sure.
The fifth witness presented was Mrs. Teresita Vedad, an employee of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, Region 10. She testified that she processed the application
of the deceased for pasture permit and was familiar with the signature of the deceased, since the
deceased signed documents in her presence, when the latter was applying for pasture permit.
Finally, Evangeline Calugay, one of the respondents, testified that she had lived with the
deceased since birth, and was in fact adopted by the latter. That after a long period of time she
became familiar with the signature of the deceased. She testified that the signature appearing in
the holographic will is the true and genuine signature of Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal.
The holographic will which was written in Visayan, is translated in English as follows:

Instruction

August 30, 1978

1. My share at Cogon, Raminal Street, for Evangeline Calugay.

(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal

August 30, 1978

2. Josefina Salcedo must be given 1,500 square meters at Pinikitan Street.

(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal

August 30, 1978

3. My jewelrys shall be divided among:

1. Eufemia Patigas
2. Josefina Salcedo

3. Evangeline Calugay

(Sgd)Matilde Vda de Ramonal

August 30, 1978

4. I bequeath my one (1) hectare land at Mandumol, Indahag to Evangeline R.

Calugay

(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal

"August 30, 1978

5. Give the 2,500 Square Meters at Sta. Cruz Ramonal Village in favor of Evangeline
R. Calugay, Helen must continue with the Sta. Cruz, once I am no longer around.

(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal

August 30, 1978

6. Bury me where my husband Justo is ever buried.

(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal

"August 30,1978

Gene and Manuel:

"Follow my instruction in order that I will rest peacefully.

Mama

Matilde Vda de Ramonal

On October 9, 1995, the Court of Appeals, rendered decision[9] ruling that the appeal was
meritorious. Citing the decision in the case of Azaola vs. Singson, 109 Phil. 102, penned by Mr.
Justice J. B. L. Reyes, a recognized authority in civil law, the Court of Appeals held:

x x x even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, we are of the
opinion that Article 811 of our present civil code can not be interpreted as to require
the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the
testator, under penalty of having the probate denied. Since no witness may have been
present at the execution of the holographic will, none being required by law (art. 810,
new civil code), it becomes obvious that the existence of witnesses possessing the
requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the proponent. For it is not
merely a question of finding and producing any three witnesses; they must be
witnesses who know the handwriting and signature of the testator and who can declare
(truthfully, of course, even if the law does not express) that the will and the signature
are in the handwriting of the testator. There may be no available witness acquainted
with the testators hand; or even if so familiarized, the witness may be unwilling to
give a positive opinion.Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of article 811 may
thus become an impossibility. That is evidently the reason why the second paragraph
of article 811 prescribes that

in the absence of any competent witness referred to in the preceding paragraph, and if
the court deems it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to.

As can be seen, the law foresees the possibility that no qualified witness may be found
(or what amounts to the same thing, that no competent witness may be willing to
testify to the authenticity of the will), and provides for resort to expert evidence to
supply the deficiency.

It may be true that the rule of this article (requiring that three witnesses be presented if
the will is contested and only one if no contest is had) was derived from the rule
established for ordinary testaments (CF Cabang vs. Delfinado, 45 PHIL 291;
Tolentino v. Francisco, 57 PHIL 742). But it can not be ignored that the requirement
can be considered mandatory only in case of ordinary testaments, precisely because
the presence of at least three witnesses at the execution of ordinary wills is made by
law essential to their validity (Art. 805). Where the will is holographic, no witness
need be present (art.10), and the rule requiring production of three witnesses must
be deemed merely permissive if absurd results are to be avoided.

Again, under Art.811, the resort to expert evidence is conditioned by the words if the
court deem it necessary, which reveal that what the law deems essential is that the
court should be convinced of the wills authenticity. Where the prescribed number of
witnesses is produced and the court is convinced by their testimony that the will is
genuine, it may consider it unnecessary to call for expert evidence. On the other hand,
if no competent witness is available, or none of those produced is convincing, the
court may still, and in fact it should resort to handwriting experts. The duty of the
court, in fine, is to exhaust all available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much
interested as the proponent that the true intention of the testator be carried into effect.
Paraphrasing Azaola vs. Singson, even if the genuineness of the holographic will were
contested, Article 811 of the civil code cannot be interpreted as to require the
compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator,
under penalty of the having the probate denied. No witness need be present in the
execution of the holographic will. And the rule requiring the production of three
witnesses is merely permissive. What the law deems essential is that the court is
convinced of the authenticity of the will. Its duty is to exhaust all available lines of
inquiry, for the state is as much interested in the proponent that the true intention of
the testator be carried into effect. And because the law leaves it to the trial court to
decide if experts are still needed, no unfavorable inference can be drawn from a partys
failure to offer expert evidence, until and unless the court expresses dissatisfaction
with the testimony of the lay witnesses.[10]

According to the Court of Appeals, Evangeline Calugay, Matilde Ramonal Binanay and
other witnesses definitely and in no uncertain terms testified that the handwriting and signature
in the holographic will were those of the testator herself.
Thus, upon the unrebutted testimony of appellant Evangeline Calugay and witness Matilde
Ramonal Binanay, the Court of Appeals sustained the authenticity of the holographic will and
the handwriting and signature therein, and allowed the will to probate.
Hence, this petition.
The petitioners raise the following issues:
(1) Whether or not the ruling of the case of Azaola vs. Singson, 109 Phil. 102, relied upon by
the respondent Court of Appeals, was applicable to the case.
(2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that private respondents had been able
to present credible evidence to prove that the date, text, and signature on the holographic will
were written entirely in the hand of the testatrix.
(3) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not analyzing the signatures in the holographic
will of Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal.
In this petition, the petitioners ask whether the provisions of Article 811 of the Civil Code
are permissive or mandatory. The article provides, as a requirement for the probate of a contested
holographic will, that at least three witnesses explicitly declare that the signature in the will is the
genuine signature of the testator.
We are convinced, based on the language used, that Article 811 of the Civil Code is
mandatory. The word shall connotes a mandatory order. We have ruled that shall in a statute
commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and
that the presumption is that the word shall, when used in a statute is mandatory.[11]
Laws are enacted to achieve a goal intended and to guide against an evil or mischief that
aims to prevent. In the case at bar, the goal to achieve is to give effect to the wishes of the
deceased and the evil to be prevented is the possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for
their benefit will employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator.
 So, we believe that the paramount consideration in the present petition is to determine the
true intent of the deceased. An exhaustive and objective consideration of the evidence is
imperative to establish the true intent of the testator.
It will be noted that not all the witnesses presented by the respondents testified explicitly
that they were familiar with the handwriting of the testator. In the case of Augusto Neri, clerk of
court, Court of First Instance, Misamis Oriental, he merely identified the record of Special
Proceedings No. 427 before said court. He was not presented to declare explicitly that the
signature appearing in the holographic was that of the deceased.
Generosa E. Senon, the election registrar of Cagayan de Oro City, was presented to identify
the signature of the deceased in the voters affidavit, which was not even produced as it was no
longer available.
Matilde Ramonal Binanay, on the other hand, testified that:
Q. And you said for eleven (11) years Matilde Vda de Ramonal resided with your parents at Pinikitan,
Cagayan de Oro City. Would you tell the court what was your occupation or how did Matilde
Vda de Ramonal keep herself busy that time?
A. Collecting rentals.
Q. From where?
A. From the land rentals and commercial buildings at Pabayo-Gomez streets.[12]
xxx
Q. Who sometime accompany her?
A. I sometimes accompany her
Q. In collecting rentals does she issue receipts?
A. Yes, sir.[13]
xxx
Q. Showing to you the receipt dated 23 October 1979, is this the one you are referring to as one of the
receipts which she issued to them?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now there is that signature of Matilde vda. De Ramonal, whose signature is that Mrs.
Binanay?
A. Matilde vda. De Ramonal.
Q. Why do you say that that is a signature of Matilde vda. De Ramonal?
A. I am familiar with her signature.
Q. Now, you tell the court Mrs. Binanay, whether you know Matilde vda de Ramonal kept records of
the accounts of her tenants?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Why do you say so?
 A. Because we sometimes post a record of accounts in behalf of Matilde Vda. De Ramonal.
Q. How is this record of accounts made? How is this reflected?
A. In handwritten.[14]
xxx
Q. In addition to collection of rentals, posting records of accounts of tenants and deed of sale which
you said what else did you do to acquire familiarity of the signature of Matilde Vda De Ramonal?
A. Posting records.
Q. Aside from that?
A. Carrying letters.
Q. Letters of whom?
A. Matilde
Q. To whom?
A. To her creditors.[15]
xxx
Q. You testified that at the time of her death she left a will. I am showing to you a document with its
title tugon is this the document you are referring to?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Showing to you this exhibit S, there is that handwritten tugon, whose handwriting is this?
A. My aunt.
Q. Why do you say this is the handwriting of your aunt?
A. Because I am familiar with her signature.[16]
What Ms. Binanay saw were pre-prepared receipts and letters of the deceased, which she
either mailed or gave to her tenants. She did not declare that she saw the deceased sign a
document or write a note.
Further, during the cross-examination, the counsel for petitioners elicited the fact that the
will was not found in the personal belongings of the deceased but was in the possession of Ms.
Binanay. She testified that:
Q. Mrs. Binanay, when you were asked by counsel for the petitioners if the late Matilde Seno vda de
Ramonal left a will you said, yes?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who was in possession of that will?
A. I.
Q. Since when did you have the possession of the will?
A. It was in my mothers possession.
Q. So, it was not in your possession?
 A. Sorry, yes.
Q. And when did you come into possession since as you said this was originally in the possession of
your mother?
A. 1985.[17]
xxx
Q. Now, Mrs. Binanay was there any particular reason why your mother left that will to you and
therefore you have that in your possession?
A. It was not given to me by my mother, I took that in the aparador when she died.
Q. After taking that document you kept it with you?
A. I presented it to the fiscal.
Q. For what purpose?
A. Just to seek advice.
Q. Advice of what?
A. About the will.[18]
In her testimony it was also evident that Ms. Binanay kept the fact about the will from
petitioners, the legally adopted children of the deceased. Such actions put in issue her motive of
keeping the will a secret to petitioners and revealing it only after the death of Matilde Seo Vda.
de Ramonal.
In the testimony of Ms. Binanay, the following were established:
Q. Now, in 1978 Matilde Seno Vda de Ramonal was not yet a sickly person is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. She was up and about and was still uprightly and she could walk agilely and she could go to her
building to collect rentals, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.[19]
xxx
Q. Now, let us go to the third signature of Matilde Ramonal. Do you know that there are retracings in
the word Vda.?
A. Yes, a little. The letter L is continuous.
Q. And also in Matilde the letter L is continued to letter D?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Again the third signature of Matilde Vda de Ramonal the letter L in Matilde is continued towards
letter D.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And there is a retracing in the word Vda.?
A. Yes, sir.[20]
 xxx
Q. Now, that was 1979, remember one year after the alleged holographic will. Now, you identified a
document marked as Exhibit R. This is dated January 8,1978 which is only about eight months
from August 30,1978. Do you notice that the signature Matilde Vda de Ramonal is beautifully
written and legible?
A. Yes, sir the handwriting shows that she was very exhausted.
Q. You just say that she was very exhausted while that in 1978 she was healthy was not sickly and she
was agile. Now, you said she was exhausted?
A. In writing.
Q. How did you know that she was exhausted when you were not present and you just tried to explain
yourself out because of the apparent inconsistencies?
A. That was I think. (sic)
Q. Now, you already observed this signature dated 1978, the same year as the alleged holographic
will. In exhibit I, you will notice that there is no retracing; there is no hesitancy and the signature
was written on a fluid movement. x x x And in fact , the name Eufemia R. Patigas here refers to
one of the petitioners?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You will also notice Mrs. Binanay that it is not only with the questioned signature appearing in the
alleged holographic will marked as Exhibit X but in the handwriting themselves, here you will
notice the hesitancy and tremors, do you notice that?
A. Yes, sir.[21]
Evangeline Calugay declared that the holographic will was written, dated and signed in the
handwriting of the testator. She testified that:
Q. You testified that you stayed with the house of the spouses Matilde and Justo Ramonal for the
period of 22 years. Could you tell the court the services if any which you rendered to Matilde
Ramonal?
A. During my stay I used to go with her to the church, to the market and then to her transactions.
Q. What else? What services that you rendered?
A. After my college days I assisted her in going to the bank, paying taxes and to her lawyer.
Q. What was your purpose of going to her lawyer?
A. I used to be her personal driver.
Q. In the course of your stay for 22 years did you acquire familiarity of the handwriting of Matilde
Vda de Ramonal?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How come that you acquired familiarity?
A. Because I lived with her since birth.[22]
xxx
 Q. Now, I am showing to you Exhibit S which is captioned tugon dated Agosto 30, 1978 there is a
signature here below item No. 1, will you tell this court whose signature is this?
A. Yes, sir, that is her signature.
Q. Why do you say that is her signature?
A. I am familiar with her signature.[23]
So, the only reason that Evangeline can give as to why she was familiar with the
handwriting of the deceased was because she lived with her since birth. She never declared that
she saw the deceased write a note or sign a document.
The former lawyer of the deceased, Fiscal Waga, testified that:
Q. Do you know Matilde Vda de Ramonal?
A. Yes, sir I know her because she is my godmother the husband is my godfather. Actually I am
related to the husband by consanguinity.
Q. Can you tell the name of the husband?
A. The late husband is Justo Ramonal.[24]
xxx
Q. Can you tell this court whether the spouses Justo Ramonal and Matilde Ramonal have legitimate
children?
A. As far as I know they have no legitimate children.[25]
xxx
Q. You said after becoming a lawyer you practice your profession? Where?
A. Here in Cagayan de Oro City.
Q. Do you have services rendered with the deceased Matilde vda de Ramonal?
A. I assisted her in terminating the partition, of properties.
Q. When you said assisted, you acted as her counsel? Any sort of counsel as in what case is that,
Fiscal?
A. It is about the project partition to terminate the property, which was under the court before.[26]
xxx
Q. Appearing in special proceeding no. 427 is the amended inventory which is marked as exhibit N of
the estate of Justo Ramonal and there appears a signature over the type written word Matilde vda
de Ramonal, whose signature is this?
A. That is the signature of Matilde Vda de Ramonal.
Q. Also in exhibit n-3, whose signature is this?
A. This one here that is the signature of Mrs. Matilde vda de Ramonal.[27]
xxx
 Q. Aside from attending as counsel in that Special Proceeding Case No. 427 what were the other
assistance wherein you were rendering professional service to the deceased Matilde Vda de
Ramonal?
A. I can not remember if I have assisted her in other matters but if there are documents to show that I
have assisted then I can recall.[28]
xxx
Q. Now, I am showing to you exhibit S which is titled tugon, kindly go over this document, Fiscal
Waga and tell the court whether you are familiar with the handwriting contained in that document
marked as exhibit S?
A. I am not familiar with the handwriting.
Q. This one, Matilde Vda de Ramonal, whose signature is this?
A. I think this signature here it seems to be the signature of Mrs. Matilde vda de Ramonal.
Q. Now, in item No. 2 there is that signature here of Matilde Vda de Ramonal, can you tell the court
whose signature is this?
A. Well, that is similar to that signature appearing in the project of partition.
Q. Also in item no. 3 there is that signature Matilde Vda de Ramonal, can you tell the court whose
signature is that?
A. As I said, this signature also seems to be the signature of Matilde vda de Ramonal.
Q. Why do you say that?
A. Because there is a similarity in the way it is being written.
Q. How about this signature in item no. 4, can you tell the court whose signature is this?
A. The same is true with the signature in item no. 4. It seems that they are similar.[29]
xxx
Q. Mr. Prosecutor, I heard you when you said that the signature of Matilde Vda de Ramonal
Appearing in exhibit S seems to be the signature of Matilde vda de Ramonal?
A. Yes, it is similar to the project of partition.
Q. So you are not definite that this is the signature of Matilde vda de Ramonal. You are merely
supposing that it seems to be her signature because it is similar to the signature of the
project of partition which you have made?
A. That is true.[30]
From the testimonies of these witnesses, the Court of Appeals allowed the will to probate
and disregard the requirement of three witnesses in case of contested holographic will, citing the
decision in Azaola vs. Singson,[31] ruling that the requirement is merely directory and not
mandatory.
In the case of Ajero vs. Court of Appeals,[32] we said that the object of the solemnities
surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid
substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the
laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But,
on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to
restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will.
However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being adjudged as the will
of the testator, which is why if the holographic will is contested, that law requires three witnesses
to declare that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased.
The will was found not in the personal belongings of the deceased but with one of the
respondents, who kept it even before the death of the deceased. In the testimony of Ms. Binanay,
she revealed that the will was in her possession as early as 1985, or five years before the death of
the deceased.
There was no opportunity for an expert to compare the signature and the handwriting of the
deceased with other documents signed and executed by her during her lifetime. The only chance
at comparison was during the cross-examination of Ms. Binanay when the lawyer of petitioners
asked Ms. Binanay to compare the documents which contained the signature of the deceased
with that of the holographic will and she is not a handwriting expert. Even the former lawyer of
the deceased expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the signature in the holographic will.
A visual examination of the holographic will convince us that the strokes are different when
compared with other documents written by the testator. The signature of the testator in some of
the disposition is not readable. There were uneven strokes, retracing and erasures on the will.
Comparing the signature in the holographic will dated August 30, 1978,[33] and the signatures
in several documents such as the application letter for pasture permit dated December 30,
1980,[34] and a letter dated June 16, 1978,[35] the strokes are different. In the letters, there are
continuous flows of the strokes, evidencing that there is no hesitation in writing unlike that of the
holographic will. We, therefore, cannot be certain that the holographic will was in the
handwriting by the deceased.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE. The records are ordered
remanded to the court of origin with instructions to allow petitioners to adduce evidence in
support of their opposition to the probate of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seo
Vda. de Ramonal.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 77047 May 28, 1988

JOAQUINA R-INFANTE DE ARANZ, ANTONIO R-INFANTE, CARLOS R. INFANTE, MERCEDES

R-INFANTE DE LEDNICKY, ALFREDO R-INFANTE, TERESITA R-INFANTE, RAMON R-
INFANTE, FLORENCIA R-INFANTE DE DIAS, MARTIN R-INFANTE, JOSE R-INFANTE LINK and
JOAQUIN R-INFANTE CAMPBELL, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. NICOLAS GALING, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL
CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH NO. 166, PASIG, METRO MANILA AND JOAQUIN R-
INFANTE, respondents.

Belo, Abiera and Associates for petitioners.

Miguel J. Lagman for respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals, dated 13 January 1987, in CA-G.R. SP No. 09622, entitled
"Joaquina R-Infante de Aranz, et al., petitioners vs. Hon. Nicolas Galing, etc., et al., respondents," dismissing petitioners' petition for certiorari
and prohibition as-, sailing the orders 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 166, dated 12 May 1986 and 30 May 1986, respectively,
in Sp. Proc. No. 9995, entitled, "In the Matter of Petition for Approval of the Last Will and Testament of Montserrat R-Infante y G-Pola
Joaquin R. Infante, Petitioner."

On 3 March 1986, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 166, a
petition for the probate and allowance of the last will and testament of the late Montserrat R-Infante y
G-Pola The petition specified the names and ad- dresses of herein petitioners as legatees and
devisees, as follows:

Joaquina R-Infante Roxas de Aranz residing at No. 86 10th St., New Manila, Quezon
City, Metro Manila;

Antonio R-Infante Roxas residing at #91 Cambridge, North Forbes, Makati, Metro
Manila;

Carlos R-Infante Roxas residing at #46 Washington St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro
Manila;

Mercedes R-Infante Roxas de Lednicky residing at #386 P. Guevarra St., San Juan,
Metro Manila;

Alfredo R-Infante Roxas residing at #27 A Scout Tobias St., Quezon City, Metro
Manila;

Teresita R-Infante Roxas residing at #121 9th Street, New Manila, Quezon City,
Metro Manila;

Ramon R-Infante Roxas residing at #27 B Scout Tobias St., Quezon City, Metro
Manila;
 Florencia R-Infante Roxas de Diaz residing at Calle Sancho Davila, 13-19-D, Madrid,
28028 Spain;

Martin R-Infante Roxas residing at #2 Bongavilla St., Cubao, Quezon City, Metro
Manila;

Jose R-Infante Link residing at 174R-Pascual St., San Juan, Metro Manila;

Joaquin R-Infante Campbell C/O Pilar Campbell, 15 Briones, Makati, Metro Marta. 3

On 12 March 1986, the probate court issued an order selling the petition for hearing on 5 May 1986
at 8:30 o'clock in the morning. Said order was published in the "Nueva Era" A newspaper of general
circulation in Metro Manila once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks. On the date of the hearing,
no oppositor appeared. The hearing was then reset to 12 May 1986, on which date, the probate
court issued the following order:

There being no opposition to this instant case, as prayed for, the oner to-receive
Branch Clerk of Court is hereby designated Co evidence ex-parte of the petitioner.

SO ORDERED. 4

On the same day (12 May 1986), private respondent presented his evidence ex-parte and placed
Arturo Arceo one of the testamentary witnesses, on the witness stand. During the proceedings,
private respondent was appointed executor.

On 14 May 1986, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of 12 May 1986 alleging
that, as named legatees, no notices were sent to them as required by Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of
Court and they prayed that they be given a period of ten (10) days within which to file their
opposition to the probate of the will.

On 30 May 1986, the probate court, acting on the opposition of private respondent and the reply
thereto of petitioners, issued an order denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Thereafter, petitioners filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition which was,
however, referred to the Court of Appeals. On 13 January 1987, the Court of Appeals promulgated a
decision dismissing the petition. 5Hence, the instant petition.

It is the view of petitioners that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that personal notice of probate
proceedings to the known legatees and devisees is not a jurisdictional requirement in the probate of
a will. Contrary to the holding of the Court of Appeals that the requirement of notice on individual
heirs, legatees and devisees is merely a matter of procedural convenience to better satisfy in some
instances the requirements of due process, petitioners allege that under Sec. 4 of Rule 76 of the
Rules of Court, said requirement of the law is mandatory and its omission constitutes a reversible
error for being constitutive of grave abuse of discretion. 6

We grant the petition:

Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Cof reads:

SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or personally.

— The court shag also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for
 proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees,
and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines at their places of residence,
and deposited in the post office with the postage thereon prepaid at least twenty (20)
days before the hearing, if such places of residence be known. A copy of the notice
must in like manner be mailed to the person named as executor, if he be not, the
petitioner; also, to any person named as co-executor not petitioning, if their places of
residence be known. Personal service of copies of the notice at least ten (10) days
before the day of hearing shall be equivalent to mailing.

It is clear from the aforecited rule that notice of the time and place of the hearing for the allowance of
a will shall be forwarded to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees residing in
the Philippines at their places of residence, if such places of residence be known. There is no
question that the residences of herein petitioners legatees and devisees were known to the probate
court. The petition for the allowance of the wig itself indicated the names and addresses of the
legatees and devisees of the testator. 7 But despite such knowledge, the probate court did not cause
copies of the notice to be sent to petitioners. The requirement of the law for the allowance of the will
was not satisfied by mere publication of the notice of hearing for three (3) weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province.

The case of Joson vs. Nable 8 cited by the Court of Appeals in its assailed decision to support its
theory is not applicable in the present case. In that case, petitioners Purificacion Joson and Erotica
Joson failed to contest the will of Tomas Joson because they had not been notified of the hearing of
the petition for probate. he the petition included the residence of petitioners as Dagupan Street No.
83, Manila, petitioners claimed that their residence was not Dagupan Street No. 83, Manila. There
the Court said:

Petitioners maintain that no notice was received by them partly because their
residence was not Dagupan Street No. 83 as alleged in the petition for probate. If the
allegation of the petition was wrong and the true residence of petitioners was not
known, then notice upon them individually was not necessary. Under the provision
abovequoted, individual notice upon heirs, legatees and devisees is necessary only
when they are known or when their places of residence are known. In other
instances, such notice is not necessary and the court may acquire and exercise
jurisdiction simply upon the publication of the notice in a newspaper of general
circulation. ... 9

In Re: Testate Estate of Suntay, 10 the Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla, said:

... It is a proceedings in rem and for the validity of such proceedings personal notice
or by publication or both to all interested parties must be made. The interested
parties in the case were known to reside in the Philippines. The evidence shows that
no such notice was received by the interested parties residing in the Philippines (pp.
474, 476, 481, 503-4, t.s.n., hearing of 24 February 1948). The proceedings had in
the municipal district court of Amoy, China, may be likened to a deposition or to a
perpetuation of testimony, and even if it were so it does not measure or come up to
the standard of such proceedings in the Philippines for lack of notice to all interested
parties and the proceedings were held at the back of such interested parties.

xxx xxx xxx

... In view thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have
been done in accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and
 principles followed in the probate and allowance of wills. Consequently, the
authenticated transcript of proceedings held in the municipal district court of Amoy,
China, cannot be deemed and accepted as proceedings leading to the probate or
allowance of a will and, therefore, the will referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed
and recorded by a competent court of court. 11

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 13 January 1987 is hereby ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby ordered remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig for
further proceedings in accordance with this decision. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE G.R. No. 169144

PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL

OF RUPERTA PALAGANAS WITH
PRAYER FOR THE APPOINTMENT
OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR,

MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS and

BENJAMIN GREGORIO PALAGANAS,
Petitioners, Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
- versus - NACHURA,

ABAD,

MENDOZA, and

SERENO,* JJ.

ERNESTO PALAGANAS,

Respondent. Promulgated:

January 26, 2011

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

ABAD, J.:
This case is about the probate before Philippine court of a will executed abroad by
a foreigner although it has not been probated in its place of execution.

The Facts and the Case

On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a

naturalized United States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the last will
and testament she executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio C.
Palaganas (Sergio), as the executor of her will for she had left properties in
the Philippines and in the U.S.

On May 19, 2003 respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another brother of

Ruperta, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, a petition
for the probate of Rupertas will and for his appointment as special administrator
of her estate.[1] On October 15, 2003, however, petitioners Manuel Miguel
Palaganas (Manuel) and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas (Benjamin), nephews of
Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that Rupertas will should not be
probated in the Philippines but in the U.S.where she executed it. Manuel and
Benjamin added that, assuming Rupertas will could be probated in
the Philippines, it is invalid nonetheless for having been executed under duress
and without the testators full understanding of the consequences of such
act. Ernesto, they claimed, is also not qualified to act as administrator of the
estate.
Meantime, since Rupertas foreign-based siblings, Gloria Villaluz and Sergio, were
on separate occasions in the Philippines for a short visit, respondent Ernesto filed
a motion with the RTC for leave to take their deposition, which it granted. On
April, 13, 2004 the RTC directed the parties to submit their memorandum on the
issue of whether or not Rupertas U.S. will may be probated in and allowed by a
court in the Philippines.

On June 17, 2004 the RTC issued an order:[2] (a) admitting to probate Rupertas last
will; (b) appointing respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the request of
Sergio, the U.S.-based executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters
of Special Administration to Ernesto.

Aggrieved by the RTCs order, petitioner nephews Manuel and Benjamin appealed
to the Court of Appeals (CA),[3] arguing that an unprobated will executed by an
American citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated for the first time in
the Philippines.

On July 29, 2005 the CA rendered a decision,[4] affirming the assailed order of the
RTC,[5] holding that the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will, subject to
respondent Ernestos submission of the authenticated copies of the documents
specified in the order and his posting of required bond. The CA pointed out that
Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does not require prior probate and
allowance of the will in the country of its execution, before it can be probated in
the Philippines. The present case, said the CA, is different from reprobate, which
refers to a will already probated and allowed abroad. Reprobate is governed by
different rules or procedures. Unsatisfied with the decision, Manuel and Benjamin
came to this Court.
The Issue Presented

The key issue presented in this case is whether or not a will executed by a
foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines although it has not been
previously probated and allowed in the country where it was executed.

The Courts Ruling

Petitioners Manuel and Benjamin maintain that wills executed by foreigners

abroad must first be probated and allowed in the country of its execution before
it can be probated here. This, they claim, ensures prior compliance with the legal
formalities of the country of its execution. They insist that local courts can only
allow probate of such wills if the proponent proves that: (a) the testator has been
admitted for probate in such foreign country, (b) the will has been admitted to
probate there under its laws, (c) the probate court has jurisdiction over the
proceedings, (d) the law on probate procedure in that foreign country and proof
of compliance with the same, and (e) the legal requirements for the valid
execution of a will.

But our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad
although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of
their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article
816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect
in the Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law
of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his
country.[6]
In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province
where he has an estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such
estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the executor, devisee, or
legatee named in the will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at
any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to
have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or
destroyed.

Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show,
so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages,
and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c)
the probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d) the name of
the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered
to the court, the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer
to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the
province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the estate he left in such province.[7] The rules do not require proof that
the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country of its
execution.

In insisting that Rupertas will should have been first probated and allowed by the
court of California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the
procedure for the reprobate of will before admitting it here. But, reprobate or re-
authentication of a will already probated and allowed in a foreign country is
different from that probate where the will is presented for the first time before a
competent court. Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of
Court. Contrary to petitioners stance, since this latter rule applies only to
reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the present case. In reprobate,
the local court acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign probate court
provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be established.

Besides, petitioners stand is fraught with impractically. If the instituted heirs do

not have the means to go abroad for the probate of the will, it is as good as
depriving them outright of their inheritance, since our law requires that no will
shall pass either real or personal property unless the will has been proved and
allowed by the proper court.[8]

Notably, the assailed RTC order of June 17, 2004 is nothing more than an initial
ruling that the court can take cognizance of the petition for probate of Rupertas
will and that, in the meantime, it was designating Ernesto as special administrator
of the estate. The parties have yet to present evidence of the due execution of
the will, i.e. the testators state of mind at the time of the execution and
compliance with the formalities required of wills by the laws of California. This
explains the trial courts directive for Ernesto to submit the duly authenticated
copy of Rupertas will and the certified copies of the Laws of Succession and
Probate of Will of California.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Court of Appeals
decision in CA-G.R. CV 83564 dated July 29, 2005.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 130371 &130855

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

Chairperson,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA, and

PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:

August 4, 2009
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the March 13, 1997 Decision[2] and August 27,
1997 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 43450.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On January 11, 1996, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City Branch
156, acting as a probate court, in Special Proceeding No. 10279, issued an
Order[4] granting letters testamentary in solidum to respondents Ferdinand R.
Marcos II and Imelda Trinidad Romualdez-Marcos as executors of the last will and
testament of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos.

The dispositive portion of the January 11, 1996 Order reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the Last Will and Testament of Ferdinand Edralin

Marcos to have been duly executed in accordance with law, the same is
hereby ALLOWED AND ADMITTED TO PROBATE.

Upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P50,000.00, let letters

testamentary be issued in solidum to Imelda Trinidad Romualdez-
Marcos AND Ferdinand Romualdez Marcos II, named executors
therein.

Pending the filing of said bond and their oath, Commissioner Liwayway
Vinzons-Chato of the Bureau of Internal Revenue is hereby authorized
to continue her functions as Special Administrator of the Estate of
Ferdinand Edralin Marcos.

Let NOTICE be given to all known heirs and creditors of the decedent,
and to any other persons having an interest in the estate for them to lay
their claim against the Estate or forever hold their peace.

SO ORDERED.[5]
 On January 15, 1996, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed a
Motion for Partial Reconsideration[6] in so far as the January 11, 1996 RTC Order
granted letters testamentary to respondents. On the other hand, respondent
Imelda Marcos filed her own motion for reconsideration on the ground that the
will is lost and that petitioner has not proven its existence and validity.

On February 5, 1996, respondent Ferdinand Marcos II filed a Compliance stating

that he already filed a bond in the amount of P50,000.00 as directed by the
January 11, 1996 RTC Order and that he took his oath as named executor of the
will on January 30, 1996.

On March 13, 1996, the RTC issued Letters of Administration[7] to BIR

Commissioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato in accordance with an earlier Order
dated September 9, 1994, appointing her as Special Administratrix of the Marcos
Estate.

On April 1, 1996, respondent Ferdinand Marcos II filed a Motion to Revoke the

Letters of Administration issued by the RTC to BIR Commissioner Vinzons-Chato.

On April 26, 1996, the RTC issued an Order[8] denying the motion for partial
reconsideration filed by petitioner as well as the motion for reconsideration filed
by respondent Imelda Marcos, the penultimate portion of which reads:

Under the Rules, a decedents testamentary privilege must be accorded

utmost respect. Guided by this legal precept, therefore, in resolving the
two (2) motions at hand, the Court is constrained to DENY both.
 Examining the arguments poised by the movants, the Court observed
that these are but a mere rehash of issues already raised and passed
upon by the Court.

One has to review the previous orders issued by the Court in this case,
e.g., the orders dated September 9, 1994, November 25, 1994, as well
as October 3, 1995, to see that even as far back then, the Court has
considered the matter of competency of the oppositors and of
Commissioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato as having been settled.

It cannot be overstressed that the assailed January 11, 1996 Orders of

the Court was arrived at only after extensive consideration of every
legal facet available on the question of validity of the Will.

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the motion for reconsideration filed

separately by petitioner Republic and oppositor Imelda R. Marcos are
both DENIED.

SO ORDERED.[9]

On June 6, 1996, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Review
on Certiorari, under Ruled 45 of the Rules of Court, questioning the
aforementioned RTC Orders granting letters testamentary to respondents.

On February 5, 1997, the First Division of this Court issued a Resolution referring
the petition to the CA, to wit:
 xxxx

The special civil action for certiorari as well as all the other pleadings
filed herein are REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for consideration
and adjudication on the merits or any other action as it may deem
appropriate, the latter having jurisdiction concurrent with this Court
over the Case, and this Court having been cited to no special and
important reason for it to take cognizance of said case in the first
instance.[10] (Emphasis and Underscoring Supplied)

On March 13, 1997, the CA issued a Decision,[11] dismissing the referred petition
for having taken the wrong mode of appeal, the pertinent portions of which
reads:

Consequently, for having taken the wrong mode of appeal, the present
petition should be dismissed in accordance with the same Supreme
Court Circular 2-90 which expressly provides that:

4. Erroneous Appeals An appeal taken to either the

Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong or
inappropriate mode shall be dismissed.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition for review is hereby

DISMISSED.
 SO ORDERED.[12]

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[13] which was, however

denied by the CA in a Resolution[14] dated August 27, 1997.
Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising the following assignment of errors,
to wit:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION

ON TECHNICAL GROUNDS DESPITE THE SUPREME COURT RESOLUTION
SPECIFICALLY REFERRING SAID PETITION FOR A DECISION ON THE
MERITS.

II.

THE PROBATE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT

RESPONDENTS IMELDA R. MARCOS AND FERDINAND R. MARCOS II
SHOULD BE DISQUALIFIED TO ACT AND SERVE AS EXECUTORS.

III.

THE PROBATE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT

SAID PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE DENIED AND DISCLAIMED THE VERY
EXISTENCE AND VALIDITY OF THE MARCOS WILL.
 IV.

THE PROBATE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT

ITS ORDER OF JANUARY 11, 1996, WHICH ADMITTED THE MARCOS WILL
TO PROBATE AND WHICH DIRECTED THE ISSUANCE OF LETTERS
TESTAMENTARY IN SOLIDUM TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AS
EXECUTORS OF SAID MARCOS WILL, WAS BASED ON THE EVIDENCE OF
THE REPUBLIC ALONE.

V.

THE PROBATE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT

BOTH PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE OBSTRUCTED THE TRANSFER TO
THE PHILIPPINES OF THE MARCOS ASSETS DEPOSITED IN THE SWISS
BANKS.[15]

In the meantime, on October 9, 2002, the RTC, acting on the pending

unresolved motions before it, issued an Order[16] which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby appoints as joint special

administrators of the estate of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos, the
nominee of the Republic of the Philippines (the Undersecretary of the
Department of Justice whom the Secretary of Justice will designate for
this purpose) and Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos and Mr. Ferdinand R.
Marcos II, to serve as such until an executor is finally appointed.
 SO ORDERED.

The petition is without merit.

When the assailed Orders granting letters testamentary in solidum to

respondents were issued by the RTC, petitioner sought to question them by filing
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90,[17] which was then in effect, reads:

2. Appeals from Regional Trial Courts to the Supreme Court. Except in

criminal cases where the penalty imposed is life imprisonment to
reclusion perpetua, judgments of regional trial courts may be appealed
to the Supreme Court only by petition for review on certiorari in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 17
of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, this being the clear
intendment of the provision of the Interim Rules that (a)ppeals to the
Supreme Court shall be taken by petition for certiorari which shall be
governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis and Underscoring
Supplied)

The pertinent portions of Section 17[18] of the Judiciary Act of 1948 read:
The Supreme Court shall further have exclusive jurisdiction to
review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on certiorari as the law or rules
of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts as
herein provided, in
(1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law,
ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question;
(2) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment or toll,
or any penalty imposed in relation thereto;
(3) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue;
 (4) All other cases in which only errors or questions of law are involved:
Provided, however, That if, in addition to constitutional, tax or
jurisdictional questions, the cases mentioned in the three next preceding
paragraphs also involve questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and
law, the aggrieved party shall appeal to the Court of Appeals; and the
final judgment or decision of the latter may be reviewed, revised,
reversed, modified or affirmed by the Supreme Court on writ
of certiorari; and
(5) Final awards, judgments, decision or orders of the Commission on
Elections, Court of Tax Appeals, Court of Industrial Relations, the
Public Service Commission, and the Workmens Compensation
Commission.
A reading of Supreme Court Circular 2-90, in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary
Act of 1948, clearly shows that the subject matter of therein petition, that is, the
propriety of granting letters testamentary to respondents, do not fall within any
ground which can be the subject of a direct appeal to this Court. The CA was thus
correct in declaring that the issues raised by petitioner do not fall within the
purview of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 such that the Supreme Court
should take cognizance of the instant case.[19]

Moreover, the Courts pronouncement in Suarez v. Judge Villarama[20] is

instructive:
Section 4 of Circular No. 2-90, in effect at the time of the
antecedents, provides that an appeal taken to either the Supreme
Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong mode or inappropriate
mode shall be dismissed. This rule is now incorporated in Section 5,
Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Moreover, the filing of the case directly with this Court runs
afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Pursuant to this doctrine,
direct resort from the lower courts to the Supreme Court will not be
entertained unless the appropriate remedy cannot be obtained in the
lower tribunals. This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain
if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the
Constitution and immemorial tradition. Thus, a petition for review on
 certiorari assailing the decision involving both questions of fact and
law must first be brought before the Court of Appeals.[21]

Also, in Southern Negros Development Bank v. Court of Appeals,[22] this

Court ruled:
It is incumbent upon private respondent qua appellants to utilize
the correct mode of appeal of the decisions of trial courts to the
appellate courts. In the mistaken choice of their remedy, they can
blame no one but themselves (Jocson v. Baguio, 179 SCRA 550 [1989];
Yucuanseh Drug Co. v. National Labor Union, 101 Phil. 409 [1957]).

xxxx

Pursuant to Section 4 of Circular No. 2-90, which provides that

"[a]n appeal taken to either the Supreme Court or the Court of
Appeals by the wrong mode or inappropriate mode shall be
dismissed," the only course of action of the Court to which an
erroneous appeal is made is to dismiss the same. There is no longer
any justification for allowing transfers of erroneous appeals from one
court to another (Quesada v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93869,
November 12, 1990, First Division, Minute Resolution).[23]

Based on the foregoing, petitioner cannot deny that the determination of

whether or not respondents should be disqualified to act as executors is a
question of fact. Hence, the proper remedy was to appeal to the CA, not to this
Court.

Petitioner is adamant, however, that notwithstanding the improper remedy, the

CA should not have dismissed therein petition. Petitioner argues in the wise:
However, as can be seen in the Resolution of February 5, 1997, (Annex
H) this Honorable Court deemed it more proper to transmit the first
Petition for Review to respondent appellate court for the reason that:
 This Court having been cited to no special and important reason for it to
take cognizance of said case in the first instance. x x x

It would appear then that even though this Honorable Court apparently
considers the Republics petition as deserving to be given due course, it
deemed it in the best interest of the parties concerned if the Court of
Appeals would first take cognizance of said case, thereby preserving its
stance as a court of last resort.

Additionally, this Honorable Court itself plainly stated that the case
under review is:

.REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for consideration and adjudication

on the merits. The latter having jurisdiction concurrent with this Court
over the case[24]

Petitioners arguments are misplaced. To stress, the February 5, 1997 Resolution

reads:

The special civil action for certiorari as well as all the other pleadings
filed herein are REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for consideration and
adjudication on the merits or any other action as it may deem
appropriate, the latter having jurisdiction concurrent with this Court
over the Case, and this Court having been cited to no special and
important reason for it to take cognizance of said case in the first
instance.[25]
 Based thereon, this Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that said
resolution gave the CA discretion and latitude to decide the petition as it may
deem proper. The resolution is clear that the petition was referred to the CA for
consideration and adjudication on the merits or any other action as it may deem
appropriate. Thus, no error can be attributed to the CA when the action it
deemed appropriate was to dismiss the petition for having availed of an improper
remedy. More importantly, the action of the CA was sanctioned under Section 4
of Supreme Court Circular 2-90 which provides that an appeal taken to either the
Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong mode or inappropriate
mode shall be dismissed.
Moreover, petitioner mistakenly relies in Oriental Media, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,[26] in which this Court made the following pronouncements:
In the case at bar, there was no urgency or need for Oriental to
resort to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari for when it learned of
the case and the judgment against it on July 25, 1986, due to its receipt
of a copy of the decision by default; no execution had as yet been
ordered by the trial court. As aforementioned, Oriental had still the time
and the opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration, as was actually
done. Upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration in the first
case, or at the latest upon the denial of its petition for relief from
judgment, Oriental should have appealed. Oriental should have
followed the procedure set forth in the Rules of Court for
Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly
administration of justice and the protection of substantive
rights in judicial and extrajudicial proceedings. It is a
mistake to purpose that substantive law and adjective law
are contradictory to each other or, as has often been
suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should
never be permitted if it will result in prejudice to the
substantive rights of the litigants. This is not exactly true;
the concept is much misunderstood. As a matter of fact,
the policy of the courts is to give effect to both kinds of
law, as complementing each other, in the just and speedy
resolution of the dispute between the parties. Observance
of both substantive rights is equally guaranteed by due
 process whatever the source of such rights, be it the
Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court.[27]

In the case at bar, as found by this Court in its February 5, 1997 Resolution,
therein petition offered no important or special reason for the Court to take
cognizance of it at the first instance. Petitioner offered no plausible reason why it
went straight to this Court when an adequate and proper remedy was still
available. The CA was thus correct that the remedy that petitioner should have
availed of was to file an appeal under Rule 109 of the Rules of Court which states:

Section 1. Orders of judgments from which appeals taken. An interested

person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment
rendered by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court, where such order or judgment:

(a) allows or disallows a will;

Because of the preceding discussion, herein petition must necessarily fail.

However, even if this Court were to set aside petitioners procedural lapses, a
careful review of the records of the case reveal that herein petition is without
merit.

At the crux of the controversy is a determination of whether or not respondents

are incompetent to serve as executors of the will of Ferdinand Marcos.

Ozeata v. Pecson[28] is instructive:

 The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a
necessary concomitant of his right to dispose of his property in the
manner he wishes. It is natural that the testator should desire to appoint
one of his confidence, one who can be trusted to carry out his wishes in
the disposal of the estate. The curtailment of this right may be
considered as a curtailment of the right to dispose. And as the rights
granted by will take effect from the time of death (Article 777, Civil
Code of the Philippines), the management of his estate by the
administrator of his choice should be made as soon as practicable, when
no reasonable objection to his assumption of the trust can be interposed
any longer. It has been held that when a will has been admitted to
probate, it is the duty of the court to issue letters testamentary to the
person named as executor upon his application (23 C.J. 1023).

xxxx

The case of In re Erlanger's Estate, 242 N.Y.S. 249, also

reiterates the same principle.
The courts have always respected the right to which a testator
enjoys to determine who is most suitable to settle his testamentary
affairs, and his solemn selection should not lightly be disregarded. After
the admission of a will to probate, the courts will not name a better
executor for the testator nor disqualify, by a judicial veto, the widow
or friend or other person selected in the will, except upon strict proof
of the statutory grounds of incompetency. Matter of Leland's Will, 219
N.Y. 387, 393, 114 N.E. 854. x x x[29]

Section 1(c), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court defines who are incompetent to
serve as executors, to wit:

Section 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or

administrators. No person is competent to serve as executor or
administrator who:
 xxxx

(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of trust by
reason of drunkenness, improvidence, or want of understanding
or integrity, or by reason of conviction of an offense involving moral
turpitude. (Emphasis Supplied)

In the case at bar, petitioner anchored its opposition to the grant of letters
testamentary to respondents, specifically on the following grounds: (1) want of
integrity, and (2) conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude. Petitioner
contends that respondents have been convicted of a number of cases[30] and,
hence, should be characterized as one without integrity, or at the least, with
questionable integrity.[31]
The RTC, however, in its January 11, 1996 Order, made the following
findings:

However, except for petitioner Republics allegation of want of

integrity on the part of Imelda Trinidad Romualdez-Marcos and
Ferdinand Romualdez Marco II, named executors in the last will and
testament, so as to render them incompetent to serve as executors, the
Court sees at this time, no evidence on record, oral or documentary,
to substantiate and support the said allegation. (Emphasis Supplied)

Based on the foregoing, this Court stresses that an appellate court is

disinclined to interfere with the action taken by the probate court in the matter of
removal of an executor or administrator unless positive error or gross abuse of
discretion is shown.[32] The Rules of Court gives the lower court the duty and
discretion to determine whether in its opinion an individual is unfit to serve as an
executor. The sufficiency of any ground for removal should thus be determined by
the said court, whose sensibilities are, in the first place, affected by any act or
omission on the part of the administrator not conformable to or in disregard of
the rules of orders of the court.[33]
Hence, in order to reverse the findings of the RTC, this Court must evaluate
the evidence presented or alleged by petitioner in support of its petition for
disqualification. However, after a painstaking review of the records and evidence
on hand, this Court finds that the RTC committed no error or gross abuse of
discretion when it ruled that petitioner failed to substantiate its allegation.

Petitioner conveniently omits to state that the two cases against

respondent Imelda Marcos have already been reversed by this Court. Her
conviction in Criminal Case No. 17453 was reversed by this Court in Dans, Jr. v.
People.[34] Likewise, her conviction in Criminal Case No. 17450 was reversed by
this Court in Marcos v. Sandiganbayan.[35]Hence, the so-called convictions against
respondent Imelda Marcos cannot serve as a ground for her disqualification to
serve as an executor.

On the other hand, the eight cases filed against respondent Ferdinand Marcos II
involve four charges for violation of Section 45 (failure to file income tax returns)
and four charges for violation of Section 50 (non-payment of deficiency taxes) of
the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 (NIRC).

It is a matter of record, that in CA-G.R. CR No. 18569,[36] the CA acquitted

respondent Ferdinand Marcos II of all the four charges for violation of Section 50
and sustained his conviction for all the four charges for violation of Section 45. It,
however, bears to stress, that the CA only ordered respondent Marcos II to pay a
fine for his failure to file his income tax return. Moreover, and as admitted by
petitioner,[37] said decision is still pending appeal.

Therefore, since respondent Ferdinand Marcos II has appealed his conviction

relating to four violations of Section 45 of the NIRC, the same should not serve as
a basis to disqualify him to be appointed as an executor of the will of his father.
More importantly, even assuming arguendo that his conviction is later on
affirmed, the same is still insufficient to disqualify him as the failure to file an
income tax return is not a crime involving moral turpitude.

In Villaber v. Commision on Elections,[38] this Court held:

As to the meaning of "moral turpitude," we have consistently

adopted the definition in Black's Law Dictionary as "an act of baseness,
vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his
fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and
customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or
conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals."

In In re Vinzon, the term "moral turpitude" is considered as

encompassing "everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, or
good morals."

xxxx

We, however, clarified in Dela Torre vs. Commission on

Elections that "not every criminal act involves moral turpitude," and
that ''as to what crime involves moral turpitude is for the Supreme
Court to determine."[39]

Moreover, In De Jesus-Paras v. Vailoces:[40]

Indeed, it is well-settled that "embezzlement, forgery, robbery,

and swindling are crimes which denote moral turpitude and, as a
general rule, all crimes of which fraud is an element are looked on as
involving moral turpitude" (58 C.J.S., 1206).
 The failure to file an income tax return is not a crime involving moral
turpitude as the mere omission is already a violation regardless of the fraudulent
intent or willfulness of the individual. This conclusion is supported by the
provisions of the NIRC as well as previous Court decisions which show that with
regard to the filing of an income tax return, the NIRC considers three distinct
violations: (1) a false return, (2) a fraudulent return with intent to evade tax, and
(3) failure to file a return.

The same is illustrated in Section 51(b) of the NIRC which reads:

(b) Assessment and payment of deficiency tax xxx

In case a person fails to make and file a return or list at the time
prescribed by law, or makes willfully or otherwise, false or fraudulent
return or list x x x. (Emphasis Supplied)

Likewise, in Aznar v. Court of Tax Appeals,[41] this Court observed:

To our minds we can dispense with these controversial

arguments on facts, although we do not deny that the findings of facts
by the Court of Tax Appeals, supported as they are by very substantial
evidence, carry great weight, by resorting to a proper interpretation of
Section 332 of the NIRC. We believe that the proper and reasonable
interpretation of said provision should be that in the three different
 cases of (1) false return, (2) fraudulent return with intent to evade tax,
(3) failure to file a return, the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in
court for the collection of such tax may be begun without assessment,
at any time within ten years after the discovery of the (1) falsity, (2)
fraud, and (3) omission. Our stand that the law should be interpreted
to mean a separation of the three different situations of false return,
fraudulent return with intent to evade tax, and failure to file a return
is strengthened immeasurably by the last portion of the provision
which segregates the situations into three different classes, namely,
"falsity," "fraud" and "omission."[42] (Emphasis Supplied)

Applying the foregoing considerations to the case at bar, the filing of a

fraudulent return with intent to evade tax is a crime involving moral turpitude as
it entails willfulness and fraudulent intent on the part of the individual. The same,
however, cannot be said for failure to file a return where the mere omission
already constitutes a violation. Thus, this Court holds that even if the conviction of
respondent Marcos II is affirmed, the same not being a crime involving moral
turpitude cannot serve as a ground for his disqualification.

Anent the third error raised by petitioner, the same has no merit.

Petitioner contends that respondents denied the existence of the will, and
are, therefore, estopped from claiming to be the rightful executors thereof.
Petitioner further claims that said actions clearly show that respondents lack the
competence and integrity to serve as officers of the court.

This Court does not agree with the posture taken by petitioner, and
instead, accepts the explanation given by respondents, to wit:
 Respondents opposed the petition for probate not because they
are disclaiming the existence of the will, but because of certain legal
grounds, to wit: (a) petitioner does not have the requisite interest to
institute it; (b) the original copy of the will was not attached to the
petition for probate as required by the rules; and (c) the Commissioner
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue is not qualified to be appointed as
administrator of the estate.[43]

Based on the foregoing, considering the nature of their opposition,

respondents cannot be held guilty of estoppel as they merely acted within their
rights when they put in issue legal grounds in opposing the probate proceedings.
More importantly, even if said grounds were later on overruled by the RTC, said
court was still of opinion that respondents were fit to serve as executors
notwithstanding their earlier opposition. Again, in the absence of palpable error
or gross abuse of discretion, this Court will not interfere with the RTCs discretion.

As for the remaining errors assigned by petitioner, the same are bereft of
merit.

Petitioner contends that respondents have strongly objected to the transfer

to the Philippines of the Marcos assets deposited in the Swiss Banks[44] and thus
the same should serve as a ground for their disqualification to act as executors.
This Court does not agree. In the first place, the same are mere allegations which,
without proof, deserve scant consideration. Time and again, this Court has
stressed that this Court is a court of law and not a court of public opinion.
Moreover, petitioner had already raised the same argument in its motion for
partial reconsideration before the RTC. Said court, however, still did not find the
same as a sufficient ground to disqualify respondents. Again, in the absence of
palpable error or gross abuse of discretion, this Court will not interfere with the
RTCs discretion.
Lastly, petitioner argues that the assailed RTC Orders were based solely on
their own evidence and that respondents offered no evidence to show that they
were qualified to serve as executors.[45] It is basic that one who alleges a fact has
the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.[46] Consequently, it
was the burden of petitioner (not respondents) to substantiate the grounds upon
which it claims that respondents should be disqualified to serve as executors, and
having failed in doing so, its petition must necessarily fail.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the March 13, 1997 Decision and August 27,
1997 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43450 are
hereby AFFIRMED.

The Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 156, acting as a probate court
in Special Proceeding No. 10279, is hereby ORDERED to issue letters
testamentary, in solidum, to Imelda Romualdez-Marcos and Ferdinand Marcos II.
SO ORDERED.