PEOPLE VS. ALICANDO [251 SCRA 293; G.R. NO.

117487;
2 DEC 1995]

Facts: Appellant was charged with the crime of rape with homicide of Khazie
Mae Penecilla, a minor, four years of age, choking her with his right hand. The
incident happened after appellant drank liquor. A neighbor, Leopoldo Santiago
found the victim’s body and the parents and police were informed. Appellant was
living in his uncle's house some five arm's length from Penecilla's
house. Appellant was arrested and interrogated by PO3 Danilo Tan. He verbally
confessed his guilt without the assistance of counsel. On the basis of his
uncounselled verbal confession and follow up interrogations, the police came to
know and recovered from appellant's house, Khazie Mae's green slippers, a pair of
gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow and a stained T-shirt all of which were
presented as evidence for the prosecution. He was arraigned with the assistance of
Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera of the PAO. Appellant pleaded guilty. The
RTC convictedhim. Hence an automatic review for the imposition of death penalty.

Issue: Whether or Not the death penalty proper.

Held: No. The records do not reveal that the Information against
theappellant was read in the language or dialect known to him. The Information
against the appellant is written in the English language. It is unknown whether
the appellant knows the English language. Neither is it known what dialect is
understood by the appellant. Nor is there any showing that the Information
couched in English was translated to theappellant in his own dialect before his
plea of guilt. The RTC violated section 1(a) of Rule 116, the rule implementing the
constitutional right of the appellant to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. It also denied appellant his constitutional right to due
process of law. It is urged that we must presume that the arraignment of
theappellant was regularly conducted. When life is at stake, we cannot lean on this
rebuttable presumption. There could be no presumption. The court must be sure.

The trial court violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of guilt of
the appellant. Said section requires that the court shall conduct a searching
inquiry the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea
and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability.
The accused may also present evidence in his behalf. The trial court simply
inquired if appellant had physical marks of maltreatment. It did not ask
the appellant when he was arrested, who arrested him, how and where he was
interrogated, whether he was medically examined before and after his
interrogation, etc. It limited its efforts trying to discover late body marks of
maltreatment as if involuntariness is caused by physical abuse alone.

Further, there are physical evidence to prove Khazie was raped. These consists of a
pillow with bloodstains in its center 14 and the T-shirt 15 of the accused colored
white with bloodstains on its bottom. These physical evidence are evidence of the
highest order. They strongly corroborate the testimony of Luisa Rebada that the
victim was raped.These are inadmissible evidence for they were gathered by PO3
Danilo Tan of the Iloilo City PNP as a result of custodial interrogation
where appellantverbally confessed to the crime without the benefit of counsel.

SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA, Petitioner,

vs.

HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, and PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
G.R. No. 226679 August 15, 2017

TOPIC: Section 23 of RA 9165, rule-making power of Supreme Court, equal

protection clause

PONENTE: Peralta

FACTS:

Petitioner Estipona, Jr. was charged with violation of Section 11 of RA 9165.

On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a
Plea Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead,
to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12 (NOTE: should have been
Section 15?) of the same law, with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being
a first-time offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in
his possession.

Petitioner argues that Section 23 of RA 9165 which prohibits plea bargaining in

all violations of said law violates:
1. The intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof;
2. The rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution; and
3. The principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of the
government.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional as it encroached upon

the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure.
2. Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional for being violative of
the Constitutional right to equal protection of the law.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: YES

The Supreme Court held that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice
and procedure is now Their exclusive domain and no longer shared with the
Executive and Legislative departments.

The Court further held that the separation of powers among the three co-
equal branchesof our government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps
the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the
sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative
if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of
the procedural rules promulgated by the Court.

Viewed from this perspective, the Court had rejected previous attempts on the
part of the Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules
of Court (Rules), to wit:

1. Fabian v. Desierto -Appeal from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman
in an administrative disciplinary case should be taken to the Court of Appeals
under the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules instead of appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45 as provided in Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770.
2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. –
The Cooperative Code provisions on notices cannot replace the rules on
summons under Rule 14 of the Rules.
3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment
of Legal Fees; Baguio Market Vendors MultiPurpose Cooperative
(BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes; In Re: Exemption of the
National Power Corporation from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees; and Rep.
of the Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara, et al. – Despite statutory provisions, the GSIS,
BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC are not exempt from the payment of legal fees
imposed by Rule 141 of the Rules.
4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division) – The first paragraph of
Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770, which prohibits courts except the Supreme Court
from issuing temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, is unconstitutional as
it contravenes Rule 58 of the Rules.

Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court
asserted its discretion to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure,
to the exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of government. To
reiterate, the Court’s authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and
procedure is exclusive and one of the safeguards of Our institutional
independence.

SECOND ISSUE: UNRESOLVED

The Supreme Court did not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No.
9165 is contrary to the constitutional right to equal protection of the law in order
not to preempt any future discussion by the Court on the policy considerations
behind Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165.

Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the statutory provision in toto

or a qualified version thereof, the Court deemed it proper to declare as invalid
the prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases until and unless it is made
part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued for
the purpose.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSIONS ABOUT PLEA BARGAINING:

Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure

Fabian v. Hon. Desierto laid down the test for determining whether a rule is
substantive or procedural in nature.

In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice
and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any
substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is,
the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law
and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of
them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates
a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter;
but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals
merely with procedure.

In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural rule violates

substantive rights. By the same token, it is towards the provision of a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases in all courts that
the rules on plea bargaining was introduced. As a way of disposing criminal
charges by agreement of the parties, plea bargaining is considered to be an
“important,” “essential,” “highly desirable,” and “legitimate” component of
the administration of justice.

In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as “a process whereby the
accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the
case subject to court approval.” There is give-and-take negotiation common in
plea bargaining. The essence of the agreement is that both the prosecution and
the defense make concessions to avoid potential losses. Properly administered,
plea bargaining is to be encouraged because the chief virtues of the system –
speed, economy, and finality – can benefit the accused, the offended party, the
prosecution, and the court.

Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage, the rules on plea

bargaining neither create a right nor take away a vested right. Instead, it
operates as a means to implement an existing right by regulating the judicial
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for
justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.

No constitutional right to plea bargain

Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are
infringed by trying him rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor
need not do so if he prefers to go to trial. Under the present Rules, the
acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right but depends on
the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, which is a condition
precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily included
in the offense charged. The reason for this is that the prosecutor has full control
of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always prosecute the proper
offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what the evidence on hand can
sustain.

Plea bargaining, when allowed

Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to

the point when the prosecution already rested its case.

As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial

court’s exercise of discretion should not amount to a grave abuse thereof.

If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail

hearing or after the prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a plea
only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt
of the crime charged. The only basis on which the prosecutor and the court could
rightfully act in allowing change in the former plea of not guilty could be nothing
more and nothing less than the evidence on record. The ruling on the motion
must disclose the strength or weakness of the prosecution’s evidence. Absent
any finding on the weight of the evidence on hand, the judge’s acceptance of the
defendant’s change of plea is improper and irregular.

People vs. Buenviaje (47 Phil. 536)

Issue/s of the case:

- Whether or not chiropractic is a form of medicine regulated under the
law.
- Whether or not the information was duplicitous.

Regulation/s involved:
1. Act 2711 (1917 Administrative Code)
- Section 770. Inhibition against practicing medicine by uncertificated
persons – No person shall practice medicine in the Philippine Islands
without having previously obtained the proper certificate of registration
issued by the Board of Medical Examiners as herein constituted, or the
lawful Board which was its predecessor, except as hereinafter stated in
this section and in the next following section of this Act.

A person shall be considered to practice medicine within the meaning of

this section, who shall, for compensation or reward or even without the
same, diagnose, treat, operate, prescribe remedies for any human
disease, injury, deformity, physical or mental condition or any ailment,
real or supposed, regardless of the nature of the remedy or treatment
used or recommended, or who shall, by means of signs, cards,
advertisements, or in any other way either offer or undertake by any
means or method to diagnose, treat, manipulate, adjust, operate, or
prescribe for any human disease, pain injury, deformity, physical or
mental condition.
2. Act 2711 (1917 Administrative Code)
- Section 2678. Violation of Medical Law – A person violating any provision
of the Medical Law shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not
more than ₽300, or by imprisonment for not more than 90 days, or both,
in the discretion of the court.

Application of regulations involved:

 1. Chiropractic is considered as practice of medicine, according to the
statutory definition of the term “practice of medicine” as found in Section
770 of the 1917 Administrative Code (Act 2711). Hence, defendant was
required to have the pertinent license to practice, and having been found
in want of one, is guilty of illegal practice.
2. Said provision did not distinguish between illegal practice and illegal
representation. Both are violations of the Medical Law, and are merely
different ways of violating the same law.

Conclusion:
- Supreme Court ruled that there was no duplicitous information when the
Medical Law itself did not distinguish any specific violation, but mere
violation of said statute is punishable. Hence, for holding herself out as a
practitioner of chiropractic when she was not qualified, for falsely
advertising and holding herself out to the public as a ‘Dra.’ and a
practitioner of chiropractic, Jovita Buenviaje was found guilty of violating
the Medical Law. It was further concluded by the High Court that in
order to use the prefix ‘Dr.’ or ‘Dra.’, one must be a doctor of medicine,
and such distinction has no application to practitioners of chiropractic.

Facts:

Defendant Jovita V. Buenviaje was accused of violating the Medical Act,

where the information filed against her alleged that said defendant had been
practicing medicine without having obtained from the Board of Medical
Examiners the necessary certificate of registration, in the City of Manila,
whereby she was further alleged that she assisted, treated, and manipulated
the head and body of Regino Noble, for the purposes of curing him of ailments,
diseases, pains and physical defects which he pretended to suffer from, and for
advertising and offering her services as a physician (doctor of chiropractic),
evidenced by letterheads and signs exposed on her office door, and in
newspapers circulated in Manila, and adding the prefix ‘Dra.’ To her name,
causing the public to believe that she was a legitimate doctor. Defendant
admitted said facts. She further admitted to collecting ₽1 from Noble for her
services, and that she graduated a doctor of chiropractic from the American
University School of Chiropractic on 13-Aug-1919, in Chicago.

Trial court found her guilty. Counsel for defendant appealed that the demurrer
to information should have been sustained when the information charged more
than one offense (illegal practice of medicine, and illegal representation).
Galman vs. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43 (1986)

FACTS: Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He was killed
from his plane that had just landed at the Manila International Airport. His brain was
smashed by a bullet fired point-blank into the back of his head by an assassin. The
military investigators reported within a span of three hours that the man who shot
Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only days
later as Rolando Galman) was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military
escorts gunned him down in turn.

President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate due to large
masses of people who joined in the ten-day period of national mourning yearning for
the truth, justice and freedom.

The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military
version stating that "the evidence shows to the contrary that Rolando Galman had no
subversive affiliations. Only the soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have
shot him; that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not a
communist plot. Only difference between the two reports is that the majority report
found all the twenty-six private respondents above-named in the title of the case
involved in the military conspiracy; " while the chairman's minority report would
exclude nineteen of them.

Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the killer.

Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from rendering a
decision in the two criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11
to issue the restraining order prayed for. The Court also granted petitioners a five-day
period to file a reply to respondents' separate comments and respondent Tanodbayan
a three-day period to submit a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the prosecution.

But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse, resolved to
dismiss the petition and to lift the TRO issued ten days earlier enjoining the
Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. The same Court majority denied
petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from receipt of respondent
Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution (which apparently was not served on
them).
Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not
indicate the legal ground for such action and urging that the case be set for a full
hearing on the merits that the people are entitled to due process.

However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of
the crime charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil
liability. Respondents submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal,
the instant case had become moot and academic. Thereafter, same Court majority
denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration
alleging that respondents committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and
resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the
petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.

(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy clause.

RULING: Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted and ordering a re-
trial of the said cases which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with
careful regard for the requirements of due process.

Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera (made his expose 15 months later when former
Pres. was no longer around) affirmed the allegations in the second motion for
reconsideration that he revealed that the Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan
prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case.
Malacañang wanted dismissal to the extent that a prepared resolution was sent to the
Investigating Panel. Malacañang Conference planned a scenario of trial where the
former President ordered then that the resolution be revised by categorizing the
participation of each respondent; decided that the presiding justice, Justice Pamaran,
(First Division) would personally handle the trial. A conference was held in an inner
room of the Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice Lazaro
were with the President. The conferees were told to take the back door in going to the
room where the meeting was held, presumably to escape notice by the visitors in the
reception hall waiting to see the President. During the conference, and after an
agreement was reached, Pres. Marcos told them 'Okay, mag moro-moro na lamang
kayo;' and that on their way out of the room Pres. Marcos expressed his thanks to the
group and uttered 'I know how to reciprocate'.

The Court then said that the then President (code-named Olympus) had stage-
managed in and from Malacañang Palace "a scripted and predetermined manner of
handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case;" and that "the prosecution
in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted
under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to
resist. Also predetermined the final outcome of the case" of total absolution of the
twenty-six respondents-accused of all criminal and civil liability. Pres. Marcos came
up with a public statement aired over television that Senator Aquino was killed not by
his military escorts, but by a communist hired gun. It was, therefore, not a source of
wonder that President Marcos would want the case disposed of in a manner consistent
with his announced theory thereof which, at the same time, would clear his name and
his administration of any suspected guilty participation in the assassination. such a
procedure would be a better arrangement because, if the accused are charged in court
and subsequently acquitted, they may claim the benefit of the doctrine of double
jeopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution if some other witnesses shall appear
when President Marcos is no longer in office.

More so was there suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses. The
disappearance of witnesses two weeks after Ninoy's assassination. According to J.
Herrera, "nobody was looking for these persons because they said Marcos was in
power. The assignment of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran; no evidence at all
that the assignment was indeed by virtue of a regular raffle, except the uncorroborated
testimony of Justice Pamaran himself. The custody of the accused and their
confinement in a military camp, instead of in a civilian jail. The monitoring of
proceedings and developments from Malacañang and by Malacañang personnel. The
partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: That President Marcos had
wanted all of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not be denied. In rendering
its decision, the Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring the presidential directive. Its
bias and partiality in favor of the accused was clearly obvious. The evidence presented
by the prosecution was totally ignored and disregarded.

The record shows that the then President misused the overwhelming resources of the
government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the
judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases. "This is the evil of one-man rule
at its very worst." Our Penal Code penalizes "any executive officer who shall address
any order or suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case or business
coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice."

Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This criminal collusion as to
the handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret
Malacañang conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel
Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its
verdict. The courts would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as
mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth.
More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to know the
truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake.

There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for
having been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void
judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. It neither
binds nor bars anyone. All acts and all claims flowing out of it are void.

Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead. In this case,

petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of their petition and
lifting of the TRO enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision had been
taken cognizance of by the Court which had required the respondents', including the
Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no restraining order was issued anew,
respondent Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately issued its decision of total
absolution of all the accused pending the final action of this Court. All of the acts of
the respondent judge manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to lack
of jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the petitioner.

With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be tried before
an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. Respondents accused must now face
trial for the crimes charged against them before an impartial court with an unbiased
prosecutor with all due process.

The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the people, under our
system of government, is to fill the public posts. Justices and judges must ever realize
that they have no constituency, serve no majority nor minority but serve only the
public interest as they see it in accordance with their oath of office, guided only the
Constitution and their own conscience and honor.
Caes vs. Intermediate Appellate Court [GRs 74989-90, 6 November
1989] First Division, Cruz (J): 4 concur
Facts:
On 21 November 1981, Joel Caes was charged in two separate informations with
illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession of marijuana before the Court of
First Instance of Rizal. The cases were consolidated on 10 December 1981.
Arraignment was originally scheduled on 11 January 1982, but was for some reason
postponed. On 31 August 1982, Caes was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Trial was
scheduled for 13 October 1982, but this was reset upon agreement of the parties. On
15 November 1982, the trial was again postponed for reasons that do not appear in
the record. On 20 December 1982, the trial was again postponed because the
prosecution witnesses were absent. On 19 January 1983, the third resetting of the
case was also canceled, no reason appearing in the record. On 21 February 1983, 21
March 1983, and 19 April 1983, no trial could be held as the prosecution witnesses
were absent. On 3 June 1983, a sheriffs return informed the trial court that the
prosecution witnesses, namely, Capt. Carlos Dacanay and Sgt. Bonifacio Lustado, had
been personally served with subpoena to appear and testify at the hearing scheduled
on 6 June 1983. On said day, the trial was again postponed, this time because there
was no trial fiscal. On 12 July 1983, trial was reset for lack of material time. On 6
September 1983, the trial was once more reset by agreement of the parties. On 19
October 1983, the trial was reset to 14 November 1983. On 14 November 1983, the
prosecution moved for the provisional dismissal of the case because its witnesses had
not appeared. On the same date, Judge Alfredo M. Gorgonio issued the order
provisionally dismissing the case. On 9 January 1984, a motion to revive the cases
was filed by Maj. Dacanay (he had been promoted in the meantime) and Sgt. Lustado,
who alleged that they could not attend the hearing scheduled on 14 November 1983,
for lack of notice. Copy of the motion was furnished the City Fiscal of Caloocan City
but not Caes. On 18 May 1984, the judge issued the order granting the "Motion for the
Revival of the Case." A motion for reconsideration filed by Caes dated 7 June 1984,
was denied on 9 October 1984, and the revived cases were set for hearing on 19
November 1984. Caes filed the petition for certiorari with th Supreme Court, which
was referred to the appellate court. The petition there was dismissed for lack of merit
on 20 May 1986, and reconsideration was denied on 17 June 1986. Caes filed the
present petition.

Issue: Whether the revival of the cases would place Caes in double jeopardy in
violation of the Bill of Rights.

Held: Fittingly described as "res judicata in prison grey," the right against double
jeopardy prohibits the prosecution of a person for a crime of which he has been
previously acquitted or convicted. The purpose is to set the effects of the first
prosecution forever at rest, assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter be
subjected to the danger and anxiety of a second charge against him for the same
offense. It has been held in a long line of cases that to constitute double jeopardy,
there must be: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) filed before a competent court;
(c) to which the defendant had pleaded; and (d) of which he had been previously
acquitted or convicted or which was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent. There is no question that the first three requisites are present in the
present case. It is settled that a case may be dismissed if the dismissal is made on
motion of the accused himself or on motion of the prosecution with the express
consent of the accused. Such a dismissal is correctly denominated provisional. But a
dismissal is not provisional even if so designated if it is shown that it was made
without the express consent of the accused. This consent cannot be presumed nor
may it be merely implied from the defendant's silence or his failure to object As held in
a number of cases, such consent must be express, so as to leave no doubt as to the
defendant's conformity. Otherwise, the dismissal will be regarded as final, i.e., with
prejudice to the refiling of the case. There are instances in fact when the dismissal will
be held to be final and to dispose of the case once and for all even if the dismissal was
made on motion of the accused himself. The first is where the dismissal is based on a
demurrer to the evidence filed by the accused after the prosecution has rested. Such
dismissal has the effect of a judgment on the merits and operates as an acquittal. The
other exception is where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused,
because of the denial of his right to a speedy trial. This is in effect a failure to
prosecute. The circumstance that the dismissal of the cases against Caes was
described by the trial judge as "provisional" did not change the nature of that
dismissal. As it was based on the "lack of interest" of the prosecutor and the
consequent delay in the trial of the cases, it was final and operated as an acquittal of
the accused on the merits. No less importantly, there is no proof that Caes expressly
concurred in the provisional dismissal. Implied consent is not enough; neither may it
be lightly inferred from the presumption of regularity, for we are dealing here with the
alleged waiver of a constitutional right. Any doubt on this matter must be resolved in
favor of the accused.

PEOPLE VS. COURT OF SILAY [74 SCRA 248; G.R. NO.

L-43790; 9 DEC 1976]
Facts: That sometime on January 4,1974, accused Pacifico Sensio, Romeo
Millan and Wilfredo Jochico who were then scalers at the Hawaiian-
Philippine Company, weighed cane cars No.1743,1686 and 1022 loaded with
sugar canes which were placed in tarjetas (weight report cards), Apparently, it was
proven and shown that there was padding of the weight of the sugar canes and
that the information on the tarjetas were to be false making it appear to be heavier
than its actual weight. The three accused then were charged with “Falsification by
private individuals and use of falsified document”. After the prosecution had
presented, the respondent moved to dismiss the charge against them on the
ground that the evidences presented were not sufficient to establish their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Acting on the motion, respondent court issued its order
dismissing the case on the ground that the acts committed by the accused do not
constituted the crime of falsification as strictly enumerated in the revised penal
code defining the crime of falsification which was charged earlier and that their
case be dismissed. People asserts that the plea of double jeopardy is not tenable
even if the case at bar was dismissed because according to them, it was done with
the consent of the accused therefore waiving there defense of double jeopardy. The
accused on the other hand, reiterated the fact that the dismissal was due to lack
of merits of the prosecution which would have the same effect as an acquittal
which will bar the prosecution from prosecuting the accused for it will be unjust
and unconstitutional for the accused due to double jeopardy rule thus the appeal
of the plaintiff.

Issue: Whether or Not the grant of petition by the court would place the
accused Sensio, Millan and Jochico in double jeopardy

Held: Yes the revival of the case will put the accused in double jeopardy for the
very reason that the case has been dismissed earlier due to lack of merits. It is
true that the criminal case of falsification was dismissed on a motion of the
accused however this was a motion filed after the prosecution had rested its case,
calling for the evidence beyond reasonable ground which the prosecution had not
been able to do which would be tantamount to acquittal therefore will bar the
prosecution of another case. As it was stated on the requirements of a valid
defense of double jeopardy it says: That there should be a valid complaint, second
would be that such complaint be filed before a competent court and to which the
accused has pleaded and that defendant was previously acquitted, convicted or
dismissed or otherwise terminated without expressconsent of the accused in which
were all present in the case at bar. There was indeed a valid, legitimate complaint
and concern against the accused Sensio, Millan and Jochico which was filed at a
competent court with jurisdiction on the said case. It was also mentioned that the
accused pleaded not guilty and during the time of trial, it was proven that the case
used against the accused were not sufficient to prove them guilty beyond
reasonable doubt therefore dismissing the case which translates to acquittal. It
explained further that there are two instances when we can conclude that there is
jeopardy when first is that the ground for the dismissal of the case was due to
insufficiency of evidence and second, when the proceedings have been reasonably
prolonged as to violate the right of the accused to a speedy trial. In the 2 requisites
given, it was the first on that is very much applicable to our case at bar where
there was dismissal of the case due to insufficiency of evidence which
will bar theapproval of the petition in the case at bar for it will constitute double
jeopardy on the part of the accused which the law despises.
PEOPLE, et al. v. Lacson, April 1, 2003
FACTS: Before the court is the petitioner’s motion of reconsideration of the resolution
dated May 23, 2002, for the determination of several factual issues relative to the
application of Sec. 8 Rule 117 of RRCP on the dismissal of the cases Q-99- 81679 and
Q-99-81689 against the respondent. The respondent was charged with the shooting
and killing of eleven male persons. The court confirmed the express consent of the
respondent in the provisional dismissal of the aforementioned cases when he filed for
judicial determination. The court also ruled the need to determine whether the other
facts for its application are attendant.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the requisites for the applicability of Sec. 8, Rule 117 of 2000 Rules
on Criminal Procedure were complied with in the Kuratong Baleleng cases
a. Was express consent given by the respondent?
b. Was notice for the motion, the hearing and the subsequent dismissal given to the
heirs of the victims?
Section 8, Rule 117 is not applicable to the case since the conditions for its
applicability, namely: 1) prosecution with the express consent of the accused or both
of them move for provisional dismissal,
2) offended party notified,
3) court grants motion and dismisses cases provisionally,
4) public prosecutor served with copy of orders of provisional dismissal, which is the
defendants burden to prove, which in this case has not been done
a. The defendant never filed and denied unequivocally in his statements, through
counsel at the Court of Appeals, that he filed for dismissal nor did he agree to a
provisional dismissal thereof.
b. No notice of motion for provisional dismissal, hearing and subsequent dismissal
was given to the heirs of the victims.

2. WON time-bar in Sec 8 Rule 117 should be applied prospectively or retroactively.

Time-bar should not be applied retroactively. Though procedural rules may be applied
retroactively, it should not be if to do so would work injustice or would involve
intricate problems of due process. Statutes should be construed in light of the
purposes to be achieved and the evils to be remedied. This is because to do so would
be prejudicial to the State since, given that the Judge dismissed the case on March
29,1999, and the New rule took effect on Dec 1,2000, it would only in effect give them
1 year and three months to work instead of 2 years. At that time, they had no
knowledge of the said rule and therefore they should not be penalized for that. “Indeed
for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the
accused alone.” The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the
State and the accused. It should not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate
retroactive application of the time-bar therein provided merely to benefit the accused.
To do so would cause an injustice of hardship to the state and adversely affect the
administration of justice.

Held: Motion granted