Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32:36–44, 2009

Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

ISSN: 1057-610X print / 1521-0731 online
DOI: 10.1080/10576100802563214

Pyro-Terrorism: Recent Cases and the Potential

for Proliferation

NICK DESHPANDE
Royal Military College of Canada
Kingston, Ontario, Canada

Several states have had to cope with pyro-terrorism aimed at their forest systems. This
method of attack—the ignition of forest fires—harms a valuable natural resource and
threatens human population and infrastructure. By adopting specific risk management
practices authorities will be better prepared to address this asymmetric, yet rational,
threat should it materialize. Prevention and deterrence based on vulnerability assess-
ments would assist officials mitigate risks associated with forest-targeted pyro-terrorism.
Given the unique nature and rarity of the threat, responses should be based on separate
policies rather than drawn from a modern counterterrorism strategy and may call for
engagement at a local level.

All you need to start a fire is one match. . . . You take the match and a can of
fuel and light it in the forest. It’s an action that doesn’t require planning, since
an arsonist usually will not get caught.
—Shimon Romach, Israeli Fire and Rescue Services Commissioner1

Notwithstanding common associations between acts of terrorism and spectacular plots

executed using advanced technological means, terrorists are more likely to employ primitive
tactics, such as arson, to cause harm to the population or infrastructure of an enemy. For
example, while the attacks of 11 September 2001 demonstrated some scientific expertise,
they were not highly technical in nature.2 Furthermore, anthrax-laced letters were dispatched
via the U.S. postal service and resulted in the deaths of five people; the cultivation of the
anthrax spores required scientific proficiency whereas the attack itself was rather primitive.3
This demonstrates that terrorist organizations are creative entities that seek to balance the
inherent risk of an operation with the intended outcome. Because of limited resources, they
attempt to identify and exploit weaker targets and dedicate assets judiciously. Terrorists

Received 26 February 2008; accepted 25 May 2008.

The views expressed herein do not reflect the opinions or policies of the Royal Military College
of Canada, the Canadian Forces, or the Department of National Defence.
A variation of this article was presented at the Interuniversity Seminar on Armed Forces and
Society’s biennial conference in Chicago, Illinois, 27 October 2007.
The author is grateful for the input of several colleagues and practitioners, especially Dr. Christian
Leuprecht, Dr. Huw Osborne, Dr. Robert Kuhlken, Dr. John Young, and Mr. J.J. Beechie. Despite
this collaboration, the author bears responsibility for any errors in the text.
Address correspondence to nick.deshpande@gmail.com

36
 Pyro-Terrorism 37

are able to commit fewer resources and apply low-tech methods if the target is highly
vulnerable, or “soft.”
In recent years, there have been several examples of such an approach. This article will
examine how extremist groups have engaged in pyro-terrorism, the deliberate ignition of
fires to harm people, infrastructure, and resources as well as provoke economic disruption.
Although this definition encompasses a variety of targets, this article addresses pyro-
terrorism directed toward forest systems in Europe and elsewhere to these ends. This
article will show how this threat materialized through four case studies and how it has the
potential to be applied in North America. It also seeks to qualify a policy framework in
which appropriate risk management techniques can be established to counter the menace
of pyro-terrorism. This article will begin with a look at Israel, Estonia, Spain, and Greece.
It will then explore the implications for North America followed by a look at the changing
roles for military forces and the intelligence community. It will demonstrate the inherent
challenge posed by existing strategies to distinguish illicit activity from terrorist acts that
both employ arson. The article will conclude with prescribed courses of action.
Pyro-terrorism has the potential to become a tactic of choice for terrorists in more cases
and in new places than it has been in recent years. By harnessing the environment as an
operational platform, terrorists can avoid traditional security mechanisms designed to detect
sophisticated bombs and biological or chemical agents. A reliance on existing vegetation
ensures that both the cost and the inherent risk of a terrorist operation are mitigated. It takes
little more than fuel and a combustible tool or a crude incendiary device to start a forest fire
given the right environmental conditions. It can be safely assumed that extremist groups
are also aware of a lack of preparedness for natural disasters and emergency response on a
massive scale. Finally, terrorists are aware of the consequences of such scenarios because
of widespread news coverage that focuses on the acute visual effects of infernos.
An attack of this nature can have extensive repercussions. Today, wildfires represent
a growing threat to populations in urban and rural interfaces as climate change and de-
mographic shifts increase the size of danger areas. The 2007 California wildfires, one of
which was deliberately set, exemplify the problems created by the urban and rural interface
that exists in many parts of North America today; as a result of the fires, thousands were
evacuated and nine people were killed.4 Fires result in significant economic and market
distress and “strategic dislocation,” due, in part, to the overuse of existing resources and the
distraction of public and private sector bodies.5 Firefighters and other emergency workers
may suffer from psychological stress due to exposure to a high-risk and potentially deadly
environment. The threat to human life, although less than that of a direct attack, cannot be
ignored. As a result, intentionally set forest fires have the potential to disrupt lives on a
massive scale.
Pyro-terrorism has significant repercussions and appeal to terrorist organizations and
therefore warrants greater study. To date, there has been minimal scholarly attention.
Geographer Robert Kuhlken gives a historic overview of the phenomenon of using fire
against forests, and identifies a trend in the use of incendiarism for protest, especially
during times of social unrest; however, he does not frame his argument in a counterterrorism
context.6 United States Marine Corps colonel Robert Baird establishes key definitions and
theorizes the risk to American forests and military forces posed by forest fires incited by
terrorists.7 Recent pyro-terrorist attacks require that governments and academics alike take
this threat seriously and prepare for future incidents.
The current legal and policy environment is shaped by an incoherent counterterrorism
strategy that directs resources imprecisely.8 This is evident when one assesses how some
national governments have chosen to address pyro-terrorism and one also considers that
38 N. Deshpande

not all intentional forest fires are instigated by terrorists, as this article will demonstrate.
In some instances, such as during the 2007 forest fires in Greece, incendiarism constituted
a form of protest. However, because this particular method is attractive to terrorist groups,
one might expect to see it used more often and in more places, including North America.
As such, the strategic redirection of resources to address this specific threat seems prudent.
The following cases will identify trends in alleged pyro-terrorism incidents and the ways
in which they were addressed by the affected states.

Recent Cases of Pyro-Terrorism

Wildfires are often thought of as a natural hazard, and rightfully so; most are caused by
lightning or accidental and careless human activity, such as poorly maintained camp fires.
However, there have been several recent cases that illustrate the threat posed by extremist
entities that target forest systems. Although many countries have had to contend with arson
in forests, some instances, such as those described in what follows, have been labeled
pyro-terrorism because of presence of an acute political dimension. Israel, Spain, and most
recently, Greece have had to contend with forest fires that were intentionally set by terrorist
entities. Estonia has been threatened with such action, although the perpetrators never
instigated a fire. These studies will demonstrate how states have confronted the challenge
posed by extremists who are seeking to harm their forest systems and undermine the
government by using pyro-terrorism.

Israel
Israel is one of the earliest cases, having experienced pyro-terrorism over the past three
decades. According to Nurit Kliot of the University of Haifa, the majority of Israel’s
forest fires in the 1980s and 1990s were caused by arson.9 These were directly related
to the Palestinian uprising, also known as the first Intifada.10 In 2004, a senior Israeli
official warned of “arson terrorism” after several deliberate forest fires destroyed acres
of forests near Jerusalem; according to the Fire and Rescue Services Commissioner, it
was a return to the 1988 “arson Intifada.”11 Israeli forests were once again a target, albeit
perhaps unintentionally, during the conflict with Hezbollah in the summer of 2006. Katyusha
rockets fired from southern Lebanon did considerable damage to about 750 acres of the
Mount Naftali Forest and endangered wildlife. Official estimates place recovery time at
up to six decades.12 Given the distance from population centers and the frequency of
strikes, there are ample indicators that the forests were the intended targets. With forests
covering only 3.7 percent of Israel, the destruction caused by terrorists is considerable.13
Since it first encountered pyro-terrorism, the government has engaged in a considerable
amount of capacity building, invested in technology to fight forest fires and improved
forest-management practices.14 In this regard, it is a model for European states that have
had to deal with the same problem, such as Spain.

Spain
For at least three consecutive summers Spain has been forced to contend with deliberately
set fires on a large scale. In 2006, officials labeled these as “forest terrorism” and claimed
they were “strategic and planned.”15 Nearly twenty people were killed, including eleven
firefighters, while battling a single blaze. The Spanish government quickly came under
considerable pressure from citizens after demonstrations called for action against those that
 Pyro-Terrorism 39

had started the deadly forest fires, many of which were close to urban areas. As a result,
thousands were forced from their homes. After dispatching an anti–organized crime police
unit to hunt for “a gang of arsonists,” several arrests were made.16
But despite the government’s characterization, there does not appear to be a political
dimension to the fires and the arsonists likely sought to clear the land for development
that would have otherwise been impossible rather than pressure the government to alter
zoning policies.17 Furthermore, according to officials, the public’s lack of adherence to
fire regulations led to 90 percent of the wildfires; it is highly unlikely that the majority
of negligent fire starters intended such destruction.18 Although the precise motive for
the intentional fires remains elusive, it is apparent that the Spanish government lacked a
comprehensive strategy to prevent forest fires. In response to the fires, the authors of a
labor-group study recommend appointing environmental prosecutors to investigate forest
fires.19 Given the Mediterranean climate, Spain will continue to battle large forest fires and
must ensure that arsonists do not distract them from the effort required to suppress those
caused naturally.

Estonia
In the summer of 2006, a group calling itself the Forest Incinerators threatened to start
forest fires in Estonian forests and “let the whole (of) Estonia burn down,” prompting a
police investigation.20 The extremist group was dissatisfied that the government of Estonia
had not removed a Soviet monument in the capital city of Tallinn. According to the United
Nation’s Global Fire Monitoring Center, arson already accounts for 13 percent of forest fires
in Estonia.21 However, this was the first time a group had exploited this vulnerability for a
political aim. Ultimately, Estonia’s forests may one day become a target for a pyro-terrorism
campaign and it is therefore important to note future developments.

Greece
One of the most well-known cases of deliberate forest burning took place in Greece
in the summer of 2007. Hundreds of fires threatened large segments of the population,
prompting officials to declare a national state of emergency in late August. The fires caused
more than $7 billion in damage and claimed nearly 70 lives.22 Authorities treated many
of the fires as acts of terrorism, as Spain had the previous summer. And, as in Spain,
the forest fires became a political issue. The Greek government did not capitulate, but
several vulnerabilities were exposed, such as the lack of a coherent forest fire containment
strategy. Instead, authorities framed the incidences as an “asymmetric threat,” dispatched
counterterrorist forces, and offered rewards for information; several arrests were made.23
Six-thousand soldiers were mobilized to assist with suppression. These responses, although
ultimately effective, were inadequate given delays and its narrow vision and may have been
prompted by experiences with the terrorist organization 17 November. Addressing the
root causes of the arsons—negligence and circumventing government planning or other
restrictive development regulations—may have resulted in a more germane strategy rather
than relying on antiterrorism policies. Despite the political angle, officials would have been
better served had they hesitated to label the acts as terrorism.
These cases illustrate the inherent difficulty of conceptually disentangling unconven-
tional political participation, criminality, and terrorist acts. The same tactic serves ends
that are dependent on the perpetrators and, therefore, varied. Employing a counterterrorism
lens, the cases reinforce the challenges posed by domestic terrorism and, in the case of
Israel, even “neighborhood” extremism. Familiarity with forest systems, vulnerabilities,
40 N. Deshpande

and response protocols are more likely to be leveraged by someone or some group within
proximity of a target rather than by those who would be forced to travel over long distances
to strike. Therefore, this inexpensive and comparatively uncomplicated act implicates local-
ized constabulary elements and forces decision-makers to address the gamut of motivations
for employing arson. Furthermore, these cases highlight the importance of response mea-
sures and emergency management protocols. With these ideas in mind, this article will next
assess the likelihood of the employment of pyro-terrorism in North America.

Implications for North America

With the exception of Israel, the aforementioned cases illustrate the limited policies gov-
ernments have employed to counter the threat of pyro-terrorism. Officials in North America
should make preparations in the event that extremists employ such tactics there, especially
given the continent’s similar if not higher level of vulnerability due to environmental factors.
Over the last thirty years, some claim that climate change has increased the average length
of the western U.S. wildfire season by nearly 75 days.24 A number of budgetary initiatives
address this development. The United States Forest Service’s suppression costs exceeded
$1 billion in three of the six years preceding 2006.25 In Canada it costs, on average, $400
million annually to suppress forest fires. Resources typically become strained each season
and cross-border cooperation is often necessary to sustain suppression activities. Also, ac-
cording to National Interagency Fire Center as well as Canadian Intervvagency Forest Fire
Centre statistics, the economic costs due to suppression activities have increased steadily
over the past few decades.
Forest fires not only occur more frequently but with greater intensity than has been
traditionally expected by those involved in suppression efforts. Climate change may have
made more areas susceptible to fire, lengthened the fire season, and made more fuel available
to combustion.26 Several communities in North America, notably in California and British
Columbia, have been severely affected by forest fires, most of them caused naturally. But
the United States is no stranger to deliberate forest fires. During the Second World War, the
Japanese set fire to forests on the West coast by launching planes from carriers and floating
incendiary devices across the Pacific Ocean in incendiary weather balloons; however, the
psychological impact was far greater than the fires’ destructive capability.27 More recently,
five firefighters lost their lives battling an intentionally set fire that grew to more than
155 square kilometers (15,500 hectares); the suspected arsonist, Raymond Lee Oyler, was
accused of setting several wildfires during the summer of 2006. He was arrested 31 October
2006, five days after initiating the fatal Esperanza fire. Prosecutors made it known that they
would seek the death penalty.28 Although this may deter future arsonists, terrorists would
be attracted to the devastating impact and the attention garnered from such incidents with
little regard for the legal ramifications.
Paradoxically, even environmentalists rely on the effect of arson to generate attention
for their causes. Although it would seem highly unlikely that such groups would target
forests with arson, they have been known to use these same tactics against housing devel-
opments and other infrastructure. Baird has assessed that eco-terrorists will consider the
use of fire “to create mass destruction in America’s forests and the dwellings surrounding
them.”29 In the late 1990s, the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) set fire to tree lots and several
commercial and industrial structures, including the United States Forest Industries head-
quarters in Medford, Oregon.30 The FBI has identified eco-terrorism as a prime domestic
terrorism threat31 and has cited arson as a tactic employed against forestry services, among
other targets.32
 Pyro-Terrorism 41

Although these groups may continue to seek to cause harm to commercial interests
without regard for the environment, officials must be aware that foreign terrorists set
their sights on American forests as recently as 2003. Apparently inspired by the firestorm
that swept across Australia in 2002, Al Qaeda operatives sought to ignite several large
wildfires simultaneously in Colorado, Montana, Utah, and Wyoming, according to a leaked
memo written for law enforcement agencies by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The
memo was based on the interrogation of an Al Qaeda operative in American custody.33 In
October 2007, Internet postings were identified by an American intelligence agency made
on websites operated and frequented by terrorists that called for the ignition of forest fires
and noted that the resulting “terror will haunt them for an extended period of time.”34
Although no plots of this kind have been executed (according to public knowledge), these
cases indicate that extremists are already well aware of the vulnerability of North American
forests and the effectiveness of pyro-terrorism.

Expanding Roles for Militaries and the Intelligence Community

Fire suppression activities involve militaries. In 2003, fires in British Columbia prompted
the deployment of the Canadian military on two separate occasions; over 2,600 soldiers,
including 900 reserve personnel, fought fires and provided support to civilian firefighters
as a part of Operation Peregrine, the third largest recent domestic operation.35 Similarly,
in 2003, during the San Diego firestorms, the American National Guard and Marine Corps
were positioned to suppress those deadly forest fires, operating under the Joint Task Force
Fire Fighting, an ad hoc outfit.36 Militaries in Spain and Greece have been called up for the
same purposes. Although their training is not readily conducive to firefighting, armed forces
are well suited for this type of activity, which requires physical and mental endurance. Their
ability to mobilize assets to provide logistical support and consultation make them an ideal
collaborator. Also, wildfire suppression precipitates the involvement of the military when
civilian assets prove inadequate to the task, which is often the case in both North America
and Europe. Labor expenses for civilian personnel are also mitigated by the deployment of
soldiers.
However, the investigation of those who engage in pyro-terrorism should exclude the
military and be relegated to a criminal investigation; the collection, transfer, and analysis of
evidence for the purpose of prosecution are important tasks that rely on police procedure.
The only element of the military that should be involved in that process are the military
police and the intelligence apparatus; furthermore, operating within this realm alone is
more likely to easily garner political and public consensus. A terrorist group’s operational
security and the low probability of detection for incendiarism prior to ignition place an
onus on the intelligence community.
Intelligence officials and policymakers operate in a complex analytical environment
that incorporates many inputs from which the extraction of intelligence is increasingly
difficult. The isolation of this type of event is paramount in order to prevent it. Traditional
collection methods are likely adequate for this engagement; however, officials should be
prepared to face this threat and lend support to allies. They must identify which actors
would likely perpetrate this act based on ideology and precedent. Intelligence officials
would benefit from cooperating with law enforcement agencies and citizens who reside in
high-risk areas. For example, the American group, National Woodland Owners Association
(NWOA), has launched a Wildfire Interface Terrorism Surveillance/Suppression (WITS)
effort to be vigilant of pyro-terrorism. Grassroots efforts such as these form an additional
42 N. Deshpande

barrier between terrorists and vulnerable targets, albeit with varying effectiveness. This
confluence of actors would likely impact civil–military relations and merits further study.

Courses of Action
For the moment pyro-terrorism as a tactic occurs rarely and, therefore, governments must
be cautious not to overreact and mistake craven vandalism for terrorism. According to Gary
Ackerman, the director of the Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies, pyro-terrorism
is “not in the top three attacks in the jihadist playbook.”37 Thus, policymakers should
be aware of the inadequacy of a counterterrorist strategy developed for other threats and
recognize the limitations that arise by applying such a strategy too broadly. Also, despite a
penchant for low-tech methods, some terrorist organizations’ aspiration to adopt advanced
technologies, such as weapons of mass destruction, cannot be ignored.
That said, forest fires are no longer strictly the result of weather phenomena or negligent
human activity; one must recognize that terrorism accounts for some of the cases. Extrem-
ists, especially the Islamist and environmentalist varieties, have recognized the advantage
of targeting forests with fire, thus pyro-terrorism has become a reality for several states.
This has become increasingly evident because extremist organizations have a propensity for
relying on low-tech methods to strike at targets. Setting fire to forests is easy to perpetrate
because of the inherent technical simplicity of the operation. Therefore, this tactic must be
recognized as a rational act, in the same way that suicide bombing is.38 Treated as such,
decision makers can mitigate some of the difficulties that characterize the establishment of
the conceptual framework to address pyro-terrorism and, in some cases, formulate policy
responses that rely more on engagement.
North America has been given strategic warning because states in Europe have already
been the target of pyro-terrorists. Officials’ focus on capacity building and developing
operational resources will better enable them to counter the threat should it materialize. For
example, the use of remote sensing and the deployment of air assets with infrared capability
are required to perform a variety of tasks, such as identifying high-risk areas or tracking
perpetrators. Capacity building also involves gaining and maintaining public confidence.
Governments must demonstrate their effectiveness as quickly as possible should pyro-
terrorism occur. The efficacy of any response will have a significant impact on not only the
ensuing public reaction, but also the likelihood of reoccurrence. To do so, the establishment
of clear points of reference to classify acts of deliberate arson is imperative. Furthermore,
officials need to develop or improve the capacity to mitigate risk, which needs to occur on
three fronts: officials need to address the effects of the threat, the psychological damage
and other second-order effects, and the threat itself. Preparations for such a response could
include modeling and scenario development as well as educational campaigns. Engagement
of the private sector is also required.
By implementing such protocols, governments will gain the ability to alter the existing
threat environment, which, in this instance, is defined by ambiguity and shaped by actors
that could strike at any number of targets. Because mass protection is extremely difficult
if not unachievable, officials should direct government capital based on a strategy that
incorporates deterrence and prevention as well as resource management aimed at mitigating
fuel loads and fire hazards. Terrorists will continue to rely on low-tech methods to cause
harm to a state and its citizens so long as there is an unimpeded course of action. Regular
threat assessments would allow authorities to gauge the effectiveness of their strategies and
to adjust them accordingly.
 Pyro-Terrorism 43

Notes
1. Yaakov Katz, “Fire Chief Warns of ‘Arson Intifada,’” Jerusalem Post, 22 April 2004, Daily
edition.
2. In a video released December 2001, Osama bin Laden explains how he had thought “that
the fire from the gas in the plane would melt the iron structure of the building and collapse the area
where the plane hit and all the floors above only.” See “Bin Laden on tape: Attacks ‘Benefited Is-
lam Greatly,’“ CNN, 14 December 2001, available at http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/12/13/ret.bin.
laden.videotape/ (accessed 26 April 2008).
3. William J. Broad and Judith Miller, “A Nation Challenged: The Germ Attacks; Inquiry
Includes Possibility of Killer from U.S. Lab,” New York Times, 2 December 2001, available at http://
query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9506EFDC113DF931A35751C1A9679C8B63&sec=&
spon=&pagewanted=all (accessed 25 April 2008).
4. Jordana Lewis, “Fire in Southern California Prompts Evacuations,” New York Times, 25
November 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/25/us/25fire.html (accessed 15 May
2008).
5. Michael C. Clarke, “Terrorism, Engineering and the Environment: Their Interrelations,”
Terrorism and Political Violence 16(2) (2004), p. 295.
6. Robert Kuhlken, “Settin’ the Woods on Fire,” The Geographical Review 89(3) (1999), p.
352.
7. Robert A. Baird, “Pyro-Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29(5) (2006), p. 416.
8. For example, see Stephen D. Biddle’s American Grand Strategy After 9/11: An Assessment
in which he elucidates how hitherto responses cannot “provide a coherent grand strategy and a sound
response to the attacks of 9/11 . . . the result is an incoherent—or at best, incomplete—strategy in
which the costs of failing to make critical choices are mounting rapidly” (Carlisle, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, April 2005), p. 2. Furthermore, some claim that the ubiquity of terrorism has made
people to perceive it as a “no-win issue” (thus possibly explaining the branding of “The Long War”).
Martha Crenshaw explains this notion and concludes that “widely dispersed and autonomous centers
of authority” have rendered “planning and implementing a consistent strategy formidable task.”
(“Terrorism, Strategies, and Grand Strategies,” in Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy,
edited by Audrey Kurth and James M. Ludes (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004),
p. 80. The legal dimension of America’s counterterrorism strategy is seen to be characterized as
one that promotes ambiguity rather than clarity; the controversy surrounding the use of enhanced
interrogation techniques epitomizes this issue.
9. Nurit Kliot, “Forests and Forest Fires in Israel,” IFFN, no. 15 (September 1996), available
at http://www.fire.uni-freiburg.de/iffn/country/il/il 3.htm (accessed 1 August 2007).
10. Josh Schollmeyer, “A Fiery Proposition,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 62(6) (Novem-
ber/December 2006), p. 11.
11. Katz, “Fire Chief Warns of ‘Arson Intifada.’”
12. Associated Press, “Nature Falls Victim to Hezbollah Rocket Attacks,” MSNBC, 2 August
2006, available at http://wwww.msnbc.msn.com/id/14153579/ (accessed 1 August 2007).
13. Kliot, “Forests and Forest Fires in Israel.”
14. Ibid.
15. Harold Heckle, “Spain Fights ‘Forest Terrorism’ Fires,” Associated Press, 9 August 2006,
available at http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/Page/document/v4/reg/logoutPage?ord=66640
(accessed 1 November 2007) and Lisa Abend and Geoff Pingree, “Spain’s Forest Fires Raise
Environmental Worries, Suspicions,” Christian Science Monitor, 17 August 2006, available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0817/p04s01-woeu.html (accessed 1 August 2007).
16. “Authorities Hunt For Gang Behind Forest Fires,” New York Times, 10 Augusted 2006, avail-
able at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B07E3D81F3FF933A2575BC0A9609C8B
63&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss (accessed 1 November 2007).
17. Despite the terrorist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)’s abrogation of the cease-fire
agreement in 2006, there has been no public evidence linking it to pyro-terrorism.
44 N. Deshpande

18. Renwick McLean, “Spain Scolds Careless Public: You Can Prevent Forest Fire,” New York
Times, 18 September 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/18/international/18spain.
html? r=1&oref=slogin (accessed 1 November 2007).
19. Ibid.
20. “Estonian Extremists Threaten Government with Forest Fires, Demand Removal
of Soviet Monument,” MosNews, 31 July 2006, available at http://mosnews.com/news/2006/
07/31/estonianforests.shtml (accessed 15 August 2006) (inactive link).
21. IFFN, “Forest Fires in Estonia—A Review,” 30 (January–June 2004), available at
http://www.fire.uni-freiburg.de/iffn/iffn 30/19-IFFN-30-Estonia.pdf (accessed 1 December 2007).
22. “A Combustible Mixture,” The Economist (22 September 2007), p. 47.
23. “Greek Fires Blamed on ‘Culture of Arson,’“ Telegraph.co.uk, 1 August 2007, available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/08/28/wgreece128.xml (accessed 15
December 2007).
24. Mari Jensen, “More Large Forest Fires Linked to Climate Change,” Alumnus (2006), avail-
able at http://www.uagrad.org/Alumnus/gw/fire.html (accessed 15 December 2007).
25. U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Audit Report: Forest Service Large Fire Suppres-
sion Costs,” Report No. 08601–44-SF (November 2006), available at http://www.usda.gov/
oig/webdocs/08601–44-SF.pdf (accessed 1 August 2007).
26. See M. D. Flannigan, B. J. Stocks, and B. M. Wotton, “Climate Change and Forest Fires,”
The Science of the Total Environment 262(3) (2000), pp. 221–229.
27. During the Second World War, the Japanese set fire to swaths of American forests using
weather balloons outfitted with incendiary devices. See Baird, “Pyro-Terrorism,” p. 420.
28. “Suspect in California Wildfire Could Face Death Penalty,” CBC News, 2 November 2006,
available at http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2006/11/02/california-wildfire.html (accessed 31 August
2007).
29. Baird, “Pyro-Terrorism,” p. 417.
30. “Group Says it Set Oregon Fire,” Counterterrorism & Security Reports 8(1) (Jan-
uary/February 1999). LexisNexis (accessed 1 October 2007).
31. “FBI: Eco-Terrorism Remains No. 1 Domestic Terror Threat,” Fox News, 31 March 2008,
available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,343768,00.html (accessed 25 April 2008).
32. John Lewis (statement), “Oversight on Eco-Terrorism Specifically Examining the Earth
Liberation Front and the Animal Liberation Front,” U.S. Senate Committee on Environment &
Public Works, 18 May 2005, available at http://epw.senate.gov/hearing statements.cfm?id=237817
(accessed 25 April 2008).
33. “FBI: Al-Qaeda detainee spoke of fire plot,” USA Today, 11 July 2003, available
at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2003–07-11-alqaeda-fire x.htm (accessed 15 August
2007).
34. “U.S. Intel Alerted to Threat of ‘Forest Jihad,’” World Tribune, 16 January 2008, available
at http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2008/me terror 01 15.asp (accessed 30 April
2008).
35. National Defence and the Canadian Forces, “Operation PEREGRINE,” 16 April 2007,
available at http://www.dnd.ca/site/operations/Peregrine/index e.asp (accessed 15 October 2007).
36. Jim Garamone, “Military Personnel to Enter Fire Lines Next Week,” American Forces Press
Service, 30 October 2003, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=28210
(accessed 20 August 2007).
37. Josh Schollmeyer, “A Fiery Proposition,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (November/
December 2006), p. 11.
38. See, for example, Martha Crenshaw, “The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st
Century,” Political Psychology 21 (2000), pp. 405–420 and Robert A. Pape, “The Strategic Logic of
Suicide Terrorism,” American Political Science Review 97(3) (2003), pp. 1–19.