PEOPLE v.

BAYOTAS It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:

Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It reads, in

part:
G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. —
Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant. 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal
penalties; and as to the pecuniary penalties liability
therefor is extinguished only when the death of the
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
offender occurs before final judgment;

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question. The law is
plain. Statutory construction is unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished.

ROMERO, J.:
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova
was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned
by Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992
at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy
secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its
Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the
Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his
commission of the offense charged.
The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is extinguished only
when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. Saddled upon
us is the task of ascertaining the legal import of the term "final judgment." Is
it final judgment as contradistinguished from an interlocutory order? Or, is it
a judgment which is final and executory?
We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in Article 89 of
the Revised Penal Code heretofore transcribed is lifted from Article 132 of the
Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870 which, in part, recites:
La responsabilidad penal se extingue.

1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas personales

In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did
siempre, y respecto a las pecuniarias, solo cuando a su
not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor
fallecimiento no hubiere recaido sentencia firme.
General, relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego 1 insists that the appeal should still be
resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability
is based. xxx xxx xxx

Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term "sentencia firme."
arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes What is "sentencia firme" under the old statute?
both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of
the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia 2 which held that the civil obligation in a
XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Española, p. 473, furnishes the ready answer: It
criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if
says:
accused should die before final judgment is rendered.

SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la fuerza

We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the accused pending appeal of his
de las definitivas por no haberse utilizado por las partes
conviction extinguish his civil liability?
litigantes recurso alguno contra ella dentro de los
terminos y plazos legales concedidos al efecto.
In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue was settled in the affirmative. This
same issue posed therein was phrased thus: Does the death of Alfredo Castillo affect both his

1
"Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one which is definite.
criminal responsibility and his civil liability as a consequence of the alleged crime?
Because, it is only when judgment is such that, as Medina y Maranon puts it,

Page
the crime is confirmed — "en condena determinada;" or, in the words of
 Groizard, the guilt of the accused becomes — "una verdad legal." Prior As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison case:
thereto, should the accused die, according to Viada, "no hay legalmente, en
tal caso, ni reo, ni delito, ni responsabilidad criminal de ninguna clase." And,
The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been established, and
as Judge Kapunan well explained, when a defendant dies before judgment
considering that there is as yet no final judgment in view of the pendency of
becomes executory, "there cannot be any determination by final judgment
the appeal, the criminal and civil liability of the said accused-appellant Alison
whether or not the felony upon which the civil action might arise exists," for
was extinguished by his death (Art. 89, Revised Penal Code; Reyes' Criminal
the simple reason that "there is no party defendant." (I Kapunan, Revised
Law, 1971 Rev. Ed., p. 717, citing People v. Castillo and Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G.
Penal Code, Annotated, p. 421. Senator Francisco holds the same view.
4045); consequently, the case against him should be dismissed.
Francisco, Revised Penal Code, Book One, 2nd ed., pp. 859-860)

On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of Buenaventura Belamala v. Marcelino
The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly reflected in the
Polinar 7 and Lamberto Torrijos v. The Honorable Court of Appeals 8 ruled differently. In the
Revised Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of that legal body mention the term
former, the issue decided by this court was: Whether the civil liability of one accused of physical
"final judgment" in the sense that it is already enforceable. This also brings
injuries who died before final judgment is extinguished by his demise to the extent of barring any
to mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which states that a
claim therefore against his estate. It was the contention of the administrator-appellant therein
judgment in a criminal case becomes final "after the lapse of the period for
that the death of the accused prior to final judgment extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities
perfecting an appeal or when the sentence has been partially or totally
resulting from the offense, in view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. However,
satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right
this court ruled therein:
to appeal."

We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished, in
By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected funnel
view of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act
down to one positive conclusion: The term final judgment employed in the
No. 386) that became operative eighteen years after the revised Penal Code.
Revised Penal Code means judgment beyond recall. Really, as long as a
As pointed out by the Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a
judgment has not become executory, it cannot be truthfully said that
civil action for damages on account of physical injuries, entirely separate and
defendant is definitely guilty of the felony charged against him.
distinct from the criminal action.

Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without reason. For
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical
where, as in this case, the right to institute a separate civil action is not
injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
reserved, the decision to be rendered must, of necessity, cover "both the
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
criminal and the civil aspects of the case." People vs. Yusico (November 9,
injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p. 964. See also: People vs. Moll, 68 Phil., 626,
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
634; Francisco, Criminal Procedure, 1958 ed., Vol. I, pp. 234, 236. Correctly,
require only a preponderance of evidence.
Judge Kapunan observed that as "the civil action is based solely on the felony
committed and of which the offender might be found guilty, the death of the
offender extinguishes the civil liability." I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for
Annotated, supra. damages was to be considered instituted together with the criminal action
still, since both proceedings were terminated without final adjudication, the
civil action of the offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced
Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillo's criminal liability
separately.
is out. His civil liability is sought to be enforced by reason of that criminal
liability. But then, if we dismiss, as we must, the criminal action and let the
civil aspect remain, we will be faced with the anomalous situation whereby In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:
we will be called upon to clamp civil liability in a case where the source thereof
— criminal liability — does not exist. And, as was well stated in Bautista, et xxx xxx xxx
al. vs. Estrella, et al., CA-G.R.
No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found and held criminally
liable in a civil suit," which solely would remain if we are to divorce it from It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the extinction
the criminal proceeding." of the criminal liability under Article 89, only when the civil liability arises from
the criminal act as its only basis. Stated differently, where the civil liability
does not exist independently of the criminal responsibility, the extinction of
This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case 3 was adopted by the Supreme Court in the the latter by death, ipso facto extinguishes the former, provided, of course,
cases of People of the Philippines v. Bonifacio Alison, et al., 4 People of the Philippines v. Jaime that death supervenes before final judgment. The said principle does not

2
Jose, et al. 5 and People of the Philippines v. Satorre 6 by dismissing the appeal in view of the apply in instant case wherein the civil liability springs neither solely nor

Page
death of the accused pending appeal of said cases.
 originally from the crime itself but from a civil contract of purchase and sale. The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the
(Emphasis ours) criminal action in the absence of express waiver or its reservation in a
separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court). The civil action for
the civil liability is separate and distinct from the criminal action (People and
xxx xxx xxx
Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).

In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability of the accused who
When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before
was charged with estafa could likewise trace its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the
final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be
Civil Code since said accused had swindled the first and second vendees of the property
prosecuted in the manner especially provided in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court
subject matter of the contract of sale. It therefore concluded: "Consequently, while the
(Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
death of the accused herein extinguished his criminal liability including fine, his civil
liability based on the laws of human relations remains."
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had
been rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives
Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil liability of the accused,
him. It may be continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336,
notwithstanding the extinction of his criminal liability due to his death pending appeal of his
October 24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394).
conviction.

The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds
To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive, the court relied on the following
improperly disbursed although he has no criminal liability (U.S. vs. Elvina, 24
ratiocination: Since Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court 9 requires the dismissal of all money
Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).
claims against the defendant whose death occurred prior to the final judgment of the Court of
First Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred that actions for recovery of money may continue to
be heard on appeal, when the death of the defendant supervenes after the CFI had rendered its In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the
judgment. In such case, explained this tribunal, "the name of the offended party shall be included deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, the Court
in the title of the case as plaintiff-appellee and the legal representative or the heirs of the Resolved to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil
deceased-accused should be substituted as defendants-appellants." liability for the money claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising from the
alleged criminal acts complained of, as if no criminal case had been instituted
against him, thus making applicable, in determining his civil liability, Article
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to Torrijos, the rule established was
30 of the Civil Code . . . and, for that purpose, his counsel is directed to
that the survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on sources
inform this Court within ten (10) days of the names and addresses of the
of obligations other than delict. Stated differently, the claim for civil liability is also extinguished
decedent's heirs or whether or not his estate is under administration and has
together with the criminal action if it were solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.
a duly appointed judicial administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be
substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action for the civil liability is
However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al. 10 departed from this long- concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
established principle of law. In this case, accused Sendaydiego was charged with and convicted
by the lower court of malversation thru falsification of public documents. Sendaydiego's death
Succeeding cases 11 raising the identical issue have maintained adherence to our ruling
supervened during the pendency of the appeal of his conviction.
in Sendaydiego; in other words, they were a reaffirmance of our abandonment of the settled rule
that a civil liability solely anchored on the criminal (civil liability ex delicto) is extinguished upon
This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss Sendaydiego's appeal but only to the dismissal of the entire appeal due to the demise of the accused.
extent of his criminal liability. His civil liability was allowed to survive although it was clear that
such claim thereon was exclusively dependent on the criminal action already extinguished. The
But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re-examination of our decision
legal import of such decision was for the court to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over
in Sendaydiego impels us to revert to the old ruling.
the entire appeal, passing upon the correctness of Sendaydiego's conviction despite dismissal of
the criminal action, for the purpose of determining if he is civilly liable. In doing so, this Court
issued a Resolution of July 8, 1977 stating thus: To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The resolution of the civil action impliedly
instituted in the criminal action can proceed irrespective of the latter's extinction due to death of
the accused pending appeal of his conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the Civil Code and Section
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived
21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Sendaydiego because his death occurred after final judgment was rendered
by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him of three
complex crimes of malversation through falsification and ordered him to Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:
indemnify the Province in the total sum of P61,048.23 (should be

3
P57,048.23).

Page
When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a
criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the
 pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be
sufficient to prove the act complained of.
Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to the ruling in Sendaydiego.
Nowhere in its text is there a grant of authority to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over
the accused's civil liability ex delicto when his death supervenes during appeal. What Article 30
recognizes is an alternative and separate civil action which may be brought to demand civil liability
arising from a criminal offense independently of any criminal action. In the event that no criminal
proceedings are instituted during the pendency of said civil case, the quantum of evidence needed
to prove the criminal act will have to be that which is compatible with civil liability and that is,
preponderance of evidence and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking
Article 30 to justify the survival of the civil action despite extinction of the criminal would in effect
merely beg the question of whether civil liability ex delicto survives upon extinction of the criminal
action due to death of the accused during appeal of his conviction. This is because whether
asserted in
the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by the death
of the accused while his conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on
this matter:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is
totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of
the offender occurs before final judgment;
xxx xxx xxx
However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed intent of Article 89. It allowed
claims for civil liability ex delicto to survive by ipso facto treating the civil action impliedly instituted
with the criminal, as one filed under Article 30, as though no criminal proceedings had been filed
but merely a separate civil action. This had the effect of converting such claims from one which
is dependent on the outcome of the criminal action to an entirely new and separate one, the
prosecution of which does not even necessitate the filing of criminal proceedings. 12 One would
be hard put to pinpoint the statutory authority for such a transformation. It is to be borne in mind
that in recovering civil liability ex delicto, the same has perforce to be determined in the criminal
action, rooted as it is in the court's pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of the accused. This
is but to render fealty to the intendment of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which provides
that "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." In such cases, extinction of
the criminal action due to death of the accused pending appeal inevitably signifies the concomitant
extinction of the civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi. Death dissolves all things.
In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final determination of the
criminal liability is a condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, such that when the
criminal action is extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending appeal thereof, said
civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of and is dependent upon facts
which, if true, would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable consequence of the
criminal liability and is to be declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be
distinguished from that which is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to
the institution of a separate civil action that does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The
Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977, however, failed to take note of this fundamental distinction
when it allowed the survival of the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by treating
the same as a separate civil action referred to under Article 30. Surely, it will take more than just
a summary judicial pronouncement to authorize the conversion of said civil action to an
independent one such as that contemplated under Article 30.
Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, the resolution of
July 8, 1977 notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main decision:
Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his
criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his estate
would be liable. 13
In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability, concomitantly made a
determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld Sendaydiego's
conviction and pronounced the same as the source of his civil liability. Consequently, although
Article 30 was not applied in the final determination of Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a
reopening of the criminal action already extinguished which served as basis for Sendaydiego's civil
liability. We reiterate: Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal
action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the
civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished,
grounded as it is on the criminal.
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as another basis for
the Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977. In citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the
Court made the inference that civil actions of the type involved in Sendaydiego consist of money
claims, the recovery of which may be continued on appeal if defendant dies pending appeal of his
conviction by holding his estate liable therefor. Hence, the Court's conclusion:
"When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the defendant dies
before final judgment in the court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to
be prosecuted in the manner especially provided" in Rule 87 of the Rules of
Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had
been rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives
him. It may be continued on appeal.
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the standpoint of procedural law, this
course taken in Sendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As correctly observed by Justice Regalado:
xxx xxx xxx
I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in
both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relying on the provisions of Section 21,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, drew the strained implication therefrom that
where the civil liability instituted together with the criminal liabilities had
4
already passed beyond the judgment of the then Court of First Instance (now
Page
the Regional Trial Court), the Court of Appeals can continue to exercise
appellate jurisdiction thereover despite the extinguishment of the component
 criminal liability of the deceased. This pronouncement, which has been
followed in the Court's judgments subsequent and consonant
to Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should be set aside and abandoned as being
clearly erroneous and unjustifiable.
Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary civil actions.
There is neither authority nor justification for its application in criminal
procedure to civil actions instituted together with and as part of criminal
actions. Nor is there any authority in law for the summary conversion from
the latter category of an ordinary civil action upon the death of the offender.
...
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding for recovery of civil
liability ex delicto can hardly be categorized as an ordinary money claim such as that referred to
in Sec. 21, Rule 3 enforceable before the estate of the deceased accused.
Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be viewed in light of the provisions
of Section 5, Rule 86 involving claims against the estate, which in Sendaydiego was held liable for
Sendaydiego's civil liability. "What are contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to Section
5 of Rule 86, 14 are contractual money claims while the claims involved in civil liability ex
delicto may include even the restitution of personal or real property." 15 Section 5, Rule 86
provides an exclusive enumeration of what claims may be filed against the estate. These are:
funeral expenses, expenses for the last illness, judgments for money and claim arising from
contracts, expressed or implied. It is clear that money claims arising from delict do not form part
of this exclusive enumeration. Hence, there could be no legal basis in (1) treating a civil action ex
delicto as an ordinary contractual money claim referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court and (2) allowing it to survive by filing a claim therefor before the estate of the deceased
accused. Rather, it should be extinguished upon extinction of the criminal action engendered by
the death of the accused pending finality of his conviction.
Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex
delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must subject
to Section 1, Rule 111 16 (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil
action, this time predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other sources of
obligation. The source of obligation upon which the separate civil action is premised determines
against whom the same shall be enforced.
If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or may, by provision of
law, result in an injury to person or property (real or personal), the separate civil action must be
filed against the executor or administrator 17 of the estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule
87 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor
or administrator. — No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt
or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or
administrator; but actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest
therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover
damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be
commenced against him.
This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala 18 where we held that, in recovering damages
for injury to persons thru an independent civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the
same must be filed against the executor or administrator of the estate of deceased accused and
not against the estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule explicitly limits the claim to those
for funeral expenses, expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, judgment for money and
claims arising from contract, express or implied. Contractual money claims, we stressed, refers
only topurely personal obligations other than those which have their source in delict or tort.
Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises from contract, the separate civil
action must be filed against the estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court.
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well
as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death
of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same
may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. 19 Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of
the same act or omission:
a) Law 20
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor
may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced
either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source
of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil
action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to
its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such
case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of
the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 21 of the Civil Code, that should
5
thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. 22
Page
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas
extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e.,
rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.

WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

6
Page
PEOPLE v. DELA CRUZ
Criminal Case No. 11557
That on or about the 1st day of December 2004, in the city of Laoag,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 190610 Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
Plaintiff and Appellee, named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, sell
Present: and deliver to a Public Officer, who acted as poseur buyer 0.1 gram including
CARPIO, J., plastic container of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, popularly known as
Chairperson, shabu, a dangerous drug, without any license or authority to do so, in
-versus- BRION, violation of the aforecited law.[5]
PEREZ,
SERENO, and Criminal Case No. 11558
REYES, JJ. That on or about the 1st day of December 2004, in the City of
Laoag, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
SATURNINO DE LA CRUZ AND JOSE BRILLANTES y Promulgated: above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
LOPEZ, have in his possession, control and custody two (2) big plastic sachet
Accused. April 25, 2012 containing shabu weighing more or less 2.6 grams including plastic container
JOSE BRILLANTES y LOPEZ, without being authorized and permitted by law to possess the same in
Accused-Appellant. violation of the aforecited law.[6]

x------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court is an Appeal[1] filed by accused-appellant Jose Brillantes y Lopez
(Brillantes) assailing the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 8 July 2009 in CA-G.R. CR
No. 30897.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is an affirmance of the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 13 in Criminal Case Nos. 11556, 11557 and 11558
convicting accused Brillantes and Saturnino de la Cruz (De la Cruz) for violation of Sections 5 and
11, Article II of RA 9165 entitled An Act Instituting the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act Of
2002.[3]
In the Criminal Case No. 11556, De la Cruz y Valdez was charged as follows:
Criminal Case No. 11556
That on or about the 1st day of December 2004, in the city of Laoag,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have
in his possession, control and custody one (1) plastic sachet containing shabu
weighing more or less 0.1 gram including plastic container without
prescription or authority to possess the same in violation of the aforecited
law.[4]
On the other hand, Jose Brillantes y Lopez was charged in Criminal Case Nos. 11557
When arraigned, both the accused pleaded not guilty of the crimes charged.
The RTC held that the prosecution successfully discharged the burden of proof in the
cases of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, in this case methamphetamine
hydrochloride otherwise known as shabu. The trial court relied on the presumption of regularity
in the performance of duty of the police officials who conducted the buy-bust operation. The
dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding [the] accused
Saturnino De la Cruz GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as charged in Criminal
Case No. 11556 for illegal possession of shabu with a weight of 0.0619 gram
and is therefore sentenced to serve the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment ranging from TWELVE (12) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY as
minimum to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS as maximum and to pay a fine of
P300,000.00.
Accused Jose Brillantes is also found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt as charged in Criminal Case No.11557 for illegal sale of shabu and is
therefore sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a
fine of P2,000,000.00. Said accused is likewise found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as charged in Criminal Case No. 11558 for illegal possession
of shabu with an aggregate weight of 0.2351 gram and is therefore further
sentenced to serve the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from
TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as minimum to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS
as maximum and to pay a fine of P300,000.00.
The contraband subject of these cases are hereby forfeited, the
same to be disposed of as the law prescribes. [7]
The appellate court found no reason to depart from the ruling of the trial court. It upheld
that all the elements of the offense of illegal sale of drugs were present and the finding against

7
Brillantes well established by the prosecution. Further, it also found that all the elements
and 11558 with illegal sale of shabu and illegal possession of dangerous drug of shabu. The two

Page
constituting illegal possession of prohibited or regulated drugs were established beyond
separate Informations follow: reasonable doubt to convict De la Cruz and Brillantes. On all the three charges, great weight was
given to the testimonies of the members of the buy-bust team and arresting officers SPO3
Rovimanuel Balolong and PO2 Celso Pang-ag, who also acted as the poseur-buyer.
On 29 July 2009, a Notice of Appeal[8] was filed by Brillantes through counsel before the
Supreme Court. His co-accused De la Cruz, did not appeal his conviction.
While this case is pending appeal, Prisons and Security Division Officer-in-Charge Romeo
F. Fajardo[9] informed the Court that accused-appellant Brillantes died while committed at the
Bureau of Corrections on 3 January 2012 as evidenced by a copy of death report[10] signed by
New Bilibid Prison Hospitals Medical Officer Benevito A. Fontanilla, III.
Hence, we resolve the effect of death pending appeal of his conviction of accused-
appellant Brillantes with regard to his criminal and pecuniary liabilities.
The Revised Penal Code is instructive on the matter. It provides in Article 89(1) that:
Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of
the offender occurs before final judgment.
It is plain that both the personal penalty of imprisonment and pecuniary penalty of fine of BrillantesNo. 30897 affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 13 in Criminal
were extinguished upon his death pending appeal of his conviction by the lower courts.
We recite the rules laid down in People v. Bayotas, to wit:
[11]
There is no civil liability involved in violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002.[12] No private offended party is involved as there is in fact no reference to civil liability in the decision
of the trial court.
The appeal of Brillantes culminating in the extinguishment of his criminal liability does not have
any effect on his co- accused De la Cruz who did not file a notice of appeal. The Rules on Criminal Procedure
on the matter states:
RULE 122 - Appeal
Section 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused.
(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those
who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate
court is favorable and applicable to the latter; (emphasis ours)
xxx
The extinguishment of Brillantes criminal and pecuniary liabilities is predicated on his
death and not on his acquittal. Following the provision, the appeal taken by Brillantes and
subsequent extinguishment of his liabilities is not applicable to De la Cruz.
WHEREFORE, in view of his death on 3 January 2012, the appeal of accused-appellant
Jose Brillantes y Lopez from the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 8 July 2009 in CA-G.R. CR
Case Nos. 11557 and 11558 convicting him of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165
is hereby declared MOOT and ACADEMIC, his criminal and pecuniary liabilities having been
extinguished. No cost.

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his SO ORDERED.
criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by
Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final
judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e.,
civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other
than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of
obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act
or omission:

a) Law

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) . . .

e) Quasi-delicts

xxx

8 Page
PEOPLE v. PATRIARCA
[G.R. No. 135547. January 23, 2002]
GERARDO F. RIVERA, ALFRED A. RAMISO, AMBROCIO PALAD, DENNIS R. ARANAS,
DAVID SORIMA, JR., JORGE P. DELA ROSA, and ISAGANI ALDEA, petitioners,
vs. HON. EDGARDO ESPIRITU in his capacity as Chairman of the PAL Inter-
Agency Task Force created under Administrative Order No. 16; HON.
BIENVENIDO LAGUESMA in his capacity as Secretary of Labor and
Employment; PHILIPPINE AIRLINES (PAL), LUCIO TAN, HENRY SO UY,
ANTONIO V. OCAMPO, MANOLO E. AQUINO, JAIME J. BAUTISTA, and
ALEXANDER O. BARRIENTOS, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
In this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, petitioners charge public
respondents with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for acts
taken in regard to the enforcement of the agreement dated September 27, 1998, between
Philippine Airlines (PAL) and its union, the PAL Employees Association (PALEA).
The factual antecedents of this case are as follows:
On June 5, 1998, PAL pilots affiliated with the Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines
(ALPAP) went on a three-week strike, causing serious losses to the financially beleaguered flag
carrier. As a result, PALs financial situation went from bad to worse. Faced with bankruptcy, PAL
adopted a rehabilitation plan and downsized its labor force by more than one-third.
On July 22, 1998, PALEA went on strike to protest the retrenchment measures adopted by
the airline, which affected 1,899 union members. The strike ended four days later, when PAL and
PALEA agreed to a more systematic reduction in PALs work force and the payment of separation
benefits to all retrenched employees.
On August 28, 1998, then President Joseph E. Estrada issued Administrative Order No. 16
creating an Inter-Agency Task Force (Task Force) to address the problems of the ailing flag
carrier. The Task Force was composed of the Departments of Finance, Labor and Employment,
Foreign Affairs, Transportation and Communication, and Tourism, together with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). Public respondent Edgardo Espiritu, then the Secretary of Finance,
was designated chairman of the Task Force. It was empowered to summon all parties concerned
for conciliation, mediation (for) the purpose of arriving at a total and complete solution of the
problem.[1] Conciliation meetings were then held between PAL management and the three unions
representing the airlines employees,[2] with the Task Force as mediator.
On September 4, 1998, PAL management submitted to the Task Force an offer by private
respondent Lucio Tan, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of PAL, of a plan to transfer shares
of stock to its employees. The pertinent portion of said plan reads:
1. From the issued shares of stock within the group of Mr. Lucio Tans holdings, the ownership of
60,000 fully paid shares of stock of Philippine Airlines with a par value of PHP5.00/share will be
transferred in favor of each employee of Philippine Airlines in the active payroll as of September
15, 1998. Should any share-owning employee leave PAL, he/she has the option to keep the shares
or sells (sic) his/her shares to his/her union or other employees currently employed by PAL.
2. The aggregate shares of stock transferred to PAL employees will allow them three (3) members
to (sic) the PAL Board of Directors. We, thus, become partners in the boardroom and together,
we shall address and find solutions to the wide range of problems besetting PAL.
3. In order for PAL to attain (a) degree of normalcy while we are tackling its problems, we would
request for a suspension of the Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs) for 10 years.[3]
On September 10, 1998, the Board of Directors of PALEA voted to accept Tans offer and
requested the Task Forces assistance in implementing the same. Union members, however,
rejected Tans offer. Under intense pressure from PALEA members, the unions directors
subsequently resolved to reject Tans offer.
On September 17, 1998, PAL informed the Task Force that it was shutting down its
operations effective September 23, 1998, preparatory to liquidating its assets and paying off its
creditors. The airline claimed that given its labor problems, rehabilitation was no longer feasible,
and hence, the airline had no alternative but to close shop.
On September 18, 1998, PALEA sought the intervention of the Office of the President in
immediately convening the parties, the PAL management, PALEA, ALPAP, and FASAP, including
the SEC under the direction of the Inter-Agency Task Force, to prevent the imminent closure of
PAL.[4]
On September 19, 1998, PALEA informed the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
that it had no objection to a referendum on the Tans offer. 2,799 out of 6,738 PALEA members
cast their votes in the referendum under DOLE supervision held on September 21-22, 1998. Of
the votes cast, 1,055 voted in favor of Tans offer while 1,371 rejected it.
On September 23, 1998, PAL ceased its operations and sent notices of termination to its
employees.
Two days later, the PALEA board wrote President Estrada anew, seeking his
intervention. PALEA offered a 10-year moratorium on strikes and similar actions and a waiver of
some of the economic benefits in the existing CBA.[5] Tan, however, rejected this counter-offer.
On September 27, 1998, the PALEA board again wrote the President proposing the following
terms and conditions, subject to ratification by the general membership:
1. Each PAL employee shall be granted 60,000 shares of stock with a par value of P5.00, from Mr.
Lucio Tans shareholdings, with three (3) seats in the PAL Board and an additional seat from
government shares as indicated by His Excellency;
2. Likewise, PALEA shall, as far as practicable, be granted adequate representation in committees
or bodies which deal with matters affecting terms and conditions of employment;
9
3. To enhance and strengthen labor-management relations, the existing Labor-Management
Page
Coordinating Council shall be reorganized and revitalized, with adequate representation from both
PAL management and PALEA;
4. To assure investors and creditors of industrial peace, PALEA agrees, subject to the ratification
by the general membership, (to) the suspension of the PAL-PALEA CBA for a period of ten (10)
years, provided the following safeguards are in place:
a. PAL shall continue recognizing PALEA as the duly certified bargaining agent of the
regular rank-and-file ground employees of the Company;
b. The union shop/maintenance of membership provision under the PAL-PALEA CBA
shall be respected.
c. No salary deduction, with full medical benefits.
5. PAL shall grant the benefits under the 26 July 1998 Memorandum of Agreement forged by and
between PAL and PALEA, to those employees who may opt to retire or be separated from the
company.
6. PALEA members who have been retrenched but have not received separation benefits shall be
granted priority in the hiring/rehiring of employees.
7. In the absence of applicable Company rule or regulation, the provisions of the Labor Code shall
apply.[6]
Among the signatories to the letter were herein petitioners Rivera, Ramiso, and Aranas, as
officers and/or members of the PALEA Board of Directors. PAL management accepted the PALEA
proposal and the necessary referendum was scheduled.
On October 2, 1998, 5,324 PALEA members cast their votes in a DOLE-supervised
referendum. Of the votes cast, 61% were in favor of accepting the PAL-PALEA agreement, while
34% rejected it.
On October 7, 1998, PAL resumed domestic operations. On the same date, seven officers
and members of PALEA filed this instant petition to annul the September 27, 1998 agreement
entered into between PAL and PALEA on the following grounds:
I is an ordinary civil action for annulment of contract, an action which properly falls under the
PUBLIC RESPONDENTS GRAVELY ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION AND EXCEEDED THEIR
JURISDICTION IN ACTIVELY PURSUING THE CONCLUSION OF THE PAL-PALEA AGREEMENT AS
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO SELF-ORGANIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING,
BEING FOUNDED ON PUBLIC POLICY, MAY NOT BE WAIVED, NOR THE WAIVER, RATIFIED.
II
PUBLIC RESPONDENTS GRAVELY ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION AND EXCEEDED THEIR
JURISDICTION IN PRESIDING OVER THE CONCLUSION OF THE PAL-PALEA AGREEMENT UNDER
THREAT OF ABUSIVE EXERCISE OF PALS MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE TO CLOSE BUSINESS
USED AS SUBTERFUGE FOR UNION-BUSTING.
The issues now for our resolution are:
(1) Is an original action for certiorari and prohibition the proper remedy to annul the
PAL-PALEA agreement of September 27, 1998;
(2) Is the PAL-PALEA agreement of September 27, 1998, stipulating the suspension
of the PAL-PALEA CBA unconstitutional and contrary to public policy?
Anent the first issue, petitioners aver that public respondents as functionaries of the Task
Force, gravely abused their discretion and exceeded their jurisdiction when they actively pursued
and presided over the PAL-PALEA agreement.
Respondents, in turn, argue that the public respondents merely served as conciliators or
mediators, consistent with the mandate of A.O. No. 16 and merely supervised the conduct of
the October 3, 1998 referendum during which the PALEA members ratified the agreement. Thus,
public respondents did not perform any judicial and quasi-judicial act pertaining to
jurisdiction. Furthermore, respondents pray for the dismissal of the petition for violating the
hierarchy of courts doctrine enunciated in People v. Cuaresma[7] and Enrile v. Salazar.[8]
Petitioners allege grave abuse of discretion under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. The essential requisites for a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 are: (1) the writ is
directed against a tribunal, a board, or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2)
such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[9] For writs of prohibition, the
requisites are: (1) the impugned act must be that of a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or
person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions; and (2) there is no plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. [10]
The assailed agreement is clearly not the act of a tribunal, board, officer, or person
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. It is not the act of public respondents
Finance Secretary Edgardo Espiritu and Labor Secretary Bienvenido Laguesma as functionaries of
the Task Force. Neither is there a judgment, order, or resolution of either public respondents
involved. Instead, what exists is a contract between a private firm and one of its labor unions,
albeit entered into with the assistance of the Task Force. The first and second requisites for
certiorari and prohibition are therefore not present in this case.
Furthermore, there is available to petitioners a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. While the petition is denominated as one for certiorari and prohibition, its
object is actually the nullification of the PAL-PALEA agreement. As such, petitioners proper remedy
jurisdiction of the regional trial courts.[11] Neither certiorari nor prohibition is the remedy in the
present case.
Petitioners further assert that public respondents were partial towards PAL
management. They allegedly pressured the PALEA leaders into accepting the
agreement. Petitioners ask this Court to examine the circumstances that led to the signing of said
agreement. This would involve review of the facts and factual issues raised in a special civil action
for certiorari which is not the function of this Court.[12]
Nevertheless, considering the prayer of the parties principally we shall look into the
substance of the petition, in the higher interest of justice[13] and in view of the public interest
involved, inasmuch as what is at stake here is industrial peace in the nations premier airline and
flag carrier, a national concern.
10
On the second issue, petitioners contend that the controverted PAL-PALEA agreement is
void because it abrogated the right of workers to self-organization[14] and their right to collective
Page
bargaining.[15] Petitioners claim that the agreement was not meant merely to suspend the existing
PAL-PALEA CBA, which expires on September 30, 2000, but also to foreclose any renegotiation or
any possibility to forge a new CBA for a decade or up to 2008. It violates the protection to labor
policy[16] laid down by the Constitution.
Article 253-A of the Labor Code reads:
ART. 253-A. Terms of a Collective Bargaining Agreement. Any Collective Bargaining
Agreement that the parties may enter into shall, insofar as the representation aspect is concerned,
be for a term of five (5) years. No petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent
bargaining agent shall be entertained and no certification election shall be conducted by the
Department of Labor and Employment outside of the sixty-day period immediately before the date
of expiry of such five-year term of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. All other provisions of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement shall be renegotiated not later than three (3) years after its
execution. Any agreement on such other provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
entered into within six (6) months from the date of expiry of the term of such other provisions as
fixed in such Collective Bargaining Agreement, shall retroact to the day immediately following such
date. If any such agreement is entered into beyond six months, the parties shall agree on the
duration of the retroactivity thereof. In case of a deadlock in the renegotiation of the collective
bargaining agreement, the parties may exercise their rights under this Code.
Under this provision, insofar as representation is concerned, a CBA has a term of five years, while
the other provisions, except for representation, may be negotiated not later than three years after
the execution.[17] Petitioners submit that a 10-year CBA suspension is inordinately long, way
beyond the maximum statutory life of a CBA, provided for in Article 253-A. By agreeing to a 10-
year suspension, PALEA, in effect, abdicated the workers constitutional right to bargain for another
CBA at the mandated time.
We find the argument devoid of merit.
A CBA is a contract executed upon request of either the employer or the exclusive bargaining
representative incorporating the agreement reached after negotiations with respect to wages,
hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment, including proposals for adjusting
any grievances or questions arising under such agreement.[18] The primary purpose of a CBA is
the stabilization of labor-management relations in order to create a climate of a sound and stable
industrial peace.[19] In construing a CBA, the courts must be practical and realistic and give due
consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and the purpose which it is intended to
serve.[20]
The assailed PAL-PALEA agreement was the result of voluntary collective bargaining
negotiations undertaken in the light of the severe financial situation faced by the employer, with
the peculiar and unique intention of not merely promoting industrial peace at PAL, but preventing
the latters closure. We find no conflict between said agreement and Article 253-A of the Labor
Code. Article 253-A has a two-fold purpose. One is to promote industrial stability and
predictability. Inasmuch as the agreement sought to promote industrial peace at PAL during its
rehabilitation, said agreement satisfies the first purpose of Article 253-A. The other is to assign
specific timetables wherein negotiations become a matter of right and requirement. Nothing in
Article 253-A, prohibits the parties from waiving or suspending the mandatory timetables and
agreeing on the remedies to enforce the same.
In the instant case, it was PALEA, as the exclusive bargaining agent of PALs ground
employees, that voluntarily entered into the CBA with PAL. It was also PALEA that voluntarily
opted for the 10-year suspension of the CBA. Either case was the unions exercise of its right to
collective bargaining. The right to free collective bargaining, after all, includes the right to suspend
it.
The acts of public respondents in sanctioning the 10-year suspension of the PAL-PALEA CBA
did not contravene the protection to labor policy of the Constitution. The agreement afforded full
protection to labor; promoted the shared responsibility between workers and employers; and the
exercised voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation to foster industrial peace."[21]
Petitioners further allege that the 10-year suspension of the CBA under the PAL-PALEA
agreement virtually installed PALEA as a company union for said period, amounting to unfair labor
practice, in violation of Article 253-A of the Labor Code mandating that an exclusive bargaining
agent serves for five years only.
The questioned proviso of the agreement reads:
a. PAL shall continue recognizing PALEA as the duly certified-bargaining agent of the
regular rank-and-file ground employees of the Company;
Said proviso cannot be construed alone. In construing an instrument with several
provisions, a construction must be adopted as will give effect to all. Under Article 1374 of the Civil
Code,[22] contracts cannot be construed by parts, but clauses must be interpreted in relation to
one another to give effect to the whole. The legal effect of a contract is not determined alone by
any particular provision disconnected from all others, but from the whole read together.[23] The
aforesaid provision must be read within the context of the next clause, which provides:
b. The union shop/maintenance of membership provision under the PAL-PALEA CBA shall
be respected.
The aforesaid provisions, taken together, clearly show the intent of the parties to maintain
union security during the period of the suspension of the CBA. Its objective is to assure the
continued existence of PALEA during the said period. We are unable to declare the objective of
union security an unfair labor practice. It is State policy to promote unionism to enable workers
to negotiate with management on an even playing field and with more persuasiveness than if they
were to individually and separately bargain with the employer. For this reason, the law has allowed
stipulations for union shop and closed shop as means of encouraging workers to join and support
the union of their choice in the protection of their rights and interests vis--vis the employer.[24]
Petitioners contention that the agreement installs PALEA as a virtual company union is also
untenable. Under Article 248 (d) of the Labor Code, a company union exists when the employer
acts [t]o initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with the formation or administration of
any labor organization, including the giving of financial or other support to it or its organizers or
supporters. The case records are bare of any showing of such acts by PAL.
We also do not agree that the agreement violates the five-year representation limit
mandated by Article 253-A. Under said article, the representation limit for the exclusive bargaining
agent applies only when there is an extant CBA in full force and effect. In the instant case, the
parties agreed to suspend the CBA and put in abeyance the limit on the representation period.
In sum, we are of the view that the PAL-PALEA agreement dated September 27, 1998, is a
valid exercise of the freedom to contract. Under the principle of inviolability of contracts
guaranteed by the Constitution,[25] the contract must be upheld.
WHEREFORE, there being no grave abuse of discretion shown, the instant petition is
11
DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
Page
SO ORDERED.
Page
12
PEOPLE v. CASIDO
G.R. No. 116512 March 7, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
WILLIAM O. CASIDO @ "MARIO," and FRANKLIN A. ALCORIN @ "ARMAN," accused-
appellants.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In our Resolution of 30 July 1996, we ruled that "the conditional pardons granted in this case to
accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin are void for having been extended on 19
January 1996 during the pendency of their instant appeal," and disposed of the incident as follows:
WHEREFORE, the accused-appellants' Urgent Motion To Withdraw Appeal is
hereby DENIED and the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to effect with the
support and assistance of the Philippine National Police, the re-arrest of
accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin who shall then,
forthwith, be reconfined at the New Bilibid Prisons in Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila, both within sixty (60) days from notice hereof, and to submit a report
thereon within the same period. In the meantime, further action on the
appeal is suspended until the re-arrest of the accused-appellants.
The Court further resolves to REQUIRE the officers of the Presidential
Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release, and Pardon to SHOW CAUSE, within
thirty (30) days from notice hereof, why they should not be held in contempt
of court for acting on and favorably recommending approval of the
applications for the pardon of the accused-appellants despite the pendency
of their appeal.
In a Comment for the members of the Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release or
Pardon (hereinafter Committee), dated 28 August 1996, two members of the Committee's
Secretariat, namely, Nilo C. Mariano (Assistant Chief Prosecutor) and Nestor J. Ballacillo (Solicitor
in the Office of the Solicitor General), submitted the following explanation in compliance with the
above-mentioned resolution:
1. In line with the confidence building measures of government, the President
on August 11, 1992 constituted the Presidential Committee for the Grant of
Bail, Release or Pardon with the Secretary of Justice as the Chairman and
Secretary of National Defense and the Secretary of the Interior and Local
Government as members with the directive to establish guidelines for the
grant of bail, release or pardon of persons detained or convicted of crimes
against national security and public order and violations of the Articles of War.
Subsequently, membership to the Committee was expanded to include the
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights and a member of the defunct
National Unification Commission who was later on replaced by the
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process.
2. On 9 December 1992, the President issued an amendment to the guidelines
incorporating therein a provision which reads: "Those charged, detained or
convicted of common crimes but who can establish by sufficient evidence that
they have actually committed any of the crimes/offenses enumerated above
may apply for possible grant of bail, release or pardon under these
guidelines."
3. Corollary to the constitution of the Committee, a Secretariat was also
constituted which was tasked to process and evaluate the applications of
those desiring to be granted pardon or recommended for release or bail under
the aforementioned guidelines and which will recommend to the Committee
those who qualify under the guidelines.
4. The members of the Secretariat are representatives of the Office of the
Chief State Prosecutor, the Board of Pardons and Parole, the Office of the
Chief State Counsel, the Bureau of Corrections, the Philippine National Police
Legal Service, the Judge Advocate's Office-Armed Forces of the Philippines,
the Office of the Solicitor General, and the Commission on Human Rights
(Legal Services).
5. In the processing and evaluation of the applications for the grant of
pardon, release or bail, it was the agreement between the Secretariat and
counsels for the applicants who are usually the lawyers of non-government
organizations (NGOs), such as the Task Force Detainees of the Philippines
(TFDP), the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG), the KAPATID, PAHRA,
among others, that simultaneous with the processing of the applications,
motions for the withdrawal of the applicant's appeals must be filed by them
with this Honorable Court.
6. With the arrangement, the processing and evaluation of the applications
for the grant of pardon, release or bail by the committee resulted in the grant
of conditional pardon to 123 applicants and absolute pardon to eight (8)
applicants as of June 27, 1994.
7. The applications for conditional pardon of the aforenamed prisoners were
recommended by the Committee to the President for the grant of Conditional
Pardon (after the Secretariat had evaluated that the former committed the
crimes for which they had been charged in pursuit of their political belief) per
Memorandum dated May 25, 1995 and approved by the President on
December 29, 1995. The Conditional Pardon paper was signed by the
President on January 19, 1996 and the subject prisoners (accused-appellants)
13
were released by the Bureau of Corrections on January 25, 1996.
Page
8. Prior to their release, subject prisoners filed an "Urgent Motion to Withdraw
Appeal" which was received by the Supreme Court on January 11, 1996.
 Unfortunately, the Committee failed to verify first whether the counsel of the
accused had also withdrawn their appeal or that the NGO lawyers had filed
in their behalf a motion to Withdraw their Appeal. It was upon the honest
belief of the Secretariat that the NGO lawyers would perform their agreed
undertaking, that the Secretariat indorsed the applications for conditional
pardon of subject prisoners for favorable action by the Committee, and
thereafter by the President.
9. There was no intention on the part of the Secretariat and the Presidential
Committee to violate Section 19, Article VII, of the Constitution, but that what
happened was a clear misappreciation of fact.
10. The Secretariat/Committee was only prompted to act, as they did, in their
sincere and zealous effort to take part in the government's confidence
building measure geared towards achieving peace and national reconciliation.
To avoid repetition of grant of presidential clemency under similar
circumstances, the Secretariat/Committee will require applicants for any
executive relief to show proof that their appeal, if any, has been withdrawn
and the withdrawal thereof has been also approved before acting on their
applications as directed by President Fidel V. Ramos in his handwritten
instructions to the Presidential Committee, thru the Executive Secretary, and
upon recommendation of Chief Presidential Legal Counsel Rene Cayetano, for
the Presidential Committee" to exercise better diligence." (See Annex "1",
and its attachments).
11. The undersigned most respectfully pray for the kind indulgence and
understanding of this Honorable Court on the matter.
On 18 September 1996, the Court required Hon. Nilo C. Mariano and Hon. Nestor J. Ballacillo to
submit to this Court list of the members of the Secretariat who participated in the deliberations
on the accused-appellants application for pardon and reocommended the grant thereof, together
with a certified true copy of the agreement between the Secretariat and the counsel for the
applicants for pardon regarding the filing with the appropriate courts of motions for the withdrawal
of appeals pending therein. Their Compliance, dated 23 October 1996, stated as follows:
2. A review of the records of the Secretariat indicates that initially or as of
January, 1993, the members of the Secretariat were:
Undersecretary Ramon S. Esquerra — DOJ
Assistant Chief State Nilo C. Mariano — DOJ
Executive Director Artemio C. Aspiras — DOJ
State Counsel Teresita L. de Castro — DOJ
Director Eriberto Misa, Jr. — Bureau of Pardon
Correction
Edgardo Dayao — JAGO
Pedro Abella — PNP
Samuel M. Soriano, Jr. — CHR
Imelda B. Devila — National Unification
Commission
Nestor J. Ballacillo — OSG
3. On February 9-11, 1995, a Working Group was constituted "to conduct and
expeditious review of the cases of prisoners in the New Bilibid Prison who are
alleged to have committed crime in pursuit of political objectives" (Resolution
No. 1, of the Secretariat Working Group).
4. For this purpose, the Working Group consisting of State Prosecutor Alberto
Vizcocho of the Department of Justice (DOJ), Commissioner Mercedes V.
Contreras of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) and Andrei Bon C.
Tagum of the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP)
convened for three days or February 9-11, 1995 to review the cases of the
political prisoners.
5. Among the cases reviewed by the Working Group were those of appellants
Franklin Alcorin y Alparo and William Casido y Balcasay.
6. After the review of the cases, the Working Group issued Resolution No. 1,
which states among others that the "prisoners [including Alcorin and Casido]
be recommended to the Secretariat of the Presidential Committee for the
Grant of Conditional Pardon in view of a determination that they were charged
or convicted of crimes that may have been committed in pursuit of political
objectives." (A copy of Resolution No.1 is attached hereto as Annex "1").
7. The recommendations on the political prisoners listed in Resolution No. 1
by the Working Group as well as the recommendations made by the
Secretariat were based on the undertaking of those representing the political
prisoners, particularly the Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) such as,
among others, the Task Force Detainees of the Philippines (TFDP), the Free
Legal Assistance Group (FLAG), KAPATID and PAHRA who promised that the
corresponding withdrawals of appeal would be filed with this Honorable Court
and other Courts concerned. This undertaking of the NGOs was however
verbal and not made in writing.
8. In recommending the grant of conditional pardon to Alcorin and Casido,
the members of the Secretariat Working Group acted in good faith and did
not disregard the Resolutions of this Honorable Court in People vs. Hino, Jr.,
G.R. No.110035,January 31, 1995 and People vs. Salle, (250 SCRA 582,
December 4, 1995). At the time they made the recommendations or the
Working Group issued Resolution No. 1, the members of the Secretariat and
the Working Group were not aware of the Hino and Salle rulings. Moreover,
at the time the cases were being reviewed, the members of the Secretariat,
were pressed on by members of the NGOs to act on certain applications for
pardon or provisional release with dispatch. In turn, they made it clear to
those following up the applications that the appropriate withdrawal of appeals
should be filed so that the applications could be acted upon.
9. Believing in good faith that the promise or undertaking of those who
followed up the applications for pardon of Alcorin and Casido would be
14
complied with as promised, the members of the Secretariat Working Group
did not secure the written commitment for the withdrawal of the appeal by
accused Alcorin and Casido before their applications for pardon were
Page
reviewed.
 Earlier, or on 1 October 1996, the Court received from Hon. Manuel C. Herrera,
Chairman of the National Amnesty Commission, a letter, dated 26 September 1996
addressed to Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., wherein the former informed the Court
that the applications for amnesty of accused- appellants Franklin A. Alcorin and William
O. Casido were "favorably acted" upon by the National Amnesty Commission on 22
February 1996. The body of the letter reads:
We refer to a newspaper article found in the Philippine Daily Inquirer's August
1, 1996 issue. Please be informed that on February 22, 1996, the National
Amnesty Commission (hereinafter the "NAC") favorably acted on the
applications for amnesty of Franklin A. Alcorin and William O. Casido.
The NAC was created under Proclamation No. 347 by President Fidel V.
Ramos on March 25, 1994, to receive, process, and decide on applications
for amnesty. Under Proclamation No. 347 a grant of amnesty shall carry with
it the extinguishment of any criminal liability for acts committed by the
grantee in pursuit of his or her political beliefs. It also carries with it the
restoration of civil or political rights that may have been suspended or lost by
virtue of a criminal conviction.
In the course of our deliberations, the NAC found that the applicants are
indeed confirmed members of the CPP/NPA/NDF whose killing of Victoriano
Mapa was committed in pursuit of their political beliefs.
We enclose, for ready reference, copies of the following documents:
1. Notice of Resolution for Franklin A. Alcorin and William O. Casido
2. Proclamation No. 347
3. Primer on Amnesty under Proclamation Nos.347 and 348.
In its Comment to the aforesaid letter (submitted in compliance with our Resolution of 7 October
1996), the Office of the Solicitor General alleged that the accused-appellants in this case, "in an
effort to seek their release at the soonest possible time, applied for pardon before the Presidential
Committee on the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon (PCGBRP), as well as for amnesty before the
National Amnesty Commission (NAC)"; then contended that since amnesty, unlike pardon, may
be granted before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes even after
conviction, as held in Barrioquinto v. Fernandez, 1 the amnesty then granted accused-appellants
William Casido and Franklin Alcorin "rendered moot and academic the question of the premature
pardon granted to them."
We agree with the Office of the Solicitor General. In Barrioquinto, 2 we stated as follows:
The theory of the respondents, supported by the dissenting opinion, is
predicated on a wrong contention of the nature or character of an amnesty.
Amnesty must be distinguished from pardon.
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which
must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts
take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive
with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts
should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction;
while amnesty is to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of
political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal
prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and
relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has
been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that
reason it does "nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or
the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms
of the pardon," and it "in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of
the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence" (article 36, Revised
Penal Code). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into
oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with
which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the
law precisely as though he had committed no offense. (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, while the pardon in this case was void for having been extended during the pendency
of the appeal or before conviction by final judgment and, therefore, in violation of the first
paragraph of Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution, the grant of the amnesty, for which
accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin voluntarily applied under Proclamation No.
347, 3 was valid. This Proclamation was concurred in by both Houses of Congress in Concurrent
Resolution No.12 adopted on 2 June 1994.
The release then of accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin can only be justified
by the amnesty, but not by the "pardon."
As to the "pardon," we find unsatisfactory the Explanation of the Secretariat of the Committee. It
borders on the absurd that its members were unaware of the resolutions of this Court in People
v. Hinlo 4 and People v.
Salle. 5 As early as 1991, this Court, in People v. Sepada, 6 cited in our Resolution of 30 July 1996
in this case, already stressed in no uncertain terms the necessity of a final judgment before parole
or pardon could be extended. Even in their Comment of 28 August 1996, the Members of the
Secretariat implied that they were all the time aware that a pardon could only be granted after
conviction by final judgment; hence, they required from the lawyers of the applicants the filing
with this Court of "motions for the withdrawal of the applicants' appeals." Thus, they cannot plead
ignorance of this condition sine qua non to the grant of pardon. They should have demanded from
the applicants the submission of proof of their compliance of the requirement before submitting
to the President a favorable recommendation. That alone, at the very least, could have been the
basis of a finding of good faith. In failing to observe due care in the performance of their duties,
the Members of the Committee caused the President serious embarrassment and thus deserve an
admonition.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby resolved that the release of accused-appellants
William O. Casido and Franklin A. Alcorin was valid solely on the ground of the amnesty granted
them and this case is dismissed with costs de officio.
15
The Members of the Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon and of its
Page
Secretariat are admonished to exercise utmost care and diligence in the performance of their duty
to save the President from any embarrassment in the exercise of his power to grant pardon or
parole.

SO ORDERED.

16
Page
BARRIOQUINTO v. FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. L-1278 January 21, 1949
LORETO BARRIOQUINTO and NORBERTO JIMENEZ, petitioners,
vs.
ENRIQUE A. FERNANDEZ, ANTONIO BELMONTE and FELICISIMO OCAMPO, as
Commissioners of the Fourteenth Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, respondents.
Roseller T. Lim for petitioners.
Antonio Belmonte for respondents.
FERIA, J.:
This is a special action of mandamus instituted by the petitioners against the respondents who
composed the 14th Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, to compel the latter to act and decide whether
or not the petitioners are entitled to the benefits of amnesty.
Petitioners Norberto Jimenez and Loreto Barrioquinto were charged with the crime of murder. As
the latter had not yet been arrested the case proceeded against the former, and after trial Court
of First Instance of Zamboanga sentenced Jimenez to life imprisonment. Before the period for
perfecting an appeal had expired, the defendant Jimenez became aware of the Proclamation No.
8, dated September 7, 1946, which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged
with an act penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy
or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and committed during the period from
December 8, 1941, to the date when particular area of the Philippines where the offense was
actually committed was liberated from enemy control and occupation, and said Jimenez decided
to submit his case to the Guerrilla Amnesty Commission presided by the respondents herein, and
the other petitioner Loreto Barrioquinto, who had then been already apprehended, did the same.
After a preliminary hearing had started, the Amnesty Commission, prescribed by the respondents,
issued on January 9, 1947, an order returning the cases of the petitioners to the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga, without deciding whether or not they are entitled to the benefits of he
said Amnesty Proclamation, on the ground that inasmuch as neither Barrioquinto nor Jimenez
have admitted having committed the offense, because Barrioquinto alleged that it was Hipolito
Tolentino who shot and killed the victim, they cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty.
The Amnesty Proclamation of September 7, 1946, issued by the President with the concurrence
of Congress of the Philippines, reads in part as follows:
WHEREAS, since the inception of the war until the liberation of the different areas
comprising the territory of the Philippines, volunteer armed forces of Filipinos and for
of other nationalities operated as guerrillas and other patriotic individuals and groups
pursued activities in opposition to the forces and agents of the Japanese Empire in the
invasion and occupation of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, members of such forces, in their determined efforts to resist the enemy,
and to bring about his ultimate defeat, committed acts penalized under the Revised
Penal Code;
WHEREAS, charges have been presented in the courts against many members of these
resistance forces, for such acts;
WHEREAS, the fact that such acts were committed in furtherance of the resistance to
the enemy is not a valid defense under the laws of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, the persons so accused should not be regarded as criminals but rather as
patriots and heroes who have rendered invaluable service to the nation; and
WHEREAS, it is desirable that without the least possible delay, these persons be freed
form the indignity and the jeopardy to which they are now being subjected;
NOW, THEREFORE, I Manuel Roxas, President of the Philippines in accordance with the
provisions of Article VII, section 10, paragraph 6 of the Constitution, do hereby declare
and proclaim an amnesty inn favor of al persons who committed any act penalized
under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against
persons aiding in the war effort of the enemy, and committed during the period from
December 8, 1941 to the date when each particular area of the Philippines was actually
liberated from the enemy control and occupation. This amnesty shall not apply to crimes
against chastity or to acts committed from purely personal motives.
It is further proclaimed and declared that in order to determine who among those
against whom charges have been filed before the courts of the Philippines or against
whom charges may be filed in the future, come within the terms of this amnesty,
Guerrilla Amnesty Commissions, simultaneously to be established , shall examine the
facts and circumstance surrounding each case and, if necessary, conduct summary
hearings of witnesses both for the complainant and the accused. These Commissions
shall decided each case and, upon finding that it falls within the terms of this
proclamation, the Commissions shall so declare and this amnesty shall immediately be
effective as to the accused, who shall forthwith be released or discharged.
The theory of the respondents, supported by the dissenting opinion, is predicated on a wrong
conception of the nature or character of an amnesty. Amnesty must be distinguished from pardon.
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded
and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by
Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of
which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while
amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses,
generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction.
Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he
has been convicted, that is, it abolished or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does
""nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such
rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon," and it "in no case exempts the culprit
from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence" article 36, Revised
Penal Code). while amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself,
it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by
17
amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. (section 10[6],
Article VII, Philippine Constitution; State vs. Blalock, 62 N.C., 242, 247; In re Briggs, 135 N.C.,
Page
118; 47 S.E. 402., 403; Ex parte Law, 35 GA., 285, 296; State ex rel Anheuser—Busch Brewing
Ass'n. vs. Eby, 170 Mo., 497; 71 S.W 52, 61; Burdick vs United States, N.Y., 35 S. Ct., 267; 271;
236 U.S., 79; 59 Law. ed., 476.)
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so hold that, in order to entitle a person to
the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation of September 7, 1946, it is not necessary that he should,
as a condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having committed the criminal act or offense with
which he is charged and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the evidence either
of the complainant or the accused, shows that the offense committed comes within the terms of
said Amnesty Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that "invocation of the benefits of
amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance." Although the accused does not
confess the imputation against him, he may be declared by the courts or the Amnesty
Commissions entitled to the benefits. For, whether or not he admits or confesses having
committed the offense with which he is charged, the Commissions should, if necessary or
requested by the interested party, conduct summary hearing of the witnesses both for the
complainants and the accused, on whether he has committed the offense in furtherance of the
resistance to the enemy, or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and decide
whether he is entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to be "regarded as a patriot or hero who
have rendered invaluable services to the nation,," or not, in accordance with the terms of the
Amnesty Proclamation. since the Amnesty Proclamation is a public act, the courts as well as the
Amnesty Commissions created thereby should take notice of the terms of said Proclamation and
apply the benefits granted therein to cases coming within their province or jurisdiction, whether
pleaded or claimed by the person charged with such offenses or not, if the evidence presented
show that the accused is entitled to said benefits.
The right to the benefits of amnesty, once established by the evidence presented either by the
complainant or prosecution, or by the defense, can not be waived, because it is of public interest
that a person who is regarded by the Amnesty Proclamation which has the force of a law, not only
as innocent, for he stands in the eyes of the law as if he had never committed any punishable
offense because of the amnesty, but as a patriot or hero, can not be punishment as a criminal.
Just as the courts of justice can not convict a person who, according to the evidence, has
committed an act not punishable by law, although he confesses being guilty thereof, so also and a
fortiori they can not convict a person considered by law not a criminal, but as a patriot and hero,
for having rendered invaluable services to the nation inn committing such an act.
While it is true that the evidence must show that the offense charged was against chastity and
was committed in furtherance of the resistance against the enemy, for otherwise, it is to be
naturally presumed that is has been committed for purely personal motive, it is nonetheless true
that though the motive as a mental impulse is state of mind or subjective, it need not be testified
to be the defendant himself at his arraignment or hearing of the case. Generally the motive for
the commission of an offense is established by the testimony of witnesses on the acts or
statements of the accused before or immediately after the commission of the offense, deeds or
words hat may express it or from which his motive or reason for committing it may be inferred.
The statement of testimony of a defendant at the time of arraignment or the hearing of the case
about said motive, can not generally be considered and relied on, specially if there is evidence to
the contrary, as the true expression of the reason o motive he had at the time of committing the
offense. Because such statements or testimony may be an afterthought or colored by the interest
he may have to suit his defense or the purpose for which he intends to achieve with such
declaration. Hence it does not stand to reason and logic to say, as the dissenting opinion avers,
that unless the defendant admits at the investigation or hearing having committed the offense
with which he is charged, and states that he did it in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy,
and not for purely personal motive, it is impossible for the court of Commission to verify the
motive for the commission of the offense, because only the accused could explain of the offense,
because only the accused could explain his belief and intention or the motive of committing the
offense.
There is no necessity for an accused to admit his responsibility for the commission of a criminal
act before a court of Amnesty Commission may investigate and extend or not to him the benefits
of amnesty. The fact that he pleads not guilty or that he has not committed the act with which
he is charged, does not necessarily prove that he is not guilty thereof. Notwithstanding his denial,
the evidence for the prosecution or complainant may show the contrary, as it is generally the case
in criminal proceedings, and what should in such a case be determined is whether or not the
offense committed is of political character. The plea of not having committed the offense made
by an accused simply means that he can not be convicted of the offense charged because he is
not guilty thereof, and, even if the evidence would show that he is, because he has committed it
in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons a ding in the war efforts of the
enemy, and not for purely political motives.
According to Administrative Order No. 11 of October 2, 1946, creating the Amnesty Commissions,
issued by the President of the Philippines, cases pending in the Courts of First Instance of the
province in which the accused claims the benefits of Amnesty Proclamation, and cases already
decided by said courts but not yet elevated on appeal to the appellate courts, shall be passed
upon and decided by the respective Amnesty Commission, and cases pending appeal shall be
passed upon by the Seventh Amnesty Commission. Under the theory of the respondents and the
writer oft he dissenting opinion, the Commissions should refuse to comply with the directive of
said Administrative Order, because is almost all cases pending in the Court of First Instance, and
all those pending appeal form the sentence of said courts, the defendants must not have pleaded
guilty or admitted having committed the offense charged for otherwise, they would not or could
not have appealed from the judgment of the Courts of First Instance. To hold that a Amnesty
Commission should not proceed to the investigation and act and decide whether the offense with
which an accused was charged comes within the Amnesty Proclamation if he does not admit or
confess having committed it would be to defeat the purpose for which the Amnesty Proclamation
was issued and the Amnesty Commission were established. If the courts have to proceed to the
trail or hearing of a case and decide whether the offense committed by the defendant comes
within the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation although the defendant has plead not guilty, there
is no reason why the Amnesty Commissions can not do so. Where a defendant to admit or confess
having committed the offense or being responsible therefor before he can invoke the benefit of
amnesty, as there is no law which makes such admission or confession not admissible as evidence
against him in the courts of justices in case the Amnesty Commission finds that the offense does
not come within the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation, nobody or few would take the risk of
submitting their case to said Commission.
Besides, in the present case, the allegation of Loreto Barrioquinto that the offended party or victim
was shot and killed by Agapito Hipolito , does not necessarily bar the respondents from finding,
after the summary hearing of the witnesses for the complaints and the accused, directed in the
said Amnesty Proclamation and Administrative Order No. 11, that the petitioners are responsible
for the killing of the victim, either as principals by cooperation, inducement or conspiration, or as
accessories before as well as after the fact, but that they are entitled to the benefits of amnesty,
because they were members of the same group of guerrilleros who killed the victim in furtherance
of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy.
18
Wherefore, the respondents are hereby ordered to immediately proceed to hear and decide the
application for amnesty of petitioners Barrioquinto and Jimenez, unless amnesty of petitioners
Barrioquinto and Jimenez, unless the courts have in the meantime already decided, expressly and
Page
finally, the question whether or not they are entitled to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation
No. 8 of September 7, 1946. So ordered.

19
Page
FLORA v. OXIMANA
G.R. No. L-19745 January 31, 1964
ELISEO FLORA, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
VICENTE OXIMANA, ET AL., respondents.
Cipriano Cid and Associates for petitioners.
Salonga, Ordoñez, Sicat and Associates for respondent.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Vicente Oximana is the president of the Benguet-Balatoc Workers Union (BBWU) having been
elected to said position on June 20, 1960, pursuant to the provisions of constitution and by-laws
of said union. Since 1948, when the union was organized, Oximana has been elected continuously
as such president and has performed the duties and functions of said office without interruption
in accordance with the provisions of said constitution and by-laws.
In 1926, Oximana was convicted of the crime of abusos deshonestos for which he was sentenced
to 3 years 6 months and 25 days imprisonment which he served until December 4, 1930. As a
consequence, a complaint was lodged against him before the Court of Industrial Relations on
February 2, 1961 by a prosecutor of said court seeking as president of the union on the strength
of the previous of Section 17(e) of Republic Act 875. In this complaint, the union was made party
respondent because of complainant's desire to restrain Oximana from performing the duties and
functions of his office as president and to have a new election held for the purpose of electing a
new qualified president.
In answer to the complaint, respondents alleged that it fails to state cause of action for it does
not show that it bears the sanction of at least 10% of the entire membership of the union of which
Oximana was president, and that assuming that it does and Oximana was convicted of the offense
which involves moral turpitude, the same is not however one of the offenses contemplated by
Section 17(e) of Republic Act 875. In any event, respondents contend that the aforesaid legal
provision, being penal in character, does not apply to Oximana for he has been an official of good
standing long before the effectivity of Republic Act 875.
When the case was called for hearing, the parties submitted a stipulation of facts wherein, among
other things, it was agreed that on April 1, 1961 the President of the Philippines granted Oximana
full, absolute and plenary pardon for the crime he had committed in 1926, thereby restoring him
to the full enjoyment of his civil and political rights, one of which is the holding of the position
now disputed by complainants.
On November 29, 1961, Judge Amado C. Bugayong, who heard the case, issued an order
dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. He said that were it not for the absolute pardon granted
to Oximana he would have been disqualified. But said pardon has erased all the ill effects of his
conviction and had restored to him all his rights and privileges as a citizen as if he had not
committed the crime at all. One of such rights is to hold an office in any labor organization as the
one now being held by respondent Oximana.
This Order was affirmed by the court en banc. Hence, the present petition for review.1äwphï1.ñët
Section 17(e) of Republic Act 875 provides as follows:
No person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude shall be eligible
for election to any office in a legitimate labor organization or for appointment to any
position involving the collection, custody, management, control or disbursement of its
funds, and any such person shall be disqualified from continuing to hold any office or
such position in the organization.
If the case of respondent Oximana should be considered in the light of what is provided for in the
section abovequoted there would be no doubt that he would be disqualified from holding the
position of president which is now being disputed by complainants for the crime for which he was
convicted in 1926 is one which involves moral turpitude because the purpose of the law is indeed
to disqualify one who, because of gross misconduct, has rendered himself unfit to hold any office
in a legitimate labor organization. But here the situation of respondent Oximana has changed
since his conviction. It appears that since the time of his conviction in 1926 up to the time the
complaint for disqualification was lodged against him in 1961, a long period of time has passed,
and, in the meantime, he may have reformed himself and become new and repentant man. In
fact, when he organized the Benguet-Balatoc Workers' Union in 1948, he became its president
and had been reelected as such continuously up to the present time without any indication that
through his actuation as such official he has ever committed any misconduct or act unbecoming
his office that may disqualify him to continue deserving the confidence of the union and its
members. It is perhaps for this reason that on April 1, 1961 the President of the Philippines grant
him full, absolute and plenary pardon which restored to him the full enjoyment of his civil and
political rights one of which is the right to hold any office in any legitimate labor organization. We
believe that the effect of this pardon is as the President of the Philippines has stated, the
restoration in full of Oximana's civil and political rights, the effect of which is to blot out any evil
consequences of the crime he has committed. Authorities abound supporting this view.
Thus, it has been held that "A full and complete pardon, granted after conviction, removes all
penalties and legal disabilities, and restores the defendant to all his civil rights." Continuing, the
court went on to say that "pardon completely destroys the effect of the judgment ... (and)
'obliterates, in legal contemplation, the offense itself; and hence its effect is to make the offender
a new man'" (Stephens v. State of ex rel. Goldsberry, 11 Okl. 262, 239 P. 450). In a similar vein,
this Court, thru Mr. Justice Laurel, stated that "an absolute pardon not only blots out the crime
committed but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction; and that when granted after
the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences
of the conviction;" (Pelobello v. Palatino, 72 Phil. 441). And in an earlier case, this Court, thru the
same Justice also stated:
... An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but removes all
disabilities resulting from the conviction. In the present case, the disability is the result
of conviction without which there would be no basis for disqualification from voting.
Imprisonment is not the only punishment which the law imposes upon those who violate
its command. There are accessory and resultant disabilities, and the pardoning power
likewise extends to such disabilities. When granted after the term of imprisonment has
expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction. In
the present case, while the pardon, extended to respondent Santos is conditional in the
sense that "he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or
20
manual in nature involving no money or property responsibility," it is absolute insofar
as it "restores the respondent to full civil and political rights." (Cristobal v. Labrador, et
al., 71 Phil. 34, 38).
Page
We are, therefore, persuaded to affirm the view expressed by the court a quo in its order of
November 29, 1961.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed. No costs.

21
Page
PELOBELLO v. PALATINO 1940. Under these circumstances, it is evident that the purpose in granting him absolute pardon
was to enable him to assume the position in deference to the popular will; and the pardon was
thus extended on the date mentioned hereinabove and before the date fixed in section 4 of the
G.R. No. L-48100 June 20, 1941
Election Code for assuming office. We see no reason for defeating this wholesome purpose by a
restrictive judicial interpretation of the constitutional grant to the Chief Executive. We, therefore,
FLORENCIO PELOBELLO, petitioner-appellant, give efficacy to executive action and disregard what at bottom is a technical objection.
vs.
GREGORIO PALATINO, respondent-appellee.
The judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with costs against the petitioner-appellant, So
ordered.
Rodriguez & Aclaro for appellant.
Cecilio Maneja for appellee.

LAUREL, J.:

The petitioner-appellant, Florencio Pelobello, instituted quo warranto proceedings in the Court of
First Instance of Tayabas against the respondent-appellee, Gregorio Palatino, the mayor-elect of
the municipality of Torrijos, Province of Marinduque. The proceedings were had pursuant to the
provisions of section 167, in relation with section 94 (a), of the Election Code (Commonwealth Act
No. 357). It was alleged that the respondent-appellee, having been convicted by final judgment
in 1912 of atendado contra la autoridad y sus agentes and sentenced to imprisonment for two
years, four months and one day of prision correccional, was disqualified from voting and being
voted upon for the contested municipal office, such disqualification not having been removed by
plenary pardon.

The fact of conviction as above set forth is admitted; so is the election and consequent
proclamation of the respondent-appellee for the office of municipal mayor. It is also admitted that
the respondent-appellee was granted by the Governor-General a conditional pardon back in 1915;
and it has been proven (Vide Exhibit 1, admitted by the lower court, rec. of ap., p. 20) that on
December 25, 1940, His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, granted the respondent-
appellee absolute pardon and restored him to the enjoyment of full civil and political rights.

The question presented is whether or not the absolute pardon had the effect of removing the
disqualification incident to criminal conviction under paragraph (a) of section 94 of the Election
Code, the pardon having been granted after the election but before the date fixed by law for
assuming office (sec. 4, Election Code). Without the necessity of inquiring into the historical
background of the benign prerogative of mercy, we adopt the broad view expressed in Cristobal
vs. Labrador, G. R. No. 47941, promulgated December 7, 1940, that subject to the limitations
imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative
action; that an absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities
resulting from the conviction, and that when granted after the term of imprisonment has expired,
absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction, While there may be
force in the argument which finds support in well considered cases that the effect of absolute
pardon should not be extended to cases of this kind, we are of the opinion that the better view in
the light of the constitutional grant in this jurisdiction is not to unnecessarily restrict or impair the
power of the Chief Executive who, after inquiry into the environmental facts, should be at liberty
to atone the rigidity of the law to the extent of relieving completely the party or parties concerned
from the accessory and resultant disabilities of criminal conviction. In the case at bar, it is admitted
that the respondent mayor-elect committed the offense more than 25 years ago; that he had

22
already merited conditional pardon from the Governor-General in 1915; that thereafter he had
exercised the right of suffrage, was elected councilor of Torrijos, Marinduque, for the period 1918

Page
to 1921; was elected municipal president of that municipality three times in succession (1922-
1931); and finally elected mayor of the municipality in the election for local officials in December,
VIDAL v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 206666 January 21, 2015
ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, Petitioner,
ALFREDO S. LIM Petitioner-Intervenor,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before the Court are (1) a Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, both
of the Revised Rules of Court, by Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal (Risos-Vidal), which essentially prays for
the issuance of the writ of certiorari annulling and setting aside the April 1, 2013 1 and April 23,
20132 Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Second Division and En bane,
respectively, in SPA No. 13-211 (DC), entitled "Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal v. Joseph Ejercito Estrada"
for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (2) a Petition-in-Intervention3 filed by Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), wherein he prays to
be declared the 2013 winning candidate for Mayor of the City of Manila in view of private
respondent former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada’s (former President Estrada) disqualification
to run for and hold public office.
The Facts
The salient facts of the case are as follows:
On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada, a former
President of the Republic of the Philippines, for the crime of plunder in Criminal Case No. 26558,
entitled "People of the Philippines v. Joseph Ejercito Estrada, et al." The dispositive part of the
graft court’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in Criminal Case No. 26558
finding the accused, Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of PLUNDER, defined in and penalized by Republic Act No. 7080, as amended. On
the other hand, for failure of the prosecution to prove and establish their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, the Court finds the accused Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada and Atty. Edward S. Serapio NOT
GUILTY of the crime of plunder, and accordingly, the Court hereby orders their ACQUITTAL.
The penalty imposable for the crime of plunder under Republic Act No. 7080, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, is Reclusion Perpetua to Death. There being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, however, the lesser penalty shall be applied in accordance with Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, the accused Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil
interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification.
The period within which accused Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada has been under
detention shall be credited to him in full as long as he agrees voluntarily in writing to abide by the
same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners.
Moreover, in accordance with Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659, the Court hereby declares the forfeiture in favor of the government of the following:
(1) The total amount of Five Hundred Forty[-]Two Million Seven Hundred Ninety[-]One
Thousand Pesos (₱545,291,000.00), with interest and income earned, inclusive of the
amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (₱200,000,000.00), deposited in the name and
account of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation.
(2) The amount of One Hundred Eighty[-]Nine Million Pesos (₱189,000,000.00),
inclusive of interests and income earned, deposited in the Jose Velarde account.
(3) The real property consisting of a house and lot dubbed as "Boracay Mansion" located
at #100 11th Street, New Manila, Quezon City.
The cash bonds posted by accused Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada and Atty. Edward S. Serapio are hereby
ordered cancelled and released to the said accused or their duly authorized representatives upon
presentation of the original receipt evidencing payment thereof and subject to the usual
accounting and auditing procedures. Likewise, the hold-departure orders issued against the said
accused are hereby recalled and declared functus oficio.4
On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (former President
Arroyo) extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada. The full
text of said pardon states:
MALACAÑAN PALACE
MANILA
By the President of the Philippines
PARDON
WHEREAS, this Administration has a policy of releasing inmates who have reached the age of
seventy (70),
WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has been under detention for six and a half years,
WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position
or office,
IN VIEW HEREOF and pursuant to the authority conferred upon me by the Constitution, I hereby
23
grant executive clemency to JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, convicted by the Sandiganbayan of
Plunder and imposed a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. He is hereby restored to his civil and political
rights.
Page
The forfeitures imposed by the Sandiganbayan remain in force and in full, including all writs and
processes issued by the Sandiganbayan in pursuance hereof, except for the bank account(s) he
owned before his tenure as President.
Upon acceptance of this pardon by JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, this pardon shall take effect.
Given under my hand at the City of Manila, this 25th Day of October, in the year of Our Lord, two
thousand and seven.
Gloria M. Arroyo (sgd.)
By the President:
IGNACIO R. BUNYE (sgd.)
Acting Executive Secretary5
On October 26, 2007, at 3:35 p.m., former President Estrada "received and accepted"6 the pardon
by affixing his signature beside his handwritten notation thereon.
On November 30, 2009, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy7 for the position
of President. During that time, his candidacy earned three oppositions in the COMELEC: (1) SPA
No. 09-024 (DC), a "Petition to Deny Due Course and Cancel Certificate of Candidacy" filed by
Rev. Elly Velez B. Lao Pamatong, ESQ; (2) SPA No. 09-028 (DC), a petition for "Disqualification as
Presidential Candidate" filed by Evilio C. Pormento (Pormento); and (3) SPA No. 09-104 (DC), a
"Petition to Disqualify Estrada Ejercito, Joseph M.from Running as President due to Constitutional
Disqualification and Creating Confusion to the Prejudice of Estrada, Mary Lou B" filed by Mary Lou
Estrada. In separate Resolutions8 dated January 20, 2010 by the COMELEC, Second Division,
however, all three petitions were effectively dismissed on the uniform grounds that (i) the
Constitutional proscription on reelection applies to a sitting president; and (ii) the pardon granted
to former President Estrada by former President Arroyo restored the former’s right to vote and be
voted for a public office. The subsequent motions for reconsideration thereto were denied by the
COMELEC En banc.
After the conduct of the May 10, 2010 synchronized elections, however, former President Estrada
only managed to garner the second highest number of votes.
Of the three petitioners above-mentioned, only Pormento sought recourse to this Court and filed
a petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 191988, entitled "Atty. Evilio C. Pormento
v. Joseph ‘ERAP’ Ejercito Estrada and Commission on Elections." But in a Resolution9 dated August
31, 2010, the Court dismissed the aforementioned petition on the ground of mootness considering
that former President Estrada lost his presidential bid.
On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and
filed a Certificate of Candidacy,10 this time vying for a local elective post, that ofthe Mayor of the
City of Manila.
On January 24, 2013, Risos-Vidal, the petitioner in this case, filed a Petition for Disqualification
against former President Estrada before the COMELEC. The petition was docketed as SPA No. 13-
211 (DC). Risos Vidal anchored her petition on the theory that "[Former President Estrada] is
Disqualified to Run for Public Office because of his Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan
in Criminal Case No. 26558 entitled ‘People of the Philippines vs. Joseph Ejercito Estrada’
Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion Perpetuawith Perpetual Absolute
Disqualification."11 She relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), which state respectively, that:
Sec. 40, Local Government Code:
SECTION 40. Disqualifications.- The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for
an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years
after serving sentence; (b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative
case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the
Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to
reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code;
and
(g) The insane or feeble minded. (Emphasis supplied.)
Sec. 12, Omnibus Election Code:
Section 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane
or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgmentfor subversion, insurrection, rebellion,
or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months
or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any
public office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. (Emphases supplied.)
In a Resolution dated April 1, 2013,the COMELEC, Second Division, dismissed the petition for
disqualification, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for utter lack of
merit.12
The COMELEC, Second Division, opined that "[h]aving taken judicial cognizance of the
24
consolidated resolution for SPA No. 09-028 (DC) and SPA No. 09-104 (DC) and the 10 May 2010
En Banc resolution affirming it, this Commission will not be labor the controversy further. Moreso,
[Risos-Vidal] failed to present cogent proof sufficient to reverse the standing pronouncement of
Page
this Commission declaring categorically that [former President Estrada’s] right to seek public office
has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.
Since this Commission has already spoken, it will no longer engage in disquisitions of a settled
matter lest indulged in wastage of government resources."13
The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by Risos-Vidal was denied in a Resolution dated
April 23, 2013.
On April 30, 2013, Risos-Vidal invoked the Court’s jurisdiction by filing the present petition. She
presented five issues for the Court’s resolution, to wit:
I. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ESTRADA’S
PARDON WAS NOT CONDITIONAL;
II. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT
ESTRADA IS DISQUALIFIED TO RUN AS MAYOR OF MANILA UNDER SEC. 40 OF THE
LOCAL GOVERNMENTCODE OF 1991 FOR HAVING BEEN CONVICTED OF PLUNDER, AN
OFFENSE INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE;
III. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR
DISQUALIFICATION ON THE GROUND THAT THE CASE INVOLVES THE SAME OR
SIMILAR ISSUES IT ALREADY RESOLVED IN THE CASES OF "PORMENTO VS.
ESTRADA", SPA NO. 09-028 (DC) AND IN "RE: PETITION TO DISQUALIFY ESTRADA
EJERCITO, JOSEPH M. FROM RUNNING AS PRESIDENT, ETC.," SPA NO. 09-104 (DC);
IV. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENT
ESTRADA’S PARDON NEITHER RESTORED HIS RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE NOR REMITTED
HIS PERPETUAL ABSOLUTE DISQUALIFICATION FROM SEEKING PUBLIC OFFICE; and
V. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT HAVING EXERCISED ITS POWER TO
MOTU PROPRIO DISQUALIFY RESPONDENT ESTRADA IN THE FACE OF HIS PATENT
DISQUALIFICATION TO RUN FOR PUBLIC OFFICE BECAUSE OF HIS PERPETUAL AND
ABSOLUTE DISQUALIFICATION TO SEEK PUBLIC OFFICE AND TO VOTE RESULTING
FROM HIS CRIMINAL CONVICTION FOR PLUNDER.14
While this case was pending beforethe Court, or on May 13, 2013, the elections were conducted
as scheduled and former President Estrada was voted into office with 349,770 votes cast in his
favor. The next day, the local board of canvassers proclaimed him as the duly elected Mayor of
the City of Manila.
On June 7, 2013, Lim, one of former President Estrada’s opponents for the position of Mayor,
moved for leave to intervene in this case. His motion was granted by the Court in a
Resolution15 dated June 25, 2013. Lim subscribed to Risos-Vidal’s theory that former President
Estrada is disqualified to run for and hold public office as the pardon granted to the latter failed
to expressly remit his perpetual disqualification. Further, given that former President Estrada is
disqualified to run for and hold public office, all the votes obtained by the latter should be declared
stray, and, being the second placer with 313,764 votes to his name, he (Lim) should be declared
the rightful winning candidate for the position of Mayor of the City of Manila.
The Issue
Though raising five seemingly separate issues for resolution, the petition filed by Risos-Vidal
actually presents only one essential question for resolution by the Court, that is, whether or not
the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
ruling that former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as a result
of the pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo.
In her petition, Risos-Vidal starts her discussion by pointing out that the pardon granted to former
President Estrada was conditional as evidenced by the latter’s express acceptance thereof. The
"acceptance," she claims, is an indication of the conditional natureof the pardon, with the condition
being embodied in the third Whereas Clause of the pardon, i.e., "WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito
Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office." She explains
that the aforementioned commitment was what impelled former President Arroyo to pardon
former President Estrada, without it, the clemency would not have been extended. And any breach
thereof, that is, whenformer President Estrada filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President and
Mayor of the City of Manila, he breached the condition of the pardon; hence, "he ought to be
recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence x x x and disqualifies him as
a candidate for the mayoralty [position] of Manila."16
Nonetheless, Risos-Vidal clarifies that the fundamental basis upon which former President Estrada
mustbe disqualified from running for and holding public elective office is actually the proscription
found in Section 40 of the LGC, in relation to Section 12 ofthe OEC. She argues that the crime of
plunder is both an offense punishable by imprisonment of one year or more and involving moral
turpitude; such that former President Estrada must be disqualified to run for and hold public
elective office.
Even with the pardon granted to former President Estrada, however, Risos-Vidal insists that the
same did not operate to make available to former President Estrada the exception provided under
Section 12 of the OEC, the pardon being merely conditional and not absolute or plenary. Moreover,
Risos-Vidal puts a premium on the ostensible requirements provided under Articles 36 and 41 of
the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
ART. 36. Pardon; its effects.– A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold
publicoffice, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the
pardon.
A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed
upon him by the sentence.
xxxx
ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal – Their accessory penalties.– The penalties
25
of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life
or during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute
Page
disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty,
unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. (Emphases supplied.)
She avers that in view of the foregoing provisions of law, it is not enough that a pardon makes a
general statement that such pardon carries with it the restoration of civil and political rights. By
virtue of Articles 36 and 41, a pardon restoring civil and political rights without categorically
making mention what specific civil and political rights are restored "shall not work to restore the
right to hold public office, or the right of suffrage; nor shall it remit the accessory penalties of civil
interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification for the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua
and reclusion temporal."17 In other words, she considers the above constraints as mandatory
requirements that shun a general or implied restoration of civil and political rights in pardons.
Risos-Vidal cites the concurring opinions of Associate Justices Teodoro R. Padilla and Florentino
P. Feliciano in Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr.18 to endorse her position that "[t]he restoration of the
right to hold public office to one who has lost such right by reason of conviction in a criminal case,
but subsequently pardoned, cannot be left to inference, no matter how intensely arguable, but
must be statedin express, explicit, positive and specific language."
Applying Monsantoto former President Estrada’s case, Risos-Vidal reckons that "such express
restoration is further demanded by the existence of the condition in the [third] [W]hereas [C]lause
of the pardon x x x indubitably indicating that the privilege to hold public office was not restored
to him."19
On the other hand, the Office ofthe Solicitor General (OSG) for public respondent COMELEC,
maintains that "the issue of whether or not the pardon extended to [former President Estrada]
restored his right to run for public office had already been passed upon by public respondent
COMELEC way back in 2010 via its rulings in SPA Nos. 09-024, 09-028 and 09-104, there is no
cogent reason for it to reverse its standing pronouncement and declare [former President Estrada]
disqualified to run and be voted as mayor of the City of Manila in the absence of any new argument
that would warrant its reversal. To be sure, public respondent COMELEC correctly exercised its
discretion in taking judicial cognizance of the aforesaid rulings which are known toit and which
can be verified from its own records, in accordance with Section 2, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court
on the courts’ discretionary power to take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge,
orare capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to them because of their
judicial functions."20
Further, the OSG contends that "[w]hile at first glance, it is apparent that [former President
Estrada’s] conviction for plunder disqualifies him from running as mayor of Manila under Section
40 of the [LGC], the subsequent grant of pardon to him, however, effectively restored his right to
run for any public office."21 The restoration of his right to run for any public office is the exception
to the prohibition under Section 40 of the LGC, as provided under Section 12 of the OEC. As to
the seeming requirement of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., the express
restoration/remission of a particular right to be stated in the pardon, the OSG asserts that "an
airtight and rigid interpretation of Article 36 and Article 41 of the [RPC] x x x would be stretching
too much the clear and plain meaning of the aforesaid provisions."22 Lastly, taking into
consideration the third Whereas Clause of the pardon granted to former President Estrada, the
OSG supports the position that it "is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon and cannot
therefore serve to restrict its effectivity."23
Thus, the OSG concludes that the "COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolutions."24
For his part, former President Estrada presents the following significant arguments to defend his
stay in office: that "the factual findings of public respondent COMELEC, the Constitutional body
mandated to administer and enforce all laws relative to the conduct of the elections, [relative to
the absoluteness of the pardon, the effects thereof, and the eligibility of former President Estrada
to seek public elective office] are binding [and conclusive] on this Honorable Supreme Court;"
that he "was granted an absolute pardon and thereby restored to his full civil and political rights,
including the right to seek public elective office such as the mayoral (sic) position in the City of
Manila;" that "the majority decision in the case of Salvacion A. Monsanto v. Fulgencio S. Factoran,
Jr.,which was erroneously cited by both Vidal and Lim as authority for their respective claims, x x
x reveal that there was no discussion whatsoever in the ratio decidendi of the Monsanto case as
to the alleged necessity for an expressed restoration of the ‘right to hold public office in the
pardon’ as a legal prerequisite to remove the subject perpetual special disqualification;" that
moreover, the "principal question raised in this Monsanto case is whether or not a public officer,
who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement
toher former position without need of a new appointment;" that his "expressed acceptance [of
the pardon] is not proof that the pardon extended to [him] is conditional and not absolute;" that
this case is a mere rehash of the casesfiled against him during his candidacy for President back
in 2009-2010; that Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code "cannot abridge or diminish the
pardoning power of the President expressly granted by the Constitution;" that the text of the
pardon granted to him substantially, if not fully, complied with the requirement posed by Article
36 of the Revised Penal Code as it was categorically stated in the said document that he was
"restored to his civil and political rights;" that since pardon is an act of grace, it must be construed
favorably in favor of the grantee;25 and that his disqualification will result in massive
disenfranchisement of the hundreds of thousands of Manileños who voted for him.26
The Court's Ruling
The petition for certiorari lacks merit.
Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored allhis civil and
political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of
this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete,
unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal
Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language of the
pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. Recall
that the petition for disqualification filed by Risos-Vidal against former President Estrada, docketed
as SPA No. 13-211 (DC), was anchored on Section 40 of the LGC, in relation to Section 12 of the
OEC, that is, having been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment of one year or more,
and involving moral turpitude, former President Estrada must be disqualified to run for and hold
public elective office notwithstanding the fact that he is a grantee of a pardon that includes a
statement expressing "[h]e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights." Risos-Vidal theorizes
that former President Estrada is disqualified from running for Mayor of Manila inthe May 13, 2013
Elections, and remains disqualified to hold any local elective post despite the presidential pardon
extended to him in 2007 by former President Arroyo for the reason that it (pardon) did not
expressly provide for the remission of the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification,
particularly the restoration of his (former President Estrada) right to vote and bevoted upon for
public office. She invokes Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code as the foundations of her
theory.
It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given to and accepted by former
26
President Estrada does not actually specify which political right is restored, it could be inferred
that former President Arroyo did not deliberately intend to restore former President Estrada’s
rights of suffrage and to hold public office, orto otherwise remit the penalty of perpetual absolute
Page
disqualification. Even if her intention was the contrary, the same cannot be upheld based on the THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Tan is recognized.
pardon’s text.
SR. TAN. Madam President, lines 7 to 9 state:
The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action.
However, the power to grant executive clemency for violations of corrupt practices laws may be
The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides limited by legislation.
that the President of the Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons, along with other acts
of executive clemency, to wit:
I suggest that this be deletedon the grounds that, first, violations of corrupt practices may include
a very little offense like stealing ₱10; second, which I think is more important, I get the impression,
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the rightly or wrongly, that subconsciously we are drafting a constitution on the premise that all our
President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after future Presidents will bebad and dishonest and, consequently, their acts will be lacking in wisdom.
conviction by final judgment. Therefore, this Article seems to contribute towards the creation of an anti-President Constitution
or a President with vast responsibilities but no corresponding power except to declare martial law.
Therefore, I request that these lines be deleted.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the
Members of the Congress.
MR. REGALADO. Madam President,may the Committee react to that?
xxxx
THE PRESIDENT. Yes, please.
Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws,
rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of MR. REGALADO. This was inserted here on the resolution of Commissioner Davide because of the
the Commission. fact that similar to the provisions on the Commission on Elections, the recommendation of that
Commission is required before executive clemency isgranted because violations of the election
laws go into the very political life of the country.
It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only instances in which the
President may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have
not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of election laws, rules and With respect to violations of our Corrupt Practices Law, we felt that it is also necessary to have
regulations in which there was no favorable recommendation coming from the COMELEC. that subjected to the same condition because violation of our Corrupt Practices Law may be of
Therefore, it can be argued that any act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit such magnitude as to affect the very economic systemof the country. Nevertheless, as a
the pardoning power of the President. compromise, we provided here that it will be the Congress that will provide for the classification
as to which convictions will still require prior recommendation; after all, the Congress could take
into account whether or not the violation of the Corrupt Practices Law is of such magnitude as to
In Cristobal v. Labrador27 and Pelobello v. Palatino,28 which were decided under the 1935
affect the economic life of the country, if it is in the millions or billions of dollars. But I assume
Constitution,wherein the provision granting pardoning power to the President shared similar
the Congress in its collective wisdom will exclude those petty crimes of corruption as not to require
phraseology with what is found in the present 1987 Constitution, the Court then unequivocally
any further stricture on the exercise of executive clemency because, of course, there is a whale
declared that "subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot
of a difference if we consider a lowly clerk committing malversation of government property or
be restricted or controlled by legislative action." The Court reiterated this pronouncement in
funds involving one hundred pesos. But then, we also anticipate the possibility that the corrupt
Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr.29 thereby establishing that, under the present Constitution, "a pardon,
practice of a public officer is of such magnitude as to have virtually drained a substantial portion
being a presidential prerogative, should not be circumscribed by legislative action." Thus, it is
of the treasury, and then he goes through all the judicial processes and later on, a President who
unmistakably the long-standing position of this Court that the exercise of the pardoning power is
may have close connections with him or out of improvident compassion may grant clemency under
discretionary in the President and may not be interfered with by Congress or the Court, except
such conditions. That is why we left it to Congress to provide and make a classification based on
only when it exceeds the limits provided for by the Constitution.
substantial distinctions between a minor act of corruption or an act of substantial proportions. SR.
TAN. So, why do we not just insert the word GROSS or GRAVE before the word "violations"?
This doctrine of non-diminution or non-impairment of the President’s power of pardon by acts of
Congress, specifically through legislation, was strongly adhered to by an overwhelming majority
MR. REGALADO. We feel that Congress can make a better distinction because "GRAVE" or
of the framers of the 1987 Constitution when they flatly rejected a proposal to carve out an
"GROSS" can be misconstrued by putting it purely as a policy.
exception from the pardoning power of the President in the form of "offenses involving graft and
corruption" that would be enumerated and defined by Congress through the enactment of a law.
The following is the pertinent portion lifted from the Record of the Commission (Vol. II): MR. RODRIGO. Madam President.

27
MR. ROMULO. I ask that Commissioner Tan be recognized to introduce an amendment on the THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.

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same section.
MR. RODRIGO. May I speak in favor of the proposed amendment?
THE PRESIDENT. Please proceed.
MR. RODRIGO. The power to grant executive clemency is essentially an executive power, and that
is precisely why it is called executive clemency. In this sentence, which the amendment seeks to
delete, an exception is being made. Congress, which is the legislative arm, is allowed to intrude
into this prerogative of the executive. Then it limits the power of Congress to subtract from this
prerogative of the President to grant executive clemency by limiting the power of Congress to
only corrupt practices laws. There are many other crimes more serious than these. Under this
amendment, Congress cannot limit the power of executive clemency in cases of drug addiction
and drug pushing which are very, very serious crimes that can endanger the State; also, rape with
murder, kidnapping and treason. Aside from the fact that it is a derogation of the power of the
President to grant executive clemency, it is also defective in that it singles out just one kind of
crime. There are far more serious crimes which are not included.
MR. REGALADO. I will just make one observation on that. We admit that the pardoning power is
anexecutive power. But even in the provisions on the COMELEC, one will notice that
constitutionally, it is required that there be a favorable recommendation by the Commission on
Elections for any violation of election laws.
At any rate, Commissioner Davide, as the principal proponent of that and as a member of the
Committee, has explained in the committee meetings we had why he sought the inclusion of this
particular provision. May we call on Commissioner Davide to state his position.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. I am constrained to rise to object to the proposal. We have just approved the Article
on Accountability of Public Officers. Under it, it is mandated that a public office is a public trust,
and all government officers are under obligation to observe the utmost of responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency, to lead modest lives and to act with patriotism and justice.
In all cases, therefore, which would go into the verycore of the concept that a public office is a
public trust, the violation is itself a violation not only of the economy but the moral fabric of public
officials. And that is the reason we now want that if there is any conviction for the violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which, in effect, is a violation of the public trust character of
the public office, no pardon shall be extended to the offender, unless some limitations are
imposed.
Originally, my limitation was, it should be with the concurrence of the convicting court, but the
Committee left it entirely to the legislature to formulate the mechanics at trying, probably, to
distinguish between grave and less grave or serious cases of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Perhaps this is now the best time, since we have strengthened the Article on
Accountability of Public Officers, to accompany it with a mandate that the President’s right to
grant executive clemency for offenders or violators of laws relating to the concept of a public
office may be limited by Congress itself.
MR. SARMIENTO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Sarmiento is recognized.
MR. SARMIENTO. May I briefly speak in favor of the amendment by deletion.
Madam President, over and over again, we have been saying and arguing before this
Constitutional Commission that we are emasculating the powers of the presidency, and this
provision to me is another clear example of that. So, I speak against this provision. Even the 1935
and the 1973 Constitutions do not provide for this kind of provision.
I am supporting the amendment by deletion of Commissioner Tan.
MR. ROMULO. Commissioner Tingson would like to be recognized.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Tingson is recognized.
MR. TINGSON. Madam President, I am also in favor of the amendment by deletion because I am
in sympathy with the stand of Commissioner Francisco "Soc" Rodrigo. I do believe and we should
remember that above all the elected or appointed officers of our Republic, the leader is the
President. I believe that the country will be as the President is, and if we systematically emasculate
the power of this presidency, the time may come whenhe will be also handcuffed that he will no
longer be able to act like he should be acting.
So, Madam President, I am in favor of the deletion of this particular line.
MR. ROMULO. Commissioner Colayco would like to be recognized.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Colayco is recognized.
MR. COLAYCO. Thank you very much, Madam President.
I seldom rise here to object to or to commend or to recommend the approval of proposals, but
now I find that the proposal of Commissioner Tan is worthy of approval of this body.
Why are we singling out this particular offense? There are other crimes which cast a bigger blot
on the moral character of the public officials.
Finally, this body should not be the first one to limit the almost absolute power of our Chief
Executive in deciding whether to pardon, to reprieve or to commute the sentence rendered by the
court.
I thank you.
THE PRESIDENT. Are we ready to vote now?
28
MR. ROMULO. Commissioner Padilla would like to be recognized, and after him will be
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Commissioner Natividad.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Padilla is recognized.
MR. PADILLA. Only one sentence, Madam President. The Sandiganbayan has been called the Anti-
Graft Court, so if this is allowed to stay, it would mean that the President’s power togrant pardon
or reprieve will be limited to the cases decided by the Anti-Graft Court, when as already stated,
there are many provisions inthe Revised Penal Code that penalize more serious offenses.
Moreover, when there is a judgment of conviction and the case merits the consideration of the
exercise of executive clemency, usually under Article V of the Revised Penal Code the judge will
recommend such exercise of clemency. And so, I am in favor of the amendment proposed by
Commissioner Tan for the deletion of this last sentence in Section 17.
THE PRESIDENT. Are we ready to vote now, Mr. Floor Leader?
MR. NATIVIDAD. Just one more.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Natividad is recognized.
MR. NATIVIDAD. I am also against this provision which will again chip more powers from the
President. In case of other criminals convicted in our society, we extend probation to them while
in this case, they have already been convicted and we offer mercy. The only way we can offer
mercy to them is through this executive clemency extended to them by the President. If we still
close this avenue to them, they would be prejudiced even worse than the murderers and the more
vicious killers in our society. I do not think they deserve this opprobrium and punishment under
the new Constitution.
I am in favor of the proposed amendment of Commissioner Tan.
MR. ROMULO. We are ready tovote, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Is this accepted by the Committee?
MR. REGALADO. The Committee, Madam President, prefers to submit this to the floor and also
because of the objection of the main proponent, Commissioner Davide. So we feel that the
Commissioners should vote on this question.
VOTING
THE PRESIDENT. As many as are in favor of the proposed amendment of Commissioner Tan to
delete the last sentence of Section 17 appearing on lines 7, 8 and 9, please raise their hand.
(Several Members raised their hand.)
As many as are against, please raise their hand. (Few Members raised their hand.)
The results show 34 votes in favor and 4 votes against; the amendment is approved.30 (Emphases
supplied.)
The proper interpretation of Articles
36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
The foregoing pronouncements solidify the thesis that Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal
Code cannot, in any way, serve to abridge or diminish the exclusive power and prerogative of the
President to pardon persons convicted of violating penal statutes.
The Court cannot subscribe to Risos-Vidal’s interpretation that the said Articles contain specific
textual commands which must be strictly followed in order to free the beneficiary of presidential
grace from the disqualifications specifically prescribed by them.
Again, Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 36. Pardon; its effects.– A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold
publicoffice, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the
pardon.
A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed
upon him by the sentence.
xxxx
ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal – Their accessory penalties.– The penalties
of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life
or during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute
disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty,
unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. (Emphases supplied.)
A rigid and inflexible reading of the above provisions of law, as proposed by Risos-Vidal, is
unwarranted, especially so if it will defeat or unduly restrict the power of the President to grant
executive clemency.
It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
Verba legis non est recedendum. From the words of a statute there should be no departure.31 It
is this Court’s firm view that the phrase in the presidential pardon at issue which declares that
former President Estrada "is hereby restored to his civil and political rights" substantially complies
with the requirement of express restoration.
The Dissent of Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen agreed with Risos Vidal that there was no express
remission and/or restoration of the rights of suffrage and/or to hold public office in the pardon
granted to former President Estrada, as required by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
Justice Leonen posits in his Dissent that the aforementioned codal provisions must be followed by
29
the President, as they do not abridge or diminish the President’s power to extend clemency. He
opines that they do not reduce the coverage of the President’s pardoning power. Particularly, he
Page
states:
Articles 36 and 41 refer only to requirements of convention or form. They only provide a
procedural prescription. They are not concerned with areas where or the instances when the
President may grant pardon; they are only concerned with how he or she is to exercise such
power so that no other governmental instrumentality needs to intervene to give it full effect.
All that Articles 36 and 41 do is prescribe that, if the President wishes to include in the pardon the
restoration of the rights of suffrage and to hold public office, or the remission of the accessory
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification,he or she should do so expressly. Articles 36 and 41
only ask that the President state his or her intentions clearly, directly, firmly, precisely, and
unmistakably. To belabor the point, the President retains the power to make such restoration or
remission, subject to a prescription on the manner by which he or she is to state it.32
With due respect, I disagree with the overbroad statement that Congress may dictate as to how
the President may exercise his/her power of executive clemency. The form or manner by which
the President, or Congress for that matter, should exercise their respective Constitutional powers
or prerogatives cannot be interfered with unless it is so provided in the Constitution. This is the
essence of the principle of separation of powers deeply ingrained in our system of government
which "ordains that each of the three great branches of government has exclusive cognizance of
and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere."33 Moreso, this
fundamental principle must be observed if noncompliance with the form imposed by one branch
on a co-equal and coordinate branch will result into the diminution of an exclusive Constitutional
prerogative.
For this reason, Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code should be construed in a way that
will give full effect to the executive clemency granted by the President, instead of indulging in an
overly strict interpretation that may serve to impair or diminish the import of the pardon which
emanated from the Office of the President and duly signed by the Chief Executive himself/herself.
The said codal provisions must be construed to harmonize the power of Congress to define crimes
and prescribe the penalties for such crimes and the power of the President to grant executive
clemency. All that the said provisions impart is that the pardon of the principal penalty does
notcarry with it the remission of the accessory penalties unless the President expressly includes
said accessory penalties in the pardon. It still recognizes the Presidential prerogative to grant
executive clemency and, specifically, to decide to pardon the principal penalty while excluding its
accessory penalties or to pardon both. Thus, Articles 36 and 41 only clarify the effect of the pardon
so decided upon by the President on the penalties imposedin accordance with law.
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both
the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon.
The first sentence refers to the executive clemency extended to former President Estrada who
was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of plunder and imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua. The
latter is the principal penalty pardoned which relieved him of imprisonment. The sentence that
followed, which states that "(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights," expressly
remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the
textof the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute
disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.
In this jurisdiction, the right toseek public elective office is recognized by law as falling under the
whole gamut of civil and political rights.
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9225,34 otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003," reads as follows:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.– Those who retain or reacquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under Section
1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications
for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at
the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear an oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their
assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the
country where they took that oath; (4) Those intending to practice their profession in
the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in
such practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines
cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of
which theyare naturalized citizens; and/or
(b) are in active service as commissioned or non commissioned officers in the
armed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens. (Emphases
supplied.)
No less than the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which the Philippines is a
signatory, acknowledges the existence of said right. Article 25(b) of the Convention states: Article
25
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned
in Article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:
xxxx
(b) To vote and to be electedat genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal
suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the
electors[.] (Emphasis supplied.)
30
Recently, in Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections,35 the Court unequivocally referred to
the right to seek public elective office as a political right, to wit:
Page
Stated differently, it is an additional qualification for elective office specific only to Filipino citizens Section 12. Disqualifications. – x x x unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
who re-acquire their citizenship under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. It is the operative act that (Emphasis supplied.)
restores their right to run for public office. The petitioner’s failure to comply there with in
accordance with the exact tenor of the law, rendered ineffectual the Declaration of Renunciation
As earlier stated, Risos-Vidal maintains that former President Estrada’s conviction for plunder
of Australian Citizenship she executed on September 18, 2006. As such, she is yet to regain her
disqualifies him from running for the elective local position of Mayor of the City of Manila under
political right to seek elective office. Unless she executes a sworn renunciation of her Australian
Section 40(a) of the LGC. However, the subsequent absolute pardon granted to former President
citizenship, she is ineligible to run for and hold any elective office in the Philippines. (Emphasis
Estrada effectively restored his right to seek public elective office. This is made possible by reading
supplied.)
Section 40(a) of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC.

Thus, from both law and jurisprudence, the right to seek public elective office is unequivocally
While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in absolute
considered as a political right. Hence, the Court reiterates its earlier statement that the pardon
terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition – a plenary pardon or
granted to former President Estrada admits no other interpretation other than to mean that, upon
amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows any person who has been granted plenary
acceptance of the pardon granted tohim, he regained his FULL civil and political rights – including
pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude,
the right to seek elective office.
inter alia, to run for and hold any public office, whether local or national position.

On the other hand, the theory of Risos-Vidal goes beyond the plain meaning of said penal
Take notice that the applicability of Section 12 of the OEC to candidates running for local elective
provisions; and prescribes a formal requirement that is not only unnecessary but, if insisted upon,
positions is not unprecedented. In Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,37 the Court
could be in derogation of the constitutional prohibition relative to the principle that the exercise
acknowledged the aforementioned provision as one of the legal remedies that may be availed of
of presidential pardon cannot be affected by legislative action.
to disqualify a candidate in a local election filed any day after the last day for filing of certificates
of candidacy, but not later than the date of proclamation.38 The pertinent ruling in the Jalosjos
Risos-Vidal relied heavily on the separate concurring opinions in Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr.36 to case is quoted as follows:
justify her argument that an absolute pardon must expressly state that the right to hold public
office has been restored, and that the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification has been
What is indisputably clear is that false material representation of Jalosjos is a ground for a petition
remitted.
under Section 78. However, since the false material representation arises from a crime penalized
by prision mayor, a petition under Section 12 ofthe Omnibus Election Code or Section 40 of the
This is incorrect. Local Government Code can also be properly filed. The petitioner has a choice whether to anchor
his petition on Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or on Section 40 of the
Local Government Code. The law expressly provides multiple remedies and the choice of which
Her reliance on said opinions is utterly misplaced. Although the learned views of Justices Teodoro
remedy to adopt belongs to petitioner.39 (Emphasis supplied.)
R. Padilla and Florentino P. Feliciano are to be respected, they do not form partof the controlling
doctrine nor to be considered part of the law of the land. On the contrary, a careful reading of
the majority opinion in Monsanto, penned by no less than Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, reveals The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon conditional.
no statement that denotes adherence to a stringent and overly nuanced application of Articles 36
and 41 of the Revised Penal Code that will in effect require the President to use a statutorily
Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas,
prescribed language in extending executive clemency, even if the intent of the President can
Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office,"
otherwise be deduced from the text or words used in the pardon. Furthermore, as explained
neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that former President
above, the pardon here is consistent with, and not contrary to, the provisions of Articles 36 and
Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to seek public elective office have been restored.
41.

The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in relation to Section
12 of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him.
Section 40 of the LGC identifies who are disqualified from running for any elective local position.
Risos-Vidal argues that former President Estrada is disqualified under item (a), to wit:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence[.]
(Emphasis supplied.)
This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or limitation,
considering the unqualified use of the term "civil and political rights"as being restored.
Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an introductory
or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the enactment, usually introduced by the word
"whereas."40 Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because, strictly speaking, they are
not part of the operative language of the statute.41 In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not
an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to
make the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the
aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.

31
On this matter, the Court quotes with approval a relevant excerpt of COMELEC Commissioner
Maria Gracia Padaca’s separate concurring opinion in the assailed April 1, 2013 Resolution of the

Page
Likewise, Section 12 of the OEC provides for similar prohibitions, but it provides for an exception,
to wit:
COMELEC in SPA No. 13-211 (DC), which captured the essence of the legal effect of preambular Justice Leonen emphasizes the point that the ultimate issue for resolution is not whether the
paragraphs/whereas clauses, viz: pardon is contingent on the condition that former President Estrada will not seek janother elective
public office, but it actually concerns the coverage of the pardon – whether the pardon granted
to former President Estrada was so expansive as to have restored all his political rights, inclusive
The present dispute does not raise anything which the 20 January 2010 Resolution did not
of the rights of suffrage and to hold public office. Justice Leonen is of the view that the pardon in
conclude upon. Here, Petitioner Risos-Vidal raised the same argument with respect to the 3rd
question is not absolute nor plenary in scope despite the statement that former President Estrada
"whereas clause" or preambular paragraph of the decree of pardon. It states that "Joseph Ejercito
is "hereby restored to his civil and political rights," that is, the foregoing statement restored to
Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office." On this
former President Estrada all his civil and political rights except the rights denied to him by the
contention, the undersigned reiterates the ruling of the Commission that the 3rd preambular
unremitted penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification made up of, among others, the rights of
paragraph does not have any legal or binding effect on the absolute nature of the pardon extended
suffrage and to hold public office. He adds that had the President chosen to be so expansive as
by former President Arroyo to herein Respondent. This ruling is consistent with the traditional and
to include the rights of suffrage and to hold public office, she should have been more clear on her
customary usage of preambular paragraphs. In the case of Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, the
intentions.
Supreme Court ruled on the legal effect of preambular paragraphs or whereas clauses on statutes.
The Court stated, viz.:
However, the statement "[h]e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights," to the mind of
the Court, iscrystal clear – the pardon granted to former President Estrada was absolute, meaning,
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to show its
it was not only unconditional, it was unrestricted in scope, complete and plenary in character, as
intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a
the term "political rights"adverted to has a settled meaning in law and jurisprudence.
statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation much
less prevail over its text.
With due respect, I disagree too with Justice Leonen that the omission of the qualifying word "full"
can be construed as excluding the restoration of the rights of suffrage and to hold public office.
If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be conditional on Respondent’s promise
There appears to be no distinction as to the coverage of the term "full political rights" and the
never to seek a public office again, the former ought to have explicitly stated the same in the text
term "political rights" used alone without any qualification. How to ascribe to the latter term the
of the pardon itself. Since former President Arroyo did not make this an integral part of the decree
meaning that it is "partial" and not "full" defies one’s understanding. More so, it will be extremely
of pardon, the Commission is constrained to rule that the 3rd preambular clause cannot be
difficult to identify which of the political rights are restored by the pardon, when the text of the
interpreted as a condition to the pardon extended to former President Estrada.42 (Emphasis
latter is silent on this matter. Exceptions to the grant of pardon cannot be presumed from the
supplied.)
absence of the qualifying word "full" when the pardon restored the "political rights" of former
President Estrada without any exclusion or reservation.
Absent any contrary evidence, former President Arroyo’s silence on former President Estrada’s
decision torun for President in the May 2010 elections against, among others, the candidate of
Therefore, there can be no other conclusion but to say that the pardon granted to former President
the political party of former President Arroyo, after the latter’s receipt and acceptance of the
Estrada was absolute in the absence of a clear, unequivocal and concrete factual basis upon which
pardon speaks volume of her intention to restore him to his rights to suffrage and to hold public
to anchor or support the Presidential intent to grant a limited pardon.
office.

To reiterate, insofar as its coverageis concerned, the text of the pardon can withstand close
Where the scope and import of the executive clemency extended by the President is in issue, the
scrutiny even under the provisions of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
Court must turn to the only evidence available to it, and that is the pardon itself. From a detailed
review ofthe four corners of said document, nothing therein gives an iota of intimation that the
third Whereas Clause is actually a limitation, proviso, stipulation or condition on the grant of the The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
pardon, such that the breach of the mentioned commitment not to seek public office will result in issuing the assailed Resolutions.
ina revocation or cancellation of said pardon. To the Court, what it is simply is a statement of fact
or the prevailing situation at the time the executive clemency was granted. It was not used as a
In light of the foregoing, contrary to the assertions of Risos-Vidal, the COMELEC did not commit
condition to the efficacy orto delimit the scope of the pardon.
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed
Resolutions.
Even if the Court were to subscribe to the view that the third Whereas Clausewas one of the
reasons to grant the pardon, the pardon itself does not provide for the attendant consequence of
The Court has consistently held that a petition for certiorariagainst actions of the COMELEC is
the breach thereof. This Court will be hard put to discern the resultant effect of an eventual
confined only to instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting to patentand substantial denial
infringement. Just like it will be hard put to determine which civil or political rights were restored
of due process, because the COMELEC is presumed to be most competent in matters falling within
if the Court were to take the road suggested by Risos-Vidal that the statement "[h]e is hereby
its domain.43
restored to his civil and political rights" excludes the restoration of former President Estrada’s

32
rights to suffrage and to hold public office. The aforequoted text ofthe executive clemency granted
does not provide the Court with any guide asto how and where to draw the line between the As settled in jurisprudence, grave abuse of discretion is the arbitrary exercise of power due to
included and excluded political rights. passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power

Page
that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all
in contemplation of law. For an act to be condemned as having been done with grave abuse of
discretion, such an abuse must be patent and gross.44

The arguments forwarded by Risos-Vidal fail to adequately demonstrate any factual or legal bases
to prove that the assailed COMELEC Resolutions were issued in a "whimsical, arbitrary or
capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion orrefusal to perform a positive duty
enjoined by law" or were so "patent and gross" as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.

On the foregoing premises and conclusions, this Court finds it unnecessary to separately discuss
Lim's petition-in-intervention, which substantially presented the same arguments as Risos-Vidal's
petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and petition-inintervention are DISMISSED. The Resolution
dated April 1, 2013 of the Commission on Elections, Second Division, and the Resolution dated
April 23, 2013 of the Commission on Elections, En bane, both in SPA No. 13-211 (DC), are
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

33
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PEOPLE v. DE GUZMAN
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 185843
Appellee,
Present:
CORONA, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
DEL CASTILLO,* and
MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated:
RONIE DE GUZMAN,
Appellant. March 3, 2010
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
This resolves the motion for extinguishment of the criminal action and reconsideration
of our Resolution dated July 20, 2009 filed by appellant Ronie de Guzman.
Appellant was indicted before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 163, Pasig City, for two
counts of rape. He pled not guilty when arraigned. After pretrial and trial, the trial court found
him guilty as charged and imposed on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count. The
trial court further ordered him to indemnify the victim P50,000.00 in each case or a total amount
of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed, in its Decision dated March 27, 2008,
appellants conviction, but modified it with an additional award of P50,000.00 for each case, or an
aggregate amount of P100,000.00, as moral damages.
Appellant elevated the case to this Court on appeal.
In a Resolution dated July 20, 2009, we dismissed the appeal for failure of appellant to
sufficiently show reversible error in the challenged decision as would warrant the exercise of the
Courts appellate jurisdiction. Accordingly, the March 27, 2008 Decision of the CA was affirmed in
toto.
In the instant motion, appellant alleges that he and private complainant contracted
marriage on August 19, 2009, solemnized by Reverend Lucas R. Dangatan of Jeruel Christ-
Centered Ministries, Inc. at the Amazing Grace Christian Ministries, Inc., Bldg. XI-A, Bureau of
Corrections, Muntinlupa City. Attached to the motion is the pertinent Certificate of Marriage[1] and
a joint sworn statement (Magkasamang Sinumpaang Salaysay)[2] executed by appellant and
private complainant, attesting to the existence of a valid and legal marriage between
them. Appellant, thus, prays that he be absolved of his conviction for the two counts of rape and
be released from imprisonment, pursuant to Article 266-C[3] of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
In its Comment/Manifestation,[4] appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
interposed no objection to the motion, finding the marriage to have been contracted in good faith,
and the motion to be legally in order.
The motion should be granted.
In relation to Article 266-C of the RPC, Article 89 of the same Code reads
ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal
liability is totally extinguished:
xxxx
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as
provided in
Article 344 of this Code.
Article 344 of the same Code also provides
ART. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage,
seduction, abduction, rape, and acts of lasciviousness. x x x.
In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness, and rape,
the marriage of the offender with the offended party shall extinguish the
criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him. x x x.
On several occasions, we applied these provisions to marriages contracted between the
offender and the offended party in the crime of rape,[5] as well as in the crime of abuse of
chastity,[6] to totally extinguish the criminal liability of and the corresponding penalty that may
have been imposed upon those found guilty of the felony.Parenthetically, we would like to mention
here that prior to the case at bar, the last case bearing similar circumstances was decided by this
Court in 1974, or around 36 years ago.
Based on the documents, including copies of pictures[7] taken after the ceremony and
attached to the motion, we find the marriage between appellant and private complainant to have
been contracted validly, legally, and in good faith, as an expression of their mutual love for each
other and their desire to establish a family of their own. Given public policy considerations of
respect for the sanctity of marriage and the highest regard for the solidarity of the family, we
must accord appellant the full benefits of Article 89, in relation to Article 344 and Article 266-C of
the RPC.
WHEREFORE, the motion is GRANTED. Appellant Ronie de Guzman is ABSOLVED of
the two (2) counts of rape against private complainant Juvilyn Velasco, on account of their
subsequent marriage, and is ordered RELEASED from imprisonment.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Bureau of Corrections for appropriate
action. No costs.
34
SO ORDERED.
Page
PEOPLE v. DELA CERNA
G.R. Nos. 136899-904 October 9, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ERNESTO DELA CERNA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Irene dela Cerna did not experience and enjoy the natural love and affection of a father. Instead,
at fifteen, she went through an ordeal, characterized by suffering and torment perpetrated by the
very person who was supposed to protect and shield her from harm ¯ her own father.
Six separate complaints were filed on May 16, 1997 against accused-appellant charging him with
rape committed on January 15, 1989, December 26, 1993, March 3, 1996, August 25, 1996,
February 10, 1997 and March 5, 1997. The first complaint alleged:
That on or about the 5th day of March, 1997, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is her father, by means of force and
intimidation upon undersigned complainant, then only fifteen (15) years old to wit: by carrying
her to a room and forcibly lie down on bed and removed her panty and short, placed himself on
top of her, did then and there have carnal knowledge with the undersigned against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
The five other complaints were identically worded except for the dates of the commission of the
crime and the age of private complainant.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, the cases were jointly tried.
As principal witness for the prosecution, Irene recounted her harrowing experience at the hands
of her father, which began when she was only seven years old. Her testimony was faithfully
summarized by the Solicitor General as follows:
Irene dela Cerna was born on August 26, 1982 at Negros Occidental, San Carlos City (p. 2, TSN,
March 25, 1998). She recalled that one afternoon when she was only seven (7) years old, her
father, appellant herein, beckoned her to come inside the room. At the time, her mother was not
at home. When she went inside the room, appellant undressed her and made her lie down.
Appellant then played with her private parts and touched her vagina with his penis which lasted
for about fourteen (14) minutes (p. 4, TSN, ibid.). Thereafter, appellant instructed her to put on
her clothes as her mother was due to arrive any time. Appellant did the same act to Irene many
times (p. 5, id.)
On January 15, 1989 at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, appellant called Irene from inside the
room. Once Irene was inside the room, appellant undressed her and made her lie down. Appellant
played with her vagina for about ten (10) minutes (p. 5, id.) and "pushed" his penis into the lips
of her vagina (p. 16, id.).
On December 26, 1993 at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon while her mother was out taking
up dressmaking, appellant forced Irene to enter the room. Appellant stripped her naked, forced
his penis into her vagina (pp. 14-15, id.) and performed the push and pull movement for about
ten (10) minutes. Irene did not shout for help because of fear. In one occasion, Irene saw
appellant with a gun. After the rape, appellant cautioned Irene not to report to anybody what
happened (p. 16, id.).
On March 3, 1996, at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon while her mother was out, appellant
called Irene in the room and stripped her naked. Appellant ordered Irene to lie down and mounted
on top of her. Appellant inserted his penis into her vagina and performed the push and pull
movement. Irene tried to shake appellant off but he was too heavy for her. Irene did not shout
for help because of fear that appellant might harm her and her siblings. Irene had witnessed
appellant punched her mother on the stomach during a quarrel (pp. 12-13, id.). After the rape,
appellant warned her not to tell anybody of what transpired between them (p. 13, id.).
On August 25, 1996, when Irene was fourteen (14) years old, appellant called her from the room.
Irene was already reluctant to go alone near appellant as she knew what appellant would do to
her. Irene was constrained to go to appellant when her other sister told her to go to him as
beckoned. Inside the room, appellant undressed her (p. 7, id.). Irene did not utter a word while
she was being undressed because she was afraid that appellant might get angry and she and her
siblings will again be subjected to physical abuse as they used to be (p. 8, id.). Irene tried to resist
appellant but he was too strong for her (p. 7, id.). Appellant mounted on top of Irene, inserted
his penis into her vagina, and performed the sexual act of push and pull. After the sexual act,
Irene was ordered to leave the room. On the same day, her mother delivered the dresses she had
sewn to her customers. Irene did not report the sexual abuse to the police authorities because
she was afraid of appellant and she pitied her mother who was suffering from tension (p.9, id.).
On February 10, 1997 while her mother was out, appellant dragged Irene up the stairs of their
new house towards the room. Appellant pushed her on the bed, inserted his penis into her vagina
and performed the push and pull movement. The sexual act lasted for just a short time as her
mother was expected to arrive any time. Irene hated appellant for raping her. After the rape,
appellant warned her not to tell anybody what happened (pp. 18-19, id.).
On March 5, 1997, appellant forced Irene inside the room and stripped her naked. Appellant made
her lie down on the bed, inserted his penis into her vagina and performed the push and pull
movement for about ten (10) minutes. Irene initially resisted appellant but she was no match for
him. After the rape, appellant warned her not to tell anybody what happened. Irene cried
thereafter (pp. 20-22, id.).
Irene described appellant as a mean person. She was afraid to tell anyone about the rape as she
believed appellant is capable of killing her and her siblings (p. 24, id.).
Irene eventually revealed the rapes to her two (2) best friends in school, namely, Cheryl Quano
and Bernadette Comita. Bernadette, in turn, told her own mother what Irene divulged (p. 27, id.).
35
Bernadette's mother talked with Irene regarding the rape incidents after which the former brought
her to the office of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) at the City Hall
Page
where she was interviewed by a social worker (pp. 28-28, id.).2
Emma Patalinghug, a social worker at the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)
Center for Women and Children, declared that private complainant, accompanied by her mother,
was referred to her office on March 21, 1997. She testified that the victim told her that she had
been sexually abused by her father since she was seven years old.3
Dra. Aster Khusravibabadi of the Cebu City Medical Center examined the victim on March 21, 1997
and found "old healed hymenal lacerations at 5:00 and 6:00 o'clock positions, and the introitus
admits two fingers with ease."4
Accused-appellant opted not to testify invoking his constitutional right to remain silent.
On September 15, 1998, the defense presented private complainant to prove that she voluntarily
executed an affidavit of desistance. Private complainant explained that she decided to forgive her
father for the sake of her mother and her younger siblings who experienced pain and difficulty in
sustaining their daily needs as their whole family was dependent upon their father for support.5
The affidavit of desistance, dated July 3, 1998, was made in the vernacular and was offered in
evidence for the defense. Pertinent portions thereof stated that "complainant was no longer
interested in pursuing the cases against her father; the complaints filed with the Prosecutor's
Office and in Court were not her voluntary acts as she was only influenced and forced by the
people who came to support and intercede in her action; the testimony she made in court on
March 25, 1998 was not of her own free will as she was only forced to do so; there were false
statements she made during the hearing of the case; she had truly forgiven her father; she wanted
harmony and happiness; nobody influenced her to execute the said affidavit of desistance to end
the cases she filed against her father x x x."6
On November 29, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment finding accused-appellant Ernesto dela
Cerna guilty of six counts of rape, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises all considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused,
ERNESTO DELA CERNA, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE committed against
complainant, IRENE DELA CERNA, his minor daughter, in the aforequoted six (6) charges and
consequently, he is hereby imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua in the aforesaid Third and
Sixth Complaints in accordance with the Revised Penal Code and the supreme penalty of DEATH
in the First, Second, Fourth, and Fifth Complaints, conformably with the provisions of the Death
Penalty Law (R.A. No. 7659) and ordered to pay the complainant Irene dela Cerna, the sums of
FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS in each of the six (6) cases as damages, with all the
accessory penalties provided for by law and to pay the costs.
The entire records of these cases must be forwarded to the Honorable Supreme Court for
automatic review.
SO ORDERED.7
Accused-appellant assails said decision and contends that the trial court erred in convicting him
despite the insufficiency of evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Accused-appellant mainly relies on the affidavit of desistance executed by private complainant,
claiming that said affidavit created a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.
An affidavit of desistance is a sworn statement, executed by a complainant in a criminal or
administrative case, that he or she is discontinuing or disavowing the action filed upon his or her
complaint for whatever reason he or she may cite. A survey of our jurisprudence reveals that the
court attaches no persuasive value to a desistance, especially when executed as an afterthought.
The unreliable character of this document is shown by the fact that it is quite incredible that a
victim, after going through the trouble of having the accused-appellant arrested by the police,
positively identifying him as the person who raped her, enduring the humiliation of a physical
examination of her private parts, repeating her accusations in open court and recounting her
anguish in detail, will suddenly turn around and declare that she is no longer interested in pursuing
the case.8
A careful scrutiny of the affidavit of desistance in this case reveals that private complainant never
retracted her allegation that she was raped by her father. Neither did she give any exculpatory
fact that would raise doubts about her rape. Plainly, all the affidavit really stated was that she had
decided to withdraw the complaints as she had already forgiven her father and she wanted peace
and happiness for her family. Rather than contradict, this affidavit reinforces complainant's
testimony that accused-appellant raped her on several occasions.
Likewise, when asked on the witness stand what prompted her to sign the affidavit, Irene
answered:
Q: What prompted you to write that letter?
A: I was already staying with the DSWD and my condition there was all right but the
problem was my mother, whenever she visited me, she told me that they were really
hard in their daily existence. They were just staying in the house of a friend and they
have no means to support themselves. My brothers and sister at times cannot even go
to school because of lack of money and they cannot eat properly.9
But, in her earlier testimony for the prosecution, Irene demonstrated a firm resolve to
have accused-appellant punished for his crime, as can be gleaned from the following:
Prosecutor Solima
Q: Are you aware that your father would be penalized the moment he would be
convicted for the crime of rape?
A: Yes, sir.
Court
Q: And you would want him to die?
A: Although I have forgiven him for what he did to me considering that he is my father,
but I will not also agree that he will not be penalized of imprisonment for what he did
36
to me.10
Page
Also, during cross-examination, Irene testified:
 Atty. Porio
Q: And you earlier testified that you pity your mother and that you have forgiven your
father for what he had done to you, do you know that if it is proven that your father is
guilty he would be sentenced to a death penalty?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Are you not bothered by your conscience if your father would be sentenced to death?
A: Yes I would surely be bothered but that is his fault.11
A comparison of Irene's previous and subsequent testimonies leads to the inference that the
affidavit of desistance was executed merely as an afterthought. As such, it has no persuasive
effect.
Accused-appellant cannot capitalize on Irene's affidavit of desistance. Such an affidavit, by and of
itself, does not mean that what she previously said was false or the recitals of the affidavit itself
are true. On the contrary, the Court has invariably regarded such affidavits as exceedingly
unreliable. The reason is because affidavits of retraction can all too easily be secured from poor
and ignorant witnesses, usually through intimidation or monetary consideration. Thus, there is
always the probability that they will later be repudiated and there will never be an end to criminal
litigation.12 It is also a dangerous rule for courts to reject testimony solemnly taken before courts
of justice simply because the witness who gave it later changed his or her mind for one reason or
another. This will make a mockery of solemn trials and put the investigation of crimes at the mercy
of unscrupulous witnesses.13
It is worthy to note that the rape incidents in this case occurred prior to the effectivity of RA 8353,
"The Anti-Rape Law of 1997" which took effect on October 22, 1997 and classified the crime of
rape as a crime against persons. Such being the case, we shall apply the old law and treat the
acts of rape herein committed as private crimes. Thus, their institution, prosecution and extinction
should still be governed by Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC):
"Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts
of lasciviousness.- The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon
a complaint filed by the offended spouse.
The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties,
if they are both alive, nor in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.
The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape, or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted
except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian,
nor in any case, the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above-named persons, as the
case may be.
In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of the offender
with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed
upon him. The provisions of this paragraph shall also be applicable to the co-principals,
accomplices and accessories after the fact of the above-mentioned crimes."
The aforequoted article provides for the extinction of criminal liability in private crimes. For the
crimes of adultery and concubinage, the pardon extended by the offended spouse results in the
extinction of the liability of the offender. On the other hand, in seduction, abduction, rape and
acts of lasciviousness, two modes are recognized for extinguishing criminal liability - pardon and
marriage. In all cases, however, the pardon must come prior to the institution of the criminal
action. After the case has been filed in court, any pardon made by the private complainant,
whether by sworn statement or on the witness stand, cannot extinguish criminal liability.14
It must be stressed that private complainant in this case filed her complaint on May 16, 1997 and
even testified against accused-appellant on March 25, 1998. On the other hand, she executed her
affidavit of desistance only on July 3, 1998. Clearly, the pardon extended by the victim to her
father was made after the institution of the criminal action. Consequently, it cannot be a ground
to dismiss the action in these cases. The reason for this rule is that the true aggrieved party in a
criminal prosecution is the People of the Philippines whose collective sense of morality, decency
and justice has been outraged. In such a case, the offended party becomes merely a complaining
witness. The complaint required by Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code is but a condition
precedent to the exercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty parties in
the name of the People of the Philippines. Such condition is imposed out of consideration for the
offended woman and her family who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go
through with the scandal of a public trial. Hence, once filed, control of the prosecution is removed
from the offended party's hands15 and any change of heart by the victim will not affect the state's
right to vindicate the atrocity committed against itself.
At any rate, there is hardly any doubt about the truthfulness and reliability of Irene's initial
testimony in the trial court which we find to be positive, credible and convincing. To be sure, she
would not have accused her own father of a serious offense like rape had she really not been
aggrieved.16 Likewise, a rape victim's testimony against her father is entitled to much credibility
since respect for elders is deeply ingrained in Filipino children and is even recognized by law.17
Considering all these premises, we are impelled to affirm the trial court's conviction of accused-
appellant for the six counts of rape committed upon Irene dela Cerna.
Certain facets of this case, however, need to be carefully threshed out in order to fully administer
justice to all parties concerned. Conformably, it is a well-established procedure that an appeal in
a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review and it becomes the duty of the
appellate court to correct an error in the appealed judgment, whether this is assigned as an error
or not.18 In the case at bar, two of the six instances of rape - on January 15, 1989 and December
26, 1993 — occurred before the effectivity of RA 7659 (Death Penalty Law) which took effect only
on December 31, 1993. As correctly held by the trial court, the imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua for each of these two crimes of rape.
However, with respect to the four other incidents of rape which were committed after the
effectivity of RA 7659 and in each of which the trial court imposed the extreme penalty of death,
an exhaustive discussion is called for.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of RA 7659, was already the
pertinent statutory provision prevailing at the time of the latter four rape incidents. It categorized
37
as a "heinous" offense punishable by death the rape of a minor by her own father. Said provision
reads:
Page
"Art. 335. When and how rape is committed.-
xxx xxx xxx matter. Corroborative evidence would be most desirable or even essential when circumstances
call for it.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances: The case of People vs. Pecayo, Sr.,23 reiterated the pronouncement in Liban that a duly certified
certificate of live birth accurately showing the complainant's age, or some other authentic
document such as a baptismal certificate or school record, is competent evidence. Even the lack
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
of objection on the part of appellant does not excuse the prosecution from proving such fact
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
beyond reasonable doubt.
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

In this case, the prosecution utterly failed to discharge its burden of proving the minority of the
xxx xxx xxx
victim beyond reasonable doubt. No single independent proof was offered in court to establish
the fact that complainant was below 18 years old at the time of the incidents. Irene merely stated
In a number of cases, this Court ruled that both the age of the offended party and her relationship during her direct examination that she was born on August 26, 1982. We find Irene's casual
with the accused must be alleged in the information as part of the constitutional right of the testimony as to her age insufficient.
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Failure to
specifically state these attendant circumstances of minority and relationship in the information will
Once again, we need to emphasize that the penalty of death is an extreme sanction as it carries
bar the imposition of the death penalty.19
with it the forfeiture of life. Which makes it imperative for this Court to carefully weigh every piece
of evidence presented by all parties. We cannot presume that the victim is a minor simply because
In the instant case, the trial court, pursuant to Section 11 of RA 7659, imposed the penalty of she claims to be one.
death on accused-appellant Ernesto dela Cerna after taking into account the minority of Irene as
well as the relationship of father and daughter between them. Both circumstances of minority and
In sum, the Court upholds the decision of the trial court convicting accused-appellant of the crime
relationship were alleged in the informations. However, jurisprudence requires that the victim's
of rape in the latter four instances but must reduce the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua on
minority must not only be specifically alleged in the information but must likewise be established
account of the prosecution's failure to satisfactorily prove the qualifying circumstance of minority
beyond reasonable doubt during trial. The leading case on this point is People vs. Javier,20where
of the victim.
this Court unanimously held:

Finally, the award of damages made by the trial court should likewise be modified. In accordance
However, it is significant to note that the prosecution failed to present the birth certificate of the
with current case law, accused-appellant should be ordered to pay complainant the amount of
complainant. Although the victim's age was not contested by the defense, proof of age of the
P50,000 as civil indemnity for each of the six counts of rape.24 In addition, the victim should be
victim is particularly necessary in this case considering that the victim's age which was then 16
awarded moral damages in the amount of P50,000 for each of the six counts of rape without need
years old is just two years less than the majority age of 18. x x x. In a criminal prosecution
of pleading or proof. This Court has held many times that a rape victim's injury is inherently
especially of cases involving the extreme penalty of death, nothing but proof beyond reasonable
concomitant to and results from the odiousness of the crime.25 Lastly, accused-appellant is also
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which an accused is charged must be
liable to pay the sum of P25,000 as exemplary damages to deter other fathers with perverse
established by the prosecution in order for said penalty to be upheld x x x. Verily, the minority of
tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters.26
the victim must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself. Otherwise, failure
to sufficiently establish the victim's age is fatal and consequently bars conviction for rape in its
qualified form. WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-
appellant Ernesto dela Cerna is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of six counts of simple rape
and is sentenced in each count to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the
This doctrine has since been reiterated in a plethora of cases with the Court consistently holding
victim Irene dela Cerna the following: (1) P50,000 as civil indemnity; (2) P50,000 as moral
that proof of the victim's age must be indubitable in order to justify the imposition of the death
damages and (3) P25,000 as exemplary damages.
penalty.

Costs de oficio.SO ORDERED.

In People vs. Cula,21 this Court lowered the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua in a case of
rape committed on a 16-year-old victim by her father on the ground that the prosecution did not
present any independent proof of age, such as a birth certificate, and the trial court failed to
render a categorical finding on the matter.

In People vs. Liban,22 we held that the birth certificate of the victim, or in lieu thereof, any other

38
documentary evidence, like a baptismal certificate or school record, that can help establish the
age of the victim beyond reasonable doubt should be presented. While the declaration o4f a victim

Page
as to her age, being an exception to the hearsay proscription, would be admissible under the rule
on pedigree, the question of the relative weight that may be accorded to it is an entirely different
IN RE: INFANTE
G.R. No. L-4164 December 12, 1952
In the matter of the petition of Antonio Infante for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus. ANTONIO INFANTE, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
THE PROVINCIAL WARDEN OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, respondent-appellant.
Office of the Assistant Solicitor General Francisco Carreon and Solicitor Meliton G. Soliman for
appellant.
Amado B. Parreño for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
This was a petition of habeas corpus filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental by
Antonio Infante, and the petition having been granted, the Provincial Fiscal has appealed to this
Court.
It appears that the petitioner was convicted of murder and sentenced to 17 years, four months
and one day of reclusion temporal, which he recommended to serve on June 21, 1927, and that
on March 6, 1939, after serving 15 years, 7 months and 11 days he was granted a conditional
pardon and released from imprisonment, the condition being that "he shall not again violate any
of the penal laws of the Philippines".
On April 25, 1949, Infante was found guilty by the Municipal Court of Bacolod City of driving a
jeep without license and sentence to pay a fine of P10 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. On July 13, 1950, "by virtue of the authority conferred upon His Excellency, the
President, by section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code", the Executive Secretary ordered
Infante re-arrested and re-committed to the custody of the Director of Prisons, Muntinlupa, Rizal,
for breach of the condition of the aforesaid pardon.lawphil.net
It was the main contention of the petitioner that section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code
upon which he was ordered re-incarcerated, had been abrogated, and he was sustained by the
court below.
Since this appeal was taken, this Court has handed down a decision (Sales vs. Director of
Prisons * 48 Off. Gaz., 560) in which these ruling were laid down:
The Revised Penal Code, which was approved on December 8, 1930, contains a
repealing clause (article 367), which expressly repeals among other acts sections 102,
2670, 2671, and 2672 of the Administrative Code. It does not repeal section 64 (i)
above quoted. On the contrary, Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law, which
is subsequent to the Revised Penal Code, in its section 9 expressly preserves the
authority conferred upon the President by section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative
Code.
The legislative intent is clear, therefore, to preserve the power of the President to
authorize the arrest and reincarceration of any person who violates the condition or
conditions of his pardon notwithstanding the enactment of article 159 of the Revised
Penal Code. In this connection, we observed that section 64 (i) of the Administrative
Code and article 159 of the Revised Penal Code are but a reiteration of 3?3 Acts Nos.
1524 and 1561, under which a violator of a conditional pardon was liable to suffer and
to serve the unexpired portion of the original sentence.
We are of the opinion that article 159 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes
violation of a conditional pardon as an offense, and the power vested in the President
by section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code to authorize the recommitment to
prison of a violator of a conditional pardon to serve the unexpired portion of his original
sentence, can stand together and that the proceeding under one provision does not
necessarily preclude action under the other. . . .
The second ground of the petition was that the remitted penalty for which the petitioner had been
recommitted to jail — one year and 11 days — had prescribed. This contention was also sustained
in the appealed decision. Said the Court:
Segun el articulo 92 del Codigo Penal Revisado, la pena de un (1) año y once (11) dias
que corresponde a la pena de prision correccional, prescribe a los diez (10) años.
Por manera que, habiendo transcurrido mas de diez (10) años la responsabilidad
criminal del solicitante proviniente de la infraccion de su indulto bajo condicion, ha
prescrito con exceso.
The contention is not well taken. According to article 93 of the Revised Penal Code the period of
prescription of penalties commences to run from the date when the culprit should evade the
service of his sentence. It is evident from this provision that evasion of the sentence is an essential
element of prescription. There had been no such evasion in this case. Even if there had been one
and prescription were to be applied, its basis would have to be the evasion of the unserved
sentence, and the computation could not have started earlier than the date of the order for the
prisoner's rearrest.
We think, however, that the condition of the pardon which the prisoner was charged with having
breached was no longer operative when he committed a violation of the Motor Vehicle Law.
Pardon is an act of grace, and there is general agreement that limitations upon its operation
should be strictly construed (46 C.J. 1202); so that, where a conditional pardon is susceptible of
more than one interpretation, it is to be construed most favorably to the grantee. (39 Am. Jur.,
564) Thus, in Huff vs. Dyer, 40 Ohio C.C. 595, 5. L R A, N S, Note 1064), it was held that the
duration of the conditions subsequent, annexed to a pardon, would be limited to the period of the
prisoner's sentence unless an intention to extend it beyond that time was manifest from the nature
of the condition or the language in which it was imposed. In that case, the prisoner was discharged
on habeas corpus because the term of the pardon in question did not, in the opinion of the court,
imply that it was contemplated to have the condition operated beyond the term of his sentence.
The herein petitioner's pardon, it will be noted, does not state the time within which the conditions
39
thereof were to be performed or observed. In adopting, which we hereby do, the rule of strict
construction, we take into account, besides the benevolent nature of the pardon, the fact that the
Page
general run out prisoners are unlettered or at least unfamiliar with the intricacies and legal
implications of conditions subsequent imposed in a pardon.
There are courts which have gone so far as to hold, not without plausible argument, that no
conditions can be attached to a pardon that are to extend after the expiration of the term for
which the prisoner was sentence, although this view is not shared by the weight of authority. (39
Am., Jur. 564, 567; 46 C.J. 1201.)

Unless the petitioner's pardon be construed as above suggested, the same, instead of an act of
mercy, would become an act of oppression and injustice. We can not believe that in exchange for
the remission of a small fraction of the prisoner's penalty it was in the Executive's mind to keep
hanging over his (prisoner's) head during the rest of his life the threat of recommitment and/or
prosecution for any slight misdemeanor such as that which gave rise to the order under
consideration.1awphil.net

There is another angle which militates in favor of a strict construction in the case at bar. Although
the penalty remitted has not, in strict law, prescribed, reimprisonment of the petitioner for the
remainder of his sentence, more than ten years after he was pardoned, would be repugnant to
the weight of reason and the spirit and genius of our penal laws. If a prisoner who has escaped
and has given the authorities trouble and caused the State additional expense in the process of
recapturing him is granted immunity from punishment after a period of hiding, there is at least as
much justification for extending this liberality through strict construction of the pardon to one
who, for the same period, has lived and comported as a peaceful and law-abiding citizen.

Not improper to consider in this connection is the circumstance that the prisoner's general conduct
during his long confinement had been "excellent", which had merited his classification as a trustee
or penal colonist, and that his release before the complete extinguishment of his sentence could
have been intended as a reward for his past exemplary behavior with little or no thought of
exacting any return from him in the form of restraint from law violations, for which, after all, there
were independent and ample punishments. The judgment of the lower court is affirmed, without
costs.

Pablo and Labrador, JJ., concur.

40
Page
TORRES v. GONZALES
G.R. No. 76872 July 23, 1987
WILFREDO TORRES Y SUMULONG, petitioner,
vs.
HON. NEPTALI A. GONZALES, THE CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE, and
THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF PRISONS, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
This is an original petition for habeas corpus filed on behalf of petitioner Wilfredo S. Torres,
presently confined at the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa. We issued the writ and during the
hearing and from the return filed by the respondents through the Solicitor General, and other
pleadings in this case, the following facts emerged:
1. Sometime before 1979 (no more specific date appears in the records before this
Court), petitioner was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila of the crime of
estafa (two counts) and was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of from eleven (11)
years, ten (10) months and twenty-two (22) days to thirty-eight (38) years, nine (9)
months and one (1) day, and to pay an indemnity of P127,728.75 (Criminal Cases Nos.
68810, 91041 and F-138107). These convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals
(CA-G.R. Nos. 14773-CR and 17694-CR). The maximum sentence would expire on 2
November 2000.1
2. On 18 April 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to the petitioner by the President
of the Philippines on condition that petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal
laws of the Philippines. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against
in the manner prescribed by law."2 Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was
consequently released from confinement.
3. On 21 May 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole (the "Board") resolved to
recommend to the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to the
petitioner. In making its recommendation to the President, the Board relied upon the
decisions of this Court in Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons (68 Phil. 154 [1939])
and Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden of Bohol (108 Phil. 356 [1960]). The evidence
before the Board showed that on 22 March 1982 and 24 June 1982, petitioner had been
charged with twenty counts of estafa in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-19672 and Q-20756,
which cases were then (on 21 May 1986) pending trial before the Regional Trial Court
of Rizal (Quezon City). The record before the Board also showed that on 26 June 1985,
petitioner had been convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Rizal (Quezon City) of the
crime of sedition in Criminal Case No. Q-22926; this conviction was then pending appeal
before the Intermediate Appellate Court. The Board also had before it a letter report
dated 14 January 1986 from the National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI"), addressed to
the Board, on the petitioner. Per this letter, the records of the NBI showed that a long
list of charges had been brought against the petitioner during the last twenty years for
a wide assortment of crimes including estafa, other forms of swindling, grave threats,
grave coercion, illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives, malicious
mischief, violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and violation of Presidential Decree No.
772 (interfering with police functions). Some of these charges were Identified in the
NBI report as having been dismissed. The NBI report did not purport to be a status
report on each of the charges there listed and Identified.
4. On 4 June 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice wrote to the President of the
Philippines informing her of the Resolution of the Board recommending cancellation of
the conditional pardon previously granted to petitioner.
5. On 8 September 1986, the President cancelled the conditional pardon of the
petitioner.
6. On 10 October 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice issued "by authority of the
President" an Order of Arrest and Recommitment against petitioner. The petitioner was
accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his
sentence.
Petitioner now impugns the validity of the Order of Arrest and Recommitment. He claims that he
did not violate his conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by final judgment of the
twenty (20) counts of estafa charged in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-19672 and Q-20756 nor of the
crime of sedition in Criminal Case No. Q-22926.3 Petitioner also contends that he was not given
an opportunity to be heard before he was arrested and recommitted to prison, and accordingly
claims he has been deprived of his rights under the due process clause of the Constitution.
The issue that confronts us therefore is whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of
a court is necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation
of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.
This issue is not novel. It has been raised before this Court three times in the past. This Court
was first faced with this issue in Tesoro Director of Prison.4 Tesoro, who had been convicted of
the crime of falsification of public documents, was granted a parole by the then Governor-General.
One of the conditions of the parole required the parolee "not [to] commit any other crime and
[to] conduct himself in an orderly manner."5 Two years after the grant of parole, Tesoro was
charged before the Justice of the Peace Court of San Juan, Rizal, with the crime of adultery said
to have been committed with the wife of Tesoro's brother-in-law. The fiscal filed with the Court
of First Instance the corresponding information which, however, was dismissed for non-
appearance of the complainant. The complainant then went before the Board of Indeterminate
Sentence and charged Tesoro with violation of the conditions of his parole. After investigation by
the parole officer, and on the basis of his report, the Board recommended to the President of the
Philippines the arrest and recommitment of the petitioner. Tesoro contended, among other things,
that a "judicial pronouncement to the effect that he has committed a crime" is necessary before
he could properly be adjudged as having violated his conditional parole.
Addressing this point, this Court, speaking through then Mr. Justice Moran, held that the
determination of whether the conditions of Tesoro's parole had been breached rested exclusively
in the sound judgment of the Governor-General and that such determination would not be
reviewed by the courts. As Tesoro had consented to place his liberty on parole upon the judgment
of the power that had granted it, we held that "he [could not] invoke the aid of the courts, however
erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered."6 Thus, this Court held
41
that by accepting the terms under which the parole had been granted, Tesoro had in effect agreed
that the Governor-General's determination (rather than that of the regular courts of law) that he
Page
had breached one of the conditions of his parole by committing adultery while he was conditionally
at liberty, was binding and conclusive upon him. In reaching this conclusion, this Court relied upon
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code which empowered the Governor-General
to grant to convicted prisoners reprieves or pardons, either plenary or partial,
conditional or unconditional; to suspend sentences without parole, remit fines, and
order the discharge of any convicted person upon parole, subject to such conditions as
he may impose; and to authorize the arrest and recommitment of any such person who,
in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition or conditions, of his pardon,
parole or suspension of sentence. (Emphasis supplied)
In Sales vs. Director of Prisons,7 the petitioner had been convicted of the crime of frustrated
murder. After serving a little more than two years of his sentence, he was given a conditional
pardon by the President of the Philippines, "the condition being that he shall not again violate any
of the penal laws of the Philippines and that, should this condition be violated, he shall be
proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law."8 Eight years after the grant of his conditional
pardon, Sales was convicted of estafa and sentenced to three months and eleven days of arresto
mayor. He was thereupon recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of his original
sentence. Sales raised before this Court two principal contentions. Firstly, he argued that Section
64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code had been repealed by Article 159 of the Revised Penal
Code. He contended, secondly, that Section 64 (i) was in any case repugnant to the due process
clause of the Constitution (Article III [1], 1935 Constitution). This Court, through Mr. Justice
Ozaeta speaking for the majority, rejected both contentions of Sales.
Sales held, firstly, that Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code did not repeal Section 64 (i) Revised
Administrative Code. It was pointed out that Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
which was enacted subsequent to the Revised Penal Code, expressly preserved the authority
conferred upon the President by Section 64. The Court also held that Article 159 and Section 64
(i) could stand together and that the proceeding under one provision did not necessarily preclude
action under the other. Sales held, secondly, that Section 64 (i) was not repugnant to the
constitutional guarantee of due process. This Court in effect held that since the petitioner was a
convict "who had already been seized in a constitutional was been confronted by his accusers and
the witnesses against him-, been convicted of crime and been sentenced to punishment therefor,"
he was not constitutionally entitled to another judicial determination of whether he had breached
the condition of his parole by committing a subsequent offense. Thus:
[a] statute [like Section 64 (i)] supervenes to avoid the necessity for any action by the
courts in the premises. The executive clemency under it is extended upon the conditions
named in it, and he accepts it upon those conditions. One of these is that the governor
may withdraw his grace in a certain contingency, and another is that the governor shall
himself determine when that contingency has arisen. It is as if the convict, with full
competency to bind himself in the premises, had expressly contracted and agreed, that,
whenever the governor should conclude that he had violated the conditions of his
parole, an executive order for his arrest and remandment to prison should at once issue,
and be conclusive upon him. 9
In Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden of Bohol,10 the petitioner had been convicted of the crime of
inciting to sedition. While serving his sentence, he was granted by the President a conditional
pardon "on condition that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the
Philippines."11 Espuelas accepted the conditional pardon and was released from confinement.
Sometime thereafter, he was convicted by the Justice of the Peace Court in Tagbilaran, Bohol, of
the crime of usurpation of authority. He appealed to the Court of First Instance. Upon motion of
the provincial fiscal, the Court of First Instance dismissed the case provisionally, an important
prosecution witness not having been available on the day set for trial. A few months later, upon
recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole, the President ordered his recommitment to
prison to serve the unexpired period of his original sentence.
The Court in Espuelas reaffirmed the continuing force and effect of Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code. This Court, quoting Tesoro and Sales, ruled that:
Due process is not necessarily judicial The appellee had had his day in court and been
afforded the opportunity to defend himself during his trial for the crime of inciting to
sedition, with which he was charged, that brought about or resulted in his conviction,
sentence and confinement in the penitentiary. When he was conditionally pardoned it
was a generous exercise by the Chief Executive of his constitutional prerogative. The
acceptance thereof by the convict or prisoner carrie[d] with it the authority or power of
the Executive to determine whether a condition or conditions of the pardon has or have
been violated. To no other department of the Government [has] such power been
intrusted. 12
The status of our case law on the matter under consideration may be summed up in the following
propositions:
1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a
conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the
proper consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject
to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may
be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon
under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of
a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a
court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional
pardon.
3. Because due process is not semper et unique judicial process, and because the
conditionally pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his
trial and conviction for the offense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64
(i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.
We do not believe we should depart from the clear and well understood rules and doctrine on this
matter.
It may be emphasized that what is involved in the instant case is not the prosecution of the
parolee for a subsequent offense in the regular course of administration of the criminal law. What
is involved is rather the ascertainment of whether the convict has breached his undertaking that
he would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines" for purposes of reimposition
upon him of the remitted portion of his original sentence. The consequences that we here deal
with are the consequences of an ascertained breach of the conditions of a pardon. A convict
42
granted conditional pardon, like the petitioner herein, who is recommitted must of course be
convicted by final judgment of a court of the subsequent crime or crimes with which he was
Page
charged before the criminal penalty for such subsequent offense(s) can be imposed upon him.
Again, since Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code defines a distinct, substantive, felony, the
parolee or convict who is regarded as having violated the provisions thereof must be charged,
prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before he can be made to suffer the penalty
prescribed in Article 159.1avvphi1

Succinctly put, in proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is
alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options:
(i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to
proceed against him under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code which imposes the penalty
of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who "having been granted conditional
pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon." Here, the
President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President's executive prerogative and is not
subject to judicial scrutiny.

WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

43
Page
CHUA v. CA
[G.R. No. 150793. November 19, 2004]
FRANCIS CHUA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LYDIA C.
HAO, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioner assails the Decision,[1] dated June 14, 2001, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 57070, affirming the Order, dated October 5, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 19. The RTC reversed the Order, dated April 26, 1999, of the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 22. Also challenged by herein petitioner is the
CA Resolution,[2] dated November 20, 2001, denying his Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On February 28, 1996, private respondent Lydia Hao, treasurer of Siena Realty Corporation,
filed a complaint-affidavit with the City Prosecutor of Manila charging Francis Chua and his wife,
Elsa Chua, of four counts of falsification of public documents pursuant to Article 172[3] in relation
to Article 171[4] of the Revised Penal Code. The charge reads:
That on or about May 13, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then a
private individual, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of
falsification upon a public document, to wit: the said accused prepared, certified, and falsified the
Minutes of the Annual Stockholders meeting of the Board of Directors of the Siena Realty
Corporation, duly notarized before a Notary Public, Atty. Juanito G. Garcia and entered in his
Notarial Registry as Doc No. 109, Page 22, Book No. IV and Series of 1994, and therefore, a public
document, by making or causing it to appear in said Minutes of the Annual Stockholders Meeting
that one LYDIA HAO CHUA was present and has participated in said proceedings, when in truth
and in fact, as the said accused fully well knew that said Lydia C. Hao was never present during
the Annual Stockholders Meeting held on April 30, 1994 and neither has participated in the
proceedings thereof to the prejudice of public interest and in violation of public faith and
destruction of truth as therein proclaimed.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
Thereafter, the City Prosecutor filed the Information docketed as Criminal Case No.
285721[6] for falsification of public document, before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Manila, Branch 22, against Francis Chua but dismissed the accusation against Elsa Chua.
Herein petitioner, Francis Chua, was arraigned and trial ensued thereafter.
During the trial in the MeTC, private prosecutors Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho and Atty. Ariel Bruno
Rivera appeared as private prosecutors and presented Hao as their first witness.
After Haos testimony, Chua moved to exclude complainants counsels as private prosecutors
in the case on the ground that Hao failed to allege and prove any civil liability in the case.
In an Order, dated April 26, 1999, the MeTC granted Chuas motion and ordered the
complainants counsels to be excluded from actively prosecuting Criminal Case No. 285721. Hao
moved for reconsideration but it was denied.
Hence, Hao filed a petition for certiorari docketed as SCA No. 99-94846,[7] entitled Lydia C.
Hao, in her own behalf and for the benefit of Siena Realty Corporation v. Francis Chua, and the
Honorable Hipolito dela Vega, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila ,
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 19.
The RTC gave due course to the petition and on October 5, 1999, the RTC in an order
reversed the MeTC Order. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The respondent Court is ordered to allow the intervention
of the private prosecutors in behalf of petitioner Lydia C. Hao in the prosecution of the civil aspect
of Crim. Case No. 285721, before Br. 22 [MeTC], Manila, allowing Attys. Evelyn Sua-Kho and Ariel
Bruno Rivera to actively participate in the proceedings.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Chua moved for reconsideration which was denied.
Dissatisfied, Chua filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. The petition
alleged that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion in: (1) refusing to consider
material facts; (2) allowing Siena Realty Corporation to be impleaded as co-petitioner in SCA No.
99-94846 although it was not a party to the criminal complaint in Criminal Case No. 285721; and
(3) effectively amending the information against the accused in violation of his constitutional
rights.
On June 14, 2001, the appellate court promulgated its assailed Decision denying the
petition, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED.
The Order, dated October 5, 1999 as well as the Order, dated December 3, 1999, are hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Petitioner had argued before the Court of Appeals that respondent had no authority
whatsoever to bring a suit in behalf of the Corporation since there was no Board Resolution
authorizing her to file the suit.
For her part, respondent Hao claimed that the suit was brought under the concept of a
derivative suit. Respondent maintained that when the directors or trustees refused to file a suit
even when there was a demand from stockholders, a derivative suit was allowed.
The Court of Appeals held that the action was indeed a derivative suit, for it alleged that
44
petitioner falsified documents pertaining to projects of the corporation and made it appear that
the petitioner was a stockholder and a director of the corporation. According to the appellate
court, the corporation was a necessary party to the petition filed with the RTC and even if private
Page
respondent filed the criminal case, her act should not divest the Corporation of its right to be a
party and present its own claim for damages.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution dated November 20,
2001.
Hence, this petition alleging that the Court of Appeals committed reversible errors:
I. IN RULING THAT LYDIA HAOS FILING OF CRIMINAL CASE NO. 285721 WAS IN
THE NATURE OF A DERIVATIVE SUIT
II. IN UPHOLDING THE RULING OF JUDGE DAGUNA THAT SIENA REALTY WAS A
PROPER PETITIONER IN SCA NO. [99-94846]
III. IN UPHOLDING JUDGE DAGUNAS DECISION ALLOWING LYDIA HAOS COUNSEL
TO CONTINUE AS PRIVATE PROSECUTORS IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 285721
IV. IN [OMITTING] TO CONSIDER AND RULE UPON THE ISSUE THAT JUDGE
DAGUNA ACTED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT DISMISSING THE
PETITION IN SCA NO. [99-94846] FOR BEING A SHAM PLEADING.[10]
The pertinent issues in this petition are the following: (1) Is the criminal complaint in the
nature of a derivative suit? (2) Is Siena Realty Corporation a proper petitioner in SCA No. 99-
94846? and (3) Should private prosecutors be allowed to actively participate in the trial of Criminal
Case No. 285721.
On the first issue, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred when (1) it sustained
the lower court in giving due course to respondents petition in SCA No. 99-94846 despite the fact
that the Corporation was not the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 285721, and (2) when
it ruled that Criminal Case No. 285721 was in the nature of a derivative suit.
Petitioner avers that a derivative suit is by nature peculiar only to intra-corporate
proceedings and cannot be made part of a criminal action. He cites the case of Western Institute
of Technology, Inc. v. Salas,[11] where the court said that an appeal on the civil aspect of a criminal
case cannot be treated as a derivative suit. Petitioner asserts that in this case, the civil aspect of
a criminal case cannot be treated as a derivative suit, considering that Siena Realty Corporation
was not the private complainant.
Petitioner misapprehends our ruling in Western Institute. In that case, we said:
Here, however, the case is not a derivative suit but is merely an appeal on the civil aspect of
Criminal Cases Nos. 37097 and 37098 filed with the RTC of Iloilo for estafa and falsification of
public document. Among the basic requirements for a derivative suit to prosper is that the minority
shareholder who is suing for and on behalf of the corporation must allege in his complaint before
the proper forum that he is suing on a derivative cause of action on behalf of the corporation and
all other shareholders similarly situated who wish to join. . . .This was not complied with by the
petitioners either in their complaint before the court a quo nor in the instant petition which, in
part, merely states that this is a petition for review on certiorari on pure questions of law to set
aside a portion of the RTC decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 37097 and 37098 since the trial courts
judgment of acquittal failed to impose civil liability against the private respondents. By no amount
of equity considerations, if at all deserved, can a mere appeal on the civil aspect of a criminal case
be treated as a derivative suit.[12]
Moreover, in Western Institute, we said that a mere appeal in the civil aspect cannot be
treated as a derivative suit because the appeal lacked the basic requirement that it must be alleged
in the complaint that the shareholder is suing on a derivative cause of action for and in behalf of
the corporation and other shareholders who wish to join.
Under Section 36[13] of the Corporation Code, read in relation to Section 23,[14] where a
corporation is an injured party, its power to sue is lodged with its board of directors or
trustees.[15]An individual stockholder is permitted to institute a derivative suit on behalf of the
corporation wherein he holds stocks in order to protect or vindicate corporate rights, whenever
the officials of the corporation refuse to sue, or are the ones to be sued, or hold the control of
the corporation. In such actions, the suing stockholder is regarded as a nominal party, with the
corporation as the real party in interest.[16]
A derivative action is a suit by a shareholder to enforce a corporate cause of action. The
corporation is a necessary party to the suit. And the relief which is granted is a judgment against
a third person in favor of the corporation. Similarly, if a corporation has a defense to an action
against it and is not asserting it, a stockholder may intervene and defend on behalf of the
corporation.[17]
Under the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable.[18] When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action
prior to the criminal action.[19]
In Criminal Case No. 285721, the complaint was instituted by respondent against petitioner
for falsifying corporate documents whose subject concerns corporate projects of Siena Realty
Corporation. Clearly, Siena Realty Corporation is an offended party. Hence, Siena Realty
Corporation has a cause of action. And the civil case for the corporate cause of action is deemed
instituted in the criminal action.
However, the board of directors of the corporation in this case did not institute the action
against petitioner. Private respondent was the one who instituted the action. Private respondent
asserts that she filed a derivative suit in behalf of the corporation. This assertion is inaccurate.
Not every suit filed in behalf of the corporation is a derivative suit. For a derivative suit to prosper,
it is required that the minority stockholder suing for and on behalf of the corporation must allege
in his complaint that he is suing on a derivative cause of action on behalf of the corporation and
all other stockholders similarly situated who may wish to join him in the suit.[20] It is a
condition sine qua non that the corporation be impleaded as a party because not only is the
corporation an indispensable party, but it is also the present rule that it must be served with
process. The judgment must be made binding upon the corporation in order that the corporation
may get the benefit of the suit and may not bring subsequent suit against the same defendants
for the same cause of action. In other words, the corporation must be joined as party because it
is its cause of action that is being litigated and because judgment must be a res adjudicata against
it.[21]
In the criminal complaint filed by herein respondent, nowhere is it stated that she is filing
the same in behalf and for the benefit of the corporation. Thus, the criminal complaint including
the civil aspect thereof could not be deemed in the nature of a derivative suit.
We turn now to the second issue, is the corporation a proper party in the petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 before the RTC? Note that the case was titled Lydia C. Hao, in her own
behalf and for the benefit of Siena Realty Corporation v. Francis Chua, and the Honorable Hipolito
dela Vega, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. Petitioner before us
45
now claims that the corporation is not a private complainant in Criminal Case No. 285721, and
thus cannot be included as appellant in SCA No. 99-94846.
Page
 Petitioner invokes the case of Ciudad Real & Devt. Corporation v. Court of
Appeals.[22] In Ciudad Real, it was ruled that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion when it upheld the standing of Magdiwang Realty Corporation as a party to the petition
for certiorari, even though it was not a party-in-interest in the civil case before the lower court.
In the present case, respondent claims that the complaint was filed by her not only in her
personal capacity, but likewise for the benefit of the corporation. Additionally, she avers that she
has exhausted all remedies available to her before she instituted the case, not only to claim
damages for herself but also to recover the damages caused to the company.
Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,[23] when a trial court commits a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the person aggrieved can file a special
civil action for certiorari. The aggrieved parties in such a case are the State and the private
offended party or complainant.[24]
In a string of cases, we consistently ruled that only a party-in-interest or those aggrieved
may file certiorari cases. It is settled that the offended parties in criminal cases have sufficient
interest and personality as person(s) aggrieved to file special civil action of prohibition and
certiorari.[25]
In Ciudad Real, cited by petitioner, we held that the appellate court committed grave abuse
of discretion when it sanctioned the standing of a corporation to join said petition for certiorari,
despite the finality of the trial courts denial of its Motion for Intervention and the subsequent
Motion to Substitute and/or Join as Party/Plaintiff.
Note, however, that in Pastor, Jr. v. Court of Appeals[26] we held that if aggrieved, even a
non-party may institute a petition for certiorari. In that case, petitioner was the holder in her own
right of three mining claims and could file a petition for certiorari, the fastest and most feasible
remedy since she could not intervene in the probate of her father-in-laws estate.[27]
In the instant case, we find that the recourse of the complainant to the respondent Court
of Appeals was proper. The petition was brought in her own name and in behalf of the Corporation.
Although, the corporation was not a complainant in the criminal action, the subject of the
falsification was the corporations project and the falsified documents were corporate documents.
Therefore, the corporation is a proper party in the petition for certiorari because the proceedings
in the criminal case directly and adversely affected the corporation.
We turn now to the third issue. Did the Court of Appeals and the lower court err in allowing
private prosecutors to actively participate in the trial of Criminal Case No. 285721?
Petitioner cites the case of Tan, Jr. v. Gallardo,[28] holding that where from the nature of
the offense or where the law defining and punishing the offense charged does not provide for an
indemnity, the offended party may not intervene in the prosecution of the offense.
Petitioners contention lacks merit. Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is
the fundamental postulate that every man criminally liable is also civilly liable. When a person
commits a crime he offends two entities namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political
entity called the State whose law he has violated; and (2) the individual member of the society
whose person, right, honor, chastity or property has been actually or directly injured or damaged
by the same punishable act or omission. An act or omission is felonious because it is punishable
by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage
to another. Additionally, what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral
duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own
act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently. The indemnity which a person is
sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by law for the commission of the
crime.[29] The civil action involves the civil liability arising from the offense charged which includes
restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for consequential damages.[30]
Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal
action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of
the offense.[31] Rule 111(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that, [w]hen a criminal
action is instituted, the civil action arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted
with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the right to institute it
separately, nor institute the civil action for damages arising from the offense charged. Thus, we
find that the private prosecutors can intervene in the trial of the criminal action.
Petitioner avers, however, that respondents testimony in the inferior court did not establish
nor prove any damages personally sustained by her as a result of petitioners alleged acts of
falsification. Petitioner adds that since no personal damages were proven therein, then the
participation of her counsel as private prosecutors, who were supposed to pursue the civil aspect
of a criminal case, is not necessary and is without basis.
When the civil action is instituted with the criminal action, evidence should be taken of the
damages claimed and the court should determine who are the persons entitled to such indemnity.
The civil liability arising from the crime may be determined in the criminal proceedings if the
offended party does not waive to have it adjudged or does not reserve the right to institute a
separate civil action against the defendant. Accordingly, if there is no waiver or reservation of civil
liability, evidence should be allowed to establish the extent of injuries suffered.[32]
In the case before us, there was neither a waiver nor a reservation made; nor did the
offended party institute a separate civil action. It follows that evidence should be allowed in the
criminal proceedings to establish the civil liability arising from the offense committed, and the
private offended party has the right to intervene through the private prosecutors.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision, dated June 14, 2001, and the
Resolution, dated November 20, 2001, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57070, affirming
the Order, dated October 5, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 19, are
AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the private prosecutors are hereby allowed to intervene in behalf of
private respondent Lydia Hao in the prosecution of the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 285721
before Branch 22, of Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
46
Page
CARPIO v. DOROJA
G.R. No. 84516 December 5, 1989
DIONISIO CARPIO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SERGIO DOROJA, (Presiding Judge, MTC, Branch IV, Zamboanga City) and
EDWIN RAMIREZ Y WEE, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
Before us is a petition to review by certiorari the decision of the Municipal Trial Court of
Zamboanga City, Branch IV, which denied petitioner's motion for subsidiary writ of execution
against the owner-operator of the vehicle which figured in the accident.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
Sometime on October 23, 1985, accused-respondent Edwin Ramirez, while driving a passenger
Fuso Jitney owned and operated by Eduardo Toribio, bumped Dionisio Carpio, a pedestrian
crossing the street, as a consequence of which the latter suffered from a fractured left clavicle as
reflected in the medico-legal certificate and sustained injuries which required medical attention
for a period of (3) three months.
An information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Serious Physical Injuries was filed against
Edwin Ramirez with the Municipal Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch IV. On January 14, 1987,
the accused voluntarily pleaded guilty to a lesser offense and was accordingly convicted for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Less Serious Physical Injuries under an amended information
punishable under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. The dispositive portion of the decision
handed down on May 27, 1987 reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused EDWIN RAMIREZ y WEE guilty as a principal beyond reasonable
doubt of the Amended Information to which he voluntarily pleaded guilty and appreciating this
mitigating circumstance in his favor, hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of One (1) month
and One (1) day to Two (2) months of Arresto Mayor in its minimum period. The accused is
likewise ordered to indemnify the complainant Dionisio A. Carpio the amount of P45.00
representing the value of the 1/2 can of tomatoes lost; the amount of P200.00 which complainant
paid to the Zamboanga General Hospital, to pay complainant the amount of Pl,500.00 as attorney's
fees and to pay the cost of this suit. SO ORDERED. (p. 7, Rollo)
Thereafter, the accused filed an application for probation.
At the early stage of the trial, the private prosecutor manifested his desire to present evidence to
establish the civil liability of either the accused driver or the owner-operator of the vehicle.
Accused's counsel moved that the court summon the owner of the vehicle to afford the latter a
day in court, on the ground that the accused is not only indigent but also jobless and thus cannot
answer any civil liability that may be imposed upon him by the court. The private prosecutor,
however, did not move for the appearance of Eduardo Toribio.
The civil aspect of the above-quoted decision was appealed by the private prosecutor to the
Regional Trial Court Branch XVI, appellant praying for moral damages in the amount of P
10,000.00, compensatory damages at P6,186.40, and attorney's fees of P 5,000.00. The appellate
court, on January 20, 1988, modified the trial court's decision, granting the appellant moral
damages in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P 5,000.00), while affirming all other civil
liabilities.
Thereafter, a writ of execution dated March 10, 1988 was duly served upon the accused but was,
however, returned unsatisfied due to the insolvency of the accused as shown by the sheriffs
return. Thus, complainant moved for a subsidiary writ of execution against the subsidiary liability
of the owner-operator of the vehicle. The same was denied by the trial court on two grounds,
namely, the decision of the appellate court made no mention of the subsidiary liability of Eduardo
Toribio, and the nature of the accident falls under "culpa-aquiliana" and not culpa-contractual." A
motion for reconsideration of the said order was disallowed for the reason that complainant having
failed to raise the matter of subsidiary liability with the appellate court, said court rendered its
decision which has become final and executory and the trial court has no power to alter or modify
such decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner relies heavily on the case of Pajarito v. Seneris, 87 SCRA 275, which enunciates that
"the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator is fixed by the judgment, because if a case were to
be filed against said operator, the court called upon to act thereto has no other function than to
render a decision based on the indemnity award in the criminal case without power to amend or
modify it even if in his opinion an error has been committed in the decision." Petitioner maintains
that the tenor of the aforesaid decision implies that the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator
may be enforced in the same proceeding and a separate action is no longer necessary in order to
avoid undue delay, notwithstanding the fact that said employer was not made a party in the
criminal action.
It is the theory of respondent that the owner-operator cannot be validly held subsidiarily liable for
the following reasons, namely: (a) the matter of subsidiary liability was not raised on appeal; (b)
contrary to the case of Pajarito v. Seneris, the injuries sustained by the complainant did not arise
from the so-called "culpa-contractual" but from "culpa-aquiliana"; (c) the judgments of appellate
courts may not be altered, modified, or changed by the court of origin; and (d) said owner was
never made a party to the criminal proceedings.
Thus, the underlying issue raised in this case is; whether or not the subsidiary liability of the
owner-operator may be enforced in the same criminal proceeding against the driver where the
award was given, or in a separate civil action.
The law involved in the instant case is Article 103 in relation to Article 100, both of the Revised
Penal Code, which reads thus:
Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability established in the next
preceding article shall apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any
kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or
47
employees in the discharge of their duties.
Page
Respondent contends that the case of Pajarito v. Seneris cannot be applied to the present case,
the former being an action involving culpa-contractual, while the latter being one of culpa-
aquiliana. Such a declaration is erroneous. The subsidiary liability in Art. 103 should be
distinguished from the primary liability of employers, which is quasi-delictual in character as
provided in Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code. Under Art. 103, the liability emanated from a delict.
On the other hand, the liability under Art. 2180 is founded on culpa-aquiliana. The present case
is neither an action for culpa-contractual nor for culpa-aquiliana. This is basically an action to
enforce the civil liability arising from crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code. In no case
can this be regarded as a civil action for the primary liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of
the New Civil Code, i.e., action for culpa-aquiliana.
In order that an employer may be held subsidiarily liable for the employee's civil liability in the
criminal action, it should be shown (1) that the employer, etc. is engaged in any kind of industry,
(2) that the employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties and (3) that he is
insolvent (Basa Marketing Corp. v. Bolinao, 117 SCRA 156). The subsidiary liability of the
employer, however, arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal action. All these
requisites present, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the employee's
conviction and upon proof of the latter's insolvency. Needless to say, the case at bar satisfies all
these requirements.
Finally, the position taken by the respondent appellate court that to grant the motion for subsidiary
writ of execution would in effect be to amend its decision which has already become final and
executory cannot be sustained. Compelling the owner-operator to pay on the basis of his
subsidiary liability does not constitute an amendment of the judgment because in an action under
Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code, once all the requisites as earlier discussed are met, the
employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable, without need of a separate action. Such being the
case, the subsidiary liability can be enforced in the same case where the award was given, and
this does not constitute an act of amending the decision. It becomes incumbent upon the court
to grant a motion for subsidiary writ of execution (but only after the employer has been heard),
upon conviction of the employee and after execution is returned unsatisfied due to the employee's
insolvency.
WHEREFORE, the order of respondent court disallowing the motion for subsidiary writ of execution
is hereby SET ASIDE. The Court a quo is directed to hear and decide in the same proceeding the
subsidiary liability of the alleged owner-operator of the passenger jitney. Costs against private
respondent.
SO ORDERED.

Furthermore, we are not convinced that the owner-operator has been deprived of his day in court,
because the case before us is not one wherein the operator is sued for a primary liability under
the Civil Code but one in which the subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon his
employee's criminal negligence is sought to be enforced. Considering the subsidiary liability
imposed upon the employer by law, he is in substance and in effect a party to the criminal case.
Ergo, the employer's subsidiary liability may be determined and enforced in the criminal case as
part of the execution proceedings against the employee. This Court held in the earlier case
of Pajarito v. Seneris, supra, that "The proceeding for the enforcement of the subsidiary civil
liability may be considered as part of the proceeding for the execution of the judgment. A case in
which an execution has been issued is regarded as still pending so that all proceedings on the
execution are proceedings in the suit. There is no question that the court which rendered the
judgment has a general supervisory control over its process of execution, and this power carries
with it the right to determine every question of fact and law which may be involved in the
execution."

The argument that the owner-operator cannot be held subsidiarily liable because the matter of
subsidiary liability was not raised on appeal and in like manner, the appellate court's decision
made no mention of such subsidiary liability is of no moment. As already discussed, the filing of
a separate complaint against the operator for recovery of subsidiary liability is not necessary since
his liability is clear from the decision against the accused. Such being the case, it is not
indispensable for the question of subsidiary liability to be passed upon by the appellate court.
Such subsidiary liability is already implied from the appellate court's decision. In the recent case
of Vda. de Paman v. Seneris, 115 SCRA 709, this Court reiterated the following pronouncement:
"A judgment of conviction sentencing a defendant employer to pay an indemnity in the absence
of any collusion between the defendant and the offended party, is conclusive upon the employer
in an action for the enforcement of the latter's subsidiary liability not only with regard to the civil
liability, but also with regard to its amount." This being the case, this Court stated in Rotea v.
Halili, 109 Phil. 495, "that the court has no other function than to render decision based upon the
indemnity awarded in the criminal case and has no power to amend or modify it even if in its

48
opinion an error has been committed in the decision. A separate and independent action is,
therefore, unnecessary and would only unduly prolong the agony of the heirs of the victim."

Page
BASILIO v. CA
[G.R. No. 113433. March 17, 2000]
LUISITO P. BASILIO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JESUS G.
BERSAMIRA, and FE ADVINCULA, respondents. Sc
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review[1] under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court which seeks to annul
and set aside the Decision[2] and Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals dated October 27, 1992 and
January 5, 1994, respectively. The decision sustained the Order dated April 7, 1992 of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 166, denying due course to petitioners appeal from the Judgment
in Criminal Case No. 70278 and allowing execution against the petitioner of the subsidiary
indemnity arising from the offense committed by his truck driver.
The relevant facts as gleaned from the records are as follows:
On July 23, 1987, Simplicio Pronebo was charged by the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal with the crime
of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with double homicide and double physical
injuries.[4] The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 70278.
The information against him reads: Scmis
"The undersigned Assistant Fiscal accused Simplicio Pronebo y Cruz of the
crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Double
Homicide and Double Physical Injuries, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 15th day of July, 1987 in the municipality of Marikina,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, being then the driver and person in charge of a dump truck
with plate no. NMW-609 owned and registered in the name of Luisito Basilio,
without due regard to traffic laws, rules and regulations and without taking
the necessary care and precaution to prevent damage to property and avoid
injuries to persons, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
drive, manage and operate said dump truck in a careless, reckless, negligent
and imprudent manner as a result of which said dump truck being then driven
by him hit/bumped and sideswiped the following vehicles, to wit: a) a
motorized tricycle with plate no. NF-2457 driven by Benedicto Abuel thereby
causing damage in the amount of P1,100.00; b) an automobile Toyota Corona
with plate no. NAL -138 driven by Virgilio Hipolito thereby causing damage in
the amount of P2,190.50 c) a motorized tricycle with plate no. NW-9018
driven by Ricardo Sese y Julian thereby causing damage of an undetermined
amount d) an automobile Mitsubishi Lancer with plate no. PHE-283 driven by
Angelito Carranto thereby causing damage of an undetermined amount and
3) a Ford Econo Van with plate no. NFR-898 driven by Ernesto Aseron thereby
causing damage of an undetermined amount; that due to the strong impact
caused by the collision, the driver Ricardo Sese y Julian and his 3 passengers
including Danilo Advincula y Poblete were hit/bumped which directly caused
their death; while the other 2 passengers, namely; Cirilo Bangot sustained
serious physical injuries which required medical attendance for a period of
more than 30 days which incapacitated him from performing his customary
labor for the same period of time and Dominador Legaspi Jr. sustained
physical injuries which required medical attendance for a period of less than
nine days and incapacitated him from performing his customary labor for the
same period of time.
Contrary to law." Mis sc
After arraignment and trial, the court rendered its judgment dated February 4, 1991, which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Simplicio Pronebo y Cruz guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Reckless Imrpudence resulting in the death of Danilo
Advincula and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two
(2) years and four (4) months, as minimum to six (6) years
of prision correccional, as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of danilo
Advincula P30,000.00 for the latters death, P31,614.00, as actual and
compensatory damages. P2,000,000.00 for the loss of his earning capacity.
P150,000.00, as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus the
costs of suit."[5]
Thereafter, the accused filed an application for probation, so that the above judgment became
final and executory.
Pertinently, the trial court also found that at the time of the vehicular accident accused Simplicio
Pronebo was employed as the driver of the dump truck owned by petitioner Luisito Basilio.
On March 27, 1991, petitioner Luisito Basilio filed with the trial court a "Special Appearance and
Motion for Reconsideration"[6] praying that the judgment dated February 4, 1991, be reconsidered
and set aside insofar as it affected him and subjected him to a subsidiary liability for the civil
aspect of the criminal case. The motion was denied for lack of merit on September 16,
1991.[7] Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal[8] on September 25, 1991. Mis spped
On September 23, 1991, private respondent filed a Motion for Execution of the subsidiary civil
liability[9] of petitioner Basilio.
On April 7, 1992, the trial court issued two separate Orders. One denied due course and dismissed
Basilios appeal for having been filed beyond the reglementary period.[10] The other directed the
issuance of a writ of execution against him for the enforcement and satisfaction of the award of
civil indemnity decreed in judgment on February 4, 1991.[11]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari[12] under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
with the Court of Appeals, alleging that respondent judge acted without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion in issuing: (1) the Order dated September 16, 1991, denying the petitioners
49
motion for reconsideration of the judgment dated February 4, 1991 insofar as the subsidiary
liability of the petitioner was concerned, and (2) the Order dated April 7, 1992, directing the
Page
issuance of a writ of execution against the petitioner. Before the appellate court, petitioner claimed
he was not afforded due process when he was found subsidiarily liable for the civil liability of the
accused Pronebo in the criminal case.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition in its Decision dated October 27, 1992, disposing as
follows: Spped
"ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction is DENIED DUE COURSE
and should be, as it is hereby, DISMISSED for lack of persuasive force and
effect."[13]
A motion for reconsideration[14] was filed by the petitioner on November 24, 1992. This was denied
in a Resolution[15] dated January 5, 1994. Hence this petition for review.
Now, petitioner, in his assignment of errors, avers that respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I. ... IN SUSTAINING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE
JUDGMENT OF 4 FEBRUARY 1991 HAD BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY AS
REGARDS BOTH THE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS WHEN THE ACCUSED
APPLIED FOR PROBATION AT THE PROMULGATION.
II. ... IN HOLDING THAT AS PETITIONER IS NEITHER AN ACCUSED OR A
PARTY IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 70278, HE IS NOT ENTITLED TO FILE A
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE JUDGMENT OF SUBSIDIARY CIVIL
LIABILITY AGAINST HIM.
III. ... IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF HIS DAY IN
COURT IN VIOLATION OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS. Jo spped
IV. ... IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE
AUXILIARY RELIEF OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION BECAUSE THE JUDGMENT
OF CONVICTION "IS CONCLUSIVE UPON THE EMPLOYER".
V. IN RULING THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE DID NOT ACT IN ABUSE OF
AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.[16]
The issue before us is whether respondent Court of Appeals erred and committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying the special civil action under Rule 65 filed by petitioner against the trial court.
To resolve it, we must, however, also pass upon the following:
(1) Had the judgment of February 4, 1991 of the trial court become final and
executory when accused applied for probation at the promulgation?
(2) May the petitioner as employer file a Motion for Reconsideration
concerning civil liability decreed in the judgment if he is not a party to the
criminal case?
(3) May petitioner, as employer, be granted relief by way of a writ of
preliminary injunction? Spped jo
Petitioner asserts that he was not given the opportunity to be heard by the trial court to prove
the absence of an employer-employee relationship between him and accused. Nor that,
alternatively, the accused was not lawfully discharging duties as an employee at the time of the
incident. While these assertions are not moved, we shall give them due consideration.
The statutory basis for an employers subsidiary liability is found in Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code.[17] This liability is enforceable in the same criminal proceeding where the award is
made.[18] However, before execution against an employer ensues, there must be a determination,
in a hearing set for the purpose of 1) the existence of an employer-employee relationship; 2) that
the employer is engaged in some kind of industry; 3) that the employee is adjudged guilty of the
wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties (not
necessarily any offense he commits "while" in the discharge of such duties; and 4) that said
employee is insolvent.[19]
In Vda. De Paman vs. Seeris, 115 SCRA 709, 714 (1982), the Court observed that the drawback
in the enforcement of the subsidiary liability in the same criminal proceeding is that the alleged
employer is not afforded due process. Not being a party to the case, he is not heard as to whether
he is indeed the employer. Hence, we held: Miso
"To remedy the situation and thereby afford due process to the alleged
employer, this Court directed the court a quo in Pajarito vs. Seeris (supra) to
hear and decide in the same proceeding the subsidiary liability of the alleged
owner and operator of the passenger bus. It was explained therein that the
proceeding for the enforcement of the subsidiary liability may be considered
as part of the proceeding for the execution of the judgment. A case in which
an execution has been issued is regarded as still pending so that all
proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the suit."[20]
There are two instances when the existence of an employer-employee relationship of an accused
driver and the alleged vehicle owner may be determined. One during the criminal proceeding, and
the other, during the proceeding for the execution of the judgment. In both instances, petitioner
should be given the opportunity to be heard, which is the essence of due process.[21]
Petitioner knew of the criminal case that was filed against accused because it was his truck that
was involved in the incident.[22] Further, it was the insurance company, with which his truck was
insured, that provided the counsel for the accused, pursuant to the stipulations in their
contract.[23] Petitioner did not intervene in the criminal proceedings, despite knowledge, through
counsel, that the prosecution adduced evidence to show employer-employee relationship.[24] With
the convicts application for probation, the trial courts judgment became final and executory. All
told, it is our view that the lower court did not err when it found that petitioner was not denied
due process. He had all his chances to intervene in the criminal proceedings, and prove that he
was not the employer of the accused, but he chooses not to intervene at the appropriate time. Nex
old
50
Petitioner was also given the opportunity during the proceedings for the enforcement of judgment.
Even assuming that he was not properly notified of the hearing on the motion for execution of
Page
subsidiary liability, he was asked by the trial court to make an opposition thereto, which he did
on October 17, 1991, where he properly alleged that there was no employer-employee relationship
between him and accused and that the latter was not discharging any function in relation to his
work at the time of the incident.[25] In addition, counsel for private respondent filed and duly
served on December 3, 1991, and December 9, 1991, respectively, a manifestation praying for
the grant of the motion for execution.[26] This was set for hearing on December 13, 1991.
However, counsel for petitioner did not appear. Consequently, the court ordered in open court
that the matter be submitted for resolution. It was only on January 6, 1992, that the petitioners
counsel filed a counter-manifestation[27] that belatedly attempted to contest the move of the
private prosecutor for the execution of the civil liability. Thus, on April 7, 1992, the trial court
issued the Order granting the motion for execution of the subsidiary liability. Given the foregoing
circumstances, we cannot agree with petitioner that the trial court denied him due process of law.
Neither can we fault respondent appellant court for sustaining the judgment and orders of the
trial court. Mani kx

Accordingly, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated October 27, 1992, in CA-G.R. SP No. 27850 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

51
Page
PHILIPPINE RABBIT v. CA income for one year at P2,500.00 a month, P50,000.00 as indemnity for the
support of Renato Torres, and the further sum of P300,000.00 as moral
damages;

[G.R. No. 147703. April 14, 2004] b. to the heirs of ESTRELLA VELERO, the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for her
death, the sum of P237,323.75 for funeral expenses, her unearned income
for three years at P45,000.00 per annum, and the further sum
of P1,000,000.00 as moral damages and P200,000.00 as attorneys fees[;]

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

c. to the heirs of LORNA ANCHETA, the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for her death,
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
the sum of P22,838.00 as funeral expenses, the sum of P20,544.94 as
medical expenses and her loss of income for 30 years at P1,000.00 per
DECISION month, and the further sum of P100,000.00 for moral damages;

PANGANIBAN, J.:
d. to MAUREEN BRENNAN, the sum of P229,654.00 as hospital expenses, doctors fees
of P170,000.00 for the orthopedic surgeon, P22,500.00 for the [n]eurologist,
When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment meted out becomes an additional indemnity [of] at least P150,000.00 to cover future correction
final and executory. The employer cannot defeat the finality of the judgment by filing a notice of of deformity of her limbs, and moral damages in the amount
appeal on its own behalf in the guise of asking for a review of its subsidiary civil liability. Both the of P1,000,000.00;
primary civil liability of the accused-employee and the subsidiary civil liability of the employer are
carried in one single decision that has become final and executory.
e. to ROSIE BALAJO, the sum of P3,561.46 as medical expenses, P2,000.00 as loss of
income, and P25,000.00 as moral damages;

The Case f. to TERESITA TAMONDONG, the sum of P19,800.47 as medical expenses, P800.00
for loss of income, and P25,000.00 as moral damages;

Before this Court is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing g. to JULIANA TABTAB, the amount of P580.81 as medical expenses, P4,600.00 as
the March 29, 2000[2] and the March 27, 2001[3] Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA- actual damages and her loss earnings of P1,400.00 as well as moral damages
GR CV No. 59390. Petitioners appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San in the amount of P10,000.00;
Fernando, La Union in Criminal Case No. 2535 was dismissed in the first Resolution as follows:

h. to MIGUEL ARQUITOLA, the sum of P12,473.82 as hospital expenses, P14,530.00

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED and the appeal is ordered as doctors fees, P1,000.00 for medicines and P50,000.00 as moral damages;
DISMISSED.[4]

i. to CLARITA CABANBAN, the sum of P155.00 for medical expenses, P87.00 for
The second Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.[5] medicines, P1,710.00 as actual damages and P5,000.00 as moral damages;

j. to MARIANO CABANBAN, the sum of P1,395.00 for hospital bills, P500.00 for
The Facts medicine, P2,100.00 as actual damages, P1,200.00 for loss of income
and P5,000.00 as moral damages;

The facts of the case are summarized by the CA in this wise: k. to La Union Electric Company as the registered owner of the Toyota Hi-Ace Van,
the amount of P250,000.00 as actual damages for the cost of the totally
wrecked vehicle; to the owner of the jeepney, the amount of P22,698.38 as
On July 27, 1994, accused [Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang] was found guilty and convicted
actual damages;
of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and
damage to property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months

52
and eleven (11) days to six (6) years, and to pay damages as follows: The court further ruled that [petitioner], in the event of the insolvency of accused, shall be liable
for the civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the judgment against accused had become final
and executory.

Page
a. to pay the heirs of JUSTINO TORRES the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for his
death, plus the sum of P25,383.00, for funeral expenses, his unearned
Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. It is worth mention[ing] that Section
8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court authorizes the dismissal of appeal when appellant jumps
bail. Counsel for accused, also admittedly hired and provided by [petitioner], filed a notice of
appeal which was denied by the trial court. We affirmed the denial of the notice of appeal filed in
behalf of accused.
Simultaneously, on August 6, 1994, [petitioner] filed its notice of appeal from the judgment of the
trial court. On April 29, 1997, the trial court gave due course to [petitioners] notice of
appeal. On December 8, 1998, [petitioner] filed its brief. On December 9, 1998, the Office of the
Solicitor General received [a] copy of [petitioners] brief. On January 8, 1999, the OSG moved to
be excused from filing [respondents] brief on the ground that the OSGs authority to represent
People is confined to criminal cases on appeal. The motion was however denied per Our resolution
of May 31, 1999. On March 2, 1999, [respondent]/private prosecutor filed the instant motion to
dismiss.[6] (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of the civil
action arising from the offense. Thus, once determined in the criminal case against the accused-
employee, the employers subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code becomes conclusive and enforceable.
The appellate court further held that to allow an employer to dispute independently the civil
liability fixed in the criminal case against the accused-employee would be to amend, nullify or
defeat a final judgment. Since the notice of appeal filed by the accused had already been
dismissed by the CA, then the judgment of conviction and the award of civil liability became final
and executory. Included in the civil liability of the accused was the employers subsidiary liability.
Hence, this Petition.[7]
The Issues
Petitioner states the issues of this case as follows:
A. Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-employee,
may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused.
B. Whether or not the doctrines of Alvarez v. Court of Appeals (158 SCRA 57) and Yusay v.
Adil (164 SCRA 494) apply to the instant case.[8]
There is really only one issue. Item B above is merely an adjunct to Item A.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:
Propriety of Appeal by the Employer
Pointing out that it had seasonably filed a notice of appeal from the RTC Decision, petitioner
contends that the judgment of conviction against the accused-employee has not attained
finality. The former insists that its appeal stayed the finality, notwithstanding the fact that the
latter had jumped bail. In effect, petitioner argues that its appeal takes the place of that of the
accused-employee.
We are not persuaded.
Appeals in Criminal Cases
Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states thus:
Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double
jeopardy.
Clearly, both the accused and the prosecution may appeal a criminal case, but the
government may do so only if the accused would not thereby be placed in double
jeopardy.[9]Furthermore, the prosecution cannot appeal on the ground that the accused should
have been given a more severe penalty.[10] On the other hand, the offended parties may also
appeal the judgment with respect to their right to civil liability. If the accused has the right to
appeal the judgment of conviction, the offended parties should have the same right to appeal as
much of the judgment as is prejudicial to them.[11]
Appeal by the Accused
Who Jumps Bail
Well-established in our jurisdiction is the principle that the appellate court may, upon motion
or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps bail. The second
paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 124 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal
53
if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during
the pendency of the appeal.[12]
Page
 This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in court when they
abscond. Unless they surrender or submit to the courts jurisdiction, they are deemed to have
waived their right to seek judicial relief.[13]
Moreover, this doctrine applies not only to the accused who jumps bail during the appeal,
but also to one who does so during the trial. Justice Florenz D. Regalado succinctly explains the
principle in this wise:
x x x. When, as in this case, the accused escaped after his arraignment and during the trial, but
the trial in absentia proceeded resulting in the promulgation of a judgment against him and his
counsel appealed, since he nonetheless remained at large his appeal must be dismissed by
analogy with the aforesaid provision of this Rule [Rule 124, 8 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure].
x x x[14]
The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they voluntarily submit to the
jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise arrested within 15 days from notice of the judgment
against them.[15] While at large, they cannot seek relief from the court, as they are deemed to
have waived the appeal.[16]
Finality of a Decision
in a Criminal Case
As to when a judgment of conviction attains finality is explained in Section 7 of Rule 120 of
the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which we quote:
A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it
becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a
judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the
sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in
writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation.
In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender to the
proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned his appeal. Consequently, the judgment
against him has become final and executory.[17]
Liability of an Employer
in a Finding of Guilt
Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states the subsidiary civil liabilities of innkeepers, as
follows:
In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or
corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where
a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall have been
committed by them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiary liable for restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their
houses from guests lodging therein, or for payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests
shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the
deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which
such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to the care and vigilance
over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation
of persons unless committed by the innkeepers employees.
Moreover, the foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers, according to Article 103
which reads:
The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers,
teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by
their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
Having laid all these basic rules and principles, we now address the main issue raised by
petitioner.
Civil Liability Deemed Instituted
in the Criminal Prosecution
At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what
civil actions are deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution.
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from
the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior
to the criminal action.
xxxxxxxxx
Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly
instituted in a criminal action, that is, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves
the right to institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action.[18] Hence, the
subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be
enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to the employee.[19]
It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving independent civil actions
and allowed these to proceed separately from criminal actions. Thus, the civil actions referred to
in Articles 32,[20] 33,[21]34[22] and 2176[23] of the Civil Code shall remain separate, distinct and
independent of any criminal prosecution based on the same act. Here are some direct
consequences of such revision and omission:
54
1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code need not be reserved in
the criminal prosecution, since they are not deemed included therein.
Page
 2. The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil action arising from the
crime charged does not extinguish the right to bring such action.
3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more than once for the same
act or omission.[24]
What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the
crime or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts,
contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil
liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may -- subject to the control
of the prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the remaining civil
interest therein.[25]
This discussion is completely in accord with the Revised Penal Code, which states that
[e]very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.[26]
Petitioner argues that, as an employer, it is considered a party to the criminal case and is
conclusively bound by the outcome thereof. Consequently, petitioner must be accorded the right
to pursue the case to its logical conclusion -- including the appeal.
The argument has no merit. Undisputedly, petitioner is not a direct party to the criminal
case, which was filed solely against Napoleon M. Roman, its employee.
In its Memorandum, petitioner cited a comprehensive list of cases dealing with the
subsidiary liability of employers. Thereafter, it noted that none can be applied to it, because in all
th[o]se cases, the accuseds employer did not interpose an appeal.[27] Indeed, petitioner cannot
cite any single case in which the employer appealed, precisely because an appeal in such
circumstances is not possible.
The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly
speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees.[28]Although
in substance and in effect, they have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of
their subsidiary liability. While they may assist their employees to the extent of supplying the
latters lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot act independently on their own behalf,
but can only defend the accused.
Waiver of Constitutional Safeguard
Against Double Jeopardy
Petitioners appeal obviously aims to have the accused-employee absolved of his criminal
responsibility and the judgment reviewed as a whole. These intentions are apparent from its
Appellants Brief[29] filed with the CA and from its Petition[30] before us, both of which claim that
the trial courts finding of guilt is not supported by competent evidence.[31]
An appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a waiver of the constitutional
safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to a review by the appellate
court. The latter is then called upon to render judgment as law and justice dictate, whether
favorable or unfavorable to the appellant.[32] This is the risk involved when the accused decides
to appeal a sentence of conviction.[33] Indeed, appellate courts have the power to reverse, affirm
or modify the judgment of the lower court and to increase or reduce the penalty it imposed.[34]
If the present appeal is given course, the whole case against the accused-employee
becomes open to review. It thus follows that a penalty higher than that which has already been
imposed by the trial court may be meted out to him. Petitioners appeal would thus violate his
right against double jeopardy, since the judgment against him could become subject to
modification without his consent.
We are not in a position to second-guess the reason why the accused effectively waived his
right to appeal by jumping bail. It is clear, though, that petitioner may not appeal without violating
his right against double jeopardy.
Effect of Absconding
on the Appeal Process
Moreover, within the meaning of the principles governing the prevailing criminal procedure,
the accused impliedly withdrew his appeal by jumping bail and thereby made the judgment of the
court below final.[35] Having been a fugitive from justice for a long period of time, he is deemed
to have waived his right to appeal. Thus, his conviction is now final and executory. The Court
in People v. Ang Gioc[36] ruled:
There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by the accused himself, but
the right of appeal is not one of them. This right is granted solely for the benefit of the accused. He
may avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may waive it either expressly or by implication. When the
accused flees after the case has been submitted to the court for decision, he will be deemed to
have waived his right to appeal from the judgment rendered against him. x x x.[37]
By fleeing, the herein accused exhibited contempt of the authority of the court and placed
himself in a position to speculate on his chances for a reversal. In the process, he kept himself
out of the reach of justice, but hoped to render the judgment nugatory at his option.[38] Such
conduct is intolerable and does not invite leniency on the part of the appellate court.[39]
Consequently, the judgment against an appellant who escapes and who refuses to
surrender to the proper authorities becomes final and executory.[40]
Thus far, we have clarified that petitioner has no right to appeal the criminal case against
the accused-employee; that by jumping bail, he has waived his right to appeal; and that the
judgment in the criminal case against him is now final.
Subsidiary Liability
Upon Finality of Judgment
As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues. Petitioner argues that
the rulings of this Court in Miranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc.,[41] Alvarez v. CA[42] and Yusay
v. Adil[43] do not apply to the present case, because it has followed the Courts directive to the
employers in these cases to take part in the criminal cases against their employees. By
participating in the defense of its employee, herein petitioner tries to shield itself from the
undisputed rulings laid down in these leading cases.
55
Such posturing is untenable. In dissecting these cases on subsidiary liability, petitioner lost
Page
track of the most basic tenet they have laid down -- that an employers liability in a finding of guilt
against its accused-employee is subsidiary.
 Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the No Deprivation
adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in the event of the latters insolvency.[44] The of Due Process
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability -- Articles 102 and 103 -- are deemed
written into the judgments in the cases to which they are applicable.[45] Thus, in the dispositive
portion of its decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the As to the argument that petitioner was deprived of due process, we reiterate that what is
employer. sought to be enforced is the subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon the employees
criminal negligence. In other words, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the
In the absence of any collusion between the accused-employee and the offended party, the
conviction of the employee and upon proof of the latters insolvency, in the same way that acquittal
judgment of conviction should bind the person who is subsidiarily liable.[46] In effect and
wipes out not only his primary civil liability, but also his employers subsidiary liability for his
implication, the stigma of a criminal conviction surpasses mere civil liability.[47]
criminal negligence.[52]
To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them
It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due
to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court.[48] By the same token,
process.[53] It is merely a procedural remedy of statutory origin, a remedy that may be exercised
to allow them to appeal the final criminal conviction of their employees without the latters consent
only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing such exercise.[54] Hence, the
would also result in improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment.
legal requirements must be strictly complied with.[55]
The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the
It would be incorrect to consider the requirements of the rules on appeal as merely harmless
employer not only with regard to the formers civil liability, but also with regard to its amount. The
and trivial technicalities that can be discarded.[56] Indeed, deviations from the rules cannot be
liability of an employer cannot be separated from that of the employee.[49]
tolerated.[57] In these times when court dockets are clogged with numerous litigations, such rules
Before the employers subsidiary liability is exacted, however, there must be adequate have to be followed by parties with greater fidelity, so as to facilitate the orderly disposition of
evidence establishing that (1) they are indeed the employers of the convicted employees; (2) that those cases.[58]
the former are engaged in some kind of industry; (3) that the crime was committed by the
After a judgment has become final, vested rights are acquired by the winning party. If the
employees in the discharge of their duties; and (4) that the execution against the latter has not
proper losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, then the former
been satisfied due to insolvency.[50]
has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case.[59]
The resolution of these issues need not be done in a separate civil action. But the
In fact, petitioner admits that by helping the accused-employee, it participated in the
determination must be based on the evidence that the offended party and the employer may fully
proceedings before the RTC; thus, it cannot be said that the employer was deprived of due
and freely present. Such determination may be done in the same criminal action in which the
process.It might have lost its right to appeal, but it was not denied its day in court.[60] In fact, it
employees liability, criminal and civil, has been pronounced;[51] and in a hearing set for that precise
can be said that by jumping bail, the accused-employee, not the court, deprived petitioner of the
purpose, with due notice to the employer, as part of the proceedings for the execution of the
right to appeal.
judgment.
All told, what is left to be done is to execute the RTC Decision against the accused. It should
Just because the present petitioner participated in the defense of its accused-employee
be clear that only after proof of his insolvency may the subsidiary liability of petitioner be
does not mean that its liability has transformed its nature; its liability remains subsidiary. Neither
enforced. It has been sufficiently proven that there exists an employer-employee relationship;
will its participation erase its subsidiary liability. The fact remains that since the accused-
that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry; and that the employee has been adjudged
employees conviction has attained finality, then the subsidiary liability of the employer ipso
guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his
factoattaches.
duties. The proof is clear from the admissions of petitioner that [o]n 26 August 1990, while on its
According to the argument of petitioner, fairness dictates that while the finality of conviction regular trip from Laoag to Manila, a passenger bus owned by petitioner, being then operated by
could be the proper sanction to be imposed upon the accused for jumping bail, the same sanction petitioners driver, Napoleon Roman, figured in an accident in San Juan, La Union x x x.[61] Neither
should not affect it. In effect, petitioner-employer splits this case into two: first, for itself; does petitioner dispute that there was already a finding of guilt against the accused while he was
and second, for its accused-employee. in the discharge of his duties.

The untenability of this argument is clearly evident. There is only one criminal case against WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed
the accused-employee. A finding of guilt has both criminal and civil aspects. It is the height of Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
absurdity for this single case to be final as to the accused who jumped bail, but not as to an entity
SO ORDERED.
whose liability is dependent upon the conviction of the former.

The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil
liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become final and
enforceable by reason of his flight, then the formers subsidiary civil liability has also become

56
immediately enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary liability
is highly contingent on the imposition of the primary civil liability.

Page
QUINTO v. ANDRES
[G.R. No. 155791. March 16, 2005]
MELBA QUINTO, petitioner, vs. DANTE ANDRES and RANDYVER
PACHECO, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
At around 7:30 a.m. on November 13, 1995, eleven-year-old Edison Garcia, a Grade 4
elementary school pupil, and his playmate, Wilson Quinto, who was also about eleven years old,
were at Barangay San Rafael, Tarlac, Tarlac. They saw respondents Dante Andres and Randyver
Pacheco by the mouth of a drainage culvert. Andres and Pacheco invited Wilson to go fishing with
them inside the drainage culvert.[1] Wilson assented. When Garcia saw that it was dark inside, he
opted to remain seated in a grassy area about two meters from the entrance of the drainage
system.[2]
Respondent Pacheco had a flashlight. He, along with respondent Andres and Wilson,
entered the drainage system which was covered by concrete culvert about a meter high and a
meter wide, with water about a foot deep.[3] After a while, respondent Pacheco, who was holding
a fish, came out of the drainage system and left[4] without saying a word. Respondent Andres also
came out, went back inside, and emerged again, this time, carrying Wilson who was already dead.
Respondent Andres laid the boys lifeless body down in the grassy area.[5]Shocked at the sudden
turn of events, Garcia fled from the scene.[6] For his part, respondent Andres went to the house
of petitioner Melba Quinto, Wilsons mother, and informed her that her son had died. Melba Quinto
rushed to the drainage culvert while respondent Andres followed her.[7]
The cadaver of Wilson was buried without any autopsy thereon having been conducted.
The police authorities of Tarlac, Tarlac, did not file any criminal complaint against the respondents
for Wilsons death.
Two weeks thereafter, or on November 28, 1995, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
investigators took the sworn statements of respondent Pacheco, Garcia and petitioner
Quinto.[8] Respondent Pacheco alleged that he had never been to the drainage system catching
fish with respondent Andres and Wilson. He also declared that he saw Wilson already dead when
he passed by the drainage system while riding on his carabao.
On February 29, 1996, the cadaver of Wilson was exhumed. Dr. Dominic Aguda of the NBI
performed an autopsy thereon at the cemetery and submitted his autopsy report containing the
following postmortem findings:
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
Body in previously embalmed, early stage of decomposition, attired with white long sleeves and
dark pants and placed inside a wooden coffin in a niche-apartment style.
Hematoma, 14.0 x 7.0 cms., scalp, occipital region.
Abrasion, 4.0 x 3.0 cms., right face, 5.0 x 3.0 cms., left forearm.
Laryngo tracheal lumina congested and edematous containing muddy particles with
bloody path.
Lungs hyperinflated, heavy and readily pits on pressure; section contains bloody froth.
Brain autolyzed and liquefied.
Stomach partly autolyzed.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Asphyxia by drowning; traumatic head injuries, contributory.[9]
The NBI filed a criminal complaint for homicide against respondents Andres and Pacheco in
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, which found probable cause for homicide by doloagainst
the two.
An Information was later filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac, Tarlac, charging
the respondents with homicide. The accusatory portion reads:
That at around 8 oclock in the morning of November 13, 1995, in the Municipality of Tarlac,
Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused
Dante Andres and Randyver Pacheco y Suliven @ Randy, conspiring, confederating, and helping
one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, and maul
Wilson Quinto inside a culvert where the three were fishing, causing Wilson Quinto to drown and
die.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[10]
After presenting Garcia, the prosecution presented Dr. Dominic Aguda, who testified on
direct examination that the hematoma at the back of the victims head and the abrasion on the
latters left forearm could have been caused by a strong force coming from a blunt instrument or
object. The injuries in the larynx and trachea also indicated that the victim died of drowning, as
some muddy particles were also found on the lumina of the larynx and trachea (Nakahigop ng
putik). Dr. Aguda stated that such injury could be caused when a person is put under water by
pressure or by force.[11] On cross-examination, Dr. Aguda declared that the hematoma on the
scalp was caused by a strong pressure or a strong force applied to the scalp coming from a blunt
instrument. He also stated that the victim could have fallen, and that the occipital portion of his
head could have hit a blunt object.
Dr. Aguda also declared that the 14x7-centimeter hematoma at the back of Wilsons head
could have rendered the latter unconscious, and, if he was thrown in a body of water, the boy
could have died by drowning.
In answer to clarificatory questions made by the court, the doctor declared that the 4x3-
centimeter abrasion on the right side of Wilsons face could have also been caused by rubbing
against a concrete wall or pavement, or by contact with a rough surface. He also stated that the
trachea region was full of mud, but that there was no sign of strangulation.[12]
After the prosecution had presented its witnesses and the respondents had admitted the
pictures showing the drainage system including the inside portions thereof,[13] the prosecution
rested its case.
57
The respondents filed a demurer to evidence which the trial court granted on the ground of
Page
insufficiency of evidence, per its Order dated January 28, 1998. It also held that it could not hold
the respondents liable for damages because of the absence of preponderant evidence to prove
their liability for Wilsons death.
The petitioner appealed the order to the Court of Appeals (CA) insofar as the civil aspect of
the case was concerned. In her brief, she averred that
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE AND IN RULING THAT NO PREPONDERANT
EVIDENCE EXISTS TO HOLD ACCUSED-APPELLEES CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF THE
VICTIM WILSON QUINTO.[14]
The CA rendered judgment affirming the assailed order of the RTC on December 21, 2001.
It ruled as follows:
The acquittal in this case is not merely based on reasonable doubt but rather on a finding that
the accused-appellees did not commit the criminal acts complained of. Thus, pursuant to the
above rule and settled jurisprudence, any civil action ex delicto cannot prosper. Acquittal in a
criminal action bars the civil action arising therefrom where the judgment of acquittal holds that
the accused did not commit the criminal acts imputed to them. (Tan v. Standard Vacuum Oil Co.,
91 Phil. 672)[15]
The petitioner filed the instant petition for review and raised the following issues:
I he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of the accused.[22] While the prosecution
WHETHER OR NOT THE EXTINCTION OF RESPONDENTS CRIMINAL LIABILITY, LIKEWISE,
CARRIES WITH IT THE EXTINCTION OF THEIR CIVIL LIABILITY.
II
WHETHER OR NOT PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO HOLD RESPONDENTS CIVILLY LIABLE
FOR THE DEATH OF WILSON QUINTO.[16]
The petitioner avers that the trial court indulged in mere possibilities, surmises and
speculations when it held that Wilson died because (a) he could have fallen, his head hitting the
stones in the drainage system since the culvert was slippery; or (b) he might have been bitten by
a snake which he thought was the prick of a fish fin, causing his head to hit hard on the top of
the culvert; or (c) he could have lost consciousness due to some ailment, such as epilepsy. The
petitioner also alleges that the trial court erred in ruling that the prosecution failed to prove any
ill motive on the part of the respondents to kill the victim, and in considering that respondent
Andres even informed her of Wilsons death.
The petitioner posits that the trial court ignored the testimony of the Medico-Legal Expert,
Dr. Aguda; the nature, location and number of the injuries sustained by the victim which caused
his death; as well as the locus criminis. The petitioner insists that the behavior of the respondents
after the commission of the crime betrayed their guilt, considering that respondent Pacheco left
the scene, leaving respondent Andres to bring out Wilsons cadaver, while respondent Andres
returned inside the drainage system only when he saw Garcia seated in the grassy area waiting
for his friend Wilson to come out.
The petitioner contends that there is preponderant evidence on record to show that either
or both the respondents caused the death of her son and, as such, are jointly and severally liable
therefor.
In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver that since the prosecution failed to
adduce any evidence to prove that they committed the crime of homicide and caused the death
of Wilson, they are not criminally and civilly liable for the latters death.
The petition has no merit.
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.[17] The civil liability of such
person established in Articles 100, 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code includes restitution,
reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for consequential damages.[18] When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.[19] With the implied institution of the civil action in the criminal action, the two
actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with the criminal action predominating the
civil.[20]
The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and
others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, to reform and
rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order.[21] The sole purpose of the civil action is
the restitution, reparation or indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or injury
must prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged, it is required
to prove the cause of action of the private complainant against the accused for damages and/or
restitution.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action.
However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a
final judgment in the civil action that the act or omission from where the civil liability may arise
does not exist.[23]
Moreover, a person committing a felony is criminally liable for all the natural and logical
consequences resulting therefrom although the wrongful act done be different from that which
he intended.[24] Natural refers to an occurrence in the ordinary course of human life or events,
while logical means that there is a rational connection between the act of the accused and the
resulting injury or damage. The felony committed must be the proximate cause of the resulting
injury. Proximate cause is that cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred. The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately, or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain
of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor.[25]
There must be a relation of cause and effect, the cause being the felonious act of the
offender, the effect being the resultant injuries and/or death of the victim. The cause and effect
relationship is not altered or changed because of the pre-existing conditions, such as the
pathological condition of the victim (las condiciones patologica del lesionado); the predisposition
of the offended party (la predisposicion del ofendido); the physical condition of the offended party
(la constitucion fisica del herido); or the concomitant or concurrent conditions, such as the
negligence or fault of the doctors (la falta de medicos para sister al herido); or the conditions
58
supervening the felonious act such as tetanus, pulmonary infection or gangrene.[26]
Page
The felony committed is not the proximate cause of the resulting injury when:
 (a) there is an active force that intervened between the felony committed and the
resulting injury, and the active force is a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign
from the felonious act of the accused; or
(b) the resulting injury is due to the intentional act of the victim.[27]
If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a manner as to put life in jeopardy
and death follows as a consequence of their felonious act, it does not alter its nature or diminish
its criminality to prove that other causes cooperated in producing the factual result. The offender
is criminally liable for the death of the victim if his delictual act caused, accelerated or contributed
to the death of the victim.[28] A different doctrine would tend to give immunity to crime and to
take away from human life a salutary and essential safeguard.[29] This Court has emphasized that:
Amid the conflicting theories of medical men, and the uncertainties attendant upon the treatment
of bodily ailments and injuries, it would be easy in many cases of homicide to raise a doubt as to
the immediate cause of death, and thereby to open a wide door by which persons guilty of the
highest crime might escape conviction and punishment. [30]
In People v. Quianzon,[31] the Supreme Court held:
The Supreme Court of Spain, in a Decision of April 3, 1879, said in a case similar to the present,
the following: Inasmuch as a man is responsible for the consequences of his act and in this case,
the physical condition and temperament of the offended party nowise lessen the evil, the
seriousness whereof is to be judged, not by the violence of the means employed, but by the result
actually produced; and as the wound which the appellant inflicted upon the deceased was the
cause which determined his death, without his being able to counteract its effects, it is evident
that the act in question should be qualified as homicide, etc.[32]
In the present case, the respondents were charged with homicide by dolo. In People v.
Delim,[33] the Court delineated the burden of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused for
homicide or murder:
In the case at bar, the prosecution was burdened to prove the corpus delicti which consists of two
things: first, the criminal act and second, defendants agency in the commission of the act.
Wharton says that corpus delicti includes two things: first, the objective; second, the subjective
element of crimes. In homicide (by dolo) and in murder cases, the prosecution is burdened to
prove: (a) the death of the party alleged to be dead; (b) that the death was produced by the
criminal act of some other than the deceased and was not the result of accident, natural cause or
suicide; and (c) that defendant committed the criminal act or was in some way criminally
responsible for the act which produced the death. To prove the felony of homicide or murder,
there must be incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the victim was deliberately
killed (with malice); in other words, that there was intent to kill. Such evidence may consist inter
alia in the use of weapons by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds
sustained by the victim and the words uttered by the malefactors before, at the time or
immediately after the killing of the victim. If the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the
malefactor, intent to kill is conclusively presumed.[34]
Insofar as the civil aspect of the case is concerned, the prosecution or the private
complainant is burdened to adduce preponderance of evidence or superior weight of evidence.
Although the evidence adduced by the plaintiff is stronger than that presented by the defendant,
he is not entitled to a judgment if his evidence is not sufficient to sustain his cause of action. The
plaintiff must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of that of the
defendants.[35]
Section 1, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence provides how preponderance of evidence is
determined:
Section 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. In civil cases, the party having the burden
of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the
preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider
all the facts and circumstance of the case, the witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence,
their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the
facts to which they testify, the probability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and
also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court
may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the
greater number.[36]
In the present case, we rule that, as held by the trial court and the CA, the prosecution
failed to adduce preponderant evidence to prove the facts on which the civil liability of the
respondents rest, i.e., that the petitioner has a cause of action against the respondents for
damages.
It bears stressing that the prosecution relied solely on the collective testimonies of Garcia,
who was not an eyewitness, and Dr. Aguda.
We agree with the petitioner that, as evidenced by the Necropsy Report of Dr. Dominic
Aguda, the deceased sustained a 14x7-centimeter hematoma on the scalp. But as to how the
deceased sustained the injury, Dr. Aguda was equivocal. He presented two possibilities: (a) that
the deceased could have been hit by a blunt object or instrument applied with full force; or (b)
the deceased could have slipped, fell hard and his head hit a hard object:
COURT:
The Court would ask questions.
Q So it is possible that the injury, that is the hematoma, caused on the back of the
head might be due to the victims falling on his back and his head hitting a
pavement?
A Well, the 14x7-centimeter hematoma is quite extensive, so if the fall is strong
enough and would fall from a high place and hit a concrete pavement, then it
is possible.
Q Is it possible that if the victim slipped on a concrete pavement and the head hit the
pavement, the injury might be caused by that slipping?
A It is also possible.
Q So when the victim was submerged under water while unconscious, it is possible
that he might have taken in some mud or what?
A Yes, Sir.
59
Q So it is your finding that the victim was submerged while still breathing?
A Yes, Your Honor, considering that the finding on the lung also would indicate that
the victim was still alive when he was placed under water.[37]
Page
 The doctor also admitted that the abrasion on the right side of the victims face could have
been caused by rubbing against a concrete wall or pavement:
Q The abrasion 4x3 centimeters on the right [side of the] face, would it be caused by
the face rubbing against a concrete wall or pavement?
A Yes, Sir. Abrasion is usually caused by a contact of a skin to a rough surface.
Q Rough surface?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q When you say that the trachea region was full of mud, were there no signs that
the victim was strangled?
A There was no sign of strangulation, Your Honor.[38]
The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Dr. Aguda that the deceased might have
slipped, causing the latter to fall hard and hit his head on the pavement, thus:
Q -Could it be possible, Doctor, that this injury might have been caused when the
victim fell down and that portion of the body or occipital portion hit a blunt
object and might have been inflicted as a result of falling down?
A - If the fall if the victim fell and he hit a hard object, well, it is also possible.[39]
The trial court took into account the following facts:
Again, it could be seen from the pictures presented by the prosecution that there were stones
inside the culvert. (See Exhibit D to D-3). The stones could have caused the victim to slip and hit
his head on the pavement. Since there was water on the culvert, the portion soaked with water
must be very slippery, aside from the fact that the culvert is round. If the victim hit his head and
lost consciousness, he will naturally take in some amount of water and drown.[40]
It is of judicial notice that nowadays persons have killed or committed serious crimes for no
reason at all.[42] However, the absence of any ill-motive to kill the deceased is relevant and
admissible in evidence to prove that no violence was perpetrated on the person of the deceased.
In this case, the petitioner failed to adduce proof of any ill-motive on the part of either respondent
to kill the deceased before or after the latter was invited to join them in fishing. Indeed, the
petitioner testified that respondent Andres used to go to their house and play with her son before
the latters death:
Q Do you know this Dante Andres personally?
A Not much but he used to go to our house and play with my son after going from
her mother who is gambling, Sir.
Q But you are acquainted with him, you know his face?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Will you please look around this courtroom and see if he is around?
A (Witness is pointing to Dante Andres, who is inside the courtroom.)[43]
When the petitioners son died inside the drainage culvert, it was respondent Andres who
brought out the deceased. He then informed the petitioner of her sons death. Even after informing
the petitioner of the death of her son, respondent Andres followed the petitioner on her way to
the grassy area where the deceased was:
Q Did not Dante Andres follow you?
A He went with me, Sir.
Q So when you went to the place where your son was lying, Dante Andres was with
you?
A No, Sir. When I was informed by Dante Andres that my son was there at the culvert,
I ran immediately. He [was] just left behind and he just followed, Sir.

The CA affirmed on appeal the findings of the trial court, as well as its conclusion based on
the said findings.
We agree with the trial and appellate courts. The general rule is that the findings of facts
of the trial court, its assessment of probative weight of the evidence of the parties, and its
conclusion anchored on such findings, affirmed no less by the CA, are given conclusive effect by
this Court, unless the trial court ignored, misapplied or misconstrued cogent facts and
circumstances which, if considered, would change the outcome of the case. The petitioner failed
to show any justification to warrant a reversal of the findings or conclusions of the trial and
appellate courts.
Q So when you reached the place where your son was lying down, Dante Andres also
came or arrived?
A It was only when we boarded the jeep that he arrived, Sir.[44]
In sum, the petitioner failed to adduce preponderance of evidence to prove a cause of action
for damages based on the deliberate acts alleged in the Information.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

That the deceased fell or slipped cannot be totally foreclosed because even Garcia testified
that the drainage culvert was dark, and that he himself was so afraid that he refused to join
respondents Andres and Pacheco inside.[41] Respondent Andres had no flashlight; only respondent
Pacheco had one.

Moreover, Dr. Aguda failed to testify and explain what might have caused the abrasion on
the left forearm of the deceased. He, likewise, failed to testify whether the abrasions on the face
and left forearm of the victim were made ante mortem or post mortem.

The petitioner even failed to adduce preponderance of evidence that either or both the
respondents hit the deceased with a blunt object or instrument, and, consequently, any blunt

60
object or instrument that might have been used by any or both of the respondents in hitting the
deceased.

Page
CASTRO v. BUSTOS
G.R. No. L-25913 February 29, 1969
HEIRS OF RAYMUNDO CASTRO, petitioners,
vs.
APOLONIO BUSTOS, respondent.
Sotto, Consengco and Dizon for petitioners.
Sipin, Abarcar and Baluyot for respondent.
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the Court of Appeals.
Respondent Apolonio Bustos was charged in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga on October
26, 1962 with the crime of murder for the killing of Raymundo Castro whose heirs are now the
petitioners. The trial court found Bustos guilty only of homicide and, crediting him with two
mitigating circumstances, namely, passion or obfuscation and voluntary surrender, sentenced him
to an indeterminate prison term of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum, and to indemnify the petitioners,
who were represented in the case by a private prosecutor, in the sum of six thousand pesos
(P6,000) "without prejudice to whatever the accused (respondent) is entitled from the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for his services of around twenty-six (26) years as
a public school teacher, prior to October 20, 1962." Both respondent and petitioners appealed to
the Court of Appeals, respondent asking that appellate, court acquit him and petitioners praying,
on the other hand, that respondent be convicted of murder, that the portion regarding what said
respondent will receive from the GSIS be deleted and that he be ordered to pay petitioners "the
aggregate sum of P50,764.00 as indemnity and actual, moral, temperate and exemplary
damages." For the purposes of their appeal, petitioners even filed unnecessarily a printed record
on appeal. On October 18, 1965, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment modifying that of the
trial court insofar as it concerned (1) the amount of damages to be awarded petitioners thus:
... Aside from the P6,000 indemnity awarded by the trial court, which we uphold, we
feel justified, in the exercise of our discretion, to award to the heirs of the deceased
moral damages in the amount of P6,000 plus P13,380.00 to compensate for the loss of
earning of the decedent at the annual salary of P2,676.00 ....
and (2) the mitigating circumstance of "obfuscation", appreciated as such by the trial court, which
was changed to "vindication of a grave offense", but affirming it in all other respects. Upon motion,
however, of respondent for the reconsideration of said decision, reiterating his plea for acquittal,
or, in the alternative, praying for the elimination of the award of moral and compensatory
damages, the Court of Appeals promulgated on November 13, 1965, an amended decision, the
pertinent portions of which are:
The arguments interposed by the appellant in his Motion for consideration to support
the complete reversal of the judgment appealed from, have been considered and
passed upon in our decision, and we see no reason to alter the same in so far as the
appellant's guilt of the crime is concerned. On the other hand, we agree with the
appellant that in the interest of justice and equity and in view of the presence of two
mitigating circumstances, without any aggravating one to offset them, the award of
moral and compensatory damages should be eliminated.
WHEREFORE, the decision promulgated October 18, 1965, is hereby amended by
eliminating therefrom the award of P6,000.00 representing moral damages, and of
P13,380.00 representing the decedent's loss of earnings.
From this amended decision, only petitioners have appealed to Us. The prayer in their petition for
certiorari asks for nothing more than that the amended decision of the Court of Appeals be revoked
and reversed, and its original decision be affirmed in toto insofar as the award of indemnity and
damages is concerned. Since We find the grounds of the appeal meritorious, We grant fully the
prayer in the petition.
This case affords this Court as appropriate an opportunity, as any other, to restate, in a more
comprehensive way, the law regarding the items of damages that are recoverable in cases of
death caused by a crime, whether the claim therefor is made in the criminal proceedings itself or
in a separate civil action. In the instant case, recovery of such damages is being sought in the
criminal proceedings but even if it were claimed otherwise, the indemnity and damages would be
the same, for generally, the items of damages are identical in both procedures, except with respect
to attorney's fees and expenses of litigation which can be awarded only when a separate civil
action is instituted. (Art. 2208, Civil Code) With the clarifications We are making herein, at least
the writer of this opinion expects that litigations regarding the aspects of the law herein passed
upon may be minimized.
As a start, it is to be noted that in the matter of damages, the original decision of the Court of
Appeals, while correct in making a particularization in the award of indemnity and damages,
nonetheless, still failed to comply strictly with the constitutional requirement that all decisions of
courts of record must state both the facts and the law on which they are based. (Sec. 12, Art.
VIII, Constitution) In said original decision, the Court of Appeals held:
Coming now to the damages asked by the heirs of the deceased: Aside from the
P6,000.00 indemnity awarded by the trial court which we uphold, we feel justified, in
the exercise of our discretion, to award to the heirs of the deceased moral damages in
the amount of P6,000 plus P13,380.00 to compensate for the loss of earning of the
decedent at the annual salary of P2,676.00 (Exh. V; p. 42 t.s.n. Vergara).
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is modified as above indicated in so far as it
concerns the amount of indemnity and damages to be awarded to the heirs of the
deceased, and the mitigating circumstance of vindication of a grave offense which takes
the place of the circumstance of obfuscation appreciated by the trial court; and affirmed
in all other respects. Costs against the appellant.
As can be seen, no legal or factual basis is stated therein for the award of indemnity and damages
to petitioners; worse, the impression is given that the said award is purely a matter of discretion
on the part of the court. Clearly, this is not in accordance with the law. Indeed, it must have been
this failure to refer to the pertinent legal provisions which induced the appellate court, at the mere
invocation by respondent of Art. 2204 of the Civil Code, to commit the error of readily eliminating
61
in the amended decision the items on moral damages and compensation for loss of earning of the
decedent which its original decision had correctly contained. Having held that it had discretion in
Page
the premises, the court easily yielded to the argument that simply because it had credited the
respondent with two mitigating circumstances, it was already justified in eliminating the items of
damages already adverted to, presumably having in mind said Art. 2204 which provides that:
In crimes, the damages to be adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened
according to the aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
Of course, this was clear error, inasmuch as construed literally or otherwise, the quoted provision
does not warrant a complete deletion of said items of damages. In any event the court evidently
failed to take into account that several other provisions can come into play considering the
circumstances in this case.
When the commission of a crime results in death, the civil obligations arising therefrom are
governed by the penal laws, "... subject to the provisions of Art. 2177, and of the pertinent
provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of this Book
(Book IV) regulating damages." (Art. 1161, Civil Code)
Thus, "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civily liable." (Art. 100, Revised Penal
Code). This civil liability, in case the felony involves death, includes indemnification for
consequential damages (Art. 104, id.) and said consequential damages in turn include "... those
suffered by his family or by a third person by reason of the crime." (Art. 107, id.) Since these
provisions are subject, however, as above indicated, to certain provisions of the Civil Code, We
will now turn to said provisions.
The general rule in the Civil Code is that:
In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the
natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not
necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been
foreseen by the defendant. (Art. 2202)
When, however, the crime committed involves death, there is Art. 2206 which provides thus:
The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least
three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In
addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased,
and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every
case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of
permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at
the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of article
291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by law of
testate or intestate succession may demand support from the person causing the death,
for a period not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased
may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the
deceased.
The amount of P3,000 referred to in the above article has already been increased by this Court
first, to P6,000.00 in People v. Amansec, 80 Phil. 426, and lately to P12,000.00 in the case
of People v. Pantoja, G. R. No. L-18793, promulgated October 11, 1968, and it must be stressed
that this amount, as well as the amount of moral damages, may be adjudicated even without
proof of pecuniary loss, the assessment of the moral damages being "left to the discretion of the
court, according to the circumstances of each case." (Art. 2216)
Exemplary damages may also be imposed as a part of this civil liability when the crime has been
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, such damages being "separate and
distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party," (Art. 2230). Exemplary damages
cannot however be recovered as a matter of right; the court will decide whether or not they should
be given. (Art. 2233)
In any event, save as expressly provided in connection with the indemnity for the sole fact of
death (1st par., Art. 2206) and in cases wherein exemplary damages are awarded precisely
because of the attendance of aggravating circumstances, (Art. 2230) "... damages to be
adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened according to the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances," (Art. 2204) but "the party suffering the loss or injury must exercise the diligence
of a good father of a family to minimize the damages resulting from the act or omisson in
question." (Art. 2203) "Interest as a part of the damages, may, in a proper case, be adjudicated
in the discretion of the Court." (Art. 2211) As to attorneys' fees and expenses of litigation, the
same may be recovered only when exemplary damages have been granted (Art. 2208, par. 1) or,
as We have already stated, when there is a separate civil action.
Stated differently, when death occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of the deceased are entitled
to the following items of damages:
1. As indemnity for the death of the victim of the offense — P12,000.00, without the
need of any evidence or proof of damages, and even though there may have been
mitigating circumstances attending the commission of the offense.
2. As indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased — an amount to be fixed
by the Court according to the circumstances of the deceased related to his actual income
at the time of death and his probable life expectancy, the said indemnity to be assessed
and awarded by the court as a matter of duty, unless the deceased had no earning
capacity at said time on account of permanent disability not caused by the accused. If
the deceased was obliged to give support, under Art. 291, Civil Code, the recipient who
is not an heir, may demand support from the accused for not more than five years, the
exact duration to be fixed by the court.
3. As moral damages for mental anguish, — an amount to be fixed by the court. This
may be recovered even by the illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased.
62
4. As exemplary damages, when the crime is attended by one or more aggravating
circumstances, — an amount to be fixed in the discretion of the court, the same to be
Page
considered separate from fines.
 5. As attorney's fees and expresses of litigation, — the actual amount thereof, (but only
when a separate civil action to recover civil liability has been filed or when exemplary
damages are awarded).
6. Interests in the proper cases.
7. It must be emphasized that the indemnities for loss of earning capacity of the
deceased and for moral damages are recoverable separately from and in addition to the
fixed sum of P12,000.00 corresponding to the indemnity for the sole fact of death, and
that these damages may, however, be respectively increased or lessened according to
the mitigating or aggravating circumstances, except items 1 and 4 above, for obvious
reasons.
In the light of the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the Court of Appeals erred in eliminating in
its amended decision, the items of moral damages and compensation for loss of earning capacity
of the deceased. Indeed, as to the award of moral damages in case of death, this Court has
already held in Mercado v. Lira, etc., G. R. Nos. L-13328-29, September 29, 1961, that once the
heirs of the deceased claim moral damages and are able to prove they are entitled thereto, it
becomes the duty of the court to make the award. We held:
Art. 2206 states further that "In addition" to the amount of at least P3,000.00 to be
awarded for the death of a passenger, the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate
descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages as a
consequence of the death of their deceased kin, which simply means that once the
above-mentioned heirs of the deceased claim compensation for moral damages and are
able to prove that they are entitled to such award, it becomes the duty of the court to
award moral damages to the claimant in an amount commensurate with the mental
anguish suffered by them.
This doctrine was reiterated in Maranan v. Perez, G. R. No. L-22272, June 26, 1967:
In connection with the award of damages, the court a quo granted only P3,000 to
plaintiff-appellant. This is the minimum compensatory damages amount recoverable
under Art. 1764 in connection with Art. 2206 of the Civil Code when a breach of contract
results in the passenger's death. As has been the policy followed by this Court, this
minimal award should be increased to P6,000 .... Still, Art. 2206 and 1764 award moral
damages in addition to compensatory damages, to the parents of the passenger killed
to compensate for the mental anguish they suffered. A claim therefor, having been
properly made, it becomes the court's duty to award moral damages. Plaintiff demands
P5,000 as moral damages; however, in the circumstances, We consider P3,000 moral
damages, in addition to the P6,000 damages aforestated, as sufficient. Interest upon
such damages are also due to plaintiff-appellant.
Likewise, in the matter of the compensatory damages for the loss of earning capacity of the
deceased, We also held in the case of Daniel Bulante v. Chu Liante, G.R. Nos. L- 21583 and L-
21591-92, May 20, 1968 that:
The next item objected to refers to the damages awarded to the heirs of the deceased
passengers for loss of earning capacity, separately from the indemnities by reason of
death. The ground for the objection is that loss of earning capacity was not specifically
pleaded or claimed in the complaint. This item, however, may be considered included
in the prayer for "actual damages" and for other "just and equitable reliefs", especially
if taken in the light of Art. 2206, in connection with Art. 1764, of the Civil Code, which
allows, in addition to an indemnity of at least P3,000 by reason of death, recovery for
loss of earning capacity on the part of the deceased, the same to be paid to his heirs
"in every case ... unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not
caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death."
To be sure, these cases of Mercado v. Lira, Maranan v. Perez and Bulante v. Chu Liante from
which We have quoted, were actions based on contracts of common carriers. But the above-
mentioned doctrines are equally applicable to civil liability ex delicto because, after all, Art. 2206
of the Civil Code which was applied in said cases is precisely the provision pertinent to liability
arising from crimes (and quasi-delicts). No doubt, said Article must have been relied upon by the
court in the above cases only because Art. 1764 of the Civil Code provides that said "Art. 2206
shall also apply to the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract of a common carrier."
Accordingly, the interpretation given to said article in those cases are applicable to the case at
bar. In other words, this must be so because under the Civil Code, the same rules on damages
are generally to be observed, whether death results from a crime or a quasi-delict or a breach of
the contract of common carriage.
As to the amount of the indemnity for moral damages and loss of earning capacity of the deceased
in the present case, the original decision of the Court of Appeals awarding them, does not afford
sufficient basis for Us to increase the amounts fixed by said court, as prayed for by appellants. As
has already been stated, the said decision failed to follow the Constitution, not only in not stating
the law on which it is based but also in not making the necessary findings of fact on which it
based its discretion in fixing the respective amounts it awarded for moral and compensatory
damages. Legally, therefore, We can, if We wish to, return this case to that court for it to supply
these constitutional omissions. We opt however, to save time and further difficulties for and
damages to, the petitioners. Extant in the records before Us is the fact that the respondent has
never disputed that petitioners are the widow and seven children of the deceased, three of whom
were still minors at the time of his death, nor that the said deceased was a public school teacher,
56 years old, and earning P2,276.00 a year. These facts appear to have been repeatedly asserted
in the briefs of petitioners in the Court of Appeals and in this Court. No denial was ever made by
the respondent. When respondent moved for the reconsideration of the original decision of the
Court of Appeals, (Annex E of Petition for Certiorari) he only argued that in view of the mitigating
circumstances credited to him by said court, petitioners were not entitled to moral damages and
to indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased; the amounts fixed therefor by said court
— he never questioned. When petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of the amended
decision of the Court of Appeals, these facts (relationship, earnings, etc.) were reiterated. (Annex
G, id.) Respondent did not file any answer to said motion despite the resolution requiring him to
do so. (Par. 12, Petition for Certiorari) Neither has respondent filed any brief in the present
instance, notwithstanding repeated requests on his part for extension to file the same, which,
incidentally, were all granted. Under these circumstances, We feel justified in brushing aside strict
technicalities of procedure in order to accomplish substantial justice more expeditiously. Anyway,
as We said at the outset, petitioners are asking Us, in the prayer of their petition for certiorari, for
nothing more than to affirm "in toto" the original decision of the Court of Appeals, and in their
lone assignment of error in the present instance, their only claim is that "the Court of Appeals
erred when it issued the amended decision eliminating the award of P6,000 moral damages and
the award of P13,380.00 loss of earnings of the deceased Raymundo Castro." In these
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circumstances, even if We should award the amounts of damages just mentioned, inspite of the
absence of the pertinent findings of fact by the Court of Appeals, We would not have to reach
beyond amounts that are undisputed by the respondent.
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We, therefore, overrule the prayer for additional damages in petitioners' brief and We hold that,
on the basis of the facts not questioned by respondent, they are entitled only to the P6,000.00 as
moral damages and the P13,380.00 as compensatory damages for the loss of earning capacity of
the deceased awarded in the original decision of the Court of Appeals in addition, of course, to
the indemnity for death fixed also by said court at P6,000.00. This amount of P6,000.00 We cannot
increase to P12,000.00, as allowed in People v. Pantoja, supra, and the subsequent cases, (People
v. Mongaya G. R. No. L-23708, October 31, 1968, and People v. Ramos, G. R. No. L-19143,
November 29, 1968) because in the instant suit, neither party has appealed in relation thereto.
This case is now before Us on appeal by the offended party only as to specific portions of the civil
indemnity to be paid by the respondent. It would have been different if the whole criminal case
were up for our review because then, even without any appeal on the part of the offended party,
We could have still increased the said liability of the accused, here-in respondent. (See Mercado
v. Lira, supra.)

At this juncture, for the guidance of parties similarly situated as petitioners herein, and so that
there may be no useless expenses in appeals by offended parties in regard to the civil aspect of
a criminal case when no separate civil action has been filed by them, it should be made clear that
when there is no such separate civil action and the claim for civil indemnity is joined with the
criminal case, no record on appeal, whether printed, typewritten or mimeographed, is necessary,
except perhaps when formal pleading raising complicated questions are filed in connection
therewith, and still, this would be purely optional on the appellant because anyway the whole
original record of the case is elevated in appeals in criminal cases. It is already settled that appeals
relating to the civil aspects of a criminal case should follow the procedure for appeal required by
rules of criminal procedure. (People vs. Lorredo, 50 Phil. 209, 220-221; People v. ViIlanueva, G.R.
No. L-18769, May 27, 1966)lawphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, the amended decision of the Court of Appeals is modified as hereinabove indicated,
in so far as the civil liability of respondent is concerned, with costs against him in this instance.

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