Motivated Decision

FI FÄ
To: Mr Osiris Guzmän Date: 9 November 2018
c/o Ruiz-Huer‘ta & Crespo
T0: CONCACAF Total Pages : 40
(incl. this page)

To: Federaciön Dominicana de Fütbol
To: Ms. Maria Claudia Rojas
Re: Decision Ethics E17-00012 DOM ZH
Federation Internationale de Football Association

FIFA, FIFA-Strasse 20, P.O. BOX, CH—8044 Zürich, Switzerland Tel: +41 43/222 7777
Dear Sir,
Please find attached the grounds of the decision passed in the aforementioned case by the
adjudicatory chamber of the FIFA Ethics Committee on 11 October 2018.
Yours faithfully,
FIFA
L. um (L C
Vassilios Skouris/Iup
Chairperson of the adjudicatory chamber
of the FIFA Ethics Committee
FIFÄ
Decision
of the
Adjudicatory Chamber
of the
FIFA Ethics Committee

Mr Vassilios Skouris [GRE], Chairman
Ms Ayotunde Phillips [NGA], Member
Mr Mohammad AIi AI Kamali [UAE], Member
taken at the Home of FIFA in Zurich, Switzerland
on 11 October 2018
in the case of:
Mr Osiris Guzmän [DOM]
(Ethics E17-00012 DOM ZH)

FI FA
Inferred from the file
Mr Osiris Guzman (hereinafter: Mr Guzmän, the accused or the official), a national

of the Dominican Republic, has been the President of the Federaciön Dominicana de
Fütbol (“FEDOFUTBOL”), a member association of FIFA, for more than two decades.
Apart from that, he is a member of the Organising Committee for FIFA
Competitions, a Standing committee of FIFA (art. 24 par. 4 of the FlFA Statutes).
The investigation proceedings against Mr Guzmän were opened on 31 July 2017

and Ied by Ms Maria Claudia Rojas, Chairperson of the lnvestigatory Chamber.
On 1June 2018, the Chairperson of the Investigatory Chamber requested the

Chairman of the Adjudicatory Chamber ("Chairman"), Mr Vassilios Skouris, t0
impose provisional measures on Mr Guzman, in accordance with art‚ 83 et seqq. of
the 2012 FIFA Code of Ethics (“FCE 2012"). By decision of 4 June 2018, the
Chairman provisionally banned Mr Guzmän from all football-related activities for a
period of 90 days.
On 31 August 2018, based on a request from the Chairperson of the Investigatory

Chamber on 30 August 2018, the Chairman extended the provisional ban against
Mr Guzman for an additional period of 45 dayst
Following the submission of the Final Report to the Adjudicatory Chamber, the
investigation proceedings were concluded on 30 August 2018.
With regard to the other exchanges during the investigation proceedings, reference
is made t0 the procedural history in the Final Report.
On 5 September 2018, the Chairman opened adjudicatory proceedings and

requested Mr Guzma’n to provide his position on the Final Report (see art. 68 and
art. 71 of the 2018 FIFA Code of Ethics, “FCE 2018") by no Iater than 18 September
2018. Moreover (due to Mr Guzmän’s earlier request for a hearing), the official was
informed that the hearing would take place at the Home of FIFA in Zurich on 12
October 2018. Finally, in the same letter, the accused was informed about the
composition of the panel, reminding him of artt 35 par. 4 of the FCE.
On 5 September 2018, Mr Guzman’s legal representatives, MrJuan de Dios Crespo

Perez and Mr Enric Ripoll Gonzälez, informed the Chairman that 12 October 2018
was National Day in both Spain and the Dominican Republic. Therefore, they
requested to reschedule the hearing. In addition, the legal representatives requested
that the Chairman grant an extension of the deadline to provide the position of at
least ten days.
On 6 September 2018, the Chairman informed Mr Guzmän that the reason

presented was not sufficient to shift the proposed date. However, the Chairman
offered an alternative date and time for the hearing (11 October 2018 at 16:00) and
requested the official to confirm his availability for either option by 7 September
2018. Finally, the Chairman also confirmed his decision to extend, exceptionally, the
deadline to submit the position unti125 September 2018.
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10, On 6 September 2018, Mr Guzman’s legal representatives informed the Chairman
that they had noticed that enclosure 16 (that should be the interview with Ms
Rodriguez) was the same as enclosure 98 (interview with Mr Rodriguez) and,
therefore, requested the Chairman to provide a complete copy of the interview with
Ms Rodriguez. On 13 September 2018, after liaising with the Investigatory Chamber
in this respect, the Chairman provided the official with the requested document.
11. On 10 September 2018, Mr Guzman asked the Chairman to hold the hearing on 11
October 2018, at 16:00, which was confirmed by the Chairman on 11 September
2018. On 13 September 2018, the official informed the Chairman that for the
hearing, he would be assisted by Mr Enric Ripoll.
12. On 25 September 2018, MrGuzman submitted his position to the Adjudicatory

Chamber. Therein, Mr Guzman requested the Adjudicatory Chamber to entirely
reject the charges mentioned in the Final Report, concluding that Mr Guzman had
not breached any provisions of the FCE. The individual submissions of Mr Guzman
in this respect will be dealt with in the context of the legal considerations (section II.
below).
13. On 28 September 2018, the Chairman provided Mr Guzman with the procedural
outline of the hearing.
14. On 11 October 2018, Mr Guzman asked whether his daughter could be present
during the hearing, although not participating. This request was subsequently
approved by the Chairman.
15. On the same day, the hearing before the Adjudicatory Chamber was held at the
Home of FlFA in Zurich. MrGuzmän attended the hearing in person and was
accompanied by legal counsel and his daughter. During the hearing, Mr Guzman
and his counsel made submissions on individual details of the case, but did not
produce additional evidence. Furthermore, Mr Guzman was asked questions by the
panel
and considered
Applicability of the FCE ratione materiae (art. 1 of the FCE)
The Adjudicatory Chamber notes that, according to the Investigatory Chamber's

Final Report, there were several indications of potential improper conduct in terms
of the FCE by Mr Guzman, which include possible violations of at least arts 14, 15,
18, 19, 20, 24 and 27 of the FCE. Therefore, the factual circumstances raise, without
any doubt, questions of potential misconduct in terms of the FCE. Consequently,
the FCE is applicable to the case according to art. 1 of the FCE (ratione materiae).
Applicability of the FCE ratione personae (art. 2 of the FCE)
Pursuant to art. 2 of the FCE, the Code shall apply, inter al/a, to officials. According
to the pertinent definition in the FCE, an official is “any board member (including
the members of the Council), committee member, referee, assistant referee, coach,
trainer or any other person responsible for technical, medical or administrative
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matters in FIFA, a confederation, a member association, a ieague or a Club as well
as all other persons obliged t0 comply with the FIFA Statutes (except players and
intermediaries)” (n0. 2 of the Definitions section in the FCE).
By virtue of his positions as the President of FEDOFUTBOL and a member of the

Organising Committee for FIFA Competitions (cfi par. I.1 above), iVIr Guzmän is an
official Within the meaning of the definition given in no. 2 of the Definitions section
in the FCE,
As a consequence, at the time the relevant actions and events occurred, the FCE
appiied (and continues to apply) to the accused (art 2 of the FCE).
Applicability of the FCE ratione temporis (art. 3 of the FCE)
The events which Ied to the investigation proceedings and, eventually, to the present
adjudicatory proceedings against the official, occurred from 2013 onwards and thus
before the current edition of the FCE entered into force (i.e. 12 August 2018; see
art. 88 par. 2 of the FCE). Hence, with regard to the materiai provisions, the previous
edition of the FCE (2012 version) applies.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Adjudicatory Chamber highlights that the

applicable material provisions of the FCE 2012 are duiy reflected in the current
edition of the FCE (2018 version), In this sense, the core part of the FCE 2012
provisions are duiy covered by similar provisions of the FCE 2018. This appiies for
the provision regarding bribery (cf. art. 27 of the FCE 2018 and art. 21 of the FCE
2012) as weil as the duty of neutrality (cf. art. 14 for both FCE 2018 and FCE 2012),
duty of oalty (cf. art. 15 for both FCE 2018 and FCE 2012), the duty t0 cooperate
(cf. arti 18 for both FCE 2018 and FCE 2012), conflicts of interest (cf. art. 19 for
both FCE 2018 and FCE 2012), offering and accepting gifts or other benefits (cf. art.
20 for both FCE 2018 and FCE 2012), and forgery and falsification (art. 24 of the
FCE 2018 and art. 17 of the FCE 2012).
Since the core part of the 2012 and 2018 FCE articles (applicable in the present case)
is identical as detailed in the previous paragraph, for the sake of ciarity, the
Adjudicatory Chamber will make reference to the 2018 version of the FCE.
Jurisdiction of the FIFA Ethics Committee

Pursuant to art. 30 par‘ 1 ot the FCE, the Ethics Committee has the exclusive
competence t0 investigate and judge the conduct of all persons bound by the FCE
where such conduct (i) has been committed by an individual who was elected,
appointed or assigned by FIFA to exercise a function; (ii) directiy concerns their FIFA—
related duties or responsibilities; or (iii) is reiated to the use of FIFA funds.
With regard to the present case, the Adjudicatory Chamber notes that that the
relevant conduct has been committed by an official who is the President of
FEDOFUTBOL and a member of a Standing committee of FIFA (cf. pari I.1 above) and
includes dealings with tickets for the 2014 and 2018 FIFA World CupsTM on behalf
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of FEDOFUTBOL and in his capacity as a FIFA Standing committee member.
Consequently, the Ethics Committee is entitled to judge his conduct in the present
case according to art. 30 par. 1 of the FCE.
10. Inthe Iight of the foregoing, the Ethics Committee has jurisdiction to investigate
and to adjudicate the present case.
Assessment of potential infringements of the FCE committed by

Mr Guzmän
Possible violation of art. 27 of the FCE (Briberv)
The relevant facts
11. In relation to the allegation of briben/ against Mr Guzma’n, the Adjudicatory

Chamber considers the following facts to be established to its comfortable
satisfaction:
[Final Report, pp. 13 etseqq.‚ 37 et seqq.]
2074 F/FA World CupT'V' tickets

12. For the 2014 FIFA World CupTM in Brazil, Mr Guzmän ordered 385 tickets in total
(76 on his own behalf, as a FIFA Standing committee member, and 309 using the
ticket allocation of FEDOFUTBOL) for an amount of USD 85,945, which he paid to
FIFA. The purchase of these tickets was formalised by means of a contract with FIFA
Ticketing (a FIFA subsidiary), which was signed by Mr Guzmän and Mr Felix Ledesma
(a former FEDOFUTBOL Executive Committee member) By signing the contract on
behalf of FEDOFUTBOL and as a FIFA standing committee member, Mr Guzmän
accepted FIFA’s Standard terms and conditions governing the purchase of tickets for
the 2014 FIFA World CupTM. The FEDOFUTBOL Executive Committee was not aware
of said ticket purchases.
[Final Report, pp. 13 etseqq. and encl. 17—27 and 29—31]
13. The applicable FIFA standard terms and conditions — i.e‚ the Ticket Allocation
Agreement between FEDOFUTBOL and FIFA Ticketing AG (Section 3 and clauses
2.2.1 par. 2, 2.711 and 2.7.4 of Exhibit B), the Ticket Sales Regulations (clauses 1611
and 16.2 as well as Exhibit B) and the General Terms and Conditions (clauses 1 and
4.1) — strictly forbid the resale of tickets, and even more so for prices above their
face value. In particular, clause 2.2.1 par. 2 of Exhibit B of the Ticket Allocation
Agreement states: “The NPMA may provide its NPMA Tickets to its Guests [for their
personal, non-commercial use, see clause 2.7.1] on a comp/imentary basis or may
seek reimbursement for the provision of NPMA Tickets to it‘s Guests. In case the
NPMA seeks reimbursement from its Guests, the NPMA may soIe/y request that its
G uests provide reimbursement of the price printed on the face of the Ticket. ”
[Final Report, pp. 13 etseqq.]
14. From March to June 2014, the company KSE Sports purchased from Mr Guzma’n a
package of tickets for the 2014 FIFA World CupTM, for which it made up to a total
of eight deposits into the bank account of Mr Guzmän in the total amount of
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USD 164,538. KSE Sports is a Canadian company involved in the organisation of
tourist packages to attend major Sporting events, namely the FlFA World CupT'V'. Mr
Vlasic is a director of said company.
[Final Report, pp. 15 etseqq. and encl. 9, 28, 32 and 96]
15. Overall, Mr Guzmän received deposits totalling USD 193,473 from the resale of
tickets to third parties.
[Final Report, pp. 15 erseqq. and encl. 28]
2078 FIFA World Cup tickets

16. Mr Guzman also ordered, purchased and paid for 220 tickets in total for the 2018
FIFA World Cup RussiaTM (28 on his own behalf, as a FlFA Standing committee
member, and 192 using the ticket allocation of FEDOFUTBOL) for an amount of USD
72,965. The purchase of these tickets was formalised by means of a contract with
FIFA Ticketing, which was signed by Mr Guzman and Mr Rolando Miranda (General
Secretary of FEDOFUTBOL). By signing the contract on behalf of FEDOFUTBOL and
as a FIFA standing committee member, Mr Guzmän accepted FlFA’s terms and
conditions applicable to the purchase of tickets for the 2018 FlFA World CupTM.
[Final Report, pp. 16 etseqq. and encl. 35—47, 55]
17. Under the Ticket Allocation Agreement between FEDOFUTBOL and FIFA Ticketing
AG, it was strictly forbidden to resell tickets. In particular, clause 2.2.1 par. 2 of
Exhibit B of the Ticket Allocation Agreement states: “The NPIVIA may provide its
NPMA Tickets to its Guests [for their personal, non-commercial use, see clause 2.7.1]
on a comp/imentary basis or may seek reimbursement for the provision of NPMA
Tickets to its Guests. In case the NPMA seeks reimbursement from its Guests, the
NPIl/IA may so/e/y request that its Guests provide reimbursement of the price printed
on the face of the Ticket. ”
[Final Report, pp. 17 etseqq. and encl. 42]
18. Overall, Mr Guzman received deposits totalling USD 70,680 from the resale of
tickets to third parties. In addition, FEDOFUTBOL received a total amount of USD
73,975 for the sale of tickets to third parties.
Summa/y of the findings of the Investigatory Chamber [Final Report, pp. 13 et seqq]
2074 FIFA World CupT'V' tickets
19. By requesting tickets from behalf of FEDOFUTBOL and by making them

FIFA on
available to third parties which he did not know, the Investigatory Chamber
concludes that Mr Guzman breached FIFA regulations on the resale ot tickets.
20. The lnvestigatory Chamber establishes that nobody within the association was
aware of the company KSE Sports.
21. The total amount paid by Mr Guzmän to purchase 2014 FlFA World CupT'V' tickets
was USD 85,945, whilst he received deposits of at least USD 193,473, i.e. more than
double the face value of the tickets. Thus, the lnvestigatory Chamber concludes that
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Mr Guzman received an illegitimate gain of at least USD 107,528 from the resale of
tickets for the 2014 FIFA World CupT'V'.

22. The Investigatory Chamber establishes that 192 tickets purchased on behalf of
FEDOFUTBOL were bought and paid for by Mr Guzmän without the prior approval
of the FEDOFUTBOL Executive Committee.
23. The Investigatory Chamber detected the following inconsistencies in respect of the
invoices that were issued by Mr Guzmän and FEDOFUTBOL for the sale of tickets to
the 2018 FIFA World CupT'V' in Russia (i) invoices issued after the payments were
made; (ii) various invoices with the same invoice number; (iii) the majority of invoices
are unsigned; (iv) Mr Guzma’n's inability to present any written exchanges with the
supposed buyers and to explain how these invoices were sent to them; (v) the
invoices of Mr James Miller and Mr Raml’rez-Gastön are identical. In view of the
foregoing, the lnvestigatory Chamber questions the authenticity of these invoices.
24. In addition, the lnvestigatory Chamber also detected the following lnconsistencies
in respect of the receipts that were issued by FEDOFUTBOL for the sale of tickets for
the 2018 FlFA World CupT'V' in Russla: (i) in the month of March, FEDOFUTBOL issued
a receipt confirming payment for the tickets, while in fact, at that time, FEDOFUTBOL
had not yet approved the purchase of tickets for the FIFA World CupTM; (li) at the
end of April 2018, the FEDOFUTBOL Executive Committee authorised Mr Guzma’n
to manage and purchase the tickets, whereas it appears that in March 2018,
FEDOFUTBOL had already charged for some of the tickets and issued the respective
receipts; (iii) in June 2018, FEDOFUTBOL issued an invoice for USD 9,865 to Mr
Apolinar, when he had apparently already paid the association USD 12,705 for the
tickets in March (a difference of USD 2,840); (iv) in June 2018, FEDOFUTBOL issued
an invoice for USD 22,450 to Mr Rodriguez, when he had apparently already paid
the amount in April; (v) Mr Guzman's bank account registered various deposits for
tickets by various individuals who do not appear on the invoices or on the receipts;
(vi) FEDOFUTBOL received deposits totalling USD 61 ‚865 for the tickets for the FlFA
World CupTM whereas according to Mr Guzmän’s testimony, the association did not
have a bank account for this; (vii) accordlng to Mr Guzman, the handover of USD
12,975 was made on 15 May 2018 by Mr Raml’rez—Gastön (President of a Canadian
football club). However, in fact (i.e. accordlng to bank documents), the payment
seems t0 have been made by a Dubai tlcket resale company called Mirra
Management DMC.
25. In addition, the lnvestigatory Chamber found that Mirra Management DMC is a
company which, according to its website, engaged in the commercial sale of tickets
for the 2018 FlFA World CupTM in Russia. Accordingly, it appears that Mirra
Management DMC sold its tickets at a price that was higher than the price set by
FlFA.
26. The lnvestigatory Chamber concludes that since FEDOFUTBOL was hardly involved
in the purchase of the tickets, the purchase should de facto be attributed to
Mr Guzma’n (in his personal capacity) instead of FEDOFUTBOL. In addition, the
lnvestigatory Chamber establishes that there is at least a duplication of the payment
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of USD 12,975, one of which was made by a professional ticket reseller (Mirra
Management DMC), which appears to have been offering packages for the 2018
FIFA World Cup RussiaTM.
Summa/y of the posit/on of Mr Guzman [Defence Statement, pp. 10 et seqq. and

encl. 3-5]
2074 FIFA Wor/d CupT'V' tickets
27. Mr Guzmän cIaims that FEDOFUTBOL never had an account into which the funds
for the tickets could be paid, or from which they could advance the purchase price
for the tickets on behalf of those who requested them. In addition, Mr Guzmän
further explained that Mr VIasic, whom he became friends with and who was an
active collaborator of footbaII in the region, had asked him to arrange tickets for the
company KSE Sports. Mr Guzmän arranged the tickets and “this company paid the
price of the tickets and decided to also provide additional amounts in order t0
contribute with a Federarion that he/peo’ it to have tickets for the Brazi/ Wor/d Cup”.
In this regard, Mr Guzmän mentioned that he “implemented such funds t0 he/p
different parts of the country in the deve/opment of footba/l” and enclosed the
relevant payments made by Mr Guzmän (in the total amount of USD 87,000) with
the funds transferred by Mr Vlasic.
2078 FIFA WOr/d CupTM tickets
28. Mr Guzman maintains that all the tickets bought by FEDOFUTBOL were delivered to
their addressees ”without charging a sing/e penny” on top of the purchase price. In
respect to the FEDOFUTBOL Executive Committee, Mr Guzman cIaims that said
committee had not commissioned him to take care of the tickets before he started
to do so, which — according to Mr Guzman — was due to the apparent difficulties t0
convene a meeting and the time pressure to arrange the payment before the expiry
of the deadlines established by FIFA.
29. Regarding the payment received from the company named "Mirra Management
DMC", Mr Guzman states that on 8 June 2018, the respectivetransferwas cancelled
and the money was sent back. Mr Guzman further explains that Mr Miller, through
Mr Juan Carlos Ramirez, had paid USD 14,100 in cash at the FEDOFUTBOL premises
and for that reason, the transfer of "Mirra Management DMC” was cancelled
because there was no Ionger any reason to receive such payment,
30. Mr Guzman cIaims that there was no invoicing, "at least in the lega/sense”, as the
documents provided were only used for the scope of having some sort of internaI
control regarding who received and paid for the tickets that Mr Guzmän paid for.
Furthermore, Mr Guzman states that the amounts paid in respect of the tickets did
not come through FEDOFUTBOL, although the payments were conducted in the
association and the receipts were drafted on the association paper. As to the
coincidences between the different invoices, the numbers are completely irrelevant
since they were not official invoices.
31. Regarding the inconsistencies pointed out by the Investigatory Chamber, Mr

Guzmän submits that there are several that make no sense since (i) FEDOFUTBOL
never received any money because it had no account for the purchase of tickets; (ii)
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FEDOFUTBOL received the money In cash at their offices and the money was
immediately handed to Mr Guzmän as it was the easiest way for Mr Guzman to be
reimbursed.
32, In respect of the payments received, Mr Guzma’n states that he received USD 70,730
(and not USD 87,100 as stated by the Investigatory Chamber). As to the payment
made by Mr Apolinar of 24 March 2018, Mr Guzman claIms that after the payment
was made, some of the tickets were not approved and therefore the number of
tickets was reduced and the difference was reimbursed.
Assessment by the Adjudicatory chamber
33. With regard t0 the structure of art. 27 of the FCE, the Adjudicatory Chamber notes
that the actual offence of bribery is Iaid down in the opening sentence of art. 27
par. 1 of the FCE, both with regard to the offerer ("offer, promise, give") and the
offeree ("accept, receive, request or solicit”). The second sentence specifies the
persons who may be involved in the act of bribery. The third sentence is a further
specification of the first sentence in view of art. 322ter and art. 322qualer of the Swiss
Criminal Code to which there are several analogies.
Persons invo/ved
34. Mr Guzmän was at the relevant time, and still is today, an official bound by the FCE
(cf. par. II.3 above). In turn, his counterparts — Mr Vlasic through KSE Sports, and
the company Mirra Management — are persons outside FlFA. Accordingly, these two
elements are met in the present case.
Personal or undue pecunian/ or other advantage
35. Secondly, a ”personal or undue pecuniary or other advantage” must be at stake.
aa. Pecunian/ or other advantage
36. With regard to the 2014 FlFA World CupT'V' tickets, there are payments to Mr
Guzmän in the total amount of USD 193,473, while the purchase price paid by Mr
Guzma’n was a total of USD 85,945. Mr Guzman’s profit thus amounts to USD
107,528 and constitutes, without any doubt, a pecuniary advantage pursuant to
art. 27 par. of the FCE.
1
37. As to the 2018 FlFA World CupTM tickets, Mr Guzma’n received a transfer in the
amount of USD 12,975 on 15 May 2018 from a Dubai company called Mirra
Management. The Adjudicatory Chamber, however, notes that said transfer was
transferred back from Mr Guzman to the company on 8 June 2018. The
Adjudicatory Chamber notes that there are several inconsistencies in the
documentation submitted by Mr Guzmän In relation to the sale of tickets for the
2018 FlFA World CupT'V'; thus, to a certain extent, the Adjudicatory Chamber
remains in doubt regarding the facts that really occurred and the motives behind
them. Reference shall also be made to the timing of the transfer from Mr Guzma’n
to the company, which took place shortly after the provisional suspension of Mr
Guzmän (and more than three weeks after receiving the deposit). In this regard,
while the information available to the lnvestigatory Chamber is not sufficient to
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establish an attempt by Mr Guzmän to engage in a profitable resale, the
Adjudlcatory Chamber would still Iike to note that it is not convinced about the facts
and thus remains in doubt.
38A Notwithstanding the foregoing, based on the available information and

documentation, the Adjudicatory Chamber cannot establish, to its comfortable
satisfaction, that Mr Guzma’n indeed received an undue advantage from the resale
of 2018 FlFA World CupT'V' tickets. For that reason, no other requirements provided
in art. 27 of the FCE will be further analysed with regard to this matter.
bb. Personal or undue advantage
39. As outlined above, Mr Guzmän made a profit from the sale of 2014 FIFA World
CupTM tickets (i.e. 309 FEDOFUTBOL tickets and 76 tickets bought in his personal
capacity). As outlined above, the relevant payments (USD 193,473) were made into
the (personal) bank account of Mr Guzma’n via the following transactions: eight
deposits from KSE Sports in the total amount of USD 164,538; a bank transfer from
the company Cementos Andinos in the amount of USD 2,120; and two cash
deposits in the total amount of USD 26,815.
40. The Adjudicatory Chamber is not comfortably satisfied with Mr Guzma’n’s

explanations that he “implemented such funds to he/p different pan‘s of the countly
in the development of football” for the follovving reasons:
41. Firstly, if those funds were to be used in football development projects in the
Dominican Republic, the competent FEDOFUTBOL bodies, i.e‚ the FEDOFUTBOL
Congress and Executive Committee, would have been involved (or at least informed
about and consulted) in the decision—making process regarding the use of these
funds. There were significant amounts (USD 164,538) involved, which would
normally have had a major impact in developing football in the region. What is more,
a considerable part of the profit emerged from the sale of tickets that were ordered
on behalf of FEDOFUTBOL, so it would be unlikely that the association did not get
properly involved either before or after the resale of tickets. The Adjudicatory
Chamber finds that if, in fact, there were development projects to be executed, it
would be very unlikely that Mr Guzman would be authorised to proceed on his own.
42. The FEDOFUTBOL Executive Committee (and none of its members) was not involved
in the purchase and sale of 2014 FlFA World CupTM tickets. Moreover, they were
not aware of the company KSE Sports or the assertion that this company had ever
been involved in football development in the Dominican Republic, as repeatedly
alleged by Mr Guzma’n. Mr Guzman submitted receipts signed by persons who had
allegedly received funds in connection with a purported project funded by KSE
Sports (in this regard, see considerations below) The Adjudicatory Chamber notes,
however, that no information was submitted by Mr Guzmän in relation to other
projects allegedly funded by KSE Sports (eg. content and objectives of such project,
persons involved in FEDOFUTBOL, payment methods, outcome of the project). In
addition, if indeed all of these funds had been used for development projects, this
would be reflected in Mr Guzmän's bank account (e.g. cash withdrawals, cheques,
bank transfers), which is not the case. This underlines that there are strong reasons
to believe that these funds were not used (and were never intended to be used) for
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football development and that, rather, it was Mr Guzmän who retained the above-
mentioned profit.
43. Secondly, there is no plausible explanation as to why a Canadian company, whose

main field of activity i5 the organisation of tourist packages to attend major sporting
events, would decide to fund football development projects in the Dominican
Republic. If that were the case, the KSE Sports funds would Iikely have been
transferred directly into the bank account of FEDOFUTBOL, the governing body of
football in the Dominican Republic (and not Mr Guzman’s bank account). Moreover,
in view of the substantial amounts, it would Iook unusual to make such an
investment without the usual contractual arrangements setting the objectives,
agreeing on the amounts, the payment method, etc.
44. Thirdly, Mr Guzman signed two Ticket Allocation Agreements with FIFA (on behalf
of FEDOFUTBOL and in his personal capacity), which forbid the re-sale of tickets e
particularly for prices above face value. The Adjudicatory Chamber notes that it was
Mr Guzma’n alone who decided to receive substantial amounts on top of the face
value, which is per se (even in the unlikely case that the funds were to be used for
football development) a breach of the FIFA ticketing regulations, which were an
integral part of the Ticket Allocation Agreements with FIFA.
45. Finaliy, the Adjudicatory Chamber emphasises that during the investigation
proceedings, Mr Guzma’n expressly admitted (even in writing) that the tickets had
been sold to KSE Sports, However, during his interview in May 2018, Mr Guzman
not only denied having been aware of any sale of tickets to KSE Sports, but he even
denied having had direct contact with that company (which, as mentioned above,
had previously transferred USD 164,538 into his personal bank account). The
Adjudicatory Chamber notes that the behaviour of Mr Guzmän was thus at times
contradictory, which Iowers the credibility of his explanations.
46. ln view of all of the above, the Adjudicatory Chamber is not convinced by Mr
Guzmän’s explanations; accordingly, it considers that the funds transferred by KSE
Sports were not used (and were never intended to be used) to implement
development projects in the Dominican Republic. The Adjudicatory Chamber is
therefore convinced, to its comfortable satisfaction, that the funds paid by KSE
Sports (i.e. Mr Guzmän’s profits generated therefrom) constituted a personal
pecuniary advantage for Mr Guzman.
47. On the other hand, based on the available information, the Adjudicatory Chamber
is not comfortably satisfied that Mr Guzmän used the profits from the two other
transactions (overall USD 28,935; see par. 39 mentioned above) for his own personal
benefit.
48. ln conclusion, the Adjudicatory Chamber finds that Mr Guzmän received a personal
benefit of USD 78,593 from the sale of tickets for the 2014 FIFA World CupTM.
49. Not every kind of benefit, however, falls under the scope of art. 27 par. of the
1
FCE. The advantage must be “undue” in the Iight of the provisions of FIFA
regulations or universally accepted legal principles. In particular, an advantage is to
be considered undue if it has no proper legal basis. As far as the term ”personal
10
FIFÄ
advantage” is concerned, the Adjudicatow Chamber hoids that it is covered by the
term “undue advantage”, leading to a distinction becoming obsolete.
50. In the present case, Mr Guzman was not e either by Iaw or by a contract — entitled
to gain a profit from the sale of tickets and even Iess to keep the profit for himself.
51. Moreover, the profit arose from violations of FIFA’s ticketing regulations, which
prohibit, inter alia, any resale on top of face value.
52. Accordingly, Mr Guzmän’s benefit of USD 78,593 was undue within the meaning
of art. 27 par. of the FCE.
1
Accepting, giving, offering, promis/ng, receiving, requesting or soliciting an

advantage
53. The undue pecuniary or other advantage, pursuant to arte 27 par. 1 of the FCE,
must, in order to constitute a violation of the same provision, be accepted, given,
offered, promised, received, requested or solicited by the persons in question.
54, In the case at hand, Mr Guzma’n directly received a benefit of USD 78,593 from the
saie of tickets in his personal bank account. Thereby, he accepted the relevant
benefit within the meaning of art. 27 par of the FCE.
1
Ratio of equiva/ence
55‘ The core element of art. 27 par. 1 of the FCE is the estabiishment of a ”quid pro
quo” (ratio of equivalence) between the undue advantage and a specific action by
the official obtaining it.
aa. Act that I's re/ated to official act/vities

56. Acts of bribery require that they aim at an act Which is related to the official activities
of the offeree or recipient (MARK PiETH, op. cit.‚ N 37 on art. 322W)
57. The act of Mr Guzman in question relates to dealings with tickets for the 2014 FIFA
World CupT'V'. This particularly includes his ticket requests as well as the signing of
ticketing contracts with FIFA. He did so as a FEDOFUTBOL official and a FIFA Standing
committee member, which quite evidently ShOWS that he acted in his official
capacity‚
bb. Act contrary t0 duties or fal/ing within discretion

58, The targeted official act must, then, be either contrary to the duties of the official
or, despite not being contrary to his duties, be based on illegitimate motives or
flawed conduct on his part (ANDREAS DONATSCH ET AL„ op. cit.‚ N 15 on art. 322m;
MARK PlETH, op. cit.‚ N 45 on art. 322W).
59. Seiling tickets for the 2014 FIFA World CupT'V' without the authorisation of FIFA, and
even more so for prices double their face value, is manifestly contrary to FIFA’s
ticketing regulations, in particular, clause 2.2t1 par. 2 of Exhibit B of the Ticket
Allocation Agreement that states: ” The NPMA may provide its NPMA Tickets to its
Guests [for their personal, non-commercia/ use, see c/ause 2.7.1] on a
comp/imentary basis or may seek reimbursement for the provision of NPMA Tickets
11
FIFÄ
to its Guests. In case the NPMA seeks reimbursement from its Guests, the NPMA
may sole/y request that its Guests provide reimbursement of the price printed on the
face of the Ticket. " Accordingly, Mr Guzmän’s conduct was contrary to his duties.
CC. lncitement of the execution or omission of the act

60. The undue advantage pursuant to art. 27 par. 1 of the FCE must, then, specifically
be given in exchange for the execution or omission of the act (qu/o’ pro quo). Since
it is, in many cases, difficult or even impossible to establish a correlation between a
payment and a particular act of an official, the Swiss Federal Court and legal doctrine
refer t0 objedive indicators in such contexts. Of particular relevance are, for
instance, the amount of the payment, the timing of the payment and the act of the
official, as weII as the occurrence and frequency of contacts between the parties
involved (MARK PIETH, op. cit.‚ N 47 on art. 322m).
61. In this respect, the Adjudicatory Chamber further recalls that CAS has held that
"corruption i5, by nature, concealed, as the parties invo/ved Will seek to use evasive
means to ensure that they leave no trai/ of their wrongdoing" (CAS 201 4/A/3 537,
par. 82; CAS 2010/A/2172, par. 21). On the other hand, it must be pointed out that
according to the pertinent definition of CAS, a violation must be established t0 the
comfortable satisfaction of the Adjudicatory Chamber ”bearing in mind the
seriousness ofthe allegation“. Without any doubt, the allegation of bribery is among
the most serious ones under FlFA’s rules and regulations and the FCE; as a
consequence, even if the act of bribery does not have to be proven beyond
reasonable doubt, it shall also not be considered as established with Ievity.
62. Mr Guzmän accepted an undue advantage for ordering tickets and reselling them
to KSE Sports. The Adjudicatory Chamber believes that Mr Guzma’n would not have
engaged in all of these arrangements if he were not positive about receiving a profit.
Accordingly, the Adjudicatory Chamber is comfortably satisfied that Mr Guzman
received the benefit in question as a return — quid pro quo — and, hence, as an
incitement for the execution of an official act within the meaning of art. 27 par. 1
of the FCE. This finding is supported by the objective indicators as specified above:
the conduct of Mr Guzman was motivated by the prospect of receiving a substantive
amount (USD 78,593); the payment and the official act were in close timely
connection (March to June 2014); and the fact that Mr Guzman tried to disguise the
payment suggests that he also wanted to hide the profits.
dd. Intention to obtain or retain business or any other improper advantage
63. Finally, art. 27 par. 1 of the
states that the undue advantage must be given “in
FCE
order to obtain or retain business or any other improper advantage". This
requirement is to be sub-divided into several different elements, the first one being
the business and/or advantage sought.
64. With regard t0 the term “advantage”, the Adjudicatory Chamber points out that it
must be interpreted in a broad sense, i.e. any kind of betterment or advancement
of economic, legal or personal, material or non-material nature (cf. par. Il.35 above).
65. Inthe present case, the advantage lies in Mr Guzmän selling to Mr Vlasic and his
company KSE Sports for fur‘ther selling tickets for the 2014 FIFA World CupTM and
12
FIFÄ
generating a profit therefrom, in other words to conduct business This constitutes
both a business and a personal betterment and thus an ”advantage”.
66, Furthermore, the advantage sought must be ”improper’l Since Mr Guzmän was, as
per the applicable FIFA ticketing regulations, not allowed to resell in bulk the
purchased tickets for the 2014 FIFA World CupTM‚ let alone to generate a profit
therefrom, it follows that the advantage sought was improper.
67, From the expression “in order to obtain or retain business or any other improper
advantage" results, as a last requirement, that there has t0 be a connection between
the business/advantage concerned and the process of accepting, giving, offering,
promising, receiving, requesting, or soliciting a pecuniary or other advantage. In this
respect, the Adjudicatory Chamber recalls that Mr Guzman received the benefit in
question for his ordering of tickets from FIFA and handing them to KSE Sports (quid
pro quo). Consequently, there is a clear connection between the business
opportunity and the personal betterment on one hand, and the pecuniaw (improper)
advantage for Mr Guzman on the otherr
Conc/usion
68. Inthe Iight of the foregoing, the Adjudicatory Chamber considers that by receiving
a profit of USD 78,593 from the sale of tickets for the 2014 FIFA World Cup,
Mr Guzmän has breached art. 27 par. I of the FCEA
Possible violation of art. 20 of the FCE (Offerinq and acceptinq qifts or other
benefitsl
The relevant facts
69, In relation to the allegation of offering and accepting gifts or other benefits against
Mr Guzma’n, the Adjudicatory Chamber considers the following facts to be
established t0 its comfortable satisfaction:
[Final Report, pp. 21 etseqq., 39 et seqq.]
CONCACAF development programme ("Programme")
70. The Programme was allegedly developed and implemented personally by Mr

Guzmän through his company "Sport Marketing & Consulting“ in 2014.
Apparently, this was a private project without any relationship to FEDOFUTBOL.
[Final Report, ppr 23 erseqqr and encl. 12]
71. The objective of the purported Programme was to develop grassroots and youth
football in less developed countries, providing support to coaches, along with
teaching methodology approved by FIFA and CONCACAF. In this sense, the
objective of this Programme was vew similar to others that had already been
implemented in the Dominican Republic, in particular the FEDOFUTBOL national
tournaments for grassroots football, organised by each of the 32 provincial
associations of FEDOFUTBOL.
[Final Report, pp. 24 etseqq.]
I3
FIFÄ
72. Following a sketchy description of the purported project, the then President of
CONCACAF, Mr Jeffrey Webb, decided in 2013 t0 assign funds t0 Mr Guzmän
without executing a bidding process or consulting with the competent bodies of the
confederation. The contract governing the implementation of this Programme was
concluded verbally, without a written contract establlshing the terms and conditions,
obligations and consideration for each of the parties. Due to the lack of content and
necessity, the then Director of Development of CONCACAF (i.e. Mr Salcedo) advised
Mr Webb not to engage in this development project programme, and also pointed
to two factors that were highly unusual in this case: the fact that CONCACAF would
pay funds into the personal bank account of the president of a member association,
as well a5 the fact that the purported project was implemented between Mr Webb
and Mr Guzmän directly and in a secretive manner.
73. In connection with this Programme, CONCACAF transferred a total amount of USD
87,000 into the personal bank account of Mr Guzmän in the following three
payments: (i) USD 15,000 on 10 December 2013; (ii) USD 36,000 on 18 November
2014; and finally, (iii) USD 36,000 on 5 December 2014. This amount was allegedly
distributed as follows: (i) Mr Ledesma received a total of USD 24,000, (ii) Mr Severino
received USD 15,000, (iii) Mr Möjica USD 6,000; (iv) Mr Castillo USD 12,000; (v) Mr
Rodriguez USD 8,000; (vi) Mr Ventura USD 8,000; (vii) Mr Saldana USD 8,000; (viii)
Mr Sänchez USD 3,000; and (ix) Ms Japa USD 3,000. Finally, it appears that Mr
Guzman received USD 15,000 for the “marketing, development and
implementation“ of the Programme.
[Final Report, pp. 23 etseqq. and encl. 63-73]
74. The payment of USD 87,000 made by CONCACAF to Mr Guzmän, as well as the
negotiation, approval, implementation and existence of the alleged Programme
does not appear in any books, reports or minutes of either FEDOFUTBOL or FIFA.
[Final Report, pp. 27 erseqq. and encl. 12]
75. ln Februaw and March 2014, Mr Guzmän and the then Director of Development of
CONCACAF had meetings to discuss the Programme. During these meetings, the
then Director of Development informed Mr Guzmän that he disagreed with the
current setup of the Programme, and that he did not approve the initiation of the
works.
76. ln respect of the work reports, only two reports (June-July-August and September-
October) were provided by Mr Guzmän to CONCACAF. The report of January-May
in respect of the Programme is missing.
77, Mr Rodriguez and Mr Severino, allegedly the technical supervisor for the Programme
and a FEDOFUTBOL Executive Committee member respectively, both firmly denied
that the signatures on the payment vouchers submitted by Mr Guzman were
authentically theirs. Moreover, Mr Severino denied having received the amount of
USD 15,000 indicated on the payment voucher (see paragraph 73) and added that
l4
FIFÄ
infact, he had not received any money at all. Furthermore, as per the Statements of
Mr Severino during the interview, it seems clear that he never engaged in the
"design" of the Programme (as indicated on the payment voucher submitted by Mr
Guzmän).
[Final Report, pp. 28 etseqq. and encl. 63-73, 97—98]
78. On 17 June 2018, Mr Severino submitted a Statement in Which he essentially

affirmed in the presence of an attorney/notary public of the Dominican Republic that
he had signed "a document veriß/ing the rece/pt of USD 75,000” for all amounts
received from Mr Guzma’n in exchange for performing the activities of
"investigating, design/ng and directing the implementation of the project" related
to the management and control of development programmes in the Caribbean.
[Final Report, pp. 29]
79. Mr Ledesma's participation in the Programme appears to have been Iimited since,
with the exception of Mr Mojica‚ none of the persons involved in the Programme
recalls having spoken or reported to Mr Ledesma during the implementation of the
Programme. Moreover, he mentioned that during that period (2014), he had been
heavily engaged in setting up the first division Ieague at national Ievel.
Sport Manufacturing Inc.
80. The CEO of the company “Sport Manufacturing Inc." is the son of the President of
FEDOFUTBOL, Mr Osiris Guzman DI’az. The company was incorporated into the
Commercial Register of Florida (USA) on 1 January 2017 and has its registered office
at the apartment of Mr Guzmän’s son in Florida (USA).
81. At the beginning of January 2017, a few days after the incorporation of Sport
Manufacturing, FEDOFUTBOL purchased two Iawnmowers with accessories for a
total amount of USD 25,000 from said company. In early May 2017, FEDOFUTBOL
purchased two new Iawnmowers and accessories, again from Sport Manufacturing,
although said association only paid the amount of USD 22,150 for one machine.
82. InJanuary 2017, FEDOFUTBOL made a new purchase from the company of Mr
Guzma’n's son; this time, it acquired 5,000 footballs for the price of USD 53,499,
despite the fact that, it appears, Sport Manufacturing’s webpage does not offer this
type of product for sale.
[Final Report, pp. 32 et seqq.]
83. According to the audit reports from PricewaterhouseCoopers and Frl Consulting,
the sale prices of the aforementioned items were increased disproportionately, vis-
ä-vis their market price, with the subsequent illegitimate gain going to Mr Guzmän’s
son (the goods surpassed the usual market value by 85% to 224%).
15
FI FÄ
TIASA
841 Mr Guzma’n is the owner of an engineering services company called TIASA. This
company appeared in an advertisement on the cover of FEDOFUTBOL’s corporate
magazine, next to the logos of FIFA and CONCACAF. For many years, TIASA never
paid FEDOFUTBOL for appearing on the cover. In addition, the members ot the
Executive Committee of FEDOFUTBOL never approved such request, nor did anyone
else in said association. Finally, it appears that TIASA took over accounting functions
for FEDOFUTBOL.
[Final Report, pp. 32 etseqq, and encl. 15, 16, 26,27 and 92]
Summary of the findings of the Investigatory Chamber [Final Report, pp. 27 etseqq.]
CONCA CAF development programme
85. The lnvestigatory Chamber believes that the objectives of the Programme were
already sufficiently covered by other development programmes, which had been
carried out by the regional provinces for various years (Without the need for funds
from third parties). In this sense, the lnvestigatory Chamber concludes that the
national tournaments, under the auspices of the various regional provinces and with
a minor involvement of FEDOFUTBOLfor the finals, covered the same field of activity.
Besides, the FIFA Talent School (a FIFA programme implemented in the Dominican
Republic from 2014 to 2016) covered similar activities as well. This would appear to
be corroborated by work reports provided by Mr Guzmän, which appear to contain
images taken from the FIFA Talent Schoolr
86. The lnvestigatory Chamber finds that there is no legal basis for the payment of USD
87,000 to Mr Guzmän (no written contract), Similarly, there has been no audit of
Mr Guzman’s company concerning the usage of these funds; there is no single
follow-up report of any of the coaches involved, which could (partially) demonstrate
how the alleged overall payment of USD 87,000 had been spent; nor are there any
written contracts concluded with them By contrast, the people who were
supposedly working on this project expressly denied having received any payment
(see paragraph 73), or stated that they received considerably less than the amounts
declared.
87. As per the lnvestigatory Chamber, Mr Guzma’n created and submitted two false
payment vouchers (i.e. confirmation of receipt), i.e. those allegedly signed by Mr
Rodriguez and Mr Severino. Both Mr Rodriguez and Mr Severino categorically denied
that the signatures were authentic, and they stated that their signatures were
different from those appearing on the alleged vouchers. Moreover, Sport Marketing
Consulting is a sole proprietorship, so the only person who could have been involved
in the falsification was Mr Guzman himself
88. The Investigatory Chamber has serious doubts as to the veracity of the Statement
issued by Mr Severino in view of the following considerations: (i) during the interview
in Santo Domingo, Mr Severino not only repudiated the signature on the document
on multiple occasions but also denied having received the amount of USD 15,000;
16
FIFÄ
Mr Severino described his role in the Programme as a regional supervisor, and Mr
(ii)
Guzmän himself confirmed it as suchi However, as per the payment voucher, he
was responsible for the design and overall implementation of the Programme; (iii)
Mr Guzmän stated that Mr Severino did not participate in the design of the
Programme, but rather that Mr Guzmän was entirely in Charge of it; (iv) the
considerable amount of time (more than a month) that passed between the
interview Statement of Mr Severino and the written submission in which he reversed
his point of view. Equally, in this regard, the fact that the written submission was
made following the provisional ban of Mr Guzmän, and thus shortly after Mr
Guzman had learned of Mr Severino's statement.
89. In addition, the Investigatory Chamber considers that the amount of money
allegedly received by Mr Ledesma (USD 24,000) does not relate to the payment of
the services performed in the Programme by said person. In reality, the Investigatory
Chamber believes that they were part of the scheme orchestrated by Mr Guzma’n t0
treat certain persons. The Investigatory Chamber asserts that this applies not only
with regard to Mr Ledesma but also in relation to the other persons, particularly
since the very persons involved confirmed that the Programme would have been
carried out anyway, as they were just the same national tournaments that were
covered by the regional associations, as had been customan/ since their inception,
for many years
90, The Investigatory Chamber concludes that (i) all of the money received by Mr
Guzmän’s company was a personal gift on the part of Mr Webb to Mr Guzman; (ii)
the Programme used the national tournaments as a de facto vehicle through which
to receive the money from Mr Webb; (iii) Mr Guzman took part of the funds for
himself and his personal benefit, whilst distributing the rest of the money received
to key football officials; (iv) the amount received by Mr Ledesma can be regarded as
a gift to him from Mr Guzman.
Sport Manufacturing lnc.

9'l. The Investigatory Chamber established that of the four lawnmowers purchased by
FEDOFUTBOL, it has only been able to demonstrate the physical presence of two of
them. In addition, the Investigatory Chamber is not convinced of FEDOFUTBOL's
arguments regarding the purchase ot the footballs, particularly when, out of the
5,000 balls apparently purchased from Mr Guzman’s son, only 1,500 footballs seem
to existt
92. In the Investigatory Chamber's opinion, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that
there has been a misappropriation ot funds and a falsification of invoices in the
process in which FEDOFUTBOL purchased supplies from the company of Mr
Guzmän’s son. The Investigatory Chamber believes that this constitutes a conflict of
interest and an offer of improper gains t0 a person related to Mr Guzman
T/A 5A
93. As Mr Guzmän advertised his private companies through FEDOFUTBOL’s official

magazines without the approval of the Executive Committee of FEDOFUTBOL and
17
FIFÄ
without compensation from said association for this significant advertising platform,
the Investigatory Chamber believes that Mr Guzmän obtained an undue benefit.
Summa/y of the posit/on of ll/Ir Guzma’n [Defence statement, pp. 15 et seqq. and
encl. 6a, 7—12, I4]
94. Mr Guzma’n points out that the conclusions reached by the Investigatow Chamber
in connection with Programme may not be accepted since the money cannot have
been used to both (i) develop football and (ii) kept by Mr Guzman. In addition, the
official claims that the reports sent t0 CONCACAF demonstrated the
implementation of the Programme. The evidence provided by the Investigatory
Chamber does not prove that Mr Guzman kept any amount for himselfr
95‘ Mr Guzman submitted a document signed by Mr Severino, mentioned in paragraph

73. Furthermore, Mr Guzma’n provided another document, this time signed by Mr
Rodriguez, in which the latter decided to go to a notary and explain that (i) he had
participated in organising the football tournament promoted by the company Sports
Consulting Marketing in 2014 and (ii) had received USD 8,000 for his participation
in said tournament Mr Rodriguez, in that document, further stated that the receipt
bears his signature and due to his health problems, his signature changes frequently
96. Mr Guzma’n states that Mr Salcedo received several emails informing him about the
progress of the Programme and that Mr Webb approved the transter to Mr
Guzman’s account. Mr Guzmän claims that Mr Salcedo knew that Mr Guzma’n was
paid but he did not send an email to either Mr Webb or to FIFA, or to anyone else,
to say that something wrong was happening.
97‘ Finally, Mr Guzman states that the reason why the Programme was disguised was
that CONCACAF was afraid that if their other member associations Iearnt about the
project, many of them could start asking for similar projects, which would overstrain
the financial possibilities of CONCACAF.
Sport Manufacturing lnc.

98A Mr Guzmän claims that since invoice number 94630 was never paid by FEDOFUTBOL
(and could thus have no impact on the assets), the conclusion of the auditors is
wrong. Mr Guzmän alleges that the prices contained in said invoice issued to Sport
Manufacturing Inc. (apparently the sole and only authorised distributor of ”Denis”
— Iawnmower
producer _ in the Caribbean and Central America) are not meant to
be paid by the final customer. In addition, Mr Guzman alleges that the purpose of
changing said invoice was to ensure that the final customer did not know the
percentage received by the distributor (Sport Manufacturing lnc.).
99. In respect of the difference between the amount of USD 22,150 (as per invoice
number 12125) and USD 25,000 (the payment ultimately made by FEDOFUTBOL),
Mr Guzmän stated that this was due to the request made by said association to
include additional items and services in the invoice in the total amount of USD 3,850.
18
FIFÄ
100. Mr Guzman stated that the purchase of footballs was a project launched by the
Dominican Government. The Iatter contracted Sport Manufacturing Inc. not only in
relation to the purchase of 10,000 footballs but also for the design of the balls, as
well as the marketing campaign. The official claims that since the respective choice
came from the Government — and not from FEDOFUTBOL — it does not fall into the
conflict of interest scenario established by the FCE.
101. Mr Guzman submits that FEDOFUTBOL did not keep an exact record of who received
the footballs, but that it can determine the balls that were distributed. A5 to the
inflated price for the footballs paid by FEDOFUTBOL, Mr Guzmän explains that
invoice 790/1 7 for a value of USD 33,000 for 10,050 balls corresponds to the invoice
provided by the manufacturer of the footballs, hired by Sport Manufacturing Inc. to
manufacture the balls. Mr Guzman further claims that the price that can be found
on invoice 790/17 was not the price of acquisition of the footballs but the
importation price declared at customs. Consequently, it has to take it back to the
market price, add the price of the services provided by Sport Manufacturing Inc.
(marketing campaign, logo and football design), which is not far from what was
actually paid.
TIASA
102. Mr Guzmän explains that aII of the persons interviewed confirmed that TIASA
provided services to FEDOFUTBOL for free for several years but apparently, the only
conflict of interest appeared once FEDOFUTBOL started t0 be able to pay salaries,
and those that worked for free were compensated for their dedication. In addition,
Mr Guzman also states that he expressly noted that TIASA might have appeared in
a magazine, but only as a sponsor, and only because it was him, through TIASA,
who had paid for the printing of the magazine.
103. Mr Guzmän claims that TIASA had been providing economic suppor’r to
FEDOFUTBOL for a number of years, paying expenses, advancing payments,
providing stali, facilities, and infrastructure.
4. Assessment by the Adjudicatory Chamber
a. Persons invo/ved
104. The first two elements set out in art. 20 par. 1 of the FCE are that (i) the person
acting must be bound by the FCE, and (ii) the counterpart must be a person within
or outside FIFA, an intermediary or a related party as defined in the FCE (see the
Definitions section of the FCE).
105. In relation to the allegations in connection with the Programme, Mr Webb was an
official bound by the FCE, and the company Sports Consulting & Marketing was
owned by Mr Guzman (also an official bound by the FCE). In respect of Sport
Manufacturing Inc. and TIASA, both are entities that match the definition of related
party established in the FCE: Mr Guzmän’s son is the CEO of Sport Manufacturing
Inc. (par. 6 (d) of the Definitions section of the FCE) and Mr Guzmän owns TIASA
(par. 6 (e) (ii) of the Definitions section of the FCE).
b. Gift or other benefit

19
FI FÄ
106. Secondly, according to art. 20 par. 1 of the FCE, a "gift or other benefit” must be
at stake.
aa. Pecuniary or other advantage
107, With regard to the term "g/ft or other benefit", the Adjudicatory Chamber points
out that this involves a pecuniary or any other advantage. As such, it includes any
kind of betterment or advancement of an economic, legal or personal, material or
non-material nature (cf., by way of analogy, ANDREAS DONATSCH ET AL. [edsr], StGB
Kommentar, 19th ed.‚ 2013, preliminary observations on art. 322‘e'-322°(“e5, N 8;
GÜNTER STRATENWERTH and WOLFGANG WOHLERS, Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch,
Handkommentar, 3'd ed.‚ 2013, N 4 on art. 322‘9’).
108. In the context of Mr Guzmän, the following benefits can be found: (i) a payment
made by CONCACAF t0 Mr Guzman in the total amount of USD 87,000; (ii) Mr
Guzman keeping USD 15,000 for himself, and offering USD 72,000 to other
officials; (iii) gains obtained by Sport Manufacturing Inc. (related party of Mr
Guzmän) from selling lawnmowers and footballs to FEDOFUTBOL; and, finally, (iv)
free advertisement for TIASA (a related party of Mr Guzmän) in the FEDOFUTBOL
magazine.
bb. Criteria of an‘, 20 par. 1(a) to (e) of the FCE

109. Not every kind of gift or other benefit, however, falls under the scope of art‚ 20
par. of the FCE. Rather, it is necessary, for a violatlon of that provision to occur,
1
that the relevant benefit does not meet the criteria set out in art. 20 par. 1(a) to (e)
of the FCE, In particular, a gift or benefit cannot be accepted if it has more than a
mere symbolic or trivial value (art. 20 par, 1(a)). Similarly, the other conditions of art.
20 par. 1(b) to (e) must also be fulfilled — cumulatively — in order for the gift or
benefit to be accepted as such by the beneficianj.
110. In addition to the above, the Adjudicatory Chamber notes that a gift or other benefit
is prohibited, in particular, if it creates an undue pecuniary or other advantage
(art. 20 par. 1(d) of the FCE; see also the title of Subsection 2: "Undue advantage“),
Whether an advantage is undue must be assessed in the light of the provisions of
FIFA regulations or universally accepted legal principles. In particular, an advantage
is to be considered undue if it has no proper basis, Ieading to the recipient not being
entitled t0 obtain it. If, on the other hand, there is a legal title under which the
advantage is given (i.e. a contract or the law), it i5, in principle, not undue within the
meaning of art. 20 par. 1(d) of the FCE (TAS 2016/A/4474, par. 233 and par. 284;
CAS 2076/A/4507, par. 285 and par. 289).
111. The Adjudicatory Chamber is comfortably satisfied that the Programme brings
together several features, which allows it to conclude that an independent
programme, amounting to USD 87,000 (or more), in fact never existed and that,
consequently, that there was no implementation through Mr Guzmän’s company.
112. To begin with, the Programme was awarded by a referral of the then President of
CONCACAF without a bidding process t0 a company owned by a president of an
20
FI FÄ
assoclation, Mr Guzma’n, to develop a football project in the Dominican Republic.
This was done without the involvement of FEDOFUTBOL, which is a member
association of CONCACAF, the goveming body in the region. lt is very unlikely that
CONCACAF would implement or fund development programmes on FEDOFUTBOL’s
soil wlthout informing the association, Mr Guzman failed to provide a reasonable or
credible explanation regarding the question why FEDOFUTBOL was not the entity in
Charge of (or even involved in) the Programme.
113. The then Director of Development at CONCACAF, who would customarily supervise
and implement all development projects in the CONCACAF region, clearly
advocated against Mr Guzman’s project proposal. Furthermore, he was not involved
in the implementation (in fact he was not even aware what kind of services had
been provided by Mr Guzmän), which means that CONCACAF would have
transferred USD 87,000 without any follow-up.
114. lt ls also very unusual for CONCACAF to transfer development funds to the personal
bank account of a president of a member association.
115. There is no signed written contract between CONCACAF and Mr Guzmän’s

company, which is contrary to the Standard practice for development projects at
CONCACAF. In view of the non-existence of a written agreement, Mr Guzman
would have received USD 87,000 without knowlng all of his legal obligations, the
expected activities and services, the budget involved, the objectives, payment
methods, etc. The same applies vice-versa to CONCACAF
116. Mr Guzmän defends himself by stating that the reports sent to CONCACAF
demonstrated the implementation of the Programme. The Adjudicatory Chamber
notes, however, that there are reports in respect of the Programme, in particular
from January t0 June 2014, that are missing. ln relation to the reports forthe second
half of 2014, it is challenging to assess if any work was performed. The reports did
not contain any references t0 participants, dates, results or activities, but only
displayed images of children playing football, some of which were taken in the
context of other development programs (e.g. the FIFA Talent School, which was
explicitly confirmed by different persons interviewed).
117. Furthermore, Mr Guzma’n also submitted two statements issued by Mr Severino and
Mr Rodriguez contradicting what they had stated during their interview during the
investigatlon proceedings. In respect of said Statements, the Adjudicatory Chamber
highlights the following:
118. The Adjudlcatory Chamber notes that during his interview, Mr Severino was clear
on his statements in which he explained, inter alia, that (i) it was not his signature
on the payment receipt, (ii) he provided his own signature during the interview, (iii)
he had not received any amount for the implementation of the Programme, (iv) the
payment receipt was false, (v) he acted as a volunteer during the CONCACAF
project, and (vi) he provided marketing sen/ices for said project (whereas Mr Severino
said in his new Statements that he provided “research, design and implementation"
services),
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119. In relation to Mr Rodriguez’s Statement, the Adjudicatory Chamber notes that the
same was issued four months after the interview was held in Santo Domingo, which
is surprising since said official had previously provided a completely different version
of the facts. In addition, it shall be mentioned that during the interview, Mr
Rodriguez was keen t0 know if the investigation proceedings were indeed
confidential ("Because if... this gets [pause]... if this gets into the wrong hands, I’l/
have problems here”) as otherwise ”l wouldn't continue working with the
Dominican federation” (Enclosure 98 of the final report, page 16). lt is clear that
said official was distressed about the nature of his testimonial.
120. Overall, the Adjudicatory Chamber finds, to its comfortable satisfaction, that both
Statements are again clearly contradictory to Statements made by both officials
previously, which together with the timing of the same (one month and four
months), are not suitable to remove, in the Adjudicatow Chamber’s opinion, the
conviction that the Programme did not exist or was implemented.
121. The Adjudicatory Chamber also notes that various persons also provided several
contradictory statements relating to the Programme (e.g. unable to state in which
year the Programme was implemented, they did not recognise the pictures in the
reports, reports made verbally), which again raises the question as to whether such
Programme was implemented as suggested by Mr Guzman. In fact, Mr Ventura,
allegedly the supervising coach in logistics for the Programme, stated that “And, a5
[understand it— I don’t knowif it was the same a5 a er, the ’Ta/entSchool’, ’Winning
in CONCACAF’" (Enclosure 25 of the final report, page 17). Even Mr Guzman
himself confirmed that the funds received from CONCACAF for this Programme
were included in the national tournaments (Enclosure 12 of the final report, pages
41 -42) and were not a separate project.
122. lt is also worth mentioning that most of the persons involved in the Programme
were not aware of Mr Ledesma’s role, in particular which services he performed.
Again, Mr Guzman also stated that Mr Ledesma was not working on a full-time
basis but he was entitled to the largest payment of all. In addition, none of the
persons allegedly involved in the Programme recalls having spoken or reported to
Mr Ledesma, which also seems unusual since he was supposedly the director of the
Programme. All in all, it seems that the funds received by Mr Ledesma did not relate
to the supposed sen/ices rendered by him in connection with the Programme.
123. The Adjudicatory Chamber also finds it doubtful that the Programme could have
been implemented without any kind of documentation associated to it, except for
the above-mentioned reports that still are not clear that relate to the Programme
and the lack of any content in connection with it. There were no emails exchanged,
evaluation reports drafted, or any relevant documents produced in connection with
the Programme. Some of the few documents that were issued were the receipts
allegedly signed by the persons involved in the Programme, which is not enough to
satisfy that the same was in fact implemented.
124. Inview of all of these considerations, after having carefully considered the party’s
submissions, the Adjudicatory Chamber concludes that the USD 87,000 received by
Mr Guzmän, through his company, did not have a proper basis e either a contractual
22
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or a legal one — and is theretore to be considered undue within the meaning of
art 20 par. 1(d) of the FCE In addition, the Adjudicatory Chamber also concludes
that the total amount of USD 72,000 given by Mr Guzman to other officials did not
have a proper basis — either a contractual or a legal one — and is therefore to be
considered undue Within the meaning of art. 20 par. 1(d) of the FCE. As a
consequence, it amounts to a prohibited benefit pursuant to art‘ 20 par. of the
1
FCE.
Sport Manufacturing Inc.
1251 In relation to this matter, the Adjudicatory Chamber notes that two expert audit
companies produced two independent reports, which both stated that the sale
prices of four lawnmowers and 5,000 footballs purchased by FEDOFUTBOL were
disproportionately increased for no apparent reason. Overall, the inflated value of
those items goes from 85% to 224%, which represents an undue profit of at least
USD 65,818 for Sport Manufacturing Inc. In addition, the Adjudicatory Chamber
notes that the auditors found only two Iawnmowers (instead of four) and 1,500
footballs (instead of 5,000).
126. Moreover, the Adjudicatory Chamber notes that there is no signed written
agreement between FEDOFUTBOL and Sport Manufacturing Inc.
127. Mr Guzman argues that the price increase relates to the corresponding price
increase that the supplier makes on the price of the product to the end customer.
The Adjudicatory Chamber notes that Mr Guzman failed to explain Why the prices
were increased in the above-mentioned disproportionate percentages. To simply
state that the prices were increased by the supplier, without providing any more
solid justification, is not sufficient to reverse the Adjudicatory Chamber’s impression
that the increase represents an undue profit received by a related party of Mr
Guzmän, his son (and the CEO of Sport Manufacturing Inc.).
128, In view of all of these considerations, after having carefully considered the party’s
submissions, the Adjudicatory Chamber concludes that at least USD 65,818 received
by Mr Guzma’n via a related party did not have a proper basis. In addition, even if
there was a legal basis for the increase of the prices (which in any case remains
doubtful), n0 rational or proper justification was given by the accused in that
respect Therefore, said amount has to be considered undue within the meaning of
art. 20 par. 1(d) of the FCE‚ As a consequence, it amounts to a prohibited benefit
pursuant to art. 20 par. 1 of the FCE.
TIASA
129. Mr Guzman claims that since his company TIASA had provided economic support t0
FEDOFUTBOL for many years, TIASA would be entitled t0 appear for free on the
FEDOFUTBOL's magazine cover (in a way that implies that TIASA is an official
Sponsor of the association). In this regard, the Adjudicatory Chamber notes that
none of the respective persons interviewed could explain what type of services (if
any) had been provided by TIASA to FEDOFUTBOL, Which is contrary to Mr Guzman's
allegations.
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FI FÄ
130. Mr Guzmän submitted a non-dated document of an alleged credit TlASA has against
FEDOFUTBOL, in the amount of approximately DOP 120,000, for which he never
requested to be reimbursed. Now, however, it seems that Mr Guzman wishes to be
reimbursed for that amount, taking into account his Statement that he is entitled to
be present for free in said magazine as a result of that credit. However, due to the
fact that the aforementioned document has no date, it cannot be established that
the document already existed at the time of issuing the respective FEDOFUTBOL
magazines. Therefore, the explanation given by Mr Guzmän cannot be followed.
131. Overall, the Adjudicatory Chamber believes, to its comfortable satisfaction, that
there was no legal basis to grant TIASA, a related party of Mr Guzmän, such a
prominent and free-of-charge presentation in the association's magazine. The
Adjudicatory Chamber also notes that there was no proper basis for such benefit.
Therefore, the Adjudicatory Chamber considers that such benefit is undue within
the meaning of art. 20 par. 1(d) of the FCE, which consequently amounts to a
prohibited benefit pursuant to art. 20 par. l of the FCE.
c, Offering or accepting
132. According to art. 20 par. l of the FCE, the prohibited gift or other benefit must be
offered or accepted.
133. It is undisputed that Mr Guzmän accepted the benefits mentioned in the above
considerations, i‚e. the payments and benefits from CONCACAF to his personal
account and those of FEDOFUTBOL to related parties (e.g. Sport Manufacturing and
TlASA).
134. In addition (and separate from the acceptance of gifts and benefits), Mr Guzmän
also offered benefits to several high-ranking FEDOFUTBOL officials in the amount of
USD 72,000, which he disguised as payments under the purported Programme.
135. Therefore, Mr Guzma’n offered and accepted prohibited gifts and other benefits.
d. Conclusion
136. Inthe Iight of the foregolng, the Adjudicatory Chamber concludes that Mr Guzma’n,
on various occasions, accepted and offered substantial gifts and benefits.
137. In the case at hand, the benefits concerned are clearly not of a merely symbolic or
trivial value. Thus, they do not meet the criteria set out in art. 20 par. 1(a) to (e) of
the FCE, and are therefore undue.
138. Consequently, Mr Guzman has breached art. 20 par. 1 of the FCE.
c. Possible violation of art. 19 of the FCE (Conflicts of interest)

7. The relevant facts
139. With regard to the accusation concerning conflicts of interest (in respect of the
resale of FIFA World CupTM tickets and TIASA), reference is made to par. Il.ll et
seqq and par. Il.84 et seqq.
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FI FÄ
140. In relation to the remaining allegation of a conflict of interest against Mr Guzman,
the Adjudicatory Chamber considers the following facts to be established to its
comfortable satisfaction:
[Final Report, pp. l3 et seqq.‚ 40 et seqq.]

FEDOFUTBOL payrol/
141. There are five relatives of Mr Guzmän working at FEDOFUTBOL (some full time,
some part time), all of whom were hired/mandated by him. For example, Mr
Guzmän’s wife apparently collaborates on everything related to FEDOFUTBOL on a
daily basis, in particular in the accounting department, and seems to be part of the
FEDOFUTBOL women's committees. Equally, Mr Guzman’s son has been chosen as
a FEDOFUTBOL representative to attend official courses provided by FIFA. The others
provide services as a driver, nurse, caretaker and other functions.
[Final Report, pp. 33 et seqq, encl. 10, 12, l3, 25, 80, 98]
2. Summary of the findings of the Investigatory Chamber [Final Report, pp. 33 etseqq.]
142. For a summary of the findings of the lnvestigatory Chamber in respect of the
allegations on the resale of FIFA World Cup tickets and TIASA, see par. II.22 et seqq
above and par. II.93 et seqq above.
FEDOFUTBOL payro/I
143. In the eyes of the lnvestigatory Chamber, Mr Guzmän’s conflict of interest in

managing the assets of FEDOFUTBOL is clear as he is responsible for the hiring of
and payment of compensation to his relatives, an act that was affected by a Situation
of conflict of interest.
3. Summary oft/1e position of Mr Guzmän [Defence Statement, pp. 22 et seqq.]

144. For a summary of Mr Guzmän's position in respect the allegations on the resale
01‘
of FIFA World CupT'V' tickets and TIASA, see par. II.28 et seqq. above and par. “.102
et seqq above.
FEDOFUTBOL payro/l
145. According to Mr Guzmän, FEDOFUTBOL hired five employees Who are relatives of
Mr Guzmän, but apparently the salary of three of these employees were paid from
the funds given by the Dominican Government, and in any case, they only received
a small salary by Dominican Republic Standards.
146. In addition, Mr Guzmän also states that three family members received their
remuneration from FIFA funds. He also mentions that, overall, the total amount of
the compensation would be equivalent to only USD 1,700.
147. The first element Which needs to be established when assessing a possible violation
of art. l9 of the FCE is whether Mr Guzmän was, under the circumstances presently
relevant, acting in a conflict of interest.
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148, A conflict of interest arlses if a person has, or appears to have, secondary interests
that are suited to detract from his abillty to perform his duties with integrity in an
independent and purposeful manner. Secondary interests, in turn, include, but are
not limited to, gaining any possible advantage for the persons bound by the FCE
themselves, or related parties as defined ln the FCE.
149. In the Adjudicatory Chamber’s view, Mr Guzmän found himself in a conflict of

interest Situation three times:
2014 FIFA World CupTM tickets

150. Mr Guzman was the person responsible for the process of requesting, purchasing,
reselling and distributing the tickets in accordance with FIFA regulations. Mr
Guzmän took advantage o1c his position at FEDOFUTBOL to obtain a larger number
of tickets, which enabled him to have a significant batch of tickets at his disposal,
which was obviously more appealing to potential buyers/sellers of the same.
151. Driven by his aim to gather the maximum number of tickets, Mr Guzmän was not
able to pen‘orm his duties in the best interests of FIFA and FEDOFUTBOL, The same
materialised even more when he proceeded wlth the sale 01‘ 385 tickets for the 2014
FlFA World CupT'V'. Mr Guzmän was thus acting under a confllct of interest.
152. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Adjudicatory Chamber deems that the violation
of art. 19 of the FCE is materially absorbed by his violation of art. 27 of the FCE (cf.
par. ".68 above).
153. Mr Guzman was the person responsible for the process of requestlng, purchasing,
reselling and distributing the tickets in accordance with FIFA regulations. Mr
Guzma’n took advantage of his position at FEDOFUTBOL to obtain a larger number
o1C tickets, which enabled him to have a
significant batch of tickets at his disposal,
which was obviously more appealing to potential buyers/sellers of the same.
154. In particular, Mr Guzmän purchased 192 tlckets on behalf of FEDOFUTBOL. All of

those tickets were collected by his son, Mr Osiris Guzman D1az, who, through his
company Sport Manufacturing lnc.‚ paid for the 28 tickets requested by Mr Guzmän
as FIFA standing committee member (Enclosure 5 of Mr Guzman’s position).
155. Mr Guzmän failed t0 involve, consult or seek prior approval by FEDOFUTBOL's

competent bodles. Bearing in mind the amounts involved, this is at least striking.
This also means that Mr Guzmän alone decided to whom he would sell the tickets,
and at which prices.
156. Driven by his aim to gather the maximum number of tickets, Mr Guzman was not
able t0 perform his duties in the best interests of FlFA and FEDOFUTBOL. The same
materialised even more when he proceeded with the sale of 192 tickets for the 2018
FIFA World CupT'V'. Mr Guzman was thus acting under a conflict of interest.
157. The Adjudicatory Chamber believes that the purchase of the tickets was in fact a
personal endeavour 01‘ Mr Guzmän, for which he used FEDOFUTBOL as a convenient
ticket source (however, without lnvolving it). By mixing his private business
26
FIFÄ
ambitions With his responsibilities as the FEDOFUTBOL President and a FIFA standing
committee member, Mr Guzma’n clearly contravened the FIFA ticketing regulations
and thus acted contrary to the best interests of FIFA and FEDOFUTBOL.
158, As the FEDOFUTBOL President, Mr Guzmän is responsible for the association acting
in compliance with the applicable ticket regulations of FIFA at all times. Equally, Mr
Guzman bears a special responsibility when acting as a FIFA Standing committee
member. By selling the tickets unauthorised (and without obtaining the approval
from the relevant bodies), he failed to live up to this duty. Accordingly, when dealing
with both his 28 personal tickets and the 192 FEDOFUTBOL t1ckets, Mr Guzmän had
secondary interests pursuant to art. 19 par. 1 of the FCE involved.
159. In addition, the Adjudicatory Chamber notes that, among the payments made by
third parties to purchase tickets, there is a bank transfer of USD 12,975 made on 15
May 2018 into Mr Guzmän’s bank account by Mirra Management DMC. Mirra
Management DMC is a company, which according to its website, was engaged in
the sale of tickets for the 2018 FIFA World CupTM in Russia at a price higher than
the normal sale price set by FIFA. By envisaging business with commercial ticket
resellers (which he did, even if the payment was sent back in the end), Mr Guzman
put the interests of FIFA and FEDOFUTBOL at risk. Equally, by granting them access
to the highly exclusive FIFA World CupTM ticketlng market, he provided the recipients
with an advantage (since his channel was certainly more beneficial than the open
market), and even more so if they would aim to resell the tickets on top 01° the
amount they paid. A5 mentioned earlier (par. 1137-38), the facts regarding these
transactlons could not be satisfactorily established, and varlous irregularities remain.
160, In order to create a conflict of interest, or — whlch is sufficient 7 the appearance

thereof, these private or personal interests must, then, be suited t0 detract the
official from the ability to perform his duties wlth integrity in an independent and
purposeful manner.
161. In the present case, the Adjudicatory Chamber holds that the personal interests
involved on the part of Mr Guzman were not only suited to but actually did detract
him from performing his dutles towards FIFA and his association with integrity.
Mr Guzma’n violated FIFA’s ticketing regulations by selling tickets for the 2018 FIFA
World CupTM without FIFA’s authorisation. Moreover, he made use of the ticket
allocation of FEDOFUTBOL in order to compile a more attractive ticket package, and
without asking FEDOFUTBOL’s competent bodies for prior approval. Quite evidently,
as a FEDOFUTBOL and FIFA official, he would have been obliged to comply with
FIFA’s ticketing regulations and to act in the best interests of both FEDOFUTBOL and
FIFA. In view of this, the Adjudicatory Chamber concludes that when arranging the
220 tickets for 2018 FIFA World CupTM and selling them to persons and companies
chosen by him alone, Mr Guzman was acting in a conflict of interest.
162. Mr Guzmän consciously entered a Situation of conflict of interest and, despite this,
continued to perform his duties. Thereby, he not only violated art. 19 par. and 1
par. 3 01° the FCE, but also the applicable FIFA ticketing regulations.
163. In the Iight of the foregoing, Mr Guzmän is found to have violated art. 19 of the
FCE.
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FIFÄ
FEDOFUTBOL payroll
164. Firstly, the Adjudicatory Chamber notes that Mr Guzmän confirmed that five persons
working for FEDOFUTBOL are his relatives, and that part of their compensation is
paid by funds from the Dominican Government and FIFA. The total number of these
employees appears to amount to 15 (as per Mr Guzmän’s position).
16S. Those employees were hired personally by Mr Guzmän, without the participation of
the FEDOFUTBOL Executive Committee. By doing so, Mr Guzma’n had clear
secondary interests: finding an occupation for his relatives, and thus providing an
advantage for related parties as defined in the FCE. In this situation, it would render
it impossible for Mr Guzman to periorm his duties with objectivity or independence.
166. Mr Guzman states that none of his relatives receives anything more than a small
compensation in the Dominican Republic. In this regard, the Adjudicatory Chamber
recalls that CAS held that the "Iack of harm does not evidence the non-existence of
conflict of interest”, as ”what matters in determining conf/ict of interest i5 whether
the individual was in a position or appeared to be in a position t0 disadvantage his
principa/ to the benefit of someone e/se” (see in this sense CAS 2077/A/5003,
Je’röme Valcke v F/FA, par. 227). The Adjudicatory Chamber established that Mr
Guzman was in a position to disadvantage FEDOFUTBOL t0 the benefit of himself
and his relatives.
167. The Adjudicatory Chamber finds that by hiring relatives at FEDOFUTBOL, Mr

Guzma’n was acting in a conflict of interest and for that reason, the official breached
art. 19 paras I and 3 of the FCE.
TIASA
168. As proven above, TIASA is a company owned by Mr Guzmän. Allegedly, said

company provides services to FEDOFUTBOL. The rendering ot such possible services
were not approved by the FEDOFUTBOL Executive Committee but only by its
President, Mr Guzman.
169. Besides, it appears that some of the accounting services were provided by his TIASA
employees. In this regard, note shall be taken that various findings above (ie.
bribery, acceptance of gifts and benefits) must have been reflected in the accounting
department. Thus, in order to conceal his actions, it was convenient for Mr Guzma’n
to bring persons of trust into the most relevant positions, i.e. accounting. In any
case, a TIASA employee would be more inclined to act in the best interests of Mr
Guzman (a5 his or her superior), rather than in the best interests of FEDOFUTBOL.
For that reason alone, the approach chosen by Mr Guzma’n is highly problematic, as
it directly inten‘eres with the best interests of FEDOFUTBOL.
170. Accordingly, Mr Guzmän has been mixing his private interests with those of the
association. The personal and financial interests that Mr Guzman has in his company
TIASA, as well as the loyalty of his TIASA employees, detracted him from his ability
to perform its duties with integrity towards FEDOFUTBOL and in an independent
and purposeful manner.
28
FI FÄ
171. Inthe light of the foregoing, the Adjudicatory Chamber concludes that Mr Guzmän
has breached art. 19 paras and 3 of the FCE.
1
d. Possible violation of art. 24 of the FCE (Forgerv and falsification)

172. With regard t0 the relevant facts, reference i5 made to par. II.77 et seqq. above. For
a summary of the findings of the Investigatory Chamber, see Final Report, p. 28, For
a summary of Mr Guzma’n’s position, see par. II.95 et seqq. above.
173. According to art. 24 of the FCE, persons bound by this Code are forbidden from
forging a document, falsifying an authentic document or using a forged or falsified
document.
174. The Investigatory Chamber found that Mr Guzmän had created and submitted false
documents t0 the investigation proceedings, i.e. false payment vouchers from Mr
Rodriguez and Mr Severino, which were allegedly issued by the company Sport
Marketing & Consulting. Although the written Statements of both Mr Severino and
Mr Rodriguez now contradict their clear oral Statements made in the interview, the
Adjudicatory Chamber is not convinced that the receipts submitted by Mr Guzmän
were forged or falsified by him. The inconsistencies of the Statements, in the
Adjudicatory Chamber’s opinion, are not enough to prove that those receipts are
false or that the same were forged or falsified by Mr Guzmän.
175. ln thelight of the foregoing, the Adjudicatory Chamber finds that Mr Guzmän has
not breached art. 24 of the FCE.
e. Possible violation of art. 14 of the FCE (Dutv of neutralitv)

176. in relation to the allegation a violation of the duty of neutrality against Mr Guzma’n,
the Adjudicatory Chamber considers the following facts to be established t0 its
comfortable satisfaction:
[Final Report, pp. 34 et seqq., 42 et seqq.]

Po/it/ca/ event at the Goa/ Project in San Cristoba/
177. Mr Guzma’n is a member of the Modern Revolutionary Party (”PRM"). On 20 January

2018, an event was held for Ms Carolina Mejia, supposedly a candidate for Secretary
General of the PRM, at the premises of the “Project Goal" in San Cristöbal, a
property owned by FEDOFUTBOL and funded by FIFA.
[Final Report, pp. 34 etseqq. and encl. 16, 81-84]
178. The above-mentioned event was promoted through social networks and announced
a5 a PRM event that would be held at the facilities of FEDOFUTBOL, specifically at
“Project Goal“ in San Cristöbal, and it was mentioned that "we will be welcoming
29
FIFÄ
Caro/ina Mej/a, a candidate for Secretary General, in San Cr/stöbal. Project GOAL“,
besides calling on the respective provincial Ieaders.
179. The event was attended by approximately 100 people, with PRM pamphlets Showing
Ms Meji’a’s face. The room was arranged with a table on a platform and Ms Mejia
in the middle (similar to official meetings), speaking through a microphone to the
audience. Mr Guzma’n was Standing opposite the audience, right next to Ms Meji’a.
180. According to Ms Meji’a (via her Twitter account), the meeting was a success: ”San
Cristöba/ i5 with the PRM in unity and in victow“, with several photos attached. One
of the photos shows Mr Guzma’n posing next to Ms Meji’a, which clearly confirms
the notion that this event was really a political activity. The event was also covered
by the Iocal press.
[Final Report, pp. 35 etseqq.‚ and encl. 81—89]
2. Summa/y of the findings oft/1e Investigatory Chamber [Final Report, pp. 34 etseqq.]
181. The lnvestigatory Chamber notes that the event had not been approved by the
members of the FEDOFUTBOL Executive Committee, which means it was organised
and carried out by Mr Guzma’n alone, availing himself once again of his position in
the said association.
182. Furthermore, the Investigatory Chamber also emphasises that Mr Guzman was not
able to point to any other specific events similar to that one and conducted by other
parties (which, in any case, still would not have justified offering FEDOFUTBOL's
facilities to others).
183. Finally, the Investigatory Chamber concludes that the aforementioned event was
part of the PRM's political campaign and thus, an official political meeting.
3. Summary of the position of Mr Guzma’n [Defence Statement, pp. 23 et seqq]

184. Mr Guzman states that this case was addressed in February when both the FIFA
Secretariat and the Investigatory Chamber requested more information regarding
the holding of a political event at the FEDOFUTBOL premises.
185. In addition, Mr Guzmän further claims that the opposing party, the PLD, the party
of the current President of FEDOFUTBOL, has requested to hold an event at the Goal
Project, which, in Mr Guzma’n’s opinion, proves his neutrality.
4. Assessment by the Adjuo’icatory Chamber
186, According to art. i4 of the FCE, in dealings with government institutions, national
and international organisations, associations and groupings, persons bound by the
FCE shall, in addition to observing the basic rules of art. 13 of the FCE, remain
politically neutral, in accordance with the principles and objectives of FIFA, the
confederations, associations, Ieagues and Clubs, and generally act in a manner
compatible with their function and integrity.
187. The Adjudicatow Chamber notes that a political event was held at the premises ot
Goal Project in San Cristobal. Nevertheless, it shall also be mentioned that according
30
FI FÄ
to Mr Guzmän, other entities, such as political parties, sports entities and civil
movements, were in the past also authorised by FEDOFUTBOL to hold other events
at the same premises. Mr Guzman provided letters from EDOCO (Escuela
Dominicana de Comunicaciön Oral) requesting to hold communication sessions, and
from the Union Deportiva de San Cristobal that held a workshop at the relevant
premlses, which to some extent confirm the position of Mr Guzmänt In this sense,
it would appear that said premises were regularly used by FEDOFUTBOL to support
the local community and provide them with a space in which to gather. Also, there
are no indications that the PRM would have been allowed to access the premises in
a disproportionate manner.
188. The Adjudicatory Chamber therefore considers that the holding of one event of the
PRM (despite the fact that this happens to be the political party of Mr Guzmän) is
not sufficient to establish that Mr Guzma’n has breached his duty to remain neutral.
189. Inthe Iight of the foregoing, the Adjudicatory Chamber finds that Mr Guzma’n has
not breached art. 14 of the FCE.
e. Possible violation of art. 18 of the FCE (Dutv to cooperate)
7. The relevant faCts
190. As to the facts relevant in this context, see par. I.1 et seqq. above. With regard to
the findings of the Investigatory Chamber, cf. Final Report, pp. 36 et seqq. and 41
et seqq, The position of Mr Guzman can be found in his defence statement, pp. 8
et seq.
191. Regarding Mr Guzman's cooperation in these proceedings, it can be observed that

he indeed provided a significant amount ot documentation to the Investigatory
Chamber and was generally available to the requests made. The Adjudicatory
Chamber considers that Mr Guzmän’s overall degree of cooperation in the present
proceedings has been satisfactory. In this sense, the Adjudicatory Chamber
acknowledges that Mr Guzmän was cooperative and, overall, contributed to
clarifying the facts of the case With regard to the failure to sometimes provide clear
answers, and to submit all relevant documentation at once, the Adjudicatory
Chamber points out that the amount of documents and information requested from
Mr Guzmän was considerablet
192. Inthe light of the foregoing, the Adjudicatory Chamber finds that Mr Guzmän has
not breached art‚ 18 ot the FCE.
f. Possible violation of art. 13 (General duties) and 15 (Dutv of lovaltv) of the
ü
193, With regard t0 the relevant facts, reference is made to par. II111 et seqq. above. The
findlngs of the Investigatory Chamber can be found in the Final Report, pp. 41 et
31
FIFÄ
seqq. For a summary ot Mr Guzmän’s position in this regard, see par. „.28 et seqq.
above.
194. With regard to the obligations set forth in arts 13 and 15 of the FCE, the
Adjudicatory Chamber is of the opinion that Mr Guzmän's conduct presently
relevant dearly falls short of the ethical Standards provided for by art. 13 of the FCE.
In particular, as described above (eg. hiring of relatives), it would appear that on
various occasions, Mr Guzman misused his position (and the power that derives
therefrom) in an undue manner. Equally, he breached the FIFA ticketing regulations
more than once.
195. Similarly, Mr Guzman failed to put FEDOFUTBOL’s interests first, as determined by

art. 15 of the FCE, and therefore did not respect his fiduciary duties towards the
institution. Mr Guzmän utilised, for example, FEDOFUTBOL to obtain a larger
number of tickets for the FIFA World CupTM and therefore t0 obtain a product that
was more appealing to potential buyers and, of course, carried with it a larger profit
margin.
196. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Adjudicatory Chamber considers that the
relevant conduct (which is in breach of arts 13 and 15 of the FCE) is sufficiently
covered by the provisions of art. 27, art. 20 and art. 19 of the FCE, violations for
which Mr Guzmän has already been found guilty.
197. Inthe light of this, the panel does not regard Mr Guzman’s violations of arts 13 and
15 of the FCE — which, to be sure, occurred in the present context — a5 an additional
basis upon which to sanction him.
f. Overall conclusion
198. Taking the above considerations into account in their entirety, Mr Guzman has, by
his conduct presently relevant, violated the following provisions of the FCE:
o Art. 13 of the FCE (General duties)

Art. 15 of the FCE (Duty of loyalty)
Art. 19 of the FCE (Conflicts of interest);
Art. 20 of the FCE (Offering and accepting gifts or other benefits);
Art. 27 of the FCE (Bribery).
199. However, as explained in par. 198 et seqq. above, the Adjudicatory Chamber
considers that the conduct incriminated by arts 13 and 15 of the FCE is
included/assimilated in the content of arts 19, 20 and 27 of the FCE. In view of the
above, the accused is found guilty of the violation of arts 19,20 and 21 of the FCE.
F. Sanctions and determination of sanctions

a. Sanction
32
FI FÄ
200. According to art. 6 par. I of the FCE, the Ethics Committee may pronounce the
sanctions described in the FCE, the FIFA Disciplinary Code (hereinafter: FDC) and the
FIFA Statutes.
201. As established above, Mr Guzmän has been found guilty of violations of arts I9, 20
and 27 of the FCE (cf. par. “.198 above) and thus of more than one breach of the
FCE. Art. II of the FCE on concurrent breaches is therefore applicable to the present
case.
202. When evaluating, first of all, the degree of the offender’s guilt, the seriousness of
the violation and the endangerment of the legal interest protected by the relevant
provisions of the FCE need to be taken into account. In this respect, it is important
to note that as the President of FEDOFUTBOL, Mr Guzman is the highest
representative of a FIFA member association. In addition, he was a member of a
standing committee of FIFA at the relevant time, which gave him privileged access
t0 tickets for the FIFA World CupT'V'. A5 such, Mr Guzman holds very prominent and
senior positions in association football both at national and international level. In
these functions, he has a reSponsibility to serve the football community as a role
model. In addition, no acts of mere negligence are at stake here but deliberate
actions (see art. 6 par. 2 of the FCE). By the same token, the relevant acts are not
merely attempted acts but have been completed. In view of these findings, the
official’s degree of guilt must be regarded as serious.
203e With regard to the circumstances of the present case, the Adjudicatory Chamber
emphasises that several of its aspects render the case particularly grave: Mr Guzman
is a senior and influential football official; he personally enriched himself through
dealing with tickets for a FIFA competition; the FIFA competition concerned is the
FIFA World CupTM, FIFA's flagship competition and the most important and
prestigious football competition in the world,‘ any misconduct with a direct
connection to the FIFA World CupWI is particularly detrimental to the reputation of
FIFA and association football at Iarge. lt must also be borne in mind that Mr Guzmän
violated art 27 of the FCE, which is the most serious oftence under the Code.
204, As far a5 the official’s motive is concerned, the Adjudicatory Chamber notes that
Mr Guzmän had personal financial interests involved in his actions He sought t0 —
and eventually did — materially benefit from his actions. In particular, he abused his
privileged access to tickets tor the FIFA World CupTM on two occasions in different
capacities (as a FIFA Standing committee member and as the President of
FEDOFUTBOL). Equally, he received very substantial, undue payments from
CONCACAF, which he hid from his own associationt Accordingly, Mr Guzmän's
motive (which was driven by personal gain) in the present case must be qualified as
reprehensible and an aggravating factor in the caset
205. Moreover, the Adjudicatory Chamber notes that Mr Guzman was banned by the
Ethics Committee for a period of 30 days in 2011. The fact that he has violated the
FCE in the past is an aggravating factor.
206, Concerning the official’s assistance and cooperation, the Adjudicatory Chamber
notes that during the present proceedings, Mr Guzmän provided a large volume of
documents and information t0 the Ethics Committee and made himself available for
33
FI FÄ
an in-person interview with the chief of investigation. On the other hand, various
information provided was incomplete and contalned documents that were disputed
by the persons concerned. Consequently, the Adjudicatory Chamber holds the view
that the degree of cooperation of Mr Guzmän in these proceedings may be taken
into account neither as an aggravating nor as a mitigating factor.
207. Finally, the Adjudicatory Chamber takes into account, in Mr Guzman’s favour, that
he has been rendering valuable services to football and t0 the development of the
game in the Dominican Republic and to FIFA for various years (more than two
decades).
208. To sum up, the Adjudicatory Chamber deems the guilt of the official in the present
case to be serious. While there are several aggravating factors, there seem to be
only a few aspects that mitigate the degree of his guilt.
b. Determination of the sanction
209. With regard to the type of sanction to be imposed on Mr Guzma’n, the Adjudicatory
Chamber deems — in view of the serious nature of his misconduct (cf. par. “.198 et
seqq. above) 7 a warning, a reprimand, a return of awards or soclal work t0 be
inappropriately mild sanctions. Moreover, a match suspension, a ban from dressing
rooms, the substitutes’ bench or on entering a stadium are inadequate in view of
the fact that the official’s misconduct was not related to a match but to football
administration in a Wider context. A ban on taking part in any footbalI-related
activity is therefore appropriate in view of the inherent, preventive character of such
sanction in terms of potential subsequent misconduct by the offlcial. In the Iight of
this, the Adjudicatory Chamber has chosen to sanction Mr Guzman by banning him
from taking part in any footbaII-related activity (art. 7 par. 1(j) of the FCE; art. 56
par. 2(f) of the FIFA Statutes; art. 11(f)and art. 22 of the FDC).
210. When determining the scope and duration of a ban, the Adjudicatory Chamber has
to be guided by the principle of proportionality. The Adjudicatory Chamber points
out that FIFA, as a private association, has considerable discretion with regard to
excludlng persons subjected t0 its jurisdiction from its field of activity in cases of
severe misconduct. Furthermore, this type of sanction is also of a preventive nature.
211, In addition, the Adjudicatory Chamber notes that the period of the ban on taking
part in any footbaII—related activity is duly foreseen in the FCE. In this regard, the
ban can range from a maximum of two years in respect of violation of articles 20
and I9 of the FCE to a minimum of five years in respect of violation of article 27 of
the FCE, which may be increased when the person holds a high position in football.
In addition, as mentioned above, since art. 11 of the FCE is applicable to the present
case, the sanction other than monetary sanctions shall be based on the most serious
breach, and increased by up to one third as appropriate. In the present case, the
most serious breach is the breach of article 27 of the FCE, committed by a person
who held a high position in football (President of FEDOFUTBOL and member of a
FIFA Standing committee).
212. After having taken into account of the case (cf, par. „.198 et
all relevant factors
seqq. above), the Adjudicatory Chamber deems a ban on taking part in any football-
34
FIFÄ
related activity for ten (10) years to be proportionate. With regard to the scope
(geographical area, art. 9 par. 4 of the FCE), only a worldwide effect is appropriate
since Mr Guzman committed FCE violations that involved FIFA assets and where
stakeholders from other countries (eg. Canada, United Arab Emirates) were
involved. Limiting the ban to association or confederation Ievel, in turn, would
neither prevent him from future misconduct nor adequately reflect the chamber’s
disapproval of his conduct.
213. In conclusion and in Iight of the above considerations, Mr Guzma’n is hereby banned
from taking part in any footbaII-related activity (administrative, sports or any other)
at national and international Ievel for ten (10) years. In accordance with art. 42
par.1 of the FCE, the ban shall come into force a5 soon a5 the decision is
communicated.
214. Pursuant to art. 7 par. 1 of the FCE, breaches of this Code or any other FIFA rules
and regulations by persons bound by this Code are punishable by one or more
sanctions. Accordingly, more than one type of sanction can be imposed.
215. In the present case, the Adjudicatory Chamber is of the opinion that the imposition
of a ban on taking part in any footbaII-related activity is not sufficient to sanction
the misconduct of Mr Guzmän adequately, in particular since a personal financial
motive and gain were involved. Therefore, a fine is to be additionally imposed on
him.
216. The amount of the fine shall not be Iess than CHF 300 and not more than
CHF 1,000,000 (art. 7 par. 2 of the FCE in conjunction with art. 15 paras1 and 2 of
the FDC). Moreover, in the case at hand, the FCE provides a5 a sanction an
appropriate fine from a minimum of CHF 10,000 to a maximum of CHF 100,000 for
the violation of articles 19, 20 and 27 of the FCE.
217. In addition, any amount unduly received shall also be included in the calculation of
the fine in respect of violations of art. 20 and art. 27 of the FCE. In the present case,
the Adjudicatory Chamber shall consider the undue pecuniary advantages received
by Mr Guzmän from CONCACAF (USD 15,000 out of the USD 87,000 paid was for
his own personal benefit) and his profit obtained in connection with the 2014 FIFA
World CupT'VI tickets (USD 78,593). However, in the Adjudicatory Chamber’s view,
these amounts alone do not adequately reflect the seriousness of the misconduct
displayed by Mr Guzmän, nor the Adjudicatory Chamber’s disapproval of such
conduct. In order to have a sanctioning and a preventive effect, the fine must be
higher than the benefit Mr Guzmän obtained (cf. par. 68 and par. 124 above) as
otherwise, it would only amount to a reclaiming of the respective benefit.
218. In the Iight of the above, the Adjudicatory Chamber considers a fine of CHF 150,000
to be proportionate.
G. Procedural costs and procedural compensation

219. The procedural costs are made up of the costs and expenses of the investigation and
adjudicatory proceedings (art. 54 of the FCE).
35
FIFÄ
220. As a principle, procedural costs shall be borne by the party that has been sanctioned
(an, 56 par. 1 of the FCE). Only in exceptional circumstances may procedural costs
be reduced or waived, in particular taking into account the party’s financial
circumstances (art. 56 par. 4 of the FCE). Further, according to am 56 par. 3 of the
FCE, part of the procedural costs, in particular the costs of the investigation
proceedings, may be borne by FIFA, a5 appropriate in respect of the imposition of
sanctions.
221. Mr Guzma’n has been found guilty of violations of arts 19, 20 and 27 of the FCE and
has been sanctioned accordingly. The Adjudicatow Chamber deems that no
exceptional circumstances apply t0 the present case that would justify deviating
from the general principle regarding the bearing of the costs. Thus, the Adjudicatory
Chamber rules that Mr Guzmän shall bear the procedural costs (art. 56 par. 1 of the
FCE).
222, Inthe present case, the costs and expenses of the investigation and the adjudicatory
proceedings — including an interview of Mr Guzmän with the chief of investigation,
13 witness interviews and a hearing before the Adjudicaton/ Chamber — add up t0
CHF 10,000.
223. According to artr 57 of the FCE, no procedural compensation shall be awarded in

proceedings conducted by the Ethics Committee. Consequently, Mr Guzma’n shall
bear his own legal and other costs incurred in connection with these proceedings.
36
FIFÄ
III. has therefore decided
1. Mr Osiris Guzmän is found guilty of infringement of art. 27 (Bribery), art. 20

(Offering and accepting gifts or other benefits) and art. l9 (Conflicts ot interest) of
the FIFA Code of Ethics.
2. Mr Osiris Guzman is hereby banned from taking part in any kind of footbalI—related
activity at national and international Ievel (administrative, sports or any other) for 10
years as of notification of the present decision, in accordance with Article 7 Iit. j) of
the FIFA Code of Ethics in conjunction with Article 22 of the FIFA Disciplinary Code.
3, Mr Osiris Guzman shall pay a fine in the amountofCHF150,000 within 30 days of

notitication of the present decision. Payment can be made either in Swiss francs
(CHF) to account no. 0230-325519701, UBS AG, Bahnhofstrasse 45, 8098 Zurich,
SWIFT: UBSWCHZHSOA, lBAN: CH85 0023 0230 3255 1970 J or in US dollars (USD)
t0 account no. 0230-32551 9.71 U, UBS AG, Bahnhofstrasse 45,8098 Zurich, SWIFT:
UBSWCHZH80A, IBAN: CH95 0023 0230 3255 197l U, with reference to case no.
El7v00012 in accordance with artt 7 let. e) of the FIFA Code of Ethics.
4. Mr Osiris Guzman shall pay costs of these proceedings in the amountofCHF10,000

within 30 days of notitication of the present decision, which shall be paid according
to the modalities stipulated under point 3. above.
5A Mr Osiris Guzmän shall bear his own legal and other costs incurred in connection
with the present proceedings,
6. This decision is sent to Mr Osiris Guzmän. A copy of the decision is sent to the
CONCACAF and to the Federaciön Dominicana de Fütbol, as well as to the
chairperson of the investigatory chamber.
37
FIFÄ
LEGAL ACTION:
This decision can be appealed against to the Court of Arbitration of Sport ("CAS") (art.
82 par. 1 of the FCE and art. 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes). The Statement of appeal must
be sent directly to CAS Within 21 days of notification of this decision. Within another ten
(10) days following the expiry of the time Iimit for filing the Statement of appeal, the
appellant shall file With CAS a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to
the appeal (see art. R51 of the Code of Sports-related Arbitration).
The address and contact numbers of CAS are the following:
Chäteau de Böthusy
Avenue de Beaumont 2
1012 Lausanne
Switzerland
Tel.:+4121613 50 00
Fax: +41 21 613 50 O1
Email: info@tas-cas.org
www.tas-cas.org
FEDERATION INTERNATIONALE
DE FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION
//4’©
Vassilios Skouris
Chairperson of the Adjudicatory Chamber
of the FIFA Ethics Committee
38

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FI FÄ

To: Mr Osiris Guzmän Date: 9 November 2018

c/o Ruiz-Huer‘ta & Crespo

T0: CONCACAF Total Pages : 40

(incl. this page)

To: Ms. Maria Claudia Rojas

Re: Decision Ethics E17-00012 DOM ZH

Federation Internationale de Football Association

FIFA Ethics Committee

taken at the Home of FIFA in Zurich, Switzerland

in the case of:

Mr Osiris Guzmän [DOM]

(Ethics E17-00012 DOM ZH)

Mr Osiris Guzman (hereinafter: Mr Guzmän, the accused or the official), a national

The investigation proceedings against Mr Guzmän were opened on 31 July 2017

On 1June 2018, the Chairperson of the Investigatory Chamber requested the

On 31 August 2018, based on a request from the Chairperson of the Investigatory

On 5 September 2018, the Chairman opened adjudicatory proceedings and

On 5 September 2018, Mr Guzman’s legal representatives, MrJuan de Dios Crespo

On 6 September 2018, the Chairman informed Mr Guzmän that the reason

12. On 25 September 2018, MrGuzman submitted his position to the Adjudicatory

Applicability of the FCE ratione materiae (art. 1 of the FCE)

The Adjudicatory Chamber notes that, according to the Investigatory Chamber's

Applicability of the FCE ratione personae (art. 2 of the FCE)

By virtue of his positions as the President of FEDOFUTBOL and a member of the

Applicability of the FCE ratione temporis (art. 3 of the FCE)

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Adjudicatory Chamber highlights that the

Jurisdiction of the FIFA Ethics Committee

Assessment of potential infringements of the FCE committed by

The relevant facts

11. In relation to the allegation of briben/ against Mr Guzma’n, the Adjudicatory

2074 F/FA World CupT'V' tickets

2078 FIFA World Cup tickets

2074 FIFA World CupT'V' tickets

19. By requesting tickets from behalf of FEDOFUTBOL and by making them

2078 FIFA World CupT'V' tickets

Summa/y of the posit/on of Mr Guzman [Defence Statement, pp. 10 et seqq. and

2074 FIFA Wor/d CupT'V' tickets

2078 FIFA WOr/d CupTM tickets

31. Regarding the inconsistencies pointed out by the Investigatory Chamber, Mr

Assessment by the Adjudicatory chamber

Personal or undue pecunian/ or other advantage

35. Secondly, a ”personal or undue pecuniary or other advantage” must be at stake.

aa. Pecunian/ or other advantage

38A Notwithstanding the foregoing, based on the available information and

bb. Personal or undue advantage

40. The Adjudicatory Chamber is not comfortably satisfied with Mr Guzma’n’s

43. Secondly, there is no plausible explanation as to why a Canadian company, whose

Accepting, giving, offering, promis/ng, receiving, requesting or soliciting an

aa. Act that I's re/ated to official act/vities

bb. Act contrary t0 duties or fal/ing within discretion

CC. lncitement of the execution or omission of the act

[Final Report, pp. 21 etseqq., 39 et seqq.]

CONCACAF development programme ("Programme")

70. The Programme was allegedly developed and implemented personally by Mr

[Final Report, ppr 23 erseqqr and encl. 12]

[Final Report, pp. 24 etseqq.]

[Final Report, pp. 24 etseqq. and encl. 12]

[Final Report, pp. 23 etseqq. and encl. 63-73]

[Final Report, pp. 27 erseqq. and encl. 12]

[Final Report, pp. 25 etseqq. and encl. 74-76]

[Final Report, pp. 28 etseqq. and encl. 63-73, 97—98]

78. On 17 June 2018, Mr Severino submitted a Statement in Which he essentially