POLITICAL LAW 1

Luis A. Vera Cruz, Jr.

PART I
INTRODUCTORY

A. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

1. The First Philippine Republic, June 12, 1898
2. The Malolos Constitution
3. The Treaty of Paris, December 10, 1898
4. The Taft Commission
5. The Philippine Bill of 1902, The (The Philippine Organic Act of 1902)
The Philippine Assembly and Philippine Commission as Bicameral Legislature
6. The Philippine Autonomy Act (Jones Law) of 1916; the Philippine Legislative
(Senate and House of Representative)
7. The Tydings-Mc Duffie Act; The Commonwealth of the Philippines
8. The 1935 Constitution
9. The 1973 Constitution
a. Political Question

Javellana vs. The Executive Secretary

On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine, Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando,
Teehankee and Chief Justice Concepcion, or six (6) members of the Court, hold that the issue of the validity of
Proclamation 1102 presents a justiciable and nonjusticiable question. Justices Makalintal and Castro did not vote
squarely on this question, but, only inferentially, in their discussion of the second question. Justice Barredo
qualified his vote, stating that “in as much as it is claimed that there has been approval by the people, the Court
may inquire into the question of whether or not there has actually been such an approval, and, in the affirmative,
the Court should keep its hands-off out of respect to the people’s will, but, in the negative, the Court may
determine from both factual and legal angles whether or not Article XV of the 1935 Constitution has been
complied with.” Justices Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that the issue
is political and “beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry.”

On the second question of validity of the ratification, Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee
and Chief Justice Concepcion, or six (6) members of the Court also hold that the Constitution proposed by the
1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with Article XV, section 1 of the 1935
Constitution, which provides only one way for ratification, i.e., “in an election or plebiscite held in accordance
with law and participated in only by qualified and duly registered voters.” Justice Barredo qualified his vote while
Justices Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that under their view there has
been in effect substantial compliance with the constitutional requirements for valid ratification.

On the third question of acquiescence by the Filipino people in the aforementioned proposed Constitution, no
majority vote has been reached by the Court. Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar,
Antonio and Esguerra hold that “the people have already accepted the 1973 Constitution.” Two (2) members of
the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and Chief Justice Concepcion hold that there can be no free expression, and
there has even been no expression, by the people qualified to vote all over the Philippines, of their acceptance or
repudiation of the proposed Constitution under Martial Law. Justice Fernando thinks that the doctrine of
“Constitution by acquiescence” cannot be applied at this time Justices Makalintal and Castro are joined by Justice
Teehankee in their statement that “Under a regime of martial law, with the free expression of opinions through
the usual media vehicles restricted, (they) have no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether
the people have accepted the Constitution.”

On the fifth question of whether the new Constitution of 1973 is in force: Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio
and Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the people’s acceptance thereof; Justices Makalintal, Castro,
Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they
could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and
Justice Zaldivar and Chief Justice Concepcion voted that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention is not in force; with the result that there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is
not in force.
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Philippine Bar Association vs. Commission on Elections
After considering all the pleadings and deliberating on the issues raised in the petitions as well as on the oral
arguments of the parties and the amici curiae in the hearings held in these cases, Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino
and six (6) Justices, namely, Justices Claudio Teehankee, Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr., Vicente Abad Santos,
Efren I. Plana, Venicio T. Escolin and Lorenzo Relova, voted to DISMISS the petitions in these cases and to
DENY the prayer for the issuance of an injunction restraining respondents from holding the election on February
7, 1986. In the opinion of Chief Justice Aquino, B.P. 883 is constitutional.
"Justices Hugo Gutierrez, Jr., B.S. de la Fuente, Serafin R. Cuevas, Nestor B. Alampay and Lino M. Patajo voted
to DECLARE solution P. 883 unconstitutional and to grant the injunction prayed essi or. "Justice the insertion is
of the opinion that inasmuch as there are less than ten votes in favor of declaring B.P. Batas Bilang
unconstitutional, the petitions in these cases are hereby dismissed and the writs therein prayed for are denied.

"This is in accordance with the opinion in Gonzales vs. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 802 and Very truly yours, vs.
Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 141. "Justices Teehankee, Plana, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., de la Revision
Alampay and Patajo separate opinions. "This resolution is without prejudice to the filing of separate opinions by
the other Members of this Court. "At the session of January 7, 1986, the Court noted that its act of dismissing the
petitions had not been formally stated in its basic Resolution of December 19, 1985. The Court therefore
authorizes the insertion of the following dispositive portion: 'Accordingly, inasmuch as there are less than the
required ten (10) votes to declare Batas Pambansa Bilang 883 unconstitutional, the petitions in these cases are
hereby DISMISSED and the writs therein prayed for are DENIED.' " "Chief Justice Aquino is of the opinion that
the revision of the December 19, 1985 resolution is totally unnecessary. It is clear. It is understood that the
petitions are dismissed. The public and the Comelec understood that the petitions were dismissed."

b. Section 1, Article VIII; Expanded Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

Araullo vs. Aquino III

The Constitution vests judicial power in the Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. In
creating a lower court, Congress concomitantly determines the jurisdiction of that court, and that court, upon its
creation, becomes by operation of the Constitution one of the repositories of judicial power. However, only the
Court is a constitutionally created court, the rest being created by Congress in its exercise of the legislative power.

The Constitution states that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice not only “to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable” but also “to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government.” It has thereby expanded the concept of judicial power, which up to then
was confined to its traditional ambit of settling actual controversies involving rights that were legally demandable
and enforceable.

What are the remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government may be determined under the Constitution? The present
Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. These are the special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition, and both are
governed by Rule 65. A similar remedy of certiorari exists under Rule 64, but the remedy is expressly applicable
only to the judgments and final orders or resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on
Audit.

Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for want or excess of jurisdiction, certiorari is to be distinguished
from prohibition by the fact that it is a corrective remedy used for the reexamination of some action of an inferior
tribunal, and is directed to the cause or proceeding in the lower court and not to the court itself, while prohibition
is a preventative remedy issuing to restrain future action, and is directed to the court itself.

With respect to the Court, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach,
and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a
tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set
right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any
branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions. This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1,
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supra. Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to
review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials. Necessarily, in discharging its duty
under Section 1, supra, to set right and undo any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, the Court is not at all precluded from making
the inquiry provided the challenge was properly brought by interested or affected parties. The Court has been
thereby entrusted expressly or by necessary implication with both the duty and the obligation of determining, in
appropriate cases, the validity of any assailed legislative or executive action. This entrustment is consistent with
the republican system of checks and balances.

The requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review are the following, namely:
(1) there must be an actual case or justiciable controversy before the Court;
(2) the question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication;
(3) the person challenging the act must be a proper party; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity and must be the very litis mota of
the case.

Lansang vs.Garcia
The Supreme Court has the authority under the Constitution to inquire into the existence of a factual basis for the
issuance of a presidential proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for the purpose of
determining the constitutional sufficiency thereof.

Far from being full and plenary, the authority to suspend the privilege of the writ is circumscribed, confined and
restricted, not only by the prescribed setting or the conditions essential to its existence, but, also, as regards the
time when and the place where it may be exercised. Like the limitations imposed by the Fundamental Law upon
the legislative department, adherence thereto and compliance therewith may, within proper bounds, be inquired
into by the courts of justice. Otherwise, the explicit constitutional provisions thereon would be meaningless.

For a valid suspension of the privilege of the writ: (a) there must be “invasion, insurrection or rebellion” or—–
pursuant to paragraph (2), section 10 of Art. VII of the Constitution—– “imminent danger thereof”; and (b) public
safety must require the aforementioned suspension. The President declared in Proclamation No. 889, as amended,
that both conditions are present.

On the basis of the evidence adduced before the Supreme Court, the members thereof entertained no doubts about
the existence of a sizeable group of men who have publicly risen in arms to overthrow the government and have
thus and still are engaged in rebellion against the government.

Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers underlying our system of government, the Executive is supreme
within his own sphere. However, the separation of powers, under the Constitution, is not absolute. What is more,
it goes hand in hand with the system of checks and balances, under which the Executive is supreme, as regards
the suspension of the privilege, but only if and when he acts within the sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law,
and the authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which, in this
respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme.

In the exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely to check—– not to supplant—– the Executive,
or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the
power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act.

The Solicitor General urged that “judicial inquiry into the basis of the questioned proclamation can go no further
than to satisfy the Court not that the President’s decision is correct and that public safety was endangered by the
re bellion and justified the suspension of the writ, but that in suspending the writ, the President did not act
arbitrarily. “No cogent reason has been submitted to warrant the rejection of such test.

Considering the data in the possession of the President, the Court is not prepared to hold that the Executive had
acted arbitrarily or gravely abused his discretion when he then concluded that public safety and national security
required the suspension of the privilege of the writ, particularly if the NPA were to strike simultaneously with
violent demonstrations staged by the two hundred forty-five (245) KM chapters, all over the Philippines, with the
assistance and cooperation of the dozens of GPP organizations, and the bombing of water mains and conduits, as

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well as electric power plants and installations—– a possibility which, no matter how remote, he was bound to
forestall, and a danger he was under obligation to anticipate and arrest.

Neither should the Court overlook the fact that the President could have declared a general suspension of the
privilege. Instead, he limited the suspension to persons detained “for crimes of insurrection or rebellion, and all
other crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in
connection therewith. Even this was further limited by a succeeding proclamation.

The members of the Court, with the exception of Mr. Justice Fernando, are of the opinion that instead of the Court
or its commissioner taking evidence adverted to above on whether the detainees had been apprehended and
detained “on reasonable belief” that they had “participated in the crime of insurrection or rebellion”, it is best to
let the preliminary examination and/or investigation before the Court of First Instance in which the detainees had
been charged for alleged violation of the AntiSubversion Act, be completed, so that their release could be ordered
by the court below, should it find that there is no probable cause against them, or a warrant for their arrest could
be issued, should a probable cause be established against them. Such course of action is more favorable to the
petitioners (detainees), inasmuch as a preliminary examination or investigation requires a greater quantum of
proof than that needed to establish that the Executive had not acted arbitrarily in causing the petitioners to be
apprehended and detained upon the ground that they had participated in the commission of the crime or rebellion
or insurrection.

The majority of the Court declined to accept the view of Mr. Justice Fernando that when a formal complaint is
presented in court against a detained person, the court steps in and the executive steps out. The major-ity’s reasons
are: (1) If the suspension of the writ is valid as in the instant case, the filing of a complaint against a detainee does
not affect the suspension of the privilege, and, consequently, his release may not be ordered by the Supreme
Court; (2) As the filing of a complaint does not detract from the validity and efficacy of the suspension of the
privilege, it would be more reasonable to construe the filing of said formal charges in the court of first instance
as an expression of the President’s belief that there is sufficient evidence to convict the detainees so charged and
that they should not be released, therefore, unless and until the court below—– after conducting the preliminary
examination and/or investigation—– shall find that the prosecution has not established the existence of a probable
cause; and (3) From a longrange viewpoint, this is more beneficial to the detainees because the opposite view of
Mr. Justice Fernando would tend to induce the Executive to refrain from filing formal charges as long as it may
be possible.

Aytona vs. Castillo

As a rule, once an appointment is issued, it cannot be reconsidered specially where the appointee has qualified.
On the other hand, the authorities admit of exceptional circumstances justifying revocation such as when mass
ad-interim appointments (350) issued in the last hours of an outgoing Chief Executive are to be considered by the
Commission on Appointments that is different from that existing at the time of the appointment and the names
are to be submitted by an incoming Chief Executive who may not wholly approve of the selections especially if
it is doubtful that the outgoing President exercised double care in extending such appointments.

After the proclamation of the election of an incoming Chief Executive, the outgoing Chief Executive is no more
than a "care-taker" administration. He is duty bound to prepare for the orderly transfer of authority to the incoming
President and he should not do acts which, he ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his
successor. It is not for him to use his powers as incumbent President to continue the political warfare that had
ended or to avail himself of presidential prerogatives to serve partisan purposes.

The filling up of vacancies in important positions, if few, and so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate
action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications may be
undoubtedly permitted. But the issuance of 350 appointments in one night and the planned induction of almost
all of them a few hours before the inauguration of the new President may, with some reason, be regarded by the
latter as an abuse of presidential prerogatives.

When the President makes ad-interim appointments, he exercises a special prerogative and is bound to be prudent
to insure approval of his selection either by previous consultation with the members of the Commission or by
thereafter explaining to them the reason for such selection. Where the Commission on Appointments that will
consider the appointees is different from that existing at the time of the appointment and where the names are to

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be submitted by his successor who may not wholly approved of the selections, the President should be doubly
careful in extending such appointments.

The separation of powers, under the circumstances in the instant case, prevents the Supreme Court to disregard a
presidential directive issued by an incoming President cancelling "midnight" or "last minute" appointments.

Once the appointee has qualified, the latter's equitable rights can be set up to deny the power to revoke the
appointment. Yet it is doubtful if such equity might be set up in the present case where rush conditional
appointments, hurried maneuvers and other happenings detracted from that degree of good faith, morality and
propriety which form the basic foundation of claims to equitable relief.

Arnault vs. Nazareno

The power of inquiry, with process to enforce it, is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function. The Congress of the Philippines has a wider range of legislative field than either the Congress of the
United States or a State Legislature, and the field of inquiry into which it may enter is also wider. It is difficult to
define any limits by which the subject matter of its inquiry can be bounded. Suffice it to say that it must be
coextensive with the range of legislative power.

No person can be punished for contumacy as a witness before either House unless his testimony is required in a
matter into which that House has jurisdiction to inquire.

Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the investi
gating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to the subject of the inquiry,
subject of course to his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.

The materiality of a question that may be propounded to a witness is determined by its direct relation to the subject
of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation.

Where the immateriality of the information sought by the legislative body from a witness is relied upon to contest
its jurisdiction, the Court is in duty bound to pass upon the contention. Although the legislative body has the
power to make the inquiry, the Court is empowered to correct a clear abuse of discretion in the exercise of that
power.

Since the Court has no power to determine what legislation to approve or not to approve, it cannot say that the
information sought from a witness which. is material to the subject of the legislative inquiry is immaterial to any
proposed or possible legislation. It is not within the province of the Court to determine or imagine what legislative
measures Congress may take after the completion of the legislative investigation.

There is no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish. for contempt to the end of every
session and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body. While the existence of the
House of Representatives is limited to four years, that of the Senate is not so limited. The Senate is a continuing
body which does not cease to exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House of
Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate's power to punish for contempt in cases where that
power may constitutionally be exerted.

Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testify and is punishable as contempt,
assuming that a refusal to testify would be so punishable.

It is not enough for the witness to say that the answer will incriminate him, as he is not the sole judge of his
liability. The danger of self-incrimination must appear reasonable and real to the court, from all the circumstances,
and from the whole case, as well as from his general 'Conception of the relations of the witness. Upon the facts
thus developed, it is the province of the court to determine whether a direct answer to a question may criminate
or not. The witness cannot assert his privilege by reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection against an.
imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a third person.

It is the duty of every citizen to give frank, sincere, and truthful testimony before a competent authority. His
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, unless clearly established, must yield to that duty. When a
specific right and a specific obligation conflict with each other, and one is doubtful or uncertain while the other
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is clear and imperative, the former must yield to the latter. The right to live is one of the most sacred that the
citizen may claim, and yet the state may deprive him of it if he violates his corresponding obligation to respect
the life of others.

10. The Freedom Constitution; Proclamation No. 3

11. The 1987 Constitution; Date of Effectivity

In Re: Saturnino V. Bermudez

Prescinding from petitioner’s lack of personality to sue or to bring this action (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677),
it is elementary that this Court assumes no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief. More importantly, the
petition amounts in effect to a suit against the incumbent President of the Republic, President Corazon C. Aquino,
and it is equally elementary that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during
the period of their incumbency and tenure.

The petition furthermore states no cause of action. Petitioner’s allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the
aforequoted provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common public knowledge
that tha Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President
Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the extension of their term to noon of June 30, 1992
for purposes of synchronization of elections. Hence, the second paragraph of the cited section provides for the
holding on the second Monday of May, 1992 of the first regular elections for the President and Vice-President
under said 1986 Constitution. In previous cases, the legitimacy of the government of President Corazon C. Aquino
was likewise sought to be questioned with the claim that it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.
The said cases were dismissed outright by this Court.

Copies of the certified returns from the provincial and city boards of canvassers have not been furnished this
Court nor is there any need to do so, In the absence of a legislature, we cannot assume the function of stating, and
neither do we have any factual or legal capacity to officially declare, who were elected President and Vice
President in the February 7,1986 elections.

As to who are the incumbent President and Vice President referred to in the 1986 Draft Constitution, we agree
that there is no doubt the 1986 Constitutional Commission referred to President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-
President Salvador H. Laurel

I vote to dismiss this petition on the ground that the Constitution we are asked to interpret has not yet been ratified
and is therefore not yet effective. I see here no actual conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination
at this time. (Aetna Life Insurance Co. vs. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227; PACU vs. Secretary of Education, 97 PhH.
806).

De Leon vs. Esguerra

Petitioners must now be held to have acquired security of tenure specially considering that the Barangay Election
Act of 1982 declares it "a policy of the State to guarantee and promote the autonomy of the barangays to ensure
their fullest development as self-reliant communities." Similarly, the 1987 Constitution ensures the autonomy of
local governments and of political subdivisions of which the barangays form a part, and limits the President's
power to "general supervision" over local governments.

Until the term of office of barangay of ficials has been determined by law, therefore, the term of office of six (6)
years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern.

Contrary to the stand of respondents, we find nothing inconsistent between the term of six (6) years for elective
Barangay officials and the 1987 Constitution, and the same should, therefore, be considered as still operative,
pursuant to Section 3, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution.

B. THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE

1.The Elements of a State; Definition of State

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Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Campos Rueda
The fact that the laws of Tangier, Morocco, do not impose transfer or death taxes upon intangible personal
properties of our citizens not residing therein, entitles to a reciprocal exemption similar properties belonging to
the decedent who at the time of his death resides in Tangiers, no matter that the latter country does not possess
international personality in the traditional sense.

a. People
b. Territory
c. Government
d. Sovereignty

United States vs. Dorr

The term "government" as employed in Act No. 292 of the United States Philippine Commission is used in the
abstract sense of the existing political system as distinguished from the concrete organism of the Government.

When an offense may be committed in any of several different modes, and the complaint alleges the crime to
have been committed in two or more modes, it is sufficient to prove the offense committed in any one of them.

The publication of an article cannot be punished under Act No. 202 of the United States Philippine Commission
as having seditious tendencies unless it has a tendency to produce disaffection or a feeling incompatible with a
disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to its laws.

The publication of an article abusive of the United States Philippine Commission and its members is not a libel
upon the Government and does not fall within said Act No. 292 of the United States Philippine Commission.

2. The Doctrine of State Immunity

a. The State may not be sued without its consent

Article XVI, Sec. 3

Kawananakoa v. Polyblank
A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and
practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends. “there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends.”

Garcia vs. The chief of staff

A claim for the recovery of money against the government should be filed with the Auditor General, in line with
the principle that the State cannot be sued without its consent.

Holy See, The vs. Rosario, Jr..

In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or diplomatic
immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to convey to the court that
said defendant is entitled to immunity.

In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international organization to first secure an
executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign Office
conveys its endorsement to the courts varies. In International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190
SCRA 130 (1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs just sent a letter directly to the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, informing the latter that the respondent-employer could not be sued because it enjoyed diplomatic
immunity. In World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent
the trial court a telegram to that effect. In Baer v. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974), the U.S. Embassy asked the Secretary
of Foreign Affairs to request the Solicitor General to make, in behalf of the Commander of the United States
Naval Base at Olongapo City, Zambales, a “suggestion” to respondent Judge. The Solicitor General embodied
the “suggestion” in a Manifestation and Memorandum as amicus curiae.

In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs, through the Office of Legal Affairs moved with this
Court to be allowed to intervene on the side of petitioner. The Court allowed the said Department to file its
memorandum in support of petitioner’s claim of sovereign immunity.
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In 1929, Italy and the Holy See entered into the Lateran Treaty, where Italy recognized the exclusive dominion
and sovereign jurisdiction of the Holy See over the Vatican City. It also recognized the right of the Holy See to
receive foreign diplomats, to send its own diplomats to foreign countries, and to enter into treaties according to
International Law (Garcia, Questions and Problems In International Law, Public and Private 81 [1948]).

The Lateran Treaty established the statehood of the Vatican City “for the purpose of assuring to the Holy See
absolute and visible independence and of guaranteeing to it indisputable sovereignty also in the field of
international relations” (O’Connell, I International Law 311 [1965]).

The Vatican City fits into none of the established categories of states, and the attribution to it of “sovereignty”
must be made in a sense different from that in which it is applied to other states (Fenwick, International Law 124-
125 [1948]; Cruz, International Law 37 [1991]). In a community of national states, the Vatican City represents
an entity organized not for political but for ecclesiastical purposes and international objects. Despite its size and
object, the Vatican City has an independent government of its own, with the Pope, who is also head of the Roman
Catholic Church, as the Holy See or Head of State, in conformity with its traditions, and the demands of its
mission in the world. Indeed, the world-wide interests and activities of the Vatican City are such as to make it in
a sense an “international state” (Fenwick, supra. 125; Kelsen, Principles of International Law 160 [1956]).

Inasmuch as the Pope prefers to conduct foreign relations and enter into transactions as the Holy See and not in
the name of the Vatican City, one can conclude that in the Pope’s own view, it is the Holy See that is the
international person.

The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The Holy See,
through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine government
since 1957 (Rollo, p. 87). This appears to be the universal practice in international relations.

Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not
for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the
Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary
for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred in by the Philippine Senate and entered into force
in the Philippines on November 15, 1965.

The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental
character. Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off the same because the
squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation. The fact
that squatters have occupied and are still occupying the lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the premises,
has been admitted by private respondent in its complaint (Rollo, pp. 26, 27).

The issue of petitioner’s non-suability can be determined by the trial court without going to trial in the light of
the pleadings, particularly the admission of private respondent. Besides, the privilege of sovereign immunity in
this case was sufficiently established by the Memorandum and Certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs.
As the department tasked with the conduct of the Philippines’ foreign relations (Administrative Code of 1987,
Book IV, Title I, Sec. 3), the Department of Foreign Affairs has formally intervened in this case and officially
certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic mission to the Republic of the
Philippines exempt from local jurisdiction and entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities of a diplomatic
mission or embassy in this country (Rollo, pp. 156-157). The determination of the executive arm of government
that a state or instrumentality is entitled to sovereign or diplomatic immunity is a political question that is
conclusive upon the courts (International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 [1990]).
Where the plea of immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch, it is the duty of the courts to
accept this claim so as not to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting the country’s foreign
relations (World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 [1972]). As in International Catholic Migration
Commission and in World Health Organization, we abide by the certification of the Department of Foreign
Affairs.

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Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its grievances. Under both Public
International Law and Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can
ask his own government to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels.

Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office, to espouse its claims against
the Holy See. Its first task is to persuade the Philippine government to take up with the Holy See the validity of
its claims. Of course, the Foreign Office shall first make a determination of the impact of its espousal on the
relations between the Philippine government and the Holy See (Young, Remedies of Private Claimants Against
Foreign States, Selected Readings on Protection by Law of Private Foreign Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once
the Philippine government decides to espouse the claim, the latter ceases to be a private cause.

US v. Ruiz
The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its
consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States.
However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And
because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them—between sovereign and
governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that
State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is now the
rule in the United States, the United Kingdom and other states in western Europe. (See Coquia and Defensor-
Santiago, Public International Law, pp. 207-209 [1984]).
It can thus be seen that the statement in respect of the waiver of State immunity from suit was purely gratuitous
and, therefore, obiter so that it has no value as an imperative authority.
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial
transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may
be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent
to be sued only when it enters into business contracts, It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise
of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the
defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest
order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
United States of America vs. Guinto
The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, under which the Philippine
government “consents and submits to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract,
express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties.” In Merritt v. Government
of the Philippine Islands, a special law was passed to enable a person to sue the government for an alleged tort.
When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting
party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent. Waiver is also implied when the
government files a complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim. The above rules are subject to qualification.
Express consent is effected only by the will of the legislature through the medium of a duly enacted statute. We
have held that not all contracts entered into by the government will operate as a waiver of its non-suability;
distinction must be made between its sovereign and proprietary acts. As for the filing of a complaint by the
government, suability will result only where the government is claiming affirmative relief from the defendant.
There is no question that the United States of America, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly
waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the
contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied. This was our ruling
in United States of America v. Ruiz, where the transaction in question dealt with the improvement of the wharves
in the naval installation at Subic Bay. As this was a clearly governmental function, we held that the contract did
not operate to divest the United States of its sovereign immunity from suit.
It is clear from a study of the records of G.R. No. 80018 that the individually named petitioners therein were
acting in the exercise of their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation against the
complainant and thereafter testified against him at his trial. The said petitioners were in fact connected with the
Air Force Office of Special Investigators and were charged precisely with the function of preventing the
distribution, possession and use of prohibited drugs and prosecuting those guilty of such acts. It cannot for a
moment be imagined that they were acting in their private or unofficial capacity when they apprehended and later
testified against the complainant. It follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they
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cannot be directly im-pleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued. As
we observed in Sanders v. Veridiano: Given the official character of the above-described letters, we have to
conclude that the petitioners were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United States government. As
they have acted on behalf of that government, and within the scope of their authority, it is that government, and
not the petitioners personally, that is responsible for their acts.
We reject the conclusion of the trial court that the answer filed by the special counsel of the Office of the Sheriff
Judge Advocate of Clark Air Base was a submission by the United States government to its jurisdiction. As we
noted in Republic v. Purisima, express waiver of immunity cannot be made by a mere counsel of the government
but must be effected through a duly-enacted statute. Neither does such answer come under the implied forms of
consent as earlier discussed.
From these circumstances, the Court can assume that the restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station
partake of the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the United States government in its proprietary
capacity. Such services are not extended to the American servicemen for free as a perquisite of membership in
the Armed Forces of the United States. Neither does it appear that they are exclusively offered to these
servicemen; on the contrary, it is well known that they are available to the general public as well, including the
tourists in Baguio City, many of whom make it a point to visit John Hay for this reason. All persons availing
themselves of this facility pay for the privilege like all other customers as in ordinary restaurants. Although the
prices are conced-edly reasonable and relatively low, such services are undoubtedly operated for profit, as a
commercial and not a governmental activity. The consequence of this finding is that the petitioners cannot invoke
the doctrine of state immunity to justify the dismissal of the damage suit against them by Genove. Such defense
will not prosper even if it be established that they were acting as agents of the United States when they investigated
and later dismissed Genove. For that matter, not even the United States government itself can claim such
immunity. The reason is that by entering into the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of its
proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit.
Torio vs. Fontanilla
If the injury is caused in the course of the performance of a governmental function or duty no recovery, as a rule,
can be had from the municipality unless there is an existing statute on the matter, nor from its officers, so long as
they performed their duties honestly and in good faith or that they did not act wantonly and maliciously. In
Palafox, et al. v. Province of Ilocos Norte, et al., 1958, a truck driver employed by the provincial government of
Ilocos Norte ran over Proceto Palafox in the course of his work at the construction of a road. The Supreme Court
in affirming the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint for damages held that the province could not be made
liable because its employee was in the performance of a governmental function—the construction and
maintenance of roads—and however tragic and deplorable it may be, the death of Palafox imposed on the province
no duty to pay monetary consideration.
With respect to proprietary functions, the settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be held liable to third
persons ex contractu or ex delicto. Municipal corporations are subject to be sued upon contracts and in tort.
Coming to the case before Us, and applying the general tests given above, We hold that the holding of the town
fiesta in 1959 by the Municipality of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, was an exercise of a private or proprietary function
of the municipality.
This provision (Section 2282, RAC) simply gives authority to the municipality to celebrate a yearly fiesta but it
does not impose upon it a duty to observe one. Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is to commemorate a religious
or historical event of the town is in essence an act for the special benefit of the community and not for the general
welfare of the public performed in pursuance of a policy of the state. The mere fact that the celebration, as claimed,
was not to secure profit or gain but merely to provide entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a conclusive
test. For instance, the maintenance of parks is not a source of income for the town, nonetheless it is a private
undertaking as distinguished from the maintenance of public schools, jails, and the like which are for public
service.
Lastly, petitioner or appellant Municipality cannot evade responsibility and/or liability under the claim that it was
Jose Macaraeg who constructed the stage. The municipality acting through its municipal council appointed,
Macaraeg as chairman of the sub-committee on entertainment and in charge of the construction of the “zarzuela”
stage. Macaraeg acted merely as an agent of the Municipality. Under the doctrine of respondent superior
mentioned earlier, petitioner is responsible or liable for the negligence of its agent acting within his assigned
tasks.

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In their Petition for review the municipal councilors allege that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the
holding of a town fiesta is not a governmental function and that there was negligence on their part for not
maintaining and supervising the safe use of the stage, in applying Article 27 of the Civil Code against them, and
in not holding Jose Macaraeg liable for the collapse of the stage and the consequent death of Vicente Fontanilla.
We agree with petitioners that the Court of Appeals erred in applying Article 27 of the Civil Code against them,
for this particular article covers a case of nonfeasance or non-performance by a public officer of his official duty;
it does nof apply to a case of negligence or misfeasance in carrying out an official duty.
The Court of Appeals in its decision now under review held that the celebration of a town fiesta by the
Municipality of Malasiqui was not a governmental function. We upheld that ruling. The legal consequence thereof
is that the Municipality stands on the same footing as an ordinary private corporation with the municipal council
acting as its board of directors. It is an elementary principle that a corporation has a personality, separate and
distinct from its officers, directors, or persons composing it and the latter are not as a rule coresponsible in an
action for damages for tort or negligence (culpa aquiliana) committed by the corporation’s employees or agents
unless there is a showing of bad faith or gross or wanton negligence on their part.
Under paragraph 11, Art. 2208 of the Civil Code attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation may be granted when
the court deems it just and equitable. In this case of Vicente Fontanilla, although respondent appellate court failed
to state the grounds for awarding attorney’s tees, the records show however that attempts were made by plaintiffs,
now private respondents, to secure an extrajudicial compensation from the municipality; that the latter gave
promises and assurances of assistance but failed to comply; and it was only eight months after the incident that
the bereaved family of Vicente Fontanilla was compelled to seek relief from the courts to ventilate what was
believed to be a just cause. We hold, therefore, that there is no error committed in the grant of attorney’s fees
which after all is a matter of judicial discretion. The amount of P1,200.00 is fair and reasonable.
b. Waiver of Immunity
Express consent; General or Special Law
Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine Islands
The Government of the Philippine Islands having been "modeled after the federal and state governments of the
United States" the decisions of the high courts of that country may be used in determining the scope and purpose
of a special statute.
The state not being liable to suit except by its express consent, an Act abrogating that immunity will be strictly
construed. An act permitting a suit against the state gives rise to no liability not previously existing unless it is
clearly expressed in the act.
The Government of the Philippine Islands its only liable for the negligent acts of its officers, agents, and
employees when they are acting as special agents within. the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil
Code, and a chauffeur of the General Hospital is not such a special agent.
"The Government," 'says Justice Story, "does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers
or agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties
and losses, which would be subversive of the public interest."

ACT NO. 3083 - AN ACT DEFINING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS MAY BE SUED

Section 1. Complaint against Government. – Subject to the provisions of this Act, the
Government of the Philippine Islands hereby consents and submits to be sued upon any
moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, expressed or implied, which could
serve as a basis of civil action between private parties.

Section 1. Complaint against Government. – Subject to the provisions of this Act, the
Government of the Philippine Islands hereby consents and submits to be sued upon any
moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, expressed or implied, which could
serve as a basis of civil action between private parties.

Sec. 2. A person desiring to avail himself of the privilege herein conferred must show that
he has presented his claim to the Insular Auditor and that the latter did not decide the same
within two months from the date of its presentation.

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Sec. 3. Venue. – Original actions brought pursuant to the authority conferred in this Act
shall be instituted in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the province
were the claimant resides, at the option of the latter, upon which court exclusive original
jurisdiction is hereby conferred to hear and determine such actions.

Sec. 4. Actions instituted as aforesaid shall be governed by the same rules of procedure,
both original and appellate, as if the litigants were private parties.

Sec. 5. When the Government of the Philippine Island is plaintiff in an action instituted in
any court of original jurisdiction, the defendant shall have the right to assert therein, by
way of set-off or counterclaim in a similar action between private parties.

Sec. 6. Process in actions brought against the Government of the Philippine Islands
pursuant to the authority granted in this Act shall be served upon the Attorney-General 2
whose duty it shall be to appear and make defense, either himself or through delegates.

Sec. 7. Execution. – No execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by any court
against the Government of the Philippine Islands under the provisions of this Act; but a
copy thereof duly certified by the clerk of the Court in which judgment is rendered shall
be transmitted by such clerk to the Governor-General, 3 within five days after the same
becomes final.

Sec. 8. Transmittal of Decision. – The Governor-General, 4 at the commencement of each

regular session of the Legislature, 5 shall transmit to that body for appropriate action all
decisions so received by him, and if said body determine that payment should be made, it
shall appropriate the sum which the Government has been sentenced to pay, including the
same in the appropriations for the ensuing year.

Commonwealth Act No. 327 — An Act fixing the time within which the Auditor
General shall render his decisions and prescribing the manner of appeal therefrom.

SECTION 1. In all cases involving the settlement of accounts or claims, other than those
of accountable officers, the Auditor General shall act and decide the same within sixty
days, exclusive of Sundays and holidays, after their presentation. If said accounts or claims
need reference to other persons, office or offices, or to a party interested, the period
aforesaid shall be counted from the time the last comment necessary to a proper decision
is received by him. With respect to the accounts of accountable officers, the Auditor
General shall act on the same within one hundred days after their submission, Sundays and
holidays excepted.

In case of accounts or claims already submitted to but still pending decision by the Auditor
General on or before the approval of this Act, the periods provided in this section shall
commence from the date of such approval.

SEC. 2. The party aggrieved by the final decision of the Auditor General in the settlement
of an account or claim may, within thirty days from receipt of the decision, take an appeal
in writing:

(a) To the President of the United States, pending the final and complete withdrawal
of her sovereignty over the Philippines, or
(b) To the President of the Philippines, or
(c) To the Supreme Court of the Philippines if the appellant is a private person or entity.

If there are more than one appellant, all appeals shall be taken to the same authority resorted
to by the first appellant.

From a decision adversely affecting the interests of the Government, the appeal may be
taken by the proper head of the department or in case of local governments by the head of
the office or branch of the Government immediately concerned.

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 The appeal shall specifically set forth the particular action of the Auditor General to which
exception is taken with the reasons and authorities relied on for reversing such decision.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Purisima

This certiorari and prohibition proceeding arose from the failure of respondent Judge x x x to apply the well-
known and oft-reiterated doctrine of the nonsuability of a State, including its offices and agencies, from suit
without its consent. It was so alleged in a motion to dismiss filed by defendant Rice and Corn Administration in
a pending civil suit in the sala of respondent Judge for the collection of a money claim arising from an alleged
breach of contract, the plaintiff being private respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc. x x x. At that time, the
leading case of Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service, where Justice Bengzon stressed
the lack of jurisdiction of a court to pass on the merits of a claim against any office or entity acting as part of the
machinery of the national government unless consent be shown, had been applied in 53 other decisions. There is
thus more than sufficient basis for an allegation of jurisdiction infirmity against the order of respondent Judge
denying the motion to dismiss dated October 4, 1972. What is more, the position of the Republic has been fortified
with the explicit affirmation found in this provision of the present Constitution: “The State may not be sued
without its consent.” The merit of the petition for certiorari and prohibition is thus obvious.
Apparently respondent Judge was misled by the terms of the contract between the private respondent, plaintiff in
his sala, and defendant Rice and Corn Administration which, according to him, anticipated the case of a breach
of contract within the parties and the suits that may thereafter arise. The consent, to be effective though, must
come from the State acting through a duly enacted statute as pointed out by Justice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus,
whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed to had no binding force on the government.
That was clearly beyond the scope of his authority.
Implied Consent:
1. Entering Into Purely Commercial Transactions
2. Filing a Claim in Court, etc.
FROILAN vs. PAN ORIENTAL SHIPPING Co.
The immunity of the state from suits does not deprive it of the right to sue private parties in its own courts. The
state as plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of actions open to private litigants. In short, by taking the
initiative in an action against a private party, the state surrenders its privileged position and comes down to the
level of the defendant. The latter automatically acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims
and other defenses he might have against the state.
Republic vs. Villasor
It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state as
well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. It is readily understandable why it must be
so. In the classic formulation of Holmes: “A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception
or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority
that makes the law on which the right depends.
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special
law, it may limit claimant’s action “only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the state of execution”
and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may
not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious
considerations of public policy. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be
paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated
by law.
Philippine National Bank vs. Pabalan
The funds of public corporations which can sue and be sued were not exempt from garnishment. As respondent
Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration is likewise a public corporation possessed of the same attributes, a
similar outcome is indicated.
If the funds appertained to one of the regular departments or offices in the government, then, certainly, such a
provision would be a bar to garnishment. Such is not the case here. Garnishment would lie.
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The National Shipyard and Steel Corporation decision was not the first of its kind. The ruling therein could be
inferred from the judgment announced in Manila Hotel Employees Association v. Manila Hotel Company,
decided as far back as 1941. In the language of its ponente, Justice Ozaeta: “On the other hand, it is well-settled
that when the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated
like any other corporation. (Bank of the United States v. Planters’ Bank, 9 Wheat. 904, 6 L. ed. 244). By engaging
in a particular business thru the instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests itself pro hac vice of its
sovereign character, so as to tender the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private corporation.”
c. Suits Against Government Agencies
i. Chartered Agencies
Arcega vs. Court of Appeals
The suit is brought against the Central Bank of the Philippines, an entity authorized by its charter to sue and be
sued. The consent of the State to thus be sued, therefore, has been given. Furthermore, section 5 of Republic Act
No. 601 (as amended) directs that refund of taxes be made by the Central Bank.
Rayo vs. CFI of Bulacan
It is not necessary to write an extended dissertation on whether or not the NPC performs a governmental function
with respect to the management and operation of the Angat Dam. It is sufficient to say that the government has
organized a private corporation, put money in it and has allowed it to sue and be sued in any court under its
charter. (R.A. No. 6395, Sec. 3, (d).) As a government owned and controlled corporation, it has a personality of
its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government. (See National Shipyards and Steel Corp. vs. CIR, et
al., L-17874, August 31, 1963, 8. SCRA 781.) Moreover, the charter provision that the NPC can “sue and be sued
in any court” is without qualification on the cause of action and accordingly it can include a tort claim such as the
one instituted by the petitioners.
Phil. National Railways vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
The bone of contention for exculpation is premised on the familiar maxim in political law that the State, by virtue
of its sovereign nature and as reaffirmed by constitutional precept, is insulated from suits without its consent
(Article 16, Section 3, 1987 Constitution). However, equally conceded is the legal proposition that the
acquiescence of the State to be sued can be manifested expressly through a general or special law, or indicated
implicitly, as when the State commences litigation for the purpose of asserting an affirmative relief or when it
enters into a contract (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1991 edition, page 33; Sinco, Philippine Political Law,
Eleventh Edition, 1962, page 34). When the State participates in a covenant, it is deemed to have descended from
its superior position to the level of an ordinary citizen and thus virtually opens itself to judicial process. Of course,
We realize that this Court qualified this form of consent only to those contracts concluded in a proprietary capacity
and therefore immunity will attach for those contracts entered into in a governmental capacity, following the
ruling in the 1985 case of United States of America vs. Ruiz (136 SCRA 487 [1985]; cited by Cruz, supra at page
36-37). But the restrictive interpretation laid down therein is of no practical worth nor can it give rise to herein
petitioner PNR’s exoneration since the case of Malong vs. Philippine National Railways (138 SCRA 63 [1985]);
3 Padilla, 1987 Constitution with Comments and Cases, 1991 edition, page 644), decided three months after Ruiz
was promulgated, was categorical enough to specify that the Philippine National Railways “is not performing any
governmental function” (supra, at page 68).
ii. Unchartered or Unincorporated Agencies
Nat. Airports Corp. vs. Teodoro Sr. and Phil. Airlines Inc.
Not all government entities, whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune to suits. Immunity from suits is
determined by the character of the objects for which the entity was organized. "Suits against state agencies with
relation to matters in which they have assumed to act in a private or non-governmental capacity, and various suits
against certain corporations created by the state for public purposes, but to engage in matters partaking more of
the nature of ordinary business rather than functions of a governmental or political character, are not regarded as
suits against the state. The latter is true, although the state may own the stock or property of such a corporation,
for by engaging in business operations through a corporation the state divests itself so far of its sovereign
character, and by implication consents to suits against the corporation." (59 C. J., 313.)

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Bureau of Printing vs. Bureau of Printing Employees Association
The Bureau of Printing is an instrumentality of the Government. It operates under the direct supervision of the
Executive Secretary. It is designed to meet the printing needs of the Government. It is primarily a service bureau.
It is obviously not engaged in business or occupation for pecuniary profit. It has no corporate existence. Its
appropriations are provided for in the budget. It is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial
Relations.
The Industrial Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the complaint for unfair labor practice filed against
institutions or corporations not organized for profit and, consequently, are not industrial or business organizations.
The Industrial Peace Act was intended to apply only to industrial employment and to govern the relations between
employers engaged in industry and occupations for purposes of gain, and their industrial employees.
As a Government office, without any juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued. Any suit, action
or proceeding against the Bureau of Printing would actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the Government
itself. The Government cannot be sued without its consent, much less over its objection.
Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. vs. Customs Arrastre Service
A defendant in a civil suit must be (1) a natural person; (2) a juridical person or (3) an entity authorized by law to
be sued. The Bureau of Customs and (a fortiori) the Customs Arrastre Service are not persons. They are merely
parts of the machinery of Government. The Customs Arrastre Service is a unit of the Bureau of Customs, set up
under Customs Administrative Order No. 8-62 of November 9, 1962. It follows that they cannot be sued as natural
or juridical persons.
The fact that a noncorporate government entity performs a function proprietary in nature does not necessarily
result in its being suable. If said non-governmental function is undertaken as an incident to its governmental
functions, there is no waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such government entity
(Bureau of Printing vs. Bureau of Printing Employees Association, L-15751, Jan. 28, 1961).
Regardless of the merits of the claim against it, the State, for obvious reasons of public policy, cannot be sued
without its consent. The Bureau of Customs, acting as part of the machinery of the national government in the
operations of the arrastre service, pursuant to express legislative mandate and as a necessary incident of its prime
government function, is immune from suit, there being no statute to the contrary.
Where the Customs Arrastre Service did not deliver all the landed cargo to the consignee, the latter's remedy is
to f. ile a money claim with the General Auditing Office pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 327.
d. Immunity Not an Instrument to Perpetuate Injustice
Santiago vs. Republic
Fortunately, the constitutional provision itself allows a waiver. Where there is consent, a suit may be filed.
Consent need not be express. It can be implied. So it was more than implied in Ministerio v. Court of First Instance
of Cebu: “The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice on a citizen.” The fact that this decision arose from a suit against the Public Highways Commissioner
and the Auditor General for failure of the government to pay for land necessary to widen a national highway, the
defense of immunity without the consent proving unavailing, is not material. The analogy is quite obvious. Where
the government ordinarily benefited by the taking of the land, the failure to institute the necessary condemnation
proceedings should not be a bar to an ordinary action for the collection of the just compensation due. Here the
alleged failure to abide by the conditions under which a donation was given should not prove an insuperable
obstacle to a civil action, the consent likewise being presumed. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that
while a donation partakes of a contract, there is no money claim, and therefore reliance on Commonwealth Act
No. 327 would be futile.
Our decision, it must be emphasized, goes no further than to rule that a donor, with the Republic or any of its
agency being the donee, is entitled to go to court in case of an alleged breach of the conditions of such donation.
He has the right to be heard. Under the circumstance, the fundamental postulate of non suability cannot stand in
the way. It is made to accommodate itself to the demands of procedural due process, which is the negation of
arbitrariness and inequity. The government, in the final analysis, is the beneficiary. It thereby manifests its
adherence to the highest ethical standards, which can only be ignored at the risk of losing the confidence of the
people, the repository of the sovereign power. The judiciary under this circumstance has the grave responsibility
of living up to the ideal of objectivity and impartiality, the very essence of the rule of law. Only by displaying the

Page 15 of 173
neutrality expected of an arbiter, even if it happens to be one of the departments of a litigant, can the decision
arrived at, whatever it may be, command respect and be entitled to acceptance.
Amigable vs. Cuenca
Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the
legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the
government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent.
The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on
a citizen. Had the government followed the procedure indicated by the governing law at the time, a complaint
would have been filed by it, and only upon pay ment of the compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender
of the party entitled to such pay ment of the amount fixed, may it “have the right to enter in and upon the land so
condemned, to appropriate the same to the public use defined in the judgment.
As registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in question at anytime
because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since restoration of possession of said portion
by the government is neither convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and has been used for road
purposes, the only relief available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and should
have done years ago. To determine the due compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value
thereof at the time of the taking.
DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS
A. POLITICAL LAW; Definition
People vs. Perfecto
It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the
ceded region are totally abrogated. "Political" is here used to denominate the laws regulating the relations
sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign.
Every nation acquiring territory, by treaty or otherwise, must hold it subject to the Constitution and laws of its
own government, and not according to those of the government ceding it. "In the eye of our Constitution and
laws, every man is a sovereign, a ruler and a freeman, and has equal rights with every other man.
Macariola vs. Asuncion
Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization and operation of
the governmental organs of the State and defined the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory. It
may be recalled that political law embraces constitutional law, law of public corporations, administrative law
including the law on public officers and elections. Specifically, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes
more of the nature of an administrative law because it regulates the conduct of certain public officers and
employees with respect to engaging in business; hence, political in essence.
B. THE SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION
Mutuc vs. COMELEC

Under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words following any enumeration being
applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to. It is quite apparent that what
was contemplated in the Constitutional Convention Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as
a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution.

A statute should be interpreted to assure its being in consonance with, rather than repugnant to, any constitutional
command or prescription. Thus, certain Administrative Code provisions were given a "construction which should
be more in harmony with the tenets of the fundamental law." The desirability of remaining in that fashion the
taint of constitutional infirmity from legislative enactments has always commended itself. The judiciary may even
strain the ordinary meaning of words to avert any collision between what a statute provides and what the
Constitution requires. The objective is to reach an interpretation rendering it free from constitutional defects. To
paraphrase Justice Cardozo, if at all possible, the conclusion reached must avoid not only that it is
unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that score.

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In unequivocal language, the Constitution prohibits an abridgment of free speech or a free press. It has been the
constant holding that this preferred freedom calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed
is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. The Commission
on Elections, in prohibiting the use of taped jingle for campaign purposes did, in effect, impose censorship, an
evil against which this constitutional right is directed. Nor could the Commission justify its action by the assertion
that petitioner, if he would not resort to taped jingle, would be free, either by himself or through others, to use his
mobile loudspeakers. Precisely, the constitutional guarantee is not to be emasculated confining it to a speaker
having his say, but not perpetuating what is uttered by him through tape or other mechanical contrivances.

The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for the validity of any public
act whether proceeding from the highest official or the lowest functionary, is a postulate of our system of
government. That is to manifest fealty to the rule of law, with priority accorded to that which occupies the topmost
rung in the legal hierarchy. The three departments of government in the discharge of the functions with which it
is entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.

As a branch of the executive department—although— independent of the President—to which the Constitution
has given the "exclusive charge" of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections, the power of decision of the Commission is limited to purely "administrative questions." It has been the
constant holding, as it could not have been otherwise, that the Commission cannot exercise any authority in
conflict with or outside of the law, and there is no higher law than the Constitution.
Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance System
A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme,
imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the
fundamental and paramount law of the nation.10 It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of
government, assigns to the different departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed
principles on which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme
law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and
all public authority administered.11 Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates
any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive
branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect.
Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written
in every statute and contract.
General Rule: Provision of the Constitution are Self Executing
Tondo Medical Center Employees Association vs. Court of Appeals
While as a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered self-executing, and do not require future
legislation for their enforcement, some provisions have already been categorically declared by the Supreme Court
as non selfexecuting.
Constitutional provisions which are statements of principles and policies are mere directives addressed to the
executive and the legislative departments—if unheeded, the remedy will not lie with the courts but rather, the
electorate’s displeasure may be manifested in their votes
THE PREAMBLE
Aglipay v. Ruiz
What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere religious toleration. Religious freedom,
however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its
influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his
Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is
deeply felt and highly appreciated.
The respondent Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in question under the provisions of Act No. 4052 of
the Philippine Legislature which appropriates the sum of sixty thousand pesos for the cost of plates and' printing
of postage stamps with new designs and other expenses incident thereto, and authorizes the Director of Posts,
with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to dispose of the amount appropriated
in the manner indicated and "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government."

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Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary
power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government."
Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government" does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It
does not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support
of a particular sect or church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the
Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian
feeling to favor a particular church or religious denomination. The stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit
of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church.
The only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists to
this country." The officials concerned merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance
"to give publicity to the Philippines and its people." The stamps as actually designed and printed (Exhibit 2),
instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the
location of the City of Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress,
Feb. 3-7, 1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the
Philippines, as the seat of that congress.
While the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of a
religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim
and purpose of the Government. The Government should not be embarrassed in its activities simply because of
incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately
be undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordination to mere
incidental results not contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs. Roberts, 175 U. S., 295; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law.
ed., 168.)
ARTICLE II
DECLARATONS OF STATE PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
Two-Fold Functions of the Government
1. Constituent Function
2. Ministrant Function
Bacani v. NACOCO
The term “Government of the Republic of the Philippines” used in section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code
refers to that government entity through which the functions of the government are exercised as an attribute of
sovereignty, and in this are included those arms through which political authority is made effective whether they
be provincial, municipal or other ex orm of local government. These are what we call municipal corporations.
They do not include government entitles which are given a corporate personality separate and distinct from the
government and which are governed by the Corporation Law, such as the National Coconut Corporation. Their
powers, duties and liabilities have to be determined in the light of that law and of their corporate charters. They
do not therefore come within the exemption clause prescribed in section 16, Rule 130 of our Rules of Court.
It is true that in section 8, Rule 130, stenographers may only charge as fees P0.30 for each page of transcript of
not less than 200 words before the appeal is taken and P0.15 for each page after the filing of the appeal, but where,
as in the case at bar, the party has agreed and in fact has paid P1 per page for the services rendered by the
stenographers and has not raised any objection to the amount paid until its propriety was disputed by the Auditor
General, the payment of the fees became contractual and as such is valid even if it goes beyond the limit prescribed
by the Rules of Court.
ACCFA vs. CUGCO
The ACA is a government office engaged in governmental, not proprietary functions. There can be no dispute as
to the fact that the land reform program contemplated in the Land Reform Code is beyond the capabilities of any
private enterprise to translate into reality. It is a purely governmental function, no less than, say, the establishment
and maintenance of public schools and public hospitals. And when, aside from the governmental objectives, of
the ACA, geared as they are to the implementation of the land reform program of the State, the law itself declares
that the ACA is a government office, with the formulation of policies, plans and programs vested no longer in a
Board of Governors, as in the case of the ACCFA, but in the National Land Reform Council, itself a government
instrumentality; and that its personnel are subject to Civil Service Laws and to rules of standardization with
respect to positions and salaries, any vestige 01 doubt as to the governmental character of its functions disappears.

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The governmental functions of ACA may not be strictly what President Wilson described as "constituent" (as
distinguished from "ministrant"), such as those relating to the maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime,
those regulating property and property rights, those relating to the administration of justice and the determination
of political duties of citizens, and those relating to national defense and foreign relations. Under this traditional
classification, such constituent functions are exercised by the State as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to
promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people—these latter functions being ministrant, the exercise
of which is optional on the part of the government The growing complexities of modern society, however, have
rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete, The
areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter
optionally continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government
must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. In the
Philippines as almost everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic
forces. Here of course this development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution
itself in its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of social justice. It was in furtherance of such policy
that the Land Reform Code was enacted and the various agencies, the ACA among them, established to carry out
its purposes.
ACCFA sought to avoid compliance with the collective bargaining contract it entered into with its labor unions
on the ground that the condition imposed by the Office of the President that the payment of the benefits therein
fixed must be "within the financial ability of the particular corporation to bear," was not complied with. Some
fringe benefits thereunder had already been paid however. HELD: The payment of the fringe benefits agreed
upon, to our mind, throws that the same were within the financial capability of the ACCFA then, and hence
justifies the conclusion that this particular condition imposed by the Office of the President in its approval of the
bargaining contract was satisfied. We hold, therefore, that insofar as the fringe benefits already paid are
concerned. there is no reason to set aside the decision of the respondent Court, but that since the respondent
Unions have no right to the certification election sought by them nor. consequently. to bargain collectively with
the petitioner ACA (formerly ACCFA), no further benefits may be demanded on the basis of any collective
bargaining agreement.
In Bacani v. NACOCO, governmental functions are classified into constituent and ministrant. The former are
those which constitute the very bonds of society and are compulsory in nature; the latter are those that are
undertaken only by way of advancing the general interests of society, and are merely optional. President Wilson
enunierates the constituent functions as follows: (1) The keeping of order and providing for the protection of
persons and property from violence and robbery; (2) The fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and
between parents and children; (3) The regulation of the holding, transmission, and interchange of property, and
the determination of its liabilities for debt or for crime; (4) The determination of contractual rights between
individuals; (5) The definition and punishment of crime; (6) The administration of justice in civil cases; (7) The
determination of the political duties, privileges, and relations of citizens; (8) Dealings of the state with foreign
powers: the preservation of the state from external danger or encroachment and the advancement of its
international interests. The most important of the ministrant functions are: public works, public education, public
charity, health and safety regulations, and regulations of trade and industry. The principles determining whether
or not a government shall exercise certain of these optional functions are (1) that a government should do for the
public welfare those things which private capital would not naturally undertake and (2) that a government should
do these things which by its very nature is better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private
individual or group of individuals.
The influence exerted by American constitutional doctrines unvoidable when the Philippines was still under
American rule notwithstanding, an influence that has not altogether vanished even after independence, the laissez-
faire principle never found full acceptance in this jurisdiction, even during the period of its full flowering in the
United States. Moreover, to erase any doubts, the Constitutional Convention saw to it that our fundamental law
embodies a policy of the responsibility thrust on government to cope with social and economic problems and an
earnest and sincere commitment to the promotion of the general welfare through state action.
Phil. Virginia Tobacco Administration vs. CIR
The welfare state concept “is not alien to the philosophy of [the 1935] Constitution.” It is much more so under
the present Charter, which is impressed with an even more explicit recognition of social and economic rights.
There is manifest, to recall Laski, “a definite increase in the profundity of the social conscience,” resulting in “a
state which seeks to realize more fully the common good of its members.”

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The growing complexities of modern society have rendered the traditional classification of the functions of
government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative
and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and only because it was better equipped to
administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals, continue to lose their well-
defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign
capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the tendency
is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces. Here of course this development was
envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning
the promotion of social justice.
There is no constitutional obstacle to a government pursuing lines of endeavor, formerly reserved for private
enterprise. This is one way, in the language of Laski, by which through such activities, “the harsh contrast which
[does] obtain between the levels of the rich and the poor” may be minimized. It is a response to a trend noted by
Justice Laurel in Calalang v. Williams for the humanization of laws and the promotion of the interest of all
component elements of society so that man’s innate aspirations, in what was so felicitously termed by the First
Lady as “a compassionate society” be attained.
Parens Patriae
Government of the P. I. vs. Monte de Piedad
The law of June 20, 1849, the royal order of April 27, 1875, and the instructions promulgated on the latter date
conferred upon the former sovereign authority to supervise and control certain private or special charities of a
temporary nature.
While there is a total abrogation of the former political relations of the inhabitants of ceded territory, and an
abrogation of laws in conflict with the political character of the substituted sovereign, the great body of municipal
law regulating private and domestic rights continues in force until abrogated or changed by the new ruler. Laws
conferring upon the Government power to supervise and control special charities are not in conflict with the
political character, constitution or institutions of the United States.
Facts: In 1863 the inhabitants of the Spanish dominions contributed funds for the relief of those
damaged by an earthquake in the Philippine Islands and the money was remitted to the Philippines
to be distributed by a central relief board. Part of the "funds contributed were turned over to the
"Monte de Piedad" to be held at the disposal of the relief board.
Held: That the Philippine Government is the proper party to maintain an action to recover the
funds thus loaned or deposited for the purpose of carrying out the intention of the contributors.
Cabanas vs. Pilapil
The judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of
litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest. ... What is more, there is this
constitutional provision vitalizing this concept. It reads: “The State shall strengthen the family as a basic social
institution.” If, as the Constitution so wisely dictates, it is the family as a unit that has to be strengthened, it does
not admit of doubt that even if a stronger case were presented for the uncle, still deference to a constitutional
mandate would have led the lower court to decide as it did.
This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged
in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted
by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties.”
De Jure and De Facto Government
Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon
It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and
judicial departments of a de facto government are good and valid.
There are several kinds of de facto governments. The first, or government de facto in a proper legal sense, is that
government that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful
legal government and maintains itself against the will of the latter, such as the government of England under the
Commonwealth, first by Parliament and later by Cromwell as Protector. The second is that which is established
and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which

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is denominated a government of paramount force, as the cases of Castine, in Maine, which was reduced to British
possession in the war of 1812, and of Tampico, Mexico, occupied during the war with Mexico, by the troops of
the United States. And the third is that established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country
who rise in insurrection against the parent state, such as the government of the Southern Confederacy in revolt
against the Union during the war of secession.
The distinguishing characteristics of the second kind of de facto government, more aptly denominated a
government of paramount force, are
(1), that its existence is maintained by active military power within the territories and against the rightful
authority of an established and lawful government; and
(2), that while it exists it must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of
obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible, as wrongdoers, for those acts,
though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government. Actual governments of this sort are established
over districts differing greatly in extent andconditions. They are usually administered by military authority,
but they may be administered, also, by civil authority, supported more or less directly by military force.
The powers and duties of de facto governments of this description are regulated in Section III of the Hague
Conventions of 1907, which is a revision of the provisions of the Hague Conventions of 1899 on the same subject
of Military Authority over Hostile Territory. Article 43 of said Section III provides that "the authority of the
legitimate power having actually passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all steps in his power
to reestablish and issue, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented,
the laws in force in the country."
It is evident that the Phil-ippine Executive Commission, which was organized by Order No. 1, issued on January
23, 1942 by the Commander of the Japanese forces, was a civil government established by the military forces of
occupation and therefore a de facto government of the second kind. It was not different from the government
established by the British in Castine, Maine, or by the United States in Tampico, Mexico. As Halleck says, "the
government established over an enemy's territory during the military occupation may exercise all the powers
given by the laws of war to the conqueror over the conquered, and is subject to an restrictions which that code
imposes. It is of little consequence whether such government be called a military or civil government. Its character
is the same and the source of its authority the same. In either case it is a government imposed by the laws of war,
and so far as it concerns the inhabitants of such territory or the rest of the world, those laws alone determine the
legality or illegality of its acts." (Vol. 2, p. 466.) The fact that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil
and not a military government and was run by Filipinos and not by Japanese nationals, is of no consequence.
The so-called Republic of the Philippines, apparently established and organized as a sovereign state independent
from any other government by the Filipino people, was, in truth and reality, a government established by the
belligerent occupant or the Japanese forces of occupation. It was of the same character as the Philippine Executive
Commission, and the ultimate source of its authority was the same—the Japanese military authority and
government. Japan had no legal power to grant independence to the Philippines or transfer the sovereignty of the
United States to, or recognize the latest sovereignty of, the Filipino people, before its military occupation and
possession of the Islands had matured into an absolute and permanent dominion or sovereignty by a treaty of
peace or other means recognized in the law of nations. For it is a wellestablished doctrine in international law,
recognized in Article 45 of the Hague Conventions of 1907 (which prohibits compulsion of the population of the
occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile power), that belligerent occupation, being essentially
provisional, does not serve to transfer sovereignty over the territory controlled although the de jure government
is during the period of occupancy deprived of the power to exercise its rights as such. Even if the Republic of the
Philippines had been established by the free will of the Filipino people who, taking advantage of the withdrawal
of the American forces from the Islands, had organized an independent government under that name with the
support and backing of Japan, such government would have been considered as one established by the Filipinos
in insurrection or rebellion against the parent state of the United States. And, as such, it would have been a de
facto government similar to that organized by the confederate states during the war of secession and recognized
as such by the Supreme Court of the United States in numerous cases; and similar to the short-lived government
established by the Filipino insurgents in the Island of Cebu during the Spanish-American war, recognised as a de
facto government by same court in the case of McCleod vs. United States (229 U. S., 416).
The governments of the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese
military occupation being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of
the courts of justice of those governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid, and, by
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virtue of the well-known principle of postliminy (postliminium) in international law, remained good and valid
after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces under the leadership of
General Douglas MacArthur.
The phrase "processes of any other government" is broad and may refer not only to judicial processes, but also to
administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional, processes of the Republic of the Philippines or other
governmental agencies established in the Islands during the Japanese occupation. Taking into consideration the
fact that, according to the well-known principles of international law all judgments and judicial proceedings,
which are not of a political complexion, of the de facto governments during the Japanese military occupation were
good and valid before and remained so after the occupied territory had come again into the power of the titular
sovereign, it should be presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of General Douglas
MacArthur, in using the phrase "processes of any other government" in said proclamation, to refer to judicial
processes, in violation of said principles of international law. The only reasonable construction of the said phrase
is that it refers to governmental processes other than judicial processes or court proceedings, for according to a
well-known rule of statutory construction, set forth in 25 R. C. L., p. 1028, "a statute ought never to be construed
to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains."
Although in theory the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is suspended as a matter of course
as soon as military occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not usually take the administration of
justice into his own hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the country
which he is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to respect. Following this practice and the precepts of the law
of nations, the Commander in Chief of the Japanese forces proclaimed on January 3, 1943, when Manila was
occupied, the military administration under martial law over the territory occupied by the army, and ordered that
"all the laws now in force in the Commonwealth, as well as executive and judicial institutions, shall continue to
be effective for the time being as in the past," and "all public officials shall remain in their present posts and carry
on faithfully their duties as before." When the Philippine Executive Commission was organized by Order No. 1
of the Japanese Commander in Chief, on January 23, 1942, the Chairman of the Executive Commission, by
Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 4 of January 30 and February 5, respectively, continued the Supreme Court, Court
of Appeals, Courts of First Instance, and justices of the peace courts, with the same jurisdiction, in conformity
with the instructions given by the Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese army in Order No. 3 of February
20, 1942. And on October 14, 1943 when the so-called Republic of the Philippines was inaugurated, the same
courts were continued with no substantial change in the organization and jurisdiction thereof. If the proceedings
pending in the different courts of the Islands prior to the Japanese military occupation had been continued during
the Japanese military administration, the Philippine Executive Commission, and the so-called Republic of the
Philippines, it stands to reason the same courts, which become reestablished and conceived of as having been in
continued existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminy
(Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 516), may continue the proceedings in cases then pending in said courts,
without necessity of enacting a law conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said proceedings.
It is a legal maxim that, excepting that of a political nature, "Law once established continues until changed by
some competent legislative power. It is not changed merely by change of sovereignty." (Joseph H. Beale, Cases
on Conflict of Laws, III, Summary section 9, citing Commonwealth vs. Chapman, 13 Met., 68.) As the same
author says, in his Treatise 011 the Conflict of Laws (Cambridge, 1916, section 131): "There can be no break or
interregnum in law. From the time the law comes into existence with the first-felt corporateness of a primitive
people it must last until the final disappearance of human society. Once created, it persists until a change takes
place, and when changed it continues in such changed condition until the next change, and so forever. Conquest
or colonization is impotent to bring law to amend; in spite of change of constitution, the law continues unchanged
until the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change." As courts are creatures of statutes and their existence
depends upon that of the laws which create and confer upon them their jurisdiction, it is evident that such laws,
not being of a political nature, are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty, and continue in force "ex proprio
vigore" unless and until repealed by legislative acts. A proclamation that said laws and courts are expressly
continued is not necessary in order that they may continue in force. Such proclamation, if made, is but a
declaration of the intention of respecting and not repealing those laws. As a consequence, enabling laws or acts
providing that proceedings pending in one court be continued by or transferred to another court, are not required
by the mere change of government or sovereignty. They are necessary only in case the "f ormer courts are
abolished or their jurisdiction so changed that they can no longer continue taking cognizance of the cases and
proceedings commenced therein, in order that the new courts or the courts having jurisdiction over said cases may
continue the proceedings.

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Peralta vs. Director of Prisons
As the so-called Republic of the Philippines was a de facto government of the second kind (of paramount force),
the questions involved in the present case cannot be decided in the light of the Constitution of the Commonwealth
Government, because the belligerent occupant was totally independent of the constitution of the occupied territory
in carrying out the administration over said territory (Oppenheim's International Law, Vol. II, Sixth Edition,
Revised, 1944, p. 342); and the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the cases
involving the validity of judicial and legislative acts of the Confederate States, considered as de facto governments
of the third kind, does not apply to the acts of the so-called Republic of the Philippines which is a de facto
government of paramount force. The Constitution of the so-called Republic of the Philippines can neither be
applied, since the validity of an act of a belligerent occupant cannot be tested in the light of another act of the
same occupant, whose criminal jurisdiction is drawn entirely from the law martial as defined in the usages of
nations.
The so-called Republic of the Philippines, being a governmental instrumentality of the belligerent occupant, had
the power or was competent to create the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. No question may
arise as to whether or not a court is of a political complexion, for it is a mere governmental agency charged with
the duty of applying the law to cases falling within its jurisdiction. Its judgments and sentences may be of a
political complexion or not depending upon the nature or character of the law so applied. There is no room for
doubt, therefore, as to the validity of the creation of the court in question.
With respect to the summary procedure adopted by Ordinance No. 7, and followed in the trial of the case which
resulted in the conviction of the herein petitioner, there is also no question as to the power or competence of the
belligerent occupant to promulgate the law providing for such procedure. The only restrictions or limitations
imposed upon the power of a belligerent occupant to alter the laws or promulgate new ones, especially the criminal
law as well as the laws regarding procedure, so far as it is necessary for military purposes, that is, for his control
of the territory and the safety and protection of his army, are those imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages
established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public conscience, It is obvious
that the summary procedure under consideration does not violate those precepts. It cannot be considered as
violating the laws of humanity and public conscience, for it is less objectionable, even from the point of view of
those who are used to the accusatory system of criminal procedure, than the procedural laws based on the semi-
inquisitorial or mixed system prevailing in France and other countries in continental Europe.
It was within the power and competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate, through the National Assembly
of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, Act "No. 65 of the said Assembly, which penalizes the crimes of
robbery and other offenses as new crimes and offenses demanded by military necessity, incident to a state of war,
and necessary for the control of the country by the belligerent occupant, the protection and safety of the army of
occupation, its support and efficiency, and the success of its operations. They are not the same ordinary offenses
penalized by the Revised Penal Code. The criminal acts penalized by said Act No. 65 are those committed by
persons charged or connected with the supervision and control of the production, procurement and distribution of
foods and other necessaries; and the penalties imposed upon the violators are different from and much heavier
than those provided by the Revised Penal Code for the same ordinary crimes. The acts penalized by said Act were
taken out of the territorial law or Revised Penal Code, and referred to what is called martial law by international
jurists, defined above by Hyde, in order, not only to prevent food and other necessaries from reaching the
"guerrillas" which were harassing the belligerent occupant from every nook and corner of the country, but also to
preserve the food supply and other necessaries in order that in case of necessity, the Imperial Japanese forces
could easily requisition them, as they did, and as they had the right to do in accordance with the law of nations
for their maintenance and subsistence (Art. LII, sec. III, Hague Conventions of 1907). Especially taking into
consideration the fact, of which this court may take judicial notice, that the Imperial Japanese Army had depended
mostly for their supply upon the produce of this country.
The crimes penalized by Act No. 65—as well as the crimes against national security and the law of nations, and
the crimes against public order, penalized by Ordinance No. 7. and placed under the jurisdiction of the Court of
Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction—are all of a political complexion, because the acts constituting those
offenses were punished, as are all political offenses, for public rather than private reasons, and were acts in aid or
favor of the enemy and directed against the welfare, safety and security of the belligerent occupant.
The punitive sentence under consideration, although good and valid during the military occupation of the
Philippines by the Japanese forces, ceased to be good and valid ipso facto upon the reoccupation of these Islands
and the restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government. (Hall's International Law, seventh edition, p. 518;

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Westlake, International Law, Part II, War, pp. 97, 98; Wheaton's International Law, War, seventh edition, 1944,
p. 245.)
Alcantara vs. Director of Prisons
The so-called Republic of the Philippines and the Philippine Executive Commission established in the Philippines
during the Japanese regime, were governments de facto organized by the belligerent occupant, and the judicial
acts thereof were good and valid and remained good and valid after the restoration of the Commonwealth
Government, except those of a political complexion.
The Court of Appeals which was continued throughout the Japanese occupation, was the same Court of Appeals
that existed prior to the Japanese occupation and was lately abolished by Executive Order No. 37. The division
of the Court of Appeals into several District Courts of Appeals, and the reduction of the number of Justices sitting
in each division, during the regime of the so-called Republic, effected no substantial change in its nature and
jurisdiction.
Even assuming that the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon was a new court created by the belligerent occupant
or the de facto governments established by him, the judgments of such court, like those of the courts which were
continued during the Japanese occupation, were good and valid and remain good and valid, and therefore
enforceable, now after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines, provided that such judgments do not have
a political complexion.
A punitive or penal sentence is said to be of a political complexion when it penalizes either a new act not defined
in the municipal laws, or acts already penalized by the latter as a crime against the legitimate government, but
taken out of the territorial law and penalized as new offenses committed against the belligerent occupant, incident
to a state of war and necessary for the control of the occupied territory and the protection of the army of the
occupier. They are acts penalized for public rather than private reasons, acts which tend, directly or indirectly, to
aid or favor the enemy and are directed against the welfare, safety and security of the belligerent occupant. As
examples, the crimes against national security, such as treason, espionage, etc., and against public order, such as
rebellion, sedition, etc,, were crimes against the Commonwealth or United States Government under the Revised
Penal Code, which were made crimes against the belligerent occupant.
Sovereignty as Auto-Limitation
Tañada vs. Angara
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition
no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.
“The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the
supremacy of the Constitution is upheld.” Once a “controversy as to the application or interpretation of a
constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court
is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.”
As the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion and as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, we have no hesitation at all in holding that this petition should be given due course and
the vital questions raised therein ruled upon under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when
proper, acts of legislative and executive officials. On this, we have no equivocation.
In deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition, the Supreme Court does not review the wisdom of the decision
of the President and the Senate in enlisting the country in the WTO, or pass upon the merits of trade liberalization
as a policy espoused by said international body, rather, it only exercises its constitutional duty “to determine
whether or not there had been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction” on the part
of the Senate in ratifying the WTO Agreement and its three annexes.
This Court notes and appreciates the ferocity and passion by which petitioners stressed their arguments on this
issue. However, while sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic
level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or
impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision a hermit-type
isolation of the country from the rest of the world.

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In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution “adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation and amity, with all nations.” By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally
accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be autom atically part of our own laws. One of
the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda— international agreements must
be performed in good faith. “A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding
obligation on the parties x x x. A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in
its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.”
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act,
nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived
from a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually
covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise absolute
rights.
Reagan vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised
over its entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are
supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern there in, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its
terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has to be
exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of its sovereignty.
It is to be admitted that any state may by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign
rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in character. That is the concept of
sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, "is the property of a state-force due to
which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction." A state then, if it chooses to,
may refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence.
People v. Gozo
As was so emphatically set forth in the Agreement, it should be noted, the Philippine overnment merely consents
that the nited States exercise urisdiction in certain cases. This consent was given purely as a matter of comity,
courtesy or expediency. The Philippine overnment has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the
Philippine territory or divested itself completely of urisdiction over offenses committed therein. nder the terms of
the treaty, the nited States overnment has prior or preferential but not exclusive urisdiction of such offenses. The
Philippine overnment retains not only urisdictional rights not granted, but also such ceded rights as the nited
States Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of.
Nor does appellant’s thesis rest on less shaky foundation by the mere fact that and dealt with the competence of
the national government, while what is sought to be emasculated in this case is the so-called administrative
urisdiction of a municipal corporation. ithin the limits of its territory, whatever statutory powers are vested upon
it may be validly exercised. Any residual authority not therein conferred, whether expressly or impliedly, belongs
to the national government, not to an alien country.
1. The Incorporation Clause and Doctrine of Incorporation
Kuroda vs. Jalandoni

2. Conflict between International Law and Municipal Law or Local Law

Ichong, etc., et al. vs. Hernandez, etc., and Sarmiento
Police power is far-reaching in scope, and it is almost impossible to limit its sweep. It derives its existence from
the very existence of the State itself, and does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope. It is said to be co-
extensive with self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental
processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework
where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and
scope of police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have
become almost all-embracing and have transcended human foresight.
The conflict between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws is more
apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the
essence, or the indispensable means for the" attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. There
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can be no absolute power, whoever exercises it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute
liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty or property,
provided there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is
given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation must
be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and
means. And if disctinction or classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in
the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality
among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions
both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation
which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such
class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those
who do not (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825).
The power of the legislature to make distinctions and classifications among persons is not curtailed or denied by
the equal protection of the laws clause. The legislative power admits of a wide scope of discretion, and a law can
be violative of the constitutional limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis. Citizenship
is a legal and valid ground for classification.
The classification in the law of retail traders into nationals and aliens is actual, real and reasonable. All persons
of one class are treated alike, and it cannot be said that the classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded.
Hence, it is the duty of this Court to declare that the legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative and it cannot
declare that the act transcends the limits of equal protection established by the Constitution.
Nationalistic tendency is manifested in various provisions of the Constitution. The nationalization of the retail
trade is only a continuance of the nationalistic protective policy laid down as a primary objective of the
Constitution, It cannot therefore be said that a law imbued with the same purpose and spirit underlying many of
the provisions of the Constitution is unreasonable, invalid or unconstitutional.
The exercise of legislative discretion is not subject to judicial review. The Court will not inquire into the motives
of the Legislature, nor pass upon general matters of legislative judgment. The Legislature is primarily the judge
of the necessity of an enactment or of any of its provisions, and every presumption is in favor of its validity, and
though the Court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the law, it may not annul the legislative
The law does not violate international treaties and obligations. The United Nations Charter imposes no strict or
legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects (Jans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations,
1951 ed., pp. 29-32), and the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere recommendation,
or a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations. The Treaty of Amity between the Republic
of the Philippines and the Republic of China of April 18, 1947 guarantees equality of treatment to the Chinese
nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country". But the nationals of China are not
discriminated against because nationals of all other countries, except those of the United States, who are granted
special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that the
law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law
(U.S. vs. Thompson, 258, Fed. 257, 260), and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power
of the State (Palston vs. Pennsylvania 58 L. ed., 539).
Gonzales vs. Hechanova
The Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled the question of whether an international agreement may be
invalidated by our courts in the affirmative, by providing in Section 2 of Article VIII thereof that the Supreme
Court may not be deprived “of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari,
or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in (1)
all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation
is in question.” In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts
with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.
Respondents, despite their lack of compliance with the Rice Importation Law, should not be enjoined from
carrying out the importation of the rice which according to the record has been authorized to be imported on
government to government level, it appearing that the arrangement to this effect has already been concluded, the
only thing lacking being its implementation. Had the writ been issued, our government would have been placed
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in a predicament where, as a necessary consequence, it would have to repudiate a duly formalized agreement to
its great embarrassment and loss of face.
In Re Garcia
Sec. 4, Article II (Government to serve and protect the people, duty of people to defend the state
People vs. Lagman
The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go against section 2,
Article II of the Philippine Constitution but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the
Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an
army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no
sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein.
In the United States the courts have held in a series of decisions that the compulsory military service adopted by
reason of the civil war and the world war does not violate the Constitution, because the power to establish it is
derived from that granted to Congress to declare war and to organize and maintain an army. This is so because
the right of the Government to require compulsory military service is a consequence of its duty to defend the State
and is reciprocal with its duty to defend the life, liberty, and property of the citizen. In the case of Jacobson vs.
Massachusetts (197 U. S., 11; 25 Sup. Ct. Rep., 385), it was said that, without violating the Constitution a person
may be compelled by force, if need be, against his will, against his pecuniary interests and even against his
religious or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of his country, and risk the chance of
being shot down in its defense.
In the case of United States vs. Olson (253 Fed., 233), it was also said that this is not deprivation of property
without due process of law, because, in its just sense, there is no right of property to an office or employment.
The circumstance that these decisions refer to laws enacted by reason of the actual existence of war does not make
our case any different, inasmuch as, in the last analysis, what justifies compulsory military service is the defense
of the State, whether actual or whether in preparation to make it more effective, in case of need.
The circumstance that the appellants have dependent families to support does not excuse them from their duty to
present themselves before the Acceptance Board because, if such circumstance exists, they can ask for deferment
in complying with their duty and, at all events, they can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to attend to these
family responsibilities (sections 65 and 69 of Commonwealth Act No. 1).
People vs. Manayao
The Makapili, although organized to render military aid to the Japanese Army in the Philippines during the late
war, was not a part of said army. It was an organization of Filipino traitors, pure and simple.
The constitutional duty of the citizen to defend the State cannot be cast off when his country is at war, by the
simple expedient of subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country,
and an enemy country at that, or by accepting a commission in the military, naval or air service of such country,
or by deserting from the Philippine Army, Navy, or Air Corps.
It would shock the conscience of any enlightened citizenry to say that the appellant, by the very fact of committing
the treasonous acts charged against him, the doing of which under the circumstances of record he does not deny,
divested himself of his Philippine citizenship and thereby placed himself beyond the arm of the treason law. For
if this were so, his very crime would be the shield that would protect him from punishment.
In appreciating the existence of a band the employment of more than three armed men is automatically included,
there being only the aggravating' circumstance of band to be considered.
Paragraphs 5 and 6 of article 11 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be construed as sanctioning as legal acts done
in compliance with duties to or orders from a foreign sovereign, any more than obedience to an illegal order.
Sec. 6, Article II (Separation of Church and The State)
Gerona vs. Sec of Education
The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of national sovereignty, of
national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect. Under
a system of complete separation of church and state in the government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious

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significance. Saluting the flag does not involve any religious ceremony. The flag salute is no more a religious
ceremony than the taking of an oath of office by a public official or by a candidate for admission to the bar.
In requiring school pupils to participate in the flag salute, the State thru the Secretary of Education is not imposing
a religion or religious belief or a religious test on said students. It is merely enforcing a nondiscriminatory school
regulation applicable to all alike whether Christian, Moslem, Protestant or Jehovah's Witness. The State is merely
carrying out the duty imposed upon it by the Constitution which charges it with supervision over and regulation
of all educational institutions, to establish and maintain a complete and adequate system of public education, and
see to it that all schools aim to develop, among other things, civic conscience and teach the duties of citizenship.
The children of Jehovah Witnesses cannot be exempted from participation in the flag ceremony. They have no
valid right to such exemption. Moreover, exemption to the requirement will disrupt school discipline and
demoralize the rest of the school population which by far constitutes the great majority.
The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption from or non-
compliance with reasonable and nondiscriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent
authority.
Ebralinag vs. The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu
Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection among
human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator (Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando's separate
opinion in German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 530-531).
The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to believe and freedom to act
on one's belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is
subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare" (J. Cruz,
Constitutional Law 1991 Ed pp 176-177).
"The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom (according to the late
Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee in his dissenting opinion in German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 517) is the
existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety,
public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest', that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent."
Absent such a threat to public safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not justified.
Our task here is extremely difficult, for the 30-year-old decision of this Court in Gerona upholding the flag salute
law and approving the expulsion of students who refuse to obey it, is not lightly to be trifled with. It is somewhat
ironic however, that after the Gerona ruling had received legislative cachet by its incorporation in the
Administrative Code of 1987, the present Court believes that the time has come to reexamine it. The idea that one
may be compelled to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge, during a flag
ceremony on pain of being dismissed from one's job or of being expelled from school, is alien to the conscience
of the present generation of Filipinos who cut their teeth on the Bill of Rights which guarantees their rights to free
speech and the free exercise of religious profession and worship (Sec. 5, Article III, 1987 Constitution; Article
IV, Section 8, 1973 Constitution; Article III, Section 1[7], 1935 Constitution).
Exemption may be accorded to the Jehovah's Witnesses with regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out
of respect for their religious beliefs, however "bizarre" those beliefs may seem to others. Nevertheless, their right
not to participate in the flag ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic exercises. Paraphrasing
the warning cited by this Court in Non vs. Dames II, 185 SCRA 523, 535, while the highest regard must be
afforded their right to the free exercise of their religion, "this should not be taken to mean that school authorities
are powerless to discipline them" if they should commit breaches of the peace by actions that offend the
sensibilities, both religious and patriotic, of other persons. If they quietly stand at attention during the flag
ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic
pledge, we do not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose "a grave and present danger of
a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest that the State
has a right (and duty) to prevent" (German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 517).
Moreover, the expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where they are enrolled will violate
their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the duty of the
State to "protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education x x x and to make such education
accessible to all" (Sec. 1, Art. XIV).

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Expelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about the very situation that this Court
had feared in Gerona. Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a
ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for duly
constituted authorities.
Pamil vs. Teleron
There is no clear-cut answer from this Tribunal. After a lengthy and protracted deliberation, the Court is divided
on the issue. Seven members of the Court are of the view that the judgment should be affirmed as the challenged
provision is no longer operative either because it was superseded by the 1935 Constitution or repealed. Outside
of the writer of this opinion, six other Justices are of this mind. They are Justices Teehankee, Muñoz Palma,
Concepcion Jr., Santos, Fernandez, and Guerrero. For them, the overriding principle of the supremacy of the
Constitution or, at the very least, the repeal of such provision bars a reversal. The remaining five members of this
Court, Chief Justice Castro, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, and Aquino, on the other hand, hold the position
that such a prohibition against an ecclesiastic running for elective office is not tainted with any constitutional
infirmity. The vote is thus indecisive. While five members of the Court constitute a minority, the vote of the
remaining seven does not suffice to render the challenged provision ineffective. Section 2175 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as far as ecclesiastics are concerned, must be accorded respect. The presumption of validity
calls for its application. Under the circumstances, certiorari lies. That is the conclusion arrived at by the writer of
this opinion, joined by Justices Concepcion Jr., Santos, Fernandez, and Guerrero. They have no choice then but
to vote for the reversal of the lower court decision and declare ineligible respondent Father Margarito R. Gonzaga
for the office of municipal mayor. With the aforesaid five other members, led by the Chief Justice, entertaining
no doubt as to his lack of eligibility, this petition for certiorari must be granted.
German vs. Barangan
The foregoing cannot but cast serious doubts on the sincerity and good faith of petitioners in invoking the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of religious worship and of locomotion. While it is beyond debate that every
citizen has the undeniable and inviolable right to religious freedom, the exercise thereof, and of all fundamental
rights for that matter, must be done in good faith. As Article 19 of the Civil Code admonishes: “Every person
must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties x x x x x observe honesty and good faith.”
Even assuming that petitioners’ claim to the free exercise of religion is genuine and valid, still respondents
reaction to the October 2, 1984 mass action may not be characterized as violative of the freedom of religious
worship. Since 1972, when mobs of demonstrators crashed through the Malacañang gates and scaled its perimeter
fence, the use by the public of J.P. Laurel Street and the streets approaching it have been restricted. While travel
to and from the affected thoroughfares has not been absolutely prohibited, passers-by have been subjected to
courteous, unobtrusive security checks. The reasonableness of this restriction is readily perceived and appreciated
if it is considered that the same is designed to protect the lives of the President and his family, as well as other
government officials, diplomats and foreign guests transacting business with Malacañang. The need to secure the
safety of heads of state and other government officials cannot be overemphasized. The threat to their lives and
safety is constant, real and felt throughout the world Vivid illustrations of this grave and serious problem are the
gruesome assassinations, kidnappings and other acts of violence and terrorism that have been perpetrated against
heads of state and other public officers of foreign nations.
Said restriction is moreover intended to secure the several executive offices within the Malacañang grounds from
possible external attacks and disturbances. These offices include communications facilities that link the central
government to all places in the land. Unquestionably. the restriction imposed is necessary to maintain the smooth
functioning of the executive branch of the government, which petitioners’ mass action would certainly disrupt.
In the case at bar, petitioners are not denied or restrained of their freedom of belief or choice of their religion, but
only in the manner by which they had attempted to translate the same into action. This curtailment is in accord
with the pronouncement of this Court in Gerona v. Secretary of Education.
Suffice it to say that the restriction imposed on the use of J.P. Laurel Street, the wisdom and reasonableness of
which have already been discussed, is allowed under the fundamental law, the same having been established in
the interest of national security.
Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Gironella
This administrative complaint, therefore, is ripe for resolution. The use of the word "gimmick" could offend the
sensibilities of the members of Iglesia ni Cristo. It is not inaccurate to state that as understood in the popular

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sense, it is not exactly complimentary. It may indicate lack of sincerity. It is a ploy or device to persuade others
to take a course of action, which without it may not be acceptable. While it would be going too far to assert that
intentional deceit is employed, it could have that effect. The Latin maxim, Suggestio falsi est suppressio veri,
comes to mind. It is to be expected that a religious sect accused of having to resort to a "gimmick" to gain converts
would certainly be far from pleased. Freedom of religion implies respect for every creed. No one, much less a
public official, is privileged to characterize the actuation of its adherents in a derogatory sense. It should not be
lost sight of either that the attendance at a trial of many members of a religious sect finds support in the
Constitution. The right to a public trial is safeguarded by the fundamental law. No adverse implication can arise
from such an occurrence. It goes without saying that if their presence would create disorder, it lies within the
power of a trial judge to maintain the proper decorum.
The Court, however, takes into consideration the fact that the right of a court to give expression to its views is
equally deserving of protection. At any rate, it is not an affront to rationality if note be taken that not all members
of the bench are possessed of such an extensive vocabulary in the English language that the misuse of a word is
to be followed automatically by reprisal of a severe character. While under the circumstances, some members of
the Court are of the opinion that censure is warranted, it is the view of the majority that an admonition would
suffice.
Estrada vs. Escritor
The case at bar takes us to a most difficult area of constitutional law where man stands accountable to an authority
higher than the state. To be held on balance are the state’s interest and the respondent’s religious freedom. In this
highly sensitive area of law, the task of balancing between authority and liberty is most delicate because to the
person invoking religious freedom, the consequences of the case are not only temporal. The task is not made
easier by the American origin of our religion clauses and the wealth of U.S. jurisprudence on these clauses for in
the United States, there is probably no more intensely controverted area of constitutional interpretation than the
religion clauses. The U.S. Supreme Court itself has acknowledged that in this constitutional area, there is
“considerable internal inconsistency in the opinions of the Court.” As stated by a professor of law, “(i)t is by now
notorious that legal doctrines and judicial decisions in the area of religious freedom are in serious disarray. In
perhaps no other area of constitutional law have confusion and inconsistency achieved such undisputed
sovereignty.” Nevertheless, this thicket is the only path to take to conquer the mountain of a legal problem the
case at bar presents. Both the penetrating and panoramic view this climb would provide will largely chart the
course of religious freedom in Philippine jurisdiction. That the religious freedom question arose in an
administrative case involving only one person does not alter the paramount importance of the question for the
“constitution commands the positive protection by government of religious freedom -not only for a minority,
however small- not only for a majority, however large- but for each of us.”
To understand the life that the religion clauses have taken, it would be well to understand not only its birth in the
United States, but its conception in the Old World. One cannot understand, much less intelligently criticize the
approaches of the courts and the political branches to religious freedom in the recent past in the United States
without a deep appreciation of the roots of these controversies in the ancient and medieval world and in the
American experience. This fresh look at the religion clauses is proper in deciding this case of first impression.
The corruption and abuses of the Catholic Church spurred the Reformation aimed at reforming the Catholic
Church and resulting in the establishment of Protestant churches. While Protestants are accustomed to ascribe to
the Reformation the rise of religious liberty and its acceptance as the principle governing the relations between a
democratic state and its citizens, history shows that it is more accurate to say that the “same causes that gave rise
to the Protestant revolution also resulted in the widespread acceptance of the principle of religious liberty, and
ultimately of the principle of separation of church and state.” Pleas for tolerance and freedom of conscience can
without doubt be found in the writings of leaders of the Reformation. But just as Protestants living in the countries
of papists pleaded for toleration of religion, so did the papists that lived where Protestants were dominant. Papist
and Protestant governments alike accepted the idea of cooperation between church and state and regarded as
essential to national unity the uniformity of at least the outward manifestations of religion. Certainly, Luther,
leader of the Reformation, stated that “neither pope, nor bishop, nor any man whatever has the right of making
one syllable binding on a Christian man, unless it be done with his own consent.” But when the tables had turned
and he was no longer the hunted heretic, he likewise stated that when he made an alliance with the secular powers
that “(h)eretics are not to be disputed with, but to be condemned unheard, and whilst they perish by fire, the
faithful ought to pursue the evil to its source, and bathe their hands in the blood of the Catholic bishops, and of
the Pope, who is a devil in disguise.” To Luther, unity among the peoples in the interests of the state was an
important consideration. Other personalities in the Reformation such as Melanchton, Zwingli and Calvin strongly
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espoused theocracy or the use of the state as an engine to further religion. In establishing theocracy in Geneva,
Calvin made absence from the sermon a crime, he included criticism of the clergy in the crime of blasphemy
punishable by death, and to eliminate heresy, he cooperated in the Inquisition
Imbong vs. Ochoa
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the bench and bar,
the issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the
constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion and expression and other
constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of contraception and reproductive health
have already caused deep division among a broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the
petitions raise issues of transcendental importance warranting immediate court adjudication. More importantly,
considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not
wait for a life to be taken away before taking action. The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint
at this time when rights enshrined in the Constitution are being imperilled to be violated. To do so, when the life
of either the mother or her child is at stake, would lead to irreparable consequences.
The ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization. In answering the question of when life begins,
focus should be made on the particular phrase of Section 12 which reads: Section 12. The State recognizes the
sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall
equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right
and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall
receive the support of the Government. Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from
conception. This is undisputable because before conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is
no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to conception or when life begins. The
problem has arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact
that conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view that life begins at implantation. Hence,
the issue of when life begins. In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous
with “fertilization” of the female ovum by the male sperm. On the other side of the spectrum are those who assert
that conception refers to the “implantation” of the fertilized ovum in the uterus.
What is Social Justice
Article XIII, Section 1 and 2
Calalang vs. Williams
The provisions of section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 do not confer legislative power upon the Director of
Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and Com- munications. The authority therein conferred upon
them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what
public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said
Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets de signated as national
roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines" and to close
them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes
such action necessary or advisable in the public con venience and interest." The delegated power, if at all, there
fore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances
upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of
national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the
condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an
administrative function which cannot be di rectly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the
discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper
occa sion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of
the law.
Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the Na tional Assembly in the exercise of the paramount police power
of the state. Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and reg ulations complained of were promulgated, aims to
promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience of the public.
In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience
and welfare. It was in spired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to
public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote
the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occu pations. Persons
and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general com fort,
health, and prosperity of the state (U. S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our Gov-
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ernment the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liber ty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but
liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then so ciety will fall into anarchy. Neither should
authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should
achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and, personal discipline, so
that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all. The
moment greater authority is con ferred upon the government, logically so much is withdrawn from the residuum
of liberty which resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of lib erty is
precisely the very means of insuring its preservation.
Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws
and the equalization of social and economic for ces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively
secular conception may at least be approximated. Social jus tice means the promotion of the welfare of all the
people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent
elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equi librium in the interrelations
of the members of the commun ity, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legal ly justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored
principle of salus populi est supremo, lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the
necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be
equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our so cial and economic life, consistent with
the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons,
and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."
Ondoy vs. Ignacio
In La Mallorca v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, this Court explicitly held that the failure to controvert
“its fatal to any defense that petitioner could interpose. So we have held in a host of decisions in compliance with
the clear and express language of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Any assertion to the contrary is doomed to
futility.” The opinion noted thirty decisions starting from Backrach Motor Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation
Commission to Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission. Thereafter, in Regal
Auto Works, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, such a doctrine was reaffirmed. It was further noted
that nine more decisions had been rendered by this Court starting from Republic v. Workmen’s Compensation
Commission to Abong v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission.
The deceased in this case met his death because of drowning. In Camotes Shipping Corporation v. Otadoy, there
was not even any direct testimony that the deceased was drowned while in the performance of his duty. All that
could be alleged was that he “was lost at sea while in the employ of petitioner.” Nonetheless, the award for
compensation was sustained. Likewise, the ruling in Caltex (Phil.) Inc. v. Villanueva was cited with approval
Thus: “The fact that the employee was found missing while on board the petitioner’s vessel MV ‘Caltex
Mindanao’ became known to the captain of the vessel on 10 October 1956 but it was only on 6 November 1956
when the petitioner transmitted to the respondent Commission WCC Form No. 3 stating that the employee was
‘lost at sea and presumed dead as of October 10, 1956,’ and that it was controverting the respondent’s claim.” In
the present case, there is evidence of the fact of death due to drowning. That was not controverted. Under the
circumstances, the failure to grant the claim finds no justification in law. It bears repeating that there is evidence,
direct and categorical, to the effect that the deceased was drowned while “in the actual performance of his work”
with the shipping enterprise of private respondent.
Even without such evidence, the petitioner could have relied on the presumption of compensability under the Act
once it is shown that the death or disability arose in the course of employment, with the burden of overthrowing
it being cast on the person or entity resisting the claim. Time and time again this Court has stressed such statutory
provision. It suffices to mention cases decided from January to April of this year. An appraisal of the counter-
affidavits submitted by two employees of private respondent and thereafter beholden to him to the effect that the
deceased left the vessel for a drinking spree certainly cannot meet the standard required to negate the force of the
presumption of compensability.
Nor is an affirmance of the finding of the referee adverse to the claim warranted because of the doctrine that the
findings of facts of an administrative agency must be accorded due weight and consideration. An excerpt from
the recent case of Uy v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission finds pertinence: “The claim merits scant
consideration for this Court is authorized to inquire into the facts when the conclusions are not supported by
substantial or credible evidence.”

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This Court, in recognizing the right of petitioner to the award, merely adheres to the interpretation uninterruptedly
followed by this Court resolving all doubts in favor of the claimants. So it has been since the first leading case of
Francisco v. Conching, decided a year after the 1935 Constitution took effect. What was said in Victorias Milling
Co., Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission is not amiss: “There is need, it seems, even at this late date,
for [private respondent] and other employers to be reminded of the high estate accorded the Workmen’s
Compensation Act in the constitutional scheme of social justice and protection to labor.” Further: “No other
judicial attitude may be expected in the face of a clearly expressed legislative determination which antedated the
constitutionally avowed concern for social justice and protection to labor. It is easily understandable why the
judiciary frowns on resort to doctrines, which even if deceptively plausible, would result in frustrating such a
national policy.” Lastly, to quote from the opinion therein rendered: ““To be more specific, the principle of social
justice is in this sphere strengthened and vitalized.
Natural and Primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth
Meyer v. Nebraska
A state law forbidding, under penalty, the teaching in any private, denominational, parochial or public school, of
any modern language, other than English, to any child who has not attained and successfully passed the eighth
grade, invades the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and exceeds the power of the State.
So held where the statute was applied in punishment of an instructor who taught reading in German, to a child of
ten years, in a parochial school.
Pierce v. Society of Sisters
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments of this Union rest excludes any general power of
the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only.
The Oregon Compulsory Education Act (Oreg. Ls., § 5259) which, with certain exemptions, requires every parent,
guardian or other person having control of a child between the ages of eight and sixteen years to send him to the
public school in the district where he resides, for the period during which the school is held for the current year,
is an unreasonable interference with the liberty of the parents and guardians to direct the upbringing of the
children, and in that respect violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
In a proper sense, it is true that corporations cannot claim for themselves the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment, and, in general, no person in any business has such an interest in possible customers as to enable
him to restrain exercise of proper power by the State upon the ground that he will be deprived of patronage;
But where corporations owning and conducting schools are threatened with destruction of their business and
property through the improper and unconstitutional compulsion exercised by this statute upon parents and
guardians, their interest is direct and immediate, and entitles them to protection by injunction.
The Act, being intended to have general application, cannot be construed in its application to such corporations
as an exercise of power to amend their charters.
Where the injury threatened by an unconstitutional statute is present and real before the statute is to be effective,
and will become irreparable if relief be postponed to that time, a suit to restrain future enforcement of the statute
is not premature.
Section 4 (1) Article XIV Constitution
PACU vs. Sec of Education
Where the petitioning private schools are actually operating by virtue of permits issued to them by the Secretary
of Education under Act No. 2706, who is not shown to have threatened to revoke their permits, there is no
justiciable controversy that would authorize the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of said Act.
The Government, in the exercise of its police power to correct a great evil, which consisted in that the great
majority of the private schools from primary grade to university are money-making devices for the profit of those
who organize and administer them, may validly establish the previous permit system provided for by
Commonwealth Act No. 180.
To confer, by statute, upon the Secretary of Education power and discretion to prescribe rules fixing minimum
standards of adequate and efficient instruction to be observed by all private schools and colleges, is not to unduly
delegate legislative powers.

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Abuse, if any, by the officials entrusted with the execution of a statute does not per se demonstrate the
unconstitutionality of such statute
In order that a circular or memorandum issued by the Department of Education may be constitutionally assailed,
the circular or memorandum must be indicated, the wrong inflicted or threatened must be alleged and proved, and
the constitutional point raised and argued specifically.
If any of the Department circulars or memoranda issued by the Secretary go beyond the bounds of regulation and
seek to establish complete control of the various activities of private schools, it would surely be invalid.
The constitutionality of the one per cent levied on gross receipts of all private schools for additional Government
expenses in connection with their supervision and regulation, which is assessed in section 11-A of Act No. 2706
as amended by Republic Act No. 74—whether it be considered a fee or a tax—involves investigation and
examination of relevant data, which should best be carried out in the courts of first instance.
There is no justiciable contro-versy as regards section 1 of Republic Act No. 139, abut textbooks, where the
petitioners have not shown that the Board on Textbooks has prohibited this or that textbook, or that he petitioners
refused or intend to refuse to submit some textbooks, and are in danger of losing substantial privileges or rights
for so doing.

Section 14, Article II (Role of Women)

Villegas vs. Subido
It was pointed out in the petition of the then Mayor Villegas in the lower court that the memorandum on which
then respondent Commissioner would base his refusal to note the appointments of the 91 women as street
sweepers in the City government of Manila was his Memorandum Circular No. 18 dated April 10, 1964. It was
then stated that it had been set aside and declared without force and effect by the Office of the President under a
fifth indorsement to respondent on September 14, 1965. All that respondent could allege in the answer was that
there was still a pending motion for reconsideration. Why such a contention could not be taken seriously was
made clear in the appealed decision in this wise: "It is of no moment that the respondent, in a 6th Indorsement
dated November 7, 1966, had requested the Office of the President to reconsider the ruling declaring
Memorandum Circular No. 18, series of 1964, as of no force and effect. Aside from the fact that the attempt to
secure a reconsideration of the said ruling was done more than one year after the promulgation of the same, it is
significant to note that the respondent sought the reconsideration only after the ruling of this case on October 28,
1966. In any event, as the situation stands, the memorandum circular in question may not be enforced until and
unless the Office of the President shall reconsider its disapproval of the same."
The situation thus presented is one akin to that found in another case between the same parties, likewise entitled
Villegas v. Subido. There as well as here, reliance of then respondent Commissioner was not on any law or rule
but simply on his own concept of what policy to pursue, in this instance in accordance with his own personal
predilection. Here he appeared to be unalterably convinced that to allow women laborers to work outside their
offices as street sweepers would run counter to Filipino tradition. The sincerity of his conviction is conceded, but
that does not suffice. A public official must be able to point to a particular provision of law or rule justifying the
exercise of a challenged authority, So it was correctly held in the decision on appeal.
lt might be said by way of a concluding observation that for the past six years at least, Filipino women have been
serving in that capacity among others as Metro Aides, an innovation introduced by the First Lady. They have
contributed along with the male employees in keeping Metro Manila clean, attractive, and hygienic. There has
been no offense to the well-known Filipino tradition of holding the women in high esteem and respect. Moreover,
as is quite obvious in civic parades where a contingent of them usually takes part, they take pride—and justly
so—in what they are doing. There would even be less justification then even from the policy standpoint for a
Memorandum Circular similar to that issued by respondent and justifiably nullified by the Office of the President.
Moreover, the trend toWards greater and greater recognition of equal rights for both sexes under the shelter of the
equal protection clause argues most strongly against this kind of discrimination.
If this case had not been decided earlier, it must have been due to the fact that with the lower court deciding in
favor of the then City Mayor and no restraining order having been issued by this Court, the ninety-one street
sweepers could continue with their work. Neither party then apparently failed to manifest further interest in the
outcome of this litigation. Moreover, it was not long after this case was submitted for decision that the late

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respondent Commissioner left public office. Apparently, his successor was of a different mind. Hence the case
was not disposed of sooner.
Section 16, Article II (Right to balance and Healthful Ecology)
Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.
Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents
did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The
subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the
Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible,
to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and
representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing
of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case
and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation
as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their
generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the “rhythm and harmony
of nature.”
—Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the
full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors’ assertion of their right to
a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of
that right for the generations to come.
—The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right—the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
which, for the first time in our nation’s constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as
the DENR’s duty—under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the
Administrative Code of 1987—to protect and advance the said right.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 cannot be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation
or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is
principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in
legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer the insurmountable
obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions
from judicial inquiry or review.
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property
or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. A license is merely a permit or privilege
to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal,
granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a
vested right; nor is it taxation’ (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create
irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights.
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, cannot be invoked. In short, the
nonimpairment clause must yield to the police power of the state.
Sec 17, Article II (Priority to Education)
Sec 5 (5), Article XIV (Highest Budgetary Priority to Education)

Guingona, Jr. vs. Carague

While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to “assign the
highest budgetary priority to education” in order to “insure that teaching will attract and retain its rightful share
of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment,”

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it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to
the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.
Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that
can reasonably service our enormous debt, the greater portion of which was inherited from the previous
administration. It is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially,
the very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt
service bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot
be thereby assailed as unconstitutional.
Department of Education, Culture and Sports us. San Diego
We see no reason why the rationale in the Tablarin case cannot apply to the case at bar. The issue raised in both
cases is the academic preparation of the applicant. This may be gauged at least initially by the admission test and,
indeed with more reliability, by the three-flunk rule. The latter cannot be regarded any less valid than the former
in the regulation of the medical profession. There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice
it to repeat that the power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably
necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful
method. The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right
and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents
to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. The method employed by the challenged regulation
is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The threeflunk rule is intended to
insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be
doctors.
While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor. This
is true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved; and the closer the link, the longer the bridge
to one’s ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that they are not
dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner that will best promote
the common good while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction.
Sec 18 Article II (Labor as a primary social economic force)
Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union
All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionally,
must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship does not render it
unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld, and
the challenger must negate all possible bases; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy,
or expediency of a statute; and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of
legislation should be adopted.
What the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act recognize and guarantee is the “right” to form or join
associations. Notwithstanding the different theories propounded by the different schools of jurisprudence
regarding the nature and contents of a “right”, it can be safely said that whatever theory one subscribes to, a right
comprehends at least two broad notions, namely: first, liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of legal restraint,
whereby an employee may act for himself without being prevented by law; and second, power, whereby an
employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from joining an association. It is, therefore, the employee who should
decide for himself whether he should join or not an association; and should he choose to join, he himself makes
up his mind as to which association he would join; and even after he has joined, he still retains the liberty and the
power to leave and cancel his membership with said organization at any time. It is clear, therefore, that the right
to join a union includes the right to abstain from joining any union.
The right to refrain from joining labor organizations recognized by Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act is,
however, limited. The legal protection granted to such right to refrain from joining is withdrawal by operation of
law, where a labor union and an employer have agreed on a closed shop, by virtue of which the employer may
employ only members of the collective bargaining union, and the employees must continue to be members of the
union for the duration of the contract in order to keep their jobs. Thus Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace
Act, before its amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, provides that although it would be an unfair labor practice

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for an employer “to discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment
to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization” the employer is, however, not precluded “from
making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if
such labor organization is the representative of the employees.” By virtue, therefore, of a closed shop agreement,
before the enactment of Republic Act No. 3350, if any person regardless of his religious beliefs, wishes to be
employed or to keep his employment, he must become a member of the collective bargaining union. Hence, the
right of said employee not to join the labor union is curtailed and withdrawn.
To that all-embracing coverage of the closed shop arrangement, Republic Act No. 3350 introduced an exception,
when it added to Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act the following proviso: “but such agreement shall
not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor
organization”. Republic Act No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application and coverage of the closed
shop agreement the employees belonging to any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members with
any labor organization. What the exception provides, therefore, is that members of said religious sects cannot be
compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have closed shop agreements with the employers;
that in spite of any closed shop agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or
dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining union.
It should not be over looked that the prohibition to impair the obligation of contracts is not absolute and
unqualified. The prohibition is not to be read with literal exactness like a mathematical formula, for it prohibits
unreasonable impairment only. In spite of the constitutional prohibition, the State continues to possess authority
to safeguard the vital interests of its people. Legislation appropriate to safeguarding said interests may modify or
abrogate contracts already in effect. For not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix the obligations
as between the parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as
a postulate pf the legal order. All contracts made with reference to any matter that is subject to regulation under
the police power must be understood as made in reference to the possible exercise of that power. Otherwise,
important and valuable reforms may be precluded by the simple device of entering into contracts for the purpose
of doing that which otherwise may be prohibited.
In order to determine whether legislation unconstitutionally impairs contract obligations, no unchanging
yardstick, applicable at all times and under all circumstances, by which the validity of each statute may be
measured or determined, has been fashioned, but every case must be determined upon its own circumstances.
Legislation impairing the obligation of contracts can be sustained when it is enacted for the promotion of the
general good of the people, and when the means adopted to secure that end are reasonable. Both the end sought
and the means adopted must be legitimate, i.e., within the scope of the reserved power of the state construed in
harmony with the constitutional limitation of that power.
What then was the purpose sought to be achieved by Republic Act No. 3350? Its purpose was to insure freedom
of belief and religion, and to promote the general welfare by preventing discrimination against those members of
religious sects which prohibit their members from joining labor unions, confirming thereby their natural, statutory
and constitutional right to work, the fruits of which work are usually the only means whereby they can maintain
their own life and the life of their dependents. It cannot be gainsaid that said purpose is legitimate. The questioned
Act also provides protection to members of said religious sects against two aggregates of group strength from
which the individual needs protection. The individual employee, at various times in his working life, is confronted
by two aggregates of power—collective labor, directed by a union, and collective capital, directed by
management. The union, an institution developed to organize labor into a collective force and thus protect the
individual employee from the power of collective capital, is, paradoxically, both the champion of employee rights,
and a new source of their frustration. Moreover, when the Union interacts with management, it produces yet a
third aggregate of group strength from which the individual also needs protection— the collective bargaining
relationship. It cannot be denied, furthermore, that the means adopted by the Act to achieve that purpose—
exempting the members of said religious sects from coverage of union security agreements—is reasonable.
t may not be amiss to point out here that the free exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to contract
rights. In case of conflict, the latter must, therefore, yield to the former. The Supreme Court of the United States
has also declared on several occasions that the rights in the First Amendment, which include freedom of religion,
enjoy a preferred position in the constitutional system. Religious freedom, although not unlimited, is a
fundamental personal right and liberty, and has a preferred position in the hierarchy of values. Contractual rights,
therefore, must yield to freedom of religion. It is only where unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and
grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified,
and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger.

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The primary effects of the exemption from closed shop agreements in favor of members of religious sects that
prohibit their members from affiliating with a labor organization, is the protection of said employees against the
aggregate force of the collective bargaining agreement, and relieving certain citizens of a burden on their religious
beliefs; and by’ eliminating to a certain extent economic insecurity due to unemployment, which is a serious
menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of the State, the Act also promotes the well-being of
society. It is our view that the exemption from the effects of closed shop agreement does not directly advance, or
diminish, the interests of any particular religion. Although the exemption may benefit those who are members of
religious sects that prohibit their members from joining labor unions, the benefit upon the religious sects is merely
incidental and indirect. The “establishment clause” (of religion) does not ban regulation on conduct whose reason
or effect merely happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions. The free exercise clause
of the Constitution has been interpreted to require that religious exercise be preferentially aided.
The Act does not require as a qualification, or condition, for joining any lawful association membership in any
particular religion or in any religious sect; neither does the Act require affiliation with a religious sect that
prohibits its members from joining a labor union as a condition or qualification for withdrawing from a labor
union. Joining or withdrawing from a labor union requires a positive act. Republic Act No. 3350 only exempts
members with such religious affiliation from the coverage of closed shop agreements. So, under this Act, a
religious objector is not required to do a positive act—to exercise the right to join or to resign from the union. He
is exempted ipso jure without need of any positive act on his part.
We believe that Republic Act No. 3350 satisfies the aforementioned requirements. The Act classifies employees
and workers, as to the effect and coverage of union shop security agreements, into those who by reason of their
religious beliefs and convictions cannot sign up with a labor union, and those whose religion does not prohibit
membership in labor unions. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical,
distinction. The classification introduced by said Act is also germane to its purpose. The purpose of the law is
precisely to avoid those who cannot, because of their religious belief, join labor unions, from being deprived of
their right to work and from being dismissed from their work because of union shop security agreements.
Appellant’s further contention that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the constitutional provision on social justice
is also baseless. Social justice is intended to promote the welfare of all the people. Republic Act No. 3350
promotes that welfare insofar as it looks after the welfare of those who, because of their religious belief, cannot
join labor unions; the Act prevents their being deprived of work and of the means of livelihood. In determining
whether any particular measure is for public advantage, it is not necessary that the entire state be directly
benefited—it is sufficient that a portion of the state be benefited thereby.
Appellant contends that the amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 3350 is not called for—in other words,
the Act is not proper, necessary or desirable. Anent this matter, it has been held that a statute which is not necessary
is not, for that reason, unconstitutional; that in determining the constitutional validity of legislation, the courts are
unconcerned with issues as to the necessity for the enactment of the legislation in question. Courts do inquire into
the wisdom of laws. Moreover, legislatures, being chosen by the people, are presumed to understand and correctly
appreciate the needs of the people, and it may change the laws accordingly.
That there was a labor dispute in the instant case cannot be disputed, for appellant sought the discharge of
respondent by virtue of the closed shop agreement and under Section 2 (j) of Republic Act No. 875 a question
involving tenure of employment is included in the term “labor dispute”. The discharge or the act of seeking it is
the labor dispute itself. It being the labor dispute itself, that very same act of the Union in asking the employer to
dismiss Appellee cannot be “an act done x x x in furtherance of an industrial dispute”. The mere fact that appellant
is a labor union does not necessarily mean that all its acts are in furtherance of an industrial dispute. Neither does
Article 2208 of the Civil Code, invoked by the Union, serve as its shield. The article provides that attorney’s fees
and expenses of litigation may be awarded “when the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff x x
x to incur expenses to protect his interest”; and “in any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that
attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered”. In the instant case, it cannot be gainsaid that
appellant Union’s act in demanding Appellee’s dismissal caused Appellee to incur expenses to prevent his being
dismissed from his job.
Free enterprise vs. Welfare State Concept
Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators vs. Philippine Coconut Authority
The rule of requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before a party may seek judicial review, so
strenuously urged by the Solicitor General on behalf of respondent, has obviously no application here. The

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resolution in question was issued by the PCA in the exercise of its rule-making or legislative power. However,
only judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies made in the exercise of their quasijudicial function is
subject to the exhaustion doctrine. The exhaustion doctrine stands as a bar to an action which is not yet complete
and it is clear, in the case at bar, that after its promulgation the resolution of the PCA abandoning regulation of
the desiccated coconut industry became effective. To be sure, the PCA is under the direct supervision of the
President of the Philippines but there is nothing in P.D. No. 232, P.D. No. 961, P.D. No. 1468 and P.D. No. 1644
defining the powers and functions of the PCA which requires rules and regulations issued by it to be approved by
the President before they become effective.
These measures—the restriction in 1982 on entry into the field, the reduction the same year of the number of the
existing coconut mills and then the lifting of the restrictions in 1987—were adopted within the framework of
regulation as established by law “to promote the rapid integrated development and growth of the coconut and
other palm oil industry in all its aspects and to ensure that the coconut farmers become direct participants in, and
beneficiaries of, such development and growth.” Contrary to the assertion in the dissent, the power given to the
Philippine Coconut Authority— and before it to the Philippine Coconut Administration—“to formulate and adopt
a general program of development for the coconut and other palm oils industry” is not a roving commission to
adopt any program deemed necessary to promote the development of the coconut and other palm oils industry,
but one to be exercised in the context of this regulatory structure.
The issue is not whether the PCA has the power to adopt this resolution to carry out its mandate under the law “to
promote the accelerated growth and development of the coconut and other palm oil industry.” The issue rather is
whether it can renounce the power to regulate implicit in the law creating it for that is what the resolution in
question actually is. Under Art. II, §3(a) of the Revised Coconut Code (P.D. No. 1468), the role of the PCA is
“To formulate and adopt a general program of development for the coconut and other palm oil industry in all its
aspects.” By limiting the purpose of registration to merely “monitoring volumes of production [and]
administration of quality standards” of coconut processing plants, the PCA in effect abdicates its role and leaves
it almost completely to market forces how the coconut industry will develop.
In the first “whereas” clause of the questioned resolution as set out above, the PCA invokes a policy of free
enterprise that is “unhampered by protective regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red tape” as justification
for abolishing the licensing system. There can be no quarrel with the elimination of “unnecessary red tape.” That
is within the power of the PCA to do and indeed it should eliminate red tape. Its success in doing so will be
applauded. But free enterprise does not call for removal of “protective regulations.”
Our Constitutions, beginning with the 1935 document, have repudiated laissez-faire as an economic principle.
Although the present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government
the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare. This is clear from the following
provisions of Art. XII of the Constitution which, so far as pertinent, state: SEC. 6. . . . Individuals and private
groups, including corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective organizations, shall have the right to own,
establish, and operate economic enterprises, subject to the duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to
intervene when the common good so demands. SEC. 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when
the public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.
(Emphasis added).
At all events, any change in policy must be made by the legislative department of the government. The regulatory
system has been set up by law. It is beyond the power of an administrative agency to dismantle it.
Sec 21 Article II (Rural Development and Agrarian Reform)
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform
In addition, the Constitution itself lays down stringent conditions for a declaration of unconstitutionality, requiring
therefor the concurrence of a majority of the members of the Supreme Court who took part in the deliberations
and voted on the issue during their session en banc. And as established by judge-made doctrine, the Court will
assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial
inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a
conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have been
opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision
of the case itself.
The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of his powers under martial law has already
been sustained in Gonzales v. Estrella and we find no reason to modify or reverse it on that issue. As for the power
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of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O Nos. 228 and 229, the same was authorized under
Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, quoted above.
The said measures were issued by President Aquino before July 27, 1987, when the Congress of the Philippines
was formally convened and took over legislative power from her. They are not “midnight” enactments intended
to pre-empt the legislature because E.O. No. 228 was issued on July 17, 1987, and the other measures, i.e., Proc.
No. 131 and E.O. No. 229, were both issued on July 22, 1987. Neither is it correct to say that these measures
ceased to be valid when she lost her legislative power for, like any statute, they continue to be in force unless
modified or repealed by subsequent law or declared invalid by the courts. A statute does not ipso facto become
inoperative simply because of the dissolution of the legislature that enacted it. By the same token, President
Aquino’s loss of legislative power did not have the effect of invalidating all the measures enacted by her when
and as long as she possessed it.
That fund, as earlier noted, is itself being questioned on the ground that it does not conform to the requirements
of a valid appropriation as specified in the Constitution. Clearly, however, Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation
measure even if it does provide for the creation of said fund, for that is not its principal purpose. An appropriation
law is one the primary and specific purpose of which is to authorize the release of public funds from the treasury.
The creation of the fund is only incidental to the main objective of the proclamation, which is agrarian reform.
The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated because they
do not provide for retention limits as required by Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution is no longer tenable.
R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most
controversial provisions. This section declares: Retention Limits.—Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no
person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall
vary according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain,
infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created
hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be
awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15)
years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm; Provided, That landowners
whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained
by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the
original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to
cultivate said homestead.
The argument that E.O. No. 229 violates the constitutional requirement that a bill shall have only one subject, to
be expressed in its title, deserves only short attention. It is settled that the title of the bill does not have to be a
catalogue of its contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may be
inferred from the title.
Finally, there is the contention of the public respondent in G.R. No. 78742 that the writ of mandamus cannot issue
to compel the performance of a discretionary act, especially by a specific department of the government. That is
true as a general proposition but is subject to one important qualification. Correctly and categorically stated, the
rule is that mandamus will lie to compel the dischrage of the discretionary duty itself but not to control the
discretion to be exercised. In other words, mandamus can issue to require action only but not specific action.
Whenever a duty is imposed upon a public official and an unnecessary and unreasonable delay in the exercise of
such duty occurs, if it is a clear duty imposed by law, the courts will intervene by the extraordinary legal remedy
of mandamus to compel action. If the duty is purely ministerial, the courts will require specific action. If the duty
is purely discretionary, the courts by mandamus will require action only. For example, if an inferior court, public
official, or board should, for an unreasonable length of time, fail to decide a particular question to the great
detriment of all parties concerned, or a court should refuse to take jurisdiction of a cause when the law clearly
gave it jurisdiction, mandamus will issue, in the first case to require a decision, and in the second to require that
jurisdiction be taken of the cause.
There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain that logically
preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the same subject. In the case of City of Baguio v.
NAWASA, for example, where a law required the transfer of all municipal waterworks systems to the NAWASA
in exchange for its assets of equivalent value, the Court held that the power being exercised was eminent domain
because the property involved was wholesome and intended for a public use. Property condemned under the
police power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which
should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of

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public morals. The confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property under the
power of expropriation, which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.
The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is concerned.
To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an
exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where,
to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in
excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which
payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the
land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all
beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the
police power but of the power of eminent domain.
Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars
and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following
requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary and
discriminatory.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the
rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a differ ent class
and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties
must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction
between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to
elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification.
Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused
to the detriment of the Bill of Rights.
It is worth remarking at this juncture that a statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is a
concurrence of the lawful subject and the lawful method. Put otherwise, the interests of the public generally as
distinguished from those of a particular class require the interference of the State and, no less important, the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. As the subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the
Constitution itself, we may say that the first requirement has been satisfied. What remains to be examined is the
validity of the method employed to achieve the Constitutional goal.
Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire private lands intended for
public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner. Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where the
owner is willing to sell under terms also acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale may
be agreed upon by the parties. It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the price or other
conditions offered by the vendee, that the power of eminent domain will come into play to assert the paramount
authority of the State over the interests of the property owner. Private rights must then yield to the irresistible
demands of the public interest on the time-honored justification, as in the case of the police power, that the welfare
of the people is the supreme law.
Section 22 Article II (Right of Indigenous People)
Ordillo vs. Commission on Elections
The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region. It is explicit in Article
X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution that: "Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and in the Cordillera consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas sharing
common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial
integrity of the Republic of the Philippines." (Italics Supplied) The keywords—provinces, cities, municipalities
and geographical areas connote that "region" is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. The term "region"
used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This is supported by the fact that the thirteen (13) regions
into which the Philippines is divided for administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces.
(Integrated Reorganization Plan (1972), which was made as part of the law of the land by P.D. No. 1; P.D. No.
742) Ifugao is a province by itself. To become part of a region, it must join other provinces, cities, municipalities,

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and geographical areas. It joins other units because of their common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures and other relevant characteristics. The Constitutional requirements are
not present in this case.
Aside from the 1987 Constitution, a reading of the provisions of Republic Act No. 6766 strengthens the
petitioner's position that the Region cannot be constituted from only one province. Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of
the Statute provide that the Cordillera Autonomous Region is to be administered by the Cordillera government
consisting of the Regional Government and local government units. It further provides that: "SECTION 2. The
Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions necessary for the proper governance and development
of all provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangay or ili within the Autonomous Region x x x." From these
sections, it can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province may constitute the autonomous
region. Otherwise, we would be faced with the absurd situation of having two sets of officials, a set of provincial
officials and another set of regional officials exercising their executive and legislative powers over exactly the
same small area.
Article V, Sections 1 and 4 of Republic Act 6766 vest the legislative power in the Cordillera Assembly whose
members shall be elected from regional assembly districts apportioned among provinces and the cities composing
the Autonomous Region. If we follow the respondent's position, the members of such Cordillera Assembly shall
then be elected only from the province of Ifugao creating an awkward predicament of having two legislative
bodies—the Cordillera Assembly and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan— exercising their legislative powers over
the province of Ifugao. And since Ifugao is one of the smallest provinces in the Philippines, population-wise, it
would have too many government officials for so few people.
Article XII, Section 10 of the law creates a Regional Planning and Development Board composed of the Cordillera
Governor, all the provincial governors and city mayors or their representatives, two members of the Cordillera
Assembly, and members representing the private sector. The Board has a counterpart in the provincial level called
the Provincial Planning and Development Coordinator. The Board's functions (Article XII, Section 10, par. 2,
Republic Act No. 6766) are almost similar to those of the Provincial Coordinator's (Title Four, Chapter 3, Article
10, Section 220 (4), Batas Pambansa Blg. 337—Local Government Code). If it takes only one person in the
provincial level to perform such functions while on the other hand it takes an entire Board to perform almost the
same tasks in the regional level, it could only mean that a larger area must be covered at the regional level. The
respondent's theory of the Autonomous Region being made up of a single province must, therefore, fail.
Section 24, Article II (NGOs and community based and sectoral organizations)
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. vs. National Telecommunications Commission
There can be no question that the NTC is the regulatory agency of the national government with jurisdiction over
all telecommunications entities. It is legally clothed with authority and given ample discretion to grant a
provisional permit or authority. In fact, NTC may, on its own initiative, grant such relief even in the absence of a
motion from an applicant.
PLDT maintains that the scope of the franchise is limited to "radio stations" and excludes telephone services such
as the establishment of the proposed Cellular Mobile Telephone System (CMTS). However, in its Order of 12
November 1987, the NTC construed the technical term "radiotelephony" liberally as to include the operation of a
cellular mobile telephone system. x x x The foregoing is the construction given by an administrative agency
possessed of the necessary special knowledge, expertise and experience and deserves great weight and respect
(Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs, et al., L-19337, September 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 617).
It can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law (Tupas Local Chapter No. 979
v. NLRC, et al., L-60532-33, November 5, 1985, 139 SCRA 478). We discern none of those considerations
sufficient to warrant judicial intervention.
Whether or not ETCI, and before it FACI, in contravention of its franchise, started the first of its radio
telecommunication stations within two (2) years from the grant of its franchise and completed the construction
within ten (10) years from said date; and whether or not its franchise had remained unused from the time of its
issuance, are questions of fact beyond the province of this Court, besides the well-settled procedural consideration
that factual issues are not proper subjects of a special civil action for Certiorari (Central Bank of the Philippines
vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 41859, 8 March 1989, 171 SCRA 49; Ygay vs. Escareal, G.R. No. 44189, 8
February 1985, 135 SCRA 78; Filipino Merchant's Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R.
No. 71640, 27 June 1988,162 SCRA 669).

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More importantly, PLDTs allegation partakes of a collateral attack on a franchise (Rep. Act No. 2090), which is
not allowed. A franchise is a property right and cannot be revoked or forfeited without due process of law. The
determination of the right to the exercise of a franchise, or whether the right to enjoy Such privilege has been
forfeited by non-user, is more properly the subject of the prerogative writ of quo warranto, the right to assert
which, as a rule, belongs to the State "upon complaint or otherwise" (Sections 1, 2 and 3, Rule 66, Rules of Court),
the reason being that the abuse of a franchise is a public wrong and not a private injury. A forfeiture of a franchise
will have to be declared in a direct proceeding for the purpose brought by the State because a franchise is granted
by law and its unlawful exercise is primarily a concern of Government. "A . . . franchise is . . . granted by law,
and its . . . unlawful exercise is the concern primarily of the Government. Hence, the latter as a rule is the party
called upon to bring the action for such . . . unlawful exercise of. . . franchise." (IV-B V. FRANCISCO, 298 [1963
ed.], citing Cruz vs. Ramos, 84 Phil. 226).
The sale of shares of stock of a public utility is governed by another law, i.e., Section 20(h) of the Public Service
Act (Commonwealth Act No. 146). Pursuant thereto, the Public Service Commission (now the NTC) is the
government agency vested with the authority to approve the transfer of more than 40% of the subscribed capital
stock of a telecommunications company to a single transferee. x x x In other words, transfers of shares of a public
utility corporation need only NTC approval, not Congressional authorization. What transpired in ETCI were a
series of transfers of shares starting in 1964 until 1987. The approval of the NTC may be deemed to have been
met when it authorized the issuance of the provisional authority to ETCI. There was full disclosure before the
NTC of the transfers. In fact, the NTC Order of 12 November 1987 required ETCI to submit its "present capital
and ownership structure." Further, ETCI even filed a Motion before the NTC, dated 8 December 1987, or more
than a year prior to the grant of provisional authority, seeking approval of the increase in its capital stock from
P360,000.00 to P40M, and the stock transfers made by its stockholders.
PLDT cannot justifiably refuse to interconnect. Rep. Act No. 6849, or the Municipal Telephone Act of 1989,
approved on 8 February 1990, mandates interconnection providing as it does that "all domestic
telecommunications carriers or utilities x x x shall be interconnected to the public switch telephone network."
Such regulation of the use and ownership of telecommunications systems is in the exercise of the plenary police
power of the State for the promotion of the general welfare. x x x The interconnection which has been required
of PLDT is a form of "intervention" with property rights dictated by "the objective of government to promote the
rapid expansion of telecommunications services in all areas of the Philippines, x x x to maximize the use of
telecommunications facilities available, x x x in recognition of the vital role of communications in nation building
x x x and to ensure that all users of the public telecommunications service have access to all other users of the
service wherever they may be within the Philippines at an acceptable standard of service and at reasonable cost"
(DOTC Circular No. 90-248). Undoubtedly, the encompassing objective is the common good. The NTC, as the
regulatory agency of the State, merely exercised its delegated authority to regulate the use of telecommunications
networks when it decreed interconnection.
Free competition in the industry may also provide the answer to a much-desired improvement in the quality and
delivery of this type of public utility, to improved technology, fast and handy mobile service, and reduced user
dissatisfaction. After all, neither PLDT nor any other public utility has a constitutional right to a monopoly
position in view of the Constitutional proscription that no franchise certificate or authorization shall be exclusive
in character or shall last longer than fifty (50) years (ibid., Section 11; Article XIV, Section 5, 1973 Constitution;
Article XIV, Section 8, 1935 Constitution). Additionally, the State is empowered to decide whether public interest
demands that monopolies be regulated or prohibited (1987 Constitution, Article XII, Section 19).
Sec 26 Article II (Equal Access to opportunities for Public Service)
Pamatong vs. Commission on Elections
Implicit in the petitioner’s invocation of the constitutional provision ensuring “equal access to opportunities for
public office” is the claim that there is a constitutional right to run for or hold public office and, particularly in
his case, to seek the presidency. There is none. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations
imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege
to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a
thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.
The “equal access” provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled “Declaration of
Principles and State Policies.” The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and
there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the “equal access” provision. Like the rest of
the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right
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but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give
rise to any cause of action before the courts.
The provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is
difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are
not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be
entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as “equal access” “opportunities” and “public service” are
susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention
of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable
rights may be sourced.
As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations.
Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code on “Nuisance Candidates” and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 dated December 10,
2002 outlining the instances wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel a
Certificate of Candidacy. As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however,
the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the
limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar,
there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have
not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure
that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the
practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the
opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation
for the election. These practical difficulties should, of course, never exempt the State from the conduct of a
mandated electoral exercise. At the same time, remedial actions should be available to alleviate these logistical
hardships, whenever necessary and proper. Ultimately, a disorderly election is not merely a textbook example of
inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in our democratic institutions. As the United States Supreme Court held:
[T]here is surely an important state interest in requiring some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of
support before printing the name of a political organization and its candidates on the ballot—the interest, if no
other, in avoiding confusion, deception and even frustration of the democratic [process].
The preparation of ballots is but one aspect that would be affected by allowance of “nuisance candidates” to run
in the elections. Our election laws provide various entitlements for candidates for public office, such as watchers
in every polling place, watchers in the board of canvassers, or even the receipt of electoral contributions.
Moreover, there are election rules and regulations the formulations of which are dependent on the number of
candidates in a given election. Given these considerations, the ignominious nature of a nuisance candidacy
becomes even more galling. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough.
To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually
impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to
constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the
electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless
sacrifice on the part of the State. Owing to the superior interest in ensuring a credible and orderly election, the
State could exclude nuisance candidates and need not indulge in, as the song goes, “their trips to the moon on
gossamer wings.”
The Omnibus Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 are cognizant of the compelling State interest
to ensure orderly and credible elections by excising impediments thereto, such as nuisance candidacies that
distract and detract from the larger purpose. The COMELEC is mandated by the Constitution with the
administration of elections and endowed with considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will
ensure the promotion of free, orderly and honest elections. Moreover, the Constitution guarantees that only bona
fide candidates for public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination. The determination
of bona fide candidates is governed by the statutes, and the concept, to our mind is, satisfactorily defined in the
Omnibus Election Code.
Petitioner has submitted to this Court mere photocopies of various documents purportedly evincing his credentials
as an eligible candidate for the presidency. Yet this Court, not being a trier of facts, can not properly pass upon
the reproductions as evidence at this level. Neither the COMELEC nor the Solicitor General appended any
document to their respective Comments. The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is

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both legal and factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this
case for the reception of further evidence is in order.
Sec 28, Article II (Policy of full Public Disclosure)
Valmonte vs. Belmonte, Jr.
Among the settled principles in administrative law is that before a party can be allowed to resort to the courts, he
is expected to have exhausted all means of administrative redress available under the law. The courts for reasons
of law, comity and convenience will not entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have been
resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in
the administrative forum. However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to settled
exceptions, among which is when only a question of law is involved [Pascual v. Provincial Board, 106 Phil. 466
(1959); Aguilar v. Valencia, et al., G.R. No. L-30396, July 30, 1971,40 SCRA 210; Malabanan v. Ramento, G.R.
No. L-2270, May 21, 1984, 129 SCRA 359.] The issue raised by petitioners, which requires the interpretation of
the scope of the constitutional right to information, is one which can be passed upon by the regular courts more
competently than the GSIS or its Board of Trustees, involving as it does a purely legal question. Thus, the
exception of this case from the application of the general rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is
warranted. Having disposed of this procedural issue, We now address ourselves to the issue of whether or not
mandamus lies to compel respondent to perform the acts sought by petitioners to be done, in pursuance of their
right to information.
The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and expression. But this is not to
say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted in application by the exercise of
the freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from it. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the
constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the public service. It is meant to enhance the
widening role of the citizenry in governmental decision-making as well as in checking abuse in government.
Yet, likely all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. As stated in Legaspi, the
people’s right to information is limited to “matters of public concern”, and is further “subject to such limitations
as may be provided by law.” Similarly, the State’s policy of full disclosure is limited to “transactions involving
public interest”, and is “subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law.” Hence, before mandamus may issue,
it must be clear that the information sought is of “public interest” or “public concern”, and is not exempted by
law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee [Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra, at p. 542.]
The information sought by petitioners in this case is the truth of reports that certain Members of the Batasang
Pambansa belonging to the opposition were able to secure “clean” loans from the GSIS immediately before the
February 7, 1986 election through the intercession of the former First Lady, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos. The GSIS is
a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of various insurance
programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. More particularly, Secs.
5(b) and 46 of P.D. 1146, as amended (the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977), provide for
annual appropriations to pay the contributions, premiums, interest and other amounts payable to GSIS by the
government, as well as the obligations which the Republic of the Philippines assumes or guarantees to pay.
Considering the
nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its resources with utmost prudence and in strict compliance
with the pertinent laws or rules and regulations. Thus, one of the reasons that prompted the revision of the old
GSIS law (CA. No. 186, as amended) was the necessity “to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the
funds administered by the System” [Second Whereas Clause, P.D. No. 1146.] Consequently, as respondent
himself admits, the GSIS “is not supposed to grant ‘clean loans’.” [Comment, p. 8.] It is therefore the ligitimate
concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly with the end in view of maximizing the
benefits that accrue to the insured government employees. Moreover, the supposed borrowers were Members of
the defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves appropriated funds for the GSIS and were therefore expected to
be the first to see to it that the GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that all its
transactions were above board. In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office
held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern.
When the information requested from the government intrudes into the privacy of a citizen, a potential conflict
between the rights to information and to privacy may arise. However, the competing interests of these rights need
not be resolved in this case. Apparent from the above-quoted statement of the Court in Morfe is that the right to
privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity, and not to public and governmental agencies like the

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GSIS. Moreover, the right cannot be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS. As held in the case of Vassar
College v. Loose Wills Biscuit Co. [197 F. 982 (1912)], a corporation has no right of privacy in its name since
the entire basis of the right to privacy is an injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the party and a corporation
would have no such ground for relief.
Neither can the GSIS through its General Manager, the respondent, invoke the right to privacy of its borrowers.
The right is purely personal in nature [Cf. Atkinson v. John Doherty & Co., 121 Mich 372, 80 N.W. 285, 46
L.R.A. 219 (1899); Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E. 22, 31 L.R.A. 286 (1985)], and hence may be
invoked only by the person whose privacy is claimed to be violated.
Respondent next asserts that the documents evidencing the loan transactions of the GSIS are private in nature and
hence, are not covered by the Constitutional right to information on matters of public concern which guarantees
“(a)ccess to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions”
only, xxx First of all, the “constituent—ministrant” dichotomy characterizing government function has long been
repudiated. In ACCFA v. Confederation of Unions and Government Corporations and Offices [G.R. Nos. L-
21484 and L23605, November 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 644], the Court said that the government, whether carrying
out its sovereign attributes or running some business, discharges the same function of service to the people,
consequently, that the GSIS, in granting the loans, was exercising a proprietary function would not justify the
exclusion of the transactions from the coverage and scope of the right to information.
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which, though not binding upon the Court, are
nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that government-owned and controlled corporations, whether
performing proprietary or governmental functions are accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that
transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are
within the ambit of the people’s right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in
government dealings.
However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e., “to furnish petitioners the
list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to
secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First
Lady Imelda Marcos.” Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled
to “access to official records,” the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official
records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of
public concern. It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant has a well-
defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to
perform the act required. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required act must be clear and
specific [Lemi v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768, November 29, 1968, 126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v. Subido, G.R. No.
L-28344, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 443.] The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being
no duty on the part of respondent to prepare the list requested.
Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission
These constitutional provisions are selfexecuting. They supply the rules by means of which the right to
information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 167 [1927]) by guaranteeing
the right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein
recognized may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the constitution without need for any ancillary
act of the Legislature. (Id. at, p. 165) What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and
limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy
of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest (Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28). However, it
cannot be overemphasized that whatever limitation may be prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the duty
under Art. III, Sec. 7 have become operative and enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the New Charter.
Therefore, the right may be properly invoked in a Mandamus proceeding such as this one.
ln the case before Us, the respondent takes issue on the personality of the petitioner to bring this suit. It is asserted
that, the instant Petition is bereft of any allegation of Legaspi's actual interest in the civil service eligibilities of
Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas. At most there is a vague reference to an unnamed client in whose behalf
he had allegedly acted when he made inquiries on the subject (Petition, Rollo, p. 3). But what is clear upon the
face of the Petition is that the petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people to information
on matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public right. It has been held that: * * * when the
question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the
people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted
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need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen
and as such interested in the execution of the laws * * * (Tanada et. al. vs. Tuvera, et. al, G.R. No. L-63915, April
24, 1985, 136 SCRA 27, 36). From the foregoing, it becomes apparent that when a Mandamus proceeding
involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the
petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general "public" which possesses the right.
The authority to regulate the manner of examining public records does not carry with it the power to prohibit. A
distinction has to be made between the discretion to refuse outright the disclosure of or access to a particular
information and the authority to regulate the manner in which the access is to be afforded. The first is a limitation
upon the availability of access to the information sought, which only the Legislature may impose (Art. III, Sec.
6, 1987 Constitution). The second pertains to the government agency charged with the custody of public records.
Its authority to regulate access is to be exercised solely to the end that damage to, or loss of, public records may
be avoided, undue interference with the duties of said agencies may be prevented, and more importantly, that the
exercise of the same constitutional right by other persons shall be assured (Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra). Thus, while
the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the government agency in
custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to public records
cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent upon
the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by
any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance
may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus in a proper case.
The constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. It does not open every
door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to
limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may therefore exempt certain
types of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security (Journal No. 90, September
23, 1986, p. 10; and Journal No. 91, September 24, 1986, p. 32, 1986 Constitutional Commission). It follows that,
in every case, the availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the
information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being
exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold question is, therefore, whether
or not the information sought is of public interest or public concern.
In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be
applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad
spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply
because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts
to determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or
affects the public. The information sought by the petitioner in this case is the truth of the claim of certain
government employees that they are civil service eligibles for the positions to which they were appointed. Public
office being a public trust, [Const., Art. XI, Sec. 1] it is the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that
government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles. Public
officers are at all times accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities for their respective positions. But
then, it is not enough that the information sought is of public interest. For Mandamus to lie in a given case, the
information must not be among the species exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.
In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite
any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not,
civil service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the civil service
examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various professions, are released to the
public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's request
is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the government employees concerned
claim to be civil service eligibles, the public, through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities
from the Civil Service Commission. The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in
the absence of express limitations under the law upon access to the register of civil service eligibles for said
position, the duty of the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person
occupying the position becomes imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies.
Tañada vs. Tuvera
After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition and on the
instant motion, we have come to the conclusion, and so hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided"
refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be
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omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval,
or on any other date, without its previous publication.
lt is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason is
that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are
supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly provide that a law shall become effective
immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after
publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they would be so
not because of a failure to comply with it but simply because they did not know of its existence. Significantly,
this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many nonpenal measures, like a
law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to
operate.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws
relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting
citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization.
It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply
directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body
politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law
without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra
vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly
applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is
fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise
of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred
by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called
letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties.
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the
national territory and directy affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published,
including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain
prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not
merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.
However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the case
studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the
assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances
are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code.
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public
of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the
presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of
effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is
not even substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for
FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos
administration. The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.
At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if we find it
impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and
apply the law as conceived and approved by the political departments of the government in accordance with the
prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code,
the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their
effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different period provided by the legislature.
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We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible, to give effect to the law
pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course, although not suggested by the parties that a law
could be rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication
as required. This is a matter, however, that we do not need to examine at this time.
Lantaco, Sr. vs. Llamas
After a careful examination of the records before this Court, We found that respondent committed grave abuse of
authority in refusing to give the complainants a copy of his decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 95647-95650. The
complainants were understandably interested in securing a copy of the decision as they were the complaining
witnesses in these four criminal cases. The request was made during office hours. It was relayed personally to the
respondent. The decision in question was already promulgated. Copies were already furnished the counsel for the
prosecution and the defense. It was already part of the public record which the citizen has a right to scrutinize.
And if there was “no more copy,” the complainants were amendable to have a xerox copy of the original on file,
copies of which, as part of court records, are allowed to be given to interested parties upon request, duly certified
as a true copy of the original on file. What aggravates the situation, as seen from the sequence of events narrated
by the complainants which were never denied or rebutted by the respondent, is that respondent, without just case,
denied complainants access to public records and gave the complainants the run-around, which is oppressive as
it is arbitrary. In Baldoza vs. Honorable Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano (A.M. No. 112-MJ, May 5, 1976), WE
emphasized the importance of access to public records, predicated as it is on the right of the people to acquire
information on matters of public concern in which the public has a legitimate interest. While the public officers
in custody or control of public records have the discretion to regulate the manner in which such records may be
inspected, examined or copied by interested persons, such discretion does not carry with it the authorit y to
prohibit such access, inspection, examination or copying.
OUR “review” in administrative cases of this nature as defined in Vda. de Zabala vs. Pamaran (A.C. No. 200-J,
June 10, 1971, 39 SCRA 430, 433), is limited to the text of the decision and respondent’s articulations on the law
and the evidence submitted. WE do not review the decision to reverse it or to set it aside as if it were brought to
this Court on regular appeal; for this is beyond the objective of an administrative proceedings to protect the public
service, to secure the faithful and efficient performance of official functions, and to rid the public service of
incompetent, corrupt and unworthy public servants.
The uniform allegation in all the four informations for estafa that “the accused, despite repeated demands, refused
and still refuses to remit x x x,” need not anymore be proved by the prosecution; because the Social Security Act
of 1954 (R.A. No. 1161, as amended by R.A. No. 1792, No. 2658 and No. 3839, and further amended by
Presidential Decrees Nos. 24, 65 and 177), makes it the duty of the employer to remit the contributions without
need of any demand therefor by the employee. Section 22(a), (b), (c) and (d) of said Act, governing “Remittance
of Contributions” requires as a legal obligation of every employer to remit within the first seven (7) days of the
month the contributions of the employee and the employer to the Social Security System, failing which invites
the imposition of a penalty of three percent (3%). With this mandate of the law, demand on the part of the
employee before the employer remits these contributions to the SSS is not a condition precedent for such
remittance. The Social Security System can collect such contributions in the same manner as taxes are made
collectible under the National Internal Revenue Code (Sec. 22[b], Social Security Act).
Indeed, considering that about nineteen (19) years before July 31, 1975, when respondent rendered his decision
in the four estafa cases, it was a settled doctrine that an employer-employee relationship exists between jeepney
owners/operators and jeepney drivers under the boundary system arrangement, of which rule respondent was
obviously ignorant (Section 1, Rule 129, Rules of Court, and in line with Municipal Board of Manila vs. Agustin,
65 Phil. 144).
Since an employeremployee relationship subsists between the jeepney owners/operators and jeepney drivers
under the boundary system arrangement, SSS coverage “shall be compulsory” (Sec. 9, Social Security Act), the
SSS’s deduction would follow as a matter of law (Sec. 18, supra), and the accused in the four estafa cases, without
previous demand by the jeepney drivers, is under legal obligation to remit the driver’s contribution to the SSS.
In recapitulation, We find that respondent exhibited gross ignorance of the Social Security Act of 1954, as
amended, particularly the sections governing SSS compulsory coverage, employer-employee contributions,
deduction of SSS’s contributions, and remittance of SSS contributions; and of the settled jurisprudence that the
relationship between jeepney owners/operators and jeepney drivers under the boundary system arrangement is
that of employer and employee. Or, if respondent was aware of them, he deliberately refrained from applying
them, which can never be excused x x x. Wherefore, respondent Francisco R. Llamas is hereby dismissed as city
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Judge of Pasay City with forfeiture of all retirement privileges and with prejudice to reinstatement to any position
in the national or local government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, agencies or
instrumentalities.
WE, moreover, find that respondent repeatedly ignored this Court’s directive to file his comment on the instant
complaint within ten (10) days from receipt of our 2nd Indorsement of September 16, 1975, necessitating the
sending of two tracer letters dated October 23, 1975 and November 25, 1975. His comment came only on March
8, 1976. His failure to submit the required comment within the period fixed is disrespect to the Court as well as
aggravated the delay in the speedy and orderly disposition of this administrative complaint.
Baldoza vs. Dimaano
As found by the Investigating Judge, the respondent allowed the complainant to open and view the docket books
of respondent under certain conditions and under his control and supervision. It has not been shown that the rules
and conditions imposed by the respondent were unreasonable. The access to public records is predicated on the
right of the people to acquire information on matters of public concern. Undoubtedly in a democracy, the public
has a legitimate interest in matters of social and political significance. In an earlier case, this Court held that
mandamus would lie to compel the Secretary of Justice and the Register of Deeds to examine the records of the
latter office. Predicating the right to examine the records on statutory provisions, and to a certain degree by general
principles of democratic institutions, this Court stated that while the Register of Deeds has discretion to exercise
as to the manner in which persons desiring to inspect, examine or copy the records in his office may exercise their
rights, such power does not carry with it authority to prohibit.
The New Constitution now expressly recognizes that the people are entitled to information on matters of public
concern and thus are expressly granted access to official records, as well as documents of official acts, or
transactions, or decisions, subject to such limitations imposed by law. The incorporation of this right in the
Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There can
be no realistic perception by the public of the nation’s problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision making if
they are denied access to information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society
to cope with the exigencies of the times. x x x However, restrictions on access to certain records may be imposed
by law. Thus, access restrictions imposed to control civil insurrection have been permitted upon a showing of
immediate and impending danger that renders ordinary means of control inadequate to maintain order.

Chavez vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government

The arguments cited by petitioner constitute the controlling decisional rule as regards his legal standing to institute
the instant petition. Access to public documents and records is a public right, and the real parties in interest are
the people themselves.
In Tañada v. Tuvera, the Court asserted that when the issue concerns a public right and the object of mandamus
is to obtain the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real parties in interest; and because it
is sufficient that petitioner is a citizen and as such is interested in the execution of the laws, he need not show that
he has any legal or special interest in the result of the action. In the aforesaid case, the petitioners sought to enforce
their right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right then recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution, in connection with the rule that laws in order to be valid and enforceable must be published in
the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated. In ruling for the petitioners’ legal standing, the Court
declared that the right they sought to be enforced “is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental
law of the land.”
The instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information and access to official records, documents
and papers—a right guaranteed under Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner, a former solicitor
general, is a Filipino citizen. Because of the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down by decisional law
to sustain petitioner’s legal standing, i.e. (1) the enforcement of a public right (2) espoused by a Filipino citizen,
we rule that the petition at bar should be allowed.
With such pronouncements of our government, whose authority emanates from the people, there is no doubt that
the recovery of the Marcoses’ alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public concern and imbued with public
interest. We may also add that “ill-gotten wealth,” by its very nature, assumes a public character.
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we believe that it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its
officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed
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settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such
information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not necessarily to inter-agency or
intra-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the
process of being formulated or are in the “exploratory” stage. There is a need, of course, to observe the same
restrictions on disclosure of information in general, as discussed earlier—such as on matters involving national
security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other classified information.
In general, the law encourages compromises in civil cases, except with regard to the following matters: (1) the
civil status of persons, (2) the validity of a marriage or a legal separation, (3) any ground for legal separation, (4)
future support, (5) the jurisdiction of courts, and (6) future legitime. And like any other contract, the terms and
conditions of a compromise must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy or public order. A
compromise is binding and has the force of law between the parties, unless the consent of a party is vitiated—
such as by mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence—or when there is forgery, or if the terms of
the settlement are so palpably unconscionable. In the latter instances, the agreement may be invalidated by the
courts.
One of the consequences of a compromise, and usually its primary object, is to avoid or to end a litigation. In fact,
the law urges courts to persuade the parties in a civil case to agree to a fair settlement. As an incentive, a court
may mitigate damages to be paid by a losing party who shows a sincere desire to compromise.
In Republic & Campos, Jr. v. Sandigan bayan, which affirmed the grant by the PCGG of civil and criminal
immunity to Jose Y. Campos and family, the Court held that in the absence of an express prohibition, the rule on
compromises in civil actions under the Civil Code is applicable to PCGG cases. Such principle is pursuant to the
objectives of EO No. 14, particularly the just and expeditious recovery of ill-gotten wealth, so that it may be used
to hasten economic recovery. The same principle was upheld in Benedicto v. Board of Administrators of
Television Stations RPN, BBC and IBC and Republic v. Benedicto, which ruled in favor of the validity of the
PCGG compromise agreement with Roberto S. Benedicto.
Any compromise relating to the civil liability arising from an offense does not automatically terminate the
criminal proceeding against or extinguish the criminal liability of the malefactor. While a compromise in civil
suits is expressly authorized by law, there is no similar general sanction as regards criminal liability. The authority
must be specifically conferred. In the present case, the power to grant criminal immunity was conferred on PCGG
by Section 5 of EO No. 14, as amended by EO No. 14-A.
The above provision specifies that the PCGG may exercise such authority under these conditions: (1) the person
to whom criminal immunity is granted provides information or testifies in an investigation conducted by the
Commission; (2) the information or testimony pertains to the unlawful manner in which the respondent, defendant
or accused acquired or accumulated ill-gotten property; and (3) such information or testimony is necessary to
ascertain or prove guilt or civil liability of such individual.
The PCGG, as the government prosecutor of illgotten wealth cases, cannot guarantee the dismissal of all such
criminal cases against the Marcoses pending in the courts, for said dismissal is not within its sole power and
discretion.

ARTICLE IV – SUFFRAGE
Section 2

The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system
for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.

The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and the illiterates to vote without the
assistance of other persons. Until then, they shall be allowed to vote under existing laws and such rules
as the Commission on Elections may promulgate to protect the secrecy of the ballot.

Macalintal vs. Commission on Elections

It is clear from these discussions of the members of the Constitutional Commission intended to enfranchise as
much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin. The Commission

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even intended to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents’ domicile of origin is in
the Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first time.
Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the execution of the affidavit itself is not the enabling or enfranchising act.
The affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not only proof of the intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to
go back and resume residency in the Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that
he had not in fact abandoned his domicile of origin. Thus, it is not correct to say that the execution of the affidavit
under Section 5(d) violates the Constitution that proscribes “provisional registration or a promise by a voter to
perform a condition to qualified to vote in a political exercise.”
It must be emphasized that Section 5(d) does not only require an affidavit or a promise to “resume actual physical
permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three years from approval of his/her registration,” the
Filipinos abroad must also declare that they have not applied for citizenship in another country. Thus, they must
return to the Philippines; otherwise, their failure to return “shall be cause for the removal” of their names “from
the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.”
Congress itself was conscious of said probability and in fact, it has addressed the expected problem. Section 5(d)
itself provides for a deterrence which is that the Filipino who fails to return as promised stands to lose his right
of suffrage. Under Section 9, should a registered overseas absentee voter fail to vote for two consecutive national
elections, his name may be ordered removed from the National Registry of Overseas Absentee Voters.
Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly
stated by petitioner, to encroach “on the power of Congress to canvass the votes for president and vice-president
and the power to proclaim the winners for the said positions.” The provisions of the Constitution as the
fundamental law of the land should be read as part of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and hence, the
canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for president and vice-president for the
entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress.
In this jurisdiction, it is well settled that “domicile” and “residence” as used in election laws are synonymous
terms which import not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place coupled
with conduct indicative of that intention. Domicile is a question of intention and circumstances. There are three
(3) rules that must be observed in the consideration of circumstances: first, that a man must have a residence or
domicile somewhere; second, domicile is not easily lost, once established it is retained until a new one is acquired;
and third, a man can have but one residence or domicile at a time. The principal elements of domicile, i.e., physical
presence in the locality involved and intention to adopt it as a domicile, must concur in order to establish a new
domicile. No change of domicile will result if either of these elements is absent. Intention to acquire a domicile
without actual residence in the locality does not result in the acquisition of domicile, nor does the fact of physical
presence without intention.
PART III
THE STRUCTURES AND POWERS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
A. Inherent Power of the State
Police Power
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro

The police power of the State is a power coextensive with self-protection, and is not inaptly termed the "law of
overruling necessity." The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on reason and authority the right to
exercise the sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest.

The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as axioms of economics and political
theory, are of the past. The modern period has shown a widespread belief in the amplest possible demonstration
of governmental activity.

Considered purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that the Legislature has exceeded
its rightful authority in enacting section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917.

The fundamental objective of governmental policy is to establish friendly relations with the so-called non-
Christians, and to promote their educational, agricultural, industrial, and economic development and advancement
in civilization. In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purposes of the Government are to

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gather together the children for educational purposes, and to improve the health and morals—is in fine, to begin
the process of civilization.

In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the State is concerned, the purposes of the Legislature in enacting
the law, and of the executive branch in enforcing it, are to protect the settlers in Mindoro and to develop the
resources of that great Island.

Most cautiously should the power of this court to overrule the judgment of the Philippine Legislature, a coordinate
branch, be exercised. The whole tendency of the best considered cases is toward non-interference on the part of
the courts whenever political ideas are the moving consideration.

National Security
Public Order
United States vs. Pompeya

The police power of the state has been variously defined. It has been defined as the power of the government,
inherent in every sovereign, and cannot be limited; the power vested in the legislature to make such laws as they
shall judge to be for the good of the state and its subjects; the power to govern men and things, extending to the
protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and the protection of all property within
the state; the authority to establish such rules and regulations for the conduct of all persons as may be conducive
to the public interest. The police power of the state may be said to embrace the whole system of internal
regulations by which the state seeks, not only to preserve public order and to prevent offenses against the state,
but also to establish, for the intercourse of citizen with citizen, those rules of good manners and good
neighborhood which are calculated to prevent a conflict of rights, and to ensure to each the uninterrupted
enjoyment of his own, so far as is reasonably consistent with a like enjoyment of the rights of others.

Republic vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., et al.

The contribution, which is levied upon sugar centrals and sugar cane planters under Republic Act No. 632 in order
to constitute the Sugar Research and Stabilization Fund or the capital of the Philippine Sugar Institute (Philsugin),
is not an exercise of the power of taxation nor the imposition of a special assessment but is an exercise of the
police power for the general welfare of the country. It is an exercise of the sovereign power which no private
citizen may lawfully resist. It is constitutional, being similar to the levy under the Sugar Adjustment Act (Com.
Act No. 567) which constituted the Sugar Adjustment and Stabilization Fund (Lutz vs. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148).

DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS

Belgica vs. Executive Secretary

The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a
law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites
for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or
issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Of these requisites, case law states that the first two are the
most important and, therefore, shall be discussed forthwith.

As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that the issues related thereto had been rendered moot and
academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual
controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits. Differing from
this description, the Court observes that respondents’ proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not terminate
the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014
budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and
existing. Neither will the President’s declaration that he had already “abolished the PDAF” render the issues on
PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of government has no constitutional authority to nullify or
annul its legal existence. By constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a law may be done either by
Congress, through the passage of a repealing law, or by the Court, through a declaration of unconstitutionality.

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The “limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies” carries the assurance that “the
courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government.” Essentially, the foregoing
limitation is a restatement of the political question doctrine which, under the classic formulation of Baker v. Carr,
369 US 186 82, S. Ct. 691, L. Ed. 2d. 663 [1962], applies when there is found, among others, “a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department,” “a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it” or “the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion.” Cast against this light, respondents submit that the
“[t]he political branches are in the best position not only to perform budget-related reforms but also to do them in
response to the specific demands of their constituents” and, as such, “urge [the Court] not to impose a solution at
this stage.”

A political question refers to “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature
or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of
a particular measure.” The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is not an issue dependent upon
the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has
commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along constitutional lines is a task that
the political branches of government are incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial
power. More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial
power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cannot
be any clearer: “The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. [It] includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.”

It must also be borne in mind that “when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not
assert any superiority over the other departments; does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature
[or the executive], but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution.” To a great
extent, the Court is laudably cognizant of the reforms undertaken by its co-equal branches of government. But it
is by constitutional force that the Court must faithfully perform its duty. Ultimately, it is the Court’s avowed
intention that a resolution of these cases would not arrest or in any manner impede the endeavors of the two other
branches but, in fact, help ensure that the pillars of change are erected on firm constitutional grounds. After all, it
is in the best interest of the people that each great branch of government, within its own sphere, contributes its
share towards achieving a holistic and genuine solution to the problems of society. For all these reasons, the Court
cannot heed respondents’ plea for judicial restraint.

The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers of
government. In the celebrated words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936), it
means that the “Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the
executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government.” To the legislative branch of
government, through Congress, belongs the power to make laws; to the executive branch of government, through
the President, belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of government, through the Court,
belongs the power to interpret laws. Because the three great powers have been, by constitutional design, ordained
in this respect, “[e]ach department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction,
and is supreme within its own sphere.” Thus, “the legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the
executive has no authority to make or construe the law, and the judiciary has no power to make or execute the
law.” The principle of separation of powers and its concepts of autonomy and independence stem from the notion
that the powers of government must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch; the
division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the other branches or the citizenry.
To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal branches of government that are equally
capable of independent action in exercising their respective mandates. Lack of independence would result in the
inability of one branch of government to check the arbitrary or self interest assertions of another or others.

The Legislative branch of government, much more any of its members, should not cross over the field of
implementing the national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is properly the domain of the Executive. Again,
in Guingona, Jr., the Court stated that “Congress enters the picture [when it] deliberates or acts on the budget
proposals of the President. Thereafter, Congress, “in the exercise of its own judgment and wisdom, formulates an
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appropriation act precisely following the process established by the Constitution, which specifies that no money
may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made by law.” Upon approval and
passage of the GAA, Congress’ law-making role necessarily comes to an end and from there the Executive’s role
of implementing the national budget begins. So as not to blur the constitutional boundaries between them,
Congress must “not concern itself with details for implementation by the Executive.” The foregoing cardinal
postulates were definitively enunciated in Abakada where the Court held that “[f]rom the moment the law
becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional.” It must be clarified, however, that since the restriction only pertains to “any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law,” Congress may still exercise its oversight function which is a
mechanism of checks and balances that the Constitution itself allows. But it must be made clear that Congress’
role must be confined to mere oversight. Any postenactment-measure allowing legislator participation beyond
oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to impermissible interference and/or
assumption of executive functions.

Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund
realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene
and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing,
legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in — as Guingona, Jr. puts it — “the
various operational aspects of budgeting,” including “the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual
activities” and the “regulation and release of funds” in violation of the separation of powers principle. The
fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in Abakada, cannot be overstated — from the moment the law
becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional. That the said authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its
unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition, to repeat, covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of
the law. Towards this end, the Court must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa which sanctioned the conduct
of legislator identification on the guise that the same is merely recommendatory and, as such, respondents’
reliance on the same falters altogether.

The Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow
legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget,
unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional.
Corollary thereto, informal practices, through which legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases
of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional treatment. That such informal practices do exist and
have, in fact, been constantly observed throughout the years has not been substantially disputed here.

As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle, legislative power shall be exclusively exercised by the body
to which the Constitution has conferred the same. In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
states that such power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and
referendum. Based on this provision, it is clear that only Congress, acting as a bicameral body, and the people,
through the process of initiative and referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative power and no other. This
premise embodies the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, and the only recognized exceptions
thereto would be: (a) delegated legislative power to local governments which, by immemorial practice, are
allowed to legislate on purely local matters; and (b) constitutionally-grafted exceptions such as the authority of
the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of
war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as
Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.

In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment
identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of nondelegability since said legislators are
effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which — as settled in Philconsa — is
lodged in Congress. That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section
29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except
in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” To understand what constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court,
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in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor (Bengzon), held that the power of appropriation involves
(a) the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Essentially, under
the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to
dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also
determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon,
and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said
legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow. Thus,
keeping with the principle of nondelegability of legislative power, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF
Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative identification
feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional.

A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the President’s power to veto an item written
into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for approval through a process known
as “bill presentment.” The President’s item-veto power is found in Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which reads as follows: Sec. 27. x x x. x x x x (2) The President shall have the power to veto any
particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items
to which he does not object. The presentment of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills to the President, wherein he
may exercise his power of item-veto, forms part of the “single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered,
procedures” for law-passage as specified under the Constitution. As stated in Abakada, the final step in the law-
making process is the “submission [of the bill] to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law
after the required publication.”

1. Inherent characteristics of republic

In Re Dick
It appearing that the Governor-General has power to deport aliens as an act of state; and that he has followed the
procedure marked out for the exercise of that power in section 69 of the Administrative Code; and that the
petitioner in the habeas corpus proceedings referred to in the opinion is a subject of a foreign "power; this court
has no power to interf ere with or to control the action of the Governor-General in ordering the deportation of the
petitioner.
The discretionary power to deport "undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the Philippine Islands is a
menace to the peace and safety of the community," as an act of state, having been conferred upon the Governor-
General, to be exercised by him upon his own opinion as to whether the facts disclosed by an investigation had
in accord with section 69 of the Administrative Code justify or necessitate deportation in a particular case, he is
the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts, and no other tribunal is at liberty to reexamine or
controvert the sufficiency of the evidence on which he acted.
It appearing that the petitioner was born in Scotland, a subject of- His Britannic Majesty the King of England;
that he came to the United States during his minority; that he declared his intention to renounce his allegiance to
the King of England and to become a citizen of the United States in the year 1902, in a court of competent
jurisdiction in the State of New York; and that not long thereafter he came to the Philippine Islands and has
continued to reside here ever since; that in the year 1910, after having been denied an American passport, he
secured a British passport from the British Consul-General in Manila, and travelled under its protection in the
United States and Europe, and that on that occasion he visited his old home in Scotland; that since declaring his
intention to become a citizen of the United States, in the year 1902, he has taken no further steps looking to his
naturalization other than to maintain his domicile, and to continue to reside within the territory of the United
States; Held: That any such rights as the petitioner may have acquired by virtue of the declaration of his intention
to become a citizen, fifteen years ago, have been lost by the lapse of time without taking any further steps to
become naturalized, and by his acceptance and use of a British passport in the year 1910; Held, further, That he
did not cease to be an alien and a subject 6f a foreign state by virtue of his mere declaration of intention to become
a citizen of the United States.
"It is admitted that sovereign states have inherent power to deport aliens, and seemingly that Congress is not
deprived of this power by the Constitution of the United States. Furthermore, the very ground of -the power in
the necessities of public welfare shows that it may have to be exercised in a summary way through executive
officers." (Tiaco vs. Forbes)
ARTICLE VI

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 THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Delegation of Powers
Delegation to the People
People vs. Vera
The power to make laws—the legislative power—is vested in a bicameral Legislature by the Jones Law and in a
unicameral National Assembly by the Constitution. The Philippine Legislature or the National Assembly may not
escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that power to any other body or authority. Any attempt to
abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that potestas delegata non delegare potest. This
principle is said to have originated with the glossators, was introduced into English law through a misreading of
Bracton, there developed as a principle of agency, was established by Lord Coke in the English public law in
decisions forbidding the delegation of judicial power, and found its way into America as an enlightened principle
of free government. It has since become an accepted corollary of the principle of separation of powers.
The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of
exceptions. An exception sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the central legislative body to delegate
legislative powers to local authorities. On quite the same principle, Congress is empowered to delegate legislative
power to such agencies in the territories of the United States as it may select, Courts have also sustained the
delegation of legislative power to the people at large, though some authorities maintain that this may not be done.
Doubtless, also, legislative power may be delegated by the Constitution itself. Section 14, paragraph 2, of Article
VI of the Constitution of the Philippines ilippines provides that "The National As limitations and restrictions as
it may impose, -to fix within specified limits, tariff rates, import or export quotas, and tonnage and wharfage
dues." And section 16 of the Same article of the Constitution provides that "In times of war or other national
emergency, the National Assembly may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy."
In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire
whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so -that
nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature. In United States vs. Ang
Tang Ho {[1922], 43 Phil., 1), the Supreme Court adhered to the foregoing rule. The general rule, however, is
limited by another rule that to a certain extent matters of detail may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations
to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards. As a rule, an act of the legislature
is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative
board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. The Probation Act does not, by
the 'force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise
of their discretionary power. What is granted is a "roving commission" which enables the provincial boards to
exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 of the Act, the legislature does seemingly on its own authority extend
the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincial
boards to determine. If a provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to
do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer. This is a virtual surrender
of legislative power to the provincial boards.
The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion
as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. (Cincinnati, W. & Z.
R. Co. vs. Clinton County Comrs. [1852], 1 Ohio St., 77, 88. See also, Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec.
68.) To the same effect are decisions of the Supreme Court in the Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of
Binangonan ([1917], 36 Phil., 547); Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro ([1919], 39 Phil., 660); and Cruz vs.
Youngberg ([1931], 56 Phil., 234).
Laws may be made effective on certain contingencies, as by proclamation of the executive or the adoption by the
people of a particular community (6 R. C. L., 118, 170172; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., vol. I, p.
227). In Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat, 1; 6 Law. ed., 253), the Supreme Court of the United States
ruled that the legisture may delegate a power not legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise. The power to
ascertain facts is such a power which may be delegated. There is nothing essentially legislative in ascertaining
the existence of facts or conditions as the basis of the taking into effect of a law. That is a mental process common
to all branches of the government. Notwithstanding the apparent tendency to relax the rule prohibiting delegation
of legislative authority on account of the complexity arising from social and economic forces at work in this

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modern industrial age, the orthodox pronouncement of Judge Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations
finds restatement in Professor Willoughby's treatise on the Constitution of the United States and is accepted.
Delegation to Local Governments
Delegation to Administrative Bodies
Cruz vs. Youngberg
The power given by Act No. 3155 to the governor general to suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition
provided in the Act does not constitute an unlawful delegation of the legislative powers, but confers an authority
or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done to the
latter no valid objection can be made.
Abakada Guro Party List vs. Ermita
The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of government has exclusive
cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. A logical
corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers, as expressed in the
Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest which means “what has been delegated, cannot be delegated.”
This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such as delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty
to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening
mind of another.
The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which are strictly, or inherently and
exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative power, which can never be delegated, has been described as the
authority to make a complete law—complete as to the time when it shall take effect and as to whom it shall be
applicable—and to determine the expediency of its enactment. Thus, the rule is that in order that a court may be
justified in holding a statute unconstitutional as a delegation of legislative power, it must appear that the power
involved is purely legislative in nature—that is, one appertaining exclusively to the legislative department. It is
the nature of the power, and not the liability of its use or the manner of its exercise, which determines the validity
of its delegation. Nonetheless, the general rule barring delegation of legislative powers is subject to the following
recognized limitations or exceptions:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.

In every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only
if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by
the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard—the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable—to
which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates
the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. Both tests are intended to prevent a total
transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature
and exercise a power essentially legislative.

The legislature may delegate to executive officers or bodies the power to determine certain facts or conditions, or
the happening of contingencies, on which the operation of a statute is, by its terms, made to depend, but the
legislature must prescribe sufficient standards, policies or limitations on their authority. While the power to tax
cannot be delegated to executive agencies, details as to the enforcement and administration of an exercise of such
power may be left to them, including the power to determine the existence of facts on which its operation depends.
The rationale for this is that the preliminary ascertainment of facts as basis for the enactment of legislation is not
of itself a legislative function, but is simply ancillary to legislation. Thus, the duty of correlating information and
making recommendations is the kind of subsidiary activity which the legislature may perform through its
members, or which it may delegate to others to perform. Intelligent legislation on the complicated problems of
modern society is impossible in the absence of accurate information on the part of the legislators, and any
reasonable method of securing such information is proper. The Constitution as a continuously operative charter
of government does not require that Congress find for itself every fact upon which it desires to base legislative

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action or that it make for itself detailed determinations which it has declared to be prerequisite to application of
legislative policy to particular facts and circumstances impossible for Congress itself properly to investigate.

The case before the Court is not a delegation of legislative power. It is simply a delegation of ascertainment of
facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increase rate under the law is contingent. The legislature
has made the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition.
It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the
executive. No discretion would be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact
that the word shall is used in the common proviso. The use of the word shall connotes a mandatory order. Its use
in a statute denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion. Where the law is clear
and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says, and courts have no choice but to see to it that
the mandate is obeyed. Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12% rate upon
the existence of any of the conditions specified by Congress. This is a duty which cannot be evaded by the
President. Inasmuch as the law specifically uses the word shall, the exercise of discretion by the President does
not come into play. It is a clear directive to impose the 12% VAT rate when the specified conditions are present.
The time of taking into effect of the 12% VAT rate is based on the happening of a certain specified contingency,
or upon the ascertainment of certain facts or conditions by a person or body other than the legislature itself.

When one speaks of the Secretary of Finance as the alter ego of the President, it simply means that as head of the
Department of Finance he is the assistant and agent of the Chief Executive. The multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the
acts of the secretaries of such departments, such as the Department of Finance, performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts
of the Chief Executive. The Secretary of Finance, as such, occupies a political position and holds office in an
advisory capacity, and, in the language of Thomas Jefferson, “should be of the President’s bosom confidence”
and, in the language of Attorney-General Cushing, is “subject to the direction of the President.”

In the present case, in making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two conditions,
the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate. In such instance,
he is not subject to the power of control and direction of the President. He is acting as the agent of the legislative
department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary of
Finance becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that
he possesses all the facilities to gather data and information and has a much broader perspective to properly
evaluate them. His function is to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information and verify if
any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is present. His personality in such instance is in reality but a
projection of that of Congress. Thus, being the agent of Congress and not of the President, the President cannot
alter or modify or nullify, or set aside the findings of the Secretary of Finance and to substitute the judgment of
the former for that of the latter.

Congress simply granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the existence of a fact, namely,
whether by December 31, 2005, the value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%) or the national government deficit as a percentage
of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1 1/2%). If either of these two instances has
occurred, the Secretary of Finance, by legislative mandate, must submit such information to the President. Then
the 12% VAT rate must be imposed by the President effective January 1, 2006. There is no undue delegation of
legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible.
Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who
must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in
which the legislative process can go forward.

As to the argument of petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al. that delegating to the President the
legislative power to tax is contrary to the principle of republicanism, the same deserves scant consideration.
Congress did not delegate the power to tax but the mere implementation of the law. The intent and will to increase
the VAT rate to 12% came from Congress and the task of the President is to simply execute the legislative policy.
That Congress chose to do so in such a manner is not within the province of the Court to inquire into, its task
being to interpret the law.
Delegation of Express Authority

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Garcia vs. Executive Secretary
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows: “(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the
President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff
rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of
the national development program of the Government.” There is thus explicit constitutional permission to
Congress to authorize the President “subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose” to fix
“within specific limits” “tariff rates x x x and other duties or imposts x x x.”
In the third place, customs duties which are assessed at the prescribed tariff rates are very much like taxes which
are frequently imposed for both revenue-raising and for regulatory purposes. Thus, it has been held that “customs
duties” is “the name given to taxes on the importation and exportation of commodities, the tariff or tax assessed
upon merchandise imported from, or exported to, a foreign country.” The levying of customs duties on imported
goods may have in some measure the effect of protecting local industries where such local industries actually
exist and are producing comparable goods. Simultaneously, however, the very same customs duties inevitably
have the effect of producing governmental revenues. Customs duties like internal revenue taxes are rarely, if ever,
designed to achieve one policy objective only. Most commonly, customs duties, which constitute taxes in the
sense of exactions the proceeds of which become public funds —have either or both the generation of revenue
and the regulation of economic or social activity as their moving purposes and frequently, it is very difficult to
say which, in a particular instance, is the dominant or principal objective. In the instant case, since the Philippines
in fact produces ten (10) to fifteen percent (15%) of the crude oil consumed here, the imposition of increased
tariff rates and a special duty on imported crude oil and imported oil products may be seen to have some
“protective” impact upon indigenous oil production. For the effective price of imported crude oil and oil products
is increased. At the same time, it cannot be gainsaid that substantial revenues for the government are raised by
the imposition of such increased tariff rates or special duty.
In the fourth place, petitioner’s concept which he urges us to build into our constitutional and customs law, is a
stiflingly narrow one. Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code establishes general standards with which the
exercise of the authority delegated by that provision to the President must be consistent: that authority must be
exercised in “the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national security.” Petitioner, however,
insists that the “protection of local industries” is the only permissible objective that can be secured by the exercise
of that delegated authority, and that therefore “protection of local industries” is the sum total or the alpha and the
omega of “the national economy, general welfare and/or national security.” We find it extremely difficult to take
seriously such a confined and closed view of the legislative standards and policies summed up in Section 401.
We believe, for instance, that the protection of consumers, who after all constitute the very great bulk of our
population, is at the very least as important a dimension of “the national ecomony, general welfare and national
security” as the protection of local industries. And so customs duties may be reduced or even removed precisely
for the purpose of protecting consumers from the high prices and shoddy quality and inefficient service that tariff-
protected and subsidized local manufacturers may otherwise impose upon the community.
Delegation to Carry Out Defined Policy According to Prescribed Standard
Edu vs. Ericta
The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the
conception that men in organizing the State and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard
constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct
unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order
and welfare.
What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them. The
test is the completeness of the statute in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature.
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard which implies at the very least that the
legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy.
Rafael vs. Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection Board
Where the statute provides that the chairman and members of the Board (except the representative from the private
section) need only be designated by the respective department heads to sit ex officio without the necessity of new
appointments, they merely perform duties in the Board in addition to those they already perform under their
original appointments. In the absence of provision in the statute that the designated members of the Board will

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lose or forfeit their original appointments in their “parent” offices, it is evident that for purposes of their tenure
on the Board they can be considered as merely on detail, subject to recall by their respective chiefs.
The arrangement envisioned in Sec. 2 of R.A. 3137 is in no wise incompatible with or violative of the established
doctrine that “the appointing power is the exclusive prerogative of the President, upon which no limitations may
be imposed by Congress, except those resulting from the need of securing the concurrence of the Commission on
Appointments and from the exercise of the limited power to prescribe the qualifications to a given appointive
office”. We see no attempt in Republic Act 3137 to deprive the President of his power to make appointments, and
therefore on this point we rule that the law is not unconstitutional.
Where the statute requires that “a representative from the private sector coming from the Association of
Embroidery and Apparel Exporters of the Philippines” shall sit as a member of the Board, respondent P.A.E.A.E.
was not singled out by the law in order to favor it over and above others, but rather because it is the dominant
organization in the field. No privileges are accorded P.A.E.A.E. members which are not similarly given to
nonmembers. Both are within its coverage. Non-membership in the P.A.E.A.E. does not mean that the benefits
granted and the restrictions imposed by the Act shall not apply to those who choose to venture into the business
independently. It is a settled rule in constitutional law that legislation which affects with equal force all persons
of the same class and not those of another is not class legislation and does not infringe the constitutional guarantee
of equal protection of the laws.
Where the statute sets a reasonable basis under which special assessment may be imposed, this does not constitute
an undue delegation of powers. The true distinction between delegation of the power to legislate and the
conferring of authority or discretion as to the execution of the law consists in that the former necessarily involves
a discretion as to what the law shall be, while in the latter the authority or discretion as to its execution has to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be
made. Tested under this score, we see no valid reason to object to the validity of Republic Act 3137.
Promulgation of Rules and Regulation
Vda. de Pineda vs. Peña
—It is established in jurisprudence that Congress may validly delegate to administrative agencies the authority to
promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies [People v. Exconde,
101 Phil. 1125 (1957); Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, G.R. No. L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183]. In
order to be valid, the administrative regulation must be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, conform
to the standards that the law prescribes [People v. Exconde, supra, citing Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil. 727
(1940); Pangasinan Transportation v. Public Service Commission, 70 Phil. 221 (1940)], and must relate solely to
carrying into effect the general provisions of the law.
With these guidelines, Section 128 of the implementing rules invoked by public respondents as basis for their
jurisdiction cannot be tainted with invalidity. First, it was issued by the Department Head pursuant to validly
delegated rule-making powers. Second, it does not contravene the provisions of Pres. Decree No. 463, nor does
it expand the coverage of the Decree. Section 128 merely prescribes a procedural rule to implement the general
provisions of the enabling law. It does not amend or extend the provisions of the statute.
Neither can it be maintained that such an implementing rule results in a denial of procedural due process, for it is
axiomatic in administrative law that what the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice, but the absolute
absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard [Catura v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-27392,
January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 303, citing De Borja v. Tan, 93 Phil. 167 (1953)]. In this case, petitioners were
afforded the opportunity to be heard on the validity of the “Ped” mining claim when they submitted rebuttal
evidence on appeal.
Section 128, being a valid implementing rule, has the force and effect of law. Thus, public respondents were duly
empowered to inquire into the validity of the mining claims involved in the protest case, even if not raised in
issue.
Test of Delegation
The Completeness Test
United States vs. Ang Tang Ho
By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and the Constitution of the United States, all powers are. vested in
the Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary. It is the duty of the Legislature to make the law; of the Executive to
execute; and of the Judiciary to construe the law. The Legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law;
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the Executive has no authority to make or construe the law; and the Judiciary has no power to make or execute
the law.
Subject to the Constitution only, the power of each branch is supreme within its own jurisdiction, and it is for the
Judiciary only to say when any Act of the Legislature is or is not constitutional.
The Legislature cannot delegate legislative power to enact any law. If Act No. 2868 is a law unto itself and within
itself, and it does nothing mor£ than to authorize the Governor-General to make rules and regulations to carry it
into effect, then the Legislature created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other hand,
if the act within itself does not define a crime and is not complete, and some legislative act remains to be done to
make it a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the GovernorGeheral, the act is a delegation of legislative
power, is unconstitutional and void.
After the passage of Act No. 2868, and without any rules and regulations of the GovernorGeneral, a dealer in rice
could sell it at, any price and he would not commit a crime. There was no legislative act which made it a crime to
sell rice at any price.
When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the Proclamatlon of the Governor-General which constitutes
the crime. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because of the Proclamation by the Governor General.
In so far as Act No. 2668 undertakes to authorize the Governor-General, in his discretion, to issue a proclamation
fixing the price of rice and to make the sale of it in violation of the proclamation a crime, it is unconstitutional
and void.
The Constitution is something solid, permanent and substantial. Its stability protects the rights, liberty, and
property rights of the rich and the poor alike, and its construction ought not to change with emergencies or
conditions.
In the instant case, the law was not dealing with Government property. It was dealing with private property and
private rights which are sacred under the Constitution.
In the instant case, the rice was the personal, private property of the defendant. The Government had not bought
it, did not claim to own it, or have any interest in it at the time the defendant sold it to one of his customers.
By the organic act and subject only to constitutional limitations, the power to legislate and enact laws is vested
exclusively in the Legislature, which is elected by a direct vote of the people of the Philippine Islands.
This opinion is confined to the right of the Governor-General to issue a proclamation fixing the maximum price
at which rice should be sold, and to make it a crime to sell it at a higher price, and to that extent holds that it is an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. It does not decide or undertake to construe the constitutionality
of any of the remaining portions of Act No. 2868.
Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS-WFTU) vs. Ople
The lack of merit of the contention that there is an unlawful delegation of legislative power is quite obvious. What
is involved is the power of appointment of the President of the Philippines. As early as Concepcion v. Paredes,
decided in 1921, this Court has left no doubt about the broad range of authority of the President in such matters.
In the categorical language of Justice Malcolm: “Appointment to office is intrinsically an executive act involving
the exercise of discretion.” What is involved then is not a legislative power but the exercise of competence
intrinsically executive. What is more the official who could make the recommendation is respondent Minister of
Labor, an alter ego of the President. The argument, therefore, that there is an unlawful delegation of legislative
power is bereft of any persuasive force.
A rigid application of the non-delegation doctrine, therefore, would be an obstacle to national efforts at
development and progress. There is accordingly more receptivity to laws leaving to administrative and executive
agencies the adoption of such means as may be necessary to effectuate a valid legislative purpose. It is worth
noting that a highly-respected legal scholar, Professor Jaffe, as early as 1947, could speak of delegation as the
‘dynamo of modern government.’ He then went on to state that ‘the occasions for delegating power to
administrative offices [could be] compassed by a single generation.’ Thus: Tower should be delegated where
there is agreement that a task must be performed and it cannot be effectively performed by the legislature without
the assistance of a delegate or without an expenditure of time so great as to lead to the neglect of equally important
business. Delegation is most commonly indicated where the relations to be regulated are highly technical or where
their regulation requires a course of continuous decision.’ His perceptive study could rightfully conclude that
even in a strictly presidential system like that of the United States, the doctrine of non-delegation reflects the
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American ‘political philosophy that insofar as possible issues be settled [by legislative bodies], an essentially
restrictive approach’ may ignore ‘deep currents of social force.’ In plainer terms, and as applied to the Philippines
under the amended Constitution with the close ties that bind the executive and legislative departments, certain
features of parliamentarism having been retained, it may be a deterrent factor to much-needed legislation. The
spectre of the nondelegation concept need not haunt, therefore, party caucuses, cabinet sessions or legislative
chambers.’ Such an observation applies to the judiciary as well.
Even under the authoritative construction of such a principle under the 1935 Constitution, the contention that that
was such a violation would be an exercise in futility. That is the teaching of Edu v. Ericta. Thus: “What cannot
be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the
completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine
whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power, the inquiry must be directed to the scope and
definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job
must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority.” Further: “To avoid the taint of unlawful
delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters
of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to
repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public
agency to apply it.” The standard “does not even have to be spelled out. It could be implied from the policy and
purpose of the act considered as a whole.”
There is in addition the allegation by petitioners that they are denied equal protection. Even the most cursory
perusal of Article III, Section 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697 will readily reveal how untenable is such an assertion.
The first two sentences of the above section read: “Not later than twenty days after the election of provincial, city
or district representatives, the most representative and generally recognized organizations or aggroupments of
members of the agricultural labor, industrial labor, and youth sectors, as attested to by the Ministers of Agrarian
Reform and Agriculture, the Minister of Labor and Employment and the Ministers of Local Government and of
Education, Culture and Sports, respectively, shall, in accordance with the procedures of said organizations or
aggroupments of members of the sector, submit to the President their respective nominees for each slot allotted
for each sector. The President shall appoint from among the nominees submitted by the aforementioned
organizations or aggroupments the representatives of each sector.” Then follow the standards, already quoted, to
guide the choice of respondent Minister as well as of the other Ministers in submitting recommendations to the
President. How can it be rationally contended then that there is favoritism, which is the hallmark of a denial of
equal protection? Conversely put, there is no discrimination, much less hostility, against any group. What is quite
apparent is that respondent Minister is called upon to see to it that all similarly situated should be similarly treated.
How then can plausibility be imparted to such an argument?
a. The Sufficiency of Standard Test

Pelaez vs. Auditor General

Since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios may "not be created or their
boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding" provincial board
"upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the
municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated." This statutory denial of the presidential
authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which
consists of several barrios.

Whereas the power to f ix a common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between
adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature—involving, as it does, the adoption of means
and ways to carry into effect the law creating" said municipalities—the authority to create municipal corporations
is essentially legislative in nature.

Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential that said law:
(a) be complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate; and
(b) fix a standard—the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable—to which the delegate
must conform in the performance of his functions.

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Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, insofar as it grants to the President the power to create
municipalities, does not meet the well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details
in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President.
If the validity of said delegation of powers, made in Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, were upheld.
there would no longer be any legal impediment to a statutory grant of authority to the President to do anything
which, in his opinion, may be required by public welfare or public interest. Such grant of authority would be a
virtual abdication of the powers of Congress in favor of the Executive, and would bring about a total collapse of
the democratic system established by the Constitution.

It is true that in Calalang vs. WiIliams (70 Phil. 726) and People vs. Rosenthal (68 Phil. 328), this Court had
upheld "public welfare" and "public interest," respectively, as sufficient standards for a valid delegation of the
authority to execute the law. But the doctrine laid down in these cases must be construed in relation to the specific
facts and Issues involved therein, outside of which they do not constitute precedents and have no binding effect.
Both cases involved grants to administrative officers of powers related to the exercise of their administrative
functions, calling for the determination of questions of fact. Such is not the nature of the powers dealt with in
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. The creation of municipalities being essentially and eminently
legislative in character, the question whether or not "public interest" demands the exercise of such power is not
one of fact It is purely a legislative question (Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway vs. Coastal Turnpike Authority,
74 S.E. 2d. 310-313, 315-318), or a political question (Udall vs. Severn, 79 P. 2d. 347-349).

The fact that Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 128 to 129, creating thirty-three municipalities, were
issued after the legislative bills for the creation of the said municipalities had failed to pass Congress, is the best
proof that their issuance entails the exercise of purely legislative functions.

The power of control under Section 10 (a) of Article X of the Constitution implies the right of the President to
interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments,
bureaus or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by
the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the
fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local governments or
the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere
with local governments, so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of their authority. He may not, for
instance, suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, 'except
on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial board. If, on the other hand, the President could create
a municipality, he could, in effect, remove any of' its officials, by creating a new municipality and including
therein the barrio in which the official concerned resides, for his office would thereby become vacant (Section
2179, Revised Administrative Code). Thus, by merely brandishing the power to create a new municipality,
without actually creating it, he could compel local officials to submit to his dictation; thereby, in effect, exercising
over them the power of control denied to him by the Constitution.

The power of control of the President over executive departments, bureaus or offices under Section 10(a) of
Article X of the Constitution implies no more than the authority to assume directly the functions thereof or to
interfere in the exercise of discretion by its officials. Manifestly, such control does not include the authority either
to abolish an executive department or bureau, or to create a new one. As a consequence, the alleged power of the
President to create municipal corporations would necessarily connote the 'exercise by him of an authority even
greater than that of control which he has over the executive departments, bureaus or offices, Instead of giving the
President less power over local governments than that vested in him over the executive departments, bureaus or
offices, it reverses the process and does the exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power over municipal
corporations than that which he has over executive departments, bureaus or offices. Even if, therefore, it did not
entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as it certainly does, said Section 68, as part of the Revised
Administrative Code, approved on March 10, 1967, must be deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of the
Constitution in 1935, which is utterly incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory enactment. (De los Santos
vs. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289, 298299.)

lt is contended that not all the proper parties have been impleaded in the present case. Suffice it to say that the
records do not show, and the parties do not claim, that the officers of any of the municipalities concerned have
been appointed or elected and have assumed office. At any rate, the Solicitor General, who has appeared on behalf
of respondent Auditor General, is the officer authorized by law "to act and represent the Government of the
Philippines, its offices and agents, in any official investigation, proceeding or matter requiring the services of a
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lawyer" (Section 1661, Revised Administrative Code), and, in connection with the creation of the municipalities
involved in this case, which involves a political, not proprietary function. said local officials, if any, are mere
agents or representatives of the national government. Their interest in the case has accordingly been duly
represented. (Mangubat vs. Osmeña, Jr., G.R. No. L-12837, April 30, 1959; City of Cebu vs. Judge Piccio, G.R.
Nos L-13012 & 14876. December 81, 1960.)

The present action cannot be said to be premature simply because respondent Auditor General has not yet acted
on any of the executive orders in question and has not intimated how he would act in connection therewith. It is
a matter of common knowledge that the President has for many years issued executive orders creating municipal
corporations and that the same have been organized and are in actual operation, thus indicating without
peradventure or doubt, that the expenditures incidental thereto have been sanctioned, approved or passed in audit
by the General Auditing Office and its officials. There is no reason to believe that respondent would adopt a
different policy as regards the new municipalities involved in this case, in the absence of an allegation to such
effect, and none has been made by him.

b. Examples of Sufficient Standard

1. Public Interest
People vs. Rosenthal

—Appellants argue that, while Act No. 2581 empowers the Insular Treasurer to issue and cancel certificates or
permits for the sale of speculative securities, no standard or rule is fixed in the Act which can guide said .official
in determining the cases in which a certificate or permit ought to be issued, thereby making his opinion the sole
criterion in the matter of its issuance, with the result that, legislative powers being unduly delegated to the Insular
Treasurer, Act No. 2581 is unconstitutional. We are of the opinion that the Act furnishes a sufficient standard for
the Insular Treasurer to follow in reaching a decision regarding the issuance or cancellation of a certificate or
permit. The certificate or permit to be issued under the Act must recite that the person, partnership, association or
corporation applying therefor "has complied with the provisions of this Act", and this requirement, construed in
relation to the other provisions of the law, means that a certificate or permit shall be issued by the Insular Treasurer
when the provisions of Act No. 2581 have been complied with. Upon the other hand, the authority of the Insular
Treasurer to cancel a certificate or permit is expressly conditioned upon a finding that such cancellation "is in the
public interest." In view of the intention and purpose of Act No. 2581—to protect the public against "speculative
schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of blue sky" and against the "sale of stock in fly-by-night
concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold mines, and other like fraudulent exploitations",—we incline to hold
that "public interest" in this case is a sufficient standard to guide the Insular Treasurer in reaching a decision on
a matter pertaining to the issuance or cancellation of certificates or permits. As observed in the case of People vs.
Fernandez and Trinidad (G. R. No. 45655, June 15, 1938), "siendo el objeto de !a ley el' evitar especulaciones
ruinosas, es claro que el interés público, es, y debe ser la razón en que el Tesorero Insular deba basar sus
resoluciones." And the term "public interest" is not without a settled meaning. "Appellant. insists that the
delegation of authority to the Commission is invalid because the stated criterion is uncertain. That criterion is the
public interest. It is a mistaken assumption that this is a mere general reference to public welfare without any
standard to guide determinations, The purpose of the Act, the requirement it imposes, and the context of the
provision in question show the contrary. * * *" (New York Central Securities Corporation vs. U. S. A., 287 U. S.,
12, 24, 25; 77 Law. ed., 138, 145, 146.) (See also Schenchter Poultry Corporation vs. U. S., 295 U. S., 495, 540;
79 Law. ed., 1570, 1585; Ferrazzini vs. Gsell, 34 Phil., 697, 711, 712.) In this connection, we cannot overlook
the fact that Act No. 2581 allows an appeal from the decision of the Insular Treasurer to the Secretary of Finance.
Hence, it cannot be contended that the Insular Treasurer can act and decide without any restraining influence.

The theory of the separation of powers is designed by its originators to secure action and at the same time to
forestall overaction which necessarily results from undue concentration of powers, and thereby obtain efficiency
and prevent despotism. Thereby, the "rule of law" was established which narrows the range of governmental
action and makes it subject to control by certain legal devices. As a corollary, we find the rule prohibiting
delegation of legislative authority, and from the earliest time American legal authorities have proceeded on the
theory that legislative power must be exercised by the legislature alone. It is frankness, however to confess that
as one delves into the mass of judicial pronouncements, -, ements, he finds a great deal of confusion. One things,
however is apparent in the development of the principle of separation of powers and that is that the maximum of
delegatus non potest delegare, or delegate potestas non potest delegare, attributed to Bracton (De Legibus et
Consuetudinious Angliæ, edited by G, E. Woodbine, Yale University Press [1922], vol 2, p. 167) 'but which is
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also recognized in principle in the Roman Law (D.17.18.3), has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of
modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate
legislation", not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern governments. The difficulty
lies in the fixing of the limit and extent of the authority. While courts have undertaken to. lay down general
principles, the safest is to decide each case according to its peculiar environment, having in mind the wholesome
legislative purpose intended to be achieved.

Counsel for appellant J. R. also argues that the Insular Treasurer possesses "the discretionary power to determine
when a security is a speculative security and' when it is not" because "he is given the power to compel any
corporation, association or partnership already functioning, to surrender to him for examination its books and
accounts enumerated in section 2, 'whenever he has reasonable ground to believe that the securities being sold or
offered for sale are of a speculative character."' It should be observed, however, that section 1 of Act No. 2581
defines and enumerates what are "speculative securities" and all the other provisions of the Act must be read and
construed in conjunction and harmony with said section.

Another ground' relied upon by appellants in contending that Act No. 2581 is unconstitutional is that it denies
equal protection of the laws because the law discriminates between an owner who sells his securities in a single
transaction and one who disposes of them. in repeated and successive transactions. In disposing of this contention
we need only refer to the case of Hall vs. Geiger-Jones Co. (242 U. S., 539), wherein the Supreme Court of the
United States held: "Discriminations are asserted against the statute which extend, it is contended, to denying
appellees the equal protection of the laws. Counsel enumerates them as follows: 'Prominent' among such
discriminations are * * * between an owner who sells his securities in a single transaction and one who disposes
of them in successive transactions; * * *.' We cannot give separate attention to the asserted discriminations. It is
enough to say that they are within the power of classification which a state has. A state 'may direct its law against
what it deems the evil as it actually exists without covering the whole field of possible abuses, and it may do so
none the less that the forbidden act does not differ in kind from those that are allowed * * *.' If a class is deemed
to present a conspicuous example of what the legislature seeks to prevent, the 14th Amendment allows it to be
dealt with although otherwise and merely logically not distinguishable from others not embraced in the law'."
Counsel for appellant N. O. further alleges that Act No. 2581 is unconstitutional on the ground that it is vague
and uncertain. A similar contention has already been overruled by this court in the case of People vs. Fernandez
and Trinidad, supra, An Act will be declared void and inoperative on the ground of vagueness and uncertainty
only upon a showing that the defect is such that the courts are unable to determine, with any reasonable degree of
certainty, what the legislature intended. The circumstance that this court has an more than one occasion given
effect and application to Act No. 2581 (Valhalla Hotel Construction Co. vs. Carmona, 44 Phil., 233; People vs.
Nimrod McKinney, 47 Phil., 792; People vs. Fernandez and Trinidad, supra) decisively argues against the position
taken by appellant O. In this conection we cannot pretermit reference to the rule that "legislation should not be
held invalid on the ground of uncertainty if susceptible of any reasonable construction that will support and give
it effect. An Act will not be declared inoperative and ineffectual on the ground that it furnishes no adequate means
to secure the purpose for which it is passed, if men of common sense and reason can devise and provide the
means, and all the instrumentalities necessary for its execution are within the reach of those intrusted therewith."
(25 R. C. L., pp. 810, 811.)
Reaffirming the view in People vs. Fernandez and Trinidad, supra. Held: That Act No. 2581 is valid and
constitutional. Laws of the different states of the American Union similar in' nature to Act No. 2581 were assailed
on constitutional grounds somewhat analogous to those involved in the case at bar, but the decisions of both the
state courts and the Supreme Court of the United States have upheld their constitutionality.
Taking up now the question raised with reference to the speculative nature of the shares of the O. R. O. Oil Co.
and the South Cebu Oil Co., we find that section 1, paragraph (b) of Act No. 2581, in defining speculative
securities, provides: "* * * The term 'speculative securities' as used in this Act shall be deemed to mean and
include: * * * (b) All securities the value of which materially depend upon proposed or promised future promotion
or development rather than on present tangible assets and conditions." At the beginning, and at the time of the
issuance of the shares of the O. R. O. Oil Co. and the South Cebu Oil Co., all that these companies had were their
exploration leases. Beyond this, there was nothing tangible. The value of those shares depended upon future
development and the uncertainty of "striking" oil. The shares issued under these circumstances are clearly
speculative because they depended upon proposed or promised future promotion or development rather than on
present tangible assets and conditions.

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Appellants next contend that in view of the repeal of Act No. 2581 by Commonwealth Act No. 83, they have
been relieved of criminal responsibility. Assuming that the former Act has been entirely and completely abrogated
by the latter Act—a point we do not have to decide—this fact does not relieve appellants from criminal
responsibility. It has been the holding, and it must again be the holding, that where an Act of the Legislature
which penalizes an offense repeals a former Act which penalized the same offense, such repeal does not have the
effect of thereafter depriving the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence offenders charged with
violations of the old law.
Appellants further contend that they come under the exception provided in section 8 of Act No. 2581. Under this
section, there are clearly two classes of persons to whom the law is not applicable: (1) Persons who hold
speculative securities but who are not the issuers thereof; and (2) persons who have acquired the same for their
own account in the usual and ordinary course of business and not for the direct or indirect promotion of any
enterprise or scheme within the purview of this Act, provided (the law uses the term "unless") such possession is
in good faith. Even if we could, we do not feel justified in disturbing the findings of fact of -the trial court
necessarily involved in the application of section 8 of Act No. 2581. The good faith set up by appellant R for
having acted on the advice of one G, an officer of the Insular Treasury, and the subsequent devolution by him of
amounts collected from some of the purchasers of the shares may be considered as a circumstance in his favor in
the imposition of the penalty prescribed. by law but does not exempt him from criminal responsibility.
2. Simplicity, Economy and Efficiency
Cervantes vs. Auditor General

With its controlling stock owned by the Government and the power of appointing its directors vested in the
President of the Philippines there can be no question that the National Abaca and other Fibers Corporation,
otherwise known as the NAFCO, is a government controlled corporation subject to the provisions of Republic
Act No. 51 and the executive order (No. 93) promulgated in accordance therewith.

The National Abaca and other Fibers Corporation (NAFCO) was subject to the powers of the Control Committee,
created in Executive Order No. 93 promulgated in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No. 61, among
which is the power of supervision for the purpose of insuring efficiency and economy in the operations of the
corporation and also the power to pass upon the program of activities and the yearly budget of expenditures
approved by its board of directors. Under these powers the Control Committee had the right to pass upon, and
consequently. to approve or disapprove, the resolution of the NAFCO board of directors granting quarters
allowance to the manager of the NAFCO as such allowance necessarily constituted an item of expenditure in the
corporation's budget. The granting of the allowance amounted to an illegal increase of the Manager's salary
beyond the limit fixed in the Corporate Charter.

In the computation of the time for doing an act, the first day is excluded and the last day included (Section 13,
Rev. Ad. Code.) As the act was approved on October 4, 1946, and the President was given a period of one year
within which to promulgate his executive order and that order was in fact promulgated on October 4,1947, it is
obvious that under the above rule the said executive order was promulgated within the period given.

The rule is that so long as the Legislature "lays down a policy and a standard is established by the statute" there
is no undue delegation. (11 Am. Jur. 957). Republic Act No. 51, in authorizing the President of the Philippines to
make reforms and changes in government-controlled corporations, lays down a standard and policy that the
purpose shall be to meet the exigencies attendant upon the establishment of the free and independent Government
of the Philippines and to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in their operations. The standard was set
and the policy fixed. The President had to carry out the mandate, and this he did by promulgating Executive Order
(No. 93) in accordance with Republic Act No. 51, which, tested by the said rule, does not constitute an undue
delegation of legislative power.

Executive Order No. 332 of 1941, which prohibits the payment of additional compensation to those working for
the Government and its instrumentalities, including government-controlled corporations, was, in 1945, amended
by Executive Order No. 77 by expressly exempting from the prohibition the- payment of quarters allowance "in
favor of local government officials and employees entitled to this under existing law." The amendment is a clear
indication that quarters allowance was meant to be included in the term "additional compensation", for otherwise
the amendment would not have expressly excepted it from the prohibition, For the purposes of the executive order
just mentioned, quarters allowance is considered additional compensation and, therefore, prohibited.

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 3. Reasonableness

Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation vs. Alcuaz

Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon the ground that some
standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the delegation has prescribed the manner
of the exercise of the delegated power. Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, respondent NTC
in this case, establishes a rate, its act must both be nonconfiscatory and must have been established in the manner
prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes
unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required
to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it
has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be
implied.

Pursuant to Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196, respondent NTC is empowered, among others, to determine and
prescribe rates pertinent to the operation of public service communications which necessarily include the power
to promulgate rules and regulations in connection therewith. And, under Section 15(g) of Executive Order No.
546, respondent NTC should be guided by the requirements of public safety, public interest and reasonable
feasibility of maintaining effective competition of private entities in communications and broadcasting facilities.
Likewise, in Section 6(d) thereof, which provides for the creation of the Ministry of Transportation and
Communications with control and supervision over respondent NTC, it is specifically provided that the national
economic viability of the entire network or components of the communications systems contemplated therein
should be maintained at reasonable rates. We need not go into an in-depth analysis of the pertinent provisions of
the law in order to conclude that respondent NTC, in the exercise of its rate-fixing power, is limited by the
requirements of public safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more
than satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative power.

In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission, we made a categorical classification as to when
the rate-fixing power of administrative bodies is quasi-judicial and when it is legislative, thus: “Moreover,
although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates—when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply
to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines—may partake of a legislative character, such is not
the nature of the order complained of. Indeed, the same applies exclusively to petitioner herein. What is more, it
is predicated upon the finding of fact—based upon a report submitted by the General Auditing Office—that
petitioner is making a profit of more than 12% of its invested capital, which is denied by petitioner. Obviously,
the latter is entitled to crossexamine the maker of said, report, and to introduce evidence to disprove the contents
thereof and/ or explain or complement the same, as well as to refute the conclusion drawn therefrom by the
respondent. In other words, in making said finding of fact, respondent performed a function partaking of a
quasijudicial character, the valid exercise of which demands previous notice and hearing.”

While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the application of petitioner, such
rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice
and hearing, as well as the requirement of reasonableness. Assuming that such power is vested in NTC, it may
not exercise the same in an arbitrary and confiscatory manner. Categorizing such an order as temporary in nature
does not perforce entail the applicability of a different rule of statutory procedure than would otherwise be applied
to any other order on the same matter unless otherwise provided by the applicable law.

Again, the order requires the new reduced rates to be made effective on a specified date. It becomes a final
legislative act as to the period during which it has to remain in force pending the final determination of the case.
An order of respondent NTC prescribing reduced rates, even for a temporary period, could be unjust, unreasonable
or even confiscatory, especially if the rates are unreasonably low, since the utility permanently loses its just
revenue during the prescribed period. In fact, such order is in effect final insofar as the revenue during the period
covered by the order is concerned. Upon a showing, therefore, that the order requiring a reduced rate is
confiscatory and will unduly deprive petitioner of a reasonable return upon its property, a declaration of its nullity
becomes indubitable, which brings us to the issue on substantive due process.

The rule is that the power of the State to regulate the conduct and business of public utilities is limited by the
consideration that it is not the owner of the property of the utility, or clothed with the general power of
management incident to ownership, since the private right of ownership to such property remains and is not to be
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destroyed by the regulatory power. The power to regulate is not the power to destroy useful and harmless
enterprises, but is the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control with due regard for the interests,
first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its patrons. Any regulation, therefore, which operates
as an effective confiscation of private property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property
rights is void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the
laws.

What is a just and reasonable rate is not a question of formula but of sound business judgment based upon the
evidence; it is a question of fact calling for the exercise of discretion, good sense, and a fair, enlightened and
independent judgment. In determining whether a rate is confiscatory, it is essential also to consider the given
situation, requirements and opportunities of the utility. A method often employed in determining reasonableness
is the fair return upon the value of the property to the public utility. Competition is also a very important factor
in determining the reasonableness of rates since a carrier is allowed to make such rates as are necessary to meet
competition.

4. Other Standards
Tio vs. Videogram Regulatory Board

The Constitutional requirement that “every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof” is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose
which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title express each and every end that the statute wishes
to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject
matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title.
An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter
how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be
considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general
object.” The rule also is that the constitutional requirement as to the title of a bill should not be so narrowly
construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. It should be given a practical rather than technical
construction.

Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the
contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental rate, as the case
may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or
audiovisual program. Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province, and
the other fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to the municipality where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in
Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila
Commission. x x x x” The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of, the general object of the DECREE, which is the regulation of the video industry through the
Videogram Regulatory Board as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to
that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms
scattered throughout the DECREE. The express purpose of the DECREE to include taxation of the video industry
in order to regulate and rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videograms is evident from
Preambles 2 and 5, supra. Those preambles explain the motives of the lawmaker in presenting the measure. The
title of the DECREE, which is the creation of the Videogram Regulatory Board, is comprehensive enough to
include the purposes expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covers all its provisions. It is unnecessary to
express all those objectives in the title or that the latter be an index to the body of the DECREE.

Petitioner also submits that the thirty percent (30%) tax imposed is harsh and oppressive, confiscatory, and in
restraint of trade. However, it is beyond serious question that a tax does not cease to be valid merely because it
regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the activities taxed. The power to impose taxes is one so unlimited
in force and so searching in extent, that the courts scarcely venture to declare that it is subject to any restrictions
whatever, except such as rest in the discretion of the authority which exercises it. In imposing a tax, the legislature
acts upon its constituents. This is, in general, a sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation. The
tax imposed by the DECREE is not only a regulatory but also a revenue measure prompted by the realization that
earnings of videogram establishments of around P600 million per annum have not been subjected to tax, thereby
depriving the Government of an additional source of revenue. It is an end-user tax, imposed on retailers for every
videogram they make available for public viewing, It is similar to the 30% amusement tax imposed or borne by
the movie industry which the theater-owners pay to the government, but which is passed on to the entire cost of
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the admission ticket, thus shifting the tax burden on the buying or the viewing public. It is a tax that is imposed
uniformly on all videogram operators. The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily
to answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant
violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also
an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.

Neither can it be successfully argued that the DECREE contains an undue delegation of legislative power. The
grant in Section 11 of the DECREE of authority to the BOARD to “solicit the direct assistance of other agencies
and Units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies
and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board” is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely
a conferment of authority or discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and implementation. “The true distinction
is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be,
and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The
first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made.” Besides, in the very language of the decree,
the authority of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a “fixed and limited period” with the deputized
agencies concerned being “subject to the direction and control of the BOARD.” That the grant of such authority
might be the source of graft and corruption would not stigmatize the DECREE as unconstitutional. Should the
eventuality occur, the aggrieved parties will not be without adequate remedy in law.

Free Telephone Workers Union vs. Minister of Labor and Employment

On the crucial issue presented, the Court holds that petitioner was not able to make out a case of an undue
delegation of legislative power. There could be, however, an unconstitutional application. For while the
Constitution allows compulsory arbitration, it must be stressed that the exercise of such competence cannot ignore
the basic fundamental principle and state policy that the state should afford protection to labor. Whenever,
therefore, it is resorted to in labor disputes causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts affecting national interest,
the State still is required to “assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of
tenure, and just and humane conditions of work.” At this stage of the litigation, however, in the absence of factual
determination by the Ministry of Labor and the National Labor Relations Commission, this Court is not in a
position to rule on whether or not there is an unconstitutional application. There was not even a categorical
assertion to that effect by petitioner’s counsel which was indicative of the care in his choice of words. He only
assumed that the conferment of such authority may run counter to the right of the workers to self-organization
and collective bargaining. The petition then cannot prosper.

The allegation that there is undue delegation of legislative powers cannot stand the test of scrutiny. The power
which he would deny the Minister of Labor by virtue of such principle is for petitioner labor union within the
competence of the President, who in its opinion can best determine national interests, but only when a strike is in
progress. Such admission is qualified by the assumption that the President “can make law,” an assertion which
need not be passed upon in this petition. What possesses significance for the purpose of this litigation is that it is
the President who “shall have control of the ministries.” It may happen, therefore, that a single person may occupy
a dual position of Minister and Assemblyman. To the extent, however, that what is involved is the execution or
enforcement of legislation, the Minister is an official of the executive branch of the government. The adoption of
certain aspects of a parliamentary system in the amended Constitution does not alter its essentially presidential
character. Article VII on the presidency starts with this provision: “The President shall be the head of state and
chief executive of the Republic of the Philippines.” Its last section is an even more emphatic affirmation that it is
a presidential system that obtains in our government.

While conceptually, there still exists a distinction between the enactment of legislation and its execution, between
formulation and implementation, the fundamental principle of separation of powers of which non- delegation is
a logical corollary becomes even more flexible and malleable. Even in the case of the United States,1 with its
adherence to the Madisonian concept of separation of powers, President Kennedy could state that its Constitution
did not make “the Presidency and Congress rivals for power but partners for progress [with the two branches]
being trustees for the people, custodians of their heritage.” With the closer relationship provided for by the
amended Constitution in our case, there is likely to be even more promptitude and dispatch in framing the policies
and thereafter unity and vigor in their execution. A rigid application of the non-delegation doctrine, therefore,
would be an obstacle to national efforts at development and progress. There is accordingly more receptivity to
laws leaving to administrative and executive agencies the adoption of such means as may be necessary to

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effectuate a valid legislative purpose. It is worth noting that a highly-respected legal scholar, Professor Jaffe, as
early as 1947, could speak of delegation as the “dynamo of modern government.”

5. Insufficient Standard

Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional
questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review
by the highest tribunal. We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm
on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in,
among others, all cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures. This simply means that the resolution
of such cases may be made in the first instance by these lower courts.

The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting idea of fair play to hear "the other side"
before an opinion is formed or a decision is made by those who sit in judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-
half of the question; the other half must also be considered if an impartial verdict is to be reached based on an
informed appreciation of the issues in contention. It is indispensable that the two sides complement each other,
as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after examination of the problem not from one or the
other perspective only but in its totality. A judgment based on less that this full appraisal, on the pretext that a
hearing is unnecessary or useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in
repressive regimes, the insolence of power.

In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor man's tractor,
so to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of Executive Order No. 626.
The method chosen in the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals, again following the above-cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by
banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years old
if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm
work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion.

But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, we
cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method.
We note that to strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the
slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical
condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The object of the
prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be
achieved by the questioned measure is missing.

Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon
with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of
the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only.
In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be
imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no
such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared,
by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.

We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as
prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to
charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission
may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry
may see fit, in the case of carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and
dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even
corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations
that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently
boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen?
Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and
in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority
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that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore
invalid delegation of legislative powers.

To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method
employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard
in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of
the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates
against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to
the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily
taken.

It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with
notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that
summary action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily
judicial only. In the exceptional cases accepted, however, there is a justification for the omission of the right to a
previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to
correct it. In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory
treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There
certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first in a
court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution.
Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation
thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have
had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused.

We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander who confiscated the petitioner's
carabaos is not liable in damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance with its mandate. The law was
at that time presumptively valid, and it was his obligation, as a member of the police, to enforce it. It would have
been impertinent of him, being a mere subordinate of the President, to declare the executive order unconstitutional
and, on his own responsibility alone, refuse to execute it. Even the trial court, in fact, and the Court of Appeals
itself did not feel they had the competence, for all their superior authority, to question the order we now annul.
B. Section 1, Article VI; Congress
C. Composition, Qualification and Term of Office
a. Senate – Art. VI, Section 2-4
b. House of Representatives- Art. VI, Section 5-8 Art. IX-C, Sec 6-8, Art. XVIII, Sec 7

Dimaporo v. Mitra
Obviously then, petitioner's assumption that the questioned statutory provision is no longer operative does not
hold water. He failed to discern that rather than cut short the term of office of elective public officials, this
statutory provision seeks to ensure that such officials serve out their entire term of office by discouraging them
from running for another public office and thereby cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should they
fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their former position. This is consonant with the constitutional edict
that all public officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they have
received from their constituents.

In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a Member of Congress,
petitioner seems to confuse "term" with "tenure" of office. As succinctly distinguished by the Solicitor General:
"The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the legislature (22 R.C.L.),
but the period during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure), may be affected by circumstances within
or beyond the power of said officer. Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may not exist at all. These situations
will not change the duration of the term of office (Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil. 12)."

That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the Constitution itself as a
mode of shortening the tenure of office of members of Congress, does not preclude its application to present
members of Congress. Section 2 of Article XI provides that "(t)he President, the Vice-President, the Members of
the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from
office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed
from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. Such constitutional expression clearly recognizes that

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the four (4) grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be
shortened are not exclusive.

In Monroy vs. Court of Appeals, a case involving Section 27 of R.A. No. 180 above-quoted, this Court
categorically pronounced that "forfeiture (is) automatic and permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate
of candidacy for another office. Only the moment and act of filing are considered. Once the certificate is filed,
the seat is forever forfeited and nothing save a new election or appointment can restore the ousted official.

As the mere act of filing the certificate of candidacy for another office produces automatically the permanent
forfeiture of the elective position being presently held, it is not necessary, as petitioner opines, that the other
position be actually held. The ground for forfeiture in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is different
from the forfeiture decreed in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881, which is actually a mode of voluntary
renunciation of office under Section 7, par. 2 of Article VI of the Constitution.

Quinto vs. Commission on Elections

The petition suffers from an incipient procedural defect. What petitioners assail in their petition is a resolution
issued by the COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power. Certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to
Rule 64, cannot be availed of, because it is a remedy to question decisions, resolutions and issuances made in the
exercise of a judicial or quasi-judicial function. Prohibition is also an inappropriate remedy, because what
petitioners actually seek from the Court is a determination of the proper construction of a statute and a declaration
of their rights thereunder. Obviously, their petition is one for declaratory relief, over which this Court does not
exercise original jurisdiction.

The Court, nevertheless, finds that, while petitioners are not yet candidates, they have the standing to raise the
constitutional challenge, simply because they are qualified voters. A restriction on candidacy, such as the
challenged measure herein, affects the rights of voters to choose their public officials. The rights of voters and
the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation; laws that affect candidates always have at least
some theoretical, correlative effect on voters. The Court believes that both candidates and voters may challenge,
on grounds of equal protection, the assailed measure because of its impact on voting rights.

In recent cases, this Court has relaxed the stringent direct injury test and has observed a liberal policy allowing
ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civil organizations to prosecute actions involving the
constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings.

We have also stressed in our prior decisions that the exercise by this Court of judicial power is limited to the
determination and resolution of actual cases and controversies. The Court, in this case, finds that an actual case
or controversy exists between the petitioners and the COMELEC, the body charged with the enforcement and
administration of all election laws. Petitioners have alleged in a precise manner that they would engage in the
very acts that would trigger the enforcement of the provision—they would file their CoCs and run in the 2010
elections. Given that the assailed provision provides for ipso facto resignation upon the filing of the CoC, it cannot
be said that it presents only a speculative or hypothetical obstacle to petitioners’ candidacy.

In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional
norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with,
namely: (1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions; (2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3)
It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.

Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of persons holding
appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law. The obvious
reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote one’s candidacy,
or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting
the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official
duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also
justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result
in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather
than to their office work.
Automated Election System
RA 8436, 22 December 1997
RA 9369, 23 January 2007
i. Residency/Reapportionment/Gerrymandering

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Aquino vs. Commission on Elections
Petitioner conveniently confuses the distinction between an unproclaimed candidate to the House of
Representatives and a member of the same. Obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not
automatically vest the position in the winning candidate.
Under Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the electoral tribunal clearly assumes jurisdiction over
all contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications of candidates for either the Senate or the House only
when the latter become members of either the Senate or the House of Representatives. A candidate who has not
been proclaimed and who has not taken his oath of office cannot be said to be a member of the House of
Representatives subject to Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution.
While the proclamation of a winning candidate in an election is ministerial, B.P. 881 in conjunction with Sec. 6
of R.A. 6646 allows suspension of proclamation under circumstances mentioned therein. Thus, petitioner’s
contention that “after the conduct of the election and (petitioner) has been established the winner of the electoral
exercise from the moment of election, the COMELEC is automatically divested of authority to pass upon the
question of qualification” finds no basis in law, because even after the elections the COMELEC is empowered by
Section 6 (in relation to Section 7) of R.A. 6646 to continue to hear and decide questions relating to qualifications
of candidates.
We agree with COMELEC’s contention that in order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for
Representative of the Second District of Makati City the latter “must prove that he has established not just
residence but domicile of choice.”The Constitution requires that a person seeking election to the House of
Representatives should be a resident of the district in which he seeks election for a period of not less than one (1)
year prior to the elections. Residence, for election law purposes, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.
Clearly, the place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no matter where
he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the
Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. The manifest purpose of this
deviation from the usual conceptions of residency in law as explained in Gallego vs. Vera is “to exclude strangers
or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community” from taking advantage of favorable
circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain.
While there is nothing wrong with the practice of establishing residence in a given area for meeting election law
requirements, this nonetheless defeats the essence of representation, which is to place through the assent of voters
those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of
residency mandated by law for him to qualify. That purpose could be obviously best met by individuals who have
either had actual residence in the area for a given period or who have been domiciled in the same area either by
origin or by choice. It would, therefore, be imperative for this Court to inquire into the threshold question as to
whether or not petitioner actually was a resident for a period of one year in the area now encompassed by the
Second Legislative District of Makati at the time of his election or whether or not he was domiciled in the same.
While property ownership is not and should never be an indicia of the right to vote or to be voted upon, the fact
that petitioner himself claims that he has other residences in Metro Manila coupled with the short length of time
he claims to be a resident of the condominium unit in Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac)
“indicate that the sole purpose of (petitioner) in transferring his physical residence” is not to acquire a new
residence or domicile “but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati
City.” The absence of clear and positive proof showing a successful abandonment of domicile under the
conditions stated above, the lack of identification—sentimental, actual or otherwise—with the area, and the
suspicious circumstances under which the lease agreement was effected all belie petitioner’s claim of residency
for the period required by the Constitution, in the Second District of Makati.
Moreover, his assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is
hardly supported by the facts in the case at bench. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a
change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention
of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with
the purpose. These requirements are hardly met by the evidence adduced in support of petitioner’s claims of a
change of domicile from Tarlac to the Second District of Makati. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the
domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
Finally, petitioner’s submission that it would be legally impossible to impose the one year residency requirement
in a newly created political district is specious and lacks basis in logic. A new political district is not created out
of thin air. It is carved out from part of a real and existing geographic area, in this case the old Municipality of
Makati. That people actually lived or were domiciled in the area encompassed by the new Second District cannot
be denied. Modern-day carpetbaggers cannot be allowed to take advantage of the creation of new political districts
by suddenly transplanting themselves in such new districts, prejudicing their genuine residents in the process of
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taking advantage of existing conditions in these areas. It will be noted, as COMELEC did in its assailed resolution,
that petitioner was disqualified from running in the Senate because of the constitutional two-term limit, and had
to shop around for a place where he could run for public office. Nothing wrong with that, but he must first prove
with reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the period
required by law. This he has not effectively done.
To contend that Syjuco should be proclaimed because he was the “first” among the qualified candidates in the
May 8, 1995 elections is to misconstrue the nature of the democratic electoral process and the sociological and
psychological underpinnings behind voters’ preferences. The result suggested by private respondent would lead
not only to our reversing the doctrines firmly entrenched in the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec but also to a
massive disenfranchisement of the thousands of voters who cast their vote in favor of a candidate they believed
could be validly voted for during the elections. Had petitioner been disqualified before the elections, the choice,
moreover, would have been different. The votes for Aquino given the acrimony which attended the campaign,
would not have automatically gone to second placer Syjuco. The nature of the playing field would have
substantially changed. To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would
be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the
elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among
qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have
substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under such circumstances.
This, it bears repeating, expresses the more logical and democratic view. We cannot, in another shift of the
pendulum, subscribe to the contention that the runner-up in an election in which the winner has been disqualified
is actually the winner among the remaining qualified candidates because this clearly represents a minority view
supported only by a scattered number of obscure American state and English court decisions. These decisions
neglect the possibility that the runner-up, though obviously qualified, could receive votes so measly and
insignificant in number that the votes they receive would be tantamount to rejection. Theoretically, the “second
placer” could receive just one vote. In such a case, it is absurd to proclaim the totally repudiated candidate as the
voters’ “choice.”
Moreover, even in instances where the votes received by the second placer may not be considered numerically
insignificant, voters preferences are nonetheless so volatile and unpredictable that the result among qualified
candidates, should the equation change because of the disqualification of an ineligible candidate, would not be
selfevident. Absence of the apparent though ineligible winner among the choices could lead to a shifting of votes
to candidates other than the second placer. By any mathematical formulation, the runner-up in an election cannot
be construed to have obtained a majority or plurality of votes cast where an “ineligible” candidate has garnered
either a majority or plurality of the votes.
A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In a republican government those laws are
themselves ordained by the people. Through their representatives, they dictate the qualifications necessary for
service in government positions. And as petitioner clearly lacks one of the essential qualifications for running for
membership in the House of Representatives, not even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters of the
Second District of Makati City would substitute for a requirement mandated by the fundamental law itself.
Ceniza vs. Commission on Elections
The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy of local government units. In the Declaration
of Principles and State Policies, it is stated that “The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local
government units, especially the barrio, to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities.” To this
end, the Constitution directs the National Assembly to “enact a local government code which may not thereafter
be amended except by a majority vote of all its members, defining a more responsive and accountable local
government structure with an effective system of recall, allocating among the different local governments their
powers, responsibilities, and resources, and providing for the qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries,
powers, functions, and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of
the local units,” and empowered local government units “to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes,
subject to limitations as may be provided by law.”

Art. XI, Section 4 of the said Constitution places highly urbanized cities outside the supervisory power of the
province where they are geographically located. This is as it should be because of the complex and varied
problems in a highly urbanized city due to a bigger population and greater economic activity which require greater
autonomy.

Corollary to independence however, is the concomitant loss of the right to participate in provincial affairs, more
particularly the selection of elective provincial officials since these provincial officials have ceased to exercise
any governmental jurisdiction and authority over said city.

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The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on the basis of their regular annual
income is based upon substantial distinction. The revenue of a city would show whether or not it is capable of
existence and development as a relatively independent social, economic, and political unit. It would also show
whether the city has sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its independence from the province
where it is geographically situated. Cities with smaller income need the continued support of the provincial
government thus justifying the continued participation of the voters in the election of provincial officials in some
instances.

The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City are denied equal protection of the law since the
voters in other component cities are allowed to vote for provincial officials. The contention is without merit. The
practice of allowing voters in one component city to vote for provincial officials and denying the same privilege
to voters in another component city is a matter of legislative discretion which violates neither the Constitution
nor the voter’s right of suffrage.

The equal protection of the law contemplates equality in the enjoyment of similar rights and privileges granted
by law. It would have been discriminatory and a denial of the equal protection of the law if the statute prohibited
an individual or group of voters in the city from voting for provincial officials while granting it to another
individual or group of voters in the same city. Neither can it be considered an infringement upon the petitioners’
rights of suffrage since the Constitution confers no right to a voter in a city to vote for the provincial officials of
the province where the city is located. Their right is limited to the right to vote for elective city officials in local
elections which the questioned statutes neither withdraw nor restrict.

The petitioners further claim that to prohibit the voters in a city from voting for elective provincial officials would
impose a substantial requirement on the exercise of suffrage and would violate the sanctity of the ballot, contrary
to the provisions of Art. VI, Section 1 of the Constitution. The prohibition contemplated in the Constitution,
however, has reference to such requirements, as the Virginia poll tax, invalidated in Harper vs. Virginia Board of
Elections, or the New York requirement that to be eligible to vote in a school district, one must be a parent of a
child enrolled in a local public school, nullified in Kramer vs. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, which
impose burdens on the right of suffrage without achieving permissible state objectives. In this particular case, no
such burdens are imposed upon the voters of the cities of Cebu and Mandaue. They are free to exercise their rights
without any other requirement, save that of being registered voters in the cities where they reside and the sanctity
of their ballot is maintained.

It is also contended that the prohibition would subvert the principle of republicanism as it would deprive a citizen
his right to participate in the conduct of the affairs of the government unit through the exercise of his right of
suffrage. It has been pointed out, however, that the provincial government has no governmental supervision over
highly urbanized cities. These cities are independent of the province in the administration of their affairs. Such
being the case, it is but just and proper to limit the selection and election of the provincial officials to the voters
of the province whose interests are vitally affected and exclude therefrom the voters of highly urbanized cities.

Petitioners assail the charter of the City of Mandaue as unconstitutional for not having been ratified by the
residents of the city in a plebiscite. This contention is untenable. The Constitutional requirement that the creation,
division, merger, abolition, or alteration of the boundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio should be
subject to the approval by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the governmental unit or units affected
is a new requirement that came into being only with the 1973 Constitution. It is prospective in character and
therefore cannot affect the creation of the City of Mandaue which came into existence on June 21, 1969.

“Gerrymandering” is a “term employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so contrived as to

give an unfair advantage to the party in power.” The questioned statutes Batas Blg. 51 and Section 96 of the
Charter of Mandaue City in this particular case do not apportion representative districts. The said representative
districts remain the same. Nor has it been shown that there is an unfair advantage in favor of the candidates of the
party in power. As the Solicitor General pointed out, it may even be that the majority of the city voters are
supporters of the administration candidates, so that the enactment of the questioned statutes will work to their
disadvantage.

ii. Party-List Representative

Veterans Federation Party vs. Commission on Elections

Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in arriving at the number
of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise “twenty per centum of the total number of

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representatives including those under the party-list.” We thus translate this legal provision into a mathematical
formula, as follows: No. of district representatives x .20 = No. of party-list .80 representatives
This formulation means that any increase in the number of district representatives, as may be provided by law,
will necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the number of party-list seats.
In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941. As said earlier, Congress declared
therein a policy to promote “proportional representation” in the election of party-list representatives in order to
enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would
benefit them. It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the
system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order to be entitled to a
party-list seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could have “additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes.” Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the
House of Representatives. Thus the relevant portion of Section 11(b) of the law provides: “(b) The parties,
organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system
shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall
be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.” Considering the foregoing statutory
requirements, it will be shown presently that Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It
merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress.
On the contention that a strict application of the two percent threshold may result in a “mathematical
impossibility,” suffice it to say that the prerogative to determine whether to adjust or change this percentage
requirement rests in Congress. Our task now, as should have been the Comelec’s, is not to find fault in the wisdom
of the law through highly unlikely scenarios of clinical extremes, but to craft an innovative mathematical formula
that can, as far as practicable, implement it within the context of the actual election process. Indeed, the function
of the Supreme Court, as well as of all judicial and quasi-judicial agencies, is to apply the law as we find it, not
to reinvent or second-guess it. Unless declared unconstitutional, ineffective, insufficient or otherwise void by the
proper tribunal, a statute remains a valid command of sovereignty that must be respected and obeyed at all times.
This is the essence of the rule of law.
The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but
with the very essence of “representation.” Under a republican or representative state, all government authority
emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them. But to have meaningful
representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a
legislature that features the party-list system, the result might be the proliferation of small groups which are
incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress.
Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to “the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio” to ensure meaningful local representation.
All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on this two percent requirement is precise and crystalline. When
the law is clear, the function of courts is simple application, not interpretation or circumvention.
Consistent with the Constitutional Commission’s pronouncements, Congress set the seat-limit to three (3) for
each qualified party, organization or coalition. “Qualified” means having hurdled the two percent vote threshold.
Such three-seat limit ensures the entry of various interest-representations into the legislature; thus, no single
group, no matter how large its membership, would dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire House.
Another suggestion that the Court considered was the Niemeyer formula, which was developed by a German
mathematician and adopted by Germany as its method of distributing party-list seats in the Bundestag. Under this
formula, the number of additional seats to which a qualified party would be entitled is determined by multiplying
the remaining number of seats to be allocated by the total number of votes obtained by that party and dividing the
product by the total number of votes garnered by all the qualified parties. The integer portion of the resulting
product will be the number of additional seats that the party concerned is entitled to.
The Niemeyer formula, while no doubt suitable for Germany, finds no application in the Philippine setting,
because of our three-seat limit and the non-mandatory character of the twenty percent allocation. True, both our
Congress and the Bundestag have threshold requirements—two percent for us and five for them. There are marked
differences between the two models, however. As ably pointed out by private respondents, one half of the German
Parliament is filled up by party-list members. More important, there are no seat limitations, because German law
discourages the proliferation of small parties. In contrast, RA 7941, as already mentioned, imposes a three-seat
limit to encourage the promotion of the multiparty system. This major statutory difference makes the Niemeyer
formula completely inapplicable to the Philippines. Just as one cannot grow Washington apples in the Philip-
pines or Guimaras mangoes in the Arctic because of fundamental environmental differences, neither can the
Niemeyer formula be transplanted in toto here because of essential variances between the two party-list models.

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It is now obvious that the Philippine style party-list system is a unique paradigm which demands an equally unique
formula. In crafting a legally defensible and logical solution to determine the number of additional seats that a
qualified party is entitled to, we need to review the parameters of the Filipino party-list system. As earlier
mentioned in the Prologue, they are as follows:
1. The twenty percent allocation—the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed
twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the
party list.
2. The two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes
cast for the party-list system are “qualified” to have a seat in the House of Representatives.
3. The three-seat limit - each qualified party, regard less of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled
to a maximum of three seats; that is, one “qualifying” and two additional seats.
4. Proportional representation — the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed
“in proportion to their total number of votes.”
Now, how do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to? The only basis given by the law is
that a party receiving at least two percent of the total votes shall be entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the first
party were to receive twice the number of votes of the second party, it should be entitled to twice the latter’s
number of seats and so on. The formula, therefore, for computing the number of seats to which the first party is
entitled is as follows:
Number of votes of first party Proportion of votes of first party relative
=
Total votes for party-list system to total votes for party-list system

If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at least six percent of the
total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall be entitled to two additional seats or a
total of three seats overall. If the proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater than four percent,
but less than six percent, then the first party shall have one additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion
is less than four percent, then the first party shall not be entitled to any additional seat.
The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are entitled to, based
on proportional representation. The formula is encompassed by the following complex fraction:
No. of votes of concerned party _____________

Total No. of votes Additional seats for party-list system No. of additional for
concerned = ———————— x seats allocated to party No. of votes to the first
party first party

Total No. of vote for party list system In simplified form, it is written as follows: No. of votes
of Additional seats concerned party No. of additional for concerned = --------------------------- x seats
allocated to party No. of votes of the first party first party
Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of the number of votes for the
other party to that for the first one is multiplied by zero. The end result would be zero additional seat for each of
the other qualified parties as well. The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of the
number of additional seats to be awarded since, in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole
number is necessary. In fact, most of the actual mathematical proportions are not whole numbers and are not
rounded off for the reasons explained earlier. To repeat, rounding off may result in the awarding of a number of
seats in excess of that provided by the law. Furthermore, obtaining absolute proportional representation is
restricted by the three seat-per-party limit to a maximum of two additional slots. An increase in the maximum
number of additional representatives a party may be entitled to would result in a more accurate proportional
representation. But the law itself has set the limit: only two additional seats. Hence, we need to work within such
extant parameter.
The Comelec, which is tasked merely to enforce and administer election-related laws, cannot simply disregard an
act of Congress exercised within the bounds of its authority. As a mere implementing body, it cannot judge the
wisdom, propriety or rationality of such act. Its recourse is to draft an amendment to the law and lobby for its
approval and enactment by the legislature.

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A reading of the entire Constitution reveals no violation of any of its provisions by the strict enforcement of RA
7941. It is basic that to strike down a law or any of its provisions as unconstitutional, there must be a clear and
unequivocal showing that what the Constitution prohibits, the statute permits.
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on Elections
We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from
the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution, provides that members of the House of Representatives may “be elected through a party-list system
of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.”
The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional representation by means of the
Filipino-style partylist system, which will “enable” the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino
citizens, who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and who lack well-
defined constituencies; but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that
will benefit the nation as a whole. The key words in this policy are “proportional representation,” “marginalized
and underrepresented,” and “lack [of] well-defined constituencies.”
“Proportional representation” here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district, because the
partylist election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed
group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the “marginalized and underrepresented” as exemplified by the
enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, “labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.”
It is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and underrepresented, because
representation is easy to claim and to feign. The partylist organization or party must factually and truly represent
the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5. Concurrently, the persons
nominated by the party-list candidate organization must be “Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties.”
“Lack of well-defined constituenc[y]” refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral group, like
voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate
interests identified with the “marginalized or underrepresented.”
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear
intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle
of statutory construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning
is ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the
meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association
specifically those belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties—to be
elected to the House of Representatives, and the assertion of the Office of the Solicitor General that the party-list
system is not exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented disregards the clear statutory policy.—The
declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). We stress that
the party-list system seeks to enable certain Filipino citizens—specifically those belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties—to be elected to the House of Representatives. The assertion
of the OSG that the party-list system is not exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented disregards the
clear statutory policy. Its claim that even the super-rich and overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit
of the partylist system.
Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under the partylist
system would not only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the marginalized and underrepresented, contrary
to the intention of the law to enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for the benefit of the underprivileged; the
law could not have given the same tool to others, to the prejudice of the intended beneficiaries.
The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec fqr the latter to determine, after summary
evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations allowed to participate in the party-list elections
comply with the requirements of the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the following
guidelines, culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work.
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941.
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to
participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy enabling Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be elected to the House of
Representatives.
Third, the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system.
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 Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941.
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or
assisted by, the government.
Sixth, the party must not only comply with t)ie requirements of the law. Its nominees must likewise do so.
Seventh, not only candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented
sectors. So also must its nominees.
Eighth, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the nominee must likewise be able to contribute
to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) vs. Commission on
Elections (April 2009)
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold
for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is
unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve
the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The
continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment
of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list
representatives.
We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as
found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted
obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of
“the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.”
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the
following procedure shall be observed:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already
been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as
“additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats.
Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding-off of
fractional seats.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list
system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate
in party-list elections through their sectoral wings.
By a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from
participating in the partylist elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted to continue disallowing major
political parties from the party-list elections joined Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate opinion. On the
formula to allocate party-list seats, the Court is unanimous in concurring with this ponencia.
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) vs. Commission on
Elections (July 2009)
The filling-up of all available party-list seats is not mandatory. Actual occupancy of the party-list seats depends
on the number of participants in the party-list election. If only ten parties participated in the 2007 party-list
election, then, despite the availability of 54 seats, the maximum possible number of occupied party-list seats
would only be 30 because of the three-seat cap. In such a case, the three-seat cap prevents the mandatory allocation
of all the 54 available seats.
In the second round allocation of additional seats, there is no minimum vote requirement to obtain a party-list
seat because the Court has struck down the application of the 2% threshold in the allocation of additional seats.
Specifically, the provision in Section 11(b) of the Party-List Act stating that “those garnering more than two
percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in the proportion to their total number of votes” can
no longer be given any effect. Otherwise, the 20 percent party-list seats in the total membership of the House of
Representatives as provided in the 1987 Constitution will mathematically be impossible to fill up. However, a
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party-list organization has to obtain a sufficient number of votes to gain a seat in the second round of seat
allocation. What is deemed a sufficient number of votes is dependent upon the circumstances of each election,
such as the number of participating parties, the number of available party-list seats, and the number of parties
with guaranteed seats received in the first round of seat allocation. To continue the example above, if only ten
parties participated in the 2007 party-list election and each party received only one thousand votes, then each of
the ten parties would receive 10% of the votes cast. All are guaranteed one seat, and are further entitled to receive
two more seats in the second round of seat allocation.
In the absence of a minimum vote requirement in the second round of party-list seat allocation, there is no need
to belabor the disparity between the votes obtained by the first and last ranked winning parties in the 2007 party-
list elections. In the same manner, no one belabors the disparity between the votes obtained by the highest and
lowest ranked winners in the senatorial elections. However, for those interested in comparing the votes received
by party-list representatives vis-a-vis the votes received by district representatives, the 162,678 votes cast in favor
of TUCP, the last party to obtain a party-list seat, is significantly higher than the votes received by 214 of the 218
elected district representatives.
The phrase “legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio”
in Section 5(1) of Article VI requires that legislative districts shall be apportioned according to proportional
representation. However, this principle of proportional representation applies only to legislative districts, not to
the party-list system. The allocation of seats under the party-list system is governed by the last phrase of Section
5(1), which states that the party-list representatives shall be “those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party-list system,” giving the Legislature wide discretion in formulating the allocation of party-list seats.
Clearly, there is no constitutional requirement for absolute proportional representation in the allocation of party-
list seats in the House of Representatives. Section 2, on Declaration of Policy, of R.A. No. 7941 provides that the
“State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives
through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof x x x.” However, this proportional representation in Section 2 is qualified by Section 11(b) of the same
law which mandates a three-seat cap, which is intended to bar any single party-list organization from dominating
the partylist system. Section 11(b) also qualifies this proportional representation by imposing a two percent cut-
off for those entitled to the guaranteed seats. These statutory qualifications are valid because they do not violate
the Constitution, which does not require absolute proportional representation for the party-list system.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections
The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation. Simply put, the party-list
system is intended to democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district
elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. The voter elects two representatives in the House
of Representatives: one for his or her legislative district, and another for his or her party-list group or organization
of choice.
Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not only sectoral
parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the
entirety, of the party-list system. As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can
participate in the party-list system “[F]or as long as they field candidates who come from the different
marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.”
The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they cannot expect to win in legislative
district elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the same number of votes that winning
candidates can garner in legislative district elections. The partylist system will be the entry point to membership
in the House of Representatives for both these non-traditional parties that could not compete in legislative district
elections.
What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could not be any clearer: the party-list
system is composed of three different groups, and the sectoral parties belong to only one of the three groups. The
text of Section 5(1) leaves no room for any doubt that national and regional parties are separate from sectoral
parties. Thus, the partylist system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or organizations; (2)
regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or
organizations are different from sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations
need not be organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector.
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a “party” as “either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of
parties.” Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides

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that a “political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and
policies for the general conduct of government.” On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that
a “sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5
hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.” R.A. No. 7941
provides different definitions for a political and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct from
each other.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented” sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the party-list system to represent the
“marginalized and underrepresented” is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-
oriented parties from the party-list system. How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot
win in legislative district elections, participate in the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list
system? To exclude them from the party-list system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle,
leaving as their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is, apart from being
obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A.
No. 7941. Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly different from
a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not represent any particular
sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party must represent a
“marginalized and underrepresented” sector. It is sufficient that the political party consists of citizens who
advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and policies, regardless of their
economic status as citizens.
The phrase “marginalized and underrepresented” should refer only to the sectors in Section 5 that are, by their
nature, economically “marginalized and underrepresented.” These sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other similar sectors. For
these sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral party must belong to the “marginalized and
underrepresented.” The nominees of the sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or must have a track record
of advocacy for the sector represented. Belonging to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector does not
mean one must “wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity.” It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below
the middle class. More specifically, the economically “marginalized and underrepresented” are those who fall in
the low income group as classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board.
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the “first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party
representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress” from participating in the May
1988 party-list elections. Thus, major political parties can participate in subsequent party-list elections since the
prohibition is expressly limited only to the 1988 party-list elections. However, major political parties should
participate in party-list elections only through their sectoral wings. The participation of major political parties
through their sectoral wings, a majority of whose members are “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking
in “well-defined political constituencies,” will facilitate the entry of the “marginalized and underrepresented” and
those who “lack welldefined political constituencies” as members of the House of Representatives.
The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in party-list elections so as
to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the “marginalized and
underrepresented” and to those who “lack well-defined political constituencies.” The participation of major
political parties in party-list elections must be geared towards the entry, as members of the House of
Representatives, of the “marginalized and underrepresented” and those who “lack well-defined political
constituencies,” giving them a voice in lawmaking. Thus, to participate in party-list elections, a major political
party that fields candidates in the legislative district elections must organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women or youth wing, that can register under the party-list system. Such
sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own constitution, by-laws, platform or program of
government, officers and members, a majority of whom must belong to the sector represented. The sectoral wing
is in itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a major political party through a coalition. This linkage
is allowed by Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941, which provides that “component parties or organizations of a coalition
may participate independently (in party-list elections) provided the coalition of which they form part does not
participate in the party-list system.”
Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of party-list nominees. This provision prescribes a special
qualification only for the nominee from the youth sector. Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees.—No
person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the
day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to
represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of
age on the day of the election. In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but
not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains

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the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term. A
party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he or she seeks to represent. In
the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee one must either belong to the sector represented,
or have a track record of advocacy for such sector.
iii. Vacancy
Lozada vs. Commission on Elections
As taxpayers, petitioners may not file the instant petition, for nowhere therein is it alleged that tax money is being
illegally spent. The act complained of is the inaction of the COMELEC to call a special election, as is allegedly
its ministerial duty under the constitutional provision abovecited, and therefore, involves no expenditure of public
funds. It is only when an act complained of, which may include a legislative enactment or statute, involves the
illegal expenditure of public money that the so-called taxpayer suit may be allowed. What the case at bar seeks is
one that entails expenditure of public funds which may be illegal because it would be spent for a purpose—that
of calling a special election—which, as will be shown, has no authority either in the Constitution or a statute.

As voters, neither have petitioners the requisite interest or personality to qualify them to maintain and prosecute
the present petition. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of
its enforcement. In the case before us, the alleged inaction of the COMELEC to call a special election to fill-up
the existing vacancies in the Batasan Pambansa, standing alone, would adversely affect only the generalized
interest of all citizens. Petitioners’ standing to sue may not be predicated upon an interest of the kind alleged here,
which is held in common by all members of the public because of the necessarily abstract nature of the injury
supposedly shared by all citizens. Concrete injury, whether actual or threatened, is that indispensable element of
a dispute which serves in part to cast it in a form traditionally capable of judicial resolution. When the asserted
harm is a “generalized grievance” shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens, that
harm alone normally does not warrant exercise of jurisdiction.

There is in this case no decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC which is sought to be reviewed by this Court
under its certiorari jurisdiction as provided for in the aforequoted provision, which is the only known provision
conferring jurisdiction or authority on the Supreme Court over the COMELEC. It is not alleged that the
COMELEC was asked by petitioners to perform its alleged duty under the Constitution to call a special election,
and that COMELEC has issued an order or resolution denying such petition.

Even from the standpoint of an action for mandamus, with the total absence of a showing that COMELEC has
unlawfully neglected the performance of a ministerial duty, or has refused on being demanded, to discharge such
a duty; and as demonstrated above, it is not shown, nor can it ever be shown, that petitioners have a clear right to
the holding of a special election which is equally the clear and ministerial duty of COMELEC to respect,
mandamus will not lie. The writ will not issue in doubtful cases.

It is obvious that the holding of special elections in several regional districts where vacancies exist, would entail
huge expenditure of money. Only the Batasan Pambansa can make the necessary appropriation for the purpose,
and this power of the Batasan Pambansa may neither be subject to mandamus by the courts much less may
COMELEC compel the Batasan to exercise its power of appropriation. From the role Batasan Pambansa has to
play in the holding of special elections, which is to appropriate the funds for the expenses thereof, it would seem
that the initiative on the matter must come from said body, not the COMELEC, even when the vacancies would
occur in the regular not interim Batasan Pambansa. The power to appropriate is the sole and exclusive prerogative
of the legislative body, the exercise of which may not be compelled through a petition for mandamus.

What is more, the provision of Section 5(2), Article VIII of the Constitution was intended to apply to vacancies
in the regular National Assembly, now Batasan Pambansa, not to the Interim Batasan Pambansa, as will presently
be shown.

Also under the original provision of the Constitution (Section 1, Article XVII—Transitory Provisions), the
Interim National Assembly had only one single occasion on which to call for an election, and that is for the
election of members of the regular National Assembly. The Constitution could not have at that time contemplated
to fill up vacancies in the Interim National Assembly the composition of which, as already demonstrated, would
not raise any imperious necessity of having to call special elections for that purpose, because the duration of its
existence was neither known or pre-determined. It could be for a period so brief that the time prescriptions
mentioned in Section 5(2), Article VIII of the Constitution cannot be applicable.

1. Election
a. Regular Election, Article VI, Section 8

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 b. Special Election, Article VI, Section 9

2. Salaries, Privileges and Disqualifications

a. Salaries- Article VI, Section 10; Article XVIII, Section 17

Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. vs. Mathay

Taxpayers may bring an action to restrain officials from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law (Cf. Philippine Constitution Association vs. Gimenez, L-23326, December 18,
1966 and other cases).

As the acts sought to be enjoined were the respondents' passing in audit and the approval of the payment of the
Representatives' increased salaries, and not the collection or receipt thereof, the members of the House of
Representatives need not be joined as defendants in the present action. Only the respondent auditors are the
indispensable or proper parties defendant.

The purpose of Section 14, Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that no increase in the compensation
of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives "shall take effect until after the full term of all the
Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase," is to place a "legal bar to
the legislators "yielding to the natural temptation to increase their salaries. Not that the power to provide for
higher compensation is lacking, but with the length of time that has to elapse before an increase becomes effective,
there is a deterrent factor to any such measure unless the need for it is clearly felt" (Tañada and Fernando,
Constitution of the" Philippines, Vol. 2, p. 867).

In establishing a waiting period before the increased compensation for legislators becomes fully effective, the
constitutional provision (Art. VI, Sec. IV) refers to "all the members of the Senate and of the House of Repre-
sentatives" in the same sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or separation between them. The fundamental
consideration is that the terms of office of all members of the Legislature that enacted the measure (whether
Senators or Representatives) must have expired before the increase in compensation can become operative.

It follows that the increased compensation provided by Republic Act No. 4134 is not operative until December
30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it on June 20, 1964 will have
expired. Insofar as Republic Act No. 4642 (1965-1966 Appropriations Act) authorizes the disbursement of the
increased compensation prior to the date aforesaid, it also violates the Constitution and must be held null and
void.

Ligot vs. Mathay

Since the salary increase to P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress under R.A. 4134 could be operative
only from December 30, 1969 for incoming members of Congress when the full term of all members of Congress
(House and Senate) that approved the increase (such as petitioner) will have expired, by virtue of the constitutional
mandate of Article VI, section 14 of the 1935 Constitution, it is self-evident that the “rate of pay as provided by
law” for members of Congress retiring on December 30, 1969 such as petitioner must necessarily be P7,200.00
per annum, the compensation they received “as provided by law” and the Constitution during their term of office.

To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on December 30, 1969 computed on
the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited by the Constitution from
receiving during their term of office) would be to pay them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase the
salary beyond that which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive during their incumbency. As stressed
by the Auditor-General in his decision in the similar case of petitioner’s colleague, ex-Congressman Singson,
“(S)uch a scheme would Contravene the Constitution for it would lead to the same prohibited result by enabling
administrative authorities to do indirectly what cannot be done directly.”

Petitioner’s contention that since the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum was already operative when his
retirement took effect on December 30, 1969, his retirement gratuity should be based on such increased salary
cannot be sustained as far as he and other members of Congress similarly situated whose term of office ended on
December 30, 1969 are concerned for the simple reason that a retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of
compensation within the purview of the Constitutional provision limiting their compensation and “other
emoluments” to their salary as provided by law. This was the clear teaching of Philconsa vs. Jimenez, 15 SCRA
479.

b. Freedom from arrest

Martinez vs. Morfe

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Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution makes it clear that parliamentary immunity from arrest does not cover
any prosecution for treason, felony and breach of the peace. Treason exists when the accused levies war against
the Republic or adheres to its enemies giving them aid and comfort. A felony is act or omission punishable by
law. Breach of the peace covers any offense whether defined by the Revised Penal Code or any special statute.
The debates in the Constitutional Convention on this particular provision also supports this conclusion.

The state of the American law on this point is aptly summarized by Cooley: “By common parliamentary law, the
members of the legislature are privileged from arrest on civil process during the session of that body, and for a
reasonable time before and after, to enable them to go to and return from the same.” A prosecution for a criminal
offense is thus excluded from this grant of immunity.

By virtue of section 2, article XVI of the Constitution which declares as inoperative any existing law inconsistent
with the Constitution, Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code which was enacted in January 1, 1932 and which
accords legislators a generous treatment exempting them from arrest even if warranted under a penal law, is
inconsistent with the Constitution is consequently inoperative.

c. Speech and Debate Clause – Article VI, Section 11

Jimenez, et al. vs. Cabangbang

The phrase “speech or debate therein,” used in Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution, refers to utterances
made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made,
or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether
the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises
housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as Members of Congress and of Congressional
Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question.
(Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192; Tenney vs. Brandhove, 341 U.S, 367; Coffin vs. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1.)

An open letter to the President of the Philippines when Congress was not in session which defendant-
Congressman caused to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines is not a
communication which the defendant published while he was performing his official duty, either as a Member of
Congress, or as officer of any Committee thereof. Said communication is not absolutely privileged.

The letter in question is not sufficient to support plaintiffs’ action for damages, Although the letter says that the
plaintiff is under the control of the unnamed persons therein alluded to as “planners” of a coup d’état, the
defendant, likewise, added that “it is of course possible” that the plaintiffs “are unwitting tools of the plan of
which they may have absolutely no knowledge”. In other words, the very document upon which plaintiffs’ action
is based explicitly indicates that they might be absolutely unaware of the alleged operational plans, and that they
may be merely unwitting tools of the planners. This statement is not derogatory to the plaintiffs, to the point of
entitling them to recover damages.

Osmeña, Jr. vs. Pendatun

While parliamentary immunity guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being
made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional
Hall, however, it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words
and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. For unparliamentary
conduct, members of Congress can be censured, committed to prison, suspended, even expelled by the votes of
their colleagues.

Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will
not invalidate the action taken by a deliberate body when the requisite number of members have agreed to a
particular measure.

The House of Representatives is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior. The courts will not assume a
jurisdiction in any case which will amount to an interference by the judicial department with the legislature.

The House of Representatives of the United States has taken the position that personal attacks upon the Chief
Executive constitutes unparliamentary conduct or breach of order. And in several instances, it took action against
offenders, even after other business had been considered.

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While under the Jones Law, the Senate had no power to suspend appointive member (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46
Phil. 83), at present Congress has the inherent legislative prerogative of suspension which the Constitution did
not impair.

d. Disqualifications and other Prohibitions – Article VI, Section 13-14

Flores vs. Drilon

In the case before us, the subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official, i.e., the Mayor of
Olongapo City, to other government posts (as Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA).
Since this is precisely what the constitutional proscription seeks to prevent, it needs no stretching of the
imagination to conclude that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. Here, the
fact that the expertise of an elective official may be most beneficial to the higher interest of the body politic is of
no moment. It is argued that Sec. 94 of the Local Government Code (LGC) permits the appointment of a local
elective official to another post if so allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office. But, the contention
is fallacious. Section 94 of the LGC is not determinative of the constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of RA 7227,
for no legislative act can prevail over the fundamental law of the land. Moreover, since the constitutionality of
Sec. 94 of LGC is not the issue here nor is that section sought to be declared unconstitutional, we need not rule
on its validity. Neither can we invoke a practice otherwise unconstitutional as authority for its validity.
It is further argued that the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor of Olongapo City, hence,
an excepted circumstance, citing Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, where we stated that the
prohibition against the holding of any other office or employment by the President, Vice-President, Members of
the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants during their tenure, as provided in Sec. 13, Art. VII, of the
Constitution, does not comprehend additional duties and functions required by the primary functions of the
officials concerned, who are to perform them in an ex officio capacity as provided by law, without receiving any
additional compensation therefor. This argument is apparently based on a wrong premise. Congress did not
contemplate making the subject SBMA posts as ex officio or automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor
of Olongapo City without need of appointment. The phrase “shall be appointed” unquestionably shows the intent
to make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo City. Had it been
the legislative intent to make the subject positions ex officio, Congress would have, at least, avoided the word
“appointed” and, instead, “ex officio” would have been used.
Considering that appointment calls for a selection, the appointing power necessarily exercises a discretion.
According to Woodbury, J., “the choice of a person to fill an office constitutes the essence of his appointment,”
and Mr. Justice Malcolm adds that an “[a]ppointment to office is intrinsically an executive act involving the
exercise of discretion.” In Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. Intermediate Appellate Court we held: The
power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing power has the right of choice which he may exercise
freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have the necessary
qualifications and eligibilities. It is a prerogative of the appointing power x x x x”
As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of Chairman of
the Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto pursuant to a legislative act that
contravenes the Constitution cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as
SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de facto officer, “one whose acts, though
not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon principles of policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they involve
the interest of the public and third persons, where the duties of the office were exercised x x x x under color of a
known election or appointment, void because the officer was not eligible, or because there was a want of power
in the electing or appointing body, or by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise, such ineligibility,
want of power or defect being unknown to the public x x x x [or] under color of an election, or appointment, by
or pursuant to a public unconstitutional law, before the same is adjudged to be such (State vs. Carroll, 38 Conn.,
499; Wilcox vs. Smith, 5 Wendell [N.Y.], 231; 21 Am. Dec., 213; Sheehan’s Case, 122 Mass, 445, 23 Am. Rep.,
323).”
e. Duty to Disclose – Article VI, Section 12 & 20, Article XI, Section 17
3. Internal Government of Congress
a. Election officers – Article VI, Section 16 (1)
Santiago vs. Guingona, Jr.
In the regular course, the regional trial courts and this Court have concurrent jurisdiction to hear and decide
petitions for quo warranto (as well as certiorari, prohibition and mandamus), and a basic deference to the hierarchy
of courts impels a filing of such petitions in the lower tribunals. However, for special and important reasons or
for exceptional and compelling circumstances, as in the present case, this Court has allowed exceptions to this
doctrine. In fact, original petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto assailing acts of
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legislative officers like the Senate President and the Speaker of the House have been recognized as exceptions to
this rule.
Unlike our previous constitutions, the 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the scope of judicial power. The
present Constitution now fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of
the acts of the political departments. It speaks of judicial prerogative in terms of duty.
Dissenting in part, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza submits that the Court has no jurisdiction over the petition.
Well-settled is the doctrine, however, that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined by the
allegations of the complaint or petition, regardless of whether the plaintiff or petitioner is entitled to the relief
asserted. In light of the aforesaid allegations of petitioners, it is clear that this Court has jurisdiction over the
petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its
officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their
functions and prerogatives.
The term “majority” has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a certain number out of a
total or aggregate, it simply “means the number greater than half or more than half of any total.” The plain and
unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must obtain the
votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not by any construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the
“majority,” much less the “minority,” in the said body. And there is no showing that the framers of our
Constitution had in mind other than the usual meanings of these terms.
In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number
constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not
vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the “minority,” who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no
law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.
The Comment of Respondent Guingona furnishes some relevant precedents, which were not contested in
petitioners’ Reply. During the eighth Congress, which was the first to convene after the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, the nomination of Sen. Jovito R. Salonga as Senate President was seconded by a member of the
minority, then Sen. Joseph E. Estrada. During the ninth regular session, when Sen. Edgardo J. Angara assumed
the Senate presidency in 1993, a consensus was reached to assign committee chairmanships to all senators,
including those belonging to the minority. This practice continued during the tenth Congress, where even the
minority leader was allowed to chair a committee. History would also show that the “majority” in either house of
Congress has referred to the political party to which the most number of lawmakers belonged, while the
“minority” normally referred to a party with a lesser number of members.
Let us go back to the definitions of the terms “majority” and “minority.” Majority may also refer to “the group,
party, or faction with the larger number of votes,” not necessarily more than one half. This is sometimes referred
to as plurality. In contrast, minority is “a group, party, or faction with a smaller number of votes or adherents than
the majority.” Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising a whole or totality, the greater number would
obviously be the majority, while the lesser would be the minority. But where there are more than two unequal
groupings, it is not as easy to say which is the minority entitled to select the leader representing all the minorities.
In a government with a multiparty system such as in the Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners themselves),
there could be several minority parties, one of which has to be identified by the Comelec as the “dominant
minority party” for purposes of the general elections. In the prevailing composition of the present Senate,
members either belong to different political parties or are independent. No constitutional or statutory provision
prescribes which of the many minority groups or the independents or a combination thereof has the right to select
the minority leader.
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however,
dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says
is that “[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.” To our mind, the method of
choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the
aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this
Court.
Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders. Neither is there
an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing
the holders thereof. At any rate, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence
of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine
the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto.
On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal
affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work. Paraphrasing
the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that where no specific, operable norms
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and standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion
and promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts may intervene.
Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and
obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they “are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the
pleasure of the body adopting them.” Being merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern to
the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of a
majority.
In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for such officers as it may
deem. And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe the parameters for the exercise of
this prerogative. This Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without
running afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold—the very duty that justifies the
Court’s being. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents
this Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate. To repeat, this Court will be neither a tyrant nor
a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the law.
To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would practically amount to judicial legislation, a clear breach
of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. If for this argument alone, the petition would easily fail.
While no provision of the Constitution or the laws or the rules and even the practice of the Senate was violated,
and while the judiciary is without power to decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been lodged
in the legislative department, this Court may still inquire whether an act of Congress or its officials has been made
with grave abuse of discretion. This is the plain implication of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which
expressly confers upon the judiciary the power and the duty not only “to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,” but likewise “to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.”
Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power by one without color of
title or who is not entitled by law thereto. A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the
right or title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. The action may be brought
by the solicitor general or a public prosecutor or any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position
usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another. The action shall be brought against the person who allegedly
usurped, intruded into or is unlawfully holding or exercising such office.
The all-embracing and plenary power and duty of the Court “to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government” is restricted only by the definition and confines of the term “grave abuse of discretion.” “By grave
abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.”
Under these circumstances, we believe that the Senate President cannot be accused of “capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment” or of “an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.” Where no
provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been
violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done
within their competence and authority.
b. Quorum – Article VI, Section 16 (2)
Avelino v. Cuenco
The subject matter of this quo warranto proceeding—to declare petitioner the rightful President of the Philippine
Senate and oust respondent—is not within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, in view of the separation of
powers, the political nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs. Quezon 46 Phil., 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil.,
192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1) and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own
president, which power should not be interfered with nor taken over by the judiciary. The selection of the presiding
officer of the Philippine Senate affects only the senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their
officers, change or reinstate them.

The Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction over this quo warranto proceeding", in the light of events subsequent to
the original resolution. The Court held that there was a quorum in the session of the Philippine Senate (composed
of twenty-four Senators) in which twelve Senators were present, one Senator being in the United States.

c. Rules of Proceedings

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Pacete vs. The Sec. of the Commission on Appointments
Our holding was that the mere filing of a motion for reconsideration did not have the effect of setting aside a
confirmation. There was a need for its being duly approved. Respondent’s theory would give to the mere filing
of a motion for reconsideration the effect which it would have if the motion were approved, and, hence, would
dispense with the necessity of such approval, for which the concurrence of a majority of the members present is
necessary. It is inconsistent with Rule 21 of the Revised Rules of the Commission. Nothing can be clearer,
therefore, than that this Court is committed to the principle that a mere motion for reconsideration to a
confirmation duly made which is not approved cannot have the effect of setting aside such confirmation, a
principle that is based not merely on the express language of Rule 21, but a reflection of the settled interpretation
of the Commission on Appointments, speaking through its Chairman.

Pursuant to this provision (Rule 21), the vote of a majority of the members present in favor of the motion for
reconsideration is necessary to “reopen” the appointment—and, hence, to “recall” its confirmation—and to
require a resubmission of the appointment for confirmation.

A distinction is thus made between the exercise of such presidential prerogative requiring confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments when Congress is in session and when it is in recess. In the former the President
nominates, and only upon the consent of the Commission on Appointments may the person thus named assume
office. It is not so with reference to ad interim appointments. It takes effect at once. The individual chosen may
thus qualify and perform his function without loss of time. His title to such office is complete. In the language of
the Constitution, the appointment is effective “until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of the Congress.”

Nor does the insistence of respondent Secretary of the Commission on Appointments, in his answer, that the
question involved is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court, elicit approval. It would extend the boundaries of the
political question doctrine beyond its legitimate limits. The courts are called upon to see to it that private rights
are not invaded. Thus even legislative acts and executive orders are not beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny.
Certainly, there is nothing sacrosanct about a rule of the Commission on Appointments, especially so, when as in
this case, a construction sought to be fastened on it would defeat the right of an individual to a public office. It
certainly can be inquired into in an appropriate case, although the utmost deference should be paid to the
interpretation accorded it by the Commission on Appointments itself. Although the Commission on Appointments
is not a power in our tripartite system of government, it is to all intents and purposes, like the Electoral Tribunals,
when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil.
139) Its actuation in the exercise of its power to approve appointments submitted to it by the President of the
Philippines is exempt from judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear showing of such arbitrary and
improvident use of the powers as will constitute a denial of due process. (Morero vs. Bocar, 37 O. G. 445) As due
process is impressed with both substantive and procedural significance, the scope of judicial inquiry is thus not
unduly limited.

Arroyo vs. De Venecia

It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240
are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a
law, i.e., Art. VI, §§26-27. Petitioners do not claim that there was no quorum but only that, by some maneuver
allegedly in violation of the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the
presence of a quorum. Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the constitutional
provision that “each House may determine the rules of its proceedings” and that for this reason they are judicially
enforceable. To begin with, this contention stands the principle on its head. In the decided cases, the constitutional
provision that “each House may determine the rules of its proceedings” was invoked by parties, although not
successfully, precisely to support claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to conduct its business free from
interference by courts. Here petitioners cite the provision for the opposite purpose of invoking judicial review.
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire
into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence
of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals.

We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by former Chief Justice Fernando, commenting
on the power of each House of Congress to determine its rules of proceedings. He wrote: Rules are hardly
permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the
pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their
observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform
to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a
particular measure. The above principle is subject, however, to this qualification. Where the construction to be
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given to a rule affects persons other than members of the legislative body the question presented is necessarily
judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved.

In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking
redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court. We have no more power to look into the internal
proceedings of a House than members of that House have to look over our shoulders, as long as no violation of
constitutional provisions is shown. Petitioners must realize that each of the three departments of our government
has its separate sphere which the others may not invade without upsetting the delicate balance on which our
constitutional order rests. Due regard for the working of our system of government, more than mere comity,
compels reluctance on our part to enter upon an inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules of the House. We
must accordingly decline the invitation to exercise our power.

Petitioners, quoting former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion’s sponsorship in the Constitutional Commission,
contend that under Art. VIII, §1, “nothing involving abuse of discretion [by the other branches of the government]
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is beyond judicial review.” Implicit in this statement of the former
Chief Justice, however, is an acknowledgment that the jurisdiction of this Court is subject to the case and
controversy requirement of Art. VIII, §5 and, therefore, to the requirement of a justiciable controversy before
courts can adjudicate constitutional questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations. For while
Art. VIII, §1 has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry into areas normally left to the political departments to
decide, such as those relating to national security, it has not altogether done away with political questions such as
those which arise in the field of foreign relations.

As we have already held, under Art. VIII, §1, this Court’s function is merely [to] check whether or not the
governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or
has a different view. In the absence of a showing . . . [of] grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power.... It has no power to look into what
it thinks is apparent error. If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void
on account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not
present a situation in which a branch of the government has “gone beyond the constitutional limits of its
jurisdiction” so as to call for the exercise of our Art. VIII, §1 power.

Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the House, Rep. Albano’s motion for the approval of the
conference committee report should have been stated by the Chair and later the individual votes of the Members
should have been taken. They say that the method used in this case is a legislator’s nightmare because it suggests
unanimity when the fact was that one or some legislators opposed the report. No rule of the House of
Representatives has been cited which specifically requires that in cases such as this involving approval of a
conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting. On
the other hand, as the Solicitor General has pointed out, the manner in which the conference committee report on
H. No. 7198 was approved was by no means a unique one. It has basis in legislative practice. It was the way the
conference committee report on the bills which became the Local Government Code of 1991 and the conference
committee report on the bills amending the Tariff and Customs Code were approved.

Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that some other way would be better, more accurate and even
more just. The advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly of a method do not present any matter for judicial
consideration. In the words of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, “this Court cannot provide a second opinion on
what is the best procedure. Notwithstanding the deference and esteem that is properly tendered to individual
congressional actors, our deference and esteem for the institution as a whole and for the constitutional command
that the institution be allowed to manage its own affairs precludes us from even attempting a diagnosis of the
problem.”

Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members be taken every time a House has to
vote, except only in the following instances: upon the last and third readings of a bill, at the request of one-fifth
of the Members present, and in repassing a bill over the veto of the President. Indeed, considering the fact that in
the approval of the original bill the votes of the Members by yeas and nays had already been taken, it would have
been sheer tedium to repeat the process.

Given this fact, it is difficult to see how it can plausibly be contended that in signing the bill which became R.A.
No. 8240, respondent Speaker of the House be acted with grave abuse of his discretion. Indeed, the phrase “grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction” has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of
procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi
judicial power as to amount to lack of power. As Chief Justice Concepcion himself said in explaining this
provision, the power granted to the courts by Art. VIII, §1 extends to cases where “a branch of the government

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or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute
an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.”

Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should
not be concerned. To repeat, the claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively
prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum
had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot
be raised repeatedly—especially when the quorum is obviously present—for the purpose of delaying the business
of the House. Rep. Arroyo waived his objection by his continued interpellation of the sponsor for in so doing he
in effect acknowledged the presence of a quorum.

Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President of the
Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21,
1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. Much energy and learning is devoted in the separate opinion of Justice
Puno, joined by Justice Davide, to disputing this doctrine. To be sure, there is no claim either here or in the
decision in the EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance] that the enrolled bill embodies a conclusive
presumption.

In one case we “went behind” an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions
of a statute had been approved by the Senate. But, whereas here there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court
will respect the certification of the presiding officers of both Houses that a bill has been duly passed. Under this
rule, this Court has refused to determine claims that the three-fourths vote needed to pass a proposed amendment
to the Constitution had not been obtained, because “a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity
and is binding on the courts.”

The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is cited with approval by text writers here
and abroad. The enrolled bill rule rests on the following considerations: . . . As the President has no authority to
approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the
official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the
President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments
of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by
Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon
that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the
court to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with
the Constitution. To overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the massive teaching of our
cases and overthrow an established rule of evidence.

The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the Constitution to be recorded
therein. With respect to other matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also been
accorded conclusive effect. Thus, in United States v. Pons, this Court spoke of the imperatives of public policy
for regarding the Journals as “public memorials of the most permanent character,” thus: “They should be public,
because all are required to conform to them; they should be permanent, that rights acquired today upon the faith
of what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed tomorrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts
resting only in the memory of individuals.” As already noted, the bill which became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in
the Journal. Hence its due enactment has been duly proven.

It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside
a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to
allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their
remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire into
complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would
itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case may instead
appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A.
No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof
acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is
due the judgment of that body.

d. Power of Members and right to sit

Vera vs. Avelino
Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its members, or its officers, to compel the performance of
purely legislative duties. The judicial department has no power to revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action
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of the legislative department, or of either house thereof, taken in pursuance of the power committed exclusively
to that department by the Constitution.
In proper cases and with appropriate parties, this court may annul any legislative enactment that fails to observe
the constitutional limitations. The judiciary is not the repository of remedies for all political or social ills.
Prohibition refers only to proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person, exercising functions judicial
or ministerial. As the respondents exercise legislative functions, the dispute falls beyond the scope of such special
remedy.
The Constitutional Convention circumscribed the authority of the Electoral Tribunal to "contests" relating to the
election, etc., and did not intend to give it all the functions of the Assembly on the subject of election and
qualifications of its members.
The House or Senate retains the authority to defer the oath-taking of any of its members, pending an election
contest. Independently of constitutional or statutory grant, the Senate has, under parliamentary practice, the power
to inquire into the credentials of any member and the latter's right to participate in its deliberations.
The legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary, subject only to such limitations, as are found in the
Republic's Constitution.
The Senate, as a branch of the legislative department, has the constitutional power to adopt rules for its
proceedings, and by legislative practice the power to promulgate such orders as may be necessary to maintain its
prestige and to preserve its dignity.
The designation of several justices to the electoral tribunals did not disqualify them in this litigation. It is presumed
that the legislature has acted within its constitutional powers. The proceedings of the Constitutional Convention
are less conclusive of the proper construction of the constitution than are legislative proceedings of the proper
construction of a statute.
Section 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 725 is addressed to the individual member of Congress, imposes on him
the obligation to come to Manila, and join his colleagues in regular session, and does not imply that if, for any
reason, he is disqualified, the House is powerless to postpone his admission. The constitutional provision that "for
any speech or debate" in Congress, Senators and Congressmen "shall not be questioned in any other place,"
includes the giving of a vote or the presentation of a resolution.

e. Discipline of members
Alejandrino vs. Quezon
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands lacks jurisdiction by mandamus to restrain or control action by the
Philippine Legislature or a branch thereof. The Congress has the exclusive power to discipline its members in
consistent to the separation of powers.
Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan
The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public official charged
with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support. It would
appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon determination of the
validity of the information filed before it. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance,
the court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be “no ifs and buts
about it.” In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear and
unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once, upheld
Sandiganbayan’s authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it.
The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline
its own ranks under the Constitution which provides that each—“x x x house may determine the rules of its
proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its
Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.” The
suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon
determination by the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member.
The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively excluded members of
Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim simply recognizes each of the three co-

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equal and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government— the Legislative, the Executive and the
Judiciary—has exclusive prerogatives and cognizance within its own sphere of influence and effectively prevents
one branch from unduly intruding into the internal affairs of either branch.
f. Journal and Congress Records
1. The Enrolled Bill Theory
Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito
Jurisdiction, which is a matter of substantive law, should not be confused with conclusiveness of an enactment or
resolution, which is a matter of evidence and practice. A duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute
verity and is binding on the courts. The rule conforms to the policy of the law making' body as expressed in
section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act; No. 2210.
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. vs. Gimenez
Individual statements made by Senators on the floor of the Senate do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate.
Much less do they indicate the intent of the House of Representative.
The enrolled bill is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and
approved by the President (Primicias v. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias v.
Comm. on Elections, L-18684, Sept. 14, 1961). If there has been any mistake in the printing of a bill before it
was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive, the remedy is by amendment or curative
legislation, not by judicial decree.
The term “urea formaldehyde”, used in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2609, under which the sale of foreign
exchange for the importation of certain articles is exempt from payment of margin fees, refers to the finished
product, and is distinct and separate from “urea” and “formaldehyde”, which are separate articles used in the
manu- facture of synthetic resin. Hence, the importation of urea and formaldehyde is not exempt from the
imposition of the margin fee established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provisions of Section 1 in relation
to Section 2 of said Act.
Fariñas vs. The Executive Secretary
Every statute is presumed valid. The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just
law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law. It is
equally well-established, however, that the courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to
determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. And
where the acts of the other branches of government run afoul of the Constitution, it is the judiciary’s solemn and
sacred duty to nullify the same.
The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of harassment or discrimination
that had to be done away with and repealed. The executive department found cause with Congress when the
President of the Philippines signed the measure into law. For sure, some sectors of society and in government
may believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it would encourage political adventurism. But policy
matters are not the concern of the Court. Government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political
branches of the government. It is not for this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative
determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory,
whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its
prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and
the serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance.
The petitioners, thus, urge the Court to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. The Court is not persuaded. Under
the “enrolled bill doctrine,” the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the
certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment.
A review of cases reveals the Court’s consistent adherence to the rule. The Court finds no reason to deviate from
the salutary rule in this case where the irregularities alleged by the petitioners mostly involved the internal rules
of Congress, e.g., creation of the 2nd or 3rd Bicameral Conference Committee by the House. This Court is not
the proper forum for the enforcement of these internal rules of Congress, whether House or Senate. Parliamentary
rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no concern. Whatever doubts there may be
as to the formal validity of Rep. Act No 9006 must be resolved in its favor. The Court reiterates its ruling in
Arroyo v. De Venecia, viz.: But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the
courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its
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own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private
individuals. In Osmeña v. Pendatun, it was held: “At any rate, courts have declared that ‘the rules adopted by
deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.’
And it has been said that ‘Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have
no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.’ Consequently, ‘mere failure to conform
to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of
members have agreed to a particular measure.’
2. Probative Value of the Journal
United States vs. Pons
The courts in the Philippine Islands are bound, judicially, to take notice of what the law is and, to enable them to
determine whether the legal requisites to the validity of a statute have been complied with, it is their right, as well
as their duty, to take notice of the legislative journals.
When the legislative journals show with certainty the- time of adjournment of the Legislature and are clear and
unambiguous respecting the same, they are conclusive; and extraneous evidence cannot be admitted to show a
different date of adjournment.
3. Journal Entry Rule v. Enrolled Bill Theory
Astorga vs. Villegas
The (1935) Constitution is silent as to what shall constitute proof of due enactment of a bill. It does not require
the presiding officers to certify to the same. The enrolled bill theory is based mainly on “the respect due to co-
equal and independent departments,” which requires the judicial department “to accept, as having passed
Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated.”
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the presiding
officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The law-making process in Congress ends when the bill is approved
by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present
upon its passage. In other words, it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers
that is essential. Thus, the (1935) Constitution says that “[e]very bill passed by the Congress shall, before it
becomes law, be presented to the President.” Thus, it has also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is
absent and the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other
records of Congress for proof of its due enactment.
This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the
same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court
can do this and resort to the Senate journal for that purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy
amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed
text sent to the President and signed by him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the
alleged law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking, but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore
did not become law. This We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when
they withdrew their signatures therein.
Morales vs. Subido
ln all cases, the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the Constitution
expressly requires must be entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act
may be affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question which the Supreme Court
cannot now decide. With respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill
prevails in the event of any discrepancy.
4. Congressional Record – Art. VI, Sec 16(4), par. 2

g. Art. VI, Sec. 15 and Sec. 16 (5)

Art VII, Sec. 10-11 and 18, par. 3

4. Electoral Tribunals – Art. VI, Sec. 17 and 19

a. Composition
Tañada and Macapagal vs. Cuenco, et al.

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Although the Constitution provides that the Senate shall choose six (6) Senators to be members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, the latter is part neither of Congress nor of the Senate. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63
Phil., 139; Suanes vs. Chief Accountant, 81 Phil., 818; 46 Off. Gaz., 462.)
The most vital feature of the Electoral Tribunals is the equal representation of the parties having the largest and
the second largest number of votes in each House therein, and the resulting equilibrium to be maintained by the
Justices of the Supreme Court as members of said Tribunals.
While it is true that the membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, in the case at bar, would in effect be limited
to seven (7), instead of nine (9), members it must be conceded that the present composition of the Senate, wherein
twenty-three (23) of its members belong to one party and one (1) member belongs to another, was not foreseen
by the framers of the Constitution. Furthermore, the spirit of the law prevails over its letter, and the solution herein
adopted maintains the spirit of the Constitution, for partisan considerations cannot be decisive in a tribunal
consisting of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court, three (3) members nominated by the majority party and
either one (1) or two (2) members nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes in the House
concerned.
If the Nacionalista Party would be allowed to nominate five (5) members to the Senate Electoral Tribunal instead
of three (3), it would have the absolute majority, since there would be one (1) member of the Citizens Party and
three (3) members of the Supreme Court, and hence, the philosophy underlying the Constitution would be entirely
upset. The equilibrium between the political parties therein would be destroyed, and, what is worse, the decisive
moderat ing role of the Justices of the Supreme Court would be wiped out, and, in lieu thereof, the door would be
thrown wide open for the predominance of political considerations in the determination of election protests
pending before said Tribunal, which is precisely what the fathers of our Constitution earnestly strove to forestall.
Abbas vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
It seems quite clear to us that in thus providing for a Tribunal to be staffed by both Justices of the Supreme Court
and Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those “Judicial” and “legislative” components
commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of Senators. The respondent Tribunal correctly stated one part of this proposition when it held that said provision
“x x x is a clear expression of an intent that all (such) contests x x x shall be resolved by a panel or body in which
their (the Senators’) peers in that Chamber are represented.” The other part, of course, is that the constitutional
provision just as clearly mandates the participation in the same process of decision of a representative or
representatives of the Supreme Court.
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or
disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may,
as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his
personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What we are merely
saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent
its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members
alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
b. Nature of Function
Angara vs. Electoral Commission
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the
executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and interlacing of
functions and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the
one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of
the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial
department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers
between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the performance
and execution of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although it is not a power in
our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority,
an independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the legislative department than to any other. The location of the
provision (sec. 4) creating the Electoral Commission under Article VI entitled "Legislative Department" of our
Constitution is very indicative. Its composition is also significant in that it is constituted by a majority of members
of the Legislature. But it is a body separate from and independent of the Legislature.
c. Independence of Electoral Tribunals
Bondoc vs. Pineda

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The use of the word “sole” in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution
underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives (Robles vs. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990). The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan
court although two-thirds of its members are politicians. It is a non-political body in a sea of politicians x x x To
be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction to
hear and decide congressional election contests is not to be shared by it with the Legislature nor with the Courts.
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete
detachment, impartiality, and independence—even independence from the political party to which they belong.
Hence, “disloyalty to party” and “breach of party discipline,” are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member
of the tribunal. ln expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a “conscience vote” in favor
of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the
votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a
violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and
void.
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates
Congressman Camasura’s right to security of tenure, Members of the HRET, as “sole judge” of congressional
election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under
our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 198? Constitution). Therefore; membership in the House Electoral Tribunal
may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member’s congressional term of
office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from-the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal
affiliation with another political party, or removal for-other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the
House of Representatives for “party disloyalty” short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another political
group. As the records of this case fail to show that Congressman Camasura has become a registered member of
another political party, his expulsion from the LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated
his right to security of tenure.
d. Powers
e. Judicial review and decisions of Electoral Tribunals
1. Commission on Appointments – Art. VI, Sec 18-19

Daza vs. Singson

To summarize, then, we hold, in view of the foregoing consideration, that the issue presented to us is justiciable
rather political, involving as it does the legality and not the wisdom of the act complained of, or the manner of
filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the Constitution. Even if the question were political in
nature, it would still come within our powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us by
Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution, which includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the
government. As for the alleged technical flaw in the designation of the party respondent, assuming the existence
of such a defect, the same maybe brushed aside, conformably to existing doctrine, so that the important
constitutional issue raised maybe addressed. Lastly, we resolve that issue in favor of the authority of the House
of Representatives to change its representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the
changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes must
be permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political
loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another.
Coseteng vs. Mitra, Jr.
The other political parties or groups in the House, such as petitioner’s KAIBA (which is presumably a member
also of the Coalesced Majority), are bound by the majority’s choices. Even if KAIBA were to be considered as
an opposition party, its lone member (petitioner Coseteng) represents only .4% or less than 1% of the House
membership, hence, she is not entitled to one of the 12 House seats in the Commission on Appointments. To be
able to claim proportional membership in the Commission on Appointments, a political party should represent at
least 8.4% of the House membership, i.e., it should have been able to elect at least 17 congressmen or
congresswoman.
Guingona, Jr. vs. Gonzales
The provision of Section 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in character and does not leave any
discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard the rule on proportional representation;

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otherwise, the party with a majority representation in the Senate or the House of Representatives can by sheer
force of numbers impose its will on the hapless minority.
We do not agree with respondents’ claim that it is mandatory to elect 12 Senators to the Commission on
Appointments. The Constitution does not contemplate that the Commission on Appointments must necessarily
include twelve (12) senators and twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives. What the Constitution
requires is that there be at least a majority of the entire membership. Under Section 18, the Commission shall rule
by majority vote of all the members and in Section 19, the Commission shall meet only while Congress is in
session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its members “to discharge such powers and functions herein
conferred upon it.”
2. Powers of Congress
a. General Plenary powers – Art. VI, Sec. 1
b. Limitations on the legislative power
1. Susbtantive limitations
a. Express Substantive limitations – Art. III; Art. VI, Sec. 25 & 28, Art. XIV. Sec 4 (3), Art. VI Sec
29-31
b. Implied substantive limitations
1. Prohibitions against delegation of legislative powers
2. Prohibitions against passage of irrepealable laws
(2) Procedural limitations- Art. VI, Sec 26-27
c. Power of inquiry vs. question hour Art. VI, Sec 22
Senate of the Philippines vs. Ermita
Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry, which
exemptions fall under the rubric of “executive privilege.” Since this term figures prominently in the challenged
order, it being mentioned in its provisions, its preambular clauses, and in its very title, a discussion of executive
privilege is crucial for determining the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
The phrase “executive privilege” is not new in this jurisdiction. It has been used even prior to the promulgation
of the 1986 Constitution. Being of American origin, it is best understood in light of how it has been defined and
used in the legal literature of the United States. Schwartz defines executive privilege as “the power of the
Government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and the Congress.” Similarly, Rozell defines it
as “the right of the President and high-level executive branch officers to withhold information from Congress, the
courts, and ultimately the public.” Executive privilege is, nonetheless, not a clear or unitary concept. It has
encompassed claims of varying kinds. Tribe, in fact, comments that while it is customary to employ the phrase
“executive privilege,” it may be more accurate to speak of executive privileges “since presidential refusals to
furnish information may be actuated by any of at least three distinct kinds of considerations, and may be asserted,
with differing degrees of success, in the context of either judicial or legislative investigations.”
One variety of the privilege, Tribe explains, is the state secrets privilege invoked by U.S. Presidents, beginning
with Washington, on the ground that the information is of such nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial
military or diplomatic objectives. Another variety is the informer’s privilege, or the privilege of the Government
not to disclose the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the
enforcement of that law. Finally, a generic privilege for internal deliberations has been said to attach to
intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part
of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.
In the context of a parliamentary system of government, the “question hour” has a definite meaning. It is a period
of confrontation initiated by Parliament to hold the Prime Minister and the other ministers accountable for their
acts and the operation of the government, corresponding to what is known in Britain as the question period. There
was a specific provision for a question hour in the 1973 Constitution which made the appearance of ministers
mandatory. The same perfectly conformed to the parliamentary system established by that Constitution, where
the ministers are also members of the legislature and are directly accountable to it. An essential feature of the
parliamentary system of government is the immediate accountability of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet to the
National Assembly. They shall be responsible to the National Assembly for the program of government and shall
determine the guidelines of national policy. Unlike in the presidential system where the tenure of office of all
elected officials cannot be terminated before their term expired, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet remain in
office only as long as they enjoy the confidence of the National Assembly. The moment this confidence is lost
the Prime Minister and the Cabinet may be changed.
Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered
as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to

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the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’
oversight function. When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the
statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as
Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such
instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their
appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is “in aid of legislation”
under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault. In fine, the oversight
function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit
of legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack
of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-
equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with
its demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads
to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they
are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power—the President on whom
executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is
based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch
of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. By the same token, members of the Supreme Court
are also exempt from this power of inquiry. Unlike the Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial body;
hence, each member thereof is exempt on the basis not only of separation of powers but also on the fiscal
autonomy and the constitutional independence of the judiciary. This point is not in dispute, as even counsel for
the Senate, Sen. Joker Arroyo, admitted it during the oral argument upon interpellation of the Chief Justice.
d. Legislative investigations – Art. VI, Sec. 21
Bengzon, Jr. vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation. xxx The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, xxx,
absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the aforequoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as
provided therein, the investigation must be “in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure” and that “the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected”. It follows
then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and
the right not to be compelled to testify against one’s self.
As held in Jean L. Arnault vs. Leon Nazareno, et al., the inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative
body making it, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as
to legislate or to expel a member. Under Sec. 4 of the aforementioned Rules, the Senate may refer to any
committee or committees any speech or resolution filed by any Senator which in its judgment requires an
appropriate inquiry in aid of legislation. In order therefore to ascertain the character or nature of an inquiry, resort
must be had to the speech or resolution under which such an inquiry is proposed to be made.
e. Act as board of canvassers for presidential and vice presidential elections – Art. VII, Sec. 4; RA7166, Sec.
30
f. Call Special election for President and Vice President – Art. VII, Sec. 10
g. Revoke or extend suspension of privilege of habeas corpus and declaration of martial law - Art. VII, Sec.
18
h. Approve Presidential amnesties – Art. VII, Sec. 19
i. Confirm certain appointments – Art. VII Sec. 9 (by Congress; Id.. Sec. 16 (by the Commission on
Appointments)
j. Concur in treaties – Art. VII, Sec. 21 (through the Senate)
k. Declaration of war and delegation of emergency powers – Art. VI. Sec. 23
Araneta vs. Dinglasan
Article VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be "for a limited period."
"Limited" has been defined to mean restricted; bounded; prescribed; confined within positive bounds; restrictive
in duration, extent or scope. The words "limited period" as used in the Constitution are beyond question intended
to mean restrictive in duration.
Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of emergency powers, "must be temporary or it can not be said to
be an emergency." In the language of section 3 of Act No. 671, the National Assembly restricted the life of the
emergency powers of the President to the time the Legislature was prevented from holding sessions due to enemy
action or other causes brought on by war.

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Commonwealth. Act No. 671 was only "for a certain period" and "would become invalid unless reenacted." These
phrases connote automatic extinction. of the law upon the conclusion of a certain period. Together they denote
that a new legislation was necessary to keep alive (not to repeal) the law after the expiration of that period. They
signify that the same law, not a different one, had to be repassed if the grant should be prolonged.
Rodriguez, Sr., etc., et al. vs. Gella, etc., et al.
Commonwealth Act No. 671, passed in pursuance of section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution, declared the
national policy that "the existence of war between the United States and other countries of Europe and Asia, which
involves the Philippines makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to
meet the resulting emergency," and authorized the President "during the existence of the emergency, to
promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy declared in the
Act." To be constitutional, this Act must be construed to be for the limited period fixed or implied therein.
Express repeal of Commonwealth Act No. 671 is not necessary; otherwise it would be unconstitutional since it
may never be repealed by the Congress, or if the latter attempts to do so, the President may wield his veto.
l. Be judge of the Presidents physical fitness – Art. VII, Sec. 11 par. 4
m. Power of impeachment
n. Power with regard to utilization of natural resources – Art. XII, Sec. 2
o. Amendment of the Constitution – Art. XVII, Sec. 1-2

3. Legislative process
a. Requirement as to bills
(1) As to titles of bills – Art. VI, Sec. 26 (1)
De la Cruz vs. Paras
Then on May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to include not merely “the power to regulate, but likewise
“prohibit * * *.” The title, however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as Republic Act No. 938. It is to be
admitted that as thus amended, if only the above portion of the Act were considered, a municipal council may go
as far as to prohibit the operation of night clubs. If that were all, then the appealed decision is not devoid of
support in law. That is not all, however. The title was not in any way altered. It was not changed one whit. The
exact wording was followed. The power granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition. There is thus support
for the view advanced by petitioners that to construe Republic Act No. 938 as allowing the prohibition of the
operation of night clubs would give rise to a constitutional question. The Constitution mandates: “Every bill shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.” Since there is no dispute as the title limits
the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in the statute being invalid if, as was done by the
Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night club was prohibited. There is a wide gap between the exercise
of a regulatory power “to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals,” in the
language of the Administrative Code, such competence extending to all “the great public needs,” to quote from
Holmes, and to interdict any calling, occupation, or enterprise. In accordance with the well-settled principle of
constitutional construction that between two possible interpretations by one of which it will be free from
constitutional infirmity and by the other tainted by such grave defect, the former is to be preferred. A construction
that would save rather than one that would affix the seal of doom certainly commends itself. We have done so
before We do so again.
Lidasan vs. Commission on Elections
Section 21(1), Art. VI of the Constitution contains dual limitations upon legislative power. First, Congress is to
refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second, the title of the bill is to be
couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the
single subject thereof.
Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be expressed in the title of the bill.
Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read
during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which became R.A. 4790,
only its title was read from its introduction to its final approval in the House of Representatives, where the bill,
being of local application, originated.
The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as
to mirror, fully indexed or catalogued, all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should
serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject
of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this,
to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and,
thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.

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The test of the sufficiency of a title whether or not it is misleading; and, while technical accuracy is not essential
and the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title
which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment
or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where
another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression on indication of the real
subject or scope of the act, is bad. In determining sufficiency of particular title its substance rather than its form
should be considered, and the purpose of the constitutional requirement, of giving notice to all persons interested,
should be kept in mind by the court.
Respondent’s stance is that the change in boundaries of the two provinces resulting in “the substantial diminution
of the territoral limits” of Cotabato province is “merely the incidental legal results of the definition of the
boundary” of the municipality of Dianaton and that, therefore, reference to the fact that portions in Cotabato are
taken away “need not be expressed in the title of the law.” This posture —we must say—but emphasizes the error
of constitutional dimensions in writing down the title of the bill. Transfer of a sizeable portion of territory from
one province to another of necessity involves reduction of area, population and income of the first and the
corresponding increase of those of the other. This is as important as the creation of a municipality. And yet, the
title did not reflect this fact.
But when the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations,
inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole,
and that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently, then, if
some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected, must fall
with them.
Tio vs. Videogram Regulatory Board
The Constitutional requirement that “every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof” is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose
which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title express each and every end that the statute wishes
to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject
matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title.
An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter
how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be
considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general
object.” The rule also is that the constitutional requirement as to the title of a bill should not be so narrowly
construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. It should be given a practical rather than technical
construction.
Insular Lumber Co. vs. Court of Tax Appeals
Republic Act No. 1435 deals with only one subject and proclaims just one policy, namely, the necessity for
increasing the Highway Special Fund through the imposition of an increased specific tax on manufactured oils.
The proviso in Section 5 of the law is in effect a partial exemption from the imposed increased tax. Said proviso,
which has reference to specific tax on oil and fuel, is not a deviation from the general subject of the law.
Where the provision of the law is clear and unambiguous, so that there is no occasion for the court’s seeking
legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or subtraction.
Furthermore, in deciding the constitutionality of a statute alleged to be defectively titled, every presumption favors
the validity of the Act. As is true in cases presenting other constitutional issues, the courts avoid declaring an Act
unconstitutional whenever possible. Where there is any doubt as to the insufficiency of either the title, or the Act,
the legislation should be sustained.
(2) Requirements as to certain laws
(i) Appropriations laws – Art. VII, Sec. 22; Art. VI Sec. 24-25 and 29
(ii) Tax Laws – Art. VI, Sec. 28; Art. XIV, Sec. 4 (3-4)
(iii) Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
When the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 226) was promulgated on July 17, 1987, the right to
appeal from the decisions and final orders of the BOI to the Supreme Court was again granted. By then, however,
the present Constitution had taken effect. The Constitution now provides in Art. VI, § 30 that “No law shall be
passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its
advice and concurrence.” This provision is intended to give the Supreme Court a measure of control over cases
placed under its appellate jurisdiction. For the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate

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jurisdiction can unnecessarily burden the Court and thereby undermine its essential function of expounding the
law in its most profound national aspects.
Fabian vs. Desierto
Considering, however, the view that this Court now takes of the case at bar and the issues therein which will
shortly be explained, it refrains from preemptively resolving the controverted points raised by the parties on the
nature and propriety of application of the writ of certiorari when used as a mode of appeal or as the basis of a
special original action, and whether or not they may be resorted to concurrently or alternatively, obvious though
the answers thereto appear to be. Besides, some seemingly obiter statements in Yabut and Alba could bear
reexamination and clarification. Hence, we will merely observe and lay down the rule at this juncture that Section
27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is involved only whenever an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a
decision in an administrative disciplinary action. It cannot be taken into account where an original action for
certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for judicial review, such as from an incident in a criminal
action.
By jurisprudential developments over the years, this Court has allowed appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 in a
substantial number of cases and instances even if questions of fact are directly involved and have to be resolved
by the appellate court. Also, the very provision cited by petitioner specifies that the appellate jurisdiction of this
Court contemplated therein is to be exercised over “final judgments and orders of lower courts,” that is, the courts
composing the integrated judicial system. It does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or agencies, hence
whenever the legislature intends that the decisions or resolutions of the quasi-judicial agency shall be reviewable
by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, a specific provision to that effect is included in the law creating
that quasi-judicial agency and, for that matter, any special statutory court. No such provision on appellate
procedure is required for the regular courts of the integrated judicial system because they are what are referred to
and already provided for in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for review on certiorari but only from
judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in Section 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders
of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review,
under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a
uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.
b. Procedure for the passage of bills – Art. VI, Sec. 26 (2)
c. The President’s Veto Power
1. Qualified vs. Absolute Veto
2. ‘Executive Impoundment”
Compare 1987 Const. Art. VI Sec. 27 with 1935 Const., Art. VI, Sec. 20
Bolinao Electronics Corporation vs. Valencia
The President may not legally veto a condition attached to an appropriation or item in the appropriation bill
without at the same time vetoing the particular item or Items to which it relates.
lf the veto of a condition attached to an item of an appropriation bill is unconstitutional, the same produces 110
effect whatsoever and the condition imposed by the appropriation bill remains.
Where it appears that the circulars issued by the respondent officials condoned the previous non-observance by
station operators of radio laws and regulations regarding late filing of applications for renewal of licenses, and
the lone reason given for the investigation of a station operator's application is the late filing thereof, it is held
that said reason being no longer tenable, the violation, in legal effect, ceased to exist, and, hence there is no legal
basis for said investigation.
A statement appearing in the construction permit to transfer a television station from one city to another, does not
establish any agreement between the radio control authority and the station operator on the switch or change of
operations from one channel to another, and therefore does not constitute any evidence of abandonment of a
television station to operate its channel.
The remarks appearing in the construction permit issued to one broadcasting station cannot bind another operator
where the latter had no participation in the preparation of said permit.
Gonzales vs. Macaraig, Jr.
As specified, the President may not veto less than all of an item of an Appropriations Bill. In other words, the
power given the executive to disapprove any item or items in an Appropriations Bill does not grant the authority
to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the same item.

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The terms item and provision in budgetary legislation and practice are concededly different. An item in a bill
refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts x x x of the bill (Bengzon, supra, at 916). It is
an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose (Commonwealth v. Dodson, 11 S.E., 2d 120, 124, 125,
etc., 176 Va. 281). The United States Supreme Court, in the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice (299 U.S.
410, 414, 57 S.Ct 252, 81 L. Ed., 312) declared “that an ‘item’ of an appropriation bill obviously means an item
which in itself is a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law, which happens to be put
into an appropriation bill.”
There can be no denying that inherent in the power of appropriation is the power to specify how money shall be
spent; and that in addition to distinct “items” of appropriation, the Legislature may include in Appropriation Bills
qualifications, conditions, limitations or restrictions on expenditure of funds. Settled also is the rule that the
Executive is not allowed to veto a condition or proviso of an appropriation while allowing the appropriation itself
to stand (Fairfield v. Foster, supra, at 320). That was also the ruling in Bolinao, supra, which held that the veto of
a condition in an Appropriations Bill which did not include a veto of the items to which the condition related was
deemed invalid and without effect whatsoever.
Bengzon vs. Drilon
It cannot be overstressed that in a constitutional government such as ours, the rule of law must prevail. The
Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons,
including the highest official of this land, must defer. From this cardinal postulate, it follows that the three
branches of government must discharge their respective functions within the limits of authority conferred by the
Constitution. Under the principle of separation of powers, neither Congress, the President, nor the Judiciary may
encroach on fields allocated to the other branches of government. The legislature is generally limited to the
enactment of laws, the executive to the enforcement of laws and the judiciary to their interpretation and
application to cases and controversies.
The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is an exercise of a constitutionally vested power. But
even as the Constitution grants the power, it also provides limitations to its exercise. The veto power is not
absolute.
The Constitution provides that only a particular item or items may be vetoed. The power to disapprove any item
or items in an appropriate bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining
portion of the same item.
We need no lengthy justifications or citations of authorities to declare that no President may veto the provisions
of a law enacted thirty-five (35) years before his or her terms of office. Neither may the President set aside or
reverse a final and executory judgment of this Court through the exercise of the veto power.
The challenged veto has far-reaching implications which the Court can not countenance as they undermine the
principle of separation of powers. The Executive has no authority to set aside and overrule a decision of the
Supreme Court.
Neither may the veto power of the President be exercised as a means of repealing RA 1797. This is arrogating
unto the Presidency legislative powers which are beyond its authority. The President has no power to enact or
amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to repeal existing laws. The President’s power is
merely to execute the laws as passed by Congress.
Philippine Constitution Association vs. Enriquez
When issues of constitutionality are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the
following requisites are compresent: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and
substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded
at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case (Luz Farms v. Secretary
of the Department of Agrarian Reform, 192 SCRA 51 [1990]; Dumlao v. Commission on Elections, 95 SCRA
392 [1980]; People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]).
We rule that a member of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives for that matter, has the legal standing
to question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in an appropriation bill. Where
the veto is claimed to have been made without or in excess of the authority vested on the President by the
Constitution, the issue of an impermissible intrusion of the Executive into the domain of the Legislature arises
(Notes: Congressional Standing To Challenge Executive Action, 122 University of Pennsylvania Law Review
1366 [1974]). To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since
his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution (Coleman v. Miller, 307
U.S. 433 [1939]; Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F. 2d 1307 [1973]). An act of the Executive which injures the
institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a

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member of Congress (Kennedy v. Jones, 412 F. Supp. 353 [1976]). In such a case, any member of Congress can
have a resort to the courts.
It is true that the Constitution provides a mechanism for overriding a veto (Art. VI, Sec. 27 [1]). Said remedy,
however, is available only when the presidential veto is based on policy or political considerations but not when
the veto is claimed to be ultra vires. In the latter case, it becomes the duty of the Court to draw the dividing line
where the exercise of executive power ends and the bounds of legislative jurisdiction begin.
The Court will indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto, the same as it will presume
the constitutionality of an act of Congress (Texas Co. v. State, 254 P. 1060; 31 Ariz., 485, 53 A.L.R. 258 [1927]).
The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative process (Memorandum of
Justice Irene Cortes as Amicus Curiae, pp. 3-7). That is why it is found in Article VI on the Legislative Department
rather than in Article VII on the Executive Department in the Constitution. There is, therefore, sound basis to
indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on those questioning the validity thereof to
show that its use is a violation of the Constitution.
Under his general veto power, the President has to veto the entire bill, not merely parts thereof (1987 Constitution,
Art. VI, Sec. 27[1]). The exception to the general veto power is the power given to the President to veto any
particular item or items in a general appropriations bill (1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 27[2]). In so doing, the
President must veto the entire item.
A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited to specified sums of money
dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit (Beckman, The Item Veto Power of the Executive, 31
Temple Law Quarterly 27 [1957]).
As the Constitution is explicit that the provision which Congress can include in an appropriations bill must “relate
specifically to some particular appropriation therein” and “be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which
it relates,” it follows that any provision which does not relate to any particular item, or which extends in its
operation beyond an item of appropriation, is considered “an inappropriate provision” which can be vetoed
separately from an item.
Also to be included in the category of “inappropriate provisions” are unconstitutional provisions and provisions
which are intended to amend other laws, because clearly these kind of laws have no place in an appropriations
bill. These are matters of general legislation more appropriately dealt with in separate enactments.
The President vetoed the entire paragraph one of the Special Provision of the item on debt service, including the
provisos that the appropriation authorized in said item “shall be used for payment of the principal and interest of
foreign and domestic indebtedness” and that “in no case shall this fund be used to pay for the liabilities of the
Central Bank Board of Liquidators.” These provisos are germane to and have a direct connection with the item
on debt service. Inherent in the power of appropriation is the power to specify how the money shall be spent
(Henry v. Edwards, LA, 346 So., 2d., 153). The said provisos, being appropriate provisions, cannot be vetoed
separately. Hence the item veto of said provisions is void.
—The second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 brings to fore the divergence in policy of Congress and the
President. While Congress expressly laid down the condition that only 30% of the total appropriation for road
maintenance should be contracted out, the President, on the basis of a comprehensive study, believed that
contracting out road maintenance projects at an option of 70% would be more efficient, economical and practical.
The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not
alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be
expended—70% by administrative and 30% by contract. The 1987 Constitution allows the addition by Congress
of special provisions, conditions to items in an expenditure bill, which cannot be vetoed separately from the items
to which they relate so long as they are “appropriate” in the budgetary sense (Art. VII, Sec. 25[2]).
The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the “Use of Fund” for the AFP modernization program that the
President must submit all purchases of military equipment to Congress for its approval, is an exercise of the
“congressional or legislative veto.” By way of definition, a congressional veto is a means whereby the legislature
can block or modify administrative action taken under a statute. It is a form of legislative control in the
implementation of particular executive actions. The form may be either negative, that is requiring disapproval of
the executive action, or affirmative, requiring approval of the executive action. This device represents a significant
attempt by Congress to move from oversight of the executive to shared administration (Dixon, The Congressional
Veto and Separation of Powers: The Executive on a Leash, 56 North Carolina Law Review, 423 [1978]). A
congressional veto is subject to serious questions involving the principle of separation of powers.
However the case at bench is not the proper occasion to resolve the issues of the validity of the legislative veto as
provided in Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 because the issues at hand can be disposed of on other grounds. Any
provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval of executive

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acts must be incorporated in a separate and substantive bill. Therefore, being “inappropriate” provisions, Special
Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed.
d. Legislative Veto
e. Effectivity of Laws – Civil Code, Art. 2; EO 200 (June 18 1987)

ARTICLE VII
THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
1. The President
a. Singular Executive
Planas vs. Gil
A perusal of our Constitution will show that extensive authority over the public service is granted the President
of the Philippines. Article VII of the Constitution begins in its section 1 with the declaration that "The Executive
power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines." All executive authority is thus vested in him, and upon
him devolves the constitutional duty of seeing that the laws are "faithfully. executed." (Art VII, sec. 11, subsec.
1, last clause.) In the fulfillment of this duty which he cannot evade, he is granted specific and express powers
and functions. (Art. VII, sec. 11.) In addition to these specific and express powers and functions, he may also
exercise those necessarily implied and included in them. (Myers vs. United States [1926], 272 U. S., 52; 71 Law.
ed., 160; 47 Sup Ct. Rep., 21; Willoughby, Constitution of the United States, sec. 953, citing Taft's Our Chief
Magistrate and His Powers, p. 139.) The National Assembly may not enact laws which either expressly or
impliedly diminish the authority conferred upon the President of the Constitution. (Cf. Concepcion vs. Paredes
[1921], 42 Phil., 599.) The Constitution provides that the President "shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices" (Art. VII, sec. 11 [1], first clause) and shall "exercise general supervision over
all local governments as may be provided by law" (Ibid, second clause). This power of control and supervision is
an important constitutional grant.
The President in the exercise of the executive power under the Constitution may act through the heads of the
.executive departments. The heads of the executive departments are his authorized assistants and agents in the
performance of his excutive duties, and their official acts, promulgated in the regular course of business, are
presumptively his acts. (Runkle vs. United States [1887], 122 U. S., 543; 30 Law. ed., 1167; 7 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
1141. See also U. S. vs. Eliason [1839], 16 Pet., 291; 10 Law. ed., 968; Jones vs. U. S. [1890], 137 U. S., 202; 34
Law. ed., 691; 11 Sup. Ct. Rep., 80; Wolsey vs. Chapman [1880], 101 U. S., 755; 25 Law. ed., 915; Wilcox vs.
Jackson [1836], 13 Pet., 498; 10 Law. ed., 264.)Pet., 291; 10 Law. ed., 968; Jones vs. U. S. [1890], 137 U. S.,
202; 34 Law. ed., 691; 11 Sup. Ct. Rep., 80; Wolsey vs. Chapman [1880], 101 U. S., 755; 25 Law. ed., 915;
Wilcox vs. Jackson [1836], 13 Pet., 498; 10 Law. ed., 264.)
The power of removal which the President may exercise directly and the practical necessities of efficient
government brought about by administrative centralization easily make the President the head of the
administration. (Willoughby, Constitution of the United States, Vol. II, 2nd ed., sec. 959.) Independently of any
statutory provision authorizing the President to conduct an investigation of the nature involved in this proceeding,
and in view of the mature and character of the executive authority with which the President of the Philippines is
invested, the constitutional grant to him of power to exercise general supervision over all local govern ments and
to take care that the laws be faithfully executed must be construed to authorize him to order an investigation of
the act or conduct of the petitioner herein. Supervision is not a meaningless thing. It is an active power. It is
certainly not without limitation, but it at least implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to
render the power real and. effective. If supervision is to be conscientious and rational, and not automatic and
brutal, it must be founded upon a knowledge of actual facts and conditions disclosed after careful study and
investigation.
Section 64 of the Administrative Code of 1917 provides as follows: "In addition to his general supervisory
authority, the Governor-General (President) shall have such specific powers and duties as are expressly conferred
or imposed on him by law and also, in particular, the powers and duties set forth in this chapter. Among such
special powers and duties shall be: * * * (c) To order, when in his opinnion the good of the public service so
requires, an investigation of any action or the conduct of any person in the Government service, and in connection
therewith to designate the official, committee, or person by whom such investigation shall be conducted." This
provision of the law, in existence before the taking effect of the Constitution, still subsists. It is not inconsistent
with the Constitution and has not been abrogated or repealed by the National Assembly. (See sec. 2, Art. XV
Constitution.)
Assuming that this is not one of the grounds provided by law for which the petitioner may be investigated
administratively (sec. 2078, Rev. Adm. Code), there is weight in the argument that the investigation would, still
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be in order if for no other purpose than to cause a full and honest disclosure of all the facts so that, if found proper
and justified, appropriate action may be taken against the parties alleged to have been guilty of the illegal acts
charged. This is essential to render effective the authority vested in the President by the Constitution to "take care
that the laws be faithfully executed." (Sec. 11, par. 1, Art. VII.) The enforcement of the law and the maintenance
of peace and order are primarily an executive obligation. The declaration that the President should "take care that
the laws be faithfully executed" is more an imposition of an obligation than a conferment of power. His oath
requires him to "faithfully and conscientiously fulfill" his duties as President, "preserve and defend" the
Constitution and "execute" the law. This duty of the Executive to see that the laws be faithfully executed is not
limited to the enforcement of legislative acts or the express terms of the Constitution but also includes the due
enforcement of rights, duties, obligations, prerogatives and immunities growing out of the Constitution itself and
of the protection implied by the nature of the government under the Constitution. (Cunningham vs. Neagle, 135
U. S., 1; 34 Law. ed., 55.)
Villena vs. Secretary of the Interior
Section 79 (C) of the Administrative Code speaks of direct control, direction, and supervision over bureaus and
offices under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior, but this section should be interpreted in relation to
section 86 of the same Code which grants to the Department of the Interior "executive supervision over the
administration of provinces, municipalities, chartered cities and other local political subdivisions."
In the case of Planas vs. Gil (37 Off. Gaz., 1228) this court observed that "Supervision is not a meaningless thing.
It is an active power. It is certainly not without limitation, but it at least implies authority to inquire into facts and
conditions in order to render the power real and effective. If supervision is to be conscientious and rational, and
not automatic and brutal, it must be founded upon a knowledge of actual facts and conditions disclosed after
careful study and investigation." The principle there enunciated is applicable with equal force to the present case.
The Secretary of the Interior is invested with authority to order the investigation of the charges against the
petitioner and to appoint a special investigator for that purpose.
As regards the challenged power of the Secretary of the Interior to decree the suspension of the herein petitioner
pending an administrative investigation of the charges against him, the question, it may be admitted, is not free
from difficulties. There is no clear and express grant of power to the secretary to suspend a mayor of a municipality
who is under investigation. On the contrary, the power appears lodged in the provincial governor by section 2188
of the Administrative Code which provides that "The provincial governor shall receive and investigate complaints
made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of
maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude."
The fact, however, that the power of suspension is expressly granted by section 2188 of the Administrative Code
to the provincial governor does not mean that the grant is necessarily exclusive and precludes the Secretary of the
Interior from exercising a similar power. For instance, counsel for the petitioner admitted in the oral argument
that the President of the Philippines may himself suspend the petitioner from office in virtue of his greater power
of removal (sec. 2191, as amended, Administrative Code) to be exercised conformably to law.
Ang-Angco vs. Castillo
The action taken by respondent Executive Secretary, even with the authority of the President, in taking direct
action by considering petitioner resigned with prejudice to reinstatement in the same bureau in the administrative
case of petitioner, without submitting the same to the Commissioner of Civil Service, is contrary to law and should
be set aside.
Under Section 16(1) of the Civil Service Act of 1959 it is the Commissioner of Civil Service who has original
and exclusive jurisdiction to decide administrative cases of all officers and employees in the classified service.
The only limitation to this power is that the decision of the Commissioner may be appealed to the Civil Service
Board of Appeals, whose decision in such cases shall be final.
The Civil Service Law of 1959 does not provide for any appeal to the President, nor is he given the power to
review the decision in administrative cases motu proprio, unlike the provision of the previous law, Com. Act No.
598, which was expressly repealed by the new law.
The extent of the power of control given to the President by the Constitution over all officers and employees in
the executive department was interpreted by this Court in the case of Hebron vs. Reyes (L-9124, July 28, 1958)
to mean “the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in
the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter”, to distinguish it
from the power of general supervision over municipal government, but the decision does not go to the extent of
including the power to remove an officer or employee in the executive department. The power merely applies to
the exercise of control over the acts of the subordinate, and not over the actor or agent himself of the act.

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The power of control of the President may extend to the power to investigate, suspend or remove officers and
employees who belong to the executive department if they are presidential appointees or do not belong to the
classified service, for such can be justified under the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power
to appoint, but not with regard to those officers or employees who belong to the classified service for as to them
that inherent power cannot be exorcised. This is in line with the provision of our Constitution which says that “the
Congress may by law vest the appointment of the inferior officer, in the President alone, in the courts, or in heads
of department”. With regard to those officers whose appointments are vested on heads of departments, Congress
has provided by law for a procedure for their removal precisely in view of this constitutional authority. On such
law is the Civil Service Act of 1959.
b. Qualifications, election, term and oath – Art. VII, Sec. 2, 4 & 5
c. Privilege and salary
d. Succession
2. In case of vacancy at the beginning of the term
3. In case of vacancy during the term
4. In case of temporary disability
Constructive Resignation

Estrada vs. Desierto

Petitioner insists he is the victim of prejudicial publicity. Among others, he assails the Decision for adverting to
newspaper accounts of the events and occurrences to reach the conclusion that he has resigned. In our Decision,
we used the totality test to arrive at the conclusion that petitioner has resigned. We referred to and analyzed events
that were prior, contemporaneous and posterior to the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo as president. All these
events are facts which are well-established and cannot be refuted. Thus, we adverted to prior events that built up
the irresistable pressure for the petitioner to resign, x x x All these prior events are facts which are within judicial
notice by this Court. There was no need to cite their news accounts. The reference by the Court to certain
newspapers reporting them as they happened does not make them inadmissible evidence for being hearsay. The
news account only buttressed these facts as facts. For all his loud protestations, petitioner has not singled out any
of these facts as false.

We now come to some events of January 20, 2001 contemporaneous to the oath taking of respondent Arroyo. We
used the Angara Diary to decipher the intent to resign on the part of the petitioner. Let it be emphasized that it is
not unusual for courts to distill a person’s subjective intent from the evidence before them. Everyday, courts
ascertain intent in criminal cases, in civil law cases involving last wills and testaments, in commercial cases
involving contracts and in other similar cases. As will be discussed below, the use of the Angara Diary is not
prohibited by the hearsay rule. Petitioner may disagree with some of the inferences arrived at by the Court from
the facts narrated in the Diary but that does not make the Diary inadmissible as evidence.
The Malacañang ground was then fully protected by the Presidential Security Guard armed with tanks and high-
powered weapons. The then Chief of Staff, General Angelo Reyes, and other military officers were in Malacañang
to assure that no harm would befall the petitioner as he left the Palace. Indeed, no harm, not even a scratch, was
suffered by the petitioner, the members of his family and his Cabinet who stuck it out with him in his last hours.
Petitioner’s entourage was even able to detour safely to the Municipal Hall of San Juan and bade goodbye to his
followers before finally going to his residence in Polk Street, Greenhills. The only incident before the petitioner
left the Palace was the stone throwing between a small group of pro and anti Erap rallyists which resulted in minor
injuries to a few of them. Certainly, there were no tanks that rumbled through the Palace, no attack planes that
flew over the presidential residence, no shooting, no large scale violence, except verbal violence, to justify the
conclusion that petitioner was coerced to resign.

Petitioner cannot complain he was not furnished a copy of the Angara Diary. Nor can he feign surprise on its use.
To be sure, the said Diary was frequently referred to by the parties in their pleadings. The three parts of the Diary
published in the PDI from February 4-6, 2001 were attached as Annexes A-C, respectively, of the Memorandum
of private respondents Romeo T. Capulong, et al., dated February 20, 2001. The second and third parts of the
Diary were earlier also attached as Annexes 12 and 13 of the Comment of private respondents Capulong, et al.,
dated February 12, 2001. In fact, petitioner even cited in his Second Supplemental Reply Memorandum both the
second part of the diary, published on February 5, 2001, and the third part, published on February 6, 2001. It was
also extensively used by Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez in his oral arguments. Thus, petitioner had all the
opportunity to contest the use of the Diary but unfortunately failed to do so.

e. Removal (Impeachment – see provisions under Art. XI: Accountability of public Officers)
f. Prohibitions – Art. VII, Sec. 13
Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary

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Going further into Section 13, Article VII, the second sentence provides: “They shall not, during said tenure,
directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.” These
sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his official family, which prohibitions are not
similarly imposed on other public officials or employees such as the Members of Congress, members of the civil
service in general and members of the armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the
President and his official family as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in
the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the
Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all
elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception
applicable only to the President, the VicePresident, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B of
the 1987 Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the
number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their
primary position to not more than two (2) positions in the government and government corporations, Executive
Order No. 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express
mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise
provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
g. Exceptions to prohibition from holding another office
1. Vice-President as member of the cabinet
2. Secretary of Justice as member of the Judicial and Bar Council
Dela Cruz vs. Commission on Audit
It bears stressing that under the above provisions, the persons mandated by law to sit as members of the NHA
Board are the following: (1) the Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and Communications, (2) the Director-
General of the National Economic and Development Authority, (3) the Secretary of Finance, (4) the Secretary of
Labor, (5) the Secretary of Industry, (6) the Executive Secretary, and (7) the General Manager of the NHA. While
petitioners are not among those officers, however, they are “alternates” of the said officers, “whose acts shall be
considered the acts of their principals.”
Since the Executive Department Secretaries, as ex-officio members of the NHA Board, are prohibited from
receiving “extra (additional) compensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an
allowance, or some other such euphemism,” it follows that petitioners who sit as their alternates cannot likewise
be entitled to receive such compensation. A contrary rule would give petitioners a better right than their principals.
h. Powers and Functions of the President
1. Executive Power
L. S. Moon & Co. vs. Harrison
This court will take judicial knowledge of the fact that the Honorable Francis Burton Harrison is no longer the
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, and for some time the position has been held by the Honorable
Leonard Wood. Where the action is against the Governor-General in his official capacity, and the other defendants
were acting under his orders, and no substitution of parties has been made, and the defendant has ceased to be
Governor-General, an injunction as to them is a moot question.
By the pleadings the Governor-General was acting in his official capacity and engaged in the performance of the
duty enjoined upon him by the Legislature of the Philippine Islands, and was exercising a discretionary power
vested in him as Governor-General.
Whatever may be the rule as to the personal liability of a Governor, after a law has been finally declared
unconstitutional, he is not personally liable in damages for the exercise of a discretionary power under a law
before it has been declared unconstitutional. There is a legal presumption that any law enacted by the Legislature
is valid, and the Governor-General had a legal right to assume that Act No. 2868 was valid.
It is the duty of the Governor-General to enforce the law until such time as it has legally been declared
unconstitutional. To hold an Executive personally liable in an action for damages for the performance or
nonperformance of official duty, in legal effect, would make him a judge as to when a law is or is not
constitutional.

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Assuming, without deciding, that there was a protanto confiscation of plaintiff's "property, under the facts alleged,
the defendants are not personally liable in an action for damages. In the commission of- the alleged acts, the other
defendants were acting for, and representing, the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, who was acting
under a law enacted by its legislature, and hence they are not liable.
Marcos vs. Manglapus
The right to return to one’s country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which
treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the right to return
may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of
the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution]. However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel
and enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being
“arbitrarily deprived” thereof [Art. 12 (4)].
It would not be accurate, however, to state that “executive power” is the power to enforce the laws, for the
President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to
the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the
execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that do
not involve the execu-tion of any provision of law, e.g.,his power over the country’s foreign relations. On these
premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of
specificpowers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of
“executive power.” Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers
enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so
enumerated.
More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President’s powers as protector of the peace. [Rossiter,
The Ameri-can Presidency.] The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the
commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against external and internal threats to
its existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked
with attending to the dayto-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in
times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling
presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way disminished by the relative want of an emergency specified
in the commander-in-chief provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers
that follow cannot be said to exclude the Presi-dent’s exercising as Commander-inChief powers short of the
calling of the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpusor declaring martial law, in
order to keep the peace, and maintain public order and security.
It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other
countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the
right involved is the right to return to one’s country, a totally distinct right under international law, independent
from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Humans Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the
territory of a state, the right to leave a country, and the right to enter one’s country as separate and distinct rights.
The Declaration speaks of the “right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state”
[Art. 13(1)] separately from the “right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.” [Art.
13(2).] On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the “right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his
residence” [Art. 12(1)] and the right to “be free to leave any country, including his own.” [Art. 12(2)] which rights
may be restricted by such laws as “are necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or morals
or the separate rights and freedoms of others.” [Art. 12(3)] as distinguished from the “right to enter his own
country” of which one cannot be “arbitrarily deprived.” [Art. 12(4).] It would therefore be inappropriate to
construe the limitations to the right to return to one’s country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty
of abode and the right to travel.
The right to return to one’s country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which
treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our wellconsidered view that the right to return
may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of
the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel
and enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e.,against being
“arbitrarily deprived” thereof [Art. 12 (4).] Thus, the rulings in the cases of Kent and Haig,which refer to the
issuance of passports for the purpose of effectively exercising the right to travel are not determinative of this case
and are only tangentially material insofar as they relate to a conflict between executive action and the exercise of
a protected right. The issue before the Court is novel and without precedent in Philippine, and even in American
jurisprudence.
Ople vs. Torres

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As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues relating to the standing to sue of the
petitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver that petitioner has no legal
interest to uphold and that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. These submissions
do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. As a Senator,
petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is
a usurpation of legislative power. As taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to
implement A.O. No. 308.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by
proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and
check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered
by an administrative order. x x x An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to
specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be
for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.
We reject the argument that A.O. No. 308 implements the legislative policy of the Administrative Code of 1987.
The Code is a general law and “incorporates in a unified document the major structural, functional and procedural
principles of governance” and “embodies changes in administrative structures and procedures designed to serve
the people.”
Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it cannot pass constitutional muster
as an administrative legislation because facially it violates the right to privacy. The essence of privacy is the “right
to be let alone.”
2. Control of Executive Departments
Drilon vs. Lim
Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance
and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax
ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that
enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his
own version of what the Code should be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis
for its annulment. He did not say that in his judgment it was a bad law. What he found only was that it was illegal.
All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in
accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of
powers to the city government under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control but
of mere supervision.
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his discretion,
order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not
cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself
does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not
observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe
his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules are
followed. In the opinion of the Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and so
performed an act not of control but of mere supervision.
Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. vs. Paño
The President’s duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, in his control of all executive
departments. Thus it is, that department heads are men of his confidence. His is the power to appoint them; his,
too, is in the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure. Naturally, he controls and directs their acts. Implicit, then, is
his authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his department secretaries. In this context,
it may not be said that the President cannot rule on the correctness of a decision of a department secretary.
It is correct to say that constitutional powers there are which the President must exercise in person. Not as correct,
however, is it to say that the Chief Executive may not delegate to his Executive Secretary Acts which the
Constitution does not command that he perform in person, for the President is not expected to perform in person
all the multifarious executive and administrative functions. The Office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary
unit which assists the President. The rule which has thus gained recognition is that under our constitutional set-
up the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed
jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
including the Director of Lands, may issue. Where the Executive Secretary acts “by authority of the President,”
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his decision is that of the President. Such decision is to be given full faith and credit by our courts. The assumed
authority of the Executive Secretary is to be accepted. For, only the President may rightfully say that the Executive
Secretary is not authorized to do so. Therefore, unless the action taken is “disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive,” that remains the act of the Chief Executive, and cannot be successfully assailed.
Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora
The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature. This
proceeds from the legal precept that the power to create includes the power to destroy. A public office is either
created by the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law. Thus, except where the office was created by the
Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same legislature that brought it into existence. The exception,
however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are concerned, the President’s
power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular office, or certain laws may grant him
the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures.
We adhere to the precedent or ruling in Larin that this provision recognizes the authority of the President to effect
organizational changes in the department or agency under the executive structure. Such a ruling further finds
support in Section 78 of Republic Act No. 8760. Under this law, the heads Of departments, bureaus, offices and
agencies and other entities in the Executive Branch are directed (a) to conduct a comprehensive review of their
respective mandates, missions, objectives, functions, programs, projects, activities and systems and procedures;
(b) identify activities which are no longer essential in the delivery of public services and which may be scaled
down, phased-out or abolished; and (c) adopt measures that will result in the streamlined organization and
improved overall performance of their respective agencies. Section 78 ends up with the mandate that the actual
streamlining and productivity improvement in agency organization and operation shall be effected pursuant to
Circulars or Orders issued for the purpose by the Office of the President.
The EIIB is a bureau attached to the Department of Finance. It falls under the Office of the President. Hence, it
is subject to the President’s continuing authority to reorganize.
Reorganization is carried out in ‘good faith’ if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more
efficient. Pertinently, Republic Act No. 6656 provides for the circumstances which may be considered as evidence
of bad faith in the removal of civil service employees made as a result of reorganization, to wit: (a) where there
is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency
concerned; (b) where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is created;
(c) where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and
merit; (d) where there is a classification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified
offices perform substantially the same functions as the original offices, and (e) where the removal violates the
order of separation.
We hold that petitioners’ right to security of tenure is not violated. Nothing is better settled in our law than that
the abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no
infirmity. Valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents.
Indeed, there is no such thing as an absolute right to hold office. Except constitutional offices which provide for
special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary.
3. General Supervision of local governments and autonomous regions – Art. X, Sec. 4 and 16
The department head as agent of the President has direct control and supervision over all bureaus and offices
under his jurisdiction as provided for in section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code, but he does not have
the same control of local governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction.
Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau
or office under his department is confined to bureaus or offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local
governments over which the President exercises only general supervision as may be provided by law (section 10,
paragraph 1, Article VII of the Constitution). If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative
Code are to be construed as conferring upon the corresponding department head direct control, direction, and
supervision over all local governments and that for that reason he may order the investigation of an official of a
local government for malfeasance in office, such interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of paragraph
1, section 10, article VII, of the Constitution.
In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as
prescribed by law to make them perform these duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer
to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and
to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.

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The provincial supervision over municipal officials is lodged in the provincial governor who is authorized to
"receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression,
corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving
moral turpitude." (Section 2188, Revised Administrative Code). If the charges are serious he shall refer the matter
to the provincial board and "may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending
action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question."
(Ibid.) But where, as in the present case, the municipal officer was charged with rape and concubinage which
have nothing to do with the performance of his duties as mayor of the municipality nor do they constitute or
involve neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or any other form of maladministration of office, as provided for
in section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code, the investigation of such charges by the provincial board is
unauthorized and illegal. Hence, his suspension as mayor of the municipality is unlawful and without authority
of law.
It is true that the charges of rape and concubinage may involve moral turpitude of which a municipal official may
be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code but
before the provincial governor and board may act and proceed against the municipal official, a conviction by final
judgment must precede the filing by the provincial governor of the charges and trial by the provincial board. Even
the provincial fiscal cannot file an information for rape without a sworn complaint of the offended party and the
crime of concubinage cannot be prosecuted but upon a sworn complaint of the offended spouse (Article 344 of
the Revised Penal Code).
Pimentel, Jr. vs. Aguirre
This provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. In Mondano v. Silvosa, the Court contrasted
the President’s power of supervision over local government officials with that of his power of control over
executive officials of the national government. It was emphasized that the two terms—supervision and control—
differed in meaning and extent. The Court distinguished them as follows: “x x x In administrative law, supervision
means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If
the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them
perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set
aside what a subordinate officer ha[s] done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for that of the latter.” In Taule v. Santos, we further stated that the Chief Executive wielded no more
authority than that of checking whether local governments or their officials were performing their duties as
provided by the fundamental law and by statutes. He cannot interfere with local governments, so long as they act
within the scope of their authority. “Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere
oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body,” we said.
Under our present system of government, executive power is vested in the President. The members of the Cabinet
and other executive officials are merely alter egos. As such, they are subject to the power of control of the
President, at whose will and behest they can be removed from office; or their actions and decisions changed,
suspended or reversed. In contrast, the heads of political subdivisions are elected by the people. Their sovereign
powers emanate from the electorate, to whom they are directly accountable. By constitutional fiat, they are subject
to the President’s supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their
legitimate powers. By the same token, the President may not withhold or alter any authority or power given them
by the Constitution and the law.
Ganzon vs. Court of Appeals
It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language, the charter
did not intend to divest the legislature of its right—or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing
legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of “as
may be provided by law”) signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments ‘autonomy from congress
and to break Congress’ “control” over local governments affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for
the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular,
concerning discipline.
It is noteworthy that under the Charter, “local autonomy” is not instantly selfexecuting, but subject to, among
other things, the passage of a local government code, a local tax law, income distribution legislation, and a national
representation law, and measures designed to realize autonomy at the local level. It is also noteworthy that in spite
of autonomy, the Constitution places the local governments under the general supervision of the Executive. It is
noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to include in the local government code provisions for
removal of local officials, which suggest that Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local
Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the President.

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The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers,
which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces
disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, “supervision” is not incompatible with
disciplinary authority. x x x “Control” has been defined as “the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify
or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment
of the former for test of the latter.” “Supervision” on the other hand means “overseeing or the power or authority
of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties.”
The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon is albeit another matter. What bothers
the Court, and what indeed looms very large, is the fact that since the Mayor is facing ten administrative charges,
the Mayor is in fact facing the possibility of 600 days of suspension, in the event that all ten cases yield prima
facie findings. The Court is not of course tolerating misfeasance in public office (assuming that Mayor Ganzon
is guilty of misfeasance) but it is certainly another question to make him serve 600 days of suspension, which is
effectively, to suspend him out of office. x x x.
The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with suspensions, x x x because it is out of the ordinary to
have a vacancy in local government. The sole objective of a suspension, x x x is simply “to prevent the accused
from hampering the normal cause of the investigation with his influence and authority over possible witnesses”
or to keep him off “the records and other evidence.” It is a means, and no more, to assist prosecutors in firming
up a case, if any, against an erring local official. Under the Local Government Code, it can not exceed sixty days,
which is to say that it need not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter period is otherwise sufficient, and which is
also to say that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a shorter span.
4. Power of appointment
Rafael vs. Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection Board
Where the statute provides that the chairman and members of the Board (except the representative from the private
section) need only be designated by the respective department heads to sit ex officio without the necessity of new
appointments, they merely perform duties in the Board in addition to those they already perform under their
original appointments. In the absence of provision in the statute that the designated members of the Board will
lose or forfeit their original appointments in their “parent” offices, it is evident that for purposes of their tenure
on the Board they can be considered as merely on detail, subject to recall by their respective chiefs.
The arrangement envisioned in Sec. 2 of R.A. 3137 is in no wise incompatible with or violative of the established
doctrine that “the appointing power is the exclusive prerogative of the President, upon which no limitations may
be imposed by Congress, except those resulting from the need of securing the concurrence of the Commission on
Appointments and from the exercise of the limited power to prescribe the qualifications to a given appointive
office”. We see no attempt in Republic Act 3137 to deprive the President of his power to make appointments, and
therefore on this point we rule that the law is not unconstitutional.
Where the statute requires that “a representative from the private sector coming from the Association of
Embroidery and Apparel Exporters of the Philippines” shall sit as a member of the Board, respondent P.A.E.A.E.
was not singled out by the law in order to favor it over and above others, but rather because it is the dominant
organization in the field. No privileges are accorded P.A.E.A.E. members which are not similarly given to
nonmembers. Both are within its coverage. Non-membership in the P.A.E.A.E. does not mean that the benefits
granted and the restrictions imposed by the Act shall not apply to those who choose to venture into the business
independently. It is a settled rule in constitutional law that legislation which affects with equal force all persons
of the same class and not those of another is not class legislation and does not infringe the constitutional guarantee
of equal protection of the laws.
Where the statute sets a reasonable basis under which special assessment may be imposed, this does not constitute
an undue delegation of powers. The true distinction between delegation of the power to legislate and the
conferring of authority or discretion as to the execution of the law consists in that the former necessarily involves
a discretion as to what the law shall be, while in the latter the authority or discretion as to its execution has to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be
made. Tested under this score, we see no valid reason to object to the validity of Republic Act 3137.
a. With consent of Commission on Appointments
Sarmiento III vs. Mison
In the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments required the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments, It is now a sad part of our political history that the power of confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, under the 1935 Constitution, transformed that commission, many times, into a
venue of "horsetrading" and similar malpractices. On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution, consistent with the
authoritarian pattern in which it was molded and re-molded by successive amendments, placed the absolute power
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of appointment in the President with hardly any check on the part of the legislature. Given the above two (2)
extremes, one, in the 1935 Constitution and the other, in the 1973 Constitution, it is not difficult for the Court to
state that the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, struck a "middle ground" by requiring
the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments for the first group of appointments and leaving
to the President, without such confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e., those in the second and third
groups as well as those in the fourth group, i.e., officers of lower rank.
In the 1987 Constitution, however, as already pointed out, the clear and expressed intent of its framers was to
exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, except appointments
to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. Consequently, there was no reason to
use in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII the word "alone" after the word "President" in providing that
Congress may by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in
the heads of departments, because the power to appoint officers whom he (the President) may be authorized by
law to appoint is already vested in the President, without need of confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, in the second sentence of the same Sec. 16, Article VII.
Therefore, the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII could have stated merely that, in the case of lower-ranked
officers, the Congress may by law vest their appointment in the President, in the courts, or in the heads of various
departments of the government. In short, the word "alone" in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, as a literal import from the last part of par. 3, section 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution,
appears to be redundant in the light of the second sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. And, this redundancy cannot
prevail over the clear and positive intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential appointments,
except those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII, are not subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
Coming now to the immediate question before the Court, it is evident that the position of Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent
of the Commission on Appointments is required. As a matter of fact, as already pointed out, while the 1935
Constitution includes "heads of bureaus" among those officers whose appointments need the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, the 1987 Constitution, on the other hand, deliberately excluded the position of
"heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
Consequently, we rule that the President of the Philippines acted within her constitutional authority and power in
appointing respondent Salvador Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, without submitting his
nomination to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full authority
and functions of the of fice and to receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.
Bautista vs. Salonga
Since the position of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is not among the positions mentioned in the
first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, appointments which are to be made with the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, it follows that the appointment by the President of the
Chairman of the CHR is to be made without the review or participation of the Commission on Appointments. To
be more precise, the appointment of the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights is not
specifically provided for in the Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members of the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit, whose appointments are expressly
vested by the Constitution in the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The President
appoints the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights pursuant to the second sentence in
Section 16, Art. VII, that is, without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments because they are
among the officers of government “whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint.” And Section
2(c), Executive Order No. 163, 5 May 1987, authorizes the President to appoint the Chairman and Members of
the Commission on Human Rights. It provides: “(c) The Chairman and the Members of the Commission on
Human Rights shall be appointed by the President for a term of seven years without reappointment. Appointment
to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor.”
The threshold question that has really come to the fore is whether the President, subsequent to her act of 17
December 1988, and after petitioner Bautista had qualified for the office to which she had been appointed, by
taking the oath of office and actually assuming and discharging the functions and duties thereof, could extend
another appointment to the petitioner on 14 January 1989, an “ad interim appointment” as termed by the
respondent Commission on Appointments or any other kind of appointment to the same office of Chairman.
Commission on Human Rights that called for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The Court, with
all due respect to both the Executive and Legislative Departments of government, and after careful deliberation,
is constrained to hold and rule in the negative. When Her Excellency, the President converted petitioner Bautista’s
designation as Acting Chairman to a permanent appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights
on 17 December 1988, significantly she advised Bautista (in the same appointment letter) that, by virtue of such

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appointment, she could qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of the office (of Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights). All that remained for Bautista to do was to reject or accept the appointment.
Obviously, she accepted the appointment by taking her oath of office before the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, Hon. Marcelo B. Fernan and assuming immediately thereafter the functions and duties of the Chairman of
the Commission on Human Rights. Bautista’s appointment therefore on 17 December 1988 as Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights was a completed act on the part of the President. To paraphrase the great jurist,
Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, in the celebrated case of Marbury vs. Madison. x x x “The answer to this question
seems an obvious one. The appointment being the sole act of the president, must be completely evidenced, when
it is shown that he has done everything to be performed by him. x x x Some point of time must be taken when the
power of the executive over an officer, not removable at his will must cease. That point of time must be when the
constitutional power of appointment has been exercised. And this power has been exercised when the last act,
required from the person possessing the power, has been performed. x x x But having once made the appointment,
his (the President’s) power over the office is terminated in all cases, where by law the officer is not removable by
him. The right to the office is then in the person appointed, and he has the absolute, unconditional power of
accepting or rejecting it.
It is respondent Commission’s submission that the President, after the appointment of 17 December 1988
extended to petitioner Bautista, decided to extend another appointment (14 January 1989) to petitioner Bautista,
this time, submitting such appointment (more accurately, nomination) to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation. And yet, it seems obvious enough, both in logic and in fact, that no new or further appointment
could be made to a position already filled by a previously completed appointment which had been accepted by
the appointee, through a valid qualification and assumption of its duties.
Respondent Commission vigorously contends that granting that petitioner’s appointment as Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights is one that under Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, as interpreted in the Mison
case, is solely for the President to make, yet, it is within the president’s prerogative to voluntarily submit such
appointment to the Commission on Appointment for confirmation. The mischief in this contention, as the Court
perceives it, lies in the suggestion that the President (with Congress agreeing) may, from time to time move power
boundaries, in the Constitution differently from where they are placed by the Constitution. The Court really finds
the above contention difficult of acceptance. Constitutional Law, to begin with, is concerned with power not
political convenience, wisdom, exigency, or even necessity. Neither the Executive nor the Legislative
(Commission on Appointments) can create power where the Constitution confers none. The evident constitutional
intent is to strike a careful and delicate balance in the matter of appointments to public office, between the
President and Congress (the latter acting through the Commission on Appointments). To tilt one side or the other
of the scale is to disrupt or alter such balance of power. In other words, to the extent that the Constitution has
blocked off certain appointments for the President to make with the participation of the Commission on
Appointments, so also has the Constitution mandated that the President can confer no power of participation in
the Commission on Appointments over other appointments exclusively reserved for her by the Constitution. The
exercise of political options that finds no support in the Constitution cannot be sustained. Nor can the Commission
on Appointments by the actual exercise of its constitutionally delimited power to review presidential
appointments, create power to confirm appointments that the Constitution has reserved to the President alone.
Stated differently, when the appointment is one that the Constitution mandates is for the President to make without
the participation of the Commission on Appointments, the executive’s voluntary act of submitting such
appointment to the Commission on Appointments and the latter’s act of confirming or rejecting the same are done
without or in excess of jurisdiction.
Nor can respondents impressively contend that the new appointment or re-appointment on 14 January 1989 was
an ad interim appointment, because, under the Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do not apply to
appointments solely for the President to make, i.e., without the participation of the Commission on Appointments.
Ad interim appointments, by their very nature under the 1987 Constitution, extend only to appointments where
the review of the Commission on Appointments is needed. That is why ad interim appointments are to remain
valid until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress; but
appointments that are for the President solely to make, that is, without the participation of the Commission on
Appointments, can not be ad interim appointments.
Quintos-Deles vs. Commission on Constitutional Commission
The Constitution provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred
fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from the legislative districts and those
who as provided by law, shall be elected thru a party-list system. The party-list representatives shall constitute
20% of the total number of representatives or fifty (50) seats. One-half or twenty-five (25) of the seats allocated
to party-list representatives is reserved for sectoral representatives. The reservation is limited to three consecutive
terms after ratification of the 1987 Constitution.

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Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by
appointment by the President by express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is indubitable
that sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives are among the “other officers whose appointments
are vested in the President in this Constitution,” referred to in the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose
appointments are subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Nevertheless, there are appointments vested in the President in the Constitution which, by express mandate of the
Constitution, require no confirmation such as appointments of members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower
courts (Sec. 9, Art. VIII) and the Ombudsman and his deputies (Sec. 9, Art. XI). No such exemption from
confirmation had been extended to appointments of sectoral representatives in the Constitution.
Implicit in the invocation of paragraph 2, Section 16, Art. VII as authority for the appointment of petitioner is,
the recognition by the President as appointing authority that petitioner’s appointment requires confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments. Under paragraph 2, Section 16, Art. VII, appointments made by the President
pursuant thereto “shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.” If indeed appointments of sectoral representatives need no confirmation, the
President need not make any reference to the constitutional provisions above-quoted in appointing the petitioner.
As a matter of fact, the President in a letter dated April 11, 1989 had expressly submitted petitioner’s appointment
for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Considering that Congress had adjourned without
respondent Commission on Appointments having acted on petitioner’s appointment, said
appointment/nomination had become moot and academic pursuant to Section 23 of the Rules of respondent
Commission and “unless resubmitted shall not again be considered by the Commission.”
The power of the President to appoint sectoral representatives remains directly derived from Section 7, Article
XVIII of the Constitution which is quoted in the second “Whereas” clause of Executive Order No. 198. Thus,
appointments by the President of sectoral representatives require the consent of the Commission on Appointments
in accordance with the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII of the Constitution. More to the point, petitioner
Deles’ appointment was issued not by virtue of Executive Order No. 198 but pursuant to Art. VII, Section 16,
paragraph 2 and Art. XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution which require submission to the confirmation process.
Manalo vs. Sistoza
It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first group require the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. The appointments of respondent officers who are not within the first category,
need not be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. As held in the case of Tarrosa vs. Singson, Congress
cannot by law expand the power of confirmation of the Commission on Appointments and require confirmation
of appointments of other government officials not mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution.
Unconstitutional are Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 which empower the Commission on Appointments
to confirm the appointments of public officials whose appointments are not required by the Constitution to be
confirmed. But the unconstitutionality of the aforesaid sections notwithstanding, the rest of Republic Act 6975
stands. It is well-settled that when provisions of law declared void are severable from the main statute and the
removal of the unconstitutional provisions would not affect the validity and enforceability of the other provisions,
the statute remains valid without its voided sections.
It is petitioner’s submission that the Philippine National Police is akin to the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
therefore, the appointments of police officers whose rank is equal to that of colonel or naval captain require
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. This contention is equally untenable. The Philippine National
Police is separate and distinct from the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The Constitution, no less, sets forth the
distinction.
The police force is different from and independent of the armed forces and the ranks in the military are not similar
to those in the Philippine National Police. Thus, directors and chief superintendents of the PNP, such as the herein
respondent police officers, do not fall under the first category of presidential appointees requiring the confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments.
Calderon vs. Carale
Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the second sentence of Section 16, Article VII
of the Constitution, more specifically under the “third groups” of appointees referred to in Mison, i.e. those whom
the President may be authorized by law to appoint. Undeniably, the Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not
among the officers mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII whose appointments requires
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
b. Limitations om appointing power of the President – Art. VII, Sec. 13 & 15

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Aytona vs. Castillo
As a rule, once an appointment is issued, it cannot be reconsidered specially where the appointee has qualified.
On the other hand, the authorities admit of exceptional circumstances justifying revocation such as when mass
ad-interim appointments (350) issued in the last hours of an outgoing Chief Executive are to be considered by the
Commission on Appointments that is different from that existing at the time of the appointment and the names
are to be submitted by an incoming Chief Executive who may not wholly approve of the selections especially if
it is doubtful that the outgoing President exercised double care in extending such appointments.
The Malacañang's practice, which is logical, to submit ad-interim appointments only when the Commission on
Appointments is in session. One good reason for the practice is that only those who have accepted the appointment
and qualified are submitted for confirmation.
After the proclamation of the election of an incoming Chief Executive, the outgoing Chief Executive is no more
than a "care-taker" administration. He is duty bound to prepare for the orderly transfer of authority to the incoming
President and he should not do acts which, he ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his
successor. It is not for him to use his powers as incumbent President to continue the political warfare that had
ended or to avail himself of presidential prerogatives to serve partisan purposes.
The filling up of vacancies in important positions, if few, and so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate
action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications may be
undoubtedly permitted. But the issuance of 350 appointments in one night and the planned induction of almost
all of them a few hours before the inauguration of the new President may, with some reason, be regarded by the
latter as an abuse of presidential prerogatives.
When the President makes ad-interim appointments, he exercises a special prerogative and is bound to be prudent
to insure approval of his selection either by previous consultation with the members of the Commission or by
thereafter explaining to them the reason for such selection. Where the Commission on Appointments that will
consider the appointees is different from that existing at the time of the appointment and where the names are to
be submitted by his successor who may not wholly approved of the selections, the President should be doubly
careful in extending such appointments.
The separation of powers, under the circumstances in the instant case, prevents the Supreme Court to disregard a
presidential directive issued by an incoming President cancelling "midnight" or "last minute" appointments.
Once the appointee has qualified, the latter's equitable rights can be set up to deny the power to revoke the
appointment. Yet it is doubtful if such equity might be set up in the present case where rush conditional
appointments, hurried maneuvers and other happenings detracted from that degree of good faith, morality and
propriety which form the basic foundation of claims to equitable relief.
Quimsing vs. Tajanglangit
Administrative Order No. 2 of President Macapagal revoking the so-called "midnight" appointments made by
President Garcia was never upheld by the Supreme Court.
The validity of the appointments made after December 13, 1961 by former President Garcia was considered by
the Court not in the light of Administrative Order No. 2 revoking such appointments, but on the basis of the
nature, character and merit of the individual appointments and the particular circumstances surrounding the same.
In the Aytona v. Castillo case (L-19313, January 19, 1962) the Court did not declare that all the ad interim
appointments made by the outgoing President after December 13, 1961 are invalid by the mere fact that they were
extended after said date, nor that they automatically come within the category of the "midnight" appointments,
the validity of which was doubted.
In the case at bar, the ad interim appointment of the petitioner chief of police, whose qualification is not in dispute
and the regularity of which is not questioned 'except for the fact that it was made only on December 20, 1961,
can not be considered as among those "midnight" appointments the validity of which the Supreme Court declared
to be doubtful.
The laying on the table of a motion for reconsideration of the confirmation of an appointment by the Commission
on Appointments has the effect, under the rules of said body, of a final disposition thereof, and the result is as if
no motion for reconsideration was filed at all.
The action of the Commission on Appointments .in delivering to Malacañang notice of the confirmation of an
appointment is in fact a recognition that the appointment was confirmed.
De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)

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In the consolidated petitions, the petitioners, with the exception of Soriano, Tolentino and Inting, submit that the
incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement on May 17, 2010, on
the ground that the prohibition against presidential appointments under Section 15, Article VII does not extend to
appointments in the Judiciary. The Court agrees with the submission.
As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the powers vested
by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and
16 of the Article. Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial Department and defines the duties and qualifications of
Members of the Supreme Court, among others. Section 4(1) and Section 9 of this Article are the provisions
specifically providing for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices. In particular, Section 9 states that the
appointment of Supreme Court Justices can only be made by the President upon the submission of a list of at least
three nominees by the JBC; Section 4(1) of the Article mandates the President to fill the vacancy within 90 days
from the occurrence of the vacancy. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15,
Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could
not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the
prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members
of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was
not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within
two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term
does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
The reference to the records of the Constitutional Commission did not advance or support the result in Valenzuela.
Far to the contrary, the records disclosed the express intent of the framers to enshrine in the Constitution, upon
the initiative of Commissioner Eulogio Lerum, “a command [to the President] to fill up any vacancy therein
within 90 days from its occurrence,” which even Valenzuela conceded. The exchanges during deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission on October 8, 1986 further show that the filling of a vacancy in the Supreme Court
within the 90-day period was a true mandate for the President.
Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word shall—an imperative, operating to impose a duty
that may be enforced—should not be disregarded. Thereby, Sections 4(1) imposes on the President the imperative
duty to make an appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the
vacancy. The failure by the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the Constitution. The 90-day
limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court was
undoubtedly a special provision to establish a definite mandate for the President as the appointing power, and
cannot be defeated by mere judicial interpretation in Valenzuela to the effect that Section 15, Article VII prevailed
because it was “couched in stronger negative language.” Such interpretation even turned out to be conjectural, in
light of the records of the Constitutional Commission’s deliberations on Section 4 (1), Article VIII.
In this connection, PHILCONSA’s urging of a revisit and a review of Valenzuela is timely and appropriate.
Valenzuela arbitrarily ignored the express intent of the Constitutional Commission to have Section 4 (1), Article
VIII stand independently of any other provision, least of all one found in Article VII. It further ignored that the
two provisions had no irreconcilable conflict, regardless of Section 15, Article VII being couched in the negative.
As judges, we are not to unduly interpret, and should not accept an interpretation that defeats the intent of the
framers. Consequently, prohibiting the incumbent President from appointing a Chief Justice on the premise that
Section 15, Article VII extends to appointments in the Judiciary cannot be sustained. A misinterpretation like
Valenzuela should not be allowed to last after its false premises have been exposed. It will not do to merely
distinguish Valenzuela from these cases, for the result to be reached herein is entirely incompatible with what
Valenzuela decreed. Consequently, Valenzuela now deserves to be quickly sent to the dustbin of the unworthy
and forgettable. We reverse Valenzuela.
Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, we have no doubt that the
Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department. The
framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their establishment of the
JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and
deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary.
If midnight appointments in the mold of Aytona were made in haste and with irregularities, or made by an
outgoing Chief Executive in the last days of his administration out of a desire to subvert the policies of the
incoming President or for partisanship, the appointments to the Judiciary made after the establishment of the JBC
would not be suffering from such defects because of the JBC’s prior processing of candidates. Indeed, it is
axiomatic in statutory construction that the ascertainment of the purpose of the enactment is a step in the process
of ascertaining the intent or meaning of the enactment, because the reason for the enactment must necessarily
shed considerable light on “the law of the statute,” i.e., the intent; hence, the enactment should be construed with
reference to its intended scope and purpose, and the court should seek to carry out this purpose rather than to
defeat it.

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The intervention of the JBC eliminates the danger that appointments to the Judiciary can be made for the purpose
of buying votes in a coming presidential election, or of satisfying partisan considerations. The experience from
the time of the establishment of the JBC shows that even candidates for judicial positions at any level backed by
people influential with the President could not always be assured of being recommended for the consideration of
the President, because they first had to undergo the vetting of the JBC and pass muster there. Indeed, the creation
of the JBC was precisely intended to de-politicize the Judiciary by doing away with the intervention of the
Commission on Appointments. This insulating process was absent from the Aytona midnight appointment.
As earlier stated, the non-applicability of Section 15, Article VII to appointments in the Judiciary was confirmed
by then Senior Associate Justice Regalado to the JBC itself when it met on March 9, 1998 to discuss the question
raised by some sectors about the “constitutionality of xxx appointments” to the Court of Appeals in light of the
forthcoming presidential elections. He assured that “on the basis of the (Constitutional) Commission’s records,
the election ban had no application to appointments to the Court of Appeals.” This confirmation was accepted by
the JBC, which then submitted to the President for consideration the nominations for the eight vacancies in the
Court of Appeals. The fault of Valenzuela was that it accorded no weight and due consideration to the
confirmation of Justice Regalado. Valenzuela was weak, because it relied on interpretation to determine the intent
of the framers rather than on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Much of the unfounded doubt
about the President’s power to appoint during the period of prohibition in Section 15, Article VII could have been
dispelled since its promulgation on November 9, 1998, had Valenzuela properly acknowledged and relied on the
confirmation of a distinguished member of the Constitutional Commission like Justice Regalado.
To hold like the Court did in Valenzuela that Section 15 extends to appointments to the Judiciary further
undermines the intent of the Constitution of ensuring the independence of the Judicial Department from the
Executive and Legislative Departments. Such a holding will tie the Judiciary and the Supreme Court to the
fortunes or misfortunes of political leaders vying for the Presidency in a presidential election. Consequently, the
wisdom of having the new President, instead of the current incumbent President, appoint the next Chief Justice is
itself suspect, and cannot ensure judicial independence, because the appointee can also become beholden to the
appointing authority. In contrast, the appointment by the incumbent President does not run the same risk of
compromising judicial independence, precisely because her term will end by June 30, 2010.
As a matter of fact, in an extreme case, we can even raise a doubt on whether a JBC list is necessary at all for the
President—any President—to appoint a Chief Justice if the appointee is to come from the ranks of the sitting
justices of the Supreme Court. Sec. 9, Article VIII says: xxx. The Members of the Supreme Court xxx shall be
appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for any
vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation. xxx The provision clearly refers to an appointee coming into
the Supreme Court from the outside, that is, a nonmember of the Court aspiring to become one. It speaks of
candidates for the Supreme Court, not of those who are already members or sitting justices of the Court, all of
whom have previously been vetted by the JBC. Can the President, therefore, appoint any of the incumbent Justices
of the Court as Chief Justice? The question is not squarely before us at the moment, but it should lend itself to a
deeper analysis if and when circumstances permit. It should be a good issue for the proposed Constitutional
Convention to consider in the light of Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile’s statement that the President can
appoint the Chief Justice from among the sitting justices of the Court even without a JBC list.
A review of Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII shows that the Supreme Court is composed of a Chief Justice and
14 Associate Justices, who all shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared
by the JBC for every vacancy, which appointments require no confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
With reference to the Chief Justice, he or she is appointed by the President as Chief Justice, and the appointment
is never in an acting capacity. The express reference to a Chief Justice abhors the idea that the framers
contemplated an Acting Chief Justice to head the membership of the Supreme Court. Otherwise, they would have
simply written so in the Constitution. Consequently, to rely on Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 in order
to forestall the imperative need to appoint the next Chief Justice soonest is to defy the plain intent of the
Constitution. For sure, the framers intended the position of Chief Justice to be permanent, not one to be occupied
in an acting or temporary capacity. In relation to the scheme of things under the present Constitution, Section 12
of the Judiciary Act of 1948 only responds to a rare situation in which the new Chief Justice is not yet appointed,
or in which the incumbent Chief Justice is unable to perform the duties and powers of the office. It ought to be
remembered, however, that it was enacted because the Chief Justice appointed under the 1935 Constitution was
subject to the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, and the confirmation process might take longer
than expected.
The appointment of the next Chief Justice by the incumbent President is preferable to having the Associate Justice
who is first in precedence take over. Under the Constitution, the heads of the Legislative and Executive
Departments are popularly elected, and whoever are elected and proclaimed at once become the leaders of their
respective Departments. However, the lack of any appointed occupant of the office of Chief Justice harms the
independence of the Judiciary, because the Chief Justice is the head of the entire Judiciary. The Chief Justice

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performs functions absolutely significant to the life of the nation. With the entire Supreme Court being the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal, the Chief Justice is the Chairman of the Tribunal. There being no obstacle to the
appointment of the next Chief Justice, aside from its being mandatory for the incumbent President to make within
the 90-day period from May 17, 2010, there is no justification to insist that the successor of Chief Justice Puno
be appointed by the next President.
Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is
proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer.
Mandamus is not available to direct the exercise of a judgment or discretion in a particular way. For mandamus
to lie, the following requisites must be complied with: (a) the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded;
(b) it must be the duty of the defendant to perform the act, because it is mandated by law; (c) the defendant
unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d) the act to be performed is ministerial, not
discretionary; and (e) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.
Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article VIII, mandate the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court within
90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy, and within 90 days from the submission of the list, in the case of the
lower courts. The 90-day period is directed at the President, not at the JBC. Thus, the JBC should start the process
of selecting the candidates to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court before the occurrence of the vacancy. Under
the Constitution, it is mandatory for the JBC to submit to the President the list of nominees to fill a vacancy in
the Supreme Court in order to enable the President to appoint one of them within the 90-day period from the
occurrence of the vacancy. The JBC has no discretion to submit the list to the President after the vacancy occurs,
because that shortens the 90-day period allowed by the Constitution for the President to make the appointment.
For the JBC to do so will be unconscionable on its part, considering that it will thereby effectively and illegally
deprive the President of the ample time granted under the Constitution to reflect on the qualifications of the
nominees named in the list of the JBC before making the appointment.
The duty of the JBC to submit a list of nominees before the start of the President’s mandatory 90-day period to
appoint is ministerial, but its selection of the candidates whose names will be in the list to be submitted to the
President lies within the discretion of the JBC. The object of the petitions for mandamus herein should only refer
to the duty to submit to the President the list of nominees for every vacancy in the Judiciary, because in order to
constitute unlawful neglect of duty, there must be an unjustified delay in performing that duty. For mandamus to
lie against the JBC, therefore, there should be an unexplained delay on its part in recommending nominees to the
Judiciary, that is, in submitting the list to the President.
The distinction between a ministerial act and a discretionary one has been delineated in the following manner:
The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely ministerial act or duty is
one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the
mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how
or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only
when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.
c. Intern or recess appointments – Art. VI, Sec. 19; Art. VII Sec. 16
Jorge vs. Mayor
Administrative Order No. 2 of President Macapagal covers only all appointments made and released by former
President Garcia after the joint session of Congress that ended on December 13, 1961. In the case at bar, where
petitioner's appointment was not only dated December 13, 1961, but there was also no evidence that it was made
and released after said joint session ended on the same day, it is held that said appointment was not validly revoked
by said administrative order.
Ad interim appointments "so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of
the need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications" could be validly made even by an outgoing
President under the Aytona ruling.
No abandonment of office may be deduced from an officer's lack of hostile attitude towards the authorities and
the respondent where such conduct was merely evidence of that courtesy and "delicadeza" to be expected of a
man in a high position who does not wish to obstruct the functions of his office and is in no way incompatible
with his determination to protect his rights.
5. Executive Clemencies – Art. VII, Sec. 19; Art. IX-C, Sec. 5
a. Pardon distinguished from probation
b. Pardon distinguished from parole

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 c. Pardon distinguished from amnesty
People vs. Pariarca, Jr.
Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political offenses, or the
forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have offended, by some breach, the law
of nations. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and
obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the person released by amnesty stands before the law
precisely as though he had committed no offense.
Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by
amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.
In the case of People vs. Casido, the difference between pardon and amnesty is given: “Pardon is granted by the
Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because
the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of
Congress, is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction;
while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally
before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward
and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes
or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does ‘not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office,
or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon,’ and it ‘in no case
exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence’ (Article 36,
Revised Penal Code). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so
overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before
the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.”
d. Effect of Pardon
People vs. Salle, Jr.
Where the pardoning power is subject to the limitation of conviction, it may be exercised at any time after
conviction even if the judgment is on appeal. It is, of course, entirely different where the requirement is “final
conviction,” as was mandated in the original provision of Section 14, Article IX of the 1973 Constitution, or
“conviction by final judgment,” as presently prescribed in Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. In
such a case, no pardon may be extended before a judgment of conviction becomes final.
A judgment of conviction becomes final (a) when no appeal is seasonably perfected, (b) when the accused
commences to serve the sentence, (c) when the right to appeal is expressly waived in writing, except where the
death penalty was imposed by the trial court, and (d) when the accused applies for probation, thereby waiving his
right to appeal. Where the judgment of conviction is still pending appeal and has not yet therefore attained finality,
as in the instant case, executive clemency may not yet be granted to the appellant.
The reason the Constitutional Commission adopted the “conviction by final judgment” requirement, reviving in
effect the original provision of the 1973 Constitution on the pardoning power, was, as expounded by
Commissioner Napoleon Rama, to prevent the President from exercising executive power in derogation of the
judicial power.
Indeed, an appeal brings the entire case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the appellate court. A becoming regard
for the doctrine of separation of powers demands that such exclusive authority of the appellate court be fully
respected and kept unimpaired. For truly, had not the present Constitution adopted the “conviction by final
judgment” limitation, the President could, at any time, and even without the knowledge of the court, extend
executive clemency to any one whom he, in good faith or otherwise, believes to merit presidential mercy.
It cannot be denied that under the Jones Law and the 1981 amendments to the 1973 Constitution on the pardoning
power which did not require conviction, the President had unimpeded power to grant pardon even before the
criminal case could be heard. And under the 1935 Constitution which required “conviction” only, the power could
be exercised at any time after conviction and regardless of the pendency of the appeal. In either case, there could
be the risk not only of a failure of justice but also of a frustration of the system of administration of justice in view
of the derogation of the jurisdiction of the trial or appellate court. Where the President is not so prevented by the
Constitution, not even Congress can impose any restriction to prevent a presidential folly. Hence, nothing but a
change in the constitutional provision consisting in the imposition of “conviction by final judgment” requirement
can change the rule. The new Constitution did it.
Hence, before an appellant may be validly granted pardon, he must first ask for the withdrawal of his appeal, i.e.,
the appealed conviction must first be brought to finality.

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We now declare that the “conviction by final judgment” limitation under Section 19, Article VII of the present
Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during the pendency of his
appeal from his conviction by the trial court. Any application therefor, if one is made, should not be acted upon
or the process toward its grant should not be begun unless the appeal is withdrawn. Accordingly, the agencies or
instrumentalities of the Government concerned must require proof from the accused that he has not appealed from
his conviction or that he has withdrawn his appeal. Such proof may be in the form of a certification issued by the
trial court or the appellate court, as the case may be. The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an
abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the release of an accused by virtue of a pardon, commutation of
sentence, or parole before the withdrawal of an appeal shall render those responsible therefor administratively
liable. Accordingly, those in custody of the accused must not solely rely on the pardon as a basis for the release
of the accused from confinement.
e. Sanctions for violations of conditional pardons
Torres vs. Gonzales
The Court in Espuelas reaffirmed the continuing force and effect of Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative
Code. This Court, quoting Tesoro and Sales, ruled that: "Due process is not necessarily judicial. The appellee had
had his day in court and been afforded the opportunity to defend himself during his trial for the crime of inciting
to sedition, with which he was charged, that brought about or resulted in his conviction, sentence and confinement
in the penitentiary. When he was conditionally pardoned it was a generous exercise by the Chief Executive of his
constitutional prerogative. The acceptance thereof by the convict or prisoner carrie[d] with it the authority or
power of the Executive to determine whether a condition or conditions of the pardon has or have been violated.
To no other department of the Government [has] such power been intrusted."
It may be emphasized that what is involved in the instant case is not the prosecution of the parolee for a subsequent
offense in the regular course of administration of the criminal law. What is involved is rather the ascertainment
of whether the convict has breached his undertaking that he would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the
Philippines" for purposes of reimposition upon him of the remitted portion of his original sentence. The
consequences that we here deal with are the consequences of an ascertained breach of the conditions of a pardon.
A convict granted conditional pardon, like the petitioner herein, who is recommitted must of course be convicted
by final judgment of a court of the subsequent crime or crimes with which he was charged before the criminal
penalty for such subsequent offense(s) can be imposed upon him. Again, since Article 159 of the Revised Penal
Code defines a distinct, substantive, felony, the parolee or convict who is regarded as having violated the
provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before he can be made to suffer
the penalty prescribed in Article 159.
f. Pardon in administrative cases
g. Who may avail of amnesty
6. Powers as Commander-in-Chief – Art. VII, Sec. 18; Art. III, Sec. 13; Art. VIII, Sec 1 par. 2
Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora
As framed by the parties, the underlying issues are the scope of presidential powers and limits, and the extent of
judicial review. But, while this Court gives considerable weight to the parties’ formulation of the issues, the
resolution of the controversy may warrant a creative approach that goes beyond the narrow confines of the issues
raised. Thus, while the parties are in agreement that the power exercised by the President is the power to call out
the armed forces, the Court is of the view that the power involved may be no more than the maintenance of peace
and order and promotion of the general welfare. For one, the realities on the ground do not show that there exist
a state of warfare, widespread civil unrest or anarchy. Secondly, the full brunt of the military is not brought upon
the citizenry, a point discussed in the latter part of this decision.
As a general proposition, a controversy is justiciable if it refers to a matter which is appropriate for court review.
It pertains to issues which are inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by law. Nevertheless,
the Court does not automatically assume jurisdiction over actual constitutional cases brought before it even in
instances that are ripe for resolution. One class of cases wherein the Court hesitates to rule on are “political
questions.” The reason is that political questions are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the
legality, of a particular act or measure being assailed. Moreover, the political question being a function of the
separation of powers, the courts will not normally interfere with the workings of another co-equal branch unless
the case shows a clear need for the courts to step in to uphold the law and the Constitution.
—The 1987 Constitution expands the concept of judicial review by providing that “(T)he Judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” Under this definition, the
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Court cannot agree with the Solicitor General that the issue involved is a political question beyond the jurisdiction
of this Court to review. When the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of
whether the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met or the limitations respected, is justiciable—the
problem being one of legality or validity, not its wisdom. Moreover, the jurisdiction to delimit constitutional
boundaries has been given to this Court. When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the
determination as to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act
at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility. Under this definition, a court is without power to directly decide matters over which full
discretionary authority has been delegated. But while this Court has no power to substitute its judgment for that
of Congress or of the President, it may look into the question of whether such exercise has been made in grave
abuse of discretion. A showing that plenary power is granted either department of government, may not be an
obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or abuse thereof may give rise to justiciable controversy.
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he
necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers
and from the text of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the President’s
wisdom or substitute its own. However, this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was
exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse
of discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the
necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision
is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence
to support the assertion that there exist no justification for calling out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no
evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse was committed because the power to call was exercised in
such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military. In the
performance of this Court’s duty of “purposeful hesitation” before declaring an act of another branch as
unconstitutional, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the
President’s judgment. To doubt is to sustain.
Under the foregoing provisions, Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension and the Court may review
the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the
revocation or review of the President’s action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out
power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the three
powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification. Expressio unius est exclusio
alterius. Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be
extended to other matters. That the intent of the Constitution is exactly what its letter says, i.e., that the power to
call is fully discretionary to the President, is extant in the deliberation of the Constitutional Commission.
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the aforementioned powers highlights the intent to grant the
President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the
lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and
the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil
rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by this Court.
Moreover, under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, in the exercise of the power to suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus or to impose martial law, two conditions must concur: (1) there must be an actual
invasion or rebellion and, (2) public safety must require it. These conditions are not required in the case of the
power to call out the armed forces. The only criterion is that “whenever it becomes necessary,” the President may
call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.” The implication is that the
President is given full discretion and wide latitude in the exercise of the power to call as compared to the two
other powers.
If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted without factual basis, then
this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity of calling
out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters considered for
satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the
absence of textual standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such
judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify,
or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that
there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.

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The President has already determined the necessity and factual basis for calling the armed forces. In his
Memorandum, he categorically asserted that, “[V]iolent crimes like bank/store robberies, holdups, kidnappings
and carnappings continue to occur in Metro Manila . . .” We do not doubt the veracity of the President’s
assessment of the situation, especially in the light of present developments. The Court takes judicial notice of the
recent bombings perpetrated by lawless elements in the shopping malls, public utilities, and other public places.
These are among the areas of deployment described in the LOI 2000. Considering all these facts, we hold that the
President has sufficient factual basis to call for military aid in law enforcement and in the exercise of this
constitutional power.
The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the
Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation
of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. The limited participation
of the Marines is evident in the provisions of the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of
the Marines’ authority. It is noteworthy that the local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols
at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP. In fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall leader
of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols. Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or orient
the soldiers on police patrol procedures. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the
Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support
to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme over
civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian
character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an “insidious incursion” of the military in the task of law
enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.
In this regard, it is not correct to say that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the AFP, by his alleged
involvement in civilian law enforcement, has been virtually appointed to a civilian post in derogation of the
aforecited provision. The real authority in these operations, as stated in the LOI, is lodged with the head of a
civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Such being the case, it does not matter whether the APP
Chief actually participates in the Task Force Tulungan since he does not exercise any authority or control over
the same. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no
appointment to a civilian position to speak of Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols
does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.
A power regulatory in nature is one which controls or directs. It is proscriptive if it prohibits or condemns and
compulsory if it exerts some coercive force. See US v. Yunis, 681 F.Supp 891 (D.D.C., 1988). See also FOURTH
AMENDMENT AND POSSE COMITATUS ACT RESTRICTIONS ON MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN
CIVIL LAW ENFORCEMENT, 54 George Washington Law Review, pp. 404433 (1986), which discusses the
four divergent standards for assessing acceptable involvement of military personnel in civil law enforcement. See
likewise HONORED IN THE BREECH: PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE THE LAWS WITH
MILITARY FORCE, 83 Yale Law Journal, pp. 130-152, 1973.
Even if the Court were to apply the above rigid standards to the present case to determine whether there is
permissible use of the military in civilian law enforcement, the conclusion is inevitable that no violation of the
civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution is committed. On this point, the Court agrees with the observation
of the Solicitor General: 3. The designation of tasks in Annex A does not constitute the exercise of regulatory,
proscriptive, or compulsory military power. First, the soldiers do not control or direct the operation. This is evident
from Nos. 6, 8(k) and 9(a) of Annex A. These soldiers, second, also have no power to prohibit or condemn. In
No. 9(d) of Annex A, all arrested persons are brought to the nearest police stations for proper disposition. And
last, these soldiers apply no coercive force. The materials or equipment issued to them, as shown in No. 8(c) of
Annex A, are all low impact and defensive in character. The conclusion is that there being no exercise of
regulatory, proscriptive or compulsory military power, the deployment of a handful of Philippine Marines
constitutes no impermissible use of military power for civilian law enforcement.
It appears that the present petition is anchored on fear that once the armed forces are deployed, the military will
gain ascendancy, and thus place in peril our cherished liberties. Such apprehensions, however, are unfounded.
The power to call the armed forces is just that—calling out the armed forces. Unless, petitioner IBP can show,
which it has not, that in the deployment of the Marines, the President has violated the fundamental law, exceeded
his authority or jeopardized the civil liberties of the people, this Court is not inclined to overrule the President’s
determination of the factual basis for the calling of the Marines to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
Since the institution of the joint visibility patrol in January, 2000, not a single citizen has complained that his
political or civil rights have been violated as a result of the deployment of the Marines. It was precisely to
safeguard peace, tranquility and the civil liberties of the people that the joint visibility patrol was conceived.
Freedom and democracy will be in full bloom only when people feel secure in their homes and in the streets, not
when the shadows of violence and anarchy constantly lurk in their midst.

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Lacson vs. Perez
All the foregoing petitions assail the declaration of a state of rebellion by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and
the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis both in fact and in law. Significantly,
on May 6, 2001, President MacapagalArroyo ordered the lifting of the declaration of a “state of rebellion” in
Metro Manila. Accordingly, the instant petitions have been rendered moot and academic.
In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected
of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the circumstances so warrant. The
warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a “state of rebellion.”
Moreover, petitioners’ contention in G.R. No. 147780 (Lacson Petition), 147781 (Defensor-Santiago Petition),
and 147799 (Lumbao Petition) that they are under imminent danger of being arrested without warrant do not
justify their resort to the extraordinary remedies of mandamus and prohibition, since an individual subjected to
warrantless arrest is not without adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. Such an individual may ask for
a preliminary investigation under Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, where he may adduce evidence in his defense,
or he may submit himself to inquest proceedings to determine whether or not he should remain under custody and
correspondingly be charged in court. Further, a person subject of a warrantless arrest must be delivered to the
proper judicial authorities within the periods provided in Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, otherwise the
arresting officer could be held liable for delay in the delivery of detained persons. Should the detention be without
legal ground, the person arrested can charge the arresting officer with arbitrary detention. All this is without
prejudice to his filing an action for damages against the arresting officer under Article 32 of the Civil Code.
Verily, petitioners have a surfeit of other remedies which they can avail themselves of, thereby making the prayer
for prohibition and mandamus improper at this time (Sections 2 and 3, Rule 65, Rules of Court).
In connection with their alleged impending warrantless arrest, petitioners Lacson, Aquino, and Mancao pray that
the “appropriate court before whom the informations against petitioners are filed be directed to desist from
arraigning and proceeding with the trial of the case, until the instant petition is finally resolved.” This relief is
clearly premature considering that as of this date, no complaints or charges have been filed against any of the
petitioners for any crime. And in the event that the same are later filed, this Court cannot enjoin criminal
prosecution conducted in accordance with the Rules of Court, for by that time any arrest would have been in
pursuance of a duly issued warrant.
The petition herein is denominated by petitioner Defensor-Santiago as one for mandamus. It is basic in matters
relating to petitions for mandamus that the legal right of the petitioner to the performance of a particular act which
is sought to be compelled must be clear and complete. Mandamus will not issue unless the right to relief is clear
at the time of the award (Palileo v. Ruiz Castro, 85 Phil. 272). Up to the present time, petitioner DefensorSantiago
has not shown that she is in imminent danger of being arrested without a warrant. In point of fact, the authorities
have categorically stated that petitioner will not be arrested without a warrant.
Petitioner Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino is not a real party-in-interest. The rule requires that a party must
show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable
decision so as to warrant an invocation of the court’s jurisdiction and to justify the exercise of the court’s remedial
powers in his behalf (KMU Labor Center v. Garcia, Jr., 239 SCRA 386 [1994]). Here, petitioner has not
demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify resort to the Court. Petitioner is a juridical person not subject
to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members,
and supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the crime of rebellion. Every action
must be brought in the name of the party whose legal right has been invaded or infringed, or whose legal right is
under imminent threat of invasion or infringement.
Sanlakas vs. Executive Secretary
Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit the President from declaring
a state of rebellion. Note that the Constitution vests the President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but,
first and foremost, with Executive powers.
The President’s authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief executive
and, at the same time, draws strength from her Commander-inChief powers. Indeed, as the Solicitor General
accurately points out, statutory authority for such a declaration may be found in Section 4, Chapter 2 (Ordinance
Power), Book III (Office of the President) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987.
David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo
As to how the Court may inquire into the President’s exercise of power, Lansang adopted the test that “judicial
inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the President’s decision is correct,” but that “the
President did not act arbitrarily.” Thus, the standard laid down is not correctness, but arbitrariness. In Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, this Court further ruled that “it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s
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decision is totally bereft of factual basis” and that if he fails, by way of proof, to support his assertion, then “this
Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings.” Petitioners failed to show that
President Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual basis. A
reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the
events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the
escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military,
particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also
the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance
between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary
allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid.
In the final analysis, the various approaches to emergency of the above political theorists—from Lock’s “theory
of prerogative,” to Watkins’ doctrine of “constitutional dictatorship” and, eventually, to McIlwain’s “principle of
constitutionalism”—ultimately aim to solve one real problem in emergency governance, i.e., that of allotting
increasing areas of discretionary power to the Chief Executive, while insuring that such powers will be exercised
with a sense of political responsibility and under effective limitations and checks. Our Constitution has fairly
coped with this problem. Fresh from the fetters of a repressive regime, the 1986 Constitutional Commission, in
drafting the 1987 Constitution, endeavored to create a government in the concept of Justice Jackson’s “balanced
power structure.” Executive, legislative, and judicial powers are dispersed to the President, the Congress, and the
Supreme Court, respectively. Each is supreme within its own sphere. But none has the monopoly of power in
times of emergency. Each branch is given a role to serve as limitation or check upon the other. This system does
not weaken the President, it just limits his power, using the language of McIlwain. In other words, in times of
emergency, our Constitution reasonably demands that we repose a certain amount of faith in the basic integrity
and wisdom of the Chief Executive but, at the same time, it obliges him to operate within carefully prescribed
procedural limitations.
A facial review of PP 1017, using the overbreadth doctrine, is uncalled for. First and foremost, the overbreadth
doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing “on their faces” statutes in free speech cases, also known under
the American Law as First Amendment cases. A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed
to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence. In United States v. Salerno, the US Supreme Court held that “we have not recognized an
‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment” (freedom of speech).
The overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that “reflects legitimate state interest in
maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.” Undoubtedly, lawless
violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered “harmful” and “constitutionally unprotected conduct.” In
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, it was held: It remains a ‘matter of no little difficulty’ to determine when a law may
properly be held void on its face and when ‘such summary action’ is inappropriate. But the plain import of our
cases is, at the very least, that facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice
and that its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids
the State to sanction moves from ‘pure speech’ toward conduct and that conduct—even if expressive—falls within
the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive
controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in
cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only “spoken words” and again, that “overbreadth
claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to
be applied to protected conduct.” Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of
conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
Facial invalidation of laws is considered as “manifestly strong medicine,” to be used “sparingly and only as a last
resort,” and is “generally disfavored”; The reason for this is obvious. Embedded in the traditional rules governing
constitutional adjudication is the principle that a person to whom a law may be applied will not be heard to
challenge a law on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in other
situations not before the Court. A writer and scholar in Constitutional Law explains further: The most distinctive
feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional
litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the
litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper
applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third
parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are
permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute “on its face,” not merely
“as applied for” so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it
more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with
the “chilling;” deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The
Court assumes that an overbroad law’s “very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from

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constitutionally protected speech or expression.” An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect
on the speech of those third parties.
Petitioners likewise seek a facial review of PP 1017 on the ground of vagueness. This, too, is unwarranted. Related
to the “overbreadth” doctrine is the “void for vagueness doctrine” which holds that “a law is facially invalid if
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” It is subject
to the same principles governing overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is also an analytical tool for testing “on their
faces” statutes in free speech cases. And like overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its
face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. Again, petitioners did not even attempt to show that PP
1017 is vague in all its application. They also failed to establish that men of common intelligence cannot
understand the meaning and application of PP 1017. Same; Same; Same; Under the calling-out power, the
President may summon the armed forces to aid him in suppressing lawless violence, invasion and rebellion.—
Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid him in suppressing lawless
violence, invasion and rebellion. This involves ordinary police action. But every act that goes beyond the
President’s calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires. For this reason, a President must be careful in
the exercise of his powers. He cannot invoke a greater power when he wishes to act under a lesser power. There
lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the greater the power, the greater are the limitations.
President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an act declaring a status or condition of public
moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4 cited above. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas,
is harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In
declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She
also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the State’s extraordinary power to take over privately-owned
public utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome
power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless, without legal significance, or not written, as
in the case of Sanlakas.
Some of the petitioners vehemently maintain that PP 1017 is actually a declaration of Martial Law. It is no so.
What defines the character of PP 1017 are its wordings. It is plain therein that what the President invoked was her
calling-out power. The declaration of Martial Law is a “warn[ing] to citizens that the military power has been
called upon by the executive to assist in the maintenance of law and order, and that, while the emergency lasts,
they must, upon pain of arrest and punishment, not commit any acts which will in any way render more difficult
the restoration of order and the enforcement of law.”
A reading of PP 1017 operative clause shows that it was lifted from Former President Marcos’ Proclamation No.
1081, which partly reads: NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines by
virtue of the powers vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby place
the entire Philippines as defined in Article 1, Section 1 of the Constitution under martial law and, in my capacity
as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and
order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of
insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated
by me personally or upon my direction. We all know that it was PP 1081 which granted President Marcos
legislative power. Its enabling clause states: “to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.” Upon the other hand, the enabling clause of PP
1017 issued by President Arroyo is: to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.”
The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chapter 2, Book III of Executive Order No. 292
(Administrative Code of 1987). She mayissue any of the following: Sec. 2. Executive Orders.—Acts of the
President providing for rules of a general or permanent character in implementation or execution of constitutional
or statutory powers shall be promulgated in executive orders. Sec. 3. Administrative Orders.—Acts of the
President which relate to particular aspect of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative
head shall be promulgated in administrative orders. Sec. 4. Proclamations.—Acts of the President fixing a date
or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a
specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of
an executive order. Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders.—Acts of the President on matters of administrative detail or of
subordinate or temporary interest which only concern a particular officer or office of the Government shall be
embodied in memorandum orders. Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars.—Acts of the President on matters relating to
internal administration, which the President desires to bring to the attention of all or some of the departments,
agencies, bureaus or offices of the Government, for information or compliance, shall be embodied in
memorandum circulars. Sec. 7. General or Special Orders.—Acts and commands of the President in his capacity
as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be issued as general or special orders.
President Arroyo’s ordinance power is limited to the foregoing issuances. She cannot issue decrees similar to

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those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the same
category and binding force as statutes because they were issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative
power during the period of Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority
to promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article
VI categorically states that “[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor
a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.
As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows that these decrees are
void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to “laws,” she cannot call the military to enforce or
implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws on obligations
and contracts and the like. She can only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to
suppress lawless violence.
It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision refers not only to war but also to “other
national emergency.” If the intention of the Framers of our Constitution was to withhold from the President the
authority to declare a “state of national emergency” pursuant to Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and
grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the existence of a state of war), then the Framers could have provided
so. Clearly, they did not intend that Congress should first authorize the President before he can declare a “state of
national emergency.” The logical conclusion then is that President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of
a state of national emergency even in the absence of a Congressional enactment. But the exercise of emergency
powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest, is a
different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress.
Courts have often said that constitutional provisions in pari materia are to be construed together. Otherwise stated,
different clauses, sections, and provisions of a constitution which relate to the same subject matter will be
construed together and considered in the light of each other. Considering that Section 17 of Article XII and Section
23 of Article VI, previously quoted, relate to national emergencies, they must be read together to determine the
limitation of the exercise of emergency powers.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article
VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed
upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to
meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant
emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus: (1) There must be a war or other
emergency. (2) The delegation must be for a limited period only. (3) The delegation must be subject to such
restrictions as the Congress may prescribe. (4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national
policy declared by Congress.
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of
private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed
upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the “the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable
terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest,” it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President
may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing
the reasonable terms thereof.
Petitioner CachoOlivares, et al. contends that the term “emergency” under Section 17, Article XII refers to
“tsunami,” “typhoon,” “hurricane” and “similar occurrences.” This is a limited view of “emergency.” Emergency,
as a generic term, connotes the existence of conditions suddenly intensifying the degree of existing danger to life
or well-being beyond that which is accepted as normal. Implicit in this definitions are the elements of intensity,
variety, and perception. Emergencies, as perceived by legislature or executive in the United States since 1933,
have been occasioned by a wide range of situations, classifiable under three (3) principal heads: a) economic, b)
natural disaster, and c) national security. “Emergency,” as contemplated in our Constitution, is of the same
breadth. It may include rebellion, economic crisis, pestilence or epidemic, typhoon, flood, or other similar
catastrophe of nationwide proportions or effect.
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this
Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct
the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without authority from
Congress. Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however,
without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public
interest. The President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take over of

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privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such
exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out the
types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute
authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency
powers act passed by Congress.
One of the misfortunes of an emergency, particularly, that which pertains to security, is that military necessity
and the guaranteed rights of the individual are often not compatible. Our history reveals that in the crucible of
conflict, many rights are curtailed and trampled upon. Here, the right against unreasonable search and seizure; the
right against warrantless arrest; and the freedom of speech, of expression, of the press, and of assembly under the
Bill of Rights suffered the greatest blow.
Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid although they may be abused and
misabused and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application. The validity of a statute or
ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from
its effects in a particular case. PP 1017 is merely an invocation of the President’s calling-out power. Its general
purpose is to command the AFP to suppress all forms of lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. It had
accomplished the end desired which prompted President Arroyo to issue PP 1021. But there is nothing in PP 1017
allowing the police, expressly or impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, search or violate the citizens’ constitutional
rights. Now, may this Court adjudge a law or ordinance unconstitutional on the ground that its implementor
committed illegal acts? The answer is no. The criterion by which the validity of the statute or ordinance is to be
measured is the essential basis for the exercise of power, and not a mere incidental result arising from its exertion.
This is logical. Just imagine the absurdity of situations when laws maybe declared unconstitutional just because
the officers implementing them have acted arbitrarily. If this were so, judging from the blunders committed by
policemen in the cases passed upon by the Court, majority of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code would
have been declared unconstitutional a long time ago.
President Arroyo issued G.O. No. 5 to carry into effect the provisions of PP 1017. General orders are “acts and
commands of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.” They
are internal rules issued by the executive officer to his subordinates precisely for the proper and efficient
administration of law. Such rules and regulations create no relation except between the official who issues them
and the official who receives them. They are based on and are the product of, a relationship in which power is
their source, and obedience, their object. For these reasons, one requirement for these rules to be valid is that they
must be reasonable, not arbitrary or capricious. G.O. No. 5 mandates the AFP and the PNP to immediately carry
out the “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless
violence.”
The Constitution provides that “the right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable search and seizure of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.”The plain import of the language of
the Constitution is that searches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly
issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection given by this provision is that between
person and police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue
search warrants or warrants of arrest.
Assembly” means a right on the part of the citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs.
It is a necessary consequence of our republican institution and complements the right of speech. As in the case of
freedom of expression, this right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent. In other words, like other rights embraced in the
freedom of expression, the right to assemble is not subject to previous restraint or censorship. It may not be
conditioned upon the prior issuance of a permit or authorization from the government authorities except, of course,
if the assembly is intended to be held in a public place, a permit for the use of such place, and not for the assembly
itself, may be validly required.
The ringing truth here is that petitioner David, et al. were arrested while they were exercising their right to peaceful
assembly. They were not committing any crime, neither was there a showing of a clear and present danger that
warranted the limitation of that right. As can be gleaned from circumstances, the charges of inciting to sedition
and violation of BP 880 were mere afterthought. Even the Solicitor General, during the oral argument, failed to
justify the arresting officers’ conduct. In De Jonge v. Oregon, it was held that peaceable assembly cannot be made
a crime, thus: Peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a crime. The holding of meetings for
peaceable political action cannot be proscribed. Those who assist in the conduct of such meetings cannot be
branded as criminals on that score. The question, if the rights of free speech and peaceful assembly are not to be
preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting was held but as to its purpose; not as to the relations
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of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution
protects. If the persons assembling have committed crimes elsewhere, if they have formed or are engaged in a
conspiracy against the public peace and order, they may be prosecuted for their conspiracy or other violations of
valid laws. But it is a different matter when the State, instead of prosecuting them for such offenses, seizes upon
mere participation in a peaceable assembly and a lawful public discussion as the basis for a criminal charge.
On the basis of the above principles, the Court likewise considers the dispersal and arrest of the members of
KMU, et al. (G.R. No. 171483) unwarranted. Apparently, their dispersal was done merely on the basis of
Malacañang’s directive canceling all permits previously issued by local government units. This is arbitrary. The
wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant disregard of the principle that “freedom of assembly is
not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that
the State has a right to prevent.” Tolerance is the rule and limitation is the exception. Only upon a showing that
an assembly presents a clear and present danger that the State may deny the citizens’ right to exercise it. Indeed,
respondents failed to show or convince the Court that the rallyists committed acts amounting to lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. With the blanket revocation of permits, the distinction between protected and unprotected
assemblies was eliminated.
Under BP 880, the authority to regulate assemblies and rallies is lodged with the local government units. They
have the power to issue permits and to revoke such permits after due notice and hearing on the determination of
the presence of clear and present danger. Here, petitioners were not even notified and heard on the revocation of
their permits.
The first time they learned of it was at the time of the dispersal. Such absence of notice is a fatal defect. When a
person’s right is restricted by government action, it behooves a democratic government to see to it that the
restriction is fair, reasonable, and according to procedure.
Gudani vs. Senga
A most dangerous general proposition is foisted on the Court—that soldiers who defy orders of their superior
officers are exempt from the strictures of military law and discipline if such defiance is predicated on an act
otherwise valid under civilian law. Obedience and deference to the military chain of command and the President
as commander-in-chief are the cornerstones of a professional military in the firm cusp of civilian control. These
values of obedience and deference expected of military officers are content-neutral, beyond the sway of the
officer’s own sense of what is prudent or rash, or more elementally, of right or wrong. A self-righteous military
invites itself as the scoundrel’s activist solution to the “ills” of participatory democracy.
What the Court has to consider though is whether the violation of the aforementioned order of Gen. Senga, which
emanated from the President, could lead to any investigation for court-martial of petitioners. It has to be
acknowledged as a general principle that AFP personnel of whatever rank are liable under military law for
violating a direct order of an officer superior in rank. Whether petitioners did violate such an order is not for the
Court to decide, but it will be necessary to assume, for the purposes of this petition, that petitioners did so.
Senate turned on the nature of executive privilege, a presidential prerogative which is encumbered by significant
limitations. Insofar as E.O. 464 compelled officials of the executive branch to seek prior presidential approval
before appearing before Congress, the notion of executive control also comes into consideration. However, the
ability of the President to require a military official to secure prior consent before appearing before Congress
pertains to a wholly different and independent specie of presidential authority—the commander-in-chief powers
of the President. By tradition and jurisprudence, the commanderin-chief powers of the President are not
encumbered by the same degree of restriction as that which may attach to executive privilege or executive control.
This point was settled against Gen. Gudani’s position in Abadilla v. Ramos, 156 SCRA 92 (1987), where the
Court declared that an officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to be outside
the jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice proceedings were initiated against him before the
termination of his service. Once jurisdiction has been acquired over the officer, it continues until his case is
terminated. Thus, the Court held: The military authorities had jurisdiction over the person of Colonel Abadilla at
the time of the alleged offenses. This jurisdiction having been vested in the military authorities, it is retained up
to the end of the proceedings against Colonel Abadilla. Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction once acquired is
not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated.
The vitality of the tenet that the President is the commanderin-chief of the Armed Forces is most crucial to the
democratic way of life, to civilian supremacy over the military, and to the general stability of our representative
system of government. The Constitution reposes final authority, control and supervision of the AFP to the
President, a civilian who is not a member of the armed forces, and whose duties as commander-in-chief represent
only a part of the organic duties imposed upon the office, the other functions being clearly civil in nature. Civilian
supremacy over the military also countermands the notion that the military may bypass civilian authorities, such
as civil courts, on matters such as conducting warrantless searches and seizures.
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The commander-in-chief provision in the Constitution is denominated as Section 18, Article VII, which begins
with the simple declaration that “[t]he President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines x x x” Outside explicit constitutional limitations, such as those found in Section 5, Article XVI, the
commander-in-chief clause vests on the President, as commander-in-chief, absolute authority over the persons
and actions of the members of the armed forces. Such authority includes the ability of the President to restrict the
travel, movement and speech of military officers, activities which may otherwise be sanctioned under civilian
law.
Any good soldier, or indeed any ROTC cadet, can attest to the fact that the military way of life circumscribes
several of the cherished freedoms of civilian life. It is part and parcel of the military package. Those who cannot
abide by these limitations normally do not pursue a military career and instead find satisfaction in other fields;
and in fact many of those discharged from the service are inspired in their later careers precisely by their rebellion
against the regimentation of military life. Inability or unwillingness to cope with military discipline is not a stain
on character, for the military mode is a highly idiosyncratic path which persons are not generally conscripted into,
but volunteer themselves to be part of. But for those who do make the choice to be a soldier, significant
concessions to personal freedoms are expected. After all, if need be, the men and women of the armed forces may
be commanded upon to die for country, even against their personal inclinations.
It may be so that military culture is a remnant of a less democratic era, yet it has been fully integrated into the
democratic system of governance. The constitutional role of the armed forces is as protector of the people and of
the State. Towards this end, the military must insist upon a respect for duty and a discipline without counterpart
in civilian life. The laws and traditions governing that discipline have a long history; but they are founded on
unique military exigencies as powerful now as in the past. In the end, it must be borne in mind that the armed
forces has a distinct subculture with unique needs, a specialized society separate from civilian society. In the
elegant prose of the eminent British military historian, John Keegan: [Warriors who fight wars have] values and
skills [which] are not those of politicians and diplomats. They are those of a world apart, a very ancient world,
which exists in parallel with the everyday world but does not belong to it. Both worlds change over time, and the
warrior world adopts in step to the civilian. It follows it, however, at a distance. The distance can never be closed,
for the culture of the warrior can never be that of civilization itself….
Critical to military discipline is obeisance to the military chain of command. Willful disobedience of a superior
officer is punishable by court-martial under Article 65 of the Articles of War. “An individual soldier is not free
to ignore the lawful orders or duties assigned by his immediate superiors. For there would be an end of all
discipline if the seaman and marines on board a ship of war [or soldiers deployed in the field], on a distant service,
were permitted to act upon their own opinion of their rights [or their opinion of the President’s intent], and to
throw off the authority of the commander whenever they supposed it to be unlawfully exercised.” Further
traditional restrictions on members of the armed forces are those imposed on free speech and mobility. Kapunan
is ample precedent in justifying that a soldier may be restrained by a superior officer from speaking out on certain
matters. As a general rule, the discretion of a military officer to restrain the speech of a soldier under his/her
command will be accorded deference, with minimal regard if at all to the reason for such restraint. It is integral
to military discipline that the soldier’s speech be with the consent and approval of the military commander.
The necessity of upholding the ability to restrain speech becomes even more imperative if the soldier desires to
speak freely on political matters. The Constitution requires that “[t]he armed forces shall be insulated from
partisan politics,” and that ‘[n]o member of the military shall engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political
activity, except to vote.” Certainly, no constitutional provision or military indoctrination will eliminate a soldier’s
ability to form a personal political opinion, yet it is vital that such opinions be kept out of the public eye. For one,
political belief is a potential source of discord among people, and a military torn by political strife is incapable of
fulfilling its constitutional function as protectors of the people and of the State. For another, it is ruinous to military
discipline to foment an atmosphere that promotes an active dislike of or dissent against the President, the
commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Soldiers are constitutionally obliged to obey a President they may dislike
or distrust. This fundamental principle averts the country from going the way of banana republics.
Parenthetically, it must be said that the Court is well aware that our country’s recent past is marked by regime
changes wherein active military dissent from the chain of command formed a key, though not exclusive, element.
The Court is not blind to history, yet it is a judge not of history but of the Constitution. The Constitution, and
indeed our modern democratic order, frown in no uncertain terms on a politicized military, informed as they are
on the trauma of absolute martial rule. Our history might imply that a political military is part of the natural order,
but this view cannot be affirmed by the legal order. The evolutionary path of our young democracy necessitates
a reorientation from this view, reliant as our socio-political culture has become on it. At the same time, evolution
mandates a similar demand that our system of governance be more responsive to the needs and aspirations of the
citizenry, so as to avoid an environment vulnerable to a military apparatus able at will to exert an undue influence
in our polity.

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Of possibly less gravitas, but of equal importance, is the principle that mobility of travel is another necessary
restriction on members of the military. A soldier cannot leave his/her post without the consent of the commanding
officer. The reasons are self-evident. The commanding officer has to be aware at all times of the location of the
troops under command, so as to be able to appropriately respond to any exigencies. For the same reason,
commanding officers have to be able to restrict the movement or travel of their soldiers, if in their judgment, their
presence at place of call of duty is necessary. At times, this may lead to unsentimental, painful consequences,
such as a soldier being denied permission to witness the birth of his first-born, or to attend the funeral of a parent.
Yet again, military life calls for considerable personal sacrifices during the period of conscription, wherein the
higher duty is not to self but to country.
We have to consider the question: may the President prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before
a legislative inquiry? We hold that the President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as
commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under
military justice. At the same time, we also hold that any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before
it of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such
attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the
President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the
attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President
has the duty to faithfully execute.
Our ruling that the President could, as a general rule, require military officers to seek presidential approval before
appearing before Congress is based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives
of the President as commander-in-chief. Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such
as budget appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the
Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the
position. Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command mandate that the President’s
ability to control the individual members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military
officer is torn between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that
the officer has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the
Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
The refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is still subject to judicial
relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature’s functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-
chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to conduct legislative
inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the
presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has the right
to require prior consent from members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize. We believe and
hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctions a modality by which members of the military may be
compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the President desires otherwise, a modality which does not offend
the Chief Executive’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief. The remedy lies with the courts.
The fact that the executive branch is an equal, coordinate branch of government to the legislative creates a wrinkle
to any basic rule that persons summoned to testify before Congress must do so. There is considerable interplay
between the legislative and executive branches, informed by due deference and respect as to their various
constitutional functions. Reciprocal courtesy idealizes this relationship; hence, it is only as a last resort that one
branch seeks to compel the other to a particular mode of behavior. The judiciary, the third coordinate branch of
government, does not enjoy a similar dynamic with either the legislative or executive branches. Whatever
weakness inheres on judicial power due to its inability to originate national policies and legislation, such is
balanced by the fact that it is the branch empowered by the Constitution to compel obeisance to its rulings by the
other branches of government.
In Senate, the Court ruled that the President could not impose a blanket prohibition barring executive officials
from testifying before Congress without the President’s consent notwithstanding the invocation of executive
privilege to justify such prohibition. The Court did not rule that the power to conduct legislative inquiry ipso facto
superseded the claim of executive privilege, acknowledging instead that the viability of executive privilege stood
on a case to case basis. Should neither branch yield to the other branch’s assertion, the constitutional recourse is
to the courts, as the final arbiter if the dispute. It is only the courts that can compel, with conclusiveness,
attendance or nonattendance in legislative inquiries.
Following these principles, it is clear that if the President or the Chief of Staff refuses to allow a member of the
AFP to appear before Congress, the legislative body seeking such testimony may seek judicial relief to compel
the attendance. Such judicial action should be directed at the heads of the executive branch or the armed forces,
the persons who wield authority and control over the actions of the officers concerned. The legislative purpose of
such testimony, as well as any defenses against the same— whether grounded on executive privilege, national
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security or similar concerns—would be accorded due judicial evaluation. All the constitutional considerations
pertinent to either branch of government may be raised, assessed, and ultimately weighed against each other. And
once the courts speak with finality, both branches of government have no option but to comply with the decision
of the courts, whether the effect of the decision is to their liking or disfavor.
Courts are empowered, under the constitutional principle of judicial review, to arbitrate disputes between the
legislative and executive branches of government on the proper constitutional parameters of power. This is the
fair and workable solution implicit in the constitutional allocation of powers among the three branches of
government. The judicial filter helps assure that the particularities of each case would ultimately govern, rather
than any overarching principle unduly inclined towards one branch of government at the expense of the other.
The procedure may not move as expeditiously as some may desire, yet it ensures thorough deliberation of all
relevant and cognizable issues before one branch is compelled to yield to the other. Moreover, judicial review
does not preclude the legislative and executive branches from negotiating a mutually acceptable solution to the
impasse. After all, the two branches, exercising as they do functions and responsibilities that are political in nature,
are free to smooth over the thorns in their relationship with a salve of their own choosing. And if emphasis be
needed, if the courts so rule, the duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize
the appearance of the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the notion
of officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with
the final orders of the courts.
Petitioners may have been of the honest belief that they were defying a direct order of their Commander-in-Chief
and Commanding General in obeisance to a paramount idea formed within their consciences, which could not be
lightly ignored. Still, the Court, in turn, is guided by the superlative principle that is the Constitution, the
embodiment of the national conscience. The Constitution simply does not permit the infraction which petitioners
have allegedly committed, and moreover, provides for an orderly manner by which the same result could have
been achieved without offending constitutional principles.
7. Emergency powers – Art. VI, Sec. 23 (2)
8. Contracting and Guaranteeing foreign loans – Art. VII, Sec. 20; Art. XII, Sec. 21; RA No. 4860
9. Power over foreign affairs
a. Recognition of foreign states
b. Conduct of foreign relations
Pimentel, Jr. vs. Office of the Executive Secretary
The question in standing is whether a party has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. We find that among the petitioners, only Senator
Pimentel has the legal standing to file the instant suit. The other petitioners maintain their standing as advocates
and defenders of human rights, and as citizens of the country. They have not shown, however, that they have
sustained or will sustain a direct injury from the non-transmittal of the signed text of the Rome Statute to the
Senate. Their contention that they will be deprived of their remedies for the protection and enforcement of their
rights does not persuade. The Rome Statute is intended to complement national criminal laws and courts.
Sufficient remedies are available under our national laws to protect our citizens against human rights violations
and petitioners can always seek redress for any abuse in our domestic courts.
As regards Senator Pimentel, it has been held that “to the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the
power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that
institution.” Thus, legislators have the standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges
vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action
which they claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators. The petition at bar invokes the power of the Senate to
grant or withhold its concurrence to a treaty entered into by the executive branch, in this case, the Rome Statute.
The petition seeks to order the executive branch to transmit the copy of the treaty to the Senate to allow it to
exercise such authority. Senator Pimentel, as member of the institution, certainly has the legal standing to assert
such authority of the Senate.
In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in
external relations and is the country’s sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign
policy, the President acts as the country’s mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President
is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain
diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of
treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states. Nonetheless, while the President
has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by
requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him.

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Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that “no treaty or international agreement shall be valid
and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.”
The participation of the legislative branch in the treaty-making process was deemed essential to provide a check
on the executive in the field of foreign relations. By requiring the concurrence of the legislature in the treaties
entered into by the President, the Constitution ensures a healthy system of checks and balance necessary in the
nation’s pursuit of political maturity and growth.
Petitioners’ arguments equate the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative with ratification. It should
be underscored that the signing of the treaty and the ratification are two separate and distinct steps in the treaty-
making process. As earlier discussed, the signature is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the
instrument and as a symbol of the good faith of the parties. It is usually performed by the state’s authorized
representative in the diplomatic mission. Ratification, on the other hand, is the formal act by which a state
confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representative. It is generally held to be an
executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the government. Thus, Executive Order No. 459 issued by
President Fidel V. Ramos on November 25, 1997 provides the guidelines in the negotiation of international
agreements and its ratification. It mandates that after the treaty has been signed by the Philippine representative,
the same shall be transmitted to the Department of Foreign Affairs. The Department of Foreign Affairs shall then
prepare the ratification papers and forward the signed copy of the treaty to the President for ratification. After the
President has ratified the treaty, the Department of Foreign Affairs shall submit the same to the Senate for
concurrence. Upon receipt of the concurrence of the Senate, the Department of Foreign Affairs shall comply with
the provisions of the treaty to render it effective.
Petitioners’ submission that the Philippines is bound under treaty law and international law to ratify the treaty
which it has signed is without basis. The signature does not signify the final consent of the state to the treaty. It
is the ratification that binds the state to the provisions thereof. In fact, the Rome Statute itself requires that the
signature of the representatives of the states be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory
states. Ratification is the act by which the provisions of a treaty are for mally confirmed and approved by a State.
By ratifying a treaty signed in its behalf, a state expresses its willingness to be bound by the provisions of such
treaty. After the treaty is signed by the state’s representative, the President, being accountable to the people, is
burdened with the responsibility and the duty to carefully study the contents of the treaty and ensure that they are
not inimical to the interest of the state and its people. Thus, the President has the discretion even after the signing
of the treaty by the Philippine representative whether or not to ratify the same. The Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties does not contemplate to defeat or even restrain this power of the head of states. If that were so,
the requirement of ratification of treaties would be pointless and futile. It has been held that a state has no legal
or even moral duty to ratify a treaty which has been signed by its plenipotentiaries. There is no legal obligation
to ratify a treaty, but it goes without saying that the refusal must be based on substantial grounds and not on
superficial or whimsical reasons. Otherwise, the other state would be justified in taking offense.
It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the
concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent,
or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to
the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to
ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision
is within the competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus.
This Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties.
The Court, therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction
to compel the executive branch of the government to transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the Senate.
c. Settlement of disputes with foreign powers
d. Treaty-making – Art. VII, Sec. 21
e. Executive Agreements
Bayan (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) vs. Zamora
Section 21, Article VII deals with treaties or international agreements in general, in which case, the concurrence
of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of the Senate is required to make the subject treaty, or international
agreement, valid and binding on the part of the Philippines. This provision lays down the general rule on treaties
or international agreements and applies to any form of treaty with a wide variety of subject matter, such as, but
not limited to, extradition or tax treaties or those economic in nature. All treaties or international agreements
entered into by the Philippines, regardless of subject matter, coverage, or particular designation or appellation,
requires the concurrence of the Senate to be valid and effective. In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special
provision that applies to treaties which involve the presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the
Philippines. Under this provision, the concurrence of the Senate is only one of the requisites to render compliance
with the constitutional requirements and to consider the agreement binding on the Philippines. Section 25, Article

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XVIII further requires that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities” may be allowed in the Philippines only
by virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum held for that purpose if so required by Congress, and recognized as such by the other contracting
state.
Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities, should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however, the
provisions of Section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of
determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the Senate, as will be further discussed
hereunder.
It is a finely-imbedded principle in statutory construction that a special provision or law prevails over a general
one. Lex specialis derogant generali. Thus, where there is in the same statute a particular enactment and also a
general one which, in its most comprehensive sense, would include what is embraced in the former, the particular
enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to affect only such cases within its general
language which are not within the provision of the particular enactment.
Moreover, it is specious to argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is inapplicable to mere transient agreements for
the reason that there is no permanent placing of structure for the establishment of a military base. On this score,
the Constitution makes no distinction between “transient” and “permanent.” Certainly, we find nothing in Section
25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placedpermanently in the Philippines.
It is a rudiment in legal hermeneutics that when no distinction is made by law, the Court should not distinguish—
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos.
In like manner, we do not subscribe to the argument that Section 25, Article XVIII is not controlling since no
foreign military bases, but merely foreign troops and facilities, are involved in the VFA. Notably, a perusal of
said constitutional provision reveals that the proscription covers “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities.”
Stated differently, this prohibition is not limited to the entry of troops and facilities without any foreign bases
being established. The clause does not refer to “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities” collectively but treats
them as separate and independent subjects. The use of comma and the disjunctive word “or” clearly signifies
disassociation and independence of one thing from the others included in the enumeration, such that, the provision
contemplates three different situations—a military treaty the subject of which could be either (a) foreign bases,
(b) foreign troops, or (c) foreign facilities—any of the three standing alone places it under the coverage of Section
25, Article XVIII.
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the following
conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the
Senate and, when so required by Congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national
referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.
This Court is of the firm view that the phrase “recognized as a treaty” means that the other contracting party
accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other contracting state, the United States of
America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution,
is to accord strict meaning to the phrase.
Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning
except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. Its
language should be understood in the sense they have in common use.
Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because,
under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses
the elements of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.
A treaty, as defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, is “an international instrument concluded
between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in
two or more related instruments, and whatever its particular designation.” There are many other terms used for a
treaty or international agreement, some of which are: act, protocol, agreement, compromis d’ arbitrage, concordat,
convention, declaration, exchange of notes, pact, statute, charter and modus vivendi. All writers, from Hugo
Grotius onward, have pointed out that the names or titles of international agreements included under the general
term treaty have little or no legal significance. Certain terms are useful, but they furnish little more than mere
description.
Thus, in international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in their binding effect
upon states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers. International
law continues to make no distinction between treaties and executive agreements: they are equally binding
obligations upon nations.

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In our jurisdiction, we have recognized the binding effect of executive agreements even without the concurrence
of the Senate or Congress. In Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading, we had occasion to pronounce:
“x x x the right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent
Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history we have entered
into executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations, most-favorednation
rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement
of claims. The validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our courts, “x x x x x x x x x “Furthermore,
the United States Supreme Court has expressly recognized the validity and constitutionality of executive
agreements entered into without Senate approval.
The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that
the United States government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as the United
States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its
obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.
Ratification is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the government, as
the case may be, through which the formal acceptance of the treaty is proclaimed. A State may provide in its
domestic legislation the process of ratification of a treaty. The consent of the State to be bound by a treaty is
expressed by ratification when: (a) the treaty provides for such ratification, (b) it is otherwise established that the
negotiating States agreed that ratification should be required, (e) the representative of the State has signed the
treaty subject to ratification, or (d) the intention of the State to sign the treaty subject to ratification appears from
the full powers of its representative, or was expressed during the negotiation. In our jurisdiction, the power to
ratify is vested in the President and not, as commonly believed, in the legislature. The role of the Senate is limited
only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.
With the ratification of the VFA, which is equivalent to final acceptance, and with the exchange of notes between
the Philippines and the United States of America, it now becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part, under
the principles of international law, to be bound by the terms of the agreement. Thus, no less than Section 2, Article
II of the Constitution, declares that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law
as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity
with all nations.
As a member of the family of nations, the Philippines agrees to be bound by generally accepted rules for the
conduct of its international relations. While the international obligation devolves upon the state and not upon any
particular branch, institution, or individual member of its government, the Philippines is nonetheless responsible
for violations committed by any branch or subdivision of its government or any official thereof. As an integral
part of the community of nations, we are responsible to assure that our government, Constitution and laws will
carry out our international obligation. Hence, we cannot readily plead the Constitution as a convenient excuse for
noncompliance with our obligations, duties and responsibilities under international law.
Beyond this, Article 13 of the Declaration of Rights and Duties of States adopted by the International Law
Commission in 1949 provides: “Every State has the duty to carry out in good faith its obligations arising from
treaties and other sources of international law, and it may not invoke provisions in its constitution or its laws as
an excuse for failure to perform this duty.” Equally important is Article 26 of the Convention which provides that
“Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith,” This is
known as the principle of pacta sunt servanda which preserves the sanctity of treaties and have been one of the
most fundamental principles of positive international law, supported by the jurisprudence of international
tribunals.
By constitutional fiat and by the intrinsic nature of his office, the President, as head of State, is the sole organ and
authority in the external affairs of the country. In many ways, the President is the chief architect of the nation’s
foreign policy; his “dominance in the field of foreign relations is (then) conceded.” Wielding vast powers and
influence, his conduct in the external affairs of the nation, as Jefferson describes, is “executive altogether.” As
regards the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the Constitution vests the same in the
President, subject only to the concurrence of at least twothirds vote of all the members of the Senate. In this light,
the negotiation of the VFA and the subsequent ratification of the agreement are exclusive acts which pertain solely
to the President, in the lawful exercise of his vast executive and diplomatic powers granted him no less than by
the fundamental law itself. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude, and Congress itself is powerless
to invade it. Consequently, the acts or judgment calls of the President involving the VFA— specifically the acts
of ratification and entering into a treaty and those necessary or incidental to the exercise of such principal acts —
squarely fall within the sphere of his constitutional powers and thus, may not be validly struck down, much less
calibrated by this Court, in the absence of clear showing of grave abuse of power or discretion.
As to the power to concur with treaties, the Constitution lodges the same with the Senate alone. Thus, once the
Senate performs that power, or exercises its prerogative within the boundaries prescribed by the Constitution, the

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concurrence cannot, in like manner, be viewed to constitute an abuse of power, much less grave abuse thereof.
Corollarily, the Senate, in the exercise of its discretion and acting within the limits of such power, may not be
similarly faulted for having simply performed a task conferred and sanctioned by no less than the fundamental
law.
For the role of the Senate in relation to treaties is essentially legislative in character; the Senate, as an independent
body possessed of its own erudite mind, has the prerogative to either accept or reject the proposed agreement, and
whatever action it takes in the exercise of its wide latitude of discretion, pertains to the wisdom rather than the
legality of the act. In this sense, the Senate partakes a principal, yet delicate, role in keeping the principles of
separation of powers and of checks and balances alive and vigilantly ensures that these cherished rudiments
remain true to their form in a democratic government such as ours. The Constitution thus animates, through this
treaty-concurring power of the Senate, a healthy system of checks and balances indispensable toward our nation’s
pursuit of political maturity and growth. True enough, rudimentary is the principle that matters pertaining to the
wisdom of a legislative act are beyond the ambit and province of the courts to inquire.
In fine, absent any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondents, this Court—as the final
arbiter of legal controversies and staunch sentinel of the rights of the people—is then without power to conduct
an incursion and meddle with such affairs purely executive and legislative in character and nature. For the
Constitution no less, maps out the distinct boundaries and limits the metes and bounds within which each of the
three political branches of government may exercise the powers exclusively and essentially conferred to it by law.
f. Distinctions between treaty and Executive Agreement
Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading
While the concurrence of the Senate is required by the Constitution in the making of “treaties” (Constitution of
the Phil., Article VII, Section 10 [7], “executive agreements” may be validly entered into without such
concurrence.
“Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the approval of two thirds of the Senate. Executive
agreements become binding through executive action without the need of a vote by the Senate or by Congress. “x
x x the right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent Congressional
approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history we have entered into executive
agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations, most-favored-nation rights, patent
rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The
validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our courts.
“Agreements with respect to the registration of trade-marks have been concluded by the Executive with various
countries under the Act of Congress of March 3, 1881 (21 Stat. 502). Postal conventions regulating the reciprocal
treatment of mail matters, money orders, parcel post, etc., have been concluded by the Postmaster General with
various countries under authorization by Congress beginning with the Act of February 20, 1792 (1 Stat. 232, 239).
Ten executive agreements were concluded by the President pursuant to the McKinley Tariff Act of 1890 (26 Stat.
567, 612), and nine such agreements were entered into under the Dingley Tariff Act 1897 (30 Stat. 151, 203, 214).
A very much larger number of agreements, along the lines of the one with Rumania previously referred to,
providing for most-favored-nation treatment in customs and related matters have been entered into since the
passage of the Tariff Act of 1922, not by direction of the Act but in harmony with it.
“International agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy and those involving
international arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form of treaties. But international agreements
embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well-established national policies and traditions and those involving
arrangements of a more or less temporary nature usually take the form of executive agreements.
“Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are commonly referred to as executive
agreements and are no less common in our scheme of government than are the more formal instruments—treaties
and conventions. They sometimes take the form of exchanges of notes and at other times that of more formal
documents denominated ‘agreements’ or ‘protocols’. The point where ordinary correspondence between this and
other governments ends and agreements—whether denominated executive agreements or exchanges of notes or
otherwise—begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake to discuss
here the large variety of executive agreements as such, concluded from time to time. Hundreds of executive
agreements, other than those entered into under the trade-agreements act, have been negotiated with foreign
governments. x x x It would seem to be sufficient, in order to show that the trade agreements under the act of
1934 are not anomalous in character, that they are not treaties, and that they have abundant precedent in our
history, to refer to certain classes of agreements heretofore entered into by the Executive without the approval of
the Senate. They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits,
the admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial relations generally, international claims, postal
matters, the registration of trademarks and copyrights, etcetera. Some of them were concluded not by specific
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congressional authorization but in conformity with policies declared in acts of Congress with respect to the general
subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still others, particularly those with respect of the settlement of claims
against foreign governments, were concluded independently of any legislation.” (39 Columbia Law Review, pp.
651, 755.)
g. Deportation of Undesirable aliens
Go Tek vs. Deportation Board
We hold that the Board has jurisdiction to investigate Go Tek for illegal possession of fake checks (as well as his
alleged “guerilla” activities) in spite of the fact that he has not yet been convicted of illegal possession thereof
under article 168 of the Revised Penal Code and notwithstanding that that act is not among the grounds for the
deportation of undesirable aliens as enumerated in section 37 of the Immigration Law. The charge against Go Tek
before the Board was not premature.
So under existing law, the deportation of an undesirable alien may be affected (1) by order of the President, after
due investigation, pursuant to section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code and (2) by the Commissioner of
Immigration, upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners under section 37 of the Immigration Law
(Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board, supra.)
The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens (Chuoco Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed.
960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125). That power may be exercised by the Chief Executive “when he deems such action
necessary for the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation”. . . Justice Johnson’s opinion is that when the Chief
Executive finds that there are aliens whose continued presence in the country is injurious to the public interest.
“He may, even in the absence of express law, deport them”.
As observed by Justice Labrador, there is no legal nor constitutional provision defining the power to deport aliens
because the intention of the law is to grant the Chief Executive “full discretion to determine whether an alien’s
residence in the country is so undesirable as to affect or injure the security, welfare or interest of the state. The
adjudication of facts upon which deportation is predicated also devolves on the Chief Executive whose decision
is final and executive.”
It is fundamental that an executive order for deportation is not dependent on a prior judicial conviction in a
criminal case” (Ang Beng vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 100 Phil. 801, 803). Thus, it was held that the fact
an alien has been acquitted in a criminal proceeding of the particular charge does not prevent the deportation of
such alien based on the same charge. Such acquittal does not constitute res judicata in the deportation proceedings.
Conviction of a crime is not necessary to warrant deportation.
10. Power over legislation
11. Immunity from suits
In Re: Saturnino V. Bermudez
Prescinding from petitioner’s lack of personality to sue or to bring this action (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677),
it is elementary that this Court assumes no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief. More importantly, the
petition amounts in effect to a suit against the incumbent President of the Republic, President Corazon C. Aquino,
and it is equally elementary that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during
the period of their incumbency and tenure.
The petition furthermore states no cause of action. Petitioner’s allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the
aforequoted provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common public knowledge
that tha Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President
Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the extension of their term to noon of June 30, 1992
for purposes of synchronization of elections. Hence, the second paragraph of the cited section provides for the
holding on the second Monday of May, 1992 of the first regular elections for the President and Vice-President
under said 1986 Constitution. In previous cases, the legitimacy of the government of President Corazon C. Aquino
was iikewise sought to be questioned with the claim that it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.
The said cases were dismissed outright by this Court.
Soliven vs. Makasiar
The rationale for the grant to the President of the privelege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of
Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief
Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder's time, also demands
undivided attention. But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and
may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an
accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense
to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused. Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would
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prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection
afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or
to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other
person.
Nixon v. Fitzgerald
The case was "in" the Court of Appeals for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 1254, which authorizes this Court's review of
"[c]ases in" the courts of appeals. The Court of Appeals here dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
However, petitioner's appeal to the Court of Appeals falls within the "collateral order" doctrine of Cohen v.
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, as raising a "serious and unsettled question" of law. Although
the Court of Appeals had previously ruled in another case that the President was not entitled to absolute immunity,
this Court had never so held. Nor was the controversy mooted by an agreement to liquidate damages entered into
between the parties after the petition for certiorari was filed and respondent had entered his opposition. Under the
terms of the agreement, petitioner paid respondent $142,000; respondent agreed to accept liquidated damages of
$28,000 if this Court ruled that petitioner was not entitled to absolute immunity; and no further payments would
be made if the decision upheld petitioner's immunity claim. The limited agreement left both parties with a
considerable financial stake in the resolution of the question presented in this Court. Cf. Havens Realty Corp. v.
Coleman, 455 U. S. 363.
as a former President of the United States, is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on
his official acts. Although there is no blanket recognition of absolute immunity for all federal executive officials
from liability for civil damages resulting from constitutional violations, certain officials -- such as judges and
prosecutors -- because of the special nature of their responsibilities, require absolute exemption from liability. Cf.
Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478. Determination of the immunity of particular officials is guided by the
Constitution, federal statutes, history, and public policy.
The President's absolute immunity is a functionally mandated incident of his unique office, rooted in the
constitutional tradition of the separation of powers and supported by the Nation's history. Because of the singular
importance of the President's duties, diversion of his energies by concern with private lawsuits would raise unique
risks to the effective functioning of government. While the separation of powers doctrine does not bar every
exercise of jurisdiction over the President, a court, before exercising jurisdiction, must balance the constitutional
weight of the interest to be served against the dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive
Branch. The exercise of jurisdiction is not warranted in the case of merely private suits for damages based on a
President's official acts.
The President's absolute immunity extends to all acts within the "outer perimeter" of his duties of office. A rule
of absolute immunity for the President does not leave the Nation without sufficient protection against his
misconduct. There remains the constitutional remedy of impeachment, as well as the deterrent effects of constant
scrutiny by the press and vigilant oversight by Congress. Other incentives to avoid misconduct may include a
desire to earn reelection, the need to maintain prestige as an element of Presidential influence, and a President's
traditional concern for his historical stature.
12. Executive Privilege
Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations
PUNO, C.J., Dissenting Opinion
It is my considered view that there is merit in the contention of respondent Senate Committees that the Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries need not be published by the Senate of every Congress, as the Senate is a
continuing body. The continuity of these rules from one Congress to the next is both an incident and an indicium
of the continuing nature of the Senate.
Excerpts from the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission provide us a brief history of the Senate
of the Philippines and its intended nature as a continuing legislative body, viz.: x x x The above deliberations
show that the nature of the Senate as a continuing body hinged on the staggering of terms of the Senators, such
that the term of one-half or twelve of the Senators (“remaining Senators”) would subsist and continue into the
succeeding Congress, while the term of the other half or twelve Senators (“outgoing Senators”) would expire in
the present Congress. As pointed out by Commissioner Gregorio J. Tingson, this arrangement whereby half of
the Senate’s membership continues into the next Congress is designed to help ensure “stability of governmental
policies.” The structure of the Philippine Senate being evidently patterned after the U.S. Senate, it reflects the
latter’s rationale for staggering senatorial terms and constituting the Senate as a continuing body.
In sum, it is the staggering of the terms of the 24 Senators and allowing the terms of office of a portion of the
Senate membership to continue into the succeeding Congress— whether two-thirds under the 1935 Constitution
or one-half under the 1987 Constitution—that provides the stability indispensable to an effective government,
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and makes the Senate a continuing body as intended by the framers of both the 1935 (as amended) and the 1987
Constitutions. Part of the stability provided by a continuing Senate is the existence of rules of proceedings adopted
pursuant to the power granted by the U.S. Constitution, rules that continue to be in effect from one Congress to
the next until such rules are repealed or amended, but with the process for repeal and amendment also being
governed by the subsisting rules. U.S. Senator Francis Warren cautions that a Senate that is not continuing, but
instead new in each Congress, opens all rules to debate as a new matter; the Senate will be totally and wholly
without rules as it proceeds “at sea without rudder or compass regarding rules.” Thus, in the U.S., the Senate rules
of proceedings provide that “(t)he rules of the Senate shall continue from one Congress to the next Congress
unless they are changed as provided in these rules.” These rules, adopted on January 11, 1884 and made effective
on January 21, 1884, continue to be in effect to this day alongside the continuing membership of the Senate.
Patterned after the U.S. Constitution, the 1987 Constitution also provides under Article VI, Section 16(3) that
“(e)ach House may determine the rules of its proceedings…” As in the U.S. Senate, the Senate Rules (of
proceedings) adopted by the Philippine Senate have a continued effect from one Congress to the next as shown
by the following provisions of the Philippine Senate Rules: “Rule LII (Date of Taking Effect), Section 137: These
Rules shall take effect on the date of their adoption and shall remain in force until they are amended or repealed.”
x x x x x x x x x “Rule LI (Amendments to, Or revisions Of, The Rules), Section 136: At the start of each
session in which the Senators elected in the preceding elections shall begin their term of office, the President may
endorse the Rules to the appropriate committee for amendment or revision. “The Rules may also be amended by
means of a motion which should be presented at least one day before its consideration, and the vote of the majority
of the Senators present in the session shall be required for its approval.” (emphasis supplied) It is obvious that
the above rules do not provide for the expiration of the Senate Rules at the termination of every Congress. On the
contrary, Rule LI provides that at the opening of every Congress, the Senate President may endorse the Senate
Rules to the appropriate committee for amendment or revision, which connotes that the Senate Rules must be
subsisting for them to be subject to amendment or revision. If the Senate were not a continuing body, the Senate
Rules governing its proceedings would not be given continuing effect from one Congress to the next.
While the present Senate Rules provide under Rule XLIV (Unfinished Business), Section 123 that “(a)ll pending
matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress,” between the expiration of a
Congress and the opening of the succeeding Congress, some functions of the Senate continue during such recess.
Aside from the administrative functions performed by Senate employees for the continued operation of the Senate
as an institution, legislative functions continue to be exercised. The offices of the “remaining Senators” continue
their legislative work in preparation for the succeeding Congress. These continuing functions require continuing
effectivity of the Senate Rules. An example of a provision of the Senate Rules applicable to these continuing
activities is Rule XXII (Filing and Consideration of Bills and Resolutions), Section 61, which provides that “(a)ll
bills and resolutions shall be filed with the Office of the Secretary whether the Senate is in session or not.”
It should be noted that the termination of unfinished business upon expiration of one Congress is sanctioned by
Rule XLIV, Section 123 of the Senate Rules. The Senate Rules, may, however, be amended under Rule LI, Section
36. It remains to be seen whether by amendment of the Senate Rules, the Senate would allow a Senate Committee
conducting an investigation, for example, to continue its proceedings after the expiration of a Congress as in the
afore-discussed case, McGrain v. Daugherty. Prescinding from the continuing nature of the Senate and the
continuing effectivity of the Senate Rules (of proceedings), it is my considered view that the Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries adopted by the Senate of the Tenth Congress on August 21, 1995 should likewise be
recognized to have continuing force and effect after being “duly published” in two newspapers of general
circulation on August 24, 1995.
It cannot be gainsaid that rules of proceedings are a necessity in preserving order, decency and regularity in a
dignified public body. These rules are weapons of the weaker party to defend themselves from irregularities and
abuses “which the wantonness of power is but too often apt to suggest to large and successful majorities.” Thomas
Jefferson stated in the opening of his widely used, A Manual of Parliamentary Practice, viz.: “Mr. Onslow, the
ablest among the Speakers of the House of Commons, used to say, ‘It was a maxim he had often heard when he
was a young man, from old and experienced members, that nothing tended more to throw power into the hands
of the administration and those who acted with the majority of the House of Commons, than in neglect of, or
departure from, the rules of proceeding; that these forms, as instituted by our ancestors, operated as a check, and
control, on the actions of the majority; and that they were, in many instances, a shelter and protection to the
minority, against the attempts of power.’ ”
Following the principles of Ballin and Santiago, I submit that the Court ought to take a deferential stance in
interpreting the rule-making power of the Senate as a co-equal branch of government, so long as rights of private
parties are not infringed. The Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries is akin to the Senate Rules (of proceeding)
in that the former governs the internal workings of the Senate and its committees, although admittedly different
in some respects from the Senate Rules because it affects rights of parties not members of the Senate and, hence,
requires publication. To the extent that the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries does not transgress the

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requirement of due process as its outer limit, the Senate should be given room to interpret the duration of its
effectivity from one Congress to the next.
Similar to Ballin, there is no standard set by Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution, as to the manner and
frequency of publication of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries. It is within the competency of the Senate
to prescribe a method that shall reasonably conform to the due-process purpose of publication, and the Senate has
validly provided the method of one-time publication of its Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in two
newspapers of general circulation, in line with the ruling in Tañada.
The unbroken practice of the Senate of not adopting Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries and publishing the
same in every Congress, owing to its nature as a continuing body, is not something to be lightly brushed aside,
especially considering the grave consequences of cutting this continuity. Holding itself to be a continuing body,
the Senate has dispensed with the adoption not only of Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries, but also of Senate
rules (of proceedings) at the start of every Congress in the last ten years. As a consequence of the absence of rules
if the Senate is held to be not a continuing body, its acts during these Congresses may be put into question. A
mathematical calculation of a quorum in view of the staggered terms of the Senate membership cannot simply
subvert the deeply-entrenched thought-out rationale for the design of a continuing and stable Senate, shown to be
necessary in promoting effective government and protecting liberties. Where rights are not violated, the Court
ought not like lightning strike down a valid rule and practice of a co-equal branch of government, lest the walls
delineating powers be burned.

The Vice President – Art. VII, Sec. 3-5, 6 and 9; Art. XI, Sec. 2-3
Right of Succession and membership in Cabinet – Art. VII, Sec. 8,11 and 3 par. 2
VII. Distribution and Separation of Powers
System of Check and Balances
A. Legislative Intrusion into Executive Domain
Concepcion vs. Paredes
It is beyond the power of any branch of the Government of the Philippine Islands to exercise its functions in any
other way than that prescribed by the organic law or by local laws which conform to the organic law.
An Act of the Philippine Legislature which has not been expressly disapproved by Congress is valid unless the
subject-matter has been covered by Congressional legislation, or its enactment forbidden by some provision of
the organic law. The Philippine Legislature is granted by the Organic Act, the Act of Congress of August 29,
1916, general legislative power subject to specific restrictions.
The Organic Act vests supreme executive power in the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands. Authority to
appoint and commission officers is conferred upon him. Appointment to office is intrinsically an executive act
involving the exercise of discretion.
It is not within the power of the Philippine Legislature to enact laws which either expressly or impliedly diminish
the authority conferred by an Act of Congress on the Chief Executive and a branch of the Legislature.
The organic law requires selection for judicial positions by the Governor-General with the assent of the Philippine
Senate. Act No. 2941 requires a drawing of lots for judicial positions. The power of appointment and confirmation
vested by the Organic Act in the Governor-General and the Philippine Senate is usurped by a lottery of judicial
positions every five years.
B. Legislative Intrusion into Judicial Domain
In re: Cunanan, et al.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement
of attorney’s-at-law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial
function and responsibility. Because of this attribute, its continuous and zealous possession and exercise by the
judicial power have been demonstrated during more than six centuries, which certainly "constitutes the most solid
of titles."
The Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal responsibilities governing the admission
to the practice of law. The primary power and responsibility which the Constitution recognizes, continue to reside
in this court. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this court, but the authority and
responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys-at-law and their
supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court.

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Being coordinate and independent branches the power to promulgate and enforce rules for the admission to the
practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them may and should be exercised with
the respect that each owes to the other, giving careful consideration to the responsibility which the nature of each
department requires. These powers have existed together for centuries without diminution on each part; the
harmonious delimitation being found in that the legislature may and should examine if the existing rules on the
admission to the Bar respond to the demands which public interest requires of a Bar endowed with high virtues,
culture, training and responsibility. The legislature may, by means of repeal, amendment or supplemental rules,
fill up any deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power, which has the inherent responsibility for a good
and efficient administration of justice and the supervision of the practice of the legal profession, should consider
these reforms as the minimum standards for the elevation of the profession, and see to it that with these reforms
the lofty objective that is desired in the exercise of its traditional duty of admitting, suspending, disbarring and
reinstating attorneys-at-law is realized. They are powers which, exercised within their proper constitutional limits,
are not repugnant, but rather complementary to each other in attaining the establishment of a Bar that would
respond to the increasing and exacting necessities of the administration of justice.
C. Executive Intrusion into Legislative Domain
Araneta v. Dinglasan

Youngstown Tube and Sheet Co. v. Sawyer

Although this case has proceeded no further than the preliminary injunction stage, it is ripe for determination of
the constitutional validity of the Executive Order on the record presented. Under prior decisions of this Court,
there is doubt as to the right to recover in the Court of Claims on account of properties unlawfully taken by
government officials for public use. Seizure and governmental operation of these going businesses were bound
to result in many present and future damages of such nature as to be difficult, if not incapable, of measurement.
The Executive Order was not authorized by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and it cannot stand.
There is no statute which expressly or impliedly authorizes the President to take possession of this property as he
did here. In its consideration of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, Congress refused to authorize governmental seizures
of property as a method of preventing work stoppages and settling labor disputes. Authority of the President to
issue such an order in the circumstances of this case cannot be implied from the aggregate of his powers under
Article II of the Constitution. The Order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the President's military
power as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. Nor can the Order be sustained because of the several
provisions of Article II which grant executive power to the President.
The power here sought to be exercised is the lawmaking power, which the Constitution vests in the Congress
alone, in both good and bad times. Even if it be true that other Presidents have taken possession of private business
enterprises without congressional authority in order to settle labor disputes, Congress has not thereby lost its
exclusive constitutional authority to make the laws necessary and proper to carry out all powers vested by the
Constitution "in the Government of the United States, or any Department or Officer thereof."
D. Executive Intrusion into Judicial Domain

Zaballero v. NHA

The determination of “just compensation” in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive
department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the
guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation,
no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court’s
findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the “justness” of the decreed compensation.

Since courts must first construe acts of government conformably with the Constitution, the proper, nay,
inexorable, meaning to be given the cited Presidential Decrees should be that the rules therein enumerated are
intended merely to provide guidelines for the courts as they go about their functions of determining just
compensation. The plaintiff, therefore, may not impute upon the presidency the un constitutional intent of direct
executive determination of just compensation in the promulgation of the cited decrees and as a delegate of
presidential powers, the National Housing Authority certainly cannot rise higher than its principal’s constitutional
source of authority. (Decision, G.R. No. 61237-39 Rollo, p. 57).

ARTICLE VIII
THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

1. Power of Judicial Review

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 Art. VIII, Sec. 4 (2)
Art. VIII, Sec. 5
Art. 7, Civil Code

Marburry v. Madison

If there is conflict between the Constitution and the enacted law, the former shall prevail. The Supreme Court is
more powerful than the Legislative when the conflicts arises between the Constitution and the enacted law.

2. Functions of Judicial Review

a. Legitimizing Function
b. Checking Function
c. Symbolic or Educational Function
Salonga v. Pano
3. Justiciable v. Political Question
Javellana v. Executive Secretary

4. Requisites of Judicial Review

David v. Macapagl Arroyo
a. Actual Case or Controversy
i. Prematurity

Fernandez vs. Torres

In actions involving constitutional issues, the firmly settled rule is that a constitutional question will not be heard
and resolved by the courts unless the following requirements of judicial inquiry are met: (1) the existence of an
actual case or controversy; (2) the party raising the constitutional issue must have a personal and substantial
interest in the resolution thereof; (3) the controversy must be raised at the earliest reasonable opportunity; and (4)
that the resolution of the constitutional issue must be indispensable for the final determination of the controversy.

[T]hat Item No. 1 of the challenged DOLE Circular does not establish an absolute and comprehensive prohibition
of deployment abroad of entertainers below twenty-three (23) years of age. Item No. 1 itself provides that “the
Secretary of Labor and Employment may, for justifiable reasons, exempt from performing artists from coverage
hereof.” The discretionary authority here asserted by the DOLE Secretary does not purport to be unlimited and
arbitrary in nature. To the contrary, fairly explicit and precisely drawn grounds for exempting particular
performing artists from the coverage of Item No. 1 are set out in a set of “Administrative Guidelines Implementing
Department Circular No. 01-91”.

[P]etitioners have failed to allege, or have refrained from alleging, that they had previously applied to public
respondent officials for exemption from the minimum age restriction imposed by Item No. 1 of DOLE Circular
No. 01-91. Necessarily, therefore, petitioners also do not allege that public respondent officials have arbitrarily
denied their applications for exemption from the minimum age requirement or from any other requirement
established by Item No. 1. Neither have petitioners alleged that public respondents have continually threatened to
deny all and sundry applications for exemption, so as to create a reasonable expectation that their applications
would be immediately and arbitrarily denied, should they in fact file them. Petitioners do assert that the exemption
clause of DOLE Circular No. 01-91 is “practically useless and [constitutes] empty verbiage.” They have not,
however, attempted to support this assertion.

The Court is not compelled to indulge in speculation that public respondent would deny any and all applications
for exemption from coverage of DOLE Circular No. 01-91. Two (2) important presumptions are here applicable.
The first is that administrative orders and regulations are entitled to the presumption of constitutionality. The
second is that official duty has been or will be regularly performed.

Dumlao vs. COMELEC

Petitioner Dumlao assails the constitutionality of the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52,
quoted earlier, as being contrary to the equal protection clause guaranteed by the Constitution, and seeks to
prohibit respondent COMELEC from implementing said provision. Yet, Dumlao has not been adversely affected
by the application of that provision. No petition seeking Dumlao’s disqualification has been filed before the
COMELEC. There is no ruling of that constitutional body on the matter, which this Court is being asked to review
on Certiorari. This is a question posed in the abstract, a hypothetical issue, and in effect, a petition for an advisory

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opinion from this Court to be “rendered without the benefit of a detailed factual record.” Petitioner Dumlao’s case
is clearly within the primary jurisdiction (see concurring Opinion of now Chief Justice Fernando in Peralta vs.
Comelec, 82 SCRA 30, 96 [1978]) of respondent COMELEC as provided for in section 2, Art. XII-C, of the
Constitution.

In the case of petitioners Igot and Salapantan, it was only during the hearing, not in their Petition, that Igot is said
to be a candidate for Councilor. Even then, it cannot be denied that neither one has been convicted nor charged
with acts of disloyalty to the State, nor disqualified from being candidates for local elective positions. Neither one
of them has been alleged to have been adversely affected by the operation of the statutory provisions they assail
as unconstitutional. Their is a generalized grievance. They have no personal nor substantial interest at stake. In
the absence of any litigable interest, they can claim no locus standi in seeking judicial redress.

However, the statutory provisions questioned in this case, namely, sec. 7, BP Blg. 51, and sections 4, 1, and 6,
BP Blg. 52, do not directly involve the disbursement of public funds. While, concededly, the elections to be held
involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money
is “being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against abuses of legislative power”
(Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S., 83 [1960]), or that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC
(see Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 [1960]), or that public money is being deflected to any
improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.

ii. Mootness vs. Ripeness

iii. Exception to the Mootness Rule
b. Earliest Time Opportunity
Arceta vs. Mangrobang
When the issue of unconstitutionality of a legislative act is raised, it is the established doctrine that the Court may
exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) an actual and appropriate
case and controversy exists; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question;
(3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question raised
is the very lis mota of the case. Only when these requisites are satisfied may the Court assume jurisdiction over a
question of unconstitutionality or invalidity of an act of Congress.

Perusal of these petitions reveals that they are primarily anchored on Rule 65, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. In a special civil action of certiorari the only question that may be raised is whether or not the
respondent has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Yet nowhere in these
petitions is there any allegation that the respondent judges acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. A special civil action for certiorari will prosper only if a grave abuse of discretion is
manifested.

Seeking judicial review at the earliest opportunity does not mean immediately elevating the matter to this Court.
Earliest opportunity means that the question of unconstitutionality of the act in question should have been
immediately raised in the proceedings in the court below. Thus, the petitioners should have moved to quash the
separate indictments or moved to dismiss the cases in the proceedings in the trial courts on the ground of
unconstitutionality of B.P. Blg. 22. But the records show that petitioners failed to initiate such moves in the
proceedings below. Needless to emphasize, this Court could not entertain questions on the invalidity of a statute
where that issue was not specifically raised, insisted upon, and adequately argued. Taking into account the early
stage of the trial proceedings below, the instant petitions are patently premature.

Lagmay vs. Court of Appeals

The issue of constitutionality of a statute, executive order or proclamation must be the very lis mota presented in
a case. The Court does not decide questions of a constitutional nature unless that question is properly raised and
presented in an appropriate case and is necessary to its determination.

Clearly then, under said provision, the terms and conditions of the sale in exercise of the lessee’s right of first
refusal to purchase shall be determined by the Urban Zone Expropriation and Land Management Committee.
Hence, the lower court rightfully ruled that certain prerequisites must be complied with by anyone who wishes to
avail himself of the benefits of the decree.

c. Standing of a party

Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works

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It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenues for anything but a public
purpose. * * * It is the essential character of the direct object of the expenditure which must determine its validity
as justifying a tax and not the magnitude of the interests to be affected nor the degree to which the general
advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their promotion.
Incidental advantage to the public or to the state, which results from the promotion of private interests, and the
prosperity of private enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by the use of public money." (23 R. L. C.
pp. 398-450).

The relation between the people of the Philippines and its taxpayers, on the one hand, and the Republic of the
Philippines, on the other, is not identical to that obtaining between the people and taxpayers of the U.S. and its
Federal Government. It is closer, from a domestic viewpoint, to that existing between the people and taxpayers
of each state and the government thereof, except that the authority of the Republic of the Philippines over the
people of the Philippines is more fully direct than that of the states of the Union, insofar as the simple and unitary
type of our national government is not subject to limitations analogous to those imposed by the Federal
Constitution upon the states of the Union, and those imposed upon the Federal Government in the interest of the
states of the Union. For this reason, the rule recognizing the right of taxpayers to assail the constitutionality of a
legislation appropriating local or state public funds—which has been upheld by the Federal Supreme Court
(Crampton vs. Zabriskie, 101 U.S. 601)—has greater application in the Philippines than that adopted with respect
to acts of Congress of the United States appropriating federal funds.

Bugnay Construction and Development Corporation vs. Laron

While generally an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and not appealable, where such denial was
issued with grave abuse of discretion or is without or in excess of jurisdiction, the extraordinary writs of certiorari
and prohibition will lie.

On the pendency of another action between the same parties for the same cause, or litis pendentia, as a ground for
dismissal, there must be between the action under consideration and the other action (1) identity of the parties or
at least such as represent the same interest in both actions, (2) identity of the rights asserted and prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same facts, (3) the identity in both cases is such that the judgment which may be
rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other
case. This ground is also referred to as lis pendens or auter action pendant.

Undeniably, whatever judgment may be rendered in Case No. D-8664 will necessarily constitute res judicata in
Case No. D-8696. And, it is too entrenched a rule brooking no dissent that a party cannot, by varying the form of
action or adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the
same cause of action shall not be twice litigated. Same; Same; Parties-in-interest; Only when the act complained
of directly involves an illegal disbursement of public funds raised by taxation will the taxpayer’s suit be
allowed.—Contrarily, it thus results that the trial court’s reliance is self-defeating since the very doctrine cited
holds that only when the act complained of directly involves an illegal disbursement of public funds raised by
taxation will the taxpayer’s suit be allowed. The essence of a taxpayer’s right to institute such an action hinges
on the existence of that requisite pecuniary or monetary interest.

Objections to a taxpayer’s suit for lack of sufficient personality standing or interest are procedural matters.
Considering the importance to the public of a suit assailing the constitutionality of a tax law, and in keeping with
the Court’s duty, specially explicated in the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of
the Government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not
abused the discretion given to them, the Supreme Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure and take
cognizance of the suit.

However, for the above rule to apply, it is exigent that the taxpayer-plaintiff sufficiently show that he would be
benefited or injured by the judgment or entitled to the avails of the suit as a real party in interest. Before he can
invoke the power of judicial review, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the
illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common
to all members of the public.

On its face, and there is no evidence to the contrary, the lease contract entered into between petitioner and the
City shows that no public funds have been or will be used in the construction of the market building. The terms
of the contract reveal that petitioner shall finance the project, the capital investment to be recovered from the
rental fees due from the stallholders. Furthermore, petitioner undertook, at its own expense, to insure the building,
to have the site cleared for construction, and to hire personnel necessary to prevent unfair competition to its
stallholders. It was likewise agreed that suits arising from and in connection with said construction shall be at the

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expense of petitioner without right of reimbursement. Finally, the building shall be turned over at the end of the
lease period to the City of Dagupan as its exclusive owner, also without right of reimbursement. No disbursement
of public funds, legal or otherwise, being involved in the challenged transaction, the locus standi claimed by
plaintiff in Civil Case No. D-8696 is nonexistent.

Forum-shopping, an act of malpratice, is proscribed and condemned as trifling with the courts and abusing their
processes. It is improper conduct that degrades the administration of justice. The rule has been formalized in
Paragraph 17 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines issued by this Court on January 11, 1983, in connection with
the implementation of the Judiciary Reorganization Act. Thus, said Paragraph 17 provides that no petition may
be filed in the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now the Court of Appeals “if another similar petition has been
filed or is still pending in the Supreme Court” and vice-versa. The Rule ordains that “(a) violation of the rule shall
constitute a contempt of court and shall be a cause for the summary dismissal of both petitions, without prejudice
to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel or party concerned.”
Standing vs. Real-party-in-Interest
i. Types of Standing
Citizen/Taxpayers
Tatad vs. Garcia, Jr.
The phrasing of the question is erroneous; it is loaded. What private respondent owns are the rail tracks, rolling
stocks like the coaches, rail stations, terminals and the power plant, not a public utility. While a franchise is
needed to operate these facilities to serve the public, they do not by themselves constitute a public utility. What
constitutes a public utility is not their ownership but their use to serve the public (Iloilo Ice & Cold Storage Co.
v. Public Service Board, 44 Phil. 551, 557-558 [1923]).

The Constitution, in no uncertain terms, requires a franchise for the operation of a public utility. However, it does
not require a franchise before one can own the facilities needed to operate a public utility so long as it does not
operate them to serve the public.

In law, there is a clear distinction between the “operation” of a public utility and the ownership of the facilities
and equipment used to serve the public.

Ownership is defined as a relation in law by virtue of which a thing pertaining to one person is completely
subjected to his will in everything not prohibited by law or the concurrence with the rights of another (Tolentino,
II Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines 45 [1992]).

The exercise of the rights encompassed in ownership is limited by law so that a property cannot be operated and
used to serve the public as a public utility unless the operator has a franchise. The operation of a rail system as a
public utility includes the transportation of passengers from one point to another point, their loading and unloading
at designated places and the movement of the trains at prescheduled times (cf. Arizona Eastern R.R. Co. v. J.A.
Matthews, 20 Ariz 282, 180 P. 159, 7 A.L.R. 1149 [1919]; United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Northern P.R. Co., 30
Wash 2d. 722, 193 P. 2d 868, 2 A.L.R. 2d 1065 [1948]).

The right to operate a public utility may exist independently and separately from the ownership of the facilities
thereof. One can own said facilities without operating them as a public utility, or conversely, one may operate a
public utility without owning the facilities used to serve the public. The devotion of property to serve the public
may be done by the owner or by the person in control thereof who may not necessarily be the owner thereof.

Indeed, a mere owner and lessor of the facilities used by a public utility is not a public utility (Providence and
W.R. Co. v. United States, 46 F. 2d 149, 152 [1930]; Chippewa Power Co. v. Railroad Commission of Wisconsin,
205 N.W. 900, 903, 188 Wis. 246 [1925]; Ellis v. Interstate Commerce Commission, Ill. 35 S. Ct. 645, 646, 237
U.S. 434, 59 L. Ed. 1036 [1914]). Neither are owners of tank, refrigerator, wine, poultry and beer cars who supply
cars under contract to railroad companies considered as public utilities (Crystal Car Line v. State Tax
Commission, 174 P. 2d 984, 987 [1946]).

Even the mere formation of a public utility corporation does not ipso facto characterize the corporation as one
operating a public utility. The moment for determining the requisite Filipino nationality is when the entity applies
for a franchise, certificate or any other form of authorization for that purpose (People v. Quasha, 93 Phil. 333
[1953]).

The BOT scheme is expressly defined as one where the contractor undertakes the construction and financing of
an infrastructure facility, and operates and maintains the same. The contractor operates the facility for a fixed
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period during which it may recover its expenses and investment in the project plus a reasonable rate of return
thereon. After the expiration of the agreed term, the contractor transfers the ownership and operation of the project
to the government.

In the BT scheme, the contractor undertakes the construction and financing of the facility, but after completion,
the ownership and operation thereof are turned over to the government. The government, in turn, shall pay the
contractor its local investment on the project in addition to a reasonable rate of return. If payment is to be effected
through amortization payments by the government infrastructure agency or local government unit concerned, this
shall be made in accordance with a scheme proposed in the bid and incorporated in the contract (R.A. No. 6957,
Sec. 6).

Emphasis must be made that under the BOT scheme, the owner of the infrastructure facility must comply with
the citizenship requirement of the Constitution on the operation of a public utility. No such a requirement is
imposed in the BT scheme.

A lease is a contract where one of the parties binds himself to give to another the enjoyment or use of a thing for
a certain price and for a period which may be definite or indefinite but not longer than 99 years (Civil Code of
the Philippines, Art. 1643). There is no transfer of ownership at the end of the lease period. But if the parties
stipulate that title to the leased premises shall be transferred to the lessee at the end of the lease period upon the
payment of an agreed sum, the lease becomes a lease-purchase agreement.

Contrary to the comments of then Executive Secretary Drilon, Section 5 of the BOT Law in relation to Presidential
Decree No. 1594 allows the negotiated award of government infrastructure projects.

Indeed, where there is a lack of qualified bidders or contractors, the award of government infrastructure contracts
may be made by negotiation. Presidential Decree No. 1594 is the general law on government infrastructure
contracts while the BOT Law governs particular arrangements or schemes aimed at encouraging private sector
participation in government infrastructure projects. The two laws are not inconsistent with each other but are in
pari materia and should be read together accordingly.

Petitioners’ claim that the BLT scheme and direct negotiation of contracts are not contemplated by the BOT Law
has now been rendered moot and academic by R.A. No. 7718. Section 3 of this law authorizes all government
infrastructure agencies, government-owned and controlled corporations and local government units to enter into
contract with any duly prequalified proponent for the financing, construction, operation and maintenance of any
financially viable infrastructure or development facility through a BOT, BT, BLT, BOO (Build-own-and-
operate), BTO (Build-transfer-and-operate), CAO (Contract-add-operate), DOT (Develop-operate-andtransfer),
ROT (Rehabilitate-operate-and-transfer), and ROO (Rehabilitate-own-operate) (R.A. No. 7718, Sec. 2 [b-j]).

Republic Act No. 7718 is a curative statute. It is intended to provide financial incentives and “a climate of
minimum government regulations and procedures and specific government undertakings in support of the private
sector” (Sec. 1). A curative statute makes valid that which before enactment of the statute was invalid. Thus,
whatever doubts and alleged procedural lapses private respondent and DOTC may have engendered and
committed in entering into the questioned contracts, these have now been cured by R.A. No. 7718 (cf.
Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 96 SCRA 342 [1980]; Santos v. Duata, 14 SCRA 1041
[1965]; Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43 [1922]).

Government officials are presumed to perform their functions with regularity and strong evidence is necessary to
rebut this presumption. Petitioners have not presented evidence on the reasonable rentals to be paid by the parties
to each other. The matter of valuation is an esoteric field which is better left to the experts and which this Court
is not eager to undertake.

Definitely, the agreements in question have been entered into by DOTC in the exercise of its governmental
function. DOTC is the primary policy, planning, programming, regulating and administrative entity of the
Executive branch of government in the promotion, development and regulation of dependable and coordinated
networks of transportation and communications systems as well as in the fast, safe, efficient and reliable postal,
transportation and communications services (Administrative Code of 1987, Book IV, Title XV, Sec. 2). It is the
Executive department, DOTC in particular, that has the power, authority and technical expertise to determine
whether or not a specific transportation or communications project is necessary, viable and beneficial to the
people. The discretion to award a contract is vested in the government agencies entrusted with that function
(Bureau Veritas v. Office of the President, 205 SCRA 705 [1992]).

Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v s. Commission on Elections

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Our nation’s political and economic future virtually hangs in the balance, pending the outcome of the 2004
elections. Hence, there can be no serious doubt that the subject matter of this case is “a matter of public concern
and imbued with public interest”; in other words, it is of “paramount public interest” and “transcendental
importance.” This fact alone would justify relaxing the rule on legal standing, following the liberal policy of this
Court whenever a case involves “an issue of overarching significance to our society.” Petitioners’ legal standing
should therefore be recognized and upheld.

The instances when the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies may be disregarded, as follows: “(1) when
there is a violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the
administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on
the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is
a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the
latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would
amount to a nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10)
when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.”

This Court in Kilosbayan v. Guingona defined joint venture as “an association of persons or companies jointly
undertaking some commercial enterprise; generally, all contribute assets and share risks. It requires a community
of interest in the performance of the subject matter, a right to direct and govern the policy in connection therewith,
and [a] duty, which may be altered by agreement to share both in profit and losses.”

The essence of public bidding is, after all, an opportunity’ for fair competition, and a fair basis for the precise
comparison of bids. In common parlance, public bidding aims to “level the playing field.” That means each bidder
must bid under the same conditions; and be subject to the same guidelines, requirements and limitations, so that
the best offer or lowest bid may be determined, all other things being equal.

Jumamil vs. Café

The petition for declaratory relief challenged the constitutionality of the subject resolutions. There is an unbending
rule that courts will not assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question unless the following requisites are
satisfied: (1) there must be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review; (2) the question before the
Court must be ripe for adjudication; (3) the person challenging the validity of the act must have standing to do
so; (4) the question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity, and (5) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

Legal standing or locus standi is a party’s personal and substantial interest in a case such that he has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act being challenged. It calls for more than just a
generalized grievance. The term “interest” means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree,
as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Unless a person’s
constitutional rights are adversely affected by the statute or ordinance, he has no legal standing.

Petitioner brought the petition in his capacity as taxpayer of the Municipality of Panabo, Davao del Norte and not
in his personal capacity. He was questioning the official acts of the public respondents in passing the ordinances
and entering into the lease contracts with private respondents. A taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to
challenge its validity. Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals cited by the
CA does not apply because it involved contracts between two private parties. Parties suing as taxpayers must
specifically prove sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation. The
expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act
constitutes a misapplication of such funds. The resolutions being assailed were appropriations ordinances.
Petitioner alleged that these ordinances were “passed for the business, occupation, enjoyment and benefit of
private respondents” (that is, allegedly for the private benefit of respondents) because even before they were
passed, respondent Mayor Cafe and private respondents had already entered into lease contracts for the
construction and award of the market stalls. Private respondents admitted they deposited P40,000 each with the
municipal treasurer, which amounts were made available to the municipality during the construction of the stalls.
The deposits, however, were needed to ensure the speedy completion of the stalls after the public market was
gutted by a series of fires. Thus, the award of the stalls was necessarily limited only to those who advanced their
personal funds for their construction.

We note that the foregoing was a disputed fact which the courts below did not resolve because the case was
dismissed on the basis of petitioner’s lack of legal standing. Nevertheless, petitioner failed to prove the subject
ordinances and agreements to be discriminatory. Considering that he was asking this Court to nullify the acts of
the local political department of Panabo, Davao del Norte, he should have clearly established that such ordinances

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operated unfairly against those who were not notified and who were thus not given the opportunity to make their
deposits. His unsubstantiated allegation that the public was not notified did not suffice. Furthermore, there was
the timehonored presumption of regularity of official duty, absent any showing to the contrary. And this is not to
mention that: The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts
of the political departments are valid, absent a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to
sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers. This means that the measure had first
been carefully studied by the legislative and executive departments and found to be in accord with the Constitution
before it was finally enacted and approved.

Adverting to the first issue, we observe that petitioner was the one who wanted the parties to await the decision
of the Supreme Court in UDK Case No. 9948 since the facts and issues in that case were similar to this. Petitioner,
having expressly agreed to be bound by our decision in the aforementioned case, should be reined in by the
dismissal order we issued, now final and executory. In addition to the fact that nothing prohibits parties from
committing to be bound by the results of another case, courts may take judicial notice of a judgment in another
case as long as the parties give their consent or do not object. As opined by Justice Edgardo L. Paras: A court will
take judicial notice of its own acts and records in the same case, of facts established in prior proceedings in the
same case, of the authenticity of its own records of another case between the same parties, of the files of related
cases in the same court, and of public records on file in the same court. In addition, judicial notice will be taken
of the record, pleadings or judgment of a case in another court between the same parties or involving one of the
same parties, as well as of the record of another case between different parties in the same court.

We do not agree that petitioner should be held liable for damages. It is not sound public policy to put a premium
on the right to litigate where such right is exercised in good faith, albeit erroneously. The alleged bad faith of
petitioner was never established. The special circumstances in Article 2208 of the Civil Code justifying the award
of attorney’s fees are not present in this case.
Associational
Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only
if the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a
personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review
is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.

“Legal standing” or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The
term “interest” means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere
interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. The gist of the question of standing is whether a
party alleges “such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.”

The IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution.
Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere
invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not
sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups
and the whole citizenry. Based on the standards above-stated; the IBP has failed to present a specific and
substantial interest in the resolution of the case. Its fundamental purpose which, under Section 2, Rule 139-A of
the Rules of Court, is to elevate the standards of the law profession and to improve the administration of justice
is alien to, and cannot be affected by the deployment of the Marines.

It should also be noted that the interest of the National President of the IBP who signed the petition, is his alone,
absent a formal board resolution authorizing him to file the present action. To be sure, members of the BAR,
those in the judiciary included, have varying opinions on the issue. Moreover, the IBP, assuming that it has duly
authorized the National President to file the petition, has not shown any specific injury which it has suffered or
may suffer by virtue of the questioned governmental act. Indeed, none of its members, whom the IBP purportedly
represents, has sustained any form of injury as a result of the operation of the joint visibility patrols. Neither is it
alleged that any of its members has been arrested or that their civil liberties have been violated by the deployment
of the Marines. What the IBP projects as injurious is the supposed “militarization” of law enforcement which
might threaten Philippine democratic institutions and may cause more harm than good in the long run. Not only
is the presumed “injury” not personal in character, it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to
satisfy the requirement of standing.

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Since petitioner has not successfully established a direct and personal injury as a consequence of the questioned
act, it does not possess the personality to assail the validity of the deployment of the Marines. This Court, however,
does not categorically rule that the IBP has absolutely no standing to raise constitutional issues now or in the
future. The IBP must, by way of allegations and proof, satisfy this Court that it has sufficient stake to obtain
judicial resolution of the controversy.

Having stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized that this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit
which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved. In not a few cases,
the Court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an
issue of transcendental significance to the people. Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to
the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. In this case, a reading of the petition shows that
the IBP has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness,
novelty and weight as precedents. Moreover, because peace and order are under constant threat and lawless
violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal
controversy raised in the petition almost certainly will not go away. It will stare us in the face again. It, therefore,
behooves the Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issue now, rather than later.

As framed by the parties, the underlying issues are the scope of presidential powers and limits, and the extent of
judicial review. But, while this Court gives considerable weight to the parties’ formulation of the issues, the
resolution of the controversy may warrant a creative approach that goes beyond the narrow confines of the issues
raised. Thus, while the parties are in agreement that the power exercised by the President is the power to call out
the armed forces, the Court is of the view that the power involved may be no more than the maintenance of peace
and order and promotion of the general welfare. For one, the realities on the ground do not show that there exist
a state of warfare, widespread civil unrest or anarchy. Secondly, the full brunt of the military is not brought upon
the citizenry, a point discussed in the latter part of this decision.

—As a general proposition, a controversy is justiciable if it refers to a matter which is appropriate for court review.
It pertains to issues which are inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by law. Nevertheless,
the Court does not automatically assume jurisdiction over actual constitutional cases brought before it even in
instances that are ripe for resolution. One class of cases wherein the Court hesitates to rule on are “political
questions.” The reason is that political questions are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the
legality, of a particular act or measure being assailed. Moreover, the political question being a function of the
separation of powers, the courts will not normally interfere with the workings of another co-equal branch unless
the case shows a clear need for the courts to step in to uphold the law and the Constitution.

The 1987 Constitution expands the concept of judicial review by providing that “(T)he Judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” Under this definition, the
Court cannot agree with the Solicitor General that the issue involved is a political question beyond the jurisdiction
of this Court to review. When the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of
whether the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met or the limitations respected, is justiciable—the
problem being one of legality or validity, not its wisdom. Moreover, the jurisdiction to delimit constitutional
boundaries has been given to this Court. When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the
determination as to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned.

By grave abuse of discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act
at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility. Under this definition, a court is without power to directly decide matters over which full
discretionary authority has been delegated. But while this Court has no power to substitute its judgment for that
of Congress or of the President, it may look into the question of whether such exercise has been made in grave
abuse of discretion. A showing that plenary power is granted either department of government, may not be an
obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or abuse thereof may give rise to justiciable controversy.

When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he
necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers
and from the text of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the President’s
wisdom or substitute its own. However, this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was
exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse
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of discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the
necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision
is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence
to support the assertion that there exist no justification for calling out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no
evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse was committed because the power to call was exercised in
such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military. In the
performance of this Court’s duty of “purposeful hesitation” before declaring an act of another branch as
unconstitutional, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the
President’s judgment. To doubt is to sustain.
Under the foregoing provisions, Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension and the Court may review
the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the
revocation or review of the President’s action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out
power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the three
powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification. Expressio unius est exclusio
alterius. Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be
extended to other matters. That the intent of the Constitution is exactly what its letter says, i.e., that the power to
call is fully discretionary to the President, is extant in the deliberation of the Constitutional Commission.
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the aforementioned powers highlights the intent to grant the
President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the
lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and
the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil
rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by this Court.
Moreover, under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, in the exercise of the power to suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus or to impose martial law, two conditions must concur: (1) there must be an actual
invasion or rebellion and, (2) public safety must require it. These conditions are not required in the case of the
power to call out the armed forces. The only criterion is that “whenever it becomes necessary,” the President may
call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.” The implication is that the
President is given full discretion and wide latitude in the exercise of the power to call as compared to the two
other powers.
If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted without factual basis, then
this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity of calling
out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters considered for
satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the
absence of textual standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such
judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify,
or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that
there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.
The President has already determined the necessity and factual basis for calling the armed forces. In his
Memorandum, he categorically asserted that, “[V]iolent crimes like bank/store robberies, holdups, kidnappings
and carnappings continue to occur in Metro Manila . . .” We do not doubt the veracity of the President’s
assessment of the situation, especially in the light of present developments. The Court takes judicial notice of the
recent bombings perpetrated by lawless elements in the shopping malls, public utilities, and other public places.
These are among the areas of deployment described in the LOI 2000. Considering all these facts, we hold that the
President has sufficient factual basis to call for military aid in law enforcement and in the exercise of this
constitutional power.
The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the
Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation
of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. The limited participation
of the Marines is evident in the provisions of the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of
the Marines’ authority. It is noteworthy that the local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols
at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP. In fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall leader
of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols. Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or orient
the soldiers on police patrol procedures. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the
Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support
to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme over
civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian
character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an “insidious incursion” of the military in the task of law
enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.

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In this regard, it is not correct to say that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the AFP, by his alleged
involvement in civilian law enforcement, has been virtually appointed to a civilian post in derogation of the
aforecited provision. The real authority in these operations, as stated in the LOI, is lodged with the head of a
civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Such being the case, it does not matter whether the APP
Chief actually participates in the Task Force Tulungan since he does not exercise any authority or control over
the same. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no
appointment to a civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols
does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.
A power regulatory in nature is one which controls or directs. It is proscriptive if it prohibits or condemns and
compulsory if it exerts some coercive force. See US v. Yunis, 681 F.Supp 891 (D.D.C., 1988). See also FOURTH
AMENDMENT AND POSSE COMITATUS ACT RESTRICTIONS ON MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN
CIVIL LAW ENFORCEMENT, 54 George Washington Law Review, pp. 404433 (1986), which discusses the
four divergent standards for assessing acceptable involvement of military personnel in civil law enforcement. See
likewise HONORED IN THE BREECH: PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE THE LAWS WITH
MILITARY FORCE, 83 Yale Law Journal, pp. 130-152, 1973.
Even if the Court were to apply the above rigid standards to the present case to determine whether there is
permissible use of the military in civilian law enforcement, the conclusion is inevitable that no violation of the
civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution is committed. On this point, the Court agrees with the observation
of the Solicitor General: 3. The designation of tasks in Annex A does not constitute the exercise of regulatory,
proscriptive, or compulsory military power. First, the soldiers do not control or direct the operation. This is evident
from Nos. 6, 8(k) and 9(a) of Annex A. These soldiers, second, also have no power to prohibit or condemn. In
No. 9(d) of Annex A, all arrested persons are brought to the nearest police stations for proper disposition. And
last, these soldiers apply no coercive force. The materials or equipment issued to them, as shown in No. 8(c) of
Annex A, are all low impact and defensive in character. The conclusion is that there being no exercise of
regulatory, proscriptive or compulsory military power, the deployment of a handful of Philippine Marines
constitutes no impermissible use of military power for civilian law enforcement.
It appears that the present petition is anchored on fear that once the armed forces are deployed, the military will
gain ascendancy, and thus place in peril our cherished liberties. Such apprehensions, however, are unfounded.
The power to call the armed forces is just that—calling out the armed forces. Unless, petitioner IBP can show,
which it has not, that in the deployment of the Marines, the President has violated the fundamental law, exceeded
his authority or jeopardized the civil liberties of the people, this Court is not inclined to overrule the President’s
determination of the factual basis for the calling of the Marines to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
Since the institution of the joint visibility patrol in January, 2000, not a single citizen has complained that his
political or civil rights have been violated as a result of the deployment of the Marines. It was precisely to
safeguard peace, tranquility and the civil liberties of the people that the joint visibility patrol was conceived.
Freedom and democracy will be in full bloom only when people feel secure in their homes and in the streets, not
when the shadows of violence and anarchy constantly lurk in their midst.
Voters
Legislative
Governmental
People vs. Vera.
Probation implies guilt by final judgment. While a probation court hearing a probation case may look into the
circumstances attending the commission of the offense, this does not authorize it to reverse the findings and
conclusions of the Supreme Court, either directly or indirectly, especially where from its own admission reliance
was merely had on the printed briefs, averments, and pleadings of the parties. As observed in Shioji vs. Harvey
([1922], 43 Phil., 333, 337), and reiterated in subsequent cases," if each and every Court of First Instance could
enjoy the privilege of overruling decisions of the Supreme Court, there would be no end to litigation, and judicial
chaos would result." A becoming modesty of inferior courts demands conscious realization of the position that
they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation.
In vetoing a bill, the President may express the reasons which he may deem proper, but his reasons are not binding
upon the Supreme Court in the determination of actual controversies submitted to it for determination. Whether
or not the Executive should express or in any manner insinuate his opinion on a matter encompassed within his
constitutional power of veto but which happens- to be at the same time pending determination before the Supreme
Court is a question of propriety for him exclusively to decide or determine. Whatever opinion is expressed by
him under these circumstances, however, cannot sway the judgment of the court one way or another and prevent
it from taking what in its opinion is the proper course of action to take in a given case.

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If it is ever necessary to make any vehement affirmance during this formative period of our political history, it is
that the judiciary is independent of the Executive no less than of the Legislative department of our government—
independent in the performance of its functions, undeterred by any consideration, free from politics, indifferent
to popularity, and unafraid of criticism in the accomplishment of its sworn duty as it sees it and understands it.
The constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is
properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case; i. e., the issue
of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented.
The question of the constitutionality of an Act of the legislature is frequently raised in ordinary actions.
Nevertheless, resort may be made to extraordinary legal remedies, particularly where the remedies in the ordinary
course of law, even if available, are not plain, speedy and adequate. Thus, in Cu Unjieng vs. Patstone ([1922], 42
Phil., 818), the Supreme Court held that the question of the constitutionality of a statute may be raised by the
petitioner in mandamus proceedings (see also 12 C. }., p. 783); and in Government of the Philippine Islands vs.
Springer ([1927], 50 Phil., 259, affirmed in Springer vs. Government of the Philippine Islands [1928], 277 U. S.,
189; 72 Law. ed., 845), this court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional in an" action of., quo warranto
brought in the name of- the Government of the Philippines. It has also been. held "that the constitutionality of a
statute may be questioned in habeas corpus proceedings (12 C. 3., p. 783; Bailey on Habeas Corpus, Vol. I, pp.
97, 117), although there are authorities to the contrary; on an application for injunction to restrain action under
the challenged statute (mandatory, see Cruz vs. Youngberg [1931], 56 Phil., 234); and even on an application for
preliminary injunction where the determination of the constitutional question is necessary to a decision of the
case. (12 C. J., p. 783.) The same may be said as regards prohibition and certiorari. (Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad
[1925], 47 Phil., 385; [1926], 271 U. S., 500; 70 Law. ed., 1059; Bell vs. First Judicial District Court [1905], 28
Nev., 280; 81 Pac., 875; 113 A. S. R., 854; 6 Ann. Cas., 982; 1 L, R. A. [N. S.], 843, and cases cited.)
The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction and directed
to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction with which it
is not legally vested. The general rule, although there is a conflict in the cases, is that the writ of prohibition will
not lie where the inferior court has jurisdiction independent of the statute the constitutionality of which is
questioned, because in such cases the inferior court having jurisdiction may itself determine the constitutionality
of the statute, and its decision may be subject to review, and consequently the complainant in such cases ordinarily
has adequate remedy by appeal without resort to the writ of prohibition. But where the inferior court or tribunal
derives its jurisdiction exclusively from an unconstitutional statute, it may be prevented by the writ of prohibition
from enforcing that statute.
A Court of First Instance sitting in probation proceedings is a court of limited jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction in such
proceedings is conferred exclusively by Act No. 4221 of the Philippine Legislature.
As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised
by the pleadings, ordinarily it may be raised at the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered
on appeal. But the general rule admits of exceptions. Courts, in the exercise of sound discretion, may determine
the time when a question affecting the constitutionality of a statute should be presented. Thus, in. criminal cases,
although there is a very sharp conflict of authorities, it is said that the question may be raised for the first time at
any stage of the proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal. Even in civil cases, it has been held that it is
the duty of a court to pass on the constitutional question, though raised for the first time on appeal, if it appears
that a determination of the question is necessary to a decision of the case. And it has been held that a constitutional
question will be considered by an appellate court at any time, where it involves the jurisdiction of the court below.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act
No. 4221 really violates the Constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is
brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal
expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an
invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that 'the state can challenge the validity of its own laws.
The mere fact that. the Probation Act has been repeatedly relied upon in the past and all that time has not been
attacked as unconstitutional by the Fiscal of Manila but, on the contrary, has been impliedly regarded by him as
constitutional, is no reason for considering the People of the Philippines estopped from now assailing its validity.
For courts will pass upon a constitutional question only when presented before it in bona fide cases for
determination, and the fact that the question has not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow
it to be raised later. The fiscal and all others are justified in relying upon the statute and treating it as valid until it
is held void by the courts in proper cases.
While the court will meet the question with firmness, where its decision is indispensable, it is the part of wisdom,
and a just respect for the legislature, renders it proper, to waive it, if the case in which it arises, can be decided on

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other points. (Ex parte Randolph [1833], 20 F. Cas. No 11,558; 2 Brock., 447, Vide, also Hoover vs. Wood [1857],
9 Ind., 286, 287.) It has been held that the determination of a constitutional question is necessary whenever it is
essential to the decision of the case, as where the right of a party is founded solely on a statute the validity of
which is attacked. (12 C. J., p. 782.)
The Supreme Court will take cognizance of the fact that the Probation Act is a new addition to our statute books
and its validity has never before been passed upon by the courts; that many persons accused and convicted of
crime in the City of Manila have applied for probation; that some of them are already on probation; that more
people will likely take advantage of the Probation Act in the future; and that the respondent M. C. U, has been at
large for a period of about four years since his first conviction. All await the decision of this court on the
constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the importance which the instant case has assumed and to prevent
muItiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policy demand that the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 be now
resolved.
Under a doctrine peculiarly American, it is the office and duty of the judiciary to enforce the Constitution. The
Supreme .Court, by clear implication from the provisions of section 2, subsection 1, and section 10, of Article
VIII of the Constitution, may declare an act of the National Legislature invalid because in conflict with the
fundamental law. It will not shirk from its sworn duty to enforce the Constitution. And, in clear cases, it will not
hesitate to give effect to- the supreme law by setting aside a statute in conflict therewith. This is of the essence of
judicial duty.
All reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. An act of the legislature
approved by the executive, is presumed to be within constitutional limitations. The responsibility of upholding
the Constitution rests not on the courts alone but on the legislature as well. "The question of the validity of every
statute is first determined by the legislative department of the government itself." (U. S. vs. Ten Yu [1912], 24
Phil., 1, 10; Case vs. Board of Health and Heiser [1913], 24 Phil., 250, 276; U. S. vs. Joson [1913], 26 Phil., 1.)
And a statute finally comes before the courts sustained by the sanction of the executive. The members of the
Legislature and the Chief Executive have taken an oath to support the Constitution and it must be presumed that
they have been true to this oath and that in enacting and sanctioning a particular law they did not intend to violate
the Constitution. Then, there is that peculiar political philosophy which bids the judiciary to reflect the wisdom
of the people as expressed through an elective Legislature and an elective Chief Executive. It follows that the
courts will not set aside a law as violative of the Constitution except in clear cases.
Section 21 of the Jones Law, in force at the time of the approval of Act No. 4221, vests in the Governor-Gerieral
of the Philippines "the exclusive power to grant pardons and reprieves and remit fines and forfeitures." This power
is now vested in the President of the Philippines. The provisions of the Jones Law and the Constitution of the
Philippines differ in some respects. The adjective "exclusive" found in the Jones Law has been omitted from the
Constitution. Under the Jones Law, as at common law, pardon could be granted any time after the commission of
the offense, either before or after conviction. The Governor-General of the Philippines was thus empowered, like
the President of the United States, to pardon a person before the facts of his case were fully brought to light. The
framers of our Constitution thought this undesirable and, following most of the state constitutions, provided that
the pardoning power can only be exercised "after conviction". So too, under the new Constitution, the pardoning
power does not extend to "cases of impeachment". This is also the rule generally followed in the United States.
The rule in England is different. There, a royal pardon can not be pleaded in bar of an impeachment; "but," says
Blackstone, "after the impeachment has been solemnly heard and determined, it is not understood that the king's
royal grace is further restrained or abridged." The reason for the distinction is obvious. In England, judgment on
impeachment is not confined to mere "removal from office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of
honor, trust, or profit under the Government" but extends to the whole punishment attached by law to the offense
committed. The House of Lords, on a conviction may, by its sentence, inflict capital punishment, perpetual
banishment, fine or imprisonment, depending upon the gravity of the offense committed, together with removal
from office and incapacity to hold office.
specific mention of "commutation" and of the power of the executive to impose, in the pardons he may grant,
such conditions, restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper. Amnesty may be granted by the President
under the Constitution but only with the concurrence of the National Assembly.
The benign prerogative of mercy reposed in the Executive cannot be taken away nor fettered by any legislative
restrictions, nor can like power be given by the legislature to any other officer or authority. The coordinate
departments of government have nothing to do with the pardoning power, since no person properly belonging to
one, of the departments can exercise any powers appertaining to either of the others except in cases expressly
provided for by the constitution. (20 R. C. L., pp. 540, 541.) Where the pardoning power is conferred on the
executive without express or implied limitations, the grant is exclusive, and the legislature can neither exercise
such power itself nor delegate it elsewhere, nor interfere with or control the proper exercise thereof (12 C. J., pp.
838, 839).

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The Philippine Legislature, like the Congress of the United States, may legally enact a probation law under its
broad power to fix the punishment of any and all penal offenses. The legislative power to set punishment for
crime is very broad, and in the exercise of this power the legislature may confer on trial judges, if it sees fit, the
largest discretion as to the sentence to be imposed, as to the beginning and end of the punishment, and whether it
should be certain, or indeterminate, or conditional. Indeed, the Philippine Legislature has defined all crimes and
fixed the penalties for their violation. Invariably, the legislature has demonstrated the desire to vest in the courts—
particularly the trial courts—large discretion in imposing- the penalties which the law prescribes in particular
cases. It is believed that justice can best be served by vesting this power in the courts, they being in a position to
best determine the penalties which an individual convict, peculiarly circumstanced, should suffer.
Probation and pardon are not coterminous; nor are they the same. They are actually distinct and different from
each other, both in origin and in nature. In probation, the probationer is in no true sense, as in pardon, a free man.
He is not finally and completely exonerated. He is not exempt from the entire punishment which the law inflicts.
Under the Probation Act, the probationer's case is not terminated by the mere fact that he is placed on probation.
The probationer, during the period of probation, remains in legal custody— subject to the control of the probation
officer and of the court, he may be rearrested upon the non-fulfillment of the conditions of probation and, when
rearrested, may be committed to prison to serve the sentence originally imposed upon him. Probation should also
be distinguished from reprieve and from commutation of the sentence.
The Probation Act does not conflict with the pardoning power of the Executive. The pardoning power, in respect
to those serving their probationary sentences, remains as full and complete as if the Probation Law had never been
enacted. The President may yet pardon the probationer and thus place it beyond the power of the court to order
his rearrest and imprisonment.
d. Constitutionality is the very lis mota of the case
Santos III vs. Northwest Orient Airlines
It is well-settled that courts will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the
essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case
or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination; the constitutional question
must have been opportunely raised by the proper party; and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary
to the decision of the case itself.
But the more important consideration is that the treaty has not been rejected by the Philippine government. The
doctrine of rebus sic stantibus does not operate automatically to render the treaty inoperative. There is a necessity
for a formal act of rejection, usually made by the head of State, with a statement of the reasons why compliance
with the treaty is no longer required.
Obviously, the constitutional guaranty of access to courts refers only to courts with appropriate jurisdiction as
defined by law. It does not mean that a person can go to any court for redress of his grievances regardless of the
nature or value of his claim. If the petitioner is barred from filing his complaint before our courts, it is because
they are not vested with the appropriate jurisdiction under the Warsaw Convention, which is part of the law of
our land.
—A number of reasons tends to support the characterization of Article 28(1) as a jurisdiction and not a venue
provision. First, the wording of Article 32, which indicates the places where the action for damages “must” be
brought, underscores the mandatory nature of Article 28(1). Second, this characterization is consistent with one
of the objectives of the Convention, which is to “regulate in a uniform manner the conditions of international
transportation by air.” Third, the Convention does not contain any provision prescribing rules of jurisdiction other
than Article 28(1), which means that the phrase “rules as to jurisdiction” used in Article 32 must refer only to
Article 28(1). In fact, the last sentence of Article 32 specifically deals with the exclusive enumeration in Article
28(1) as “jurisdictions,” which, as such cannot be left to the will of the parties regardless of the time when the
damage occurred.
The place of destination, within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention, is determined by the terms of the contract
of carriage or, specifically in this case, the ticket between the passenger and the carrier. Examination of the
petitioner’s ticket shows that his ultimate destination is San Francisco. Although the date of the return flight was
left open, the contract of carriage between the parties indicates that NOA was bound to transport the petitioner to
San Francisco from Manila. Manila should therefore be considered merely an agreed stopping place and not the
destination.
The contract is a single undivided operation, beginning with the place of departure and ending with the ultimate
destination. The use of the singular in this expression indicates the understanding of the parties to the Convention
that every contract of carriage has one place of departure and one place of destination. An intermediate place
where the carriage may be broken is not regarded as a “place of destination.”

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In arriving at an interpretation of a treaty whose sole official language is French, are we bound to apply French
law? xxx We think this question and the underlying choice of law issue warrant some discussion. xxx We do not
think this statement can be regarded as a conclusion that internal French law is to be “applied” in the choice of
law sense, to determine the meaning and scope of the Convention’s terms. Of course, French legal usage must be
considered in arriving at an accurate English translation of the French. But when an accurate English translation
is made and agreed upon, as here, the inquiry into meaning does not then revert to a quest for a past or present
French law to be “applied” for revelation of the proper scope of the terms. It does not follow from the fact that
the treaty is written in French that in interpreting it, we are forever chained to French law, either as it existed
when the treaty was written or in its present state of development. There is no suggestion in the treaty that French
law was intended to govern the meaning of Warsaw’s terms, nor have we found any indication to this effect in its
legislative history or from our study of its application and interpretation by other courts. Indeed, analysis of the
cases indicates that the courts, in interpreting and applying the Warsaw Convention, have not considered
themselves bound to apply French law simply because the Convention is written in French.
Presumably, the reason for the use of the phrase “however founded,” is two-fold: to accommodate all of the
multifarious bases on which a claim might be founded in different countries, whether under code law or common
law, whether under contract or tort, etc.; and to include all bases on which a claim seeking relief for an injury
might be founded in any one country. In other words, if the injury occurs as described in Article 17, any relief
available is subject to the conditions and limitations established by the Warsaw System, regardless of the
particular cause of action which forms the basis on which a plaintiff could seek relief.
The private respondent correctly contends that the allegation of willful misconduct resulting in a tort is insufficient
to exclude the case from the comprehension of the Warsaw Convention.
e. Effect of Declaration of Unconstitutionality of a Law
Norton v. Shelby County
This Court follows the decisions of the highest court of a state in construing the constitution and laws of the state
unless they conflict with or impair the efficacy of some principle of the federal Constitution or of a federal statute
or a rule of commercial or general law.
The decisions of state courts on questions relating to the existence of its subordinate tribunals and the eligibility
and election or appointment of their officers and the passage of its laws are conclusive upon federal courts.
Following the decision of the highest court of the Tennessee in Pope v. Phifer, 3 Heiskell 691, and other cases,
this Court holds that the Board of Commissioners of Shelby County, organized under the Act of March 9, 1867,
had no lawful existence; that it was an unauthorized and illegal body; that its members were usurpers of the
functions and powers of the justices of peace of the county; that their action in holding a county court was void,
and that their acts in subscribing to the stock of the Mississippi River Railroad Company and issuing bonds in
payment therefor were void.
While acts of a de facto incumbent of an office lawfully created by law and existing are often held to be binding
from reasons of public policy, the acts of a person assuming to fill and perform the duties of an office which does
not exist de jure can have no validity whatever in law.
An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates
no office; it is in legal contemplation as inoperative as though it had never been passed.
The action of a minority of the justices of the peace of the County Court of Shelby County, Tennessee, prior to
May 5, 1870, did not operate as a ratification by the county court of the previously invalid subscription of the
county to stock in the Mississippi River Railroad Company, and on and after that day, on which the new
Constitution of Tennessee took effect, no ratification could be made without previous assent of three-fourths of
the voters of the county.
De Agbayani vs. Philippine National Bank
The orthodox view is that an unconstitutional act, for that matter an executive order or a municipal ordinance
likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source of any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any
official act taken under it. Its repugnancy to the fundamental law once judicially declared results in its being to
all intents and purposes a mere scrap of paper.
The orthodox view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. It may not however be sufficiently
realistic. It does not admit of doubt, that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive
act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary, man appropriate
case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have
changed their positions. What could be more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has
been done while such legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is
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now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is
merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say
on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can
exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of
its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.
The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination (of unconstitutionality), is an operative fact and
may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects,—
with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official.
Such an approach all the more commends itself whenever police power legislation intended to promote public
welfare but adversely affecting property rights is involved. While subject to be assailed on due process, equal
protection and non-impairment grounds, all that is required to avoid the corrosion of invalidity is that the rational
basis or reasonableness test is satisfied. The legislature on the whole is not likely to allow an enactment suffering,
to paraphrase Cardozo, from the infirmity of outrunning the bounds of reason and resulting in sheer oppression.
It may be of course that if challenged, an adverse judgment could be the result, as its running counter to the
Constitution could still be shown. In the meanwhile though, in the normal course of things, it has been acted upon
by the public and accepted as valid. To ignore such a fact would indeed be the fruitful parent of injustice.
Moreover, as its constitutionality is conditioned on its being fair or reasonable, which in turn is dependent on the
actual situation, never static but subject to change, a measure valid when enacted may subsequently, due to altered
circumstances, be stricken down.
At the time of the issuance of Executive Order No. 32 in 1945 and of the passage of R.A. 342 in 1948, there was
a factual justification for the moratorium. The Philippines was confronted with an emergency of impressive
magnitude at the time of her liberation from the Japanese military forces in 1945. Business was at a standstill.
Her economy lay prostrate. Measures, radical measures, were then devised to tide her over until some semblance
of normalcy could be restored and an improvement in her economy noted. No wonder then that the suspension of
enforcement of payment of the obligations then existing was declared first by executive order and then by
legislation. The Supreme Court was right therefore in rejecting the contention that on its face, the Moratorium
Law was unconstitutional, amounting as it did to the impairment of the obligation of contracts. Time passed
however, and conditions did change.
When the legislation was before this Court in 1953, the question before it was its satisfying the rational basis test,
not as of the time of its enactment, but as of such date. Clearly, if then it were found unreasonable, the right to
non-impairment of contractual obligations must prevail over the assertion of community power to remedy an
existing evil. The Supreme Court was convinced that such indeed was the case. As of the time of adjudication, it
was apparent that Republic Act No. 342 could not survive the test of validity. Executive Order No. 32 should
likewise be nullified. That before the decision they were not constitutionally infirm was admitted expressly. There
is all the more reason then to yield assent to the now prevailing principle that the existence of a statute or executive
order prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal consequences are attached.
Precisely though because of the judicial recognition that moratorium was a valid governmental response to the
plight of the debtors who were war sufferers, this Court has made clear its view in a series of cases impressive in
their number and unanimity that during the eight-year period that Executive Order No. 32 and Republic Act No.
342 were in force, prescription did not run. So it has been held from Day v. Court of First Instance, 94 Phil. 816,
decided in 1954, to Republic v. Hernaez, L-24137, Jan. 30, 1970. Hence, the error of the lower court in sustaining
plaintiff’s suit is manifest. The prescriptive period was tolled, from March 10, 1945, the effectivity of Executive
Order No. 32, to May 18, 1953, when the decision of Rutter v. Esteban was promulgated, covering eight years,
two montns and eight days.
B. THE JUDICIARY
1. Judicial Power
Lopez vs. Roxas, et al.
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution vests in the judicial branch of the government, not merely some
specified or limited judicial power, but the entirety or all of said power, except, only, so much as the Constitution
confers upon some other agency, such as the power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the Senate and those of the House of Representatives, which is vested by the
fundamental law solely in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal, respectively (Article
VI, Section 11, of the Constitution).
Republic Act No. 1793, creating the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, has the effect of giving a defeated candidate
the legal right to contest judicially the election of the Presidentelect or Vice-President-elect and to demand a
recount of the votes cast for the office involved in the litigation, as well as to secure a judgment declaring that he,
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not the candidate proclaimed elected by Congress, is the one elected President or VicePresident, as the case may
be, and that, as such, he is entitled to assume the duties attached to said office.
By providing that the Presidential Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of the Chief Justice and the other ten
Members of the Supreme Court, Republic Act No. 1793 has conferred upon such Court an additional original
jurisdiction of an exclusive character.
Republic Act No. 1793 has not created a new or separate court. It has merely conferred upon the Supreme Court
the functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. The Presidential Electoral Tribunal is not inferior to the
Supreme Court, since it is the same Court, although the functions peculiar to said Tribunal are more limited in
scope than those of the Supreme Court in the exercise of its. ordinary functions. The result of the enactment of
Republic Act No. 1793 may be likened to the fact that Courts of First Instance perform the f unctions of such
ordinary Courts of First Instance, those of courts of land registration, those of probate courts, and those of courts
of juvenile and domestic relations. It is, also, comparable to the situation obtaining when the municipal court of
a provincial capital exercises its authority, pursuant to law, over a limited number of cases which were previously
within the exclusive jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance. In all of these instances, the court (Court of First
Instance or municipal court) is only one, although the functions may be distinct and, even, separate.
The power to be the judge of contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of any public officer is
essentially judicial. As such —under the very principle of separation of powers—it belongs exclusively to the
udicial department, except only insofar as the Constitution provides otherwise. This is precisely the reason why
said organic law ordains that the Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members (Article VI, Section 11, of the Constitution). In other words, the purpose of this provision was to exclude
the power to decide such contests relating to Members of Congress—which by nature is judicial— from the
operation of the general grant of judicial power to the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be
established by law.
The power of Congress to declare who, among the candidates for President andor VicePresident, has obtained the
largest number of votes, is entirely different in nature from and not inconsistent with the jurisdiction vested in the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal by Republic Act No. 1793. Congress merely acts as a national board of canvassers,
charged with the ministerial and executive duty to make said declaration, on the basis of the election returns only
certified by provincial and city boards of canvassers. (Article VII, Section 2, Constitution of the Philippines.)
Upon the other hand, the Presidential Electoral Tribunal has the udicial power to determine whether or not said
duly certified election returns have been irregularly made or tampered with, or reflect the true results of the
elections in the areas covered by each, and, if not, to recount the ballots cast, and, pass upon the validity of each
ballot or determine whether the same shall be counted, and, in the affirmative, in whose favor, which Congress
has no power to do.
The authority of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal to determine whether or not the protestant has a better right
than the President andor VicePresident to be declared elected by Congress would not abridge the constitutional
tenure. If the evidence introduced in the election protest shows that the person really elected President or Vice-
President is the protestant, not the person declared elected by Congress, then the latter had legally no constitutional
tenure whatsoever, and, hence, he can claim no abridgment thereof.
In imposing upon the Supreme .Court the additional duty of performing the functions of a Presidential Electoral
Tribunal, Congress has not, through Republic Act No. 1793, encroached upon the appointing power of the
Executive. The imposition of new duties constitutes, neither the creation of an office, nor the appointment of an
officer. Said law is constitutional.
Santiago, Jr. vs. Bautista
Committee on the ratings of students for honor whose actions in proclaiming the honor students of a graduating
class are questioned, is not the “tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions” against which an action
for certiorari may lie under Section 1 of Rule 65.
Before a tribunal, board or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law
that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made,
and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought, in turn, before the tribunal, board or officer clothed with power
and authority to determine what that law is and thereupon adjudicate the respective rights of the contending
parties.
Failure of petitioner to accompany his petition for certiorari with a copy of the judgment or order subject thereof
together with copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto “is fatal to his cause.”
2. Supreme Court
a. Jurisdiction – Art. VIII, Sec. 5 (2) (d)
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 b. Congressional Power over the Jurisdiction of the SC – Art. VII, Sec. 2 par. 1, Art. VI, Sec. 30
c. En Banc vs. Division – Art. VIII, Sec. 4; En banc; (1) Constitutional Questions; (2) conflict of decisions by
its divisions; (3) referred by a division and receipts by en banc; (4) death penalty cases
d. Composition – Art. VIII, Sec. 4
e. Judicial and Bar Council: Appointment and Qualifications – Art. VIII, Sec. 7 (1), 8, 9
f. Salary – Art VIII, Sec. 10; Art. XVIII, Sec. 17
g. Security of Tenure – Art. VIII, Sec. 2, par. 2 and 11
De La Llana vs. Alba
The argument as to the lack of standing of petitioners is easily resolved. As far as Judge de la Llana is concerned,
he certainly falls within the principle set forth in Justice Laurel’s opinion in People v. Vera. Thus: “The
unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement.” The
other petitioners as members of the bar and officers of the court cannot be considered as devoid of “any personal
and substantial interest” on the matter.
The imputation of arbitrariness to the legislative body in the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 to
demonstrate lack of good faith does manifest violence to the facts. Petitioners should have exercised greater care
in informing themselves as to its antecedents. They have laid themselves open to the accusation of reckless
disregard for the truth. On August 7, 1980, a Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization was organized.
This Executive Order was later amended by Executive Order No. 619A, dated September 5 of that year. It clearly
specified the task assigned to it: “1. The Committee shall formulate plans on the reorganization of the Judiciary
which shall be submitted within seventy (70) days from August 7, 1980 to provide the President sufficient options
for the reorganization of the entire Judiciary which shall embrace all lower courts, including the Court of Appeals,
the Courts of First Instance, the City and Municipal Courts, and all Special Courts, but excluding the
Sandiganbayan.” On October 17, 1980, a Report was submitted by such Committee on Judicial Reorganization.
It began with this paragraph: “The Committee on Judicial Reorganization has the honor to submit the following
Report. It expresses at the outset its appreciation for the opportunity accorded it to study ways and means for what
today is a basic and urgent need, nothing less than the restructuring of the judicial system. There are problems,
both grave and pressing, that call for remedial measures. The felt necessities of the time, to borrow a phrase from
Holmes, admit of no delay, for if no step be taken and at the earliest opportunity, it is not too much to say that the
people’s faith in the administration of justice could be shaken. It is imperative that there be a greater efficiency
in the disposition of cases and that litigants, especially those of modest means—much more so, the poorest and
the humblest—can vindicate their rights in an expeditious and inexpensive manner. The rectitude and the fairness
in the way the courts operate must be manifest to all members of the community and particularly to those whose
interests are affected by the exercise of their functions. It is to that task that the Committee addresses itself and
hopes that the plans submitted could be a starting point for an institutional reform in the Philippine judiciary. The
experience of the Supreme Court, which since 1973 has been empowered to supervise inferior courts, from the
Court of Appeals to the municipal courts, has proven that reliance on improved court management as well as
training of judges for more efficient administration does not suffice. Hence, to repeat, there is need for a major
reform in the judicial system. It is worth noting that it will be the first of its kind since the Judiciary Act became
effective on June 16, 1901.”
There is no denying, therefore, the need for “institutional reforms,” characterized in the Report as “both pressing
and urgent.” It is worth noting, likewise, as therein pointed out that a major reorganization of such scope, if it
were to take place, would be the most thorough after four generations. The reference was to the basic Judiciary
Act enacted in June of 1901, amended in a significant way, only twice previous to the Commonwealth.
Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate body
if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. The ponencia of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Cruz v. Primicias, Jr.
reiterated such a doctrine: “We find this point urged by respondents, to be without merit. No removal or separation
of petitioners from the service is here involved, but the validity of the abolition of their offices. This is a legal
issue that is for the Courts to decide. It is well-known rule also that valid abolition of offices is neither removal
or separation of the incumbents. x x x And, of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to
have ceased to hold office. The preliminary question laid at rest, we pass to the merits of the case. As well-settled
as the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle
that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith.”
Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be
no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an
office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict
law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of
inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal
and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary.
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In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of
constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and
that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord
respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If
such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two
departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue.
Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization.
That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the
tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to
preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior
courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The
challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to
those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic
principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a
statute, the former is to be preferred. There is an obvious way to do so. The principle that the Constitution enters
into and forms part of every act to avoid any unconstitutional taint must be applied.
Petitioners would characterize as an undue delegation of legislative power to the President the grant of authority
to fix the compensation and the allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed. A more careful reading
of the challenged Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 ought to have cautioned them against raising such an issue. The
language of the statute is quite clear. The questioned provision reads as follows: “Intermediate Appellate Justices,
Regional Trial Judges, Metropolitan Trial Judges, Municipal Trial Judges, and Municipal Circuit Trial Judges
shall receive such compensation and allowances as may be authorized by the President along the guidelines set
forth in Letter of Implementation No. 93 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1597.” The existence of a standard is thus clear.
It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative
office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The
standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the nondelegation objection is easily met. The standard
though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act
considered as a whole.” The undeniably strong links that bind the executive and legislative departments under the
amended Constitution assure that the framing of policies as well as their implementation can be accomplished
with unity, promptitude, and efficiency.
Certainly, petitioners cannot be heard to argue that the President is insensible to his constitutional duty to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed. In the meanwhile, the existing inferior courts affected continue
functioning as before, “until the completion of the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the President.
Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall
cease to hold office.” There is no ambiguity. The incumbents of the courts thus automatically abolished “shall
cease to hold office.” No fear need be entertained by incumbents whose length of service, quality of performance,
and clean record justify their being named anew, in legal contemplation, without any interruption in the continuity
of their service. It is equally reasonable to assume that from the ranks of lawyers, either in the government service,
private practice, or law professors will come the new appointees. In the event that in certain cases, a little more
time is necessary in the appraisal of whether or not certain incumbents deserve reappointment, it is not from their
standpoint undesirable. Rather, it would be a reaffirmation of the good faith that will characterize its
implementation by the Executive.
In the morning of the hearing of this petition on September 8, 1981, petitioners sought to have the writer of this
opinion and Justices Ramon C. Aquino and Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera disqualified because the first-named
was the Chairman and the other two, members of the Committee on Judicial Reorganization. At the hearing, the
motion was denied. It was made clear then and there that not one of the three members of the Court had any hand
in the framing or in the discussion of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. They were not consulted. They did not testify.
The challenged legislation is entirely the product of the efforts of the legislative body. Their work was limited, as
set forth in the Executive Order, to submitting alternative plans for reorganization. That is more on the nature of
scholarly studies. That they undertook. There could be no possible objection to such activity. Ever since 1973,
this Tribunal has had administrative supervision over inferior courts. It has had the opportunity to inform itself as
to the way judicial business is conducted and how it may be improved. Even prior to the 1973 Constitution, it is
the recollection of the writer of this opinion that either the then Chairman or members of the Committee on Justice
of the then Senate of the Philippines consulted members of the Court in drafting proposed legislation affecting
the judiciary. It is not inappropriate to cite this excerpt from an article in the 1975 Supreme Court Review: “In
the twentieth century the Chief Justice of the United States has played a leading part in judicial reform. A variety
of conditions have been responsible for the development of this role, and foremost among them has been the
creation of explicit institutional structures designed to facilitate reform.” Also: “Thus the Chief Justice cannot

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avoid exposure to and direct involvement in judicial reform at the federal level and, to the extent issues of judicial
federalism arise, at the state level as well.”
That is to recall one of the greatest Common Law jurists, who at the cost of his office made clear that he would
not just blindly obey the King’s order but “will do what becomes [him] as a judge.” So it was pointed out in the
first leading case stressing the independence of the judiciary, Borromeo v. Mariano. The ponencia of Justice
Malcolm identified good judges with “men who have a mastery of the principles of law, who discharge their
duties in accordance with law, who are permitted to perform the duties of the office undeterred by outside
influence, and who are independent and self-respecting human units in a judicial system equal and coordinate to
the other two departments of government.” There is no reason to assume that the failure of this suit to annul Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 would be attended with deleterious consequences to the administration of justice. It does not
follow that the abolition in good faith of the existing inferior courts except the Sandiganbayan and the Court of
Tax Appeals and the creation of new ones will result in a judiciary unable or unwilling to discharge with
independence its solemn duty or one recreant to the trust re-posed in it. Nor should there be any fear that less than
good faith will attend the exercise of the appointing power vested in the Executive. It cannot be denied that an
independent and efficient judiciary is something to the credit of any administration.
h. Removal – Art. VIII, Sec. 11; Art. XI, Sec. 2
Oil and Natural Gas Commission vs. Court of Appeals
The foreign court explicitly declared in its Order that “Award Paper No. 3/B-1 shall be part of the decree.” This
curt ruling of the foreign court may be categorized in the nature of memorandum decisions or those which adopt
by reference the findings of facts and conclusions of law of inferior tribunals. In this jurisdiction, it has been held
that memorandum decisions do not transgress the constitutional requirement in Article VIII, Section 14, on clearly
and distinctly stating the facts and the law on which the decision is based. Nonetheless, it would be more prudent
for a memorandum decision not to be simply limited to the dispositive portion but to state the nature of the case,
summarize the facts with references to the record, and contain a statement of the applicable laws and jurisprudence
and the tribunal’s assessments and conclusions on the case. This practice would better enable a court to make an
appropriate consideration of whether the dispositive portion of the judgment sought to be enforced is consistent
with the findings of facts and conclusions of law made by the tribunal that rendered the decision. This is
particularly true where the decisions, orders, or resolutions came from a court in another jurisdiction. Otherwise,
the enforcement of the decisions would be based on presumptions that laws in other jurisdictions are similar to
our laws, at the expense of justice based on the merits.
Moreover, the constitutional guideline set forth in Article VIII, Section 14 cannot prevail over the fundamental
elements of due process. Matters of procedure even if laid down in the Constitution must be tempered by
substantial justice provided it has factual and legal basis. Considering that the case involves significant properties,
the overriding consideration of a judgment based on the merits should prevail over the primordial interests of
strict enforcement on matters of technicalities. Procedural lapses, absent any collusion or intent to defraud the
parties or mislead the tribunals, should not be allowed to defeat the claim of a party who is not well informed in
the technical aspects of the case but whose interest is merely to enforce what he believes to be his rightful claim.
Air France vs. Carrascoso
A written document speaks a uniform language; the spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to
achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the terms of a ticket is desirable.
Where at the start of the trial, respondent's counsel placed petitioner on guard that he intended to prove that, while
sitting in the plane in Bangkok, the respondent was ousted .by petitioner's manager, who gave his seat to a white
man, and evidence of bad faith in the fulfillment of the contract was presented without objection on the part of
the petitioner, it is therefore unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient averment in the
complaint to justify an award for moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by the evidence.
The New Civil Code gives the court ample power to grant exemplary damages in contracts and quasi-contracts.
The only condition is that defendant should have acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner. The manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legal precept.
The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar judgment for
attorney's fees. The least that can be said is that the courts below felt that it is but just and equitable that attorneys’
fees be given. We do not intend to break tradition that discretion well exercised—as it was here—should not be
disturbed.
Vda. de Espiritu vs. Court of First Instance of Cavite

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Under Section 3 of Rule 41, the period for appeal from any final order or judgment starts only from the date from
notice thereof, which means when it is duly served. Section 7 of Rule 13 very explicitly enjoins that "final orders
or judgment cannot be served by ordinary mail."
It is contended that because copy of respondents' motion of January 16, 1968 for the return of their title, which
included allegations attesting to the issuance of the order of dismissal, appears to have been "furnished" counsel
for petitioner on the same date, petitioner must be deemed to have been on notice of said order since then. To
start with, it is not very clear that petitioner's counsel was in fact served with such 'copy; in the second place and
worse, in the light of the rulings just mentioned prescribing strict compliance with the requirements of service,
such indirect way of imparting knowledge of the order cannot serve as a mode of service. Moreover, it is to be
noted that significantly, there seems to have been no appearance for petitioner when the motion was heard on the
day the court granted the same, hence, there is no affirmative act of petitioner or her counsel upon which an
inference of possible waiver may be safely drawn.
The Supreme Court has already ruled on several occasions, since as early as De la Cruz vs. Blanco, 73 Phil. 596
that mandamus to compel approval and certification of an appeal, even if otherwise well grounded, procedurally
speaking, has to be denied where it is evident that there is no merit in the appeal itself, and "it would serve no
useful purpose to reinstate" the same.
—The whole statute of limitations must be deemed supplanted and replaced by Chapter 3, Title V, Book III of
the Civil Code, which in itself is a complete and comprehensive body of rules on prescription intended to cover
all conceivable situations. We cannot see any logic in thinking otherwise, having in mind Articles 2270 and 2258
of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Differently from the Code of Civil Procedure, the Civil Code does not consider the action by the vendee of real
property to compel execution of a deed of conveyance as imprescriptible. In fact, under Article 1143, only the
following rights "are not extinguished by prescription: (1) to demand a right of way, regulated in Article 649 and
(2) to bring an action to abate a public or private nuisance/' which are actions involving public policy. Nor is there
any other provision of the Civil Code or any unrepealed law or jurisprudential ruling of this Court, under which
petitioner's claim of imprescriptibility can be sustained. We believe that the specific enumeration in the Civil
Code of imprescriptible actions excludes any other ones.
The nature of petitioner's action may be said to be one founded on an oral contract, which, to be sure, cannot be
considered as among those rendered unenforceable by the statute of frauds, for the simple reason that it has already
been, from petitioner's own point of view, almost fully consummated by the delivery of the lands and the
corresponding titles to her.
The petitioner's action, based as it is upon an oral contract, prescribes in six years according to Article 1145 of
the Civil Code. Assuming otherwise, the only other possibility is that petitioner's case comes under Article 1149
and the action prescribes in five years. In either case, since the cause of action of petitioner accrued in 1948 and
the present suit was instituted in 1964 or sixteen years later, and none of the interrupting circumstances
enumerated in Article 1155 has been shown to have intervened, it is unquestionable that petitioner's action filed
in the court below has already prescribed.
There is substantial compliance with the fundamental law and the rules where the order of the court adopts by
reference the reasons, alleged in the motion to dismiss of respondents, which, the record reveals, includes the
facts and the law in support thereof.
Buscayno vs. Enrile
Whatever doubts may still exist as to the power of respondent Military Commission to try petitioner should be
dispelled, as was set forth in the opening sentence of this opinion by the aforesaid Aquino Jr. v. Military
Commission decision. Justice Antonio, now retired, as ponente, left no doubt on that score. Thus: “We hold that
the respondent Military Commission No. 2 has been lawfully constituted and validly vested with jurisdiction to
hear the cases against civilians, including the petitioner. 1. The Court has previously declared that the
proclamation of Martial Law (Proclamation No. 1081) on September 21, 1972, by the President of the Philippines
is valid and constitutional and that its continuance is justified by the danger posed to the public safety. 2. To
preserve the safety of the nation in times of national peril, the President of the Philippines necessarily possesses
broad authority compatible with the imperative requirements of the emergency. On the basis of this, he has
authorized in General Order No. 8 (September 27, 1972) the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, to
create military tribunals to try and decide cases of military personnel and such other cases as may be referred to
them.
One other issue raised by petitioner remains. It was likewise contended that a judgment of respondent Military
Commission would be violative of Article X, Section 9 of the Constitution. That provision requires that a decision
of a court of record “shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based.” The proceeding

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in a military commission terminates with a guilty or not guilty verdict. Hence this objection. It can be said of
course that a military commission is not a court of record within the meaning of this Article on the judiciary.
Moreover, the procedure followed, including the form the judgment takes, was given the seal of approval in the
above Aquino decision citing the applicable section of the Article on Transitory Provisions. That would remove
any taint of unconstitutionality. It may be stated further that the record of the proceedings are available to the
reviewing authorities. Hence any imputation of arbitrariness sought to be avoided by the above provision would
not be warranted.
It may be noted that less than a year ago, in an exhaustive opinion by Justice Makasiar, this Court once again
sustained the power of the President to create military commissions or courts martial to try not only members of
the armed forces but also civilian offenders. Counsel for petitioner, in his voluminous pleadings, was quite
vehement in his assertion that there was a marked failure to abide by constitutional processes. Such an attitude is
reminiscent of the aphorism of Holmes that certitude is not the test of certainty. For beginning with Javellana v.
Executive Secretary, decided on March 31, 1973, up to and including Sanidad v. Commission on Elections,
decided five days before the October 17, 1976 plebiscite, the question raised in the former case being the validity
of the ratification of the present Constitution and in the latter the power of the President to propose amendments,
this Court performed its awesome and delicate power of judicial review. In the three Aquino cases referred to in
the body of the opinion, the question raised and decided dealt with the presidential authority to issue the
challenged decrees. It is quite apparent, therefore, that to stigmatize the existing government between September
22, 1972 to October 17, 1976 as a military dictatorship is bereft of any support in law. The Constitution remained
supreme, with the fundamental principle of civilian supremacy upheld.
Mangelen vs. Court of Appeals
The challenged decision leaves much to be desired. What was filed before the public respondent was an ordinary
appeal from a judgment by default. This necessitated a full-blown decision taking into account the five (5)
assigned errors which touch on both substantive and procedural matters. Accordingly, public respondent
promulgated its 30 January 1989 decision following a meticulous review of the proceedings had before the trial
court and a careful re-appraisal of the evidence adduced before it. Thus, that decision faithfully complied with
Section 4, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that no decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts of the law on which it is based. Now, if such decision had to be
completely overturned or set aside, upon the filing of a motion for reconsideration, in a subsequent action via a
resolution or modified decision, such resolution or decision should likewise state the factual and legal foundation
relied upon. The reason is obvious: aside from being required by the Constitution, the court should be able to
justify such a sudden change of course; it must be able to convincingly explain the taking back of its solemn
conclusions and pronouncements in the earlier decision.
If the reason for their failure to file the answer was because they had wanted to file a petition for certiorari with
the then Intermediate Appellate Court, they should have acted immediately. Yet, as borne out by the records, they
opted to take their sweet time, filing that petition only on 12 July 1984. It is obvious that they were unmoved by
any sense of urgency to protect their interests. It appears, therefore, that the filing of the petition much later was
but part of a wellplanned strategy to gain more time to delay the case. If the trial court aborted such strategy,
private respondents have only themselves to blame. The trial court acted correctly and in accordance with Section
1, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court in declaring private respondents in default and in authorizing petitioner to present
his evidenceex-parte.
In the light of the above narrated circumstances, private respondents cannot take refuge under the allegations of
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect to justify their failure to file the answer. To Our mind, such inaction
was due to their obstinate refusal to comply with the mandated procedural requirements.
Thus, whether private respondents had a valid or good defense is entirely irrelevant considering the circumstances
obtaining. The public respondent, therefore, gravely erred in “reversing” its decision of 30 January 1989 on the
basis of respondents’ “good and valid defenses”.
–It may be pointed out that there is a difference between a judgment against a defendant based on evidence
presented ex-parte pursuant to a default order and one based on evidence presentedex-parte and against a
defendant who had filed an answer but who failed to appear at the hearing. In the former, Section 5 of Rule 18
provides that the judgment against the defendant should not exceed the amount or be different in kind from that
prayed for. In the latter, however, the award may exceed the amount or be different in kind from that prayed for.
j. Mandatory Period for deciding cases – Art. VIII, Sec. 15; Art. VII, Sec. 18 par. 3; Art. XVII, Sec. 12-14
k. Presidential Electoral Tribunal
l. Administrative Powers – Art. VIII, Sec. 5 (3) (4) (6) and Sec. 11
1. Supervision of lower courts
Maceda vs. Vasquez
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However, We agree with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative action taken against him by this
Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches
into the Court’s power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine
of separation of powers. Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals
down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can
oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action
against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power,
without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of
petitioner on the powers granted to it by the Constitution, for such a justification not only runs counter to the
specific mandate of the Constitution granting supervisory powers to the Supreme Court over all courts and their
personnel, but likewise undermines the independence of the judiciary.
In Re: CA Asso. Justice Demetrio Demetria
The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice is
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His at all times must be characterized with propriety and
must be above suspicion. His must be free of even a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to the performance
of his judicial duties, but also his behavior outside the courtroom and as a private individual. Unfortunately,
respondent Justice Demetrio Demetria failed to live up to this expectation. Through his indiscretions, Justice
Demetria did not only make a mockery of his high office, but also caused incalculable damage to the entire
Judiciary. The mere mention of his name in the national newspapers, allegedly lawyering for a suspected drug
queen and interfering with her prosecution, seriously undermined the integrity of the entire Judiciary.
Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral
righteousness and uprightness than a seat in the Judiciary. High ethical principles and a sense of propriety should
be maintained, without which the faith of the people in the Judiciary so indispensable in orderly society cannot
be preserved. There is simply no place in the Judiciary for those who cannot meet the exacting standards of
judicial conduct and integrity.
2. Temporarily assign judges to other stations in public interest
3. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid miscarriage of justice

Mondiguing vs. Abad

A change of place of trial in criminal cases should not be granted for whimsical or flimsy reasons. The interests
of the public require that, to secure the best results and effects in the punishment of crime, it is necessary to
prosecute and punish the criminal in the very place, as near as may be, where he committed his crime.
A change of place of trial in criminal cases should not be granted for whimsical or flimsy reasons. The interests
of the public require that, to secure the best results and effects in the punishment of crime, it is necessary to
prosecute and punish the criminal in the very place, as near as may be, where he committed his crime.
4. Appointment of officials and employees of the entire judiciary
5. Promulgate rules concerning the enforcement and protection of constitutional rights
6. Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure
Bustos vs. Lucero
The constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him does not apply to preliminary
hearings; nor will the absence of a preliminary examination be an infringement of his right to confront witnesses.
As a matter of fact, preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely without infringing the constitutional
tight of an accused under the due process clause to a fair trial. (Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, L-1336,
May 28, 1948.)
Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said to be synonymous.
Substantive rights is a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the
disturbance of normal relations. (60 C.J., 980.) Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and
regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law
which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method
of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their invasion.

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As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what acts are crimes and prescribes the
punishment for committing them, as distinguished from the procedural law which provides or regulates the steps
by which one who commits a crime is to be punished.
As a rule of evidence, section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural. Evidence-which is “the mode and manner of
proving the competent facts and circumstances on which a party relies to establish the fact in dispute in judicial
proceedings"-is identified with and forms part of the method by which, in private law, rights are enf orced and
redress obtained, and, in criminal law, a law transgressor is punished. Criminal procedure refers to pleading,
evidencea nd practice. (State vs. Capaci, 164 So., 419; 179 La., 462.) The entire rules of evidence have been
incorporated into the Rules of Court. We can not tear down section 11 of Rule 108 on constitutional grounds
without throwing out the whole code of evidence embodied in these Rules.
The curtailment of the right of an accused in a preliminary investigation to crossexamine the witnesses who had
given evidence for his arrest is not of such importance as to offend against the constitutional inhibition.
Preliminary investigation is not an. essential part of due process of law. It may be suppressed entirely, and if this
may be done, mere restriction of the privilege formerly enjoyed thereunder can not be held to fall within the
constitutional prohibition.
While section 11 of Rule 108 denies to the defendant the right to cross-examine witnesses in a preliminary
investigation, his right to present his witnesses remains unaffected, and his constitutional right to be informed of
the charges against him both at such investigation and at the trial is unchanged. In the latter stage of the
proceedings, the only stage where the guaranty of due process comes into play, he still enjoys to the full extent
the right to be confronted by and to cross-examine the witnesses against him. The degree of importance of a
preliminary investigation to an accused may be gauged by the fact that this formality is frequently waived.
The distinction between “remedy” and “substantive right” is incapable of exact definition. The difference is
somewhat a question of degree. It is difficult to draw a line in any particular case beyond which legislative power
over remedy and procedure can pass without touching upon the substantive rights of parties affected, as it is
impossible to fix that boundary by general condition.
That the Supreme Court in making rules should step on substantive rights, and the Constitution must be presumed
to tolerate if not to expect such incursion as does not affect the accused in a harsh and arbitrary manner or deprive
him of a def ense, but operates only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage. For the court’s
power is not merely to compile, revise or codify the rules of procedure existing at the time of the Constitution’s
approval. This power is “to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,” which
is a power to adopt a general, complete and comprehensive system of procedure, adding new and different rules
without regard to their source and discarding old ones.

Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan

It is to be made clear that the power of the then President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos to create the
Sandiganbayan in 1978 is not challenged in this proceeding. While such competence under the 1973 Constitution
contemplated that such an act should come from the National Assembly, the 1976 Amendments made clear that
he as incumbent President “shall continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law shall have been lifted”
Thus, there is an affirmation of the ruling of this Court in Aquino Jr. v. Commission on Elections decided in 1975.
In the language of the ponente, Justice Makasiar, it dissipated “all doubts as to the legality of such law-making
authority by the President during the period of Martial Law, * * *.” As the opinion went on to state: “It is not a
grant of authority to legislate, but a recognition of such power as already existing in favor of the incumbent
President during the period of Martial Law.”
The premise underlying petitioner’s contention on this point is set forth in his memorandum thus: “1. The
Sandiganbayan proceedings violates petitioner’s right to equal protection, because—appeal as a matter of right
became minimized into a mere matter of discretion;— appeal likewise was shrunk and limited only to questions
of law, excluding a review of the facts and trial evidence; and—there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by
certiorari to the Supreme Court, instead of the traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are entitled
to appeal as a matter of right covering both law and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the Court of
Appeals and thereafter to the Supreme Court” That is hardly convincing, considering that the classification
satisfies the test announced by this Court through Justice Laurel in People v. Vera requiring that it “must be based
on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not
be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.” To repeat, the
Constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan, precisely in
response to a problem, the urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows
that those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as January 17, 1973,
when the present Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the accused therein, whether a private
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citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. Petitioner, moreover, cannot be unaware of the ruling of this Court in Co Chiong v. Cuaderno, a
1949 decision, that the general guarantees of the Bill of Rights, included among which are the due process of law
and equal protection clauses must “give way to [a] specific provision,” in that decision, one reserving to “Filipino
citizens of the operation of public services or utilities.” The scope of such a principle is not to be constricted. It is
certainly broad enough to cover the instant situation.
The contention that the challenged Presidential Decree is contrary to the ex post facto provision of the Constitution
is similarly premised on the allegation that “petitioner’s right of appeal is being diluted or eroded efficacy wise *
* *.” A more searching scrutiny of its rationale would demonstrate the lack of persuasiveness of such an argument.
The Kay Villegas Kami decision, promulgated in 1970, cited by petitioner, supplies the most recent and binding
pronouncement on the matter. To quote from the ponencia of Justice Makasiar: “An ex post facto law is one
which: (1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and
punishes such an act; (2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed; (3) changes the
punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; (4) alters the
legal rules of evidences, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the
time of the commission of the offense; (5) assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes
penal ty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful; and (6) deprives a person accused
of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction
or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.” Even the most careful scrutiny of the above definition fails to sustain
the claim of petitioner. The “lawful protection” to which an accused “has become entitled” is qualified, not given
a broad scope. It hardly can be argued that the mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right to appeal is
therein embraced. This is hardly a controversial matter.
Even from the standpoint then of the American decisions relied upon, it cannot be successfully argued that there
is a dilution of the right to appeal. Admittedly under Presidential Decree No. 1486, there is no recourse to the
Court of Appeals, the review coining from this Court. x x x Would the omission of the Court of Appeals as an
intermediate tribunal deprive petitioner of a right vital to the protection of his liberty? The answer must be in the
negative. In the first place, his innocence or guilt is passed upon by the threejudge court of a division of respondent
Court. Moreover, a unanimous vote is required, failing which “the Presiding Justice shall designate two other
justices from among the members of the Court to sit temporarily with them, forming a division of five justices,
and the concurrence of a majority of such division shall be necessary for rendering judgment.” Then if convicted,
this Court has the duty if he seeks a review to see whether any error of law was committed to justify a reversal of
the judgment. Petitioner makes much, perhaps excessively so as is the wont of advocates, of the fact that there is
no review of the facts. What cannot be too sufficiently stressed is that this Court in determining whether or not to
give due course to the petition for review must be convinced that the constitutional presumption of innocence has
been overcome. In that sense, it cannot be said that on the appellate level there is no way of scrutinizing whether
the quantum of evidence required for a finding of guilt has been satisfied. The standard as to when there is proof
of such weight to justify a conviction is set forth in People v. Dramayo.
But justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be strained till
it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true. What is re quired for compliance with the due process
mandate in criminal proceedings? In Arnault v. Pecson this Court with Justice Tuason as ponente, succinctly
identified it with “a fair and impartial trial and reasonable opportunity for the preparation of defense.” In criminal
proceedings then, due process is satisfied if the accused is “informed as to why he is proceeded against and what
charge he has to meet, with his conviction being made to rest on evidence that is not tainted with falsity after full
opportunity for him to rebut it and the sentence being imposed in accordance with a valid law. It is assumed, of
course, that the court that rendered the decision is one of competent jurisdiction.
It is true that other Sections of the Decree could have been worded to avoid any constitutional objection. As of
now, however, no ruling is called for. The view is given expression in the concurring and dissenting opinion of
Justice Makasiar that in such a case to save the Decree from the dire fate of invalidity, they must be construed in
such a way as to preclude any possible erosion on the powers vested in this Court by the Constitution. That is a
proposition too plain to be contested It commends itself for approval. Nor should there be any doubt either that a
review by certiorari of a decision of conviction by the Sandiganbayan calls for strict observance of the
constitutional presumption of innocence.
Maniago vs. Court of Appeals
After considering the arguments of the parties, we have reached the conclusion that the right to bring an action
for damages under the Civil Code must be reserved as required by Rule 111, §1, otherwise it should be dismissed.
To begin with, §1 quite clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute separately all civil actions for
the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will be deemed to have been instituted with the criminal case. Such
civil actions are not limited to those which arise “from the offense charged,” as originally provided in Rule 111
before the amendment of the Rules of Court in 1988. In other words the right of the injured party to sue separately
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for the recovery of the civil liability whether arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from quasi delict under Art. 2176
of the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will be deemed instituted with the criminal action.
The short of it is that the rulings in these cases are consistent with the proposition herein made that, on the basis
of Rule 111, §§1-3, a civil action for the recovery of civil liability is, as a general rule, impliedly instituted with
the criminal action, except only (1) when such action arising from the same act or omission, which is the subject
of the criminal action, is waived; (2) the right to bring it separately is reserved; or (3) such action has been
instituted prior to the criminal action. Even if an action has not been reserved or it was brought before the
institution of the criminal case, the acquittal of the ac cused will not bar recovery of civil liability unless the
acquittal is based on a finding that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist because of Art.
29 of the Civil Code.
Contrary to private respondent’s contention, the requirement that before a separate civil action may be brought it
must be reserved does not impair, diminish or defeat substantive rights, but only regulates their exercise in the
general interest of orderly procedure. The requirement is merely procedural in nature. For that matter the Revised
Penal Code, by providing in Art. 100 that any person criminally liable is also civilly liable, gives the offended
party the right to bring a separate civil action, yet no one has ever questioned the rule that such action must be
reserved before it may be brought separately.
Indeed, the requirement that the right to institute actions under the Civil Code separately must be reserved is not
incompatible with the independent character of such actions. There is a difference between allowing the trial of
civil actions to proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and requiring that, before they may be instituted
at all, a reservation to bring them separately must be made. Put in another way, it is the conduct of the trial of the
civil action—not its institution through the filing of a complaint—which is allowed to proceed independently of
the outcome of the criminal case.
There is a practical reason for requiring that the right to bring an independent civil action under the Civil Code
separately must be reserved. It is to avoid the filing of more than one action for the same act or omission against
the same party. Any award made against the employer, whether based on his subsidiary civil liability under Art.
103 of the Revised Penal Code or his primary liability under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, is ultimately recoverable
from the accused.
In the present case, the criminal action was filed against the employee, bus driver. Had the driver been convicted
and found insolvent, his employer would have been held subsidiarily liable for damages. But if the right to bring
a separate civil action (whether arising from the crime or from quasi delict) is reserved, there would be no
possibility that the employer would be held liable because in such a case there would be no pronouncement as to
the civil liability of the accused. In such a case the institution of a separate and independent civil action under the
Civil Code would not result in the employee being held liable for the same act or omission. The rule requiring
reservation in the end serves to implement the prohibition against double recovery for the same act or omission.
As held in Barredo v. Garcia, the injured party must choose which of the available causes of action for damages
he will bring. If he fails to reserve the filing of a separate civil action he will be deemed to have elected to recover
damages from the bus driver on the basis of the crime. In such a case his cause of action against the employer
will be limited to the recovery of the latter’s subsidiary liability under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
Nor does it matter that the action is against the employer to enforce his vicarious liability under Art. 2180 of the
Civil Code. Though not an accused in the criminal case, the employer is very much a party, as long as the right
to bring or institute a separate action (whether arising from crime or from quasi delict) is not reserved. The ruling
that a decision convicting the employee is binding and conclusive upon the employer “not only with regard to its
civil liability but also with regard to its amount because the liability of an employer cannot be separated but
follows that of his employee” is true not only with respect to the civil liability arising from crime but also with
respect to the civil liability under the Civil Code. Since whatever is recoverable against the employer is ultimately
recoverable by him from the employee, the policy against double recovery requires that only one action be
maintained for the same act or omission whether the action is brought against the employee or against his
employer. Thus in Dulay v. Court of Appeals this Court held that an employer may be sued under Art. 2180 of
the Civil Code and that the right to bring the action did not have to be reserved because, having been instituted
before the criminal case against the employee, the filing of the civil action against the employer constituted an
express reservation of the right to institute it separately.
7. Admission to the practice of law
SC Circular No. 19, 19 December 1986
8. Integration of the bar
In re Atty. Marcial Edillon
An “Integrated Bar” is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar
associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the
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Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in
carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to hear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by
or under the direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required
to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the
requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and
adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient
reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or
disbarment of the offending member. The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding
considerations of public interest and public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally
justifies the restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of
individual lawyers.
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been
uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The
practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a
lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and
to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State —the administration of justice—
as an officer of the court. The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must
submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S.
Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression “affected with a public interest” is the
equivalent of “subject to the exercise of the police power”.
When, therefore. Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 authorizing the Supreme Court to “adopt rules of court
to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit,” it did so in the exercise of
the paramount-police power of the State. The Act’s avowal is to “raise the standards of the legal profession,
improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.”
Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution
promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into
a body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental
considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity. The
State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general
prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. Gomez, Jesus, 31 Phil. 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, “Salus populi
eat suprema lex.” The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of government the rights
of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be
made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70, Phil. 726).
It is an undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some
freedom.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the
said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require
him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even
to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable
interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar Integration in the
Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X
of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines. xxx Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the
enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution
granting the Supreme Court the power “to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts, and the admission to the practice of law,” it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration
vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice
of law.
The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to become a member
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on
his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a
member of the Integrated Bar is no violative of his constitution freedom to associate. Integration does not make
a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he
passed the Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for
the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member. Bar
Integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings
of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to
which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State’s legitimate

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interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the
professional in his fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program—the lawyers.
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be member of the Integrated Bar, such
compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State.
The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule repairing payment of a
membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power
and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine
Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution)—which power the respondent acknowledges—from requiring
members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of
regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory
measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration.
That respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of
property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law
is property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to practise of law is a property
right, in the sense of its being one that en titles the holder of a license to practise a profession, we do not here
pause to consider at length, as it is clear that under the police power of the State, and under necessary powers
granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent’s right to practise law before the courts of this
country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to imposed the fee as
regulatory measure is recognized, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided
altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. But we must here emphasize that the practice of
law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the
Court to exact compliance with the lawyer’s public responsibilities.
Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its
Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement
of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial
functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. The Court’s jurisdiction was greatly
reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the power to “promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice . . . . . . . and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar . . .
. .” (Article X, Sec. 5[5]) The power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal
profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal. x x x It is the unanimous sense of
the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby
ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
9. Legal assistance to the underpriveleged
m. No quasi-judicial and administrative work for judges – Art. VIII, Sec. 12
Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay Transportation Co.
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of power in the Philippine
Government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to
assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial functions.
The Supreme Court exercises jurisdiction as a court and this juris diction does not include the exercise of
jurisdiction by the members of the Supreme Court sitting as a board of arbitrators. A board of arbitrators is not a
"court" in any proper sense of the term and possesses none of the ju risdiction which the Organic Act contemplates
shall be exer cised by the Supreme Court.
Arbitration represents a method of the parties' own choice. A submission to arbitration is a contract. A clause in
a contract providing that all matters in dispute between the parties shall be referred to arbitrators and to them
alone is contrary to public policy and cannot oust the courts of jurisdiction. However, unless the ar bitration
agreement is such as absolutely to close the doors of the courts against the parties, the courts should look with
favor upon such amicable arrangements.
Section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of a demo cratic government
constitutionally established. It would be improper and illegal for the members of the Supreme Court, to sit as a
board of arbi trators the decision of a majority of whom shall be final.
In Re: Rodolfo U. Manzano

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An examination of Executive Order No. 856, as amended reveals that Provincial/City Committees on Justice are
created to insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees, particularly those involving the poor and indigent
ones, thus alleviating jail congestion and improving local jail conditions. Among the functions of the Committee
are—Receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail warden, fiscal or judge who may be found to have
committed abuses in the discharge of his duties and refer the same to proper authority for appropriate action;
Recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed prejudicial to the proper administration of
criminal justice. It is evident that such Provincial/ City Committees on Justice perform administrative functions.
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of
individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of
the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence (Nasipit
Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services, Inc. vs. Tapucar, SP-07599-R, 29 September 1978, Black’s Law
Dictionary).
Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by law shall not be
designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions (Sections 12, Art. VIII,
Constitution). Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on
Justice, which discharges administrative functions, will be in violation of the Constitution, the Court is constrained
to deny his request. Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in his concurring opinion in the case of Garcia vs.
Macaraig (39 SCRA 106) ably sets forth: While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be
enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of government precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot
justify a member of the judiciary being required to assume a position or perform a duty non-judicial in character.
That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise there is a plain departure from its command. The essence of the trust
reposed in him is to decide. Only a higher court, as was emphasized by Justice Barredo, can pass on his actuation.
He is not a subordinate of an executive or legislative official, however eminent. It is indispensable that there be
no exception to the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to be confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity
to his sworn responsibility no less than the maintenance of respect for the judiciary can be satisfied with nothing
less.”
This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic insensibility or unbecoming
indifference to Provincial/City Committee on Justice. As incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the structure
of government. Their integrity and performance in the adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such
structure. As public officials, they are trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-members of Provincial/City
Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render assistance to said Committees to help promote the laudable
purposes for which they exist, but only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fullfilment of
their judicial duties.

n. Fiscal Autonomy
Nitafan vs. Commissioner of lnternal Revenue
lt may be pointed out that, early on, the Court had dealt with the matter administratively in response to
representations that the Court direct its Finance Officer to discontinue the withholding of taxes from salaries of
members of the Bench. Thus, on June 4, 1987, the Court en banc had reaffirmed the Chief Justice's directive as
follows: "RE: Question of exemption from income taxation.—The Court REAFFIRMED the Chief Justice's
previous and standing directive to the Fiscal Management and Budget Office of this Court to continue with the
deduction of the withholding taxes from the salaries of the Justices of the Supreme Court as well as from the
salaries of all other members of the judiciary." That should have resolved the question. However, with the filing
of this petition, the Court has deemed it best to settle the legal issue raised through this judicial pronouncement.
As will be shown hereinafter, the clear intent of the Constitutional Commission was to delete the proposed express
grant of exemption from payment of income tax to members of the Judiciary, so as to "give substance to equality
among the three branches of Government" in the words of Commissioner Rigos. In the course of the deliberations,
it was further expressly made clear, specially with regard to Commissioner Joaquin F. Bernas' accepted
amendment to the amendment of Commissioner Rigos, that the salaries of members of the Judiciary would be
subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers. This intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly
set forth in the final text of the Constitution as approved and ratified in February, 1987 (infra, pp. 7-8). Although
the intent may have been obscured by the failure to include in the General Provisions a proscription against
exemption of any public officer or employee, including constitutional officers, from payment of income tax, the
Court since then has authorized the continuation of the deduction of the withholding tax from the salaries of the
members of the Supreme Court, as well as from the salaries of all other members of the Judiciary. The Court
hereby makes of record that it had then discarded the ruling in Perfecto vs. Meer and Endencia vs. David, infra,
that declared the salaries of members of the Judiciary exempt from payment of the income tax and considered
such payment as a diminution of their salaries during their continuance in office. The Court hereby reiterates that
the salaries of Justices and Judges are properly subject to a general income tax law applicable to all income earners
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and that the payment of such income tax by Justices and Judges does not fall within the constitutional protection
against decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office.
The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in question until it was
finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in
adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but
in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the
organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction
is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption
of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly
by the explanation offered by the framers. Besides, construing Section 10, Articles VIII, of the 1987 Constitution,
which, for clarity, is again reproduced hereunder: "The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices
of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office,
their salary shall not be decreased." (Italics supplied). It is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass
a law fixing another rate of compensation of Justices and Judges but such rate must be higher than that which
they are receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower, it would be applicable only to those appointed after its
approval. It would be a strained construction to read into the provision an exemption from taxation in the light of
the discussion in the Constitutional Commission
o. Time Limit to Render Decision – Art. VIII. Sec. 16
Corpus vs. Court of Appeals
WE find respondent David’s position meritorious. While there was no express agreement between petitioner
Corpus and respondent David as regards attorney’s fees, the facts of the case support the position of respondent
David that there was at least an implied agreement for the payment of attorney’s fees. Petitioner s act of giving
the check for P2,000.00 through his aforestated April 18, 1962 letter to respondent David indicates petitioner’s
commitment to pay the former attorney’s fees, which is stressed by expressing that “I wish I could give more but
as you know we were banking on a SC decision reinstating me and reimbursing my back salaries.’ This last
sentiment constitutes a promise to pay more upon his reinstatement and payment of his back salaries. Petitioner
ended his letter that he was “looking forward to a continuation of the case in the lower court, x x x”, to which the
certiorari-mandamus-quo warranto case was remanded by the Supreme Court for further proceedings.
It may be advanced that respondent David may be faulted for not reducing the agreement for attorney’s fees with
petitioner Corpus in writing. However, this should be viewed from their special relationship. It appears that both
have been friends for several years and were co-members of the Civil Liberties Union. In addition, respondent
David and petitioner’s father, the late Rafael Corpus, were also close friends. Thus, the absence of an express
contract for attorney’s fees between respondent David and petitioner Corpus is no argument against the payment
of attorney’s fees, considering their close relationship which signifies mutual trust and confidence between them.
Moreover, the payment of attorney’s fees to respondent David may also be justified by virtue of the innominate
contract of facio ut des (I do and you give) which is based on the principle that “no one shall unjustly enrich
himself at the expense of another.” Innominate contracts have been elevated to a codal provision in the New Civil
Code by providing under Article 1307 that such contracts shall be regulated by the stipulations of the parties, by
the general provisions or principles of obligations and contracts, by the rules governing the most analogous
nominate contracts, and by the customs of the people.
There was no contract for contingent fee between Corpus and respondent David. Contingent fees depend on an
express contract therefor. Thus, “an attorney is not entitled to a percentage of the amount recovered by his client
in the absence of an express contract to that effect” (7 C.J.S. 1063 citing Thurston v. Travelers Ins. Co., 258 N.W.
66, 128 Neb. 141).
In determining a reasonable fee to be paid to respondent David as compensation for his services, on a quantum
meruit basis, it is proper to consider all the facts and circumstances obtaining in this case particularly the
following: x x x.
Respondent David filed on or about September 13, 1978 a motion with the court a quo for the issuance of a writ
of execution to enforce its decision in Civil Case No. 61802, subject of the present petition, knowing fully well
that it was then still pending appeal before this Court. In addition, no certification that the aforesaid decision is
already deemed affirmed had as yet been issued by the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 11, paragraph 2, Article
X of the New Constitution; because respondent David’s petitions filed with the Supreme Court on January 31,
1978 and on July 7, 1978 to remand the case to the trial court for execution and for the issuance of such
certification had not yet been acted upon as the same were still pending consideration by this Court. In fact, this
Court has not as of this time made any pronouncement on the aforesaid provision of the New Constitution.

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This act of respondent David constitute disrespect to, as well as disregard of the authority of this Court as the
final arbiter of all cases duly appealed to it, especially constitutional questions. It must be emphasized that as a
member of the Philippine Bar he is required “to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and
judicial officers” (Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court). Likewise, Canon 1 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics expressly provides that: “It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a
respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of
its supreme importance.” And this Court had stressed that “the duty of an attorney to the courts ’can only be
maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to uphold’ ”
(Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, 20 SCRA 441, 444 [1967] citing the case of Lualhati v. Albert, 57 Phil. 86,
92 [1932]).
Moreover, this Court takes judicial notice of the fact that herein respondent David, in the previous case of
Integrated Construction Services, Inc. and Engineering Construction, Inc. v. Relova (65 SCRA 638 [1975]), had
sent letters addressed to the then Chief Justice Querube C. Makalintal and later to the Chief Justice Fred Ruiz
Castro, requesting for the issuance of certification on the basis of the aforementioned provision of the New
Constitution which were not given due consideration. And knowing this, respondent David should have been
more prudent and cautious in filing with the court a quo any motion for execution.
On the part of Judge Jose H. Tecson, his presumptuous and precipitate act of granting the motion for execution
of respondent David likewise constitutes disrespect to, as well as disregard of, the authority of this Court because
he knew for a fact that the case was still pending appeal as the records thereof had not yet been remanded to it
and that no certification has been issued by this Court. As a judicial officer, Judge Tecson is charged with the
knowledge of the fact that this Court has yet to make a definite pronouncement on Section 11, paragraph 2, Article
X of the New Constitution. Judge Tecson should know that only the Supreme Court can authoritatively interpret
Section 11(2) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution. Yet, Judge Tecson assumed the role of the Highest Court of
the Land.
Malacora vs. Court of Appeals
The variance between the writ of execution and the final judgment of the Court of Appeals sought to be enforced
is at once noticeable. On the basis of the judgment to be executed, the amount to be paid by the private respondents
to petitioners should be only P1,100.00, the value of 1/2 of the 275 coconut trees planted, at the rate of P8.00 a
tree already fruit bearing or not. The writ of execution fixed the value at P2,184.00. Not being in accordance with
the judgment to be enforced, in a very substantial manner, the writ of execu-tion was correctly set aside as a
nullity by the respondent Court of Appeals, properly acting on the authority of the Collector of Internal Revenue
vs. Gutierrez, et al.
I have always left very strongly, and more so now, for the reasons above stated, that the provision of Article X,
Section 11 of the Constitution, is mandatory and should have been complied with immediately after the effectivity
of the New Constitution. This has always been my position, basically, on the legal principle that all provisions of
the Constitution which direct specific acts to be done, or prohibit certain acts to be done, should be construed as
mandatory. To construe them as merely directory would be to thwart the intention of the Constitution which, its
command being of the highest order should, under no circumstance, be permitted if they are the 'great ordinances'
as Justice Holmes had called the provisions of the Constitution (Springer vs. Government of the Philippine Island,
27 U.S. 189, 216 [1928].
From the plain language of the provision, the Constitution could not have intended anything but full and
immediate compliance therewith. The manifest purpose of the provision is to avoid delay in the disposition of
cases, which always is a cause of injustice, under the familiar aphorism that 'justice delayed is justice denied.' It
would, at the same time, ease up the clogged dockets of the courts, which had long presented a problem that defies
solution, despite the striving of this Court in constant quest of one.
If the arguments thus far presented is not enough to support the view that the provision in question is mandatory,
not merely directory, We need not go outside of the text of the provision to look for perhaps the argument that
will end all arguments. The express mention by Section 11 itself of exceptions to the automatic affirmance of
appealed decisions, orders or resolutions when not reversed or modified within the prescribed period, namely, (1)
cases where a qualified majority is required and (2) appeals from judgment of conviction in criminal cases, which
even after the lapse of the fixed period may still be decided on the merits, clearly means under the maxim
"expressio unius est exclusio alterius," that aside from the exceptions expressly mentioned, all other cases may
no longer be decided on the merits after the lapse of the applicable maximum period. The appealed decision, order
and resolution would be deemed affirmed, and shall then be so certified by the chief magistrate of the court, as
provided in the last part of paragraph 2 of Section 11. Said provision would be rendered also useless by holding
Section 11 merely directory because the occasion for the certification will never arise. It will thus be seen that the
exceptions expressly mentioned in the provision and the certification required thereby as just pointed out, argue

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most eloquently and convincingly in favor of the mandatory character of Section 11 of Article X of the New
Constitution.
Marcelino vs. Cruz, Jr.
Undisputed is the fact that on November 28, 1975, or eighty-five [85] days from September 4, 1975 the date the
case was deemed submitted for decision, respondent judge filed with the deputy clerk of court the decision in
Criminal Case No. 5910. He had thus veritably rendered his decision on said case within the three-month period
prescribed by the Constitution.
In Comia v. Nicolas, Ago v. Court of Appeals and Balquira v. Court of First Instance this Court ruled that the
rendition of the judgment in trial courts refers to the filing of the signed decision with the clerk of court. There is
no doubt that the constitutional provision cited by petitioner refers to the rendition of judgment and not to the
promulgation thereof. Thus, it is this date that should be considered in determining whether or not respondent
judge had resolved the case within the allotted period. Indeed, the date of promulgation of a decision could not
serve as the reckoning date because the same necessarily comes at a later date, considering that notices have to
be sent to the accused as well as to the other parties involved, an event which is beyond the control of the judge.
Such construction applies equally to the constitutional provision under consideration. In Mikell v. School Dis. of
Philadelphia, it was ruled that “the legal distinction between directory and mandatory laws is applicable to
fundamental as it is to statutory laws.”
To Our mind, the phraseology of the provision in question indicates that it falls within the exception rather than
the general rule. By the phrase “unless reduced by the Supreme Court,” it is evident that the period prescribed
therein is subject to modification by this Court in accordance with its prerogative under Section 5[5] of Article X
of the New Constitution to “promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts x x x.”
And there can be no doubt that said provision, having been incorporated for reasons of expediency, relates merely
to matters of procedure. Albermarle Oil & Gas Co. v. Morris, declares that constitutional provisions are directory,
and not mandatory, where they refer to matters merely procedural.
In practice, We have assumed a liberal stand with respect to this provision. This Court had at various times, upon
proper application and for meritorious reasons, allowed judges of inferior courts additional time beyond the three-
month period within which to decide cases submitted to them. The reason is that a departure from said provision
would result in less injury to the general public than would its strict application. To hold that non-compliance by
the courts with the aforesaid provision would result in loss of jurisdiction, would make the courts, through which
conflicts are resolved, the very instruments to foster unresolved causes by reason merely of having failed to render
a decision within the alloted term. Such an absurd situation could not have been intended by the framers of our
fundamental law.
One last point. Notwithstanding Our conclusion that courts are not divested of their jurisdiction for failure to
decide a case within the ninety-day period, We here emphasize the rule, for the guidance of the judges manning
our courts, that cases pending before their salas must be decided within the aforementioned period. Failure to
observe said rule constitutes a ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting judge. In fact, a certificate
to this effect is required before judges are allowed to draw their salaries.
De Roma vs. Court of Appeals
We agree with the respondent court that there is nothing in the above provisions expressly prohibiting the collation
of the donated properties. As the said court correctly observed, the phrase "sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di
na mababawing muli" merely described the donation as "irrevocable" and should not be construed as an express
prohibition against collation. The fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the subject
thereof from the collation required under Article 1061. We surmise from the use of such terms as "legitime" and
"free portion" in the deed of donation that it was prepared by a lawyer, and we may also presume he understood
the legal consequences of the donation being made. It is reasonable to suppose, given the precise language of the
document, that he would have included therein an express prohibition to collate if that had been the donor's
intention. Anything less than such express prohibition will not suffice under the clear language of Article 1062.
The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and unequivocally as an exception to the
general rule announced in Article 1062. Absent such a clear indication of that intention, we apply not the exception
but the rule, which is categorical enough.
There is no need to dwell long on the other error assigned by the petitioner regarding the decision of the appealed
case by the respondent court beyond the 12month period prescribed by Article X, Section 11 (1) of the 1973
Constitution. As we held in Marcelino v. Cruz, the said provision was merely directory and failure to decide on
time would not deprive the corresponding courts of jurisdiction or render their decisions invalid. It is worth
stressing that the aforementioned provision has now been reworded in Article VIII, Section 15, of the 1987
Constitution, which also impresses upon the courts of justice, indeed with greater urgency, the need for the speedy
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disposition of the cases that have been clogging their dockets these many years. Serious studies and efforts are
now being taken by the Court to meet that need.
p. Automatic Release of Appropriation for the Judiciary – Art. VIII. Sec. 3

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