Automation in Construction 8 Ž1999.

681–687
www.elsevier.comrlocaterautcon

The causes and costs of defects in construction

A study of seven building projects
P.-E. Josephson ) , Y. Hammarlund
Department of Management of Construction and Facilities, Chalmers UniÕersity of Technology, S-41296 Gothenburg, Sweden
Accepted 29 October 1998

Abstract

To perform rational defect prevention, it is necessary to have knowledge about defects, their causes and associated costs.
The purpose of the study presented here is to stimulate improvements by indicating where preventive measures are most
effective as well as how to perform them. A study of defects in construction was performed during the period 1986–1990. A
new and deeper study has been performed by the same research group during 1994–1996. Seven building projects have each
been monitored during a 6 month-period. Observers spent 8 h a day at the site analysing and describing defects occurring. A
total of 2879 defects have been collected and fully described, including their root causes. Formal interviews with 92 key
persons have been made. q 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Building project; Causes of defect; Defect; Defect cost; Quality cost

1. Introduction Economics and Construction Management at

The conditions for construction are constantly
changing. To succeed, companies must develop and
improve continuously. Changes must be based on
knowledge of both the environment and one’s own
work. In this situation knowledge of the nature of
defects that have occurred is important. With such
knowledge, effective actions can be taken to improve
the process.
In this paper, a study made in seven construction
companies is presented. The nature of defects de-
tected during production is discussed.
The study was performed during 1994-1996 in
cooperation between the Department of Building
)
Corresponding author
Chalmers University of Technology and ‘R & D-
West’; a group of construction companies in Swe-
den. The study is a continuation and deepening of a
study carried out during 1986-1990 by the same
R & D group. In this new study the main focus is on
the causes of defects, including underlying causes.
1.1. Defect studies
There are a large number of studies of defects
occurring in the production and maintenance phases.
However, there are only a limited number of studies
about the briefing and design phases.
The cost of defects occurring during production is
stated to be 2-6% of the cost of production
w1,12,10,25x. In our first study, the defect cost in one

0926-5805r99r$ - see front matter q 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
PII: S 0 9 2 6 - 5 8 0 5 Ž 9 8 . 0 0 1 1 4 - 9
682 P.-E. Josephson, Y. Hammarlundr Automation in Construction 8 (1999) 681–687

Table 1 breaks up. Most actors only take part for a limited
The origin of defects in a number of studies Ž% of total defect time. Therefore, the organisation is continuously
cost.
changing during the process. This study was per-
During During
formed to find potentials for improvements in these
production maintenance
organisations.
"R&D-West" Summary of Summary of
Some of the most important roles in a building
1986–1990 w10x several studies several studies
project organisation are played by the client, de-
Client 3 5–15 0
signer, contractor, sub-contractor, material supplier,
Design 20 15–30 40–55
Production 54 35–55 20–45 machine supplier, and the user. It is through the
Material 20 5–20 5–15 coordinated actions of these actors that the building
Maintenance 0 0 5–10 is actually built. In similar ways, defects in the
Other 3 0–15 0–10 product or in the process can be ascribed either to
the actors or to the coordination amongst them.

2.2. Defect— a chain of eÕents

building project was approximately 6% of the pro-
duction cost. The cost of defects occurring during the
maintenance phase is stated to be 3–5% of the
production cost w19,20,22,24x.
The origin of defects occurring during production
is principally in production, but also in design
w2,4,10,11,14x. In our first study, 54% of the defect
cost could be attributed to production; 34% to site
management and 20% to workmanship w10x. The
origin of defects occurring during maintenance is
principally in design, but also in production
w7,15,19,20,24x. A summary of a number of defect
studies is presented in Table 1.
Organisations consist of individuals who co-oper-
ate towards a specific goal. Therefore, it is natural
for the defects to be ascribed to individuals
w5,10,16,18x. It is generally believed that defects are
caused by lack of knowledge, lack of information or
lack of motivation. Carelessness is stated to be the
most common cause w2,10,16,17x. Lack of knowl-
edge is often mentioned as the second most common
cause of defects, but information is also often men-
tioned. Although defects are ascribed to individuals,
the basic cause can be found in organisational phe-
nomena.
2. Frame of reference
2.1. The roles
Building project organisations are temporary.
When the project is completed, the organisation
The evolvement of all defects can be considered
as a chain of events including cause, erroneous
action, manifest defect, consequence and corrective
measure w3x. This model of a defect constitutes the
basis for our study.
2.2.1. Cause
We define cause, in accordance with Ref. w9x, as a
proven reason for the existence of a defect. Often
there are several causes of the same erroneous ac-
tion. There may be either combined causes, or a
chain of causes. For that reason, the term ‘root
cause’ is sometimes used to describe the most basic
reason for an undesirable condition. If the root cause
is eliminated or corrected, this will prevent the recur-
rence of the defect w8,26x. The direct causes of
defects can primarily be attributed to individuals.
However, every action by an individual is influenced
by conditions. If individuals are to find it worthwhile
to act at all, motivation, expectations and commit-
ment are necessary w3x. MotiÕation is people’s desire
to contribute, through their own actions, to the resul-
tant organisational action. Expectations imply that
individuals believe that their actions will result in an
organisational action. Commitment means that in
order to achieve something together, people must
have some ‘control’ over one another, i.e. they must
be able to rely on certain types of behaviour and
certain attitudes in the rest of the team. This control
is secured by the creation of mutual commitment.
Henceforth, we use ‘motivation’ to describe the sum
of these three conditions.
 P.-E. Josephson, Y. Hammarlundr Automation in Construction 8 (1999) 681–687 683

Motivation alone is not enough. If an individual is rely on opinions from the actual organisation. Non-
to act correctly, on the basis of hisrher own personal fulfilment of these opinions gives rise to defects.
prerequisites, the individual must also have the nec- The changes which are made because of new or
essary knowledge and the necessary information for changed needs during production or use phase are
the specific task. Knowledge is information and not seen as defects.
understanding about a subject which a person has in
his or her mind or which is shared by all human 2.2.3. Consequences and correctiÕe measures
beings w6x. Knowledge includes skill and experience. By ‘consequence’, we mean all consequences of a
Skill is the knowledge and ability that enables you to manifest defect, which includes consequences for
do something such as a job, game, or sport very well both the product and the process. By ‘corrective
w6x. Experience is knowledge or skill of a particular measure’, we mean all actions performed with a
job that you have gained because you have worked view to completely or partly remedying manifest
at the job for a long time w6x. Information about the defects, and their consequences. The extent of conse-
operation is received in communication between in- quences and corrective measures taken constitutes
dividuals or between organisations. the defect cost.
Motivation, knowledge and information are mutu-
ally dependent w13x. For instance, insufficient infor-
mation involves lower motivation. 3. The method
The concepts of risk and stress are also used in
the analysis of causes. Calculated risk is part of all The method used is based on our study performed
actions, and thus it is difficult to avoid defects from 1986 to 1990 w10,13x. The method has been
entirely. The term ‘risk’ implies that there is a modified to a minor extent. The organisation of the
probability of a defect. ‘Calculated risk’ means a study, i.e., the group of companies and the research
conscious probability of defects. Higher calculated group, is the same as in the first study.
risk means that a higher probability of defects is
accepted. 3.1. The building projects
Stress seems to characterise temporary organisa-
tions. Stress is the general reaction of an organism, In this study, six projects are each being followed
which is activated when the individual is threatened up during a six-month period, and one project is
w23x. followed up for four months. The seven projects are
being performed by different companies. The pro-
jects have been chosen with the intention of acquir-
2.2.2. Erroneous action and manifest defect ing knowledge about different types of projects.
We distinguish between erroneous action and Some characteristics are presented in Table 2.
manifest defect, i.e., the result of an erroneous ac-
tion. The manifest defect is a non-desired condition
Table 2
in the product or process. We start from Ref. w21x,
The building projects
which author defines defect as ‘the non-fulfilment of
Project Type New Type Production Time
intended usage requirements’. constructionr of cost Žmonths.
Some requirements are given by law and in regu- conversion contract ŽSEK M.
lations, building standards, etc., as well as in contract A Museum NewrConv General 30 12
documents, site meeting records and other project B School New Turnkey 130 13
documentation. However, not all requirements can C University New General 100 16
be specified. Every individual also has non-ex- D Industry New Turnkey 21 14
pressed basic needs. There are also many details E Housing Conversion General 15 4
F Fire station New Turnkey 55 15
which are difficult to specify. These demands are G Shopping Conversion General 30 13
referred to as ‘usage’ requirements. Sometimes the centre
specified requirements are wrong. In such cases we
684 P.-E. Josephson, Y. Hammarlundr Automation in Construction 8 (1999) 681–687
Ø Project A is a conversion of an old museum,
and a technically complicated new construction of an
entrance. It has a complicated client organisation,
including several authorities to consult, strict saving
demands and small spaces. For reasons of financing,
the time of production was cut down from 17 to 12
months.
Ø Project B mainly concerns a new construction
of an upper secondary school. For part of the build-
ing, the framework of an old fire station is used. The
school personnel were not employed when the con-
struction work started. There were specific demands
for an allergy-free school. This is a complex building
because of the many different methods and materials
used.
Ø Project C is a new construction of a university
building. The building is of high technical standard,
especially the ventilation. The time of production
was shortened from 20 to 16 months at a very late
stage. The project organisation consists of companies
and individuals who have worked together before.
Ø Project D concerns a new construction of two
similar multi-dwelling blocks, which are similar to
two 5-year old blocks in the same area. The total
price has been forced down because the contract is
part of a larger contract. The production work is
strongly influenced by a large development pro-
gramme in the company. The site is exposed to
strong winds.
Ø Project E is a conversion of an industry build-
ing, with a very short production time. Many work
activities are ongoing at the same time. Periodically,
there are lot of workers in small spaces. The building
includes many installations. Except for these charac-
teristics, it is quite a simple construction.
Ø Project F concerns a new construction of a fire
station. Part of the building includes many installa-
tions. For this, the authorities have high security
requirements. Major user influence during produc-
tion.
Ø Project G is a conversion of several shops in a
large shopping centre. Quite a divided site with a
great deal to be taken into consideration because the
shops are open during production.
3.2. Data collection
One starting-point is to register and analyse all
defects occurring in the building projects during a
six-month period. One observer is placed at each
site. The observer has no other task than to register,
follow-up and describe defects occurring.
By making rounds on site, the observer has daily
contact with all the personnel, the building contrac-
tor’s as well as the subcontractor’s personnel. When
necessary, the observer contacts the client, designers,
material manufacturers, etc. He takes part in meet-
ings and reads all documentation. Each observer has
been educated in the method and introduced at the
site. During the study the observer and the re-
searchers have continuous contact. At special meet-
ings, the observers compare notes.
The observers are engineers or civil engineers.
Six of them have less than ten years and one has 30
years of experience from construction. Our first study
showed that young people with only limited experi-
ence of construction are the most successful in the
data collection. People with more experience tend to
perceive some situations as normal and for that
reason fail to describe them as defects.
The data collection consists of three main parts.
Ø Defect descriptions. Each defect is described
on a special form. Approximately 20 questions are
coded. They are supplemented with detailed descrip-
tions of causes, erroneous action, manifest defect,
consequences and corrective measures. The defect
cost is estimated. Sketches, drawings and pho-
tographs are appended. A total of 2879 defects were
registered. Some of them consisted of several similar
defects.
Ø Project description. To enable the analysis,
each building project is fully described. Among other
things, the project organisation and the site organisa-
tion changes during the process, systems for leading,
planning methods, policies regarding choice of sub-
contractors, etc., activities included and their interde-
pendence, are described. Schedules, drawings, site
meeting records and diary are appended. Costs and
times for the whole project and for separate physical
elements, activities and materials are stated.
Ø InterÕiews. In each project, the research group
interviews 10–15 key persons. Each interview is
approximately 1 h. The interviews are tape-recorded
and transcribed in full afterwards. During the inter-
views, the characteristics of the building project are
mainly discussed. This type of interview was not
made in our first study.
 P.-E. Josephson, Y. Hammarlundr Automation in Construction 8 (1999) 681–687 685

4. Results not been registered as defects. There were also prob-

The analysis of the primary data of the study is
ongoing. The following results, particularly those
concerning root causes, are hence preliminary.
4.1. Number of defects and defect cost
The number of defect descriptions varies between
283 and 480 per project. Since some descriptions
contain several similar defects, the real number of
defects is higher. The defect costs arising during the
time of the study vary between 2.3 and 9.4% of the
production cost Žsee Table 3..
Among noteworthy conditions, the following can
be mentioned.
Ø In project A, the time for a complex blasting
was gravely underestimated, so the whole project
was delayed. Severe savings demands involved sev-
eral changes in the production method. The compli-
cated organisation involved many last-minute in-
structions from the client.
Ø In project B, the contractor received extra
orders for SEK 4 M. One reason was that no school
personnel were employed when the production
started. Only a few of these extra orders have been
registered as defects.
Ø Project C was successful according to several
actors. The largest defect was a part of the ventila-
tion pipes, which fell down.
Ø In project D, the total price was exceeded.
Many extra tasks were imposed on both the site
managers and the workers, and the situation was
stressful. The project was exposed to many distur-
bances because of the weather; however these have
lems with deliveries of prefabricated concrete ele-
ments.
Ø In project E, many problems arose because the
project was an intensive one, with many workers in
small spaces. Several workers described the project
as ‘messy’. The main defect was a delayed elevator
contract.
Ø In project F, there have been some late changes
because of the user’s influence during production.
The design process was described as faulty. The
inexperienced manager of the design process felt that
he should have directed the process more firmly.
Ø Project G was described as ‘messy’ because of
the fragmented site and the adaptations of the pro-
duction work to the opened shops that had opened.
Many customers had to cross the site to reach the
site. The contractor received a lot of extra orders
from the shops, which involved delays in the con-
tract.
4.2. The origin of defects
The analysis indicates that, on average, 32% of
the defect costs originated in the early phases, i.e., in
relation to the client and the design. Approximately
45% of the defect cost originated on the site, i.e. in
relation to the site management, the workers
and the sub-contractors. Approximately 20% of the
defect cost originated in materials or machines Žsee
Table 4..
In three projects, design defects were the largest.
Defects attributed to sub-contractors dominate in two
projects. Project E is dominated by the delayed
elevator contract.

Table 3 4.3. The causes of defects

Number of defects and defect cost
Project Number of defects Defect cost The causes were often difficult to identify, which
ŽSEK. Ž% of prod. cost. means that our results should be extrapolated with
A 454 750 000 4.6 caution. In most situations, we found that the indi-
B 441 106 0000 3.1 vidual who gave rise to a defect had the necessary
C 371 610 000 2.3 knowledge and right information for the specific
D 376 1 530 000 9.4 task, but that the cause was lack of motivation. An
E 283 930 000 6.2
F 474 1 050 000 3.6
average of 50% of the defect cost could be attributed
G 480 1 330 000 4.8 to this category Žsee Table 5.. A deeper analysis
indicates that most ‘motivation defects’ are due to
686 P.-E. Josephson, Y. Hammarlundr Automation in Construction 8 (1999) 681–687

Table 4
The origin of defects Ž% of total defect cost.
Project Client Design Site management Workmanship Subcontractors Materials Machines Other
A 9 13 27 8 30 8 5 0
B 4 47 5 14 17 12 1 0
C 7 38 6 5 30 13 1 0
D 0 21 20 27 5 22 4 1
E 10 18 2 5 7 51 1 6
F 2 33 23 14 8 13 5 2
G 13 18 14 5 37 3 2 8
Average 6 26 14 13 18 17 3 3

forgetfulness or carelessness. Only a few of the Ø Stability in the client organisation. Key per-
‘motivation defects’ were intentional. 29% of the sons were often changed. The project organisation
defect cost was caused by lack of knowledge, while lost time and knowledge through these changes.
a small part was ascribed to lack of communication, Ø Client’s project control. The client often used a
stress and risk. long time to come to decisions necessary for design-
ers and contractors. Their day-to-day plan was often
4.4. Causes per actor changed while waiting.
Ø User inÕolÕement. In some projects several
An analysis of causes for each actor has been groups of users visited the site in late stages and
made. Table 6 presents the average for the projects. consequently gave their points of view Žtoo. late.
For design defects, 44% of the defect cost was found Ø Time pressure. Designers and contractors
to be caused by lack of knowledge. For defects in worked under conditions of high time pressure.
site management, 50% of the cost was caused by Ø Composition of the project organisation. The
motivation. For defects in workmanship, motivation work in projects with people and groups of people
dominated but risk is also identified as a cause. For who had worked together before ran considerably
the subcontractors, 47% of the defect cost was found more smoothly than the work in other projects.
to be caused by motivation. Ø Cost pressure. Lowest bid is still a common
strategy in choosing suppliers. However, this cost
4.5. Root causes pressure spread through the organisation, from client
to contractor, from contractor to sub-contractor etc.
The root causes of the defects are now subject for Ø Support to the site organisation. The contrac-
analysis. However, some preliminary causes have tors’ management at the main office did not give
been identified. enough support to their site managers.
Ø To motiÕate people. Activities aimed at moti-
vating workers on site were lacking.
Table 5
The causes of defects Ž% of total defect cost.
Project Knowledge Information Motivation Stress Risk
Table 6
A 46 13 33 0 8 Causes of defects for each category of actors Ž% of defect cost per
B 27 15 36 5 17 actor respectively.
C 36 24 36 1 3
D 30 8 58 4 0 Actor Knowledge Information Motivation Stress Risk
E 8 21 49 10 12 Design 44 18 35 2 1
F 35 4 60 1 0 Site management 31 8 50 6 5
G 18 14 60 2 6 Workmanship 12 2 69 1 16
Average 29 12 50 3 6 Subcontractors 27 13 47 3 10
 P.-E. Josephson, Y. Hammarlundr Automation in Construction 8 (1999) 681–687
5. Conclusions
The study is a deepened repeat of an earlier study.
The aim is, through increasing the knowledge of
defect causes, to find motivation for improvement of
the building process. We have pointed out some
objective results in this paper. Comparison with ear-
lier studies does not show significant differences. We
have also mentioned some preliminary results con-
cerning the root causes of the defects. The root
causes are now subject for deeper analysis.
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