RULE 2
The prohibition will not apply when the matter
Luvimin Cebu Mining Corp. v Cebu Port Authority
Doctrine: Pursuant to RA 8975, only the Supreme Court can issue a temporary
restraining order, writ of preliminary injunction, or writ of mandatory injunction
when what is involved is a national project. An exception is when the issuance will
result in grave injustice and irreparable injury.
Ponente: Justice Reyes
Concurred by: Justices Velasco Jr., Peralta, Villarama Jr., and Jardeleza
Facts: On October 28, 1997, the Cebu Port Authority issued a Certificate of
Registration and Permit to Operate to Luvimin Cebu Mining Corp. to operate a
private port at Brgy. Talo-ot, Cebu. On March 1, 2006, CPA rescinded the
registration/permit on the following grounds:
a) A Foreshore Lease Agreement is a prerequisite for a port license and the FLA
application of petitioner is still pending with DENR
b) Said FLA application was denied by DENR in 1999. Instead petitioner should apply
for a special land use which is Other Lawful Purposes
c) No permit is still granted from the OLP application
Thus, CPA declared the registration/permit as defective and took possession of the
port facility. Petitioners then filed a complaint for Injunction with Damages before the
RTC. Petitioners allege that they were not given prior warning and that the unilateral
cancellation of their permit/license denied them due process of law as they had
already built a RORO facility on the land using their own money. They also claim that
they had already secured an ECC from DENR and that the CPA's invasion of their
right to operate a wharf is material and substantial, which warrants the issuance of a
writ of injunction to prevent serious damage.
RTC issued an Order directing the issuance of a TRO and set the hearing for
preliminary injunction.
CPA opposed. It asserted that it has an on-going infrastructure project at the Talo-ot
Port which forms part of the Nautical Highway envisioned by former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. Considering that it is a national project, only the Supreme Court
can restrain the same pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8975. In addition, an
injunctive writ is moot and academic since they have already taken over the port by
implementing two projects: a) repair of the RORO ramp and b) construction of an
office and other facilities.
Petitioners then argued that the case falls within the exception in Sec. 3 of RA 8975.
RTC issued an Order granting petitioners' application for the issuance of a writ of
injunction. RTC reasoned that it was premature for the CPA to take over the port's
premises without giving the petitioners the opportunity to iron things out or be given
proper notification for them to vacate. The RTC also held that the prohibition in R.A.
No. 8975 on the issuance of restraining orders by courts against government
infrastructure projects is not absolute.
is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that unless a TRO is
issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise. Irreparable injury and grave
injustice was found to have been caused to the petitioners by CPA's premature
takeover of the port.
CPA moved for reconsideration but was denied. CPA appealed to the CA. CA ruled
that RTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction.
The CA ratiocinated that an injunctive writ cannot be issued to enjoin the respondents
from taking over the port facility because the two projects implemented by the CPA
are considered as national government projects as defined in Section 2 (a) of R.A. No.
8975 against which no injunctive writ can lie pursuant to Section 3 of the same law.
The CA further decreed that no irreparable injury was caused to the petitioners
because whatever loss they will likely suffer can be measured by way of damages
(actual or compensatory, exemplary, attorney's fees and costs of litigation).
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
Issues:
a) Sec. 3 of RA 8975 cannot be applied because the wharf in Talo-ot Port was never a
national government project
b) The exceptional circumstance in Sec. 3 of RA 8975 is present because the
petitioners' constitutional right over the property was violated
Held:
a) No. CA correctly ruled that RTC abused its discretion in issuing a writ of
preliminary injunction, violating Sec. 3 and 4 of RA 8975:
Section 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary
Mandatory Injunctions. — No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any
temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory
injunction against the government... to restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts:
(d) Termination or rescission of any such contract/project;
xxxx
This prohibition shall not apply when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a
constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave
injustice and irreparable injury will arise.
Section 4. Nullity of Writs and Orders. — Any temporary restraining order,
preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction issued in violation of
Section 3 hereof is void and of no force and effect.
The prohibition covers national government projects defined in Section 2 of the same
law.
The term infrastructure projects means "construction, improvement and
rehabilitation of roads, and bridges, railways, airports, seaports..."
On the other hand, the project by petitioner is covered by RA 6957, as amended by RA
7718 which covers those by private entities. The contract arrangement between
petitioner and CPA is such that the private entity undertakes the construction,
financing, operation and/or maintenance of a given infrastructure facility subject to
its eventual transfer to the concerned government entity upon completion, after a
fixed number of period or after the private entity has recouped its investments.
This is affirmed in the Certificate of Registration and Permit to Operate granted to
petitioner such that upon the expiration of said certificate, the port facility shall
become the property of CPA. In other words, the Talo-ot Port is a national
infrastructure project, the termination or rescission of which cannot be enjoined by an
injunctive writ issued by any lower court.
b) No. The petitioners cannot claim exception. No constitutional issue of due process
is involved because the petitioners were not deprived of any property or property right
when their Certificate of Registration and Permit to Operate was cancelled. The
petitioners were given a mere privilege to operate a private facility in Talo-ot Port, not
a property right. They also had no vested right to operate the private port since their
certificate can be withdrawn at any time. Sufficient notice was also afforded the
petitioners when it was stated in the certificate that it may be terminated should they
be found to be non-compliant with the rules.
Petition is denied.
Resident Marine Mammals v Reyes
Facts: Herein petitioners, resident marine mammals are the toothed whales, dolphins,
porpoises and other cetacean species which inhabit the waters in and around the
Tanon Strait (islands of Negros and Cebu) They are joined by Gloria ramos and Rose
Osorio collectively know as the stewards who seek the protection of these marine
species.
In this case, the petitioners seek to nullify the service contract which permits
exploration, development and exploitation by Japan petroleum exploration within the
Tanon Strait. As we have discussed in NIPAS act, tanon strait is a protected seascape.
Originally the contract was entered by the government with JAPEX for geophysical
survey and exploration. However it was converted into a service contract by the DOE
and JAPEX. JAPEX had started its operations through conducting a survey and
exploration of the areas. While in the second sub-phase of the project, JAPEX apply
for Environmental impact assessment since it knew that the areas the contract covers
are within the protected seascapes. Thereafter, JAPEX obtain a Environmental
Compliance Certificate.
Issue: There are 2 primary issues in this case, first is the procedural issue which is our
topic for today. Whether or not the petitioners in the case have a legal standing. And
the substantive issue talks about the legality of the service contract.
Ruling: Under the rules of court. It requires that the parties to a suit be either natural
or juridical person or entities authorized by law. It further requires that action be
brought in the name of the real party in interest even if it is filed by a representative.
Hence, the respondents alleged that the stewards have no legal standing since the
party that they represent are the resident marine mammals who are neither natural or
juridical persons.
However. The stewards contend that they have legal standing since they will be
benefited or injured by the decision of the case and based their right in the case of
oposa v factoran wherein the court allows the petitioner to bring a suit in behalf of the
future generations for the faithful performance of environmental laws.
The court passed the rules of procedure for environmental cases which allow a citizen
suit and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for violations of
our environmental laws. It means that locus standi in environmental cases has been
given a more liberalized approach.
Although the case was filed before the passage of the rules of procedure for
environmental cases, the court held that the rules shall be applied retroactively. And
therefore the court ruled that the need to give the stewards a legal standing has been
eliminated by the passage of rules of procedure for environmental cases for it allows
any filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce environmental
laws. The court also justified that herein petitioners, the stewards are real parties and
not just a representative
Torrecampo v MWSS
Doctrine: Torrecampo, in seeking the issuance of a writ of injunction, seeks judicial
review of a question of Executive policy, a matter outside this Court's jurisdiction.
Torrecampo failed to show that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion that
would warrant the exercise of this Court's extraordinary certiorari power.
Ponente: Justice Carpio
Concurred by: Justices Nachura, Peralta, Abad and Mendoza
Facts: On June 30, 2009, Torrecampo reported that personnel and heavy equipment
from DPWH entered Brgy. Matandang Balara to implement the C-5 Road Extension
Project over Lot Nos. 42-A-4, 42-A-6, and 42-A-4. Torrecampo alleged that if the
MWSS and the DPWH are allowed to continue and complete the C-5 Road Extension
Project, three aqueducts of the MWSS which supply water to eight million Metro
Manila residents will be put at great risk. Torrecampo insisted that the RIPADA area,
consisting of Pook Ricarte, Pook Polaris and Pook Dagohoy is a better alternative to
subject lots. Torrecampo then filed the present petition before the Supreme Court.
The Court issued a status quo order. Pertinent provisions of the Resolution reads:
Atty Alfredo Villamor, Jr., as counsel for Torrecampo, alleges that the project would
result to grave injustice and irreparable injury to petitioner and the 8 million
residents of Metro Manila whose water supply are sourced from the aqueducts found
underneath the area where the road project is to be implemented. He also alleges that
the petition raises the fundamental right to health, and that this petition for
injunction has to be filed directly with the Supreme Court rather than with the lower
court pursuant to Sec. 3 of RA 8975.
The OSG claims that the present case does not fall within the exceptions under Sec. 3
of RA 8975. He also clarified that the proposed C-5 Road Extension Project shall not
be undertaken pending completion by the DPWH of studies and tests on safety
concerns which includes the aqueducts.
Atty. Agra for respondent MWSS finds the petition for injunction premature as the
project is yet to be implemented since for it to be implemented, it has to pass prior
review by the MWSS first which the MWSS can only do after DPWH has submitted its
detailed study and tests.
Thus, the Court resolved to lift the status quo order considering that no grave injustice
or irreparable injury would arise.
Under PP 1395 by Pres. Arroyo, certain parcels of the RIPADA are serve two
purposes:
a) An access highway for the new road alignment of the C-5 Road Extension Project
b) Housing facilities for deserving and bona fide occupants
On December 3, 2007, MMDA Chairperson Fernando wrote to MWSS Administrator
Jamora and proposed that certain MWSS properties be utilized for the construction of
medium rise building for the families to be displaced by the C-5 Road Extension
Project. MWSS rejected such proposal.
Between December 2007 and June 2008, certain correspondences took place
regarding the construction of MRBs. On March 12, 2009, MWSS issued a resolution
allowing DPWH to use the 60 Meter Right-of-Way for preliminary studies in the
implementation of the c-5 Road Extension Project. DPWH then entered said
properties and conducted the necessary complete study. DPWH then released a
memorandum stating the properties to be affected by the road project, which included
those of MWSS and which MWSS allowed entry of the DPWH.
Issue: Whether respondents should be enjoined from commencing with and
implementing theC-5 Road Extension Project which affected MWSS properties.
Torrecampo's relevant claims:
a) Only the SC may issue a restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
against government projects
b) Present suit is not premature
c) The implementation of the road project violates RA 8975
MWSS claims:
a) Petition does not present a justiciable matter
b) Petition failed to allege Torrecampo's right that warrants an issuance of an
injunction under RA 8975
DPWH relevant claims:
a) MWSS did not object to the DPWH project
b) DPWH's determination of the location of the project in accordance with its
specialized skills and technical expertise should be accorded with finality and respect
c) Torrecampo is not entitled to an injunction
Held: No, the petition by Torrecampo must fail. He is not entitled to an injunction. He
seeks judicial review of a question of Executive policy, a matter outside this Court's
jurisdiction. Torrecampo failed to show that respondents committed grave abuse of
discretion that would warrant the exercise of this Court's extraordinary certiorari
power.
Torrecampo raises a violation of the residents' right to clean and potable water to
demand that this Court determine whether the Tandang Sora area is a better
alternative to the RIPADA area for the C-5 Road Extension Project. However, such
inquiry on issues raised by Torrecampo would delve into matters that are exclusively
within the wisdom of the Executive branch, not the Judiciary. The Court can only
determine whether there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction attributed to the respondents. However, in this case the DPWH still has to
conduct the proper study to determine whether a road can be safely constructed on
land beneath which runs the aqueducts. Without such study, the MWSS, which owns
the land, cannot decide whether to allow the DPWH to construct the road. Absent
such DPWH study and MWSS decision, no grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction can be alleged against or attributed to respondents.
Petition is denied.
Alvarez V. Picop Resources, Inc.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Doctrine: Accordingly, the prohibition in PD 605 against the issuance of preliminary
injunction in cases involving permits for the exploitation of natural resources was
inapplicable to this case. Statutes such as PD 605, PD 1818 and Republic Act 8975
merely proscribed the issuance of temporary restraining orders and writs of
preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction. They could not, under
pain of violating the Constitution, deprive the courts of authority to take cognizance of
issues raised in the principal action, as long as that action and the relief sought were
within their jurisdiction.
FACTS: In 1952, Bislig Bay Lumber Co., Inc. (BBLCI), the predecessor of Paper
Industries Corporation of the Philippines (Picop) was granted Timber License
Agreement (TLA) No. 43. The Agreement covered an area of 75,545 hectares in
Surigao del Sur, Agusan del Sur, Compostela Valley, and Davao Oriental. The late
President Ferdinand E. Marcos allegedly issued, sometime in 1969, a Presidential
Warranty confirming that TLA No. 43 “definitely establishes the boundary lines of
[BBLCI’s] concession area.” Upon its expiry in 1977, this Agreement -- as amended --
was renewed for another 25 years, to “terminate on April 25, 2002.” On December 23,
1999, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) promulgated
DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 99-53 or the “Regulations Governing the
Integrated Forest Management Program (IFMP).” In a letter dated August 28 2000,
Picop signified its intention to convert TLA No. 43 into an Integrated Forest
Management Agreement (IFMA), pursuant to DAO No. 99-53. During the
performance evaluation of Picop, the DENR found that respondent had violated the
rules and regulations governing TLA No. 43. Some of these violations were the non-
submission of a five-year forest protection plan and a sevenyear reforestation plan;
nonpayment of overdue forest and other charges in the total amount of
P167,592,440.90 as of August 30, 2002; and failure to secure a clearance from the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), considering the presence of
indigenous peoples in the area, as well as a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Claims
covering part of the area. Meanwhile, Picop received from the DENR secretary a
letter. By virtue of this letter, Picop claimed that “the TLA has been converted.” The
DENR believed, however, that respondent’s application for an IFMA should undergo
the process as provided in DAO No. 99-53. Thus, petitioner required Picop to submit
the following to the DENR: 1. Certificate of Filing of Amended Articles of
Incorporation issued on 12 August 2002 that extended PICOP’s corporate term for
another fifty (50) years; 2. Proof of Payment of forest charges; 3. Proof of Payment of
Reforestation Deposit; 4. Response to social issues, particularly clearance from the
NCIP; and 5. Map showing reforestation activities on an annual basis. Upon
evaluation of the documents subsequently submitted, the DENR noted as follows: a)
PICOP did not submit the required NCIP clearance; b) The proof of payments for
forest charges covers only the production period from 1 July 2001 to 21 September
2001; c) The proof of payment of reforestation deposits covers only the period from
the first quarter of CY 1999 to the second quarter of CY 2001; d) The map of the areas
planted through supplemental planting and social forestry is not sufficient compliance
per Performance Evaluation Team’s 11 July 2001 report on PICOP’s performance on
its TLA No. 43, pursuant to Section 6.6 of DAO 79-87; and e) PICOP failed to respond
completely to all the social issues raised. Insisting that the conversion of its TLA No.
43 had been completed, Picop filed a Petition for Mandamus (“mandamus case”)
against then DENR Secretary Heherson T. Alvarez before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City. The RTC granted the Petition in its October 11, 2002 Decision,
which was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA). Meanwhile, on November 25,
2002, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 297, “Excluding a
Certain Area from the Operation of Proclamation No. 369 Dated February 27, 1931,
and Declaring the Same as Mineral Reservation and as Environmentally Critical
Area.” The excluded area consisted of about 8,100 hectares of respondent’s TLA No.
43. On January 21, 2003, Picop filed a Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of the
aforesaid presidential proclamation, as well as of the implementing order, DAO No.
2002-35 (“nullity case”). Initially, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) enjoining respondents in that case from implementing the questioned
issuances. Subsequently, however, it dismissed Picop’s Petition for not stating a cause
of action. On reconsideration, it set for hearing respondent’s application for
preliminary injunction. Thus, these consolidated Petitions have been brought before
the Court, assailing (1) the grant of a writ of mandamus to compel the DENR to issue
an IFMA in favor of Picop; (2) the immediate execution of the writ; and (3) the non-
dismissal of the nullity case.
ISSUE: 1. Whether the mandamus case should be dismissed, because (1) it lacked a
cause of action; and (2) its subject matter pertained to the exclusive administrative
domain of the DENR secretary
RULING: (Whether Outright Dismissal Whether Outright Dismissal Was Proper)
The Petition filed before the trial court was one for mandamus with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction, with
damages. Specifically, the Petition sought to compel the DENR secretary to (1) sign,
execute and deliver the IFMA documents to Picop; (2) issue the corresponding IFMA
number assignment; and (3) approve respondent’s harvesting of timber from the area
of TLA No. 43. Petitioner contended that these acts related to the licensing, regulation
and management of forest resources, a task that belonged exclusively to the exclusive
administrative domain of the DENR. Picop, however, alleged grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the DENR secretary. Thus, it behooved the Court to determine whether
the department head had indeed gravely abused his discretion. An outright dismissal
of the case would have prevented the Court’s resolution of the issue. For the same
reason, the Petition could not be dismissed outright on the ground of lack of cause of
action. A motion to dismiss on that basis would hypothetically admit the truth of the
allegations in the Complaint. In ruling upon the DENR secretary’s Motion to Dismiss,
the allegation of respondent that it had a contract with the government should thus be
hypothetically admitted. Necessarily, petitioner’s argument that there was no such
contract should be considered in the trial of the case. Petitioner countered that he had
not yet exercised his exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case -- either
to approve or to disapprove Picop’s application for IFMA conversion. Hence, he
argued that respondent’s immediate resort to the trial court was precipitate, in
violation of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies could be
disregarded when there were circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention. In this case, it cited the employment by Picop of a sizeable number of
workers and respondent’s payment of millions in taxes to the government.
The issue of whether there was indeed an urgency of judicial intervention (as to
warrant the issuance of a writ of mandamus despite the exclusive jurisdiction of the
DENR) was ultimately connected to the truth of Picop’s assertions, which were
hypothetically admitted in the Motion to Dismiss filed by the DENR. In other words,
the issue still boiled down to whether petitioner had committed grave abuse of
discretion in not executing the IFMA documents and in not approving respondent’s
harvesting of timber from the area of TLA No. 43. Hence, the mandamus case could
not have been subjected to outright dismissal. Another issue raised by the DENR
concerned Section 1 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 605 which, according to the CA,
had been partly repealed by Republic Act 8975. Republic Act 8975 was not intended
to set forth in full all laws concerning the prohibition on temporary restraining orders,
preliminary injunctions and preliminary mandatory injunctions. This law prohibited
lower courts from issuing such orders in connection with the implementation of
government infrastructure projects. On the other hand, PD 605 prohibited the
issuance of these orders in any case involving licenses, concessions and the like, in
connection with the natural resources of the Philippines. When the licenses,
concessions and the like also entailed government infrastructure projects, however,
the provisions of Republic Act 8975 were deemed to apply. Thus, PD 605 was
modified in this sense. In Datiles and Co. v. Sucaldito, the Court held that the
prohibition in PD 605 “pertains to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders by
courts against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of
discretion in technical cases, because to allow courts to judge these matters could
disturb the smooth functioning of the administrative machinery. But on issues
definitely outside of this dimension and involving questions of law, courts are not
prevented by Presidential Decree No. 605 from exercising their power to restrain or
prohibit administrative acts.” While there were indeed questions of fact in the present
Petitions, the overriding controversy involved was one of law: whether the
Presidential Warranty issued by former President Marcos was a contract within the
purview of the Constitution’s Non Impairment Clause. Accordingly, the prohibition in
PD 605 against the issuance of preliminary injunction in cases involving permits for
the exploitation of natural resources was inapplicable to this case. Moreover, as the
Court held in Republic v. Nolasco, [1] statutes such as PD 605, PD 1818 and Republic
Act 8975 merely proscribed the issuance of temporary restraining orders and writs of
preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction. They could not, under
pain of violating the Constitution, deprive the courts of authority to take cognizance of
issues raised in the principal action, as long as that action and the relief sought were
within their jurisdiction.
Province of Cagayan vs. Lara
Facts:
Lara obtained an Industrial Sand and Gravel Permit (ISAG Permit) from the Mines
and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), authorizing him to conduct quarrying operations in a twenty-
hectare area situated in Cagayan (Permit Area) and extract and dispose of sand,
gravel, and other unconsolidated materials from the Permit Area. For the same
purpose, Lara obtained an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the
DENR Environmental Management Bureau (EMB).
Because of Refusal of ENRO Adap to issue and Order of Payment, Lara deposited the
amount of P51, 500.00 with the Treasurer’s Office corresponding to the extraction fee
and other fees.
Lara received a Stoppage Order from Cagayan Governor Alvaro T. Antonio (Gov.
Antonio), directing him to stop his quarrying operations for the following reasons: (a)
the ISAG Permit was not in accordance with Republic Act No. (RA) 7942, otherwise
known as the "Philippine Mining Act of 1995," and its implementing rules and
regulations; (b) Lara's failure to pay sand and gravel fee under Provincial Ordinance
No. 2005-07; and (c) [Lara's] failure to secure all necessary permits or clearances
from the local government unit concerned as required by the [ECC].
Lara maintains that the MGB and DENR-EMB had already authorized him to extract
sand and gravel from the Permit Area, as evidenced by the ISAG Permit and ECC,
thereby dispensing with the need to secure any permit from the local government. In
any case, he contends that the only reason why he failed to secure such permits was
because the local government officials deliberately refused to process his applications
without any legitimate reason whatsoever.
Issue:
WON Lara is entitled to continue his quarrying operations.
Ruling:
No.
In order for an entity to legally undertake a quarrying business, he must first comply
with all the requirements imposed not only by the national government, but also by
the local government unit where his business is situated.
Section 138(2) of RA 7160:
SECTION 138. Tax on Sand, Gravel and Other Quarry Resources.
The permit to extract sand, gravel and other quarry resources shall be issued
exclusively by the provincial governor, pursuant to the ordinance of the sangguniang
panlalawigan.
Provincial Ordinance No. 2005-07
SECTION 2H.04. Permit for Gravel and Sand Extraction and Quarrying. No person
shall extract ordinary stones, gravel, earth, boulders and quarry resources from public
lands or from the beds of seas, rivers, streams, creeks or other public waters unless a
permit has been issued by the Governor (or his deputy as provided herein) x x x.
A plain reading of the afore-cited provisions clearly shows that a governor's permit is
a pre-requisite before one can engage in a quarrying business in Cagayan. Records,
however, reveal that Lara admittedly failed to secure the same; hence, he has no right
to conduct his quarrying operations within the Permit Area. Consequently, he is not
entitled to any injunction.
Special People vs Canda
Facts:
The petitioner was a proponent of a water-resource development and utilization Accordingly, the Court is called upon to resolve, firstly, whether the appeal directly to
project in Barangay Jimilia-an in the Municipality of Loboc, Bohol that would involve this Court from the RTC was proper, and, secondly, whether the petition for
the tapping and purifying of water from the Loboc River, and the distribution of the mandamus was the correct recourse.
purified water to the... residents of Loboc and six other municipalities.seeking to be
exempt from the requirement of... the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) Held
under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1586
RTC dismissed the petition for mandamus. Mandamus was an improper remedy for
Upon evaluating the nature and magnitude of the environmental impact of the petitioner,
project, respondent Nestor M. Canda, then Chief of EMB in Bohol, rendered his
We dismiss the present recourse because the petitioner failed to exhaust the available
findings in a letter dated December 4, 2001, as follows:
administrative remedies, and because it failed to show that it was legally entitled to
The project is located within a critical area; hence, Initial Environmental Examination demand the performance of the act by the respondents.
is required.
Accordingly, the petitioner should have appealed the EMB Regional Director's
The project is socially and politically sensitive therefore proof of social acceptability decision to the EMB Director who exercised supervision and control over the former.
should be established. Proper indorsement from the [Protected Area Management
It is relevant to mention that the DENR later promulgated Administrative Order No.
Bureau or] PAMB should be secured.[2] (Emphasis supplied)...
2003-30[23] in order to define where appeals should be taken
The petitioner appealed Canda's findings to respondent EMB Region 7 Director
Another reason for denying due course to this review is that the petitioner did not
Bienvenido L. Lipayon (RD Lipayon), claiming that it should also be issued a CNC
establish that the grant of its application for the CNC was a purely ministerial in
because the project was no different from the Loboc-Loay waterworks project of the
nature on the part of RD Lipayon. Hence, mandamus was not a proper remedy.
Department ofPublic Works and Highways (DPWH) that had recently been issued a
CNC. The foregoing considerations indicate that the grant or denial of an application for
ECC/CNC is not an act that is purely ministerial in nature, but one that involves the
RD Lipayon required the petitioner to submit certain certifications from different
exercise of judgment and discretion by the EMB Director or Regional Director, who
government agencies to enable the EMB to determine whether the project was within
must determine whether the... project or project area is classified as critical to the
an environmentally critical area or not.
environment based on the documents to be submitted by the applicant.
Petitioner failed to secure a certification from the Regional Office of the Mines and
The petitioner errs on two grounds.
Geosciences Bureau (RO-MGB), the petitioner filed a petition for mandamus and
damages in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Loay, Bohol,[12] alleging that it was Firstly, RD Lipayon had not yet fully exercised his discretion with regard to the CNC
now entitled to a CNC as a matter of right after having complied with the certification application when he made his finding.
requirements; and that the EMB had earlier issued a CNC to the DPWH for a similar
waterworks project in the same area. Secondly, there is no sufficient showing that the petitioner satisfactorily complied
with the requirement to submit the needed certifications.
RD Lipayon and Canda aver that the act complained of against them involved an
exercise of discretion that could not be compelled by mandamus that the petitioner's WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; and ORDERS
proposed project was located within an environmentally critical area, and the the petitioner to pay the costs of suit
activitiesto be done were so significant that they would create massive earth
movement and environmental degradation; that the petitioner violated the rule
against forum shopping; and that the petitioner had no cause of action against them
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Issue

WHETHER OR NOT, AFTER PETITIONER'S DUE COMPLIANCE WITH THE

REQUIREMENTS MANDATED BY RESPONDENTS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE
CERTIFICATE OF NON- COVERAGE (CNC) APPLIED FOR BY PETITIONER, IT IS
NOW THE RIPENED DUTY OF RESPONDENTS, THROUGH RESPONDENT EMB
REGIONALDIRECTOR, TO ISSUE SAID DOCUMENT IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER
RULE 4
Alecha vs. Atienza
Facts:
Cebu Ore and Mineral Resources Corporation (Cebu Ore) filed an application for the
approval of the Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (subject mining agreement),
covering an area of about 8,100 hectares located in the municipalities of Midsalip and
Bayog, Zamboanga del Sur. Cebu Ore later on assigned to 168 FPMC its rights over
the mining agreement. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., then DENR Secretary, granted the mining
agreement to 168 FPMC.
Alecha, et. al. filed a petition for cancellation of the mining agreement alleging that
168 FPMC failed to secure the Free and Prior Informed Consent (FPIC) of the
Indigenous Peoples (IP) concerned for the approval of the mining agreement. They
also alleged that the contract area under the mining agreement was located in the
volcanic cones of Mt. Sugarloaf Complex, a known key biodiversity area and forest
reserve, thus rendering it exempt from any mining application. Lastly, they submitted
that the proposed operation would destroy the lives of the Zamboanga Peninsula
residents.
168 FPMC denied the allegations and insisted that it had observed the FPIC process.
It submitted the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) Compliance
Certificate (Certification Precondition) as proof of its compliance with the FPIC
process. The 168 FPMC also claimed that the nearest volcanic cones of Mt. Sugarloaf
Complex cones are located 9 kilometers away from the contract area.
DENR dismissed the petition. The DENR Secretary also held that the Certification
Precondition was the best evidence that 168 FPMC complied with the FPIC process.
Issue:
WON DENR Secretary gravely abused his discretion when he dismissed the petition
for cancellation of the 168 FPMC mining agreement.
Ruling:
No.
We find that the DENR Secretary did not gravely abuse his discretion in taking
judicial notice of the documents submitted for 168 FPMC's application for the mining
agreement that showed compliance with the FPIC process and all the legal
requirements for the approval of the mining agreement.
DENR Secretary took judicial notice of the documents submitted for the approval of
the subject mining agreement which were already in his possession by reason of his
office and were either posted in a conspicuous place, published in a newspaper of
general circulation, or its contents announced through the radio. The DENR Secretary
merely confirmed the 168 FPMC's allegation in its Answer that it had complied with
the legal process laid down by law and obtained the consent of the IPs concerned for
the approval of the mining agreement.
NCIP Compliance Certificate was issued to 168 FPMC as proof that there was free and
prior consent from the indigenous cultural communities affected. Also, the One Stop
Shop Committee of the DENR-MGB-RIX screened the subject mining application to
ensure that the covered areas do not fall within any reservation or declared protected
area.
Factual considerations relating to mining applications properly rest within the
administrative competence of the DENR. Its factual findings are accorded great
respect and even finality by the appellate courts because it possesses the specialized
knowledge and expertise in its field. (XPN: Grave abuse of discretion which was not
proved in this case).
RULE 7 AND 8
[RULE 7: WRIT OF KALIKASAN] -- LNL Archipelago Minerals Inc. vs Agham Party
List
J. Carpio
Doctrine: The following requisites must be present to avail of this remedy: (1) there is
an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology; (2) the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity; and (3) the
actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of
such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or
more cities or provinces.
FACTS:
Petitioner LNL Archipelago Minerals, Inc. (LAMI) is the operator of a mining claim
located in Sta. Cruz, Zambales. LAMI embarked on a project to build a private, non-
commercial port in Brgy. Bolitoc, Sta. Cruz, Zambales. A port is a vital infrastructure
to the operations of a mining company to ship out ores and other minerals extracted
from the mines and make the venture economically feasible. Brgy. Bolitoc, about 25
kilometers away from the mine site, makes it an ideal location to build a port facility
LAMI secured the following permits and compliance certificates for the port project:
(1) Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Environmental
Compliance Certificate5 (ECC) The Bolitoc community – the barangay, its officials
and residents – gave several endorsements12 supporting the project. Even the
Sangguniang Bayan of Sta. Cruz gave its consent to the construction of the port
However, LAMI allegedly encountered problems from the local government of Sta.
Cruz, headed by Mayor Luisito E. Marty (Mayor Marty). Mayor Marty unduly favored
some mining companies in the municipality and allegedly refused to issue business
and mayor’s permits despite the necessary national permits and licenses secured by
the other mining companies. DENR Environmental Management Bureau in Region
III (DENR-EMB R3) received a letter from Mayor Marty inquiring if the ECC the
DENR issued in favor of LAMI allowed LAMI to cut trees and level a mountain. The
DENR PENRO team found that LAMI violated some of its conditions under the ECC.
Accordingly, a Notice of Violation (NOV) was issued against LAMI for violation of
certain conditions of the ECC with a cease and desist order from further constructing
and developing until such time that the ECC conditions were fully complied. DENR-
EMB R3, Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) R3 and PENRO Zambales, conducted
an investigation to determine whether mitigating measures done by LAMI were
sufficient. The composite team found that LAMI’s activities in its property would not
result to any environmental damage to its surrounding communities. Thereafter, the
DENR-EMB R3 lifted the cease and desist order after LAMI was found to have
complied with the requirements.
Respondent Agham Party List (Agham), through its President, former Representative
Angelo B. Palmones (Rep. Palmones), filed a Petition21 for the issuance of a Writ22 of
Kalikasan against LAMI
Agham alleged that LAMI violated: (1) Section 6823 of PD No. 705,24 as amended by
Executive Order No. 277,25 or the Revised Forestry Code; and (2) Sections 5726 and
6927 of Republic Act No. 7942,28 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (Philippine
Mining Act). Agham added that LAMI cut mountain trees and flattened a mountain
which serves as a natural protective barrier from typhoons and floods not only of the
residents of Zambales but also the residents of some nearby towns located in
Pangasinan.
This Court remanded the petition29 to the Court of Appeals for hearing, reception of
evidence and rendition of judgment. LAMI stated further that there is no
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health, or property
of inhabitants in two or more cities and provinces. The Court of Appeals decided the
case in favor of petitioner. Thus, for failing to comply with the requisites necessary for
the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan, the Court of Appeals resolved to deny the petition.
Agham filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals. In an Amended
Decision, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside its original Decision and granted
the petition for WRIT OF KALIKASAN. Hence, the instant petition.
The Issues: The issues for our resolution are (1) whether LAMI violated the
environmental laws as alleged by Agham, and (2) whether LAMI flattened any
mountain and caused environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the
life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. ----- W/N the
petition for Writ of Kalikasan should be granted.
RULING: NO -- The present case involves the extraordinary remedy of a Writ of
Kalikasan which is under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.42 Section
1, Rule 7, Part III of the said Rules provides: Section 1. Nature of the writ. – The writ
is a remedy available to a natural or juridical person, entity authorized by law,
people’s organization, non-governmental organization, or any public interest group
accredited by or registered with any government agency, on behalf of persons whose
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private
individual or entity, involving environmental damage of such magnitude as to
prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
The Writ of Kalikasan, categorized as a special civil action and conceptualized as an
extraordinary remedy covers environmental damage of such magnitude that will
prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
The writ is available against an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or private individual or entity.
The following requisites must be present to avail of this remedy: (1) there is an actual
or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology;
(2) the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or private individual or entity; and (3) the actual or
threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such
magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more
cities or provinces.
In the present case, Agham, in its Petition for a Writ of Kalikasan, cited two laws
which LAMI allegedly violated: (1) Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code, as
amended; and (2) Sections 57 and 69 of the Philippine Mining Act.
Section 2(c), Rule 7, Part III of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
provides: Section 2. Contents of the petition. - The verified petition shall contain the
following: (c) The environmental law, rule or regulation violated or threatened to be
violated, the act or omission complained of, and the environmental damage of such
magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more
cities or provinces.
The Rules are clear that in a Writ of Kalikasan petitioner has the burden to prove the
(1) environmental law, rule or regulation violated or threatened to be violated; (2) act
or omission complained of; and (3) the environmental damage of such magnitude as
to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or
provinces.
It is well-settled that a party claiming the privilege for the issuance of a Writ of
Kalikasan has to show that a law, rule or regulation was violated or would be violated.
In the present case, the allegation by Agham that two laws – the Revised Forestry
Code, as amended, and the Philippine Mining Act – were violated by LAMI was not
adequately substantiated by Agham. Even the facts submitted by Agham to establish
environmental damage were mere general allegations.
Second, Agham’s allegation that there was a "mountain" in LAMI’s port site was
earlier established as false as the "mountain" was non-existent as proven by the
testimonies of the witnesses and reports made by environmental experts and persons
who have been educated and trained in their respective fields.
Last, the alleged scraping off or leveling of land at LAMI’s port site is deemed
insignificant to pose a detrimental impact on the environment. the cut and fill
operations of LAMI only affected the port site but not the surrounding area and that
the environmental effect was only minimal and insignificant and temporary and
nature, and it does not in any way affect or cannot affect the Province of Pangasinan
as alleged.
In sum, the SC finds that In sum, SC finds that LAMI did not cause any environmental
damage that prejudiced the life, health or property of the inhabitants residing in the
municipality of Sta. Cruz, the province of Zambales or in the neighboring province of
Pangasinan. Agham, as the party that has the burden to prove the requirements for
the issuance of the privilege of the Writ ofKalikasan, failed to prove (1) the
environmental laws allegedly violated by LAMI; and (2) the magnitude of the
environmental damage allegedly caused by LAMI in the construction of LAMI' s port
facility in Brgy. Bolitoc, Sta. Cruz, Zambales and its surrounding area. Thus, the
petition for the issuance of the privilege of the Writ of Kalikasan must be denied.
WEST TOWER CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, on behalf of the Residents of West
Tower Condominium and in representation of Barangay Bangkal, and others,
including minors and generations yet unborn,Petitioners, vs. FIRST PHILIPPINE
INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, FIRST GEN CORPORATION and their RESPECTIVE
BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS, JOHN DOES, and RICHARD DOES,
Respondents. (VELASCO, JR., J.)
Facts: Before the Court is the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan filed
following the leak in the oil pipeline owned by First Philippine Industrial Corporation
(FPIC) in Makati City.
Respondent FPI C operates two pipelines since 1969, viz: ( 1) the White Oil Pipeline
(WOPL) System, which covers a 117-kilometer stretch from Batangas to the Pandacan
Terminal in Manila and transports diesel, gasoline, jet fuel and kerosene; and (b) the
Black Oil Pipeline (BOPL) System which extends 105 kilometers and transports
bunker fuel from Batangas to a depot in Sucat, Parañaque. These systems transport
nearly 60% of the petroleum requirements of Metro Manila and parts of the provinces
of Bulacan, Laguna, and Rizal.
In May 2010, however, a leakage from one of the pipelines was suspected after the
residents of West Tower Condominium (West Tower) started to smell gas within the
condominium. A search made on July 10, 2010 within the condominium premises led
to the discovery of a fuel leak from the wall of its Basement 2. Owing to its inability to
control the flow, West Tower's management reported the matter to the Police
Department of Makati City, which in turn called the city's Bureau of Fire Protection.
What started as a two-drum leak at the initial stages became a 15-20 drum a day
affair. Eventually, the sump pit of the condominium was ordered shut down by the
City of Makati to prevent the discharge of contaminated water into the drainage
system of Barangay Bangkal. Eventually, the fumes compelled the residents of West
Tower to abandon their respective units on July 23, 2010 and the condo's power was
shut down.
Petitioner FPIC initially disowned any leak from its oil pipeline. Thus, the residents of
West Tower shouldered the expenses of hauling the waste water from its basement,
which eventually required the setting up of a treatment plant in the area to separate
fuel from the waste water. On October 28,
2010, the University of the Philippines-National Institute of Geological Sciences (UP-
NIGS), which the City of Makati invited to determine the source of the fuel, found a
leak in FPIC's WOPL about 86 meters from West Tower.
A day after, or on October 29, 2010, FPIC admitted that indeed the source of the fuel
leak is the WOPL, which was already closed since October 24, 2010, but denied
liability by placing blame on the construction activities on the roads surrounding
West Tower.
On November 15, 2010, West Tower Condominium Corporation (West Tower Corp.)
interposed the present Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan on behalf of the
residents of West Tower and in representation of the surrounding communities in
Barangay Bangkal, Makati City. West Tower Corp. also alleged that it is joined by the
civil society and several people's organizations, nongovernmental organizations and
public interest groups who have expressed their intent to join the suit because of the
magnitude of the environmental issues involved.1
In their petition, petitioners prayed that respondents FPIC and its board of directors
and officers, and First Gen Corporation (FGC) and its board of directors and officers
be directed to: (1) permanently cease and desist from committing acts of negligence in
the performance of their functions as a common carrier; (2) continue to check the
structural integrity of the whole 117-kilometer pipeline and to replace the same; (3)
make periodic reports on their findings with regard to the 117-kilometer pipeline and
their replacement of the same; (4) rehabilitate and restore the environment, especially
Barangay Bangkal and West Tower, at least to what it was before the signs of the leak
became manifest; and (5) to open a special trust fund to answer for similar and future
contingencies in the future. Furthermore, petitioners pray that respondents be
prohibited from opening the pipeline and allowing the use thereof until the same has
been thoroughly checked and replaced, and be temporarily restrained from operating
the pipeline until the final resolution of the case.
On November 19, 2010, the Court issued the Writ of Kalikasan2 with a Temporary
Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) requiring respondents FPIC, FGC, and the
members of their Boards of Directors to file their respective verified returns. The
TEPO enjoined FPIC and FGC to: (a) cease and desist from operating the WOPL until
further orders; (b) check the structural integrity of the whole span of the 11 7-
kilometer WOPL while implementing sufficient measures to prevent and avert any
untoward incident that may result from any leak of the pipeline; and ( c) make a
report thereon within 60 days from receipt thereof.
They alleged... that: petitioners had no legal capacity to institute the petition; there is
no allegation that the environmental damage affected the inhabitants of two (2) or
more cities or provinces; and the continued operation of the pipeline should be
allowed in the interest of maintaining... adequate petroleum supply to the public.
Verified Return... claiming that not all requirements for the issuance of the Writ of
Kalikasan are present and there is no showing that West Tower Corp. was authorized
by all those it claimed to represent.
Issues:
1. Whether petitioner West Tower Corp. has the legal capacity to represent the other
petitioners and whether the other petitioners, apart from the residents of West Tower
and Barangay Bangkal, are real parties-in-interest;
2. Whether a Permanent Environmental Protection Order should be issued to direct
the respondents to perform or to desist from performing acts in order to protect,
preserve, and rehabilitate the affected environment;
3. Whether a special trust fund should be opened by respondents to answer for future
similar contingencies;
4. Whether FGC and the directors and officers of respondents FPIC and FGC may be
held liable under the environmental protection order.
Ruling:
Petitioners as Real Parties-in-Interest
We agree with the CA that petitioners who are affected residents of West Tower and
Barangay Bangkal have the requisite concern to be real parties-in-interest to pursue
the instant petition. Organizations that indicated their intention to join the petition
and submitted proof of juridical personality including the Catholic Bishops'
Conference of the Philippines, Kilusang Makabansang Ekonomiya, Inc., Women's
Business Council of the Philippines, Inc., Junior Chambers International Philippines,
Inc. - San Juan Chapter, Zonta Club of Makati Ayala Foundations, and the
Consolidated Mansions Condominium Corporation, as petitioners in the case, the
Court already granted their intervention in the present controversy in the adverted
July 30, 2013 Resolution. This is so considering that the filing of a petition for the
issuance of a writ of kalikasan under Sec. 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases does not require that a petitioner be directly affected by an
environmental disaster. The rule clearly allows juridical persons to file the petition on
behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
violated, or threatened with violation.
Propriety of Converting the TEPO to PEPO or its Lifting in light of the DOE
Certification of the WOPL's Commercial Viability
With respect to leak detection, FPIC claims that it has in place systems that seeks to
regulate and check the pipelines in place.
The CA, however, observed that all of these tests and measures are inconclusive and
insufficient for purposes of leak detection and pipeline integrity maintenance. Hence,
considering the necessary caution and level of assurance required to ensure that the
WOPL system is free from leaks and is safe for commercial operation, the CA
recommended that FPIC obtain from the DOE a certification that the WOPL is already
safe for commercial operation. This certification, according to the CA, was to be
issued with due consideration of the adoption by FPIC of the appropriate leak
detection systems to monitor sufficiently the entire WOPL and the need to replace
portions of the pipes with existing patches and sleeves. Sans the required certification,
use of the WOPL shall remain abated.
The Court found this recommendation of the appellate court proper. Hence, We
required FPIC to obtain the adverted DOE Certification in Our July 30, 2013
Resolution. We deemed it proper to require said certification from the DOE
considering that the core issue of this case requires the specialized knowledge and
special expertise of the DOE and various other administrative agencies. On October
25, 2013, the DOE submitted the certification pursuant to the July 30, 2013
Resolution of the Court. Later, however, on August 5, 2014, DOE Secretary Carlos
Jericho I. Petilla submitted a letter recommending certain activities and the timetable
for the resumption of the WOPL operations after conducting a dialogue between the
concerned government agencies and FPIC.
Propriety of the Creation of a Special Trust Fund
A reading of the petition and the motion for partial reconsideration readily reveals
that the prayer is for the creation of a trust fund for similar future contingencies. This
is clearly outside the limited purpose of a special trust fund under the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases, which is to rehabilitate or restore the
environment that has presumably already suffered. Hence, the Court affirms with
concurrence the observation of the appellate court that the prayer is but a claim for
damages, which is prohibited by the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. As
such, the Court is of the considered view that the creation of a special trust fund is
misplaced. The present ruling on petitioners' prayer for the creation of a special trust
fund in the instant recourse, however, is without prejudice to the judgment/s that
may be rendered in the civil and/or criminal cases filed by petitioners arising from the
same incident if the payment of damages is found warranted.
Liability of FPIC, FGC and their respective Directors and Officers
The Court will refrain from ruling on the finding of the CA that the individual
directors and officers of FPIC and FGC are not liable due to the explicit rule in the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental cases that in a petition for a writ of kalikasan,
the Court cannot grant the award of damages to individual petitioners under Rule 7,
Sec. 15(e) of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. As duly noted by the
CA, the civil case and criminal complaint filed by petitioners against respondents are
the proper proceedings to ventilate and determine the individual liability of
respondents, if any, on their exercise of corporate powers and the management of
FPIC relative to the dire environmental impact of the dumping of petroleum products
stemming from the leak in the WOPL in Barangay Bangkal, Makati City. Hence, the
Court will not rule on the alleged liability on the part of the FPIC and FGC officials
which can, however, be properly resolved in the civil and criminal cases now pending
against them.
Segovia v Climate Change Commission
Doctrine: Mandamus lies to compel the performance of duties that are purely
ministerial in nature, not those that are discretionary, and the official can only be
directed by mandamus to act but not to act one way or the other.
Ponente: Justice Caguioa
Facts: To address the clamor for a more tangible response to climate change, Former
Pres. Arroyo issued AO 171 which created the Presidential Task Force on Climate
Change (PTFCC). It was reorganized through EO 774, which contained the Road
Sharing Principle: “Those who have less in wheels must have more in road.” In 2009,
AO 254 was issued mandating DOTC to formulate a nation Environmentally
Sustainable Transport Strategy, which similarly included the Road Sharing Principle.
Later, Congress passed the Climate Change Act which created the Climate Change
Commission and absorbed the functions of the PTFCC. Then, petitioners requested
the CCC to implement the Road Sharing Principle but did not receive a response.
Hence, this petition.
The petitioners filed for the issuance of writs of kalikasan and continuing mandamus
to compel the implementation of the Climate Change Act, Clean Air Act, EO 774, AO
254 and AO 171. They contend that respondents’ failure to implement the foregoing
resulted in the violation of their right to a healthful and balanced ecology.
Issues:
WoN the petitioners have standing
WoN the petition should be dismissed for failure to adhere to the doctrine of the
hierarchy of courts
WoN a writ of kalikasan and/or continuing mandamus should issue
Held:
For the writ of kalikasan, yes. For the writ of continuing mandamus, no. The RPEC
liberalized the requirements on standing, allowing the filing of citizen suits for the
enforcement of rights and obligations under environmental laws. However, while in a
petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan, it is sufficient that the person filing
represents the inhabitants prejudiced by the environmental damage subject of the
writ, a petition for the issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus is only available to
one who is personally aggrieved by the unlawful act or omission.
No. A direct resort to the Supreme Court for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan may be
allowed by way of exception where its necessity is dictated by public welfare. Thus, it
is ultimately within the Court’s discretion whether or not to accept the petitions
brought before it.
No. Both petitions must fail.
For a writ of kalikasan to issue, the following requisites must concur:
1. There is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced
and healthful ecology;
2. The actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or private individual or entity; and
3. The actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage
of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or
more cities or provinces.
It is well-settled that a party claiming the privilege for the issuance of a writ of
kalikasan has to show that a law, rule or regulation was violated or would be violated.
In this case, there was none. The correlations made by the petitioners on the current
state of air quality, alleging that it was a result of failure to implement the
environmental laws lacks merit. On the contrary, respondents have shown that they
were indeed able to implement the law through different projects and actions.
Similarly, the writ of continuing mandamus cannot issue.
First, the petitioners failed to show they suffered personal injury.
Second, the Road Sharing Principle is precisely as it is denominated – a principle.
Unless there were specific provisions in the law requiring the implementing agencies
to take a specific course of action to implement the principle, then they cannot be
compelled to do so, and failure to do so will not make them liable. Mandamus lies to
compel the performance of duties that are purely ministerial in nature, not those that
are discretionary, and the official can only be directed by mandamus to act but not to
act one way or the other. The duty being enjoined in mandamus must be one
according to the terms provided in the law itself. Thus, the recognized rule is that, in
the performance of an official duty or act involving discretion, the corresponding
official can only be directed by mandamus to act, but not to act one way or the other.
In this case, what the petitioners are seeking is to compel the performance not of a
ministerial act, but a discretionary act.
Rule 8
INTERNATIONAL SERVICE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF AGRI-BIOTECH
APPLICATIONS, INC.,
vs. GREENPEACE SOUTHEAST ASIA (PHILIPPINES)
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Respondents' petition for Writ of Kalikasan was already mooted by the expiration of
the Biosafoty Permits and the completion of the field trials subject of these cases, and
with none of the exceptions to the mootness principle properly attending, the Court
grants the instant motions for reconsideration and hereby dismisses the aforesaid
petition. With this pronouncement, no discussion on the substantive merits of the
same should be made.
Background:
The instant case arose from the conduct of field trials for "bioengineered eggplants,"
known as Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) eggplant (Bt talong), administered pursuant to
the Memorandum of Undertaking (MOU) entered into by herein petitioners
University of the Philippines Los Baños Foundation, Inc. (UPLBFI) and International
Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. (ISAAA), and the
University of the Philippines Mindanao Foundation, Inc. (UPMFI), among others. Bt
talong contains the crystal toxin genes from the soil bacterium Bt, which produces
the CrylAc protein that is toxic to target insect pests. The CryAc protein is said to be
highly specific to lepidopteran larvae such as the fruit and shoot borer, the most
destructive insect pest to eggplants.
From 2007 to 2009, petitioner University of the Philippines Los Banos (UPLB), the
implementing institution of the field trials, conducted a contained experiment on Bt
talong under the supervision of the National Committee on Biosafety of the
Philippines (NCBP) to identify and evaluate potential hazards involved in initiating
genetic engineering experiments or the introduction of new species and genetically
engineered organisms and recommend measures to minimize risks";
and (b) ''formulate and review national policies and guidelines on biosafety.
On March 16, 2010 and June 28, 2010, the Bureau of Plant Industries (BPI) issued
two (2)-year Biosafety Permits for field testing of Bt talong after UPLB's field test
proposal satisfactorily completed biosafety risk assessment for field testing pursuant
to the Department of Agriculture's (DA) Administrative Order No. 8, series of 2002.
Consequently, field testing proceeded in approved trial sites in North Cotabato,
Pangasinan, Camarines Sur, Davao City, and Laguna.
Facts: On April 26, 2012, respondents Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines)
(Greenpeace), Magsasaka at Siyentipiko sa Pagpapaunlad ng Agrikultura
(MASIPAG), and others (respondents) filed before the Court a Petition for Writ of
Continuing Mandamus and Writ of Kalikasan with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO)18 (petition for Writ
of Kalikasan) against herein petitioners the Environmental Management Bureau
(EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), the BPI
and the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA) of the DA, UPLBFI, and ISAAA, and
UPMFI, alleging that the Bt talong field trials violated their constitutional right to
health and a balanced ecology considering, among others, that:
(a) the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC), as required by Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 1151, was not secured prior to the field trials;
(b) the required public consultations under the Local Government Code (LGC) were
not complied with;
(c) as a regulated article under DAO 08-2002, Bt talong is presumed harmful to
human health and the environment, and that there is no independent, peer-reviewed
study showing its safety for human consumption and the environment.
On May 2, 2012, the Court issued a Writ of Kalikasan against petitioners (except
UPLB) and UPMFI, ordering them to make a verified return within a non-extendible
period of ten (10) days, as provided for in Section 8, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases. Thus, in compliance therewith, ISAAA, EMB/BPI/FPA,
UPLBFI, and UPMFI filed their respective verified returns, and therein maintained
that: (a) all environmental laws were complied with, including the required public
consultations in the affected communities; (b) an ECC was not required for the field
trials as it will not significantly affect the environment nor pose a hazard to human
health; (c) there is a plethora of scientific works and literature, peer-reviewed, on the
safety of Bt talong for human consumption; (d) at any rate, the safety of Bt talong for
human consumption is irrelevant because none of the eggplants will be consumed by
humans or animals and all materials not used for analyses will be chopped, boiled,
and buried following the conditions of the Biosafety Permits; and (e) the
precautionary principle could not be applied as the field testing was only a part of a
continuing study to ensure that such trials have no significant and negative impact on
the environment.
In a Decision35 dated May 17, 2013, the CA ruled in favor of respondents and directed
petitioners to pemanently cease and desist from conducting the Bt talong field
trials.36 At the outset, it did not find merit in petitioners' contention that the case
should be dismissed on the ground of mootness, noting that the issues raised by the
latter were "capable of repetition yet evading review" since the Bt talong field trial was
just one of the phases or stages of an overall and bigger study that is being conducted
in relation to the said genetically-modified organism.37 It then held that the
precautionary principle set forth under Section 1,38 Rule 20 of the Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases39 is relevant, considering the Philippines' rich biodiversity
and uncertainty surrounding the safety of Bt talong. It noted the possible irreversible
effects of the field trials and the introduction of Bt talong to the market, and found the
existing regulations issued by the DA and the Department of Science and Technology
(DOST) insufficient to guarantee the safety of the environment and the health of the
people.40
Aggrieved, petitioners filed their respective petitions for review on certiorari before
this Court.
Issues:
(a) the case should have been dismissed for mootness in view of the completion and
termination of the Bt talong field trials and the expiration of the Biosafety Permits;
(b) the Court should not have ruled on the validity of DAO 08-2002 as it was not
raised as an issue
Ruling: respondents petition for Writ of Kalikasan, were mooted by the undisputed
expiration of the Biosafety Permits issued by the BPI and the completion and
termination of the Bt talong field trials subject of the same.82 These incidents
effectively negated the necessity for the reliefs sought by respondents in their petition
for Writ of Kalikasan as there was no longer any field test to enjoin.
The Supreme Court of the Philippines upheld a lower court decision invalidating an
administrative order governing import and release of genetically-modified organisms
(GMOs) in the Philippines. The Court addressed a range of issues, from standing and
mootness to application of the precautionary principle. On the procedural claims by
the petitioners that the case was moot and “academic” because all field trials had been
suspended, the Supreme Court found the paramount public interest in the case and
the fact that the legal issues were capable of repetition yet evading review justified the
Court’s review of the case. Page 38. The Court also noted the petitioners were
warranted in seeking judicial review because the biotechnology administrative
framework does not provide “a speedy, or adequate remedy.”

The decision explains the current controversy over GMOs and, in particular,
genetically-modified food crops for human consumption. Drawing on research and
case studies from around the world, and the testimony of expert witnesses, the
Supreme Court found there to be no consensus on the safety of Bt talong to humans
and the environment, stating “[t]hese divergent views of local scientists reflect the
continuing international debate on GMOs and the varying degrees of acceptance of
GM technology by states . . . .” The Court also cautioned that the “uncertainties
generated by conflicting scientific findings or limited research [are] not diminished by
extensive use at present of GM technology in agriculture.”
Invoking the precautionary principle, the Supreme Court blocked further field trials of
Bt talong until regulatory systems governing the import and release of GMOs are
strengthened. “When these features - uncertainty, the possibility of irreversible harm,
and the possibility of serious harm - coincide, the case for the precautionary principle
is strongest. When in doubt, cases must be resolved in favor of the constitutional right
to a balanced and healthful ecology.” The Court proceeded to nullify DAO 08-2002
and enjoined applications for contained use, field testing, propagation and
commercialization, and importation of any GMOs until a new administrative order is
adopted.
All told, with respondents' petition for Writ of Kalikasan already mooted by the
expiration of the Biosafoty Permits and the completion of the field trials subject of
these cases, and with none of the exceptions to the mootness principle properly
attending, the Court grants the instant motions for reconsideration and hereby
dismisses the aforesaid petition. With this pronouncement, no discussion on the
substantive merits of the same should be made.
T.N. Godavarman VS. Union of India & Ors
2 SCC 267 (1997)
Verma, J.Kirpal., B.
FACTS
In 1995, T.N. Godavarman Thirumulkpad filed writ petition with the Supreme Court
of India to protect the Niligris Forest Land from Deforestation by illegal timber
operations.
In view of the great significance of the points involved in these matters, relating to the
protection and conservation of the forests throughout the country, the Court formed
the opinion that the matters required a further indepth hearing to examine all the
aspects relation to the National Forest Policy.
It considered that certain interim directions were necessary to oversee the
enforcement of forest laws across the nation. The Court examined in detail all the
aspect of the National Forest Policy, the forest conservation act, 1980, which was
enacted with a view to check further deforestation.
Section 2 of the Forest Conservation Act specifies that no state government or other
authority may allow the use of any forest land for any non-forestry purpose without
prior approval from the Central Government.
RULE 2,7,8
Dolot vs Paje
Facts:
On September 15, 2011, petitioner Maricris D. Dolot (Dolot), together with the parish
priest of the Holy Infant Jesus Parish and the officers of Alyansa Laban sa Mina sa
Matnog (petitioners), filed a petition for continuing mandamus, damages and
attorney’s fees with the RTC of Sorsogon, docketed as Civil Case No. 2011-8338.4 The
petition contained the following pertinent allegations: (1) sometime in 2009, they
protested the iron ore mining operations being conducted by Antones Enterprises,
Global Summit Mines Development Corporation and TR Ore in Barangays Balocawe
and Bon-ot Daco, located in the Municipality of Matnog, to no avail; (2) Matnog is
located in the southern tip of Luzon and there is a need to protect, preserve and
maintain the geological foundation of the municipality; (3) Matnog is susceptible to
flooding and landslides, and confronted with the environmental dangers of flood
hazard, liquefaction, ground settlement, ground subsidence and landslide hazard; (4)
after investigation, they learned that the mining operators did not have the required
permit to operate; (5) Sorsogon Governor Raul Lee and his predecessor Sally Lee
issued to the operators a small-scale mining permit, which they did not have authority
to issue; (6) the representatives of the Presidential Management Staff and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), despite knowledge, did
not do anything to protect the interest of the people of Matnog;5 and (7) the
respondents violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076 or the People’s Small-Scale Mining
Act of 1991, R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and the Local
Government Code.6 Thus, they prayed for the following reliefs: (1) the issuance of a
writ commanding the respondents to immediately stop the mining operations in the
Municipality of Matnog; (2) the issuance of a temporary environment protection
order or TEPO; (3) the creation of an inter-agency group to undertake the
rehabilitation of the mining site; (4) award of damages; and (5) return of the iron ore,
among others.7
The case was referred by the Executive Judge to the RTC of Sorsogon, Branch 53
being the designated environmental court.8 In the Order9 dated September 16, 2011,
the case was summarily dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the
Resolution10 dated October 18, 2011. Aside from sustaining the dismissal of the case
for lack of jurisdiction, the RTC11 further ruled that: (1) there was no final court
decree, order or decision yet that the public officials allegedly failed to act on, which is
a condition for the issuance of the writ of continuing mandamus; (2) the case was
prematurely filed as the petitioners therein failed to exhaust their administrative
remedies; and (3) they also failed to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the
complaint to the government or appropriate agency, as required by the rules
Issues:
WoN RTC SORSOGON has Jurisdiction
The RTC cannot solely rely on SC A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 and
confine itself within its four corners in determining whether it had jurisdiction over
the action filed by the petitioners.
None is more well-settled than the rule that jurisdiction, which is the power and
authority of the court to hear, try and decide a case, is conferred by law.16 It may
either be over the nature of the action, over the subject matter, over the person of the
defendants or over the issues framed in the pleadings.17 By virtue of Batas Pambansa
(B.P.) Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, jurisdiction over special
civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is vested in the RTC.
Particularly, Section 21(1) thereof provides that the RTCs shall exercise original
jurisdiction –
in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions.
(Emphasis ours)
A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 was issued pursuant to Section 18 of B.P.
Blg. 129, which gave the Court authority to define the territory over which a branch of
the RTC shall exercise its authority. These administrative orders and circulars issued
by the Court merely provide for the venue where an action may be filed. The Court
does not have the power to confer jurisdiction on any court or tribunal as the
allocation of jurisdiction is lodged solely in Congress.18 It also cannot be delegated to
another office or agency of the Government.19 Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, in fact,
explicitly states that the territory thus defined shall be deemed to be the territorial
area of the branch concerned for purposes of determining the venue of all suits,
proceedings or actions
The RTC need not be reminded that venue relates only to the place of trial or the
geographical location in which an action or proceeding should be brought and does
not equate to the jurisdiction of the court. It is intended to accord convenience to the
parties, as it relates to the place of trial, and does not restrict their access to the
courts.22Consequently, the RTC’s motu proprio dismissal of Civil Case No. 2011-8338
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction is patently incorrect. It should have referred the
case to the appropriate venue which is the RTC of Irosin
WoN lack of JA is a ground for the immediate dismissal of the case.
The Court also finds that the RTC erred in ruling that the petition is infirm for failure
to attach judicial affidavits. As previously stated, Rule 8 requires that the petition
should be verified, contain supporting evidence and must be accompanied by a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping. There is nothing in Rule 8 that compels the
inclusion of judicial affidavits, albeit not prohibited. It is only if the evidence of the
petitioner would consist of testimony of witnesses that it would be the time that
judicial affidavits (affidavits of witnesses in the question and answer form) must be
attached to the petition/complaint
WoN Final Decision is needed for Continuing Mandamus
Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an environmental case directing
any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof to perform an act
or series of acts decreed by final judgment which shall remain effective until judgment
is fully satisfied. (Emphasis ours)
The final court decree, order or decision erroneously alluded to by the RTC actually
pertains to the judgment or decree that a court would eventually render in an
environmental case for continuing mandamus and which judgment or decree shall
subsequently become final.
Under the Rules, after the court has rendered a judgment in conformity with Rule 8,
Section 7 and such judgment has become final, the issuing court still retains
jurisdiction over the case to ensure that the government agency concerned is
performing its tasks as mandated by law and to monitor the effective performance of
said tasks. It is only upon full satisfaction of the final judgment, order or decision that
a final return of the writ shall be made to the court and if the court finds that the
judgment has been fully implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in
the court docket.34 A writ of continuing mandamus is, in essence, a command of
continuing compliance with a final judgment as it "permits the court to retain
jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the successful implementation of the
reliefs mandated under the court’s decision
Braga v. Abaya RULE 4-7-8
Brion, J.
Doctrine: Petition for Writ of Kalikasan cannot be invoked absent clear showing of the
threatened environmental damage to 2 cities/municipalities, especially when project
is still under negotiation. Same rule applies with petition for Writ of CM due to
absence of definite proponent who may be compelled under law.
Facts:
An urgent petition for a Writ of Continuing Mandamus and/or Writ of Kalikasan with
a prayer for issuance of TEPO
Filed against DOTC and Phil. Ports Authority assailing their modernization project of
the Sasa Wharf in Davao under the Public-Private Partnership Scheme (PPP)
Petitioner alleges that:
DOTC issued the notice of public bidding despite failure to comply with the Local
Government Code which requires consultations with Sanggunian of Davao City
Failure to procure and ECC under PD 1586
Respondent, through OSG:
Invoked the prematurity of petition
Project is still under bidding and thus there is no proponent yet of the project to
which the complaint may be filed against
Even if there is, the proponent is not the government but the private party
Issue: WON petition is meritorious & writs prayed for can be granted
Held:
Petition is not meritorious because it is PREMATURE. The project has not yet even
reached the construction stage.
Writ of Continuing Mandamus cannot be resorted to when:
The respondent is NOT the person obliged to perform the duty under the law; or
When the period for respondent to perform its legal duty has not yet expired
Writ of Kalikasan cannot be granted
Condition sine qua non for this writ: Such magnitude that would negatively affect
health and cause environmental damage
Petitioner failed to identify particular threats from the project itself; failed to show
clear environmental risk that threatens to prejudice the inhabitants of 2 or more
cities/municipalities because bidding process itself cannot conceivably cause any
environmental damage
RULE 9
Monge v. People of the Philippines
TINGA, J.,
Facts
On 20 July 1994, petitioner Monge and Potencio were found by barangay tanods
Serdan and Molina in possession of and transporting three (3) pieces of mahogany
lumber in Barangay Santo Domingo, Iriga City. Right there and then, the tanods
demanded that they be shown the requisite permit and/or authority from the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) but neither petitioner
nor Potencio was able to produce any. Petitioner fled the scene in that instant whereas
Potencio was brought to the police station for interrogation, and thereafter, to the
DENR-Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO).The
DENR-CENRO issued a seizure receipt for the three pieces of lumber indicating that
the items, totaling 77 board feet of mahogany valued at P1,925.00, had been seized
from Potencio.
At the 26 November 1996 arraignment, petitioner entered a negative plea.
Trial ensued. On 17 June 1997, Serdan testified on the circumstances of the
apprehension but for failing to appear in court for cross examination, his testimony
was stricken out. On 16 January 1998, Potencio was discharged to be used as a state
witness on motion of the prosecutor.Accordingly, he testified on the circumstances of
the arrest but claimed that for a promised fee he was merely requested by petitioner,
the owner of the log, to assist him in hauling the same down from the mountain.
Potencios testimony was materially corroborated by Molina. Petitioner did not contest
the allegations, except that it was not he but Potencio who owned the lumber. He
lamented that contrary to what Potencio had stated in court, it was the latter who
hired him to bring the log from the site to the sawmill where the same was to be sawn
into pieces.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty for the possession and transportation of
mahogany lumber?
Ruling:
Yes. The petioner is guilty for the possession and transportation of mahogany lumber.
Petitioner and Potencio were caught in flagrante delicto transporting, and thus in
possession of, processed mahogany lumber without proper authority from the DENR.
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, criminalizes two distinct and
separate offenses, namely: (a) the cutting, gathering, collecting and removing of
timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land without any authority; and (b) the
possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required
under existing laws and regulations.
It is thus clear that the fact of possession by petitioner and Potencio of the subject
mahogany lumber and their subsequent failure to produce the requisite legal
documents, taken together, has already given rise to criminal liability under Section
68 of P.D. No. 705, particularly the second act punished thereunder.
John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid and Pedro Hernandez vs People of the Philippines
(Ponente: Carpio)
Doctrine: Duplicity of charges means a single complaint or information charges more
than on offense. The filing of several charges is proper. A single act or incident might
offend two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the
prosecution for more than one offense. The only limit is double jeopardy.
Facts: Loney, Reid and Hernandez are the President, CEO and Senior Manager and
Resident Manager for Mining Operation of Marcopper in Marinduque. Marcopper
built concrete plug at the tunnels discharging tons of tailing into Boac and Makalupnit
rivers.
DOJ then filed separate charges against the petitioners in MTC Marinduque for
violation of Art. 19 of PD 1067 or the Water code of the Philippines, Section 8 of PD
984 or the National Pollution Control Decree, Section 108 of RA 7942 or the
Philippine Mining Act of 2005 and Art. 365 of the RPC for reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property.
Petitioners moved to quash the information saying that the (1) information was
duplicitous for it charges more than one offense for a single act, (2) that Loney and
Reid were not yet officers when this incident took place and (3) that the informations
contain allegations which constitute legal excuse or justification.
MTC: partially granted the quashing of the informations for violation of PD 1067 and
PD 984 but maintained violation of RA 7942 and RPC. MTC then issued a
consolidated order in so far as the offense against RPC. With such, petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari with RTC-Marinduque assailing the Consolidated Order.
RTC: granted appeal but denied the petition for certiorari. Consolidated Order was
affirmed and ordered the reinstatement of the informations pertaining to the violation
of PD 1967 and PD 984. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA alleging
grave abuse of discretion reiterating the defense that the informations were made out
from a single act.
CA: affirmed RTC
Issues: Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed
for duplicity of charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Damage to Property should stand.
Ruling: No duplicity. Duplicity of charges means a single complaint or information
charges more than on offense. The filing of several charges is proper. A single act or
incident might offend two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law
thus justifying the prosecution for more than one offense. The only limit is double
jeopardy.
Duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or information charges more
than one offense, as Section 13 of Rule 11020 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
clearly states:
Duplicity of offense. – A complaint or information must charge but one offense,
except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for
various offenses.
In short, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information
charges more than one offense.21
Under Section 3(e), Rule 11722 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, duplicity of
offenses in a single information is a ground to quash the Information. The Rules
prohibit the filing of such Information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing his
defense.23 Here, however, the prosecution charged each petitioner with four offenses,
with each Information charging only one offense. Thus, petitioners erroneously
invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the Informations. On this score
alone, the petition deserves outright denial.
As early as the start of the last century, this Court had ruled that a single act or
incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions
of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one offense.24 The
only limit to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be twice
put in jeopardy of punishment for “the same offense.”25 In People v. Doriquez,26 we
held that two (or more) offenses arising from the same act are not “the same” —
x x x if one provision [of law] requires proof of an additional fact or element which the
other does not, x x x. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the
same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a
prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each
crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the
other.27 (Emphasis supplied)
Here, double jeopardy is not at issue because not all of its elements are
present.28 However, for the limited purpose of controverting petitioners’ claim that
they should be charged with one offense only, we quote with approval Branch 94’s
comparative analysis of PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942, and Article 365 of the RPC
showing that in each of these laws on which petitioners were charged, there is one
essential element not required of the others.
People vs. Dator
Facts:
Police officers confiscated pieces of lumber from an Isuzu cargo for failure of the
driver, accused Benito Genol, to show the required documents for the proper
transport of the pieces of lumber consisting of forty-one (41) pieces of Dita lumber
and ten (10) pieces of Antipolo lumber with a total volume of 1,560.16 board feet.
Pastor Telen, owner of lumber, testified that the lumber will be used in renovating his
residence. Boy Leonor, who was the Officer in Charge of CENRO Maasin, Southern
Leyte allegedly allowed Telen to cut the aging Dita trees only. According to Telen,
Leonor assured him that a written permit was not anymore necessary before he could
cut the Dita trees, which are considered soft lumber, from the private land of his
mother, provided the same would be used exclusively for the renovation of his house
and that he shall plant trees as replacement thereof, which he did by planting
Gemelina seedlings.The trial court convicted Pastor Telen of violation of Sec 68 of PD
No. 705 which Telen appealed.
Issue:
WON Legal Documents / Permit is still required for cutting/transporting the soft
lumber.
Held:
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction.
The fact of possession by the appellant of the subject lumber, as well as his
subsequent failure to produce the legal documents as required under existing forest
laws and regulations constitute criminal liability for violation of Presidential Decree
No. 705, Section 68.
The appellant stands charged with the crime of violation of Section 68 of PD No. 705,
a special statutory law, and which crime is considered mala prohibita. In the
prosecution for crimes that are considered mala prohibita, the only inquiry is whether
or not the law has been violated. The motive or intention underlying the act of the
appellant is immaterial for the reason that his mere possession of the confiscated
pieces of lumber without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws
and regulations gave rise to his criminal liability.
Under the DENR Administrative Order No. 78, Series of 1987, a certification from the
CENRO concerned to the effect that the forest products came from a titled land or tax
declared alienable and disposable land must still be secured to accompany the
shipment. This the appellant failed to do, thus, he is criminally liable under Section 68
of PD No. 705 necessitating prior acquisition of permit and “legal documents as
required under existing forest laws and regulations.”
Roldan vs. Arca (nasa book ito)
FACTS:
Respondent company filed a case against Roldan, Jr. for the recovery of fishing vessel
Tony Lex VI which had been seized and impounded by petitioner Fisheries
Commissioner through the Philippine Navy. The CFI Manila granted it, thus
respondent company took Possession of the vessel Tony Lex VI.- Petitioner requested
the Philippine Navy to apprehend vessels Tony Lex VI and Tony Lex III, also
respectively called Srta. Winnie and Srta. Agnes, for alleged violations of some
provisions of the Fisheries Act. On August 5 or 6, 1965, the two fishing boats were
actually seized for illegal fishing with dynamite.
ISSUE:
WON the seizure of the vessel, its equipment and dynamites therein was valid.
HELD:
YES. Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations
of the customs laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional
requirement of a search warrant, because the vessel can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought before such
warrant could be secured; hence it is not practicable to require a search warrant
before such search or seizure can be constitutionally effected. The same exception
should apply to seizures of fishing vessels breaching our fishery laws. They are usually
equipped with powerful motors that enable them to elude pursuing ships of the
Philippine Navy or Coast Guard. Under our Rules of Court, a police officer or a private
individual may, without a warrant, arrest a person(a) who has committed, is actually
committing or is about to commit an offense in his presence; (b) who is reasonably
believed to have committed an offense which has been actually committed; or (c) who
is a prisoner who has escaped from confinement while serving a final judgment or
from temporary detention during the pendency of his case or while being transferred
from one confinement to another. In the case at bar, the members of the crew of the
two vessels were caught in flagrante illegally fishing with dynamite and without the
requisite license. Thus their apprehension without a warrant of arrest while
committing a crime is lawful. Consequently, the seizure of the vessel, its equipment
and dynamites therein was equally valid as an incident to a lawful arrest.
MUSTANG LUMBER, INC VS. CA
(J. Davide, Jr., 1996) [RULE 11 – ARREST]
DOCTRINE: Search of a moving vehicle is one of the five doctrinally accepted
exceptions to the constitutional mandate[34] that no search or seizure shall be made
except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the
existence of probable cause. The other exceptions are (1) search as an incident to a
lawful arrest, (2) seizure of evidence in plain view, (3) customs searches, and (4)
consented warrantless search.[35]
FACTS: On 1 April 1990, Special Actions and Investigation Division (SAID), acting on
information that a huge pile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen inside the
lumberyard of Mustang Lumber, conducted a surveillance at Mustang lumberyard.
The team saw a truck loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber coming out of the
lumberyard. Since the driver could not produce the required invoices and transport
documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them at
DENR compound. On 3 April 1990, RTC Valenzuela issued a search warrant. On same
day, the team seized from the lumberyard narra shorts, trimmings and slabs, narra
lumber, and various species of lumber and shorts. On 4 April 1990, team returned to
lumberyard and placed under administrative seizure (owner retains physical
possession of seized articles, only an inventory is taken) the remaining
lumber because Mustang Lumber failed to produce required documents
upondemand. Upon recommendation of SAID Chief Robles, DENR Sec Factoran
suspended Mustang Lumber¶s permit and confiscated in favor of the gov¶t the seized
articles. Mustang Lumber filed for a TRO against Factoran and Robles, and
questioned the validity of the April 1 and 4 seizure. RTC held that the warrantless
seizure on April 1 is valid as it comes within the exceptions where warrantless seizure
is justified (search of a moving vehicle), and April 4 seizure was also valid pursuant to
the search warrant issued on April 3. CA affirmed. Mustang lumber filed a petition for
review on certiorari.
ISSUES: a) WON the search and seizure on April 4 was valid.
HELD: Yes. The search and seizures made on April 1, 3, 4 were all valid. valid. (1)
April 1 search was conducted on a moving vehicle, which could be Lawfully conducted
without a search warrant. (2) The search on April 4 was a continuation of the search
on April 3 done under and by virtue of the search warrant issued on 3 April 1990 by
Exec Judge Osorio. Under ROC Rule 126 Sec 9, a search warrant ahs a lifetime of 10
days. Hence, it could be served at any time within the said period, and if its object or
purpose cannot be accomplished in 1 day, the same may be continued the following
day or days until completed, provided it is still within the 10-day period.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition is denied. CA did not commit any reversible error in affirming
RTC judgment. Search and seizure done was valid
RULE 12
SEA LION FISHING CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
When an instrument or tool used in a crime is being claimed by a third-party not
liable to the offense, such third-party must first establish its ownership over the same.
Facts:
In response to fishermen's report of poaching off Mangsee Island in Balabac,
Palawan, a combined team of Philippine Marines, Coast Guard and barangay officials
conducted search and seizure operations therein. There they found F/V Sea Lion
anchored three nautical miles northwest of Mangsee Island. Beside it were five boats
and a long fishing net already spread over the water. The team boarded the vessel and
apprehended her captain, a Filipino, and a crew composed of three Filipinos and three
Chinese. Also arrested were 17 Chinese fishermen aboard F/V Sea Lion.
Various charges were thereafter filed as follows: (1) Violation of Section 97[7] of
Republic Act (RA) No. 8550[8] against all those arrested, docketed as I.S. No. 2004-
032; (2) Violation of Section 90[9] of the same law against the captain of F/V Sea
Lion, the Chief Engineer, and the President of the corporation which owned said
vessel, docketed as I.S. No. 2004-061; and (3) Violation of Section 27(a) and (f)[10] of
RA 9147[11] and of Section 87[12] of RA 8550 against all those arrested and the
President of the corporation which owned the vessel, respectively docketed as I.S.
Nos. 2004-68, 2004-69, and 2004-70.
The Provincial Prosecutor of Palawan nevertheless found probable cause for the
remaining charges[13] but only against the 17 Chinese fishermen.[14] This was after
it was found out that the crew of F/V Sea Lion did not assent to the illegal acts of said
17 Chinese fishermen who were rescued by the crew of the F/V Sea Lion from a
distressed Chinese vessel. The prosecutor concluded that the crew, unarmed,
outnumbered and hampered by language barrier, acted only out of uncontrollable fear
of imminent danger to their lives and property which hindered them from asserting
their authority over these Chinese nationals. The Fishing Vessel F/V Sea Lion 1 as well
as the fishing paraphernalia and equipments used by the accused in committing the
crime [are] hereby ordered confiscated in the favor of the government.
Petitioner contends that F/V Sea Lion should be released to it because it is the
registered owner of said vessel and her captain and crew members were not among
those accused of and convicted in Criminal Case Nos. 18965 and 19422. To buttress
its contention, petitioner invokes Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
ART. 45. Confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the crime. -
Every penalty imposed for the commission of a felony shall carry with it the forfeiture
of the proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools with which it was
committed.
Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of
the Government, unless they be the property of a third person not liable for the
offense, but those articles which are not subject of lawful commerce shall be
destroyed. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner also claims that it was denied its right to due process of law when it was not
notified of the judicial proceedings relative to the confiscation of the fishing vessel. It
argues that such notification was necessary considering that the provincial prosecutor
was duly informed of its claim of ownership of the F/V Sea Lion.
Issue:

Whether the forfeiture of F/V Sea Lion in favor of the government was proper
Ruling:
Yes. The government was correct when it forfeited F/V Sea Lion since its motion was
only filed after the judgment has been rendered and it failed to seek all remedies given
the sufficient time to do so.
The lack of any factual basis for the third-party claim of ownership was not cured at
all when the petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration before the trial court. At
that point, evidence should have been adduced to support the petitioner's claim (so
that a new trial or reopening of the trial on the confiscation aspect should have been
prayed for, rather than a mere motion for reconsideration.) There is firstly the factual
issue - to be proved by proper evidence in order to be properly considered by the court
- that the vessel is owned by a third party other than the accused. Article 45 required
too that proof be adduced that the third party is not liable for the offense. After the
admission by the accused through their guilty plea that the vessel had been used in
the commission of a crime, we believe and so hold that this additional Article 45
requirement cannot be simply inferred from the mere fact that the alleged owner is
not charged in the same case before the court.[
The public prosecutor filed, on 24 March 2000, a motion for reconsideration. Instead
of deciding the pending motion, respondent Judge deferred its resolution until after
the arraignment of the accused and the pretrial of the case would have been had.
Special Prosecutor Romeo B. Senson filed an administrative complaint against
respondent Judge for Gross Misconduct with Prayer for Preventive Suspension
asseverating that the release of the evidence had exposed said evidence to tampering
and that the deferment of the resolution of the motion for reconsideration virtually
resulted in the undue archive of the case.
In his comment, respondent contended that Republic Act No. 8550, the law under
which the accused were charged with having transgressed, did not provide for the
seizure of the fishing paraphernalia pending trial and that the prosecution still could
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt even without the evidence
being presented since it had sufficient witnesses for the purpose.

The lower court had jurisdiction over the case and the petitioner was not denied of
ISSUE: Whether the judge’s order in granting the motion is valid.
due process and gets it failed to comply with the other requirements provided in the
law.

SENSON v PANGILINAN RULING: NO, Evidently, the seizure of the fishing paraphernalia has been made as
being an incident to a lawful arrest. Rule 127, Section 12, of the Rules of Court
J. VITUG (RULE 12 – CUSTODY AND DISPOSITION OF SEIZED ITEMS)
provides:

DOCTRINE: All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information are

SEC. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest.- A person lawfully arrested may be searched
prosecuted under the direction and control of the prosecutor. The seized items
for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of
ordered released by respondent Judge have not yet been offered in evidence; hence,
an offense, without a search warrant.
the prosecution, not the court, could still be deemed to be in the legal custody and to
have the responsibility over such items.

All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information are prosecuted under

FACTS: On 14 March 2000, several persons were apprehended for violation of Section
86 of Republic Act No. 8550, also known as The Philippine Fisheries Code of
1998[1] by members of the Philippine National Police. The items seized from those
arrested included (a) 1 unit fish net, … etc. On the same day, Criminal Case No.15019
against them was filed. Three days later, Danilo Alayon and Norma Villarosa,
asserting to be the co-owners of the M/B King Fisher that was used in the illegal
fishing activity, filed an Urgent Motion for Custody of Fishing Net, alleging that the
fish net which costs no less than P600,000.00 was left unattended at the beach
exposed to the elements and movements of the sea which could cause its early
deterioration and ultimate loss. Respondent Judge, despite the vigorous objection of
the public prosecutor, granted the motion.
the direction and control of the prosecutor. The seized items ordered released by
respondent Judge have not yet been offered in evidence; hence, the prosecution, not
the court, could still be deemed to be in the legal custody and to have the
responsibility over such items.
The outcome of the criminal action will dictate the disposition of the seized
property. If found to be contraband, i.e., articles the possession of which, without
more, constitutes a crime and the repossession of which would subject defendant to
criminal penalties and frustrate the express policy against the possession of such
objects, they will not be returned, but shall be confiscated in favor of the State or
destroyed, as the case may be. If not contraband, the property shall be returned Tally Sheets.
without undue delay to the person who appears from the evidence to be the owner or
rightful possessor.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Heriberto M. Pangilinan GUILTY of Such omission is punishable under Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705
gross ignorance of the law, and he is hereby ordered to pay a fine of Ten Thousand otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code. Thus, petitioner Atty. Robles issued a
(P10,000.00) Pesos with a warning that another infraction by him will be dealt with temporary seizure order and seizure receipt for the narra lumber and the six-wheeler
severely. truck.

Factoran VS. Court of Appeals On January 20, 1989, petitioner Fulgencio S. Factoran, then Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources issued an order for the confiscation of the narra
G.R. No. 93540 lumber and the six-wheeler truck

FACTS

On August 9, 1988 two police officers of Marikina Police Station, Sub-Station III, Private respondents neither asked for reconsideration of nor appealed the said order
intercepted a six-wheeler truck carrying 4,000 board feet of narra lumber as it was to the Office of the President. Consequently, the narra lumber and six-wheeler truck
cruising along Marcos Highway. They apprehended the truck driver, private were forfeited in favor of the government and were later on advertised to be sold at a
respondent Jesus Sy, and brought the truck and its cargo to the Personnel public auction on March 20, 1989.
Investigation Committee/Special Actions and Investigation Division (PIC/SAID) of
DENR Office in Quezon City. There, petitioner Atty. Vicente Robles of the PIC/SAID
investigated them, and discovered the discrepancies in the documentation of the
On March 17, 1989, private respondents filed a complaint with prayer for the issuance
narra lumber.
of the writs of replevin and preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order for the recovery of the confiscated items, and to enjoin the panned auction sale
of the subject narra lumber, respectively.
What were declared in the documents were narra flitches, while the cargo of the truck
consisted of narra lumber. In the documents, the plate numbers of the truck supposed
to carry the cargo bear the numbers BAX-404, PEC-492 or NSN-267, while the plate
On the same day, the trial court issued an order directing the parties to desist from
of the truck apprehended is NVT-881. Considering that the cargo is lumber, the
proceeding with the planned auction sale and setting the hearing for the issuance of
transport should have been accompanied by a Certificate of Lumber Origin, scale
the writ of preliminary injunction on March 27, 1989.
sheet of said lumber and not by a Certificate of Timber Origin. The Log Sale Purchase
Agreement presented is between DSM Golden Cup International as the Seller and
Bonamy Enterprises as the buyer/consignee and not with Lily Francisco Lumber
Hardware. On March 20, 1989, private respondents filed and Ex-Parte motion for Release and
Return of Goods and Documents (Replevin) supported by an Affidavit for Issuance of
Writ of Replevin and Preliminary Injunction and a Replevin Bond in the amount of
P180,000.00. The trial court granted the writ of replevin on the same day and
These are in violation of Bureau of Forestry Development (BFD) Circular No. 10
directed the petitioners "to deliver the xxx [n]arra lumber, original documents and
which requires possession or transportation of lumber to be supported by the
truck with plate no. NJT 881 to the custody of the plaintiffs and/or their
following documents:
representatives x x x".
Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) which shall be issued only by the District Forester,
or in his absence, the Assistant District Forester;
On March 22, 1989, the trial court issued a writ of seizure. However, petitioners
Sales Invoice;
refused to comply therewith. Sheriff David G. Brodett of Branch 80 of the RTC of
Delivery Receipt; and Quezon City, reported that the petitioners prevented him from removing the subject
properties from the DENR compound and transferring them to the Mobile Unit
compound of the Quezon City Police Force. He then agreed to a constructive On April 25, 1990, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing
possession of the properties. On that same day, petitioners filed a Manifestation decision but it was subsequently denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution
stating their intention to file a counterbond under Rule 60 of the Rules of Court to dated May 18, 1990.
stay the execution of the writ of seizure and to post a cash bond in the amount of
P180,000.00. The trial court did not oblige the petitioners for they failed to serve a
copy of the Manifestation on the private respondents. Petitioners then made
Hence this petition.
immediately the required service and tendered the cash counterbond but it was
refused, petitioners' Manifestation having already been set for hearing on March 30,
1989.
ISSUE:

On March 27, 1989, petitioners made another attempt to post a counterbond but was
also denied for the same reason. Whether or not the RTC was correct in the issuance of a writ of replevin and the Court
of Appeals in dismissing the petition and lifting the preliminary injunction.

On the same day, private respondents filed a motion to declare petitioners in

contempt for disobeying the writ of seizure. The trial court gave petitioners 24 hours RULING:
to answer the motion. Hearing was scheduled on March 30, 1989.

On March 29, 1989, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and/or Mandamus to annul the orders of the trial court dated
March 20, 1989 and March 27, 1989.
On March 30, 1989, the Court of Appeals granted petitioners temporary relief in the
form of a temporary restraining order (TRO).
On September 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals converted the TRO into a writ of
preliminary injunction upon filing by petitioners of a bond in the amount of
P180,000.00.
On March 30, 1990, the Court of Appeals lifted the writ of preliminary injunction and
dismissed the petition. It declared that the complaint for replevin filed by the private
respondents complied with the requirements of an affidavit and bond under Sec. 1
and 2 of Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of Court, issuance of the writ of replevin was
mandatory.
As for the contempt charges against the petitioners, the Court of Appeals believed that
the same were sufficiently based on a written charge by private respondents and the
reports submitted by the Sheriff.
No, Pursuant to Sec. 8 of P.D. No. 705, all actions and decision of the Director are
subject to review, motu propio or upon appeal of any person aggrieved thereby, by the
Department Head whose decision shall be final and executory after the lapse of 30
days from the receipt by the aggrieved party of said decision unless appealed to the
President. The decision of the Department Head may not be reviewed by the courts
except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.
It was observed by the Court that herein respondents never appealed the confiscation
order of the petitioner Secretary to the Office of the President.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of
law, comity and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available
administrative remedies have first been resorted to and proper authorities have been
given an appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any,
committed in the administrative forum.
It was pointed out by the Court in Paat vs. Court of Appeals that the enforcement of
forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection, development and management
of forest land fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the DENR. It held
that assumption of the trial court of a replevin suit constitutes an encroachment into
the domain of the administrative agency's prerogative. The doctrine of preliminary
jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a
controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body
of special competence.
However, herein petitioners did not a motion to dismiss on the ground of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies. Thus, it is deemed waived.
Nonetheless, the Court finds the petition impressed with merit.
Finally. The writ or seizure and the writ of replevin was issued by the trial court in
grave abuse of its discretion. Thus, disobedience thereto cannot constitute indirect
contempt of court which presupposes that the court order thereby violated was valid
and legal. Without a lawful order being issued, no contempt of court could be
committed.

The instant petition is granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 30,
First. A writ of replevin does not issue as a matter of course upon the applicant's filing
1990 and its Resolution dated May 18, 1990 were set aside. Respondent presiding
of a bond and affidavit, as the Court of Appeals has wrongly put it. The mere filing of
judge of the RTC of Quezon City was permanently enjoined from enforcing the Orders
an affidavit, sans allegations therein that satisfy the requirements of Section 2 Rule 60
dated March 20, 1989 and March 22, 1989, or if said orders had already been issued,
of the Revised Rules of Court, cannot justify the issuance of a writ of replevin.
said respondent judge was directed to render judgement of forfeiture of replevin bond
Wrongful detention of the properties sought in an action for replevin must be
filed by private respondents. Finally, the said respondent judge is hereby permanently
satisfactory established. If only mechanistic averment thereof is offered, the writ
enjoined from further acting on the Motion for Contempt filed by private respondents
should not be issued.
against petitioners.

In the case at bar, the taking of the subject property was within the administrative
authority of the Secretary as provided by Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705. Thus, it is not
wrongful and does not warrant the issuance of a writ of replevin prayed for by the
private respondents.

Second. By virtue of the confiscation order by petitioner Secretary, the subject

properties of private respondents were held in custodia legis and hence, beyond the
reach of replevin. Property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is deemed to be in
custodia legis. So basic is this doctrine that it found inclusion in the 1997 amendments
introduced to the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Third. Petitioner Secretary's authority to confiscate forest products under SEction 68-
A of P.D. No. 705 is distinct and independent of the confiscation of forest products in
a criminal action provided for in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705.

Fourth. SEction 80 of P.D. No. 705 which requires the delivery of the seized forest
products within six (6) hours from the time of the seizure to the appropriate official
designated by law to conduct preliminary investigations applies only to criminal
prosecutions provided for in Section 68 and not to administrative confiscation
provided for in Section 68-A.

Fifth. Nothing in the records supports private respondents' allegation that their right
to due process was violated as no investigation was conducted prior to confiscation of
their properties.