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Case Digests (40-57)

Numbers 44 and 57 are assigned to Kerwin.o

40. John Hay People’s Alternative Coalition vs. Lim, BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORIT
(BCDA)Y; JOHN HAY PORO POINT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, CITY OF BAGUIO, TUNTEX (B.V.I.)
CO. LTD., ASIAWORLD INTERNATIONALE GROUP, INC., DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES

Facts:

 This is a case petitioned for prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief with prayer for a temporary restraining
order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction, petitioners assail, in the main, the constitutionality of Presidential
Proclamation No. 420. Republic Act No. 7227, is an Act Accelerating The Conversion Of Military Reservations
into other productive uses, creating the bases conversion and development authority for this purpose, providing
funds therefor and for other purposes, otherwise known as the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992,
which was enacted on March 13, 1992, set out the policy of the government to accelerate the sound and balanced
conversion into alternative productive uses of the former military bases under the 1947 Philippines-United States
of America Military Bases Agreement, namely, the Clark and Subic military reservations as well as their extensions
including the John Hay Station (Camp John Hay or the camp) in the City of Baguio.

 R.A. No. 7227 granted the Subic SEZ incentives ranging from tax and duty-free importations, exemption of
businesses therein from local and national taxes, to other hallmarks of a liberalized financial and business climate.
Also, this act expressly gave authority to the President to create through executive proclamation, subject to the
concurrence of the local government units directly affected, other Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in the areas
covered respectively by the Clark military reservation, the Wallace Air Station in San Fernando, La Union, and
Camp John Hay.

 On August 16, 1993, BCDA entered into a Memorandum of Agreement and Escrow Agreement with private
respondents Tuntex (B.V.I.) Co., Ltd (TUNTEX) and Asiaworld Internationale Group, Inc. (ASIAWORLD), and
thus formed a joint venture for the development of Poro Point in La Union and Camp John Hay as premier tourist
destinations and recreation centers. Later on private respondents bound themselves to put up a joint venture
company known as the Baguio International Development and Management Corporation which would lease areas
within Camp John Hay and Poro Point for the purpose of turning such places into principal tourist and recreation
spots.

 The Baguio City government meanwhile passed a number of resolutions in response to the actions taken by BCDA
as owner and administrator of Camp John Hay. By a subsequent Resolution dated January 19, 1994,
the sanggunian sought from BCDA an abdication, waiver or quitclaim of its ownership over the home lots being
occupied by residents of nine (9) barangays surrounding the military reservation.

 By another resolution passed on February 21, 1994, the sanggunian adopted and submitted to BCDA a concept for
the development of Camp John Hay. The sanggunians vision expressed, among other things, a kind of development
that affords protection to the environment, the making of a family-oriented type of tourist destination, priority in
employment opportunities for Baguio residents and free access to the base area, guaranteed participation of the city
government in the management and operation of the camp, exclusion of the previously named nine barangays from
the area for development, and liability for local taxes of businesses to be established within the camp. However,
BCDA, TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD agreed to some, but rejected or modified the other proposals. They stressed
the need to declare Camp John Hay a SEZ as a condition precedent to its full development in accordance
with the mandate of R.A. No. 7227.
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 On May 11, 1994, the sanggunian passed a resolution (intended to intelligently guide the sanggunian in
determining its position on whether Camp John Hay be declared a SEZ, it (the sanggunian) being of the view
that such declaration would exempt the camps property and the economic activity therein from local or
national taxation.) requesting the Mayor to order the determination of realty taxes which may otherwise be
collected from real properties of Camp John Hay. In response to this resolution, then President Ramos issued
Proclamation No. 420 which established a SEZ on a portion of Camp John Hay.

 Thus, The issuance of Proclamation No. 420 spawned the present petition for prohibition, mandamus and
declaratory relief which was filed on April 25, 1995 challenging, in the main, its constitutionality or validity
as well as the legality of the Memorandum of Agreement and Joint Venture Agreement between public
respondent BCDA and private respondents TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD.
Petitioners allege as grounds for the allowance of the petition the following:
I. PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 420, SERIES OF 1990 (sic) IN SO FAR AS IT GRANTS TAX
EXEMPTIONS IS INVALID AND ILLEGAL AS IT IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL EXERCISE BY THE
PRESIDENT OF A POWER GRANTED ONLY TO THE LEGISLATURE.

II. PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 420, IN SO FAR AS IT LIMITS THE POWERS AND INTERFERES
WITH THE AUTONOMY OF THE CITY OF BAGUIO IS INVALID, ILLEGAL AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

III. PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 420, SERIES OF 1994 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN THAT

IT VIOLATES THE RULE THAT ALL TAXES SHOULD BE UNIFORM AND EQUITABLE.

IV. THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY AND BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC
RESPONDENTS BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY HAVING BEEN ENTERED INTO
ONLY BY DIRECT NEGOTIATION IS ILLEGAL.

V. THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY AND
BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC RESPONDENT BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY IS (sic) ILLEGAL.

VI. THE CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN OF RESPONDENTS NOT HAVING UNDERGONE

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT IS BEING ILLEGALLY CONSIDERED WITHOUT A VALID
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT

 A temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction was prayed for to enjoin BCDA, John Hay Poro
Point Development Corporation and the city government from implementing Proclamation No. 420,
and TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD from proceeding with their plan.

 Public respondents, by their separate Comments, allege as moot and academic the issues raised by the petition,
the questioned Memorandum of Agreement and Joint Venture Agreement having already been deemed abandoned
by the inaction of the parties thereto prior to the filing of the petition as in fact, by letter of November 21, 1995,
BCDA formally notified TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD of the revocation of their said agreements.

 Respondents assail petitioners lack of standing to bring the present suit even as taxpayers and in the absence of any
actual case or controversy to warrant this Courts exercise of its power of judicial review over the proclamation,
and they (respondents) also seek the outright dismissal of the petition for having been filed in disregard of the
hierarchy of courts and of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

 Replying, petitioners aver that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies finds no application herein
since they are invoking the exclusive authority of this Court under Section 21 of R.A. No. 7227 to enjoin or restrain
implementation of projects for conversion of the base areas; that the established exceptions to the aforesaid doctrine
obtain in the present petition; and that they possess the standing to bring the petition which is a taxpayers suit.
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 Before dwelling on the CORE ISSUES, the court firstly addressed the preliminary procedural questions confronting
the petition (which was the respondents’ assailment of whether the petitioners lack legal standing to bring present
suit and in the absence of actual controversy to warrant this courts exercise of its power of judicial review over the
proclamation). Consequently, the court was convinced then that the present petition embodies crucial issues in
which it will take jurisdiction. As it is only this Court which has the power under Section 21 of R.A. No. 7227 to
enjoin implementation of projects for the development of the former US military reservations, the issuance of which
injunction petitioners pray for, petitioners direct filing of the present petition with it is allowed. Over and above
this procedural objection to the present suit, this Court retains full discretionary power to take cognizance of a
petition filed directly to it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant. Besides,
remanding the case to the lower courts now would just unduly prolong adjudication of the issues.

Issues:
The legal questions being raised thereon by petitioners have indeed been rendered moot and academic by the revocation of
such agreements. There are, however, other issues posed by the petition, those which center on the constitutionality of
Proclamation No. 420, which have not been mooted by the said supervening event upon application of the rules for the
judicial scrutiny of constitutional cases.

1. Whether the present petition complies with the requirements for this Courts exercise of jurisdiction over constitutional
issues;
2. Whether Proclamation No. 420 is constitutional by providing for national and local tax exemption within and granting
other economic incentives to the John Hay Special Economic Zone; and
3. Whether Proclamation No. 420 is constitutional for limiting or interfering with the local autonomy of Baguio City.

Held:
1.
 Yes. The grant by the law on local government units of the right of concurrence on the bases conversion is equivalent
to vesting a legal standing on them, for it is in effect a recognition of the real interests that communities nearby or
surrounding a particular base area have in its utilization. Thus, the interest of petitioners, being inhabitants of
Baguio, in assailing the legality of Proclamation No. 420, is personal and substantial such that they have sustained
or will sustain direct injury as a result of the government act being challenged.[33]Theirs is a material interest, an
interest in issue affected by the proclamation and not merely an interest in the question involved or an incidental
interest, for what is at stake in the enforcement of Proclamation No. 420 is the very economic and social existence
of the people of Baguio City.
 By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged act, the dispute is deemed to have
ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the
Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.[37]

 As to the third and fourth requisites of a judicial inquiry, there is likewise no question that they have been complied
with in the case at bar. This is an action filed purposely to bring forth constitutional issues, ruling on which this
Court must take up. Besides, respondents never raised issues with respect to these requisites, hence, they are deemed
waived.

 Having cleared the way for judicial review, the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 420, as framed in the second
and third issues above, must now be addressed squarely.
2.

 No. The incentives under R.A. No. 7227 are exclusive only to the Subic SEZ, hence, the extension of the same to
the John Hay SEZ finds no support therein. Neither does the same grant of privileges to the John Hay SEZ find
support in the other laws specified under Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420, which laws were already extant before
the issuance of the proclamation or the enactment of R.A. No. 7227.
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 More importantly, the nature of most of the assailed privileges is one of tax exemption. It is the legislature, unless
limited by a provision of the state constitution, that has full power to exempt any person or corporation or class of
property from taxation, its power to exempt being as broad as its power to tax. Other than Congress, the Constitution
may itself provide for specific tax exemptions, or local governments.

 The Court then declared that the grant by Proclamation No. 420 of tax exemption and other privileges to the John
Hay SEZ as void for being violative of the Constitution.

3.

 Yes. Objection is specifically mounted against Section 2 thereof in which BCDA is set up as the governing body of
the John Hay SEZ. Petitioners argue that there is no authority of the President to subject the John Hay SEZ to the
governance of BCDA which has just oversight functions over SEZ; and that to do so is to diminish the city
governments power over an area within its jurisdiction, hence, Proclamation No. 420 unlawfully gives the President
power of control over the local government instead of just mere supervision. Petitioners arguments however are
bereft of merit.

 With such broad rights of ownership and administration vested in BCDA over Camp John Hay, BCDA virtually
has control over it, subject to certain limitations provided for by law. By designating BCDA as the governing agency
of the John Hay SEZ, the law merely emphasizes or reiterates the statutory role or functions it has been granted.

 The unconstitutionality of the grant of tax immunity and financial incentives as contained in the second sentence of
Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420 notwithstanding, the entire assailed proclamation cannot be declared
unconstitutional, the other parts thereof not being repugnant to law or the Constitution. The delineation and
declaration of a portion of the area covered by Camp John Hay as a SEZ was well within the powers of the President
to do so by means of a proclamation.[51] The requisite prior concurrence by the Baguio City government to such
proclamation appears to have been given in the form of a duly enacted resolution by the sanggunian. The other
provisions of the proclamation had been proven to be consistent with R.A. No. 7227.

 Where part of a statute is void as contrary to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if
separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced.[52] This Court finds that the other provisions in
Proclamation No. 420 converting a delineated portion of Camp John Hay into the John Hay SEZ are separable from
the invalid second sentence of Section 3 thereof, hence they stand.
WHEREFORE, the second sentence of Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420 is hereby declared NULL AND VOID
and is accordingly declared of no legal force and effect. Public respondents are hereby enjoined from implementing
the aforesaid void provision..
Proclamation No. 420, without the invalidated portion, remains valid and effective.
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41. Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora

There has been an alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, as a result, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada
invoked his powers as commander in chief and ordered the Philippine National Police and the Marines to conduct a joint
visibility patrols for the resolution of crime prevention and suppression. The president declared this anti-crime campaign to
be merely temporary, until such time when the situation shall have improved.

On January 17, 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines filed an instant petition to annul the Letter of Instruction
(Letter of Instruction 02/2000 detailed the manner by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would
be conducted) and to declare the deployment of the Marines, null and void and unconstitutional on the grounds of the
following:

1. NO EMERGENCY SITUATION OBTAINS IN METRO MANILA AS WOULD JUSTIFY, EVEN ONLY

REMOTELY, THE DEPLOYMENT OF SOLDIERS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT WORK; HENCE, SAID
DEPLOYMENT IS IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE II, SECTION 3 OF THE CONSTITUTION;

2. DEPLOYMENT CONSTITUTES AN INSIDIOUS INCURSION (Invasion or Attack) BY THE MILITARY IN A

CIVILIAN FUNCTION OF GOVERNMENT (LAW ENFORCEMENT) IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE XVI,
SECTION 5 (4), OF THE CONSTITUTION;

Issues:
1. Whether or not petitioner has legal standing;

2. Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial
review;

3. Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional
provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP.

Held:
The petition has no merit.

1. The IBP has no legal standing as it failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case.
What the IBP projects as injurious is the supposed militarization of law enforcement which might threaten Philippine
democratic institutions and may cause more harm than good in the long run. Not only is the presumed injury not personal
in character, it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing. Since petitioner
has not successfully established a direct and personal injury as a consequence of the questioned act, it does not possess the
personality to assail the validity of the deployment of the Marines. The Court, however, did not categorically rule that the
IBP has absolutely no standing to raise constitutional issues now or in the future. The IBP must, by way of allegations
and proof, satisfy this Court that it has sufficient stake to obtain judicial resolution of the controversy.

2. The underlying issues are the scope of presidential powers and limits, and the extent of judicial review. Both the parties
are in agreement that the power exercised by the President is the power to call out the armed forces, the Court is of the view
that the power involved may be no more than the maintenance of peace and order and promotion of the general welfare.

This case calls for the exercise of the Presidents powers as protector of the peace. The power of the President to
keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the
State against external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in
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times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and
ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon.

To address the Solicitor Generals argument that the issue involved is not susceptible to review by the judiciary
because it involves a political question, and thus, not justiciable. The Court does not automatically assume jurisdiction over
actual constitutional cases brought before it even in instances that are ripe for resolution. One class of cases wherein the
Court hesitates to rule on are political questions. The reason is that political questions are concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular act or measure being assailed. Moreover, the political question being a
function of the separation of powers, the courts will not normally interfere with the workings of another co-equal branch
unless the case shows a clear need for the courts to step in to uphold the law and the Constitution.

(Political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of government. Thus, if an issue is clearly identified by the text of the Constitution as matters for discretionary action
by a particular branch of government or to the people themselves then it is held to be a political question.)

Under this definition, the Court cannot agree that the issue involved is a political question beyond the
jurisdiction of this Court to review. Hence, the present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence
to support the assertion that there exist no justification for calling out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to
support the proposition that grave abuse was committed because the power to call was exercised in such a manner as to
violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military. In the performance of the Courts duty of
purposeful hesitation before declaring an act of another branch as unconstitutional, only where such grave abuse of
discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Presidents judgment. To doubt is to sustain.

3. The deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy clause, nor does it infringe the civilian character
of the police force. Prescinding from its argument that no emergency situation exists to justify the calling of the Marines,
the IBP asserts that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is militarized in violation of
Section 3, Article II of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian
supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. The
limited participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes and
bounds of the Marines authority.

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police
force. Neither does it amount to an insidious incursion of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section
5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution. Thus, the Marines render nothing more than assistance required in conducting the
patrols. As such, there can be no insidious incursion of the military in civilian affairs nor can there be a violation of the
civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution
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42. Executive Secretary vs. CA and ASIAN RECRUITMENT COUNCIL PHILIPPINE CHAPTER (ARCO-PHIL.),
INC.
429 SCRA 781. May 25, 2004

FACTS:

 This petition for review on certiorari, the Executive Secretary of the President of the Philippines, the Secretary
of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the Secretary of Labor and Employment, the POEA Administrator
and the OWWA Administrator, through the Office of the Solicitor General, assail the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 38815 affirming the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City dated
August 21, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-24401, granting the plea of the petitioners therein for a writ of
preliminary injunction and of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court on August 24, 1995.

 Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,
took effect on July 15, 1995. The Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipino Act of 1995 was published in the April 7. However, even before the law took effect, the
Asian Recruitment Council Philippine Chapter, Inc. (ARCO-Phil.) filed, on July 17, 1995, a petition for
declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to declare
as unconstitutional (Section 2, 6, 7, 9, and 10) with a plea for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the respondents therein from enforcing the assailed provisions
of the law. In a supplement to its petition, the ARCO-Phil. alleged that Rep. Act No. 8042 was self-executory
and that no implementing rules were needed.

 On August 1, 1995, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order effective for a period of only twenty
(20) days therefrom.

 With the effectivity of RA 8042, a great majority of licensed recruitment agencies have stopped or suspended
their operations for fear of being prosecuted under the provisions of a law that are unjust and
unconstitutional.

 The respondent averred that Rep. Act No. 8042 violates the following:
a. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.
b. Section 6(g) and (i) discriminated against unskilled workers and their families and
c. Violated the equal protection clause
d. Article II, Section 12[6] and Article XV, Sections 1[7] and 3(3: The right of the Family to a family living wage and income)
of the Constitution.

The respondent ARCO-Phil. assailed Section 2(g) and (i), Section 6 subsection (a) to (m), Section 7(a) to (b), and
Section 10 paragraphs (1) and (2), quoted as follows:

(g) THE STATE RECOGNIZES THAT THE ULTIMATE PROTECTION TO ALL MIGRANT WORKERS IS THE
POSSESSION OF SKILLS. PURSUANT TO THIS AND AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE, THE GOVERNMENT
SHALL DEPLOY AND/OR ALLOW THE DEPLOYMENT ONLY OF SKILLED FILIPINO WORKERS.
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II. ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT

SEC. 6. Definition. For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring, contract services, promising
or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder
of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the
Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or
promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall, likewise, include
the following acts, whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of
authority:

 Licensed and authorized recruiters are thus deprived of their right to property and due process and to the equality
of the person. It is understandable for the law to prohibit illegal recruiters, but to discriminate against licensed
and registered recruiters is unconstitutional.

 The respondent stressed that unskilled workers also have the right to seek employment abroad. According to
the respondent, the right of unskilled workers to due process is violated because they are prevented from finding
employment and earning a living abroad. It cannot be argued that skilled workers are immune from abuses by
employers, while unskilled workers are merely prone to such abuses. It was pointed out that both skilled and
unskilled workers are subjected to abuses by foreign employers.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
issuing the assailed order and the writ of preliminary injunction on a bond of only P50,000.

Held:
 To be entitled to a preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of a law assailed to be unconstitutional, the
party must establish that it will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief and must demonstrate that
it is likely to succeed on the merits, or that there are sufficiently serious questions going to the merits and the balance
of hardships tips decidedly in its favor. Before the plaintiff may be entitled to injunction against future enforcement,
he is burdened to show some substantial hardship.

 The comparative gravity of crimes and whether their consequences are more or less injurious are matters for the
State and Congress itself to determine

 The possibility that the officers and employees of the recruitment agencies, which are members of the respondent,
and their relatives who are employed in the government agencies charged in the enforcement of the law, would be
indicted for illegal recruitment and, if convicted sentenced to life imprisonment for large scale illegal recruitment,
absent proof of irreparable injury, is not sufficient on which to base the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
to suspend the enforcement of the penal provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042 and avert any indictments under the law.
The normal course of criminal prosecutions cannot be blocked on the basis of allegations which amount to
speculations about the future

 There is no allegation in the amended petition or evidence adduced by the respondent that the officers and/or
employees of its members had been threatened with any indictments for violations of the penal provisions of Rep.
Act No. 8042. Neither is there any allegation therein that any of its members and/or their officers and employees
committed any of the acts enumerated in Section 6(a) to (m) of the law for which they could be indicted.
 9

 The respondent merely speculated and surmised that licensed and registered recruitment agencies would close shop
and stop business operations because of the assailed penal provisions of the law. A writ of preliminary injunction
to enjoin the enforcement of penal laws cannot be based on such conjectures or speculations. The Court cannot take
judicial notice that the processing of deployment papers of overseas workers have come to a virtual standstill at the
POEA because of the assailed provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042. The respondent must adduce evidence to prove its
allegation, and the petitioners accorded a chance to adduce controverting evidence.

 Preliminarily, the proliferation of illegal job recruiters and syndicates preying on innocent people anxious to obtain
employment abroad is one of the primary considerations that led to the enactment of The Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.

 YES. The trial court committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
issuing the assailed order and writ of preliminary injunction. It is for this reason that the Court issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the
trial court.

 IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the appellate court
is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

43. Kilosbayan vs. Guingona

G.R. 113375. May 5, 1994.

Facts:

The PCSO decided to establish a on line lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversig
its sources of funds in pursuant to Section 1 of the charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42) which
grants it the authority to hold and conduct "charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities”. After learning
that the PCSO was interested in operating an on-line lottery system, the Berjaya Group Berhad, "a multinational company
and one of the ten largest public companies in Malaysia, and who has been long engaged in lottery operations in Asia,
became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO. As an initial step, Berjaya Group Berhad (through its
individual nominees) organized with some Filipino investors in March 1993 a Philippine corporation known as the
Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC), which was intended to be the medium through which the technical
and management services required for the project would be offered and delivered to PCSO.

Before August 1993, the PCSO formally issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the Lease Contract of an on-line
lottery system for the PCSO. The bids submitted by PGMC were evaluated by the Special Pre-Qualification Bids and
Awards Committee (SPBAC) for the on-line lottery and its Bid Report was thereafter submitted to the Office of the
President. On 21 October 1993, the Office of the President announced that respondent PGMC may finally operate the
country's on-line lottery system and that the corresponding implementing contract would be submitted for final clearance
and approval by the Chief Executive.

On 4 November 1993, KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter to Presidential Fidel V. Ramos strongly opposing the
setting up to the on-line lottery system on the basis of serious moral and ethical considerations. Petitioners also submit that
the PCSO cannot validly enter into the assailed Contract of Lease with the PGMC because it is an arrangement wherein the
PCSO would hold and conduct the on-line lottery system in "collaboration" or "association" with the PGMC, in violation
of Section 1(B) of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting
charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other similar activities "in collaboration, association or joint venture with any
person, association, company or entity, foreign or domestic." Petitioner seeks to prohibit and restrain the implementation of
 10

the "Contract of Lease" executed by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming
Management Corporation (PGMC) in connection with the on- line lottery system, also known as "lotto."

Issue: Whether or not the oppositions made by the petitioner was valid.

Held: No. The Court agrees with the petitioners and the challenged Contract of Lease executed by respondent PCSO and
respondent PGMC is declared to be contrary to law and invalid. The preliminary issue on the locus standi of the petitioners
which was raised by the respondents should be resolved in their favor. The Court finds this petition to be of transcendental
importance to the public. The issues it raised are of paramount public interest and of a category even higher than those
involved in many of the aforecited cases. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and
moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive
effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal
standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes
aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of.

On the substantive issue regarding the provision in Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amending by B.P. Blg. 42, is
indisputably clear with respect to its franchise or privilege "to hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and
other similar activities." Meaning, the PCSO cannot exercise it "in collaboration, association or joint venture" with any other
party. Thus, the challenged Contract of Lease violates the exception provided for in paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No.
1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, and is, therefore, invalid for being contrary to law.

45. Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines (ITF) vs. Comelec

G.R. No. 159139. January 13, 2004.

Facts:
 On June 7, 1995, Congress passed Republic Act 8046, which authorized Comelec to conduct a nationwide
demonstration of a computerized election system and allowed the poll body to pilot-test the system in the March
1996 elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).

 On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act 8436 authorizing Comelec to use an automated election
system (AES) for the process of voting, counting votes and canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and
local elections. It also mandated the poll body to acquire automated counting machines (ACMs), computer
equipment, devices and materials; and to adopt new electoral forms and printing materials.

 On October 29, 2002, Comelec adopted in its Resolution 02-0170 a modernization program for the 2004 elections.
It resolved to conduct biddings for the three (3) phases of its Automated Election System; namely, Phase I — Voter
Registration and Validation System; Phase II — Automated Counting and Canvassing System; and Phase III —
Electronic Transmission.

 On January 24, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 172, which allocated the sum
of P2.5 billion to fund the AES for the May 10, 2004 elections. Upon the request of Comelec, she authorized the
release of an additional P500 million.

 On January 28, 2003, the Commission issued an "Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid".

o Out of the 57 bidders, the BAC found MPC and the Total Information Management Corporation (TIMC)
eligible. For technical evaluation, they were referred to the BACs Technical Working Group (TWG) and
the Department of Science and Technology (DOST).
 11

 In its Report on the Evaluation of the Technical Proposals on Phase II, DOST said that both MPC and TIMC had
obtained a number of failed marks in the technical evaluation. Notwithstanding these failures, Comelec,
promulgated Resolution No. 6074 awarding the project to MPC.

 On May 29, 2003, five individuals and entities (including the herein Petitioners Information Technology Foundation
of the Philippines) wrote a letter to Comelec Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. They protested the award of the
Contract to Respondent MPC "due to glaring irregularities in the manner in which the bidding process had been
conducted." Citing therein the noncompliance with eligibility as well as technical and procedural requirements
(many of which have been discussed at length in the Petition), they sought a re-bidding.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the Commission on Elections, the agency vested with the exclusive constitutional mandate to oversee
elections, gravely abused its discretion when, in the exercise of its administrative functions, it awarded to MPC the contract
for the second phase of the comprehensive Automated Election System.
2. Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing.

Held:
1. Yes. COMELEC has not merely gravely abused its discretion in awarding the Contract for the automation of the counting
and canvassing of the ballots, but it has also put at grave risk the holding of credible and peaceful elections by carelessly
accepting electronic hardware and software that admittedly failed to pass legally mandated technical requirements.
Inadequate as they are, the remedies it proffers post facto do not cure the grave abuse of discretion it already committed (1)
on April 15, 2003, when it illegally made the award; and (2) sometime in May 2003 when it executed the Contract for the
purchase of defective machines and non-existent software from a non-eligible bidder.

2. Yes. Our nation’s political and economic future virtually hangs in the balance, pending the outcome of the 2004 elections.
Hence, there can be no serious doubt that the subject matter of this case is a matter of public concern and imbued with public
interest; in other words, it is of paramount public interest and transcendental importance. This fact alone would justify
relaxing the rule on legal standing, following the liberal policy of this Court whenever a case involves an issue of
overarching significance to our society. Petitioners legal standing should therefore be recognized and upheld.

46. Jumamil vs. Café

G.R. No. 144570

Facts:
 In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Vivencio V. Jumamil seeks
to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

 The Regional Trial Court dismissed petitioners petition for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction
and writ of restraining order, and ordered the petitioner to pay attorneys fees in the amount of P1,000 to each of the
57 private respondents.

 In 1989, petitioner Jumamil filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Panabo, Davao del Norte a petition for
declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and writ of restraining order against public respondents
Mayor Jose J. Cafe and the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Panabo, Davao del Norte. He questioned the
constitutionality of Municipal Resolution No. 7, Series of 1989 (Resolution No. 7).
 12

 Resolution No. 7, enacting Appropriation Ordinance No. 111, provided for an initial appropriation of P765,000 for
the construction of stalls around a proposed terminal fronting the Panabo Public Market which was destroyed by
fire. Subsequently, the petition was amended due to the passage of Resolution No. 49, series of 1989 (Resolution
No. 49), denominated as Ordinance No. 10, appropriating a further amount of P1,515,000 for the construction of
additional stalls in the same public market.

 Prior to the passage of these resolutions, respondent Mayor Cafe had already entered into contracts with those who
advanced and deposited (with the municipal treasurer) from their personal funds the sum of P40,000 each. Some of
the parties were close friends and/or relatives of the public respondents. The leases of the stalls were then awarded
by public raffle which, however, was limited to those who had deposited P40,000 each. Thus, the petition was
amended anew to include the 57 awardees of the stalls as private respondents.

 Petitioner alleges that Resolution Nos. 7 and 49 were unconstitutional because they were:

1. The questioned resolutions and ordinances did not provide for any notice of publication that the special privilege
and unwarranted benefits conferred on the private respondents maybe (sic) availed of by anybody who can deposit
the amount of P40,000.00.

2. Neither was there any prior notice or publication pertaining to contracts entered into by public and private
respondents for the construction of stalls to be awarded to private respondents that the same can be availed of by
anybody willing to deposit P40,000.00.

 In this petition, petitioner prays for the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) and a declaration of
the unconstitutionality, illegality and nullity of the questioned resolutions/ordinances.

 The RTC, consequently, deferred the resolution of the pending petition. The appellate court eventually rendered its
decision in that case finding that the petitioners were not entitled to the declaratory relief prayed for as they had
no legal interest in the controversy. Upon elevation to the Supreme Court as UDK Case No. 9948, the petition for
review on certiorari was denied for being insufficient in form and substance.

 Both the RTC and the CA dismissed the case on the ground of petitioners lack of legal standing and the parties
agreement to be bound by the decision.

Issues:

1. Whether petitioner had the legal standing to bring the petition for declaratory relief;
2. Whether Resolution Nos. 7 and 49 were unconstitutional; and

Held:
1. The CA held that petitioner had no standing to challenge the two resolutions/ordinances because he suffered no wrong
under their terms. It also concluded that the issue (was) not the ordinances themselves but the award of the market stalls to
the private respondents on the strength of the contracts individually executed by them with Mayor Cafe. Consequently, it
ruled that petitioner, who was not a party to the lease contracts, had no standing to file the petition for declaratory relief and
seek judicial interpretation of the agreements.

Petitioner brought the petition in his capacity as taxpayer of the Municipality of Panabo, Davao del Norte and not
in his personal capacity. He was questioning the official acts of the public respondents in passing the ordinances and entering
 13

into the lease contracts with private respondents. Parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation.

2. Since petitioner had no locus standi/local standing to question the ordinances, there was no need for court to discuss the
constitutionality of said enactments.

47. Tolentino vs. Comelec

420 SCRA 438. January 21, 2004.

Facts:
 In January 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (shortly after her succession to the presidency) nominated
then Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. (Senator Guingona) as Vice-President. Congress confirmed the nomination
of Senator Guingona who took his oath as Vice-President on 9 February 2001.

 Following Senator Guingona’s confirmation, the Senate on 8 February 2001 passed Resolution No. 84 (Resolution
No. 84) certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the Senate. Resolution No. 84 called on COMELEC to fill the
vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001.

 Twelve Senators, with a 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that election. Resolution No. 84 further provided
that the Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of
former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., which ends on 30 June 2004.

 On June 20, 2001, petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica (petitioners), as voters and taxpayers, filed the
instant petition for prohibition, impleading only COMELEC as respondent. Petitioners sought to enjoin COMELEC
from proclaiming with finality the candidate for Senator receiving the 13th highest number of votes as the winner
in the special election for a single three-year term seat. Accordingly, petitioners prayed for the nullification of
Resolution No. 01-005 in so far as it makes a proclamation to such effect.

Petitioners contend that COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005 without jurisdiction because:

(1) it failed to notify the electorate of the position to be filled in the special election as required under Section 2 of Republic
Act No. 6645 (R.A. No. 6645);[4]

(2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy whether they seek election under
the special or regular elections as allegedly required under Section 73 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881;[5] and, consequently

(3) it failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates seeking election under the special or regular senatorial
elections as purportedly required under Section 4, paragraph 4 of Republic Act No. 6646 (R.A. No. 6646).[6] Petitioners
add that because of these omissions, COMELEC canvassed all the votes cast for the senatorial candidates in the 14 May
2001 elections without distinction such that there were no two separate Senate elections held simultaneously but just a single
election for thirteen seats, irrespective of term.

Issues:
A. Procedurally
Whether or not the petition is in fact a petition for quo warranto over which the Senate Electoral Tribunal is the sole
judge.

B. Whether or not the special election was held valid:

 14

1. Whether or not Comelec’s failure to give notice to the time of the special election negate the calling of said
election.
1. Whether or not Comelec’s failure to give notice of office to be filled and the manner of
determining the winner misled voters.
2. Whether or not separate canvassing and documentation for the special election was required.

Held:
A. No. The petitioner does not seek to determine Honasan’s right in the exercise of his office in the Senate. What the
petitioners allege is COMELEC’s failure to comply with certain requirements pertaining to the conduct of the
special election. Hence, the court has jurisdiction.

A quo warranto proceeding is, among others, one to determine the right of a public officer in the exercise of his
office and to oust him from its enjoyment if his claim is not well-founded. Under Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the qualifications of the
members of the Senate.

B. Yes. Special election was held validly. Hence, petition has no merit.

1. No. Sec. 2 of RA 6645 (which was passed to implement art 6, sec. 9 of the constitution), EXPRESSLY PROVIDES
that in case of a vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the next
succeeding regular election. In a special election, the rule is that if a statute expressly provides that an election to
fill the vacancy shall be held at the next regular election, the statute FIXES the date, hence, the election is NOT
INVALIDATED by the fact that the body charged by law with the duty (in this case, COMELEC) failed to do so.
(as opposed to if thelaw does not fix the time and place but empowers some authority to fix those, the statutory
provision on the giving of notice is considered mandatory and failure to do so will make election void)

The law then charges the voters with knowledge of the statutory notice and COMELEC’s
failure to give additional notice does not negate the election.

2. No. The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give notice is whether the
lack of notice resulted in misleading a sufficient number of voters. The petitioners were not able to prove that
COMELEC’s failure to give the notice misled a sufficient number of voters as would change the result of the vote.

3. No. No such requirements exist. What is mandatory under RA 6645 is for COMELEC to fix the date if necessary
and state the office/s to be voted for. The method adopted by COMELEC merely implemented RA No.84 that “the
senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former
Sen. Guingona” (an amendment introduced by Sen. Roco)

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.

48. Ople vs. Torres

293 SCRA 141

Facts:

 The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the shrinking of the
right to privacy. Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a
usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's
 15

protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need
stronger barriers against further erosion.

 On December 12, 1996, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 308--- “ADOPTION OF A
NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM”.

 A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997.
On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, who as members of the Inter-
Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997 a
temporary restraining was issued.

Petitioner contends:

A. The establishment of a national computerized identification reference system requires a legislative act. The issuance of
A.O. no. 308 by the president of the republic of the Philippines is, therefore, an unconstitutional usurpation of the
legislative powers of the congress of the republic of the Philippines.

B. The appropriation of public funds by the president for the implementation of A.O. No. 308 is an unconstitutional
usurpation of the exclusive right of congress to appropriate public funds for expenditure.

C. The implementation of A.O. No. 308 insidiously lays the groundwork for a system which will violate the bill of
rights enshrined in the constitution."

Respondents counter-argue:

A. The instant petition is not a justiciable case as would warrant a judicial review;
B. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] was issued within the executive and administrative powers of the president without encroaching
on the legislative powers of congress;
C. The funds necessary for the implementation of the identification reference system may be sourced from the budgets of
the concerned agencies;
D. A.O. No. 308 [1996] protects an individual's interest in privacy.

Issues:

1. Whether or not A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the
President.

2. Whether or not A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the
life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy.

Held:
1. Yes. Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of Congress is
understandable. The blurring of the demarcation line between the power of the Legislature to make laws and the power of
the Executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate balance of power and cannot be allowed. Hence, the exercise by
one branch of government of power belonging to another will be given a stricter scrutiny by this Court.
 16

Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper
governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the
official conduct of his agents. To this end, the president can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.

Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be
covered by an administrative order.

An administrative order is:

"Sec. 3. Administrative Orders.-- Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental operation
in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders."

An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative
operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of
implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. We reject the argument that A.O. No. 308
implements the legislative policy of the Administrative Code of 1987.

2. Yes. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is
fully deserving of constitutional protection.

 Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it cannot pass constitutional muster
as an administrative legislation because facially it violates the right to privacy
 The essence of privacy is the “right to be left alone.” The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. Indeed, if
we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in several provisions
of our Constitution.[33] It is expresslyrecognized in Section 3(1) of the Bill of Rights:

 The Court prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution,
hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and
that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations:

1. The need to provides our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service
and social security providers and other government instrumentalities and ;
2. The need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic
services.

It is debatable whether the interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of the said order. The broadness,
vagueness, and overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people’s right to privacy in clear
and present danger. In the case at bar, the threat comes from which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people
to surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of
basic services.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System" declared null and void for being unconstitutional.
 17

49. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING
CORPORATION,petitioners, vs.
JOSE O. VERA, Judge . of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU UNJIENG, respondents.
65 Phil 56. November 16, 1937

Facts:

Petitioners herein, the People of the Philippine and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, are
respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and the respondent herein Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants, in
the criminal case entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", criminal case No. 42649 of
the Court of First Instance of Manila and G.R. No. 41200 of this court. Respondent herein, Hon. Jose O. Vera, is the Judge
ad interim of the seventh branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, who heard the application of the defendant Mariano
Cu Unjieng for probation in the aforesaid criminal case.

Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted of criminal charges by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration
and four motions for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court remanded
the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is
innocent of the crime he was convicted of. The Judge of the Manila (Court of First Instance Manila-CFI) directed the appeal
to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner
allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng
under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting
provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person.

Nowhere in the law which is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein
that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law, it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the
Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also
constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of the power of the executive
to provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Act No. 4221 constituted an undue delegation of legislative power.
2. Whether or not the said act denies the equal protection of the laws.

Held:
1. The Court concludes that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of legislative
authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void. There is no set standard provided
by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards are
given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non delegation of power.
Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section
11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards
have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals.
Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the
Probation Office.

The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law
shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed
in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province,
all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer.
 18

2. It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the provisions of our Bill of Rights which prohibits the denial to
any person of the equal protection of the laws. The resultant inequality may be said to flow from the unwarranted
delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case. Adopting the
example given by one of the counsel for the petitioners in the course of his oral argument, one province may
appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation officer, while another province may refuse or fail
to do so. In such a case, the Probation Act would be in operation in the former province but not in the latter. This
means that a person otherwise coming within the purview of the law would be liable to enjoy the benefits of
probation in one province while another person similarly situated in another province would be denied those same
benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the provincial boards to
appropriate the necessary funds for the salaries of the probation officers in their respective provinces, in which case
no inequality would result for the obvious reason that probation would be in operation in each and every province
by the affirmative action of appropriation by all the provincial boards.

50. Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001.

Facts:
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining
and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it
crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent
call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to him:

(a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness

(b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and,
(c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which
are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.

Issues:
1. Whether or not R.A. 7080 is unconstitutional for being vague.
2. Whether or not the Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore
violates the rights of the accused to due process.

Held:
1. No. Nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as there is obviously none - that will confuse petitioner
in his defense. Although subject to proof, these factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are
easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such
unequivocal assertions, petitioner is completely informed of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare
for an intelligent defense.

The doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on
their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot
be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule
is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground
that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might
be unconstitutional." As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like
overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process
 19

typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant." Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's
claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.

In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
does not suffer from the constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith,"
and "gross and inexcusable negligence" merely describe the different modes by which the offense penalized in Sec.
3, par. (e), of the statute may be committed, and the use of all these phrases in the same Information does not mean
that the indictment charges three (3) distinct offenses.

2. No. The Bill of Rights guarantees the right of the accused in criminal prosecutions to be presumed innocent until
proven otherwise. Thus, he is entitled to an acquittal unless the state succeeds in demonstrating the guilt of the
accused with proof beyond reasonable doubt. The contention that Sec. 4, of R.A. 7080 does away with proof of
each and every component of the crime is a misconception. Rather than proving each and every criminal act done,
it is enough that the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt a patter of overt or criminal acts indicative of the
crime as a whole.

51. Umali vs. Guingona

Facts:

 On October 27, 1993, petitioner Osmundo Umali was appointed Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue by the then President Fidel V. Ramos.

 On August 1, 1994, President Ramos received a confidential memorandum against the petitioner for alleged
violations of internal revenue laws, rules and regulations during his incumbency as Regional Director, more
particularly the following malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance, to wit:

A. Issuance of Letters of Authority (LAs) to investigate taxpayers despite the ban on investigations as ordered in Revenue
memorandum Order No. 31-93. In numerous cases, revenue officers whose names appeared in the LAs as
investigating officers were unaware that such LAs were issued to them.

B. Termination of tax cases without the submission of the required investigation reports, thus exempting the same from
examination and review;

C. Terminated cases with reports were submitted directly to and approved by respondent Umali without being reviewed
by the Assessment Division, thus eliminating the check and balance mechanism designed to guard against abuses or
errors;

D. Unlawful issuance of LAs to taxpayers who were thereafter convinced to avail of the BIRs compromise and
abatement program under RMOs 45093 and 54-93, for which the taxpayers were made, for a monetary consideration,
to pay smaller amounts in lieu of being investigated;

E. Despite the devolution of the authority to issue LAs from Regional Directors to the Revenue District Officers under
RMO 26-94, dated April 14, 1994, respondent Umali continued to issue antedated LAs in absolute defiance of the
aforesaid issuance, using old LAs requisitioned by him when still Regional Director of San Pablo Region. In one
instance, he issued a termination letter bearing the San Pablo Region letterhead even when he was already Makati
Regional Director; and

F. In his attempt to cover up his tracks and to muddle the real issue of his violations of the ban in the issuance of LAs and
basic revenue rules and regulations, respondent enlisted the support of other regional directors for the purpose of
questioning particularly the devolution/centralization of the functions of the Bureau.
 20

 On August 2, 1994, upon receipt of the said confidential memorandum, former President Ramos authorized the
issuance of an Order for the preventive suspension of Umali and immediately referred the Complaint against the
latter to the Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption (PCAGC), for investigation.

 On October 6, 1994, acting upon the recommendation of the PCAGC, then President Ramos issued Administrative
Order No. 152 dismissing petitioner from the service, with forfeiture of retirement and all benefits under the law.

 On October 24, 1994, the petitioner moved for reconsideration of his dismissal but the Office of the President denied
the motion for reconsideration on November 28, 1994. On December 1, 1994, petitioner brought a Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-3079 before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, alleging, among others:

I. That the petitioner was suspended and dismissed from the service in violation of his constitutional right to due process of
law; and

II. That the constitutional right of the petitioner to security of tenure was violated by the respondents.

ISSUES:
1. WHETHER ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 152 VIOLATED PETITIONERS RIGHT TO SECURITY OF
TENURE
2. WHETHER PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS IN THE ISSUANCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ORDER NO. 152

HELD:

1. There was a violation of what petitioner asserts as his security of tenure. According to petitioner, as a Regional Director
of Bureau of Internal Revenue, he is a CESO eligible entitled to security of tenure. However, petitioners claim of CESO
eligibility is anemic of evidentiary support. It was incumbent upon him to prove that he is a CESO eligible but unfortunately,
he failed to adduce sufficient evidence on the matter. His failure to do so is fatal.

2. The petitioner was not denied the right to due process before the PCAGC. Records show that the petitioner filed his
answer and other pleadings with respect to his alleged violation of internal revenue laws and regulations, and he attended
the hearings before the investigatory body. It is thus decisively clear that his protestation of non-observance of due process
is devoid of any factual or legal basis.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing effective and substantive supervening events, and in the exercise of its equity
powers, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition. Accordingly, Administrative Order No. 152 is considered LIFTED, and
petitioner can be allowed to retire with full benefits. No pronouncement as to costs.

52. Arceta vs. Mangrobang

G.R. No. 148560. June 15, 2004

Facts: The city prosecutor of Navotas Metro Mnila charged Ofelia V. Arceta for violating Batas Pambansa 22 in an
information (Criminal Case 1599-CR), alleging in an in Information that on or about September 16, 1998, Arceta issued a
Regional Bank Check worth P740,000.00 (postdated December 21, 1998) to Oscar R. Castro payable in CASH, well
knowing that at the time of issue she did have sufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank for the payment, and despite
receipt of notice of such dishonor, Arceta failed to pay said payee with the face amount of said check or to make arrangement
for full payment thereof within 5 banking days after receiving notice.
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Arceta did not move to have the charge against her dismissed or the Information quashed on the ground that BP 22
was unconstitutional, Arceta was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the charge. However, she manifested hat her
arraignment should be without prejudice to the present petition or to any other actions she would take to suspend proceedings
in the trial court. Arceta [GR 152895] then filed the petition for certitiorary, prohibition, and madamus with prayers for
temporary restraining order, assailing the constitutionality of the Bouncing Checks Law (BP 22).
Issue: Whether or not the court should render BP22 unconstitutional due to the present economic and financial crisis.

Held: The Court examined the contentions of Arceta carefully, but they still have to persuade us that BP by itself or in its
implementation transgressed a provision of the Constitution. As stressed in Lozano, it is precisely during trying times that
there exists a most compelling reason to strengthen faith and confidence in the financial system and any practice tending to
destroy confidence in checks as currency substitutes should be deterred to prevent havoc in the trading and financial
communities. Further, while indeed the metropolitan trial courts may be burdened immensely by bouncing checks cases
now, that fact us immaterial to the alleged invalidity of the law being assailed.

The Instant petition is DISMISSED for utter lack or merit.

53. Mirasol vs. CA

G.R. 128448

SPOUSES ALEJANDRO MIRASOL and LILIA E. MIRASOL, petitioners,

vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, and PHILIPPINE EXCHANGE CO., INC.,
respondents.

Facts:

 The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters.

 Private respondent Philippine National Bank (PNB) financed the Mirasols sugar production venture for crop years,
1973-1974 and 1974-1975 under a crop loan financing scheme. Under said scheme, the Mirasols signed Credit
Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops, and a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB. The Chattel
Mortgage empowered PNB as the petitioners attorney-in-fact to negotiate and to sell the latters sugar in both
domestic and export markets and to apply the proceeds to the payment of their obligations to it.

 Then president Marcos issued a Presidential Decree No. 579 to authorized private respondent Philippine Exchange
Co., Inc. (PHILEX) to purchase sugar allocated for export to the United States and to other foreign markets. The
price and quantity was determined by the Sugar Quota Administration, PNB, the Department of Trade and
Industry, and finally, by the Office of the President. The decree further authorized PNB to finance PHILEXs
purchases. Finally, the decree directed that whatever profit PHILEX might realize from sales of sugar abroad was
to be remitted to a special fund of the national government, after commissions, overhead expenses and
liabilities had been deducted. The government offices and entities tasked by existing laws and administrative
regulations to oversee the sugar export pegged the purchase price of export sugar in crop years 1973-1974 and
1974-1975 at P180.00 per picul.
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 On August 10, 1982, the balance of outstanding sugar crop and other loans owed by petitioners to PNB stood at
P15,964,252.93. Despite demands, the Mirasols failed to settle said due and demandable accounts. PNB then
proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged properties. After applying the proceeds of the auction sale
of the mortgaged realties, PNB still had a deficiency claim of P12,551,252.93.

 Petitoners continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds of the sale of their export sugar for crop years 1973-
1974 and 1974-1975, insisting that said proceeds, if properly liquidated, could offset their outstanding
obligations with the bank. PNB remained adamant in its stance that under P.D. No. 579, there was nothing to
account since under said law, all earnings from the export sales of sugar pertained to the National Government and
were subject to the disposition of the President of the Philippines for public purposes.

 On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for accounting, specific performance, and damages against PNB with
the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, docketed as Civil Case No. 14725.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendants Philippine National Bank (PNB) and Philippine Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX)

 The Mirasols then filed an appeal with the respondent court, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 38607, faulting the trial
court for not nullifying the dacion en pago and the mortgage contracts, as well as the foreclosure of their mortgaged
properties. Also faulted was the trial courts failure to award them the full money claims and damages sought
from both PNB and PHILEX.

Issues:

1. Whether the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional without notice to the Solicitor General
where the parties have agreed to submit such issue for the resolution of the Trial Court.
2. Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof are unconstitutional.

Held:

1. Yes. It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a
statute, presidential decree, or executive order. The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to
declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation not only in this Court, but in all Regional Trial Courts.[10] In J.M. Tuason and Co. v. Court of Appeals,
3 SCRA 696 (1961) we held:

Plainly, the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving
constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases
where such constitutionality happens to be in issue.

Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that it was improper for the trial court to have declared
P.D. No. 579 unconstitutional, since petitioners had not complied with Rule 64, Section 3, of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners contend that said Rule specifically refers only to actions for declaratory relief and not to an ordinary
action for accounting, specific performance, and damages.
 23

Petitioners contentions are bereft of merit. Rule 64, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 3. Notice to Solicitor General. In any action which involves the validity of a statute, or executive order or
regulation, the Solicitor General shall be notified by the party attacking the statute, executive order, or regulation,
and shall be entitled to be heard upon such question.

In this case, the Solicitor General was never notified about Civil Case No. 14725. Nor did the trial court ever require
him to appear in person or by a representative or to file any pleading or memorandum on the constitutionality of the
assailed decree. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that lack of the required notice made it
improper for the trial court to pass upon the constitutional validity of the questioned presidential decrees.

2. No. As a rule, the courts will not resolve the constitutionality of a law, if the controversy can be settled on other
grounds. The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the
political departments are valid, absent a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This
presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers. This means that the measure had first been carefully
studied by the legislative and executive departments and found to be in accord with the Constitution before it was
finally enacted and approved.

The present case was instituted primarily for accounting and specific performance. The Court of Appeals correctly
ruled that PNBs obligation to render an accounting is an issue, which can be determined, without having to
rule on the constitutionality of P.D. No. 579. In fact there is nothing in P.D. No. 579, which is applicable to PNBs
intransigence in refusing to give an accounting. The governing law should be the law on agency, it being undisputed
that PNB acted as petitioners agent. In other words, the requisite that the constitutionality of the law in question be
the very lis mota of the case is absent. Thus we cannot rule on the constitutionality of P.D. No. 579.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the respondent court in CA-G.R. CV
38607 AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

54. Mitra vs. Comelec

104 SCRA 58 (1981)

55. Salonga vs. Cruz-Pano

134 SCRA 438 (1985)

Facts:
The case roots backs to the rash of bombings which occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months of August,
September and October of 1980. Victor Burns Lovely, Jr, one of the victims of the bombing, implicated petitioner Salonga
as one of those responsible.

On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the petitioner a “Notice of Preliminary Investigation” in
People v. Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. (which included petitioner as a co-accused), stating that “the preliminary investigation
of the above-entitled case has been set at 2:30 o’clock p.m. on December 12, 1980” and that petitioner was given ten (10)
days from receipt of the charge sheet and the supporting evidence within which to file his counter-evidence. The petitioner
states that up to the time martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981, and despite assurance to the contrary, he has not
received any copies of the charges against him nor any copies of the so-called supporting evidence.
 24

The counsel for Salonga was furnished a copy of an amended complaint signed by Gen. Prospero Olivas, dated 12
March 1981, charging Salonga, along with 39 other accused with the violation of RA 1700, as amended by PD 885, BP 31
and PD 1736. On 15 October 1981, the counsel for Salonga filed a motion to dismiss the charges against Salonga for failure
of the prosecution to establish a prima facie case against him. On 2 December 1981, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano (Presiding
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII, Quezon City) denied the motion. On 4 January 1982, he (Pano)
issued a resolution ordering the filing of an information for violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act, as amended,
against 40 people, including Salonga. The resolutions of the said judge dated 2 December 1981 and 4 January 1982 are the
subject of the present petition for certiorari. It is the contention of Salonga that no prima facie case has been established by
the prosecution to justify the filing of an information against him. He states that to sanction his further prosecution despite
the lack of evidence against him would be to admit that no rule of law exists in the Philippines today.

Issues:
1. Whether the above case still falls under an actual case.
2. Whether the above case dropped by the lower court still deserves a decision from the Supreme Court.

Held: 1. No. The Court had already deliberated on this case, a consensus on the Court’s judgment had been arrived at, and
a draft ponencia was circulating for concurrences and separate opinions, if any, when on January 18, 1985, respondent Judge
Rodolfo Ortiz granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal Sergio Apostol to drop the subversion case against the petitioner.
Pursuant to instructions of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution restudied its evidence and decided to seek the exclusion
of petitioner Jovito Salonga as one of the accused in the information filed under the questioned resolution.

The court is constrained by this action of the prosecution and the respondent Judge to withdraw the draft ponencia from
circulating for concurrences and signatures and to place it once again in the Court’s crowded agenda for further
deliberations.

Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of subversion charges is concerned, this decision has been
rendered moot and academic by the action of the prosecution.

2. Yes. Despite the SC’s dismissal of the petition due to the case’s moot and academic nature, it has on several occasions
rendered elaborate decisions in similar cases where mootness was clearly apparent.

The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It
has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees.

In dela Camara vs Enage (41 SCRA 1), the court ruled that:

“The fact that the case is moot and academic should not preclude this Tribunal from setting forth in language clear and
unmistakable, the obligation of fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the unequivocal command of the Constitution
that excessive bail shall not be required.”

In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural Center of the Philippines could validly be created
through an executive order was mooted by Presidential Decree No. 15, the Center’s new charter pursuant to the President’s
legislative powers under martial law. Nevertheless, the Court discussed the constitutional mandate on the preservation and
development of Filipino culture for national Identity. (Article XV, Section 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution).

In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183), the fact that the petition was moot and academic
did not prevent this Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from promulgating one of the most voluminous decisions
ever printed in the Reports.
 25

56. Javier vs. Comelec and Arturo Pacificador

144 SCRA 194 (1988)

Facts:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Commission of Elections. The petitioner (Javier) and the private
respondent (Pacificador) were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. The petitioner
appeared to enjoy more popular support but the respondernt had the advantage of being the nominee of the KBL with all its
perquisites power. On May 13, 1984, several followers of the petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the
respondent’s men. Seven suspects including Pacificador faced trial for these murders. Even through this heightened tension
of atmosphere, the election occurred with the respondent proclaimed as winner by the Second Division.

The petitioner thereupon came to the Court of Appeals arguing that the proclamation was void because made only
by a division and not by the COMELEC enbanc as required by the constitution. Meanwhile, the private respondent took his
oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa. This case was still being considered by this court when on February 11, 1986,
the petitioner was gunned down in cold blood and in broad daylight. Consequently, the abolition of the Batasang Pambansa
and the disappearance of the office in dispute between the petitioner and the private respondent—both of whom have gone
their separate way—could be a convenient justification for dismissing the case. But there are larger issues involved that
must be resolved. The more important purpose is to manifest in the clearest possible terms that the court will not disregard
and ineffect condone wrong n the simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has become moot and academic.

What made the situation especially deplorable was the indifferent attitude of the COMELEC toward the anomalies
being committed. It is a matter of record that the petitioner complained against the terroristic acts of his opponents. All the
electoral body did was refer the matter to the Armed Forces without taking a more active step as befitted its constitutional
role as guardian of free, orderly and honest elections. A more assertive stance could have averted the election eve massacre
and saved the lives of the nine victims of the tragedy. In addition, the petitioner charged that the elections were marred by
massive terrorism, intimidation… snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed me of respondent Pacificador.
However, on June 7, 1984, the same SECOND DIVISION ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the
winner without prejudice to the outcome case before the Commission. And on July 23, 1984, the Second Division
promulgated the decision of proclaiming Arturo F. Pacificador as the elected assemblyman of the province of Antique. The
petitioner then came to the court, asking to annul the said decision.

Issue: Whether or not the Second Division of the COMELEC was authorized to promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984,
proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election.

Held:
The applicable provisions in this case are found in the Article 12-C, Sections 2 and 3, of the 19873 Constitution.
Section 2 consfers on the COMELEC the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to election, returns and
qualifications of all member of the Batasang Pambansa. Section 3 also provides that the “COMELEC may en banc or in
three divisions. All election cases may be heard and decided by divisions except contests involving members of the Batasang
Pambansa, which shall be heard and decided en banc.

Base of the COMELEC’s interpretation the case therein was that neither the petitioner nor the private respondent
had at that time assumed office and returns or qualifications could be examined by the COMELEC en banc. The en banc
requirement would apply only from the time a candidate for the Batasang Pambansa was proclaimed winner, for it was only
then that a contest could be permitted under the law. However, as the court saw it, the effect of this interpretation would be
to divide the jurisdiction of the COMELEC in two: 1) over matters arising before the proclamation, which should be heard
and decided by division in the exercise of its administrative power, and 2) over matters arising after the proclamation, which
 26

could be heard and decided only en banc in the exercise of its judicial power. However, the court did not agree with the
interpretation of the COMELEC.

The term “contest” was incorporated in the 1973 Constitution which did not follow the strict definition of a
contention between the parties for the same office. Under the Election Code of 1971, which presumably was taken into
consideration when the 1973 Constitution was being drafted, election contests included the quo warranto petition that could
be filed by any voter on the ground of disloyalty or ineligibility of the constestee although such voted was himself not
claiming the office involve. The phrase “election, returns and qualifications” should be interpreted in its totality as referring
to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee’s title.

As correctly observed by the petitioner, the purpose of section 3 in requiring that cases involving members of the
Batasang Pambasa be heard and decided by the COMELEC en banc was to insure the most careful consideration of such
cases. Obviously, that objective could not be achieved if the Commission could act en banc only after the proclamation had
been made, for it might then be too late already. After that delay, the Commission might then no longer be able to rectify in
time the proclamation summarily and not very judiciously made by the division. While in the end the protestant might be
sustained, he might find himself with only a Phyrric victory because the term of his office would he already be expired.

Wherefore, were it not for the supervening evets that have legally rendered it moot and academic, this petition
would have been grated and the decision of the COMELEC date July 23, 1984, set aside as VIOLATIVE OF THE
CONSTITUTION.

57. Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)

148 SCRA 659 (1987)

Facts:

 Then President FERDINAND E. MARCOS promulgated the following:

SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no carabao regardless of age, sex,
physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The carabao or carabeef
transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the
government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National
Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the
Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.

 On January 13, 1984, the petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on when
they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure.
The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his
filing of a supersede as bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the
confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The
court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of
authority and also for its presumed validity.
 The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court, which upheld the trial court, and he came
before in this petition for review on certiorari.

 The thrust of his petition are the following:

 27

a. The executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef
being transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without
according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due
process.
b. Petitioner complains that the measure should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional.
c. There is also a challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President under
Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the petitioner’s right to due process is violated.
2. Whether or not there has been an improper exercise of the legislative power by the president (1973 Constitution,
Amendment 6).

Held:
1. The petitioner was not accorded with the right to be heard before the court as guaranteed by due process, and he was
immediately condemned and punished.

 The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed
with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. We have consistently declared that
every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster
described almost two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, as "the law which hears before it
condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every
person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade
the due process clause into a worn and empty catchword.
 In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the
petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was
ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive order
defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out
forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard,
thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.

2. The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree, promulgating a new
rule instead of merely implementing an existing law. It was issued by then President Marcos not for the purpose of taking
care that the laws were faithfully executed but in the exercise of his legislative authority under Amendment No. 6.

 It was provided thereunder that whenever in his judgment there existed a grave emergency or a threat or imminence
thereof or whenever the legislature failed or was unable to act adequately on any matter that in his judgment required
immediate action, he could, in order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters of instruction that were to
have the force and effect of law.
 As there is no showing of any exigency to justify the exercise of that extraordinary power then, the petitioner has
reason, indeed, to question the validity of the executive order. Nevertheless, since the determination of the grounds
was supposed to have been made by the President "in his judgment, " a phrase that will lead to protracted discussion
not really necessary at this time, we reserve resolution of this matter until a more appropriate occasion. For the
nonce, we confine ourselves to the more fundamental question of due process.

To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method
employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive.
Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is
immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt
 28

of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of
powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted
unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive
Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed above, the decision
of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to the
petitioner. No costs.