G.R. No.

104732 June 22, 1993

ROBERTO A. FLORES, DANIEL Y. FIGUEROA, ROGELIO T. PALO, DOMINGO A. JADLOC,

CARLITO T. CRUZ and MANUEL P. REYES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, Executive Secretary, and RICHARD J. GORDON, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners, taxpayers and employees of U.S facilities at Subic, challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 13
(d) of the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which directs the President to appoint a
professional manager as administrator of the SBMA…provided that “for the 1st year of its operations, the
mayor of Olongapo City (Richard Gordon) shall be appointed as the chairman and the CEO of the Subic
Authority.”

ISSUES

(1) Whether the proviso violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation
of elective officials to other government posts.

(2) Whether or not the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor of Olongapo City and
thus an excepted circumstance.

(3) Whether or not the Constitutional provision allowing an elective official to receive double
compensation (Sec. 8, Art. IX-B) would be useless if no elective official may be appointed to another post.

(4) Whether there is legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of the President.

(5) Whether Mayor Gordon may retain any and all per diems, allowances and other emoluments which he
may have received pursuant to his appointment.

HELD

(1) YES, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution Provides: No elective official shall be eligible for
appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official
shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. The subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official i.e. the Mayor
of Olongapo City, to other government post (as Chairman and CEO of SBMA). This is precisely
what the Constitution prohibits. It seeks to prevent a situation where a local elective official will
work for his appointment in an executive position in government, and thus neglect his
constitutents.

(2) NO, Congress did not contemplate making the SBMA posts as automatically attached to the
Office of the Mayor without need of appointment. The phrase “shall be appointed” unquestionably
shows the intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor
of Olongapo City.

(3) NO, Sec. 8 does not affect the constitutionality of the subject proviso. In any case, the Vice-
 President for example, an elective official who may be appointed to a cabinet post, may receive
the compensation attached to the cabinet position if specifically authorized by law.

(4) YES, although Section 13(d) itself vests in the President the power to appoint the Chairman of
SBMA, he really has no choice but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City. The power of choice is
the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of whom
to appoint. Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer, it
cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate. Such
enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes
an irregular restriction on the power of appointment. While it may be viewed that the proviso
merely sets the qualifications of the officer during the first year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he
must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to
prescribe qualifications where only one, and no other, can qualify. Since the ineligibility of
an elective official for appointment remains all throughout his tenure or during his incumbency, he
may however resign first from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-
attached disqualification before he may be considered fit for appointment. Consequently, as long
as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for appointment to another public
office.

(5) YES, as incumbent elective official, Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of
Chairman and CEO of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto cannot be sustained. He however
remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void;
he may be considered a de facto officer, and in accordance with jurisprudence, is entitled to such
benefits.

G.R. No. 112889 April 18, 1995

BIENVENIDO O. MARQUEZ, JR., petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ, respondents.

Facts:
Marquez, a candidate for an elective position in Quezon Province during the 1998 elections, filed
a petition praying for the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of Rodriguez on the ground of
disqualification under section 40 of the Local Government Code Section 40. Disqualification.
The following persons are disqualified from running for any local elective position… (e) Fugitive
from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad.
Rodriguez is allegedly criminally charged with insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property
in the United States and that his arrest is yet to be served because of his flight from the country. The
COMELEC dismissed Marquez’s Petition. Rodriguez was proclaimed the Governor-elect of Quezon.

Issue:
Whether or not private respondent, who at the time of the filing of his COC is said to be facing
criminal charges before a foreign court and evading a warrant of arrest comes within the term “fugitive
from justice”.

Held:
No. Although it is provided in Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991 that for a person to be considered a fugitive from justice, he or she has to be
convicted by final judgment, but such definition is an ordinate and under circumscription of the law. For
the term fugitive from justice includes not only those who after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise
those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. This definition truly finds support from
jurisprudence, and it may be conceded as expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term.

[G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]

ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in the
May 11, 1998 elections.

Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of votes. However, his
proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado on
the ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.

From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen.

The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for said elective position.

However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the respondent
was reversed. Respondent was held to have renounced his US citizenship when he attained the age of
majority and registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.

Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August 31, 1998. Thus the
present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the Philippines.

RULING:

The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be
understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former
arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a
situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states.
While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5
of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be
dealt with by law."

Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with
dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their
status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other
country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that,
from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced
his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.

When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty to
any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The determination whether such
renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province
and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the
legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and
application.

The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his American
citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his
certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of
another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and
allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the
laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he
may have said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the
fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an
artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he
betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through
expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court sustained the denial of
entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he
applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed
abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in
electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act
constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

CITY OF MANILA VS INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

Date: November 15, 1989
Petitioners: City of Manila and Evangeline Suva
Respondents: IAC, Irene Sto. Domingo, et al

Ponente: Paras

Facts: Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. died and was buried in North Cemetery which lot was leased by the
city to Irene Sto. Domingo for the period from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021. The wife paid the full amount
of the lease. Apart, however from the receipt, no other document embodied such lease over the lot.
Believing that the lease was only for five years, the city certified the lot as ready for exhumation.
 On the basis of the certification, Joseph Helmuth authorized the exhumation and removal of the
remains of Vicencio. His bones were placed in a bag and kept in the bodega of the cemetery. The lot was
also leased to another lessee. During the next all souls day, the private respondents were shocked to find
out that Vicencio’s remains were removed. The cemetery told Irene to look for the bones of the husband
in the bodega.
Aggrieved, the widow and the children brought an action for damages against the City of Manila;
Evangeline Suva of the City Health Office; Sergio Mallari, officer-in-charge of the North Cemetery; and
Joseph Helmuth, the latter's predecessor as officer-in-charge of the said burial grounds owned and
operated by the City Government of Manila. The court ordered defendants to give plaintiffs the right to
make use of another lot. The CA affirmed and included the award of damages in favor of the private
respondents.

Issue: WON the operations and functions of a public cemetery are a governmental, or a corporate or
proprietary function of the City of Manila.

Held: Proprietary

Ratio: Petitioners alleged in their petition that the North Cemetery is exclusively devoted for public use or
purpose as stated in Sec. 316 of the Compilation of the Ordinances of the City of Manila. They conclude
that since the City is a political subdivision in the performance of its governmental function, it is immune
from tort liability which may be caused by its public officers and subordinate employees. Private
respondents maintain that the City of Manila entered into a contract of lease which involve the exercise of
proprietary functions with Irene Sto. Domingo. The city and its officers therefore can be sued for any-
violation of the contract of lease.

The City of Manila is a political body corporate and as such endowed with the faculties of
municipal corporations to be exercised by and through its city government in conformity with law, and in
its proper corporate name. It may sue and be sued, and contract and be contracted with. Its powers are
twofold in character-public, governmental or political on the one hand, and corporate, private and
proprietary on the other. Governmental powers are those exercised in administering the powers of the
state and promoting the public welfare and they include the legislative, judicial, public and political.
Municipal powers on the one hand are exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the community
and include those which are ministerial, private and corporate. In connection with the powers of a
municipal corporation, it may acquire property in its public or governmental capacity, and private or
proprietary capacity. The New Civil Code divides such properties into property for public use and
patrimonial properties (Article 423), and further enumerates the properties for public use as provincial
roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public
works for public service paid for by said provisions, cities or municipalities, all other property is patrimonial
without prejudice to the provisions of special laws. Thus in Torio v. Fontanilla, the Court declared that with
respect to proprietary functions the settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be held liable to third
persons ex contractu.

Under the foregoing considerations and in the absence of a special law, the North Cemetery is a
patrimonial property of the City of Manila. The administration and government of the cemetery are under
the City Health Officer, the order and police of the cemetery, the opening of graves, niches, or tombs, the
exhuming of remains, and the purification of the same are under the charge and responsibility of the
superintendent of the cemetery. With the acts of dominion, there is no doubt that the North Cemetery is
within the class of property which the City of Manila owns in its proprietary or private character.
Furthermore, there is no dispute that the burial lot was leased in favor of the private respondents. Hence,
obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties. Thus a lease
contract executed by the lessor and lessee remains as the law between them. Therefore, a breach of
contractual provision entitles the other party to damages even if no penalty for such breach is prescribed
in the contract.

Issue: WON the city is liable for damages

Held: Yes

Ratio: All things considered, even as the Court commiserates with plaintiffs for the unfortunate
happening complained of and untimely desecration of the resting place and remains of their deceased
dearly beloved, it finds the reliefs prayed for by them lacking in legal and factual basis. Under the
aforementioned facts and circumstances, the most that plaintiffs ran ask for is the replacement of subject
lot with another lot of equal size and similar location in the North Cemetery which substitute lot plaintiffs
can make use of without paying any rental to the city government for a period of forty-three (43) years,
four (4) months and eleven (11) days corresponding to the unexpired portion of the term of the lease sued
upon as of January 25, 1978 when the remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. were prematurely
removed from the disputed lot; and to require the defendants to look in earnest for the bones and skull of
the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo Sr. and to bury the same in the substitute lot adjudged in favor of plaintiffs
hereunder.

As regards the issue of the validity of the contract of lease of grave lot No. 159, Block No. 195 of
the North Cemetery for 50 years beginning from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021 as clearly stated in the
receipt duly signed by the deputy treasurer of the City of Manila and sealed by the city government, there
is nothing in the record that justifies the reversal of the conclusion of both the trial court and the
Intermediate Appellate Court to the effect that the receipt is in itself a contract of lease.

Under the doctrine of respondent superior, (Torio v. Fontanilla), petitioner City of Manila is liable
for the tortious act committed by its agents who failed to verify and check the duration of the contract of
lease. The contention of the petitioner-city that the lease is covered by Administrative Order No. 5, series
of 1975 dated March 6, 1975 of the City of Manila for five (5) years only beginning from June 6, 1971 is
not meritorious for the said administrative order covers new leases. When subject lot was certified on
January 25, 1978 as ready for exhumation, the lease contract for fifty (50) years was still in full force and
effect.

[G. R. No. 126661. December 3, 1999]

JOSE S. ANDAYA and EDGARDO L. INCIONG, petitioners, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Cebu
City, Branch 20, and THE CITY OF CEBU, respondents.

Facts: Petitioner Andaya, Regional Director, Regional Police Command No. 7, submitted to the City
Mayor of Cebu a list of 5 eligibles for the mayor to choose one to be appointed as the chief of police of
Cebu City. The mayor did not choose anyone from the list because the name of his protégé was not
included therein.

The City of Cebu filed a complaint against the petitioner to require him to include the mayor’s protégé in
the list of 5 eligibles to be recommended by the Regional Police Director to the mayor.
Petitioner refuses stating that aside from the fact that said protégé is not qualified; the power to designate
the chief of police of Cebu City is vested with the Regional Director. However, the mayor is authorized to
choose the chief of police from a list of 5 eligibles submitted by the Regional Director.
Under RA 6975, Sec 51, the mayor of Cebu City shall be deputized as representative of the National
Police Commission in his territorial jurisdiction and as such the mayor shall have authority to choose the
chief of police from a list of 5 eligibles recommended by the Police Regional Director. Then the Regional
Director, RPC No.7, appoints the officer selected by the mayor as the Chief of Police, Cebu City.
Issue: WON the mayor has the authority to appoint the Chief of Police.

Held: No. As deputy of the Commission, the authority of the mayor is very limited. In reality, he has no
power of appointment; he has only the limited power of selecting one from among the list of 5 eligibles to
be named the chief of police. Actually, the power to appoint the chief of police of Cebu City is vested in
the Regional Director.
Moreover, it is the prerogative of the Regional Police Director to name the 5 eligibles from a pool of
eligible officers without interference from local executives. Hence, the mayor cannot require the petitioner
to include the mayor’s protégé in the list of 5 eligibles to be recommended by the Regional Police Director
to the mayor.

WILMER GREGO, petitioner, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND HUMBERTO BASCO,

respondents (DIGEST)
G.R. No. 125955, June 19, 1997

FACTS:
In 1981, Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff for serious misconduct. Subsequently,
he ran as a candidate for councilor in the Second District of the City of Manila during the 1988, local
elections. He won and assumed office. After his term, Basco sought re-election. Again, he won. However,
he found himself facing lawsuits filed by his opponents who wanted to dislodge him from his position.

Petitioner argues that Basco should be disqualified from running for any elective position since he had
been “removed from office as a result of an administrative case” pursuant to Section 40 (b) of Republic
Act No. 7160.

For a third time, Basco was elected councilor in 1995. Expectedly, his right to office was again contested.
In 1995, petitioner Grego filed with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification. The COMELEC
conducted a hearing and ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda.

However, the Manila City BOC proclaimed Basco in May 1995, as a duly elected councilor for the Second
District of Manila, placing sixth among several candidates who vied for the seats. Basco immediately took
his oath of office.

COMELEC resolved to dismiss the petition for disqualification. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of
said resolution was later denied by the COMELEC,, hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not COMELEC acted in with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for
disqualification.

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC in dismissing the
petition for disqualification, however, the Court noted that they do not agree with its conclusions and
reasons in the assailed resolution.

The Court reiterated that being merely an implementing rule, Sec 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure must not override, but instead remain consistent with and in harmony with the law it seeks to
apply and implement. Administrative rules and regulations are intended to carry out, neither to supplant
nor to modify, the law. The law itself cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory
requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. An administrative agency cannot amend
an act of Congress.

In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the
basic law prevails because said rule or regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the
basic law. Since Section 6 of Rep. Act 6646, the law which Section 5 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure seeks to implement, employed the word “may,” it is, therefore, improper and highly irregular
for the COMELEC to have used instead the word “shall” in its rules.

Still, the Court DISMISSED the petition for lack of merit.

 [G.R. No. 133495. September 3, 1998]

BENJAMIN U. BORJA, JR., petitioner vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE T. CAPCO,
JR., respondents.

Facts: Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for
a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the
death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. For the next two succeeding elections in 1992 and 1995, he was
again re-elected as Mayor.

On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros
relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for
mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification on the theory that the latter would have already served as mayor
for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term
after that.
The Second Division of the Commission on Elections ruled in favor of petitioner and declared private
respondent Capco disqualified from running for reelection as mayor of Pateros but in the motion for
reconsideration, majority overturned the original decision.
Issue: WON Capco has served for three consecutive terms as Mayor?

Held: No. Article X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that “…the term of office of elective local
officials… …shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.”

This provision is restated in par. 43(b) of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 71) which states that
“…no local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected….”
The term served must therefore be one “for which [the official concerned] was elected.” The purpose of
this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an elective official may
serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he was elected because he is simply continuing
the service of the official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully served the term
not withstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its expiration.
The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right
to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three
consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the
same number of times before the disqualification can apply.

SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY vs.COMELEC

G.R. No. 125416 September 26, 1996FACTS:

On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA. 7227 (The Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992),
which created the Subic Economic Zone. RA 7227 likewise created SBMA to implement the declared
national policy of converting the Subic military reservation into alternative productive uses.
On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic military reservation to the Philippines
government. Immediately, petitioner commenced the implementation of its task, particularly the
preservation of the sea-ports, airport, buildings, houses and other installations left by the American navy.

On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10,
Serye 1993, expressing therein itsabsolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to
jointhe Subic Special Economic Zone and submitted such to the Office of the President.

On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to
annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg.10, Serye 1993.

The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify Pambayang Kapasyang Blg. 10 for Morong to join the
Subic Special Economi Zone,b) to allow Morong to join provided conditions are met.

The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the petition by promulgating Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg.
18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of the Philippines so amend certain provisions of RA 7227.

Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under the LGC of 1991.

On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the ground that the subject
thereof was merely a resolution and not an ordinance.

On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation No. 532 defining the metes and bounds of the
SSEZ including therein the portion of the former naval base within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Municipality of Morong.

On June 18, 19956, respondent COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2845and 2848, adopting a "Calendar of
Activities for local referendum and providing for "the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the
referendum

On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari Contesting the validity of Resolution No. 2848
alleging that public respondent isintent on proceeding with a local initiative that proposes an amendment
of a national law

ISSUE:
1. WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No. 2848
which governs the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Pambayang
Kapasyahan Blg. 10

2. WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powers of the people of Morong to
enact; i. e., whether such initiative "seeks the amendment of a national law."

HELD:

1. YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. FIRST. The process started by private
respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent Comelec made preparations for a
REFERENDUM only. In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the footnote below,
the word "referendum" is repeated at least 27 times, but "initiative" is not mentioned at all. The
COMELEC labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; the counting of votes was entrusted to a
"Referendum Committee"; the documents were called "referendum returns"; the canvassers,
"Referendum Board of Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the description"
referendum". To repeat, not once was the word "initiative" used in said body of Resolution No.
 2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an INITIATIVE. As defined, Initiative is the power
of the people to propose bills and laws, and to enact or reject them at the polls independent of
the legislative assembly. On the other hand, referendum is the right reserved to the people to
adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a legislative body and which in
most cases would without action on the part of electors become a law. In initiative and referendum,
the COMELEC exercises administration and supervision of the process itself, akin to its powers
over the conduct of elections.

These law-making powers belong to the people, hence the respondent Commission cannot
control or change the substance or the content of legislation.

2. The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the municipal resolution isstill in the proposal stage
and not yet an approved law.

The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an approved law. Should the people
reject it, then there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when the people have voted
for it and it has become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations can be enforced
or implemented there under. At this point, it is merely a proposal and the writ or prohibition cannot issue
upon a mere conjecture or possibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only actual
controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases. In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court
has authority to review COMELEC Resolution No. 2848 to determine the commission of grave abuse
of discretion. However, it does not have the same authority in regard to the proposed initiative since it has
not been promulgated or approved, or passed upon by any "branch or instrumentality" or lower court, for
that matter. The Commission on Elections itself has made no reviewable pronouncements about the
issues brought by the pleadings. The COMELEC simply included verbatim the proposal in its questioned
Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there is really no decision or action made by a branch, instrumentality or
court which this Court could take cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over, in the exercise of its review
powers.