 From an analysis of the four sections contained in Article 32 what we find is that every citizen

has a right to move the Supreme Court for the enforcement of the rights guaranteed in Part III
of the Constitution.1

 The High Courts have similar powers under Article 226(1) of the Constitution.

In the language of Dr. Ambedkar "It is the very soul of the Constitution and the very heart of it. The
Constitution has invested the Supreme Court with these rights and these writs could not be taken away
unless and until the Constitution itself is attended by means left open to the legislature. This in my
judgment is one of the greatest safeguards that can be provided for the safety and security of the
individual.2

The Supreme Court has expressed the same sentiment in Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras in the
following words:

"Art 32 provides a guaranteed remedy for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III (of the
Constitution) and this remedial right is itself made a fundamental right by being included in Part III. The
Court is thus constituted the protector and guarantor of fundamental rights and it cannot, consistently
with the responsibility so laid down upon it, refuse to entertain application seeking protection against
infringement of such rights."3

 The powers of the Supreme Court in protection of the constitutional rights are of the widest
amplitude. It is the constitutional obligation of the Court, as the guardian of the fundamental
rights of the people, as a sentinel of the qui vire, to enforce the fundamental right of the
accused to a speedy trial by issuing necessary directions to the State which may include active
and positive action... There is no reason why this (Supreme) Court should not adopt an activist
approach similar to that in the United States with a view to securing enforcement of the
fundamental right to speedy trial.4

 Scope and applicability of Article 32.-In Chiranjit Lal's case.5 the Supreme Court has dealt with
elaborate the scope and applicability of writs under Article 32. The following propositions
emerge from the decision:

1
Gopal Das Mohta v. Union of India, AIR 1955 SC 1 : 1955(1) SCR 773: 1955 SCJ 60 ; M.K Gopalan v. State of M.P.,
AIR 1954 SC 362 : (1955) 1 SCR 168 (174): 1954 SCJ 534 ; Khajoor Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1961 SC 532: 1961 (2)
SCR 828: 1961 (2) SCJ 235 ; Abdul v. State of J. & K., AIR 1971 SC 1217 (1220) : 1971(3) SCR 275: (1970) 3 SCC 525.
2
C.A.D., Vol. II, p. 963.
3
Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124 (127) :1950 SCR 594 (597); Chiranjit Lal Choudhury v. Union
of India, AIR 1951 SC 42 : 1950 SCR 869 ; State of Madras v. V.G. Row, AIR 1952 SC 196 (199) : 1952 SCR 597 (605);
Daryao v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 1457 (1461): 1962 (1) SCR 574 : 1962 (1) SCJ 702 ; Prem Chand v. Excise
Commissioner, U.P., AIR 1963 SC 996 (999): 1963 Supp (1) SCR 885.
4
Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1369 (1376, 1377) : 1979(3) SCR 532 (1980) 1 SCC 48: See also
Charles Sobhraj, Supdt, Central Jail, Tihar, AIR 1978 SC 1514 (1515, 1516): 1979(1) SCR 512: (1978) 4 SCC 104.
5
2. Chiranjit Lal Choudhury v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41: 1950 SCR 869.
 (1) the sole object of Article 32 is the enforcement of the Fundamental rights guaranteed under
the constitution;
(2) no matter, whether the necessity arises out of the executive or legislative action;
(3) a person aggrieved with the infraction of any of the fundamental rights is at liberty to move
Supreme Court.
(4) a petition of a person cannot be thrown out simply on the ground that the proper writ or
direction has not been prayed for;
(5) Article 32 is not directly concerned with the determination of the constitutional validity of a
particular legislative enactment. To make out a case under this Article, it is incumbent upon the
petitioner to establish not merely that the law complained of is beyond the competency of the
particular legislature as not being covered by any other items in the legislative lists, but also that
it affects or invades his fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution of which he could
seek enforcement by an appropriate writ or order.

 (Respondent) By a long catena of decisions the Supreme Court has evolved some
principles which regulate the entertainment of direct petitions. It was necessary to
discourage unnecessary and infructuous petition. The following circumstances have
been held to be sufficient grounds for rejecting petitions :
(1) where the right alleged to be infringed is a personal right of contract, not affecting
any of the fundamental rights6
(2) where the administrative order is only erroneous and the constitutionality of the
statute or any order made there under has not been challenged on the ground of
contravention of any fundamental rights.7
(3) where the application under Article 226 has been dismissed on merits, no petition
under Article 32 lies on the same ground as heard and rejected by the High Court.8 But if
the petition is dismissed in limine without going into merits of the case, this would not
create a bar of res judicata9. Nor would it create a bar if the petition under Article 226
has been dismissed on grounds of laches or delay or on the ground of an alternative
remedy being available. It would be open to the Supreme Court to reconsider the
matter to ascertain if any of such grounds exist.10
(4) where it is alleged that a fundamental right has been infringed the petitioner has to
disclose how his fundamental right has been infringed by a particular rule or decision or

6
Achuthan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1959 SC 490 : 1959 Supp(1) SCR 787.
7
Sadhu Singh v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1965 SC 91(95); D. A. V. College v. State of Punjah, AIR 1971 SC 1737
1971 Supp SCR 688: (1971) 2 SCC 269.
8
Daryao v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 1457 : 1962(1) SCR 574: 1962(1) SCJ 702 ; Trilok Chand v. Munshi, AIR 1970
SC 898 (901): 1969 (2) SCR 824 (1969) 1 SCC 110; Harswarup v. General Manager, Central Railway., AIR 1975 SC
202 (206): 1975(3) SCR 621.
9
Trilok Chand v. Munshi, AIR 1970 SC 898: 1969 (2) SCR 824: (1969) 1 SCC 110.
10
Ghulam Sarwar v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1335 (1337) : 1967(2) SCR 271 ; P.C. Sethi v. Union of India, AIR
1975 SC 2164 (2172) : 1975 (3) SCR 201: (1975) 4 SCC 67.
 its application. The impact of such rule or decision has to be clearly brought out."11 No
petition under Article 32 will lie until that infringement has been established.12
(5) Where there is an unprecedented delay on the part of the petitioner his own laches
and acquiescence cannot be overlooked when considering a claim to enforce the
fundamental right to equal treatment. With circumstances altered by lapse of time and
other facts, it would be quite difficult to enforce a fundamental right to the determinant
of innocent third persons.13

 Scope of issuance of writs in fundamental rights cases.-The quick remedy by way of

writs is specially intended for enforcement of fundamental rights. As already stated, a
person who finds any of his fundamental rights in jeopardy is at liberty to move the
Supreme Court direct under Article 32. He is not bound to move the High Court in the
first instance, though the High Court has concurrent powers to issue writs in such case.14
Even though a person has approached a High Court in the first instance under Article
226 and his petition has been dismissed by it, it is still open to the petitioner to move
the Supreme Court under Article 32, without obtaining leave to appeal, but the Supreme
Court has deprecated such direct approach except when there are good reasons for it.15

 (Respondent) There is another principle which guides the Courts for issuance of writs as
has been stated in Asiatic Engineering Co v. Achru Ram by the Allahabad High Court as
under-

"A petitioner for a writ under Article 226 must come with clean hands : if his
application suppresses relevant facts, or makes misleading statements or gives incorrect
information, the Court may exercise its inherent power to prevent abuse of its process
by refusing to hear the petition on its merits."16

 When a fundamental right is involved, Article 32 provides a guaranteed remedy in the Supreme
Court. It is not necessary that one must go to the High Court in the first instance, but if a plea is
taken to the High Court, the High Court is bound to give the same remedy as the Supreme Court
under Article 32. On the otherhand, the jurisdiction under Article 226 to grant "writs" for any
other purpose must, however, be discretionary and, in general, not exercised when there is
another adequate remedy, i.e. departmental remedy or civil suit, or any other remedy available

11
Amrit Lal Berry v. Collector, Central Excise & Revenue, AIR 1975 SC 538: 1975(2) SCR 960: (1975) 4 SCC 714.
12
Syed Ahmed Aga v. State of Mysore, AIR 1975 SC 1443 (1452): 1975 Supp SCR 473: (1975) 2 SCC 131.
13
Amrit Lal Berry v. Collector, Central Excise & Revenue, AIR 1975 SC 538: 1975(2) SCR 960: (1975) 4 SCC 714;
Nahar Singh v. Delhi Administration, (1978) 2 SLR 642 (647) (Delhi).
14
Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124: (1950) 1 SCR 594.
15
M.K. Gopalan v. State of M.P., AIR 1954 SC 362: (1955) 1 SCR 168 (174).
16
AIR 1951 All. 746.
 to the petitioner. The Court rarely accepts cases unless grave injustice is likely to result
otherwise.