SPE-174059-MS

Leading Safety, Health, and Environmental Indicators in Hydraulic

Fracturing
Nima Jabbari, Cyrus Ashayeri, and Najmedin Meshkati, University of Southern California

Copyright 2015, Society of Petroleum Engineers

This paper was prepared for presentation at the SPE Western Regional Meeting held in Garden Grove, California, USA, 27–30 April 2015.

This paper was selected for presentation by an SPE program committee following review of information contained in an abstract submitted by the author(s). Contents
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Abstract
Increasing number of hydraulic fracturing operations necessitates paying more attention to the safety and
environmental considerations of this technology. In-depth understanding of the complex nature and
root-causes of incidents related to the hydraulic fracturing operation is a prerequisite for any proactive risk
mitigation strategy. Many of the safety and environmental incidents during the development of shale
resources are widely regarded by public as results of hydraulic fracturing operation. Differentiation among
multiple steps of developing oil and gas resources allows an independent root cause analysis. In this
approach incidents that are not directly caused by underground injection of fracturing fluid can be
highlighted. These incidents can be treated in the same manner as common incidents in conventional
production. In this research the hydraulic fracturing operation is broken down into its components and
potential risks are investigated. Also, leading safety and environmental indicators for this industry are
defined and case-studies are investigated to find the connections between the incidents and the proposed
indicators.
Introduction
Like any other environmental and safety-critical industry, accidents, incidents and unintended negative
consequences attributed to the hydraulic fracturing operation can cause financial and environmental
damages, can harm the reputation of the operating company and sully the image of the entire industry.
There is a shared concern that the result of last November 4, 2014 referendum in city of Denton, TX,
which banned fracturing primarilry because of its alleged adverse safety and environmental consequences,
can transcend well beyond Denton’s city limits, become a precendent-setter and affect the future of the
entire unconventional oil and gas industry in the United States (Meshkati et al. 2014). In order to alleviate
public’s concerns and again their acceptance, sustainable shale industry in the US must operate in the
safest and most environmentally conscious manner, using a proactive systems-oriented approach. This
feasible goal only be attained through proactively and continuously monitoring the environmental and
safety “pulse” of the entire hydraulic fracturing operations, through relevant, tangible and tractable
indicators, which is the main thrust and intention of this research paper.
A safe and environmentally sound practice can guarantee a more secure energy future and also dispel
the public concern. Measurement and disclosure of operational data plays an important role in preventing
2 SPE-174059-MS

environmental hazards and safety incidents. Investigating the root causes of an industrial accident is
enhanced by studying all available information related to the accident. The more the collected information
the more face -based analysis will become. A better data collection and monitoring procedure can too lead
to a more successful production. It is, thus, important for the oil and gas industry to come to a mutual
understanding on the topic of collecting and disclosing data on various aspects of hydraulic fracturing
operation. Information from water usage volume, fracturing fluid and wastewater composition, and
gaseous emissions help defining a baseline for environmental and safety indicators. Recently, however,
efforts have been made by the oil and gas companies to address some of the concerns on hydraulic
fracturing impacts on the environment by disclosing the previously unraveled data of constituents used in
the injection fluid. FracFocus chemical disclosure registry is the most famous online database on this
subject matter.
It is well understood that reducing environmental and safety impacts of an operation with such caliber
to zero is an impossible task. In the meantime it is important to come to realization that assuring the
society from the level of effort put in preventing accidents will directly translate into safer hydraulic
fracturing and eventually more recoverable hydrocarbon reserve. After all without social approval of the
hydraulic fracturing process, there would be no resource to produce in the near future as the operations
will be subject to bans and moratoria from the states or a local community.
The concept of leading safety and environmental indicators has been a point of discussion in many
other industries as well as energy sector. The American Petroleum Institute (API) Recommended Practice
754 is an example of a set of guidelines aimed at the petrochemical and refining industry (API 2010a).
However, a fundamental difference between a chemical process plant and a hydrocarbon production
operation is the fact that the plants are designed and constructed by human whereas the oil and gas
operation field consists of a reservoir which is a production of nature. The main contributors to the oil and
gas production operations are unknown variables such as reservoir heterogeneity, abnormal formation
pressure, unidentified faulting and fracture networks, etc. As a result, one cannot develop rigid guidelines
when working in oil and gas production industry.
Definitions and Different Industries’ Quest for Leading Indicators
The concept of leading and lagging safety indicators have been around and on the radar screen of
safety-critical industries for a while. Lagging indicators are facts about previous events, measurements
collected after an incident occurs, such as injury rates; while leading indicators are pre-incident mea-
surements, they provide “a check of system functioning”, and have a predictive quality. A special issue
of the prestigious journal Safety Science in 2009 was dedicated to a debate on Process Safety Indicators,
which was inspired by a seminal and thought-provoking paper by Hopkins (2009). According to the
National Safety Council (NSC 2014, p. 3) expert panel, leading indicators are: “Proactive, preventative,
and predictive measures that monitor and provide current information about the effective performance,
activities, and processes of an EHS [Environment, Health and Safety] management system that can drive
the identification and elimination or control of risks in the workplace that can cause incidents and
injuries.”
The API Recommended Practice 754, Process Safety Performance Indicators for the Refining and
Petrochemical Industries (2010), characterizes leading indicator as being forward-looking and “indicate
the performance of the key work processes, operating discipline, or protective barriers that prevent
incidents. They are designed to give an indication of potential problems or deterioration in key safety
systems early enough that corrective actions may be taken” (p. 18). The International Association of Oil
and Gas Producers (IOGP 2011), Process Safety- Recommended Practice on Key Performance Indicators,
by echoing mostly the aforementioned API RP 754, considers leading indicators as measuring the
company’s “performance in maintain robust risk control” (p. 3). Other safety-critical industries such as
chemical processing, nuclear power, electric utility and maritime shipping have developed guidelines for
SPE-174059-MS 3

monitoring their context-specific relevant lagging and leading indicators. They, respectively, include
Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS 2011); ScottishPower (Sedgwick and Wands 2012); Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA 2000). The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) has
extensively studied application and efficacy of leading safety indicators for improving safety of its
oversight nuclear facilities (Robinson, 2012). And it considers leading indicators to “predict the likelihood
of an accident before it occurs; prevent accidents, and support productivity and quality” (emphasis added,
Winokur and Minnema 2010, p. 6). Nevertheless, it points out that leading indicators should not be viewed
necessarily as predictors of accidents; rather, they are “identifiers of accident-prone situations.”
Many federal and safety agencies and entities and have strongly recommended using lagging and
leading safety indicators to improve safety and reduce accident potential in the upstream and downstream
facilities associated with oil and gas industries. For instance, the National Academy of Engineering/
National Research Council (NAE/NRC 2011) investigation the BP Deepwater Horizon offshore drilling
rig accident explicitly recommended that, “Industry, BSEE [Bureau of Safety and Environmental En-
forcement of the U.S. Department of the Interior], and other regulators should foster an effective safety
culture through consistent training, adherence to principles of human factors, system safety, and continued
measurement through leading indicators” (emphasis added, Recommendations 5.5 and 6.25, p. 82 and
96). US Chemical and Hazard Investigation Board’s (CBS) 2007 BP Texas City investigation report
describes the importance of analyzing leading and lagging indicators (CBS 2007) and has reiterated it in
its comprehensive final reports of investigations of Tesoro Anacortes Refinery (CSB 2014) and Chevron
Richmond Refinery (CSB 2015) accidents.
In the State of California, the Interagency Working Group on Refinery Safety (2013), which was
created after a serious chemical release and fire at Chevron’s Richmond oil refinery in August, 2012,
recommended that the Interagency Refinery Task Force to review the “Process Safety Leading and
Lagging Indicators. . .and in consultation with the Refinery Safety Forums, develop recommendations for
appropriate indicators and how they should be used” (p. 30). And the Interagency Working Group on
Refinery Safety (2014) in its report recommended to “Require Refineries to Perform Periodic Safety
Culture Assessments” (p. 28), which, as will be discussed later, is an incubator or (fertile) ground for many
leading indicators, and to “Require Refineries to Explicitly Account for Human Factors” (p. 30).

Characteristics of Leading Indicators

Characteristics of leading indicators have been discussed by various organizations (API 2010; NSC 2014;
and IAEA 2000). Table 1 summarizes some of the important qualities or characteristics of the leading
indicators.
4 SPE-174059-MS

Table 1—Proposed characteristics of leading indicators proposed by various organizations

Organization Characteristics of Leading Indicators

API (2010, p.16-17 and 19) ● Reliable ● Meaningful

NSC (2014, p. 3)
IAEA (2000, p.23)
● Repeatable ● Appropriate for the intended audience
● Consistent ● Timely
● Independent of outside influences, ● Easy to use
● Relevant ● Auditable
● Comparable
● Actionable ● Easy to communicate
● Achievable ● Valid
● Meaningful ● Useful
● Transparent ● Timely
● Direct relationship between the indicator and safety ● Meaningful
● Availability of required data ● Applied in regular operational activities
● Quantitatively measurable ● Get validated easily
● Unambiguous ● Connected to the cause of a failure
● Significant enough ● Their quality can be controlled and verified
● Not prone to get manipulated ● Having a basis upon which local actions can be taken
● Form a manageable set

Types of Leading Indicators

Different types of leading indicators are tabulated in Table 2. It should be noted that, however that,
according to the API (2010, p. 18), the differentiation between or classification of indicators as lagging
or leading is not important; “the important point is to capture information that can be acted upon to correct
a situation, to identify lessons learned, and communicate this knowledge.” And for example, near miss can
be considered as either lagging or leading indicator, depending on the context and level of analysis (IOGP
2011). This differentiation between lagging and leading indicators and their applicability in different
safety management regimes has been succinctly discussed by Wreathall (2009) in his response to Hopkins
(2009).
SPE-174059-MS
Table 2—Proposed types of leading indicators proposed by various organizations
Organization
API (2010, p.16-17 and 19)
IOGP (2011, p.19) from
“Tier 4 KPIs [Key
Performance Indicators]”
CCPS (2011, p. 28) from
“Leading Metrics”
DNFSB (Winokur and
Minnema, 2010, p. 7)
NSC (2014, p. 2)
ScottishPower (2012, p. 6)
A major oil company From:
CSB (2015, p. 79)
1
According to the CSB (2015, p. 78), “They help facilities maintain safety protection layers and operating discipline by monitoring items such as equipment
selection, engineering design, and specification, technique, and frequency of inspection.“
Types of Leading Indicators
● Process Hazard Evaluations
Completion
● Process Safety Action Item
Closure
● Training Completed on Sched-
ule
● Procedures Current and Accu-
rate
● Work Permit Compliance
● Engineering and inherently
safe design
● Equipment maintenance, in-
spection, and testing
● Process hazard and major inci-
dents risk assessments
● Facility management of change
● Mechanical integrity
● Action items follow-up
● Management of change
● Process safety training and
competency
● Staffing and resource levels;
turnover and overtime rates
● On-time completion of training
and qualification requirements
● Rate and nature of employee
concerns and minority opin-
ions
● Rate and nature of procedural
violations
● Currency of procedures; fre-
quency of procedure reworks
● On-time completion of routine
tasks and surveillances
● Training
● Assessment and audits
● Hazard and near-miss
reporting
● Inspection and maintenance of
control systems and critical
systems
● Alarm management
● Control loop performance
● Completion of operational rou-
tine checks/testing
● Shift logging and handover
● PHA [Process Hazard Analy-
sis] Recommendation Imple-
mentation Overdue
● Safety Instrumented Systems
(SIS) Functions Disabled
● SIS [Safety Instrumented Sys-
tem] Functional Test Overdue
● Open Safety Work Requests
● Overdue Preventative Mainte-
nance
● Inspections Overdue
● Overdue training
● Training due in 30 days
● Permanent MOCs [Manage-
ment of Change] Overdue
● Temporary MOCs Overdue
● Mechanical Availability
● Incident Solutions Overdue
5
● Safety Critical Equipment Inspection
● Safety Critical Equipment Deficiency Management
● Management of Change (MOC) and Pre Start-up Safety
Review (PSSR) Compliance
● Completion of Emergency Response Drills
● Fatigue Risk Management
● Quality of and adherence to operating procedures
● Contractor capability and management
● Audit improvement actions
● Asset integrity and process safety initaives
● Workforce and management training and development
● Technical competence assessment and assurance
● Safety culture
● Operating and maintenance procedures
● Fatigue risk management
● On-time completion and effectiveness of corrective ac-
tions
● Effectiveness and on-time completion of routine mainte-
nance
● Quality of housekeeping; adequacy of supplies and mate-
rial
● Frequency of unexpected maintenance or equipment fail-
ure
● Frequency of challenges to engineered controls and
barriers
● Communication at the workplace
● Resources for safety efforts/activities, including time and
funds
● Perceptions surveys, including feedbacks from employees
● Plant override and defeat of interlock
● Safety critical systems not available
● Operations
● Maintenance
● Engineering
● Critical processes undertaken correctly
● Investigations
● Audit Action Items
● Pre-Startup Safety Review Exceptions
● Overdue Testing of Over Speed Trips
● Overdue PRDs (Pressure relief valves) Testing
● Days Exceeding Alarm Limit
● Critical Process Variable Deviations
● Routine Duties not Completed
● Work Order Schedule Adherence
● Open Temporary Leak Repairs
● Utilization (Mechanical Utilization)
● Reliability Clock (Mechanical Reliability)
● Industrial Safety Ordinance Recommendation Implemen-
tation Overdue
● Overdue Compliance Assurance Program tasks
6 SPE-174059-MS

Safety Culture and Leading Indicators

Safety culture plays a vital role in safety of both upstream and downstream oil and gas industry facilities.
(Heinecke et al. 2014; Tabibzadeh et al. 2014). The CCPS (2011) document considers safety culture as
a leading metrics and recommends that the chemical and downstream oil processing sectors should
proactively assess it. The IAEA (2000) framework, considered safety culture-related factors, such
attitudes towards procedures, policies and rules, as “strategic indicators” that should be always be
monitored. It is noteworthy that a recent seminal study of safety performance in U.S. nuclear power
operations by Morrow et al. (2014), contended that assessing an organization’s safety culture may be used
as a performance indicator. Moreover, “it is possible that safety culture assessments may serve as leading
indicators of performance, and provide opportunities for intervention before significant events occur.
Post-event investigations, like TMI [Three Mile Island] and Chernobyl, have repeatedly shown that
weaknesses in an organization’s safety culture can create opportunities for significant adverse events” (p.
38).

Overview of Hydraulic Fracturing Potential Impacts

Hydraulic fracturing has been widely used to stimulate tight oil and gas formations and boost the
production in the US. The application of this technology is not limited to shale. Other resources such as
coalbed methane (CBM), tight sand, and conventional wells are benefiting from fracturing. According to
a survey by API and ANGA (America’s Natural Gas Alliance) and as it is displayed in Figure 1, tight gas
and shale gas are showing the largest gas well numbers followed by the conventional and coal-bed
methane resources (Shirez et al. 2012). This survey covers 91,000 wells from over 20 companies and
being considered as an accurate measure for natural gas operations (Shirez et al. 2012). Table 3 further
elaborates on the number of gas wells in conventional and unconventional resources. More particularly,
it can be inferred from this database that 99% of the gas wells in shale formations undergo hydraulic
fracturing and among these fractured wells 81% are drilled horizontally (Shirez et al. 2012). Figure 2
shows the percent of hydraulically fractured gas wells in different resources.
SPE-174059-MS 7

Figure 1—Ratio of gas well numbers for different resources (Shirez et al. 2012)

Table 3—Gas well numbers in a survey by API and ANGA (Shirez et al. 2012)
Fractured Wells

Resource Total Wells Vertical Horizontal Total Fractured

Conventional 536 315 57 370

Coal-bed Methane (CBM) 33 27 3 30
Tight 2,528 2,054 368 2,427
Shale 2,210 317 1,863 2,188
Total 5,307 2,713 2,291 5,015
8 SPE-174059-MS

Figure 2—Hydraulically fractured gas wells ratio for different resources (Shirez et al. 2012)

High ratio of fracturing operations in shale formations makes it worthwhile to review the possible
violations in this industry. In that regard, violations in the Marcellus Shale are paid attention. Marcellu is
the largest natural gas producer shale play in the US with production level of more than 14.2 bcf/day (EIA
2014). A large portion of wells producing natural gas from the Marcellus Shale are dilled in the state of
Pennsylvania. Based on the data from Pennsylvania Energy Management Energy (PEMA) there are a total
number of 9,781 permitted Marcellus shale gas wells in the state. Pennsylvania Department of Environ-
mental Protection reports a total number of 3,880 violations from 7,109 active wells. These violations
include Health, Safety and Environmental violations as well as administrative ones (Stateimpact 2015).
Figure 3 illustrates the top 10 most frequent violations. These violations make up almost two thirds of the
total number of violations. According to the data, the most frequent violations are about the management
and handling of the residual waste in the Marcellus shale.
SPE-174059-MS 9

Figure 3—Top 10 HSE violations in Marcellus Shale - State of Pennsylvania (Stateimpact 2015)

The importance of compliance with the environmental and safety regulations in the production of
unconventional resources has been discussed in a detailed report by International Energy Agency (IEA)
in 2012 under the title of “Golden Rules for a Golden Age of Gas”. This report shows that with a 7%
increase in the capital cost, and conducting a set of rules to prevent the safety and environmental hazards,
companies and governments can assure the steady increase in the production of unconventional gas
resources (IEA 2012). A portion of the investment is dedicated to building a safer work environment for
workers. In the United States and from 2009 to 2013, the probability of mortality of workers in the
upstream oil and gas extraction has been seven times greater than that of the workers in the other sectors.
Also, the fatal work injury rate for the oil and gas extraction is reported as 27.1 per 100,000, whereas this
rate goes down to 3.8 for the private sector. The major categories of the incidents and fatalities involve
falls, struck by/against, caught-in between, fire/explosion, and shock/electrocution. The most highlighted
10 SPE-174059-MS

contributors to the increase in fatality rates are the employee length of service, company size and the type
and duration of the training an employee has got (Koppari 2014). From the experience perspective,
workers with less than a year of service were cause of 55% of the fatalities that are further attributed to
the hydraulic fracturing boom and the vital need for work force which in turn made the operators hire
not-fully-skilled and trained employees (Retzer and Hill 2011).
Safety culture considerations and their impacts on the overall safety of the operation are discussed by
(Heinecke et al. 2014). According to this study, decomposing the hydraulic fracturing operations to the
main components and defining particular issues and concerns for each step play a great role in reducing
the fatalities and injuries pertained to this industry as deeply understanding human factors and safety and
environmental issues of the overall process will not be possible unless by elaborately examining the steps
of the operation (Heinecke et al. 2014). Following this approach winds up to identification of the major
contributing factors to the safety of the fracturing and it will eventually enhance the efficiency and the
safety of the entire system (Heinecke et al. 2014). It is necessary to develop a scientific and systematic
framework to analyze incidents related to hydraulic fracturing operation. Hydraulic fracturing is a
complex of multiple stages of operations. And each stage must be isolated from other stages in order to
allow a detailed analysis.
Aside from the safety perspective, hydraulic fracturing has raised many arguments among the scientists
and public regarding its potential environmental impacts. Water issues are one of the most important
drawbacks of the hydraulic fracturing in particular when doing the frac job in areas with water problems.
In the IEA report the water resources management has been introduced as the heart of the Golden rules
(IEA 2012). The previous literature suggests that the impact of hydraulic fracturing on water resources
must be investigated in three general areas of subsurface migration, surface spills, waste handling and
water resources availability (Gregory et al. 2011; Osborn et al. 2011; EPA 2012; Bryant and Haggstrom.
2012; Gordalla et al. 2013; Vengosh et al. 2014; Jabbari et al. 2014). Air quality and emission control is
another topic of interest in the environmental aspects of hydraulic fracturing operations. Volatile organic
compounds (VOCs), methane and other hydrocarbons, H2S, CO, and particulate matters are infamous
by-products of natural gas development projects (Kargbo et al. 2010; McKenzie et al. 2012; Moore et al.
2014). Another category of concerns attribted to fracturing is the potential for generating micro-
earthquakes (De Pater and Baisch 2011). However, it is suggested by the literature that the general risk
of generating large seismic tremors is higher in subsurface injection operations as opposed to the
fracturing operation (Ellsworth 2013). Genration of seismic events conseequenced by waste injection in
oil and gas operations has been subject of studies such as (ODNR 2012; Holland 2011; Goebel et al.
2014).

Major Public policy and Public Relations Issues Associated with Hydraulic
Fracturing
Addressing the public concerns regarding the hydraulic fracturing environmental and safety issues is of
great importance. It is necessary that oil and gas industry increases its efforts on educating the local
residents about the nature of its operations and potential risks associated with such activities. It is
important to understand that the integration of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing technologies
has made it possible to produce oil and gas in parts of the country that have never experienced oil and gas
related activities. One of the major shale oil plays of the country, the Bakken oilfield, is located in the state
of North Dakota that has not been among the traditional hydrocarbon producing states. Therefore, local
residents of such regions are not expected to be familiar with the positive and negative consequences of
such operations. It is incumbent on the operating companies to be as transparent with public and
communicate with local residents of fracturing communities about scientific facts, figures and risks when
it comes to the vote ballet. One of the recent examples is the case of city of Denton in Texas which
SPE-174059-MS 11

resulted in a halt on hydraulic fracturing, for the first time in the history of the state, by public vote on
November 4 2014. Another example, from the state California, was the Santa Barbara County Fracking
Ban Proposition P which was rejected in November 2014. One must consider the unintended conse-
quences of such bans on oil and gas activities because the outcome could have negative effects on the local
businesses and economies. On the other hand, failing to act in a timely manner to stop unsafe hydraulic
fracturing practice could result in severe environmental and health damages. It is important that lawmak-
ers, in both state and federal level, put in place regulations to assure inspection and monitoring every
hydrocarbon production operation, including hydraulic fracturing. On May 2012, the Bureau of Land
Management, under U.S. Department of the Interior, proposed a set of rules on the issue. State of
California also passed the Senate Bill Number 4 (SB-4) in 2013 addressing a wide range of key issues
about oil and gas well stimulation. These regulations discuss in detail every aspect of the hydraulic
fracturing process, such as chemicals used in the fracturing process, mechanical integrity of the wellbore
(cement-casing) and the backflow water disposal mechanisms. Aside from the state and federal regula-
tions, it is crucial that operators proactively and voluntarily act according to the proposed rules and
standards.
Leading Indicators in Hydraulic Fracturing
To better investigate the role of leading safety and environmental indicators in hydraulic fracturing, one
effective method is to break down the operation into components (steps) and investigate the indicators at
lower scales instead of in a system level. The steps are categorized in three groups of pre-fracturing,
during the injection (fracturing), and post-fracturing. As the first step of a hydraulic fracturing operation,
data collection and design of the fracturing treatment play an important role in ensuring the safety of the
entire process. A more accurate physical and geological model may decrease the likelihood of occurrence
of incidents that are linked to misunderstanding or lack of knowledge (e.g. Out of formation fracturing or
targeting wrong formations). Transportation and storage of the chemicals and the mixing process is
inherently linked to safety, health and environmental incidents. Accidental spill of the chemicals from the
storage tanks or from transportation incidents and the exposure of workers to them are good examples of
potential hazards in this step. Drilling of the wellbore is an important step which could cause safety
hazards if not practiced in a safe manner. Failing to do a high quality cementing job will also endanger
the well integrity which later on and during the production may provide pathways for the gaseous
compounds towards the surface. The high pressure injection is an activity which must be conducted with
high precautions and with enough safety tools equipped on the site. Returning fluid and handling is
another step which is potentially a subject of safety and environmental incidents. Enough attention must
be given to the design of the temporary waste storage system (e.g. lined pits) to make sure the waste does
not percolate into the shallow aquifer. The deep well injection is the common method of disposing the
waste in most of the hydraulic fracturing operations. This method has its own unqiue considerations and
requirements to be complied.
To investigate the indicators in a hydraulic fracturing operation it is crucial to utilize the right
measurement tools. For example, Microseismic, as an essential surveillance tool, enables the industry to
optimize the development of unconventional resources. Wellbore azimuth and spacing, treatment effi-
ciency and fracture quality control are facilitated by interpretation of microseismic data (Hosseini et al.
2014). Operators could design a real-time monitoring process to study the fractures behavior in each stage
of the hydraulic fracturing process. This topic has been discussed by Sparkman et al. (2009) where
fracturing into underlying water-bearing Ellenberger carbonate formation in the Barnett Shale play has
been addressed. Integration of microseismic monitoring and zipper-frac technique enhances the accuracy
of the fracturing operation and limits fracturing of either overlying or underlying formations (Sparkman
et al. 2009). Analytical solutions to the fracture propogations in the tight formations are other valuable
tools with a great help in optimizing the fracturing operation (Shojaei and Tajer 2013). In short, Figure
12 SPE-174059-MS

4 shows typical steps of a hydraulic fracturing operation as well as the leading safety and environmental
indicators. It is worth to state that some of the indicators belong to a particular step of the operation;
however there are some cross-cutting indicators which can be common in different steps (e.g. management
of fatigue risk).

Figure 4 —Leading indicators in hydraulic fracturing (Hydraulic fracturing steps inspired from: (Arthur 2008) and (King 2012))

Engineering and inherently safe design is one of the main leading indicators in the safety process
(IOGP 2011) which is also applicable to the hydraulic fracturing operation. One good example for this
indicator is the integrity of the cementing job that, as previously discussed, is linked to the potential
upward migration of fluids such as methane and other volatile organic compounds (VOCs). During the
fracturing process cement-casing system undergoes several stages of the stimulation through excessive
pressure injection (EPA 2012). As offered by scientific studies, poor cementing job and lack of integrity
can potentially provide a pathway for fugitive gas from the fractured formation and can eventually cause
water tables contamination (Jackson et al. 2013; Dusseault and Jackson 2014). More specifically and as
stated by the Environmental Protection Agency, separation of cement from the outer surface of casing
during the hydraulic fracturing stages is a potential pathway which could be a subject of inherent design
studies (EPA 2012). Choosing the right cement with appropriate properties can be a great help in
preventing such phenomenon.
Case Studies
In this section three case-studies are presented. Case 1, 2, and 3 describe incidents that have taken place
in the pre-fracturing, fracturing, and post-fracturing phases respectively. All the cases have been studied
by applying an approach presented in Figure 5. Following the proposed approach enables the companies
to separate the incidents directly caused by the underground injection from the ones linking to other steps
of hydraulic fracturing operations.
SPE-174059-MS 13

Figure 5—Root-cause analysis approach for hydraulic fracturing related incidents

Case 1: Caddo Parish, near Shreveport, Louisiana (2010)

In April 2010, hitting a gas layer while drilling a well in the Haynesville shale made the operator company
evacuate 100 homes. The gas layer was several thousands feet above the target formation and when it was
struck natural gas flew up and reached the surface. The underground injection is not the cause of this
incident, but according to the LA regulators poor cementing of an adjacent well has the most contribution
to this event (Holloway 2013). From the leading indicators point of view one could link the gaseous
emissions and blowout precursor to this incident.
14 SPE-174059-MS

Case 2: Killdeer, Dunn County, North Dakota (2010)

On September 1, 2010 and during the fifth stage of the fracturing operation in Bakken formation a blowout
happened. This incident was attributed to the intermediate casing burst because of pressure spike. As a
result, more than 150,000 gallons of fracturing and formation fluid returned to the surface. Excessive
pressure exerted on the pop-off relief valve during the underground injection is the main cause of this
incident (EPA 2012). Among the proposed leading indicators, mechanical integrity tests prior and during
the operation could point out potential hazards of this type.

Case 3: Clearfield County, Pennsylvania (2010)

On June 3, 2010 a gas well blowout resulted in spewing gas and 35,000 gallons of flowback flow and
drilling waste for more than 16 hours. The main cause of this incident was the malfunction of a blowout
preventer due to deteriorated seal integrity between the rams of the pipe (Holloway 2010). Mechanical
integrity of the equipment and lack of accurate inspection are two main leading indicators pertained to this
incident.

Conclusion Remarks
The best way to answer public concerns regarding hydraulic fracturing is to ensure that the operation is
safe and the environmental impacts are minimized as much as possible. Leading safety, health and
environmental indicators are helpful measures with applications in safety of the processes. In this paper,
the specific indicators for hydraulic fracturing are identified and a set of case-studies are investigated. For
that a flowchart is proposed and applied to each case-study. Following the same approach allows
contractors/companies to ask questions about the potential hazards of such operations and try to come up
with all possible answers. Answering all these questions will help with preventing accidents as well as
building an emergency response plan as well. In this case each part of the process of oil and gas production
which can potentially cause an environmental or safety problem can be treated as an independent
component not necessarily related to the hydraulic fracturing. Considering the high dimension of the
uncertainty in oil and gas production and the numerous key random variables, it is impossible to design
a set of rigid guidelines under the title of leading environmental and safety indicators without investigating
each individual hydrocarbon operation as a unique system and with regard to its specific characteristics.
Based on the proposed table on types and characteristics of the indicators in this study, companies and
operators can adopt a set of indicators which apply to their certain operational and geological conditions.
There is yet more room for implementing an effective lessons-learned process in the industry.

Acknowledgment
The authors would like to acknowledge and express their gratitude to a team of remarkable students of the
University of Southern California, who are members of the multidisciplinary study group on Hydraulic
Fracturing Safety under the supervision of Professor Najmedin Meshkati. This is an independent academic
effort with no financial or administrative ties, whatsoever to the oil and gas industry. The Group includes,
Jacob Beaudin, Alejandro Schugurensky, Matthew Walsh, Alfredo Ramirez, Xi (Cameron) Luo, and Ali
Farshid.

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