Macalintal vs PET, GR 191618, June 7, 2011

(Admin Law, PET, Quasi-judicial power)

Facts: Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: “The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose.”

Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law
shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

The case at bar is a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the SC’s decision dismissing the former’s petition
and declaring the establishment of the respondent PET as constitutional.

Petitioner argues that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution does not provide for
the creation of the PET, and it violates Sec 12, Art VIII of the Constitution.

The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on firm footing on the basis of the grant of authority
to the Supreme Court to be the sole judge of all election contests for the President or Vice-President under par 7, Sec 4,
Art VII of the Constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not PET is constitutional.

Whether or not PET exercises quasi-judicial power.

Held:

Yes. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional Commission to a Presidential Electoral Tribunal, with Fr.
Joaquin Bernas categorically declaring that in crafting the last paragraph of Sec. 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution, they
“constitutionalized what was statutory.” Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is
plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and vice-presidential elections contests includes the
means necessary to carry it into effect.

No. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that the
power “shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.” The set up
embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterize the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of
judicial power. When the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs
what is essentially a judicial power.

The COMELEC, HRET and SET are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of law, they are,
nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because
of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article
VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution.

Mendoza vs Comelec, GR 188308, October 15, 2009]

(Admin Law, Comelec, quasi-judicial power)

Facts: Petitioner Mendoza asserts that the COMELEC, exercising judicial power, conducted proceedings in the election
contest within SET premises for the gubernatorial position of the Province of Bulacan, between him and the respondent
Pagdanganan, without due regard to his fundamental due process rights of notice and participation.

The COMELEC, claims that its decision-making deliberations are internal, confidential and do not require notice to and
the participation of the contending parties.

Issue: Whether or not COMELEC has judicial power.

Held: No. Judicial power in our country is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law.
The COMELECs adjudicative function is quasi-judicial since it is a constitutional body, other than a court, vested with
authority to decide election contests, and in the course of the exercise of its jurisdiction, to hold hearings and exercise
discretion of a judicial nature; it receives evidence, ascertain the facts from these submissions, determine the law and
the legal rights of the parties, and on the basis of all these decides on the merits of the case and renders judgment.
Despite the exercise of discretion that is essentially judicial in character, particularly with respect to election contests,
COMELEC is not a tribunal within the judicial branch of government and is not a court exercising judicial power in the
constitutional sense; hence, its adjudicative function, exercised as it is in the course of administration and enforcement,
is quasi-judicial.

Under these terms, the COMELEC under our governmental structure is a constitutional administrative agency and its
powers are essentially executive in nature (i.e., to enforce and administer election laws), quasi-judicial (to exercise
original jurisdiction over election contests of regional, provincial and city officials and appellate jurisdiction over election
contests of other lower ranking officials), and quasi-legislative (rulemaking on all questions affecting elections and the
promulgation of its rules of procedure).

Gonzales vs Rosas, GR 145363, February 23, 2004

(Admin Law, Ombudsman, quasi-judicial power)

Facts: Sec. 9 RA 4670 provides that administrative charges against a teacher shall be heard initially by a committee
composed of the corresponding School Superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized representative who should at
least have the rank of a division supervisor.

Under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial
agencies should be taken to the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner Gonzales, a public school teacher was facing a complaint for grave misconduct, dishonesty and estafa.
Respondent Rosas, then DECS-National Capital Region Director dismissed petitioner from the service based from the
initial administrative proceeding conducted by Nagpacan, the Administrative Officer III of City Schools

Petitioner filed an administrative complaint for violation of Sec. 9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers against
the respondents before the Office of the Ombudsman instead of a judicial relief for resolution of the jurisdictional issue
and declaration of nullity of the administrative proceeding.

Petitioner filed with the CA a special civil action for certiorari on the ground that the Ombudsman acted with grave
abuse of discretion in adopting Director Baliton’s memorandum recommending the dismissal of her complaint against
the DECS officials for want of merit. The CA dismissed the case as the proper remedy was a petition for review under
Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner contends that she could not file a petition for review under Rule
43 as it only pertains to appeals from the Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals,
implying that the Office of the Ombudsman is not a quasi-judicial agency.

Issue: Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman is a quasi-judicial agency.

Held: Yes. The Office of the Ombudsman is a quasi-judicial agency covered by the procedure outlined in Rule 43 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As a rule, appeals from decisions of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the Office of the
ombudsman, in administrative disciplinary cases, should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43.

De Jesus vs. Civil Service Commission, 471 SCRA 624

(Admin Law, quasi-judicial power)

Facts: Sec. 13 of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) Charter (PD 198, as amended) expressly allowed the
director of water districts to be granted per diems, and shall receive no other compensation for services to the district.

CSC issued Resolution No. 95-4073 ruling that it is illegal for any LWUA officer or employee who sits as a member of the
board of directors of a water disctrict to receive and collect any additional, double or indirect compensation from said
water disctricts except per diems pursuant to Sec. 13 of PD 198 as amended.

CSC based its ruling on Sec.8, Art IX (B) of the 1987 Constitution which is deemed included the power to “promulgate
and enforce policies on personnel actions.”
Petitioners argue that CSC had no plenary jurisdiction to construe any provision of PD 198 on matters pertaining to
compensation and other benefits of water district directors based on Sec.8 of the decree authorizing LWUA to appoint
any of its personnel to sit on the board of director of a water district that has availed financial assistance from LWUA and
any such personnel so appointed is entitled to enjoy the rights and privileges pertaining to a regional director.

The present controversy originated from an administrative case filed with the SCS for violations of RA 6713.

Issue: WON CSC has plenary jurisdiction to motu proprio construe PD 198 as amended.

Held: No. For the Court to sustain them would be to allow the board of an admin agency, by merely issuing a resolution,
to derogate the broad and extensive powers granted by the Constitution to the CSC.

LWUA has quasi-judicial power only as regards rates or charges fixed by water districts, which it may review to establish
compliance with the provisions of PD 198.

Blas F. Ople vs Ruben D. Torres, et al. 293 SCRA 141 / GR No. 127685, 23 July 1998

Facts: Administrative Order No. 308, entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System,"
was issued by President Fidel Ramos On December 12, 1996.

Senator Blas F. Ople filed a petition seeking to invalidate A.O. No. 308 on several grounds. One of them is that: The
establishment of a National Computerized Identification Reference System requires a legislative act. The issuance of A.O.
No. 308 by the President is an unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative powers of congress. Petitioner claims that
A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue. He
alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and
liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy.

On this point, respondents counter-argue that: A.O. No. 308 was issued within the executive and administrative powers
of the president without encroaching on the legislative powers of congress.

Issue:

Whether the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is an unconstitutional usurpation of the power ofCongress to legislate.

Ruling:

Legislative power is the authority to make laws, and to alter and repeal them. The Constitution has vested this power in
the Congress. The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general, and comprehensive. Any power deemed to be
legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere.

The executive power, on the other hand, is vested in the President. It is generally defined as the power to enforce and
administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance. As
head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the government as a whole and
sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He has control over the executive
department, bureaus and offices. Corollary to the power of control, the President also has the duty of supervising the
enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power
over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.

Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper
governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the
official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.

From these precepts, the Court holds that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an
administrative order.

The Administrative Code of 1987 provides:

Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. — Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental operation in
pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders.

An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative
operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the
law and carrying out the legislative policy. The Court rejects the argument that A.O. No. 308 implements the legislative
policy of the Administrative Code of 1987. The Code is a general law and incorporates in a unified document the major
structural, functional and procedural principles of governance and embodies changes in administrative structure and
procedures designed to serve the people.

It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes
for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate
adjustment of various contending state policies — the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest against
dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. As said administrative order redefines the parameters of
some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the administrative power of the
President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that
should be covered by law.

Petition is granted and A.O. No. 308 is declared null and void for being unconstitutional.

SEC. OF DOTC. V. MABALOT

FACTS: 19 February 1996: then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia, Jr., issued Memorandum Order No. 96-735 addressed to
Land Transportation Franchising Regulatory Board (LTFRB) Chairman Dante Lantin directing him to effect the transfer of
regional functions of that office to the DOTCCAR Regional Office, pending the creation of a regular Regional Franchising
and Regulatory Office thereat, pursuant to Section 7 of Executive Order No. 202.

13 March 1996: herein respondent Roberto Mabalot filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that the
Memorandum Order No. 96-735 be declared “illegal and without effect.”

29 January 1997: Secretary Lagdameo issued the assailed Department Order No. 97-1025, establishing DOTC-CAR
Regional Office, created by virtue of Executive Order No. 220 dated July 15, 1987, as the Regional Office of the LTFRB.

Mabalot filed a Supplemental Petition assailing the validity of Department Order No. 97-1025

31 March 1999: the lower court rendered a decision declaring Memorandum Order Nos. 96-733 and 97-1025 of the
respondent DOTC Secretary null and void and without any legal effect as being violative of the provision of the
Constitution against encroachment on the powers of the legislative department and also of the provision enjoining
appointive officials from holding any other office or employment in the Government.

Instant petition where this Court is tasked in the main to resolve the issue of validity of the subject administrative
issuances by the DOTC Secretary.

ISSUES

(1) WON the administrative issuances of the DOTC Secretary are valid.

(2)WON the DOTC Sec encroached on the powers of the legislature.

(3) WON the administrative issuances are violative of Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-B of the Constitution.

HELD/RATIO

(1) YES. Memorandum Order No. 96-735 and Department Order No. 97-1025 are legal and valid administrative issuances
by the DOTC Secretary.

Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution mandates that “The President shall have control of all executive departments,
bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed...”

Section 62 of Republic Act 7645 (General Appropriations Act [G.A.A.] for FY 1993) shows that the President is authorized
to effect organizational changes including the creation of offices in the department or agency concerned.

The Administrative Code of 1987 also provides legal basis for the Chief Executive’s authority to reorganize the National
Government.

(2) NO, the office was created by authority of law, not by Congress. The President - through his duly constituted political
agent and alter ego, the DOTC Secretary in the present case - may legally and validly decree the reorganization of the
Department, particularly the establishment of DOTC-CAR as the LTFRB Regional Office at the Cordillera Administrative
Region, with the concomitant transfer and performance of public functions and responsibilities appurtenant to a
regional office of the LTFRB.

By the Chief Executive’s unequivocal act of issuing Administrative Order No. 36 ordering his alter ego - the DOTC
Secretary in the present case - to effectuate the creation of Regional Offices in the CAR, it is as if the President himself
carried out the creation and establishment of LTFRB-CAR Regional Office, when in fact, the DOTC Secretary, as alter ego
of the President, directly and merely sought to implement the Chief Executive’s Administrative Order.

The personality of the heads of the various departments is in reality but the projection of that of the President. Thus,
their acts, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the
Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.

Elementary rule in administrative law and the law on public officers that a public office may be created through any of
the following modes: (1) by the Constitution (fundamental law), (2) by law (statute duly enacted by Congress), or (3) by
authority of law, thus, Congress can delegate the power to create positions.

The creation and establishment of LTFRB-CAR Regional Office was made pursuant to the third mode - by authority of
law, which could be decreed for instance, through an Executive Order (E.O.) issued by the President or an order of an
administrative agency such as the Civil Service Commission pursuant to Section 17, Book V of E.O. 292, otherwise known
as The Administrative Code of 1987. In this case, the DOTC Secretary issued the assailed Memorandum and Department
Orders pursuant to Administrative Order No. 36 of the President

Reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out
in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. The reorganization in this case
was decreed in the interest of the service and for purposes of economy and more effective coordination of the DOTC
functions in the Cordillera Administrative Region, thus in good faith.

(3) NO. The assailed Orders of the DOTC Secretary do not violate Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-B of the Constitution.
Considering that in the case of Memorandum Order No. 96-735, the organic personnel of the DOTC-CAR were, in effect,
merely designated to perform the additional duties and functions while performing the functions of their permanent
office. Also, an office or employment held in the exercise of the primary functions of one’s principal office is an
exception to, or not within the contemplation, of the prohibition embodied in Section 7, Article IX-B.

No evidence was adduced and presented to clearly establish that the appointive officials and employees of DOTC-CAR
shall receive any additional, double or indirect compensation, in violation of Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitution

EUGENIO vs. CSC et al G.R. No. 115863

March 31, 1995

FACTS: . Eugenio is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She applied for a Career Executive
Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank,. She was given a CES eligibility and was recommended to the President for a
CESO rank by the Career Executive Service Board.

Then respondent Civil Service Commission passed a Resolution which abolished the CESB, relying on the provisions of
Section 17, Title I, Subtitle A. Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 allegedly conferring on the Commission the
power and authority to effect changes in its organization as the need arises. Said resolution states:

“Pursuant thereto, the Career Executive Service Board, shall now be known as the Office for Career Executive Service of
the Civil Service Commission. Accordingly, the existing personnel, budget, properties and equipment of the Career
Executive Service Board shall now form part of the Office for Career Executive Service.”

Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the Career Executive Service Board which recommended her
CESO Rank IV has been abolished, petitioner filed the petition at bench to annul, among others, said resolution.

ISSUE: WON CSC given the authority to abolish the office of the CESB

HELD: the petition is granted and Resolution of the respondent Commission is hereby annulled and set aside

NO
1. The controlling fact is that the CESB was created in PD No. 1 on September 1, 1974. It cannot be disputed, therefore,
that as the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by the legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of
rulings that the creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function

In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the abolition of the CESB. On the contrary,
in all the General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993, the legislature has set aside funds for the operation of CESB.

Respondent Commission, however, invokes Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code
of 1987 as the source of its power to abolish the CESB.

But as well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor General, Section 17 must be read together with Section 16 of the
said Code which enumerates the offices under the respondent Commission.

As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent Commission’s power to reorganize is limited to offices
under its control as enumerated in Section 16..

2. From its inception, the CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit administratively attached to respondent
Commission. As conceptualized by the Reorganization Committee “the CESB shall be autonomous. It is expected to view
the problem of building up executive manpower in the government with a broad and positive outlook.”

The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment to respondent Commission. By said
attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the control of respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of
1987, the purpose of attaching one functionally inter-related government agency to another is to attain “policy and
program coordination.” This is clearly etched out in Section 38(3), Chapter 7, Book IV of the aforecited Code, to wit:

(3) Attachment. — (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the department or its equivalent and attached
agency or corporation for purposes of policy and program coordination. The coordination may be accomplished by
having the department represented in the governing board of the attached agency or corporation, either as chairman or
as a member, with or without voting rights, if this is permitted by the charter; having the attached corporation or agency
comply with a system of periodic reporting which shall reflect the progress of programs and projects; and having the
department or its equivalent provide general policies through its representative in the board, which shall serve as the
framework for the internal policies of the attached corporation or agency.

NOTES:

Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of its power to abolish
the CESB. Section 17 provides:

Sec. 17. Organizational Structure. — Each office of the Commission shall be headed by a Director with at least one
Assistant Director, and may have such divisions as are necessary independent constitutional body, the Commission may
effect changes in the organization as the need arises.

Sec. 16. Offices in the Commission. — The Commission shall have the following offices:

(1) The Office of the Executive

(2) The Merit System Protection Board composed of a Chairman and two (2) members

(3) The Office of Legal Affairs

(4) The Office of Planning and Management

(5) The Central Administrative Office.

(6) The Office of Central Personnel Records

(7) The Office of Position Classification and Compensation

(8) The Office of Recruitment, Examination and Placement

(9) The Office of Career Systems and Standards

(10) The Office of Human Resource Development

(11) The Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit.

(12) The Office of Personnel Relations

(13) The Office of Corporate Affairs

(14) The Office of Retirement

(15) The Regional and Field Offices

Aquilino Larin vs The Executive Secretary

Law on Public Officers – Career Service Appointees Must Be Removed for Valid Reasons

FACTS: Aquilino Larin was an Assistant Commissioner in the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). He was in charge of the
office of the Excise Tax Service. In 1992, the Sandiganbayan convicted Larin for grave misconduct. His conviction was
reported to the Office of the President, at the same time, an administrative complaint was filed with the same office.
The President then, based on the Sandiganbayan conviction, created a committee to investigate Larin. Eventually, Larin’s
removal was recommended. The President dismissed Larin.

ISSUE: Whether or not Larin was removed from office properly.

HELD: No. Larin is a presidential appointee who belongs to the career service of the Civil Service. Although it is a general
rule that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint, such power to remove I with limitations. In the case
at bar, the limitation can be found in the fact that Larin is a career service officer and under the Administrative Code of
1987, such officers who fall under career service are characterized by the existence of security of tenure, as contra-
distinguished from non-career service whose tenure is co-terminus with that of the appointing authority or subject to his
pleasure, or limited to a period specified by law or to the duration of a particular project for which purpose the
employment was made. As a career service officer, Larin enjoys the right to security of tenure. He can only be removed
from his office on grounds enumerated in the Administrative Code of 1987. In the case at bar, the basis for his removal
was his conviction in the Sandiganbayan – this is not one of those grounds enumerated in the Administrative Code.
Further, the Supreme Court notes that when Larin’s conviction was appealed to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court
actually absolved Larin.
CARINO vs CAPULONG 222 SCRA 593

FACTS:

On 6 July 1990, AMA filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 18, a petition for prohibition, certiorari and mandamus
against the Hon. Isidro Carino, DEC's Secretary and Atty. Venancio R. Nava, Regional Director, Department of Education,
Culture and Sports, Region IX to annul and set aside the closure order and to enjoin the respondents from closing or
padlocking AMACC, Davao City.

On 26 July 1990, the trial court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

Thereafter, AMA filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari in assailing the26 July order of the court a quo,
but, again, the Court of Appeals peremptorily dismissed the petition and also denied its motion for reconsideration.

Under the cloak of an organization of parents of students styling themselves as AMACC-PARENTS Organization, AMA
filed another petition for prohibition and/or mandamus with preliminary injunction with the RTC of Davao City, Branch
8, entitled "Freddie Retotal, RicardoFuentes, Calixta Holazo, Ursula Reyes, in their own behalf and in behalf of the other
members of AMACC Parents' Organization vs. Venancio Nava, in his capacity as Regional Director, Department of
Education, Culture and Sports."

On 7 August 1990, the court dismissed the petition. AMA, however, in order to thwart the closure or padlocking of its
school in Davao City, filed with the RTC of Makati, Branch 134, presided over by respondent Judge, another petition for
mandamus, with damages, preliminary injunction and/or restraining order against Hon. Isidro Carino, Secretary and
Director, Department of Education, Culture and Sports, Region IX to compel the respondents to approve petitioners'
application for permit to operate retroactive to the commencement of school year 1990-1991, and to enjoin the closure
and/or padlocking of AMA-Davao school. Petitioners, through the Office of the Solicitor General, moved to dismiss
AMA's petition on the ground that(1) AMA is not entitled to the writ of mandamus as petitioners' authority to grant or
deny the permit to operate is discretionary and not ministerial;(2) AMA failed to comply with the provisions of the
Education Act;(3) AMA is blatantly engaging in forum shopping;(4) AMA failed to exhaust available administrative
remedies before resorting to court; and (5) lack of territorial jurisdiction over petitioner Regional Director and AMA-
Davao.

On 15 November 1990, the respondent Judge issued an order directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing reasons, let a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued, upon filing of petitioners of a bond in the amount of P500,000.00, duly approved by this Court,
enjoining and restraining the respondent Hon. Isidro Carino, his agents, representatives and any person acting for and
his behalf, from implementing the closing and/or padlocking AMA Computer College, Inc. - Davao City Branch, until
further orders from this Court and on the following day, on 16 November 1990, issued the writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE: WON the authority to grant permit by DECS to applicant educational institution is a ministerial duty or
discretionary duty?

HELD : The SC ruled that As a rule, mandamus will lie only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty but not a
discretionary function. A ministerial duty is one which is so clear and specific as to leave no room for the exercise of
discretion in its performance. On the other hand, a discretionary duty is that which by nature requires the exercise of
judgment.