Group 3
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC
G.R. 190582 | April 8, 2010 | Case 9 | Party-list
Facts
 The case is a petition for certiorari with an application for a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction filed by Ang Ladlad
LGBT Party against the resolutions of COMELEC on
November 11, 2009 and December 16, 2009
o The case is rooted from the COMELEC’s refusal
to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list under RA
7941.
 For a short background, ‘Ang Ladlad’ is an organization
composed of men and women who identify as LGBTs. Ang
Ladlad first applied for registration in 2006 but was denied
due to the COMELEC stating that the organization had no
substantial membership base.
o In 2009, the Party filed again and argued before
the COMELEC that the LGBT community is a
marginalized and under-represented sector that is
particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual
orientation and gender identity.
o According to Ang Ladlad, they complied with the
8-point guidelines enunciated in the Ang Bagong
Bayani OFW party case.
o And on top of that, Petitioner laid out its national
membership base
 Then on November 2009, the COMELEC dismissed the
petition on moral grounds where they stated that the
definition of the LGBT sector makes it clear that petitioner
tolerates immorality.
o The said resolution also cites the Christian
Scripture and verses from the Koran.
o For the COMELEC’s legal basis they cited Article
695 of the Civil Code wherein the law department
on October stated that Petitioner collides with
Article 695 of the Civil Code wherein they posited
that the Party-list falls under the definition of
nuisance.
o To that end, the COMELEC in its resolution
concluded that Petitioner should be denied for
accreditation as they are not only advocating
immoral doctrines and also for not being truthful to
the COMELEC when it said that its nominees or
party-list have not violated or failed to comply with
its rules and regulations regarding elections.
 With that ruling, Petitioner then sought for a reconsideration
wherein the votes resulted into a tie where the COMELEC
chairman broke the tie and upheld the first resolution on
November.
 With the upholding of the first resolution, Ang Ladlad filed
this petition on January 4, 2010 where hey prayed that the
Court annul the resolutions made by the COMELEC and
grant Petitioner their accreditation as a party-list.
 On January 6, 2010 the Court ordered the OSg to file its
comment on behalf of COMELEC not later than 12 PM of
January 11, 2010. However, OSG filed a motion for
extension that it be given January 16, 2010 to comment.
Surprisingly, the OSG filed a comment in support of
petitioner. This prompted the court to give the COMELEC
the opportunity to fully ventilate its position
 Due to the urgency of the petition, the court issued a
Temporary Restraining Order directing the COMELEC to
cease and desist from implementing the Assailed
Resolutions.
 The Commission on Human Rights also appeared as
Amicus Curiae wherein the CHR opined that the denial of
Ladlad’s petition on moral grounds violated the standards,
principles of the Constitution, Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.
Petitioner’s Arguments
 Petitioner argues that the denial of their accreditation with
religious dogma violated the constitutional guarantee against
the establishment of religion.
 Furthermore, petitioner argues that the Resolutions
contravened constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of
speech and equal protection of laws and constituted
violations of the Philippines’ international obligations against
discrimination on sexual orientation.
COMELEC’s comment
 Comelec reiterated that petitioner does not have concrete
and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation
and that the petition was dismissed validly on moral grounds.
Comelec further adds that the LGBT sector is not among the
sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941.
Issue
 Whether or not Ang Ladlad party-list should be
accredited as a party-list under RA 7941
Ruling
 The Court granted the petition.
 While Respondent argues that the ruling in Ang Bagong
Bayani that only those sectors enumerated in RA 7941 must
be registered under the party-list system. The court added
that in the said ruling they stated that “the enumeration of
marginalized and under-represented sectors is not
exclusive.”
 Furthermore, the Court ruled that there was no
misrepresentation from Ang Ladlad as petitioner states that
Ang Ladlad represented itself as a national LGBT umbrella
with affiliates around the Philippines.
 With the said qualifications presented by Petitioner. The
Court ruled that Ang Ladlad demonstrated its compliance
with legal requirements for accreditation and aside from the
moral objection from the COMELEC, respondent has not
ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified as a party-list
organization under R.A 7941 or the guideliens set in Ang
Bagong Bayani.
 The Court ruled that COMELEC’s claims regarding the
rejection of Ang Ladlad is based on moral claims and
religious claims. Which is against Article 3 Section 5o f the
Constitution.
 Accordingly under the principles of Equal Protection,
Freedom of Expression and Association, and non-
discrimination and treaties. The LGBT sector should not
be deprived of their rights on the virtue of their sexual
orientation.
 The Court granted the petition and set aside the
Assailed Resolutions from COMELEC. The Court
directed COMELEC to grant petitioner’s application for
accreditation.
Group 3
Social Justice Society v Dangerous Drugs Board
GR No. 157870
Qualifications and Term of Office
Statute:
Sec. 36 of RA 9165 otherwise known as Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing .—Authorized drug testing shall be
done by any government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug
testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard
the quality of the test results. . . . The drug testing shall employ,
among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will
determine the positive result as well as the type of drug used and the
confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. . . . The
following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:
force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the
Constitution. Thus, declaring Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165
unconstitutional.
 Supreme Court also stated that the Congress' inherent
legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to
certain limitations subject to substantive and
constitutional limitations which circumscribe both the
exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of
legislation.
 In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of
enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating
rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36 (g), validly
impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to
what the Constitution prescribes.
 The unconstitutionality of Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 is rooted
on its having infringed the constitutional provision defining
the qualification or eligibility requirements for one aspiring to
run for and serve as senator.

(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in
the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to
be positive for dangerous drugs use shall be subject to the provisions
of Section 15 of this Act.

Facts:

 The case at bar consists of 3 petitions which are

consolidated wherein Petitioners question the
constitutionality of the said statute.
 Petitioner Pimentel questions the Resolution of COMELEC
which orders the mandatory drug test to candidates of local
and national election in connection with Section 36 (g) of
Republic Act No. 9165.
o Pimentel argues that the Constitution only
prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for
one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a
member of the Senate. He says that both the
Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA
9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial
aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a
mandatory drug test, create an additional
qualification that all candidates for senator must
first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is
no provision in the Constitution authorizing the
Congress or COMELEC to expand the
qualification requirements of candidates for
senator.
Issues:

 Among others, whether or not Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 and

COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional
qualification for candidates for senator?
 Can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for
candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the
Constitution?

Ruling on Pimentel’s Petition:

 Supreme Court enumerated the qualification requirements
for the senatorial candidates as per Sec. 3, Art. 6 of the
Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration,
(3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these
stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator
need not possess any other qualification. The Congress
cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification
standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the
Group 3
ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS V. COMELEC
GR NO. 119976 | 18 SEPTEMBER 1995
(Under Topic VII, Qualifications and Term of Office, Residency
Requirement)
OSS:
The case at bar presents a contestation of Imelda Romualdez Marcos’
congressional candidacy for the First District of Leyte, with herein private
respondents arguing that the unscrupulous goon does not meet the
residency requirements to run for a position in the House of
Representatives.
STATUTE/S:
Article 6, Section 6, 1987 Constitution:
No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless
he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the
election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and,
except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in
which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less
than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.
FACTS:
Petitioner Romualdez-Marcos forwarded her candidacy for the
congressional elections, wanting to represent the First District of Leyte.
Herein private respondent and a candidate to the same position, Cirilio
Montejo appealed to Comelec that the former’s candidacy be rejected
as it did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. Her COC
stated that she was a resident of Leyte for seven months. Private
Respondent Montejo, a rival candidate filed a petition to cancel the COC
and to disqualify Marcos on the ground that she did not meet the one
year residency requirement as provided for in the Constitution. In
response, Marcos amended her COC changing the entry "seven"
months to "since childhood". Marcos claimed that "she has always
maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence." She further
claimed that she is entitled to the correction of her COC on the ground
that her original entry of "seven months" was the result of an "honest
misinterpretation or honest mistake”. The COMELEC granted the
petition to cancel the COC and to disqualify Marcos. It held that the
animus revertendi of Marcos was not Tacloban, but San Juan, Manila,
because that where she chose to live after she went back to the
Philippines after her well-publicized exile in the US. It explained that
while Petitioner grew up in Tacloban, after her graduation, however, she
moved to Manila where she became a registered voter, became a
member of the Batasang Pambansa as a representative of Manila and
eventually became Governor of Manila. This, according to the
COMELEC debunks her claim that she was a resident of Leyte 1st
District "since childhood.”
To review the definitions accorded to the two terms, a look into Ong v.
Republic would be useful:
Domicile is an individual's "permanent home", "a place to which,
whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and
depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose
intent.” Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of
"the fact of residing or physical presence in a said place" and animus
manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of
an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in
a given area, community or country. The essential distinction between
residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to
leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode
ends.
Yet, in matters of election, domicile and residence are accorded the
same meaning. Thus, the residence being asked in the COC follows the
construction of a domicile. COMELEC was wrong to pertain such
residence requirement to all the other places petitioner has stayed due
to her work, school, and family.
Additional notes.
A minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired
is retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of
petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of
origin by operation of law. This domicile was not established only when
she reached the age of eight years old, when her father brought his
family back to Leyte contrary to private respondent's averments.
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. Even though, as argued by
the respondent, Marcos has lived in different places due to her studies,
her husband, and her work, this does not mean that she has outright
abandoned her domicile.
NO. It cannot be expressly deduced where Mr. Marcos has established
his residence, rendering Imelda’s residence as also unattainable. Even
then, assuming Mr. Marcos has established the residence of the family,
it does not outright follow that there was a change of domicile on the part
of Imelda.
The domicile of origin can only be lost by the following:
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence
and establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

(RELEVANT) ISSUE/S:
WON Petitioner is a resident of Leyte for election purposes.
WON Petitioner lost her domicile after she married and lived with her
husband in Ilocos Norte and in San Juan.

(RELEVANT) RULING:
YES. The basic principle that the domicile of origin cannot be easily lost
by residence in other places. (Think of how for example, you’re a
Cebuana, but because of the need for further studies, you decide to stay
for a long period of time - 8 years let us say, in Manila to complete both
secondary and tertiary education. Your stay in Manila, probably as a
resident of Quezon City does not erase the fact that Cebu will always be
your home. It is where you were born, were you intend to come back,
and to stay. Some may say home is where the people you love reside
and such may lead you seeking for different places, but as in the domain
of law, particularly in matters of election, there is no echos, it simply is
the place where you have first stayed in, and intend to come back no
matter how strong the lure is to stay in another place of greener pasture).
Group 3
Macalintal v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B.
Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that
certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he
has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case
in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and
appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a
lawyer.
Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates
Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter
must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the
place where he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately
preceding an election. Petitioner cites the ruling of the Court in Caasi vs.
Court of Appeals to support his claim. In that case, the Court held that a
green card holder immigrant to the United States is deemed to have
abandoned his domicile and residence in the Philippines.
Petitioner further argues that Section 1, Article V of the Constitution does
not allow provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a
condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise; that the legislature
should not be allowed to circumvent the requirement of the Constitution
on the right of suffrage by providing a condition thereon which in effect
amends or alters the aforesaid residence requirement to qualify a
Filipino abroad to vote. He claims that the right of suffrage should not be
granted to anyone who, on the date of the election, does not possess
the qualifications provided for by Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the
registration of voters who are immigrants or permanent residents in
other countries by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing
their intention to return to the Philippines, violate the residency
requirement In Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution?
HELD:
NO. R.A. No. 9189 was enacted in obeisance to the mandate of the first
paragraph of Section 2, Article V of the Constitution that Congress shall
provide a system for voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice versa; a person cannot
be at the same time, both a resident and an absentee. However, under
our election laws and the countless pronouncements of the Court
pertaining to elections, an absentee remains attached to his residence
in the Philippines as residence is considered synonymous with domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are
dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have
evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged
is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously
with domicile.
Thus, the Constitutional Commission recognized the fact that while
millions of Filipinos reside abroad principally for economic reasons and
hence contribute in no small measure to the economic uplift of this
country, their voices are marginal insofar as the choice of this country's
leaders is concerned.
It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for
Section 2 immediately after the residency requirement of Section 1. By
the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory construction, which
may be applied in construing constitutional provisions, the strategic
location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional Commission
provided for an exception to the actual residency requirement of Section
1 with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same Commission has
in effect declared that qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines
may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy the residency
requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the execution of the affidavit itself is
not the enabling or enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section
5(d) is not only proof of the intention of the immigrant or permanent
resident to go back and resume residency in the Philippines, but more
significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that he had not in fact
abandoned his domicile of origin. Thus, it is not correct to say that the
execution of the affidavit under Section 5(d) violates the Constitution that
proscribes "provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a
condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise."
To repeat, the affidavit is required of immigrants and permanent
residents abroad because by their status in their host countries, they are
presumed to have relinquished their intent to return to this country; thus,
without the affidavit, the presumption of abandonment of Philippine
domicile shall remain.
It must be emphasized that Section 5(d) does not only require an
affidavit or a promise to "resume actual physical permanent residence
in the Philippines not later than three years from approval of his/her
registration," the Filipinos abroad must also declare that they have not
applied for citizenship in another country. Thus, they must return to the
Philippines; otherwise, their failure to return "shall be cause for the
removal" of their names "from the National Registry of Absentee Voters
and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia."
Thus, Congress crafted a process of registration by which a Filipino
voter permanently residing abroad who is at least eighteen years old,
not otherwise disqualified by law, who has not relinquished Philippine
citizenship and who has not actually abandoned his/her intentions to
return to his/her domicile of origin, the Philippines, is allowed to register
and vote in the Philippine embassy, consulate or other foreign service
establishments of the place which has jurisdiction over the country
where he/she has indicated his/her address for purposes of the
elections, while providing for safeguards to a clean election.
Contrary to petitioner's claim that Section 5(d) circumvents the
Constitution, Congress enacted the law prescribing a system of
overseas absentee voting in compliance with the constitutional
mandate. Such mandate expressly requires that Congress provide a
system of absentee voting that necessarily presupposes that the
"qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad" is not physically present in
the country. The provisions of Sections 5(d) and 11 are components of
the system of overseas absentee voting established by R.A. No. 9189.
The qualified Filipino abroad who executed the affidavit is deemed to
have retained his domicile in the Philippines. He is presumed not to have
lost his domicile by his physical absence from this country. His having
become an immigrant or permanent resident of his host country does
not necessarily imply an abandonment of his intention to return to his
domicile of origin, the Philippines. Therefore, under the law, he must be
given the opportunity to express that he has not actually abandoned his
domicile in the Philippines by executing the affidavit required by Sections
5(d) and 8(c) of the law.
Group 3
Gaminde v. COA
GR 140335
Facts:
 On June 11, 1993 the President of the Philippines appointed
petitioner Thelma P. Gaminde, ad interim, commissioner of CSC.
 She assumed office on June 22, 1993 after taking oath and was
appointed by the CA on Sept. 1993.
 It is indicated in the appointment letter that her term will expire on
Feb 2, 1999.
 On Feb 24, 1998 petitioner sought clarification to the OP as to the
expiry date of her term of office.
 In reply the Chief Legal Counsel opined that the petitioner’s term
of office would expire on February 2, 2000 not on 1999.
 Relying on the said opinion she stayed in office up to 2000.
 Chairman de Leon then wrote a letter to COA whether or not
Gaminde and her co-terminous staff be paid their salaries
notwithstanding the expiration of their term on 1999.
 General Counsel of COA issued an opinion that Commissioner
Gaminde’s term was already expired.
 Notice of disallowance was issued enjoining the petitioner and her
staff from collecting salary.
 Petitioner appealed to COA but denied appeal.
Issue: WON Gaminde’s term expired on February 2, 1999 or February
2, 2000.
Ruling:
 The term of office of the Chairman and Commissioners shall be of
seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the
chairman shall hold office for seven years, a commissioner for five
years, and another commissioner for three years without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any member
be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
 Term- time during the officer may claim to hold office as of right,
and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall
succeed one another. Tenure- represents the term during the
incumbent actually holds office.
 In Republic v Imperial, it was held that the operation for the
rotational plan requires two conditions, both indispensable to its
workability: 1. that the terms of the first three commissioners
should start on a common date, and, 2. that any vacancy due to
death, resignation or disability before the expiration of the term
should only be filled for the unexpired balance of the term.
 Her term expired on February 2, 1999 but she served as de facto
officer in good faith until February 2, 2000.
 Thus she is entitled to receive her salaries and emoluments,
including that of her co-terminous staff.
 COA decision was reversed.
Socrates v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 154512
Facts:
 On July 2, 2002, 312 out of 528 members of the then
incumbent barangay officials of the Puerto Princesa
convened themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly
(PRA) to initiate the recall of Socrates who assumed office
as Puerto Princesa's mayor on June 30, 2001. The members
of the PRA designated Hagedorn, president of the
Association of Barangay Captains, as interim chair of the
PRA.
 PRA passed Resolution No. 01-02 (Recall Resolution) which
declared its loss of confidence in Socrates and called for his
recall. The PRA requested the COMELEC to schedule the
recall election for mayor within 30 days from receipt of the
Recall Resolution.
 Socrates led with the COMELEC a petition to nullify and
deny due course to the Recall Resolution.
 COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution dismissing for
lack of merit Socrates' petition and scheduled the recall
election on September 7, 2002.
 COMELEC en banc promulgated Resolution No. 5673
prescribing the calendar of activities and periods of certain
prohibited acts in connection with the recall election and
fixed the campaign period from August 27, 2002 to
September 5, 2002 or a period of 10 days.
 Hagedorn led his certificate of candidacy for mayor in the
recall election.
 Adovo, Gilo, Ollave and Manaay filed petitions with
COMELEC which were all anchored on the ground that
Hagedorn is disqualified from running for a fourth
consecutive term, having been elected and having served as
mayor of the city for 3 consecutive full terms immediately
prior to the instant recall election for the same post. These
petitions were consolidated.
 COMELEC’s first division dismissed this for lack of merit and
declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election.
 COMELEC en banc denied motion for recon, hence the
consolidated petition:
G.R. No. 15451
 Socrates seeks to nullify the COMELEC en banc resolution
which gave due course to the Recall Resolution and
scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002
G.R. No. 154683
 seeks to annul COMELEC Resolution No. 5673 insofar as it
fixed the recall election on September 7, 2002, giving the
candidates only a ten-day campaign period.
 COMELEC be enjoined from holding the recall election on
September 7, 2002 and that a new date be fixed giving the
candidates at least an additional 15 days to campaign.
G.R. Nos. 155083-84
 Adovo, Gilo and Ollave assail the COMELEC's resolutions
declaring Hagedorn qualified to run for mayor in the recall
election
Group 3
 prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to
enjoin the proclamation of the winning candidate in the recall
election
Facts (Continuation):
 COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No. 5708 giving the
candidates an additional 15 days within which to campaign.
Thus, the COMELEC reset the recall election to September
24, 2002. (Note: G.R. No. 154683 is now moot and
academic)
 Socrates led a motion for leave to file an attached petition for
intervention seeking the same reliefs as those sought by
Adovo, Gilo and Ollave
 Hagedorn garnered the highest number of votes in the recall
election with 20,238 votes. Rival candidates Socrates and
Sandoval obtained 17,220 votes and 13,241 votes.
 Hagedorn led motions to lift the order restraining the
COMELEC from proclaiming the winning candidate and to
allow him to assume office to give effect to the will of the
electorate.
 Court granted Socrates' motion for leave to file a petition for
intervention
Petitioner’s Argument:
 COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in upholding the
Recall Resolution.
 (1) not all members of the PRA were notified of the meeting
to adopt the resolution; (2) the proof of service of notice was
palpably and legally deficient; (3) the members of the PRA
were themselves seeking a new electoral mandate from their
respective constituents; (4) the adoption of the resolution
was exercised with grave abuse of authority; and (5) the
PRA proceedings were conducted in a manner that violated
his and the public's constitutional right to information.
 argue that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
upholding Hagedorn's qualification to run for mayor in the
recall election despite the constitutional and statutory
prohibitions against a fourth consecutive term for elective
local officials.
Issues:
1. WON the recall resolution was valid.
2. WON Hagedorn was qualified to run for mayor despite serving three
consecutive full terms immediately prior to recall election.
Ruling: (Petitions dismissed)
1. NO. the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in upholding the validity of the Recall Resolution
and in scheduling the recall election on September 24, 2002.
Socrates bewails that the manner private respondents
conducted the PRA proceedings violated his constitutional
right to information on matters of public concern. Socrates,
however, admits receiving notice of the PRA meeting and of
even sending his representative and counsel who were
present during the entire PRA proceedings. Proponents of
the recall election submitted to the COMELEC the Recall
Resolution, minutes of the PRA proceedings, the journal of
the PRA assembly, attendance sheets, notices sent to PRA
members, and authenticated master list of barangay officials
in Puerto Princesa. Socrates had the right to examine and
copy all these public records in the official custody of the
COMELEC. Socrates, however, does not claim that the
COMELEC denied him this right. There is no legal basis in
Socrates' claim that respondents violated his constitutional
right to information on matters of public concern.
2. YES. The three-term limit rule for elective local o􀀴cials is
found in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which states:
"Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three
years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term for which he was elected."
This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160,
otherwise
known as the Local Government Code, which provides:
"Section 43. Term of Office. — (a) . . . (b) No local elective official shall
serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which the elective official was elected."’
These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The first
part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than
three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms
count in determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states
that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not
interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary
severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of
service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from
being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive
terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek
immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers
to the next regular election for the same office following the end
of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a
recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two
reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer
an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the
intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the
continuity of service.
What the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth
term following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however,
does not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as
the reelection is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive
term. A recall election mid-way in the term following the third
consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate
reelection after the third term.
In summary, we hold that Hagedorn is qualified to run in the
September 24, 2002 recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa
because:
1. Hagedorn is not running for immediate reelection following
his three consecutive terms as mayor which ended on June
30, 2001;
2. Hagedorn's continuity of service as mayor was involuntarily
interrupted from June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002
during which time he was a private citizen;
3. Hagedorn's recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30,
2004 cannot be made to retroact to June 30, 2001 to make a
fourth consecutive term because factually the recall term is
not a fourth consecutive term; and
4. Term limits should be construed strictly to give the fullest
possible effect to the right of the electorate to choose their
leaders.
Group 3
Lozada v. COMELEC
GR L- 59068
Facts
 Lozada et al., as taxpayers and voters, filed a petition for
mandamus with prayer to compel the COMELEC to hold a
special election for the vacancies in the Interim Batasang
Pambansa
 Lozada et al. invoke Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution which states:
“In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang
Pambansa eighteen months or more before
a regular election, the COMELEC shall call
a special election to be held within sixty
days after the vacancy occurs to elect the
Member to serve the unexpired term.”
 COMELEC responds: 1) petitioners have no legal
standing, 2) the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to
entertain the petition; and 3) Section 5(2), Article VIII
of the 1973 Constitution does not apply to the Interim
Batasang Pambansa
Issues
1) Whether or not the petitions have legal standing;
2) If in affirmative, whether or not Supreme Court can issue
mandamus for COMELEC to hold special election; and
3) Whether or not the Interim Batasang Pambansa is covered by
the constitutional provision invoked.
Holding
1) The petitioners do not have legal standing—they have no
personal or substantial interest to the case at hand nor are
they under any threat of direct injury from enforcement.
2) The Supreme Court can issue mandamus for COMELEC to
hold a special election—The extent of the SC’s jurisdiction is
only to review of the orders and rulings of the COMELEC; the
power of judicial review in cases of grave abuse of discretion.
3) The constitutional provision invoked does not apply to the
Interim Batasang Pambansa—Section 5(2), Article VIII of the
1973 Constitution only applies to the regular Legislative
Department and not the interim Legislative Department.
Notes as per topic:
 The intent of the mentioned provision is to fill up vacancies
because it was assumed that a province or representative
district would have only one representative in the said
Legislative Department.
 The constitutional provision mentioned is found now in
Section 9, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
 The Interim Batasang Pambansa was the legislature from
1978 to 1984, serving as a transitional legislative body as
mandated by the 1973 Constitution as the Ph shifted from a
presidential to a parliamentary form of Government under the
Bagong Lipunan (New Society) of Marcos.
Antonio F. Trillanes v Hon. Oscar Pimentel – Presiding Judge RTC
Makati
G.R. No. 179817 – June 27, 2008
“Oakwood Incident”
Facts of the Case:
 July 27, 2003 – group of more than 300 armed soldiers led by
junior offices of the AFP stormed into Oakwood Premier
Apartments in Makati City and demanded the resignation of
the President and key national officials.
 On the same day, then Pres. Arroyo issued Proclamation No.
427 and General Order No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and
calling out the AFP to suppress the rebellion.
 But the militant soldier surrendered that evening.
 Because of this incident, Trillanes was charged with coup
d’etat.
 4 years later, he won a seat in the Senate
 Before the commencement of his term, he filed before the
RTC of the same branch in which he was charged, an
"Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend
Senate Sessions and Related Requests"(Omnibus Motion).
 Among his requests are: he be allowed to go to the Senate to
attend all official functions, set up a working area at his place
of detention, to receive members of his staff in the proposed
area, to give interviews and to air his comments pertaining to
the important issues affecting the country, to receive reporters
and other members of the media and to attend the
organizational meeting and election of officers of the Senate.
 RTC denied all the requests
 Trillanes omitted some of the requests and filed for a motion
for reconsideration but still it was denied.
 Hence, the present petition for certiorari and for prohibition
and mandamus to enjoin respondents from banning the
Senate staff from meeting with him and direct respondents to
allow him access Senate staff and permit him to attend to all
meetings
Issues:
 Whether or not this case is different from that of Jalosjos case
 Whether or not petitioner should be allowed to work and serve
his mandate as a senator since the people elected him
 Whether or not Trillanes should enjoy the liberal treatment of
detention prisoners who were held without bail (same as
Estrada and Misuari)
Ruling:
 There is no distinction as to the political complexion of or
moral turpitude involved in the crime charged
 Petitioner hinges his contention on the doctrine of
administrative law that “a public official cannot be removed
for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term”,
but this assertion is unavailing. His case is not administrative
in nature, and the doctrine of condonation does not apply
in criminal cases and re-election to office does not obliterate
a criminal charge. Never has the call of a particular duty
lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those
others who are validly restrained by law.
 Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from
imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of
the authorities or upon court orders. Petitioner has failed to
establish that this discretion has been gravely abused. In fact,
he was allowed to register as a voter, file his certificate of
candidacy, cast his vote, be proclaimed as Senator-elect and
take his oath of office.
Group 3
Additional Notes:
Romeo Jalosjos said that:
“Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions
and committee meetings for five (5) days or more in a week will
virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant
to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates
accused-appellant's status to that of a special class, it also would
be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system”
Petition is dismissed.
[GR Nos. 132875-76, Feb 03, 2000]
PEOPLE v. ROMEO G. JALOSJOS
FACTS:
Congressman ROMEO JALOJOS was accused and convicted for
statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness.
The accused-appellant filed a Motion to be Allowed to Discharge the
Duties of Congressman, on the contention that;
 Being voted via popular vote, he is obligated to do his
functions, which the Government should allow as it is the
“mandate of the sovereign will”
ISSUES:
 W/N, acting a representative of the people, he is privileged
from arrest and confinement?
HELD / RATIO:
NO. Immunity from arrest xxx arises from the provisions of the
Constitution;
 S.15, Art. VI, 1935 – xxx members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony and
breach of peace, be privilege from arrest xxx
 S.9, Art. VII, 1973 (1987) – xxx in all offenses punishable by
not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from
arrest during his attendance at its sessions xxx.
The former covers the broad coverage of felony, and the latter limits the
privilege to crimes punishable of less than 6 years imprisonment. A
Congressman is NOT immune from arrest under Title 11 of the Penal
Code, nor did the accused provide substantial reason to be exempted
from the rule.
One rational behind confinement is public self-defense; society must
defend itself and it also serves as a warning to others. “It is the injury
to the public which State action seeks to redress.”
All top officials of Government - executive, legislative, and judicial are
subject to the majesty of law; Privilege has to be granted by law, not
inferred from the duties of a position. Lawful arrest and confinement
are germane to the purposes of the law (redress public injury) and apply
to all those belonging to the same class. The functions and duties of
the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the
class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in
liberty of movement.
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a
reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement.
-------------------------------------------------------
CASE LAW;
Accused-appellant's reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos, which
states, inter alia, that;
“The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to
his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the
people of their right to elect their officers xxx”
It can be readily seen in the above-quoted ruling that the Aguinaldo case
involves the administrative removal of a public officer for acts done
prior to his present term of office. It does NOT apply to
imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal law.
Moreover, in the same way that preventive suspension is not removal,
confinement pending appeal is not removal. He remains a congressman
unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.