V.

LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT: POWERS

A. GENERAL POWERS
Sec. 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.

Legislative Investigations and Right to Privacy

I. LEGISLATIVE POWER
 The conduct of legislative investigations is an incident of the power to legislate. The Phil. Const.
contemplate on the ff. major legislative powers: (1) lawmaking, (2) checking the administration, (3)
conducting political education for the public, and (4) providing representation for several kinds of
clientage. The hallmark of legislative powers is lawmaking.
 Lawmaking. The chances for legislation increase when: (1) influential pressure groups mobilize their
members and seek a governmental solution; (2) the unorganized public becomes intensely concerned
with the matter, or conversely, is indifferent to the special measures sought by a pressure group; (3) the
parties and powerful legislators take up the cudgels; and (4) the formation of strong counterpressures to
defend the status quo fails to materialize.
 Checking the other branches of the government. Legislature has a long-established concern with
inquiring into administrative discretion under the acts of the legislature, and with ascertaining compliance
with legislative intent.
 The role of the legislature consists of questioning, reviewing and assessing, modifying and rejecting
policies of the administration. This power is referred to as congressional oversight—embraces all
activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over the implementation
of legislation it has enacted. Oversight may be in the form of review or investigation of executive branch
action, or it can include aggressive participation in the effectuation and administration of policy (e.g.
legislation, participation in the appointment process, power to appropriate funds for the conduct of the
government)
 Political education for the public. 2 activities of the Legislature: prolonged debate and committee
investigation, have as leading purpose the instruction of the public. Through prolonged debate, public is
allowed the time to focus its attention on the issue at hand. Committee investigations, on the other hand,
serve several purposes including: exposure of problems and abuses in private groups and public
agencies, correction of such abuses and justification for the need for new or remedial legislation (thus,
investigations should be made in aid of legislation).
 Representing different clientele. Legislators spend their time running errands for their constituents,
being guardians of their locality’s interests, mobilization of popular consent for new public policies and
maintaining consent for continuing policies. It is essential that consultation and interchange continuously
occur between those who hold and exercise political power and those who are affected by it.

B. LEGISLATIVE MILL

C. REQUIREMENTS AS TO BILLS
c.1 Subject and Title (Sec. 26)
Section 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof.

Cruz v. Paras
Certiorari proceeding on whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan, represented by the respondents
can prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful corporation, such
clubs employing hostesses. It is contended that the ordinance assailed as invalid is tainted with nullity, the municipality
being devoid of power to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling, petitioners at the same time alleging that their
rights to due process and equal protection of the laws were violated as the licenses previously given to them was in
effect withdrawn without judicial hearing.

The decision now under review refers to RA 938, originally enacted on 06/20/1953 and entitled: An Act Granting
Municipal or City Maintenance and Operation of Certain Places of Amusement within their Respective Territorial
Jurisdictions.Then on 05/21/1954, the first section was amended to include not merely “the power to regulate, but
likewise prohibit. The title, however, remained the same. It was not changed one whit. The exact wording was followed.
The power granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition.

There is thus support for the view advanced by petitioners that to construe RA938 as allowing the prohibition of the
operation of night clubs would give rise to a constitutional question.

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The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."

In accordance with the well-settled principle of constitutional construction that between two possible interpretations by
one of which it will be free from constitutional infirmity and by the other
tainted by such grave defect, the former is to be preferred. A construction that would save rather than one that would
affix the seal of doom certainly commends itself. We have done so before We do so again.

It is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of might clubs. They may be regulated, but not
prevented from carrying on their business.
c.2 As to specific laws (Art. VII, Sec. 22)
Section 22. The President shall submit to the Congress, within thirty days from the opening of every regular session as
the basis of the general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing, including receipts from
existing and proposed revenue measures.

Sec. 24-25
Section 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application,
and private bills, shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur
with amendments.
Section 25. (1) The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the operation of
the Government as specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be
prescribed by law.

(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some
particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to
which it relates.

(3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for approving
appropriations for other departments and agencies.

(4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds
actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein.

(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported
by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law.

(7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general appropriations bill for the ensuing
fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed re-enacted and shall remain in
force and effect until the general appropriations bill is passed by the Congress
Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance
RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the
NIRC. Various suits were filed challenging the constitutionality of the RA7716. Petitioners' contention is that Republic
Act No. 7716 did not "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, § 24 of the
Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of two distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. In
this connection, petitioners point out that although Art. VI, § 24 was adopted from the American Federal Constitution,
2 it is notable in two respects: the verb "shall originate" is qualified in the Philippine Constitution by the word "exclusively"
and the phrase "as on other bills" in the American version is omitted. This means, according to them, that to be
considered as having originated in the House, Republic Act No. 7716 must retain the essence of H. No. 11197.

Issue: Does Republic Act No. 7716 violate Art. VI, § 24 of the Constitution?

Ruling:
1. No. Indeed, what the Constitution simply
means is that the initiative for filing revenue,
tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase
of the public debt, private bills and bills of local
application must come from the House of
Representatives on the theory that, elected as
they are from the districts, the members of the
House can be expected to be more sensitive

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 to the local needs and problems. On the other
hand, the senators, who are elected at large,
are expected to approach the same problems
from the national perspective. Both views are
thereby made to bear on the enactment of
such laws.
Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the
Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its
receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action
by the Senate as a body is withheld pending
receipt of the House bill.
>What is the extent of the power of the Bicameral
Conference Committee? (not in the syllabus)
Finally it is contended that the bill which became
Republic Act No. 7716 is the bill which the Conference
Committee prepared by consolidating H. No. 11197
and S. No. 1630. It is claimed that the Conference
Committee report included provisions not found in
either the House bill or the Senate bill and that these
provisions were "surreptitiously" inserted by the
Conference Committee. Much is made of the fact that
in the last two days of its session on April 21 and 25,
1994 the Committee met behind closed doors. We are
not told, however, whether the provisions were not the
result of the give and take that often mark the
proceedings of conference committees.
As to the possibility of an entirely new bill emergency
out of a Conference Committee, it has been explained:
Under congressional rules of procedure, conference
committees are not expected to make any material
change in the measure at issue, either by deleting
provisions to which both houses have already agreed
or by inserting new provisions. But this is a difficult
provision to enforce. Note the problem when one
house amends a proposal originating in either house
by striking out everything following the enacting clause
and substituting provisions which make it an entirely
new bill. The versions are now altogether different,
permitting a conference committee to draft essentially
a new bill . . .
Demetria v. Alba
Petitioners, members of the National
Assembly/Batasan Pambansa, assails the
constitutionality of the 1st paragraph of Sec. 44 of the
Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise known as the
“Budget Reform Decree of 1977.”
Said paragraph 1 of Section 44 provides: "The
President shall have the authority to transfer any fund,
appropriated for the different departments, bureaus,
offices and agencies of the Executive Department,
which are included in the General Appropriations Act,
to any program, project or activity of any department,
bureau, or office included in the General
Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment."
The result is a third version, which is considered an
"amendment in the nature of a substitute," the only
requirement for which being that the third version be
germane to the subject of the House and Senate bills.
Indeed, this Court recently held that it is within the
power of a conference committee to include in its report
an entirely new provision that is not found either in the
House bill or in the Senate bill. If the committee can
propose an amendment consisting of one or two
provisions, there is no reason why it cannot propose
several provisions, collectively considered as an
"amendment in the nature of a substitute," so long as
such amendment is germane to the subject of the bills
before the committee. After all, its report was not final
but needed the approval of both houses of Congress
to become valid as an act of the legislative department.
The charge that in this case the Conference Committee
acted as a third legislative chamber is thus without any
basis.
Art. VI, § 26(2) must, therefore, be construed as
referring only to bills introduced for the first time in
either house of Congress, not to the conference
committee report. For if the purpose of requiring three
readings is to give members of Congress time to study
bills, it cannot be gainsaid that H. No. 11197 was
passed in the House after three reading; that in the
Senate it was considered on first reading and then
referred to a committee of that body; that although the
Senate committee did not report out the House bill, it
submitted a version (S. No. 1630) which it had
prepared by "taking into consideration" the House bill;
that for its part the Conference Committee
consolidated the two bills and prepared a compromise
version; that the Conference Committee Report was
thereafter approved by the House and the Senate,
presumably after appropriate study by their members.
We cannot say that, as a matter of fact, the members
of Congress were not fully informed of the provisions
of the bill. The allegation that the Conference
Committee usurped the legislative power of Congress
is, in our view, without warrant in fact and in law.
On the other hand, the constitutional provision under
consideration reads as follows:
"Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any
transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the
Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional
commissions may by law be authorized to augment
any item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations."
The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item
to another was explicit and categorical under the 1973
Constitution. However, to afford the heads of the
different branches of the government and those of the
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constitutional commissions considerable flexibility in
the use of public funds and resources, the constitution
allowed the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer
of funds for the purpose of augmenting an item from
savings in another item in the appropriation of the
government branch or constitutional body concerned.
The leeway granted was thus limited. The purpose and
conditions for which funds may be transferred were
specified, i.e. transfer may be allowed for the purpose
of augmenting an item and such transfer may be made
only if there are savings from another item in the
appropriation of the government branch or
constitutional body. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D.
No. 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted
under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to
indiscriminately transfer funds from one department,
bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department
to any program, project or activity of any department,
bureau or office included in the General Appropriations
Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as
to whether or not the funds to be transferred are
actually savings in the item from which the same are to
be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the
purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer
is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the
standards set in the fundamental law, thereby
amounting to an undue delegation of legislative
powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof.
Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the
provision in question null and void.
Hence, the conditions on the release of money from the
treasury [Sec. 18(1)]; the restrictions on the use of
public funds for public purpose [Sec. 18(2)]; the
prohibition to transfer an appropriation for an item to
another [Sec. 16(5) and the requirement of
specifications [Sec. 16(2)], among others, were all
safeguards designed to forestall abuses in the
expenditure of public funds. Paragraph 1 of Section 44
puts all these safeguards to naught. For, as correctly
observed by petitioners, in view of the unlimited
authority bestowed upon the President, ". . . Pres.
Decree No. 1177 opens the floodgates for the
enactment of unfounded appropriations, results in
uncontrolled executive expenditures, diffuses
accountability for budgetary performance and
entrenches the pork barrel system as the ruling party
may well expand [sic] public money not on the basis of
development priorities but on political and personal
expediency."

Abakada Guro v. Ermita

Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., questioned the constitutionality of
Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC). These questioned provisions contain a uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006.

Petitioners claim that the amendments to these provisions of the NIRC did not at all originate from the House. They
aver that House Bill No. 3555 proposed amendments only regarding Sections 106, 107, 108, 110 and 114 of the NIRC,
while House Bill No. 3705 proposed amendments only to Sections 106, 107,108, 109, 110 and 111 of the NIRC; thus,
the other sections of the NIRC which the Senate amended but which amendments were not found in the House bills
are not intended to be amended by the House of Representatives. Hence, they argue that since the proposed
amendments did not originate from the House, such amendments are a violation of Article VI, Section 24 of the
Constitution.

Under the provisions of both the Rules of the House of The argument does not hold water.
Representatives and Senate Rules, the Bicameral
Conference Committee is mandated to settle the In the present cases, petitioners admit that it was indeed
differences between the disagreeing provisions in the House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705 that initiated the move for
House bill and the Senate bill. The term settle is amending provisions of the NIRC dealing mainly with the
synonymous to reconcile and harmonize. To reconcile value-added tax. Upon transmittal of said House bills to the
or harmonize disagreeing provisions, the Bicameral Senate, the Senate came out with Senate Bill No. 1950
Conference Committee may then (a) adopt the specific proposing amendments not only to NIRC provisions on the
provisions of either the House bill or Senate bill, (b)
value-added tax but also amendments to NIRC provisions
decide that neither provisions in the House bill or the
on other kinds of taxes. Is the introduction by the Senate
provisions in the Senate bill would be carried into the
of provisions not dealing directly with the value- added
final form of the bill, and/or (c) try to arrive at a tax, which is the only kind of tax being amended in the
compromise between the disagreeing provisions. House bills, still within the purview of the constitutional
provision authorizing the Senate to propose or concur
with amendments to a revenue bill that originated from the House?

The foregoing question had been squarely answered in the Tolentino case, wherein the Court held, thus:

. . . To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the
House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. . .
. At this point, what is important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be

4
 produced. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process
culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to
deny the Senates power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. It
would be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the
House superior to the Senate.

Given, then, the power of the Senate to propose amendments, the Senate can propose its own version
even with respect to bills which are required by the Constitution to originate in the House.

Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills
authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House
of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can
be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators,
who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective.
Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws

Notably therefore, the main purpose of the bills emanating from the House of Representatives is to bring in sizeable
revenues for the government to supplement our countrys serious financial problems, and improve tax administration
and control of the leakages in revenues from income taxes and value-added taxes. As these house bills were
transmitted to the Senate, the latter, approaching the measures from the point of national perspective, can introduce
amendments within the purposes of those bills. It can provide for ways that would soften the impact of the VAT measure
on the consumer, i.e., by distributing the burden across all sectors instead of putting it entirely on the shoulders of the
consumers.

Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) v. Secretary of Budget and Management
LAMP assails the constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF) as provided in RA9206/ GAA for 2004. They also sought to enjoin respondent Secretary of the DBM from
making, and thereafter releasing budgetary allocations to individual members of Congress as “pork barrel” funds out of
PDAF.

For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers because in receiving and, thereafter,
spending funds for their chosen projects, the Member of Congress in effect intrude into an executive function. Verily,
the power of appropriation granted to Congress as a collegial body, “does not include the power of the Members thereof
to individually propose, select and identify which projects are to be actually implemented and funded—a function which
essentially and exclusively pertains to the Executive Department.

For the respondents, they say that the Court should decline the petitioner’s plea to take judicial notice of the supposed
iniquity of PDAF because there is no concrete proof that PDAF, in the guise of “pork barrel,” is a source of “dirty money”
for unscrupulous lawmakers and other officials who tend to misuse their allocations. Failing to present even an iota of
proof that the DBM Secretary has been releasing lump sums from PDAF directly or indirectly to individual members of
Congress, the petition falls short of its cause.

Issue: In allowing the direct allocation and release of PDAF funds to the Members of Congress based on their own list
proposed projects, did the implementation of the PDAF provision under the GAA of 2004 violate the Constitution or the
laws?

>passed the requisites for judicial review (taxpayer’s suit)

Ruling: No. Allegations lack substantiation, presumption of constitutionality subsists. The Court is constrained to hold
that a lawful and regular government budgeting and appropriation process ensued during the enactment and all
throughout the implementation of the GAA of 2004, lest it commits unpardonable judicial legislation and encroachment
on the principle of separation of powers.

Under the Constitution, the power of appropriation is vested in the Legislature, subject to the requirement that
appropriation bills originate exclusively in the House of Representatives with the option of the Senate to propose or
concur with amendments. While the budgetary process commences from the proposal submitted by the President to
Congress, it is the latter which concludes the exercise by crafting an appropriation act it may deem beneficial to the
nation, based on its own judgment, wisdom and purposes. Like any other piece of legislation, the appropriation act may
then be susceptible to objection from the branch tasked to implement it, by way of a Presidential veto. Thereafter,
budget execution comes under the domain of the Executive branch which deals with the operational aspects of the
cycle including the allocation and release of funds earmarked for various projects. Simply put, from the regulation of
fund releases, the implementation of payment schedules and up to the actual spending of the funds specified in the

5
law, the Executive takes the wheel. "The DBM lays down the guidelines for the disbursement of the fund. The Members
of Congress are then requested by the President to recommend projects and programs which may be funded from the
PDAF. The list submitted by the Members of Congress is endorsed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives to
the DBM, which reviews and determines whether such list of projects submitted are consistent with the guidelines and
the priorities set by the Executive." This demonstrates the power given to the President to execute appropriation laws
and therefore, to exercise the spending per se of the budget.
Sec. 29
Section 29. (1) No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.

(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use,
benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest,
preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary
is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.

(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such
purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any,
shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government.
Guingona v. Carague
The petition seeks the declaration of the constitutionality of PD 81, Section 31 of PD No. 1177, and PD 1967. The
petition also seeks to restrain the disbursement for debt service under the 1990 budget pursuant to said decrees.
Respondents contend that the petition involves a pure political question which is the repeal or amendment of said laws
addressed to the judgment, wisdom and patriotism of the legislative body and not this Court.

Petitioners argue that the said automatic appropriations under the aforesaid decrees of then President Marcos became
functus oficio when he was ousted in February, 1986; that upon the expiration of the one-man legislature in the person
of President Marcos, the legislative power was restored to Congress on February 2, 1987 when the Constitution was
ratified by the people; that there is a need for a new legislation by Congress providing for automatic appropriation, but
Congress, up to the present, has not approved any such law; and thus the said P86.8 Billion automatic appropriation
in the 1990 budget is an administrative act that rests on no law, and thus, it cannot be enforced. They then point out
that since the said decrees are inconsistent with Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution [Sec. 24. All appropriation,
revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments."] whereby bills
have to be approved by the President, 10 then a law must be passed by Congress to authorize said automatic
appropriation. Further, petitioners state said decrees violate Section 29(1) of Article VI of the Constitution which
provides as follows:

Sec. 29(1). No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.

They assert that there must be definiteness, certainty and exactness in an appropriation, otherwise it is an undue
delegation of legislative power to the President who determines in advance the amount appropriated for the debt
service.

Issue: Are the laws violative of Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution?
Ruling: No.
Budgetary Process
1. Budget preparation. The first step is essentially tasked upon the Executive Branch and covers the estimation
of government revenues, the determination of budgetary priorities and activities within the constraints imposed
by available revenues and by borrowing limits, and the translation of desired priorities and activities into
expenditure levels. Budget preparation starts with the budget call issued by the Department of Budget and
Management. Each agency is required to submit agency budget estimates in line with the requirements
consistent with the general ceilings set by the Development Budget Coordinating Council (DBCC). With regard
to debt servicing, the DBCC staff, based on the macro-economic projections of interest rates (e.g., LIBOR
rate) and estimated sources of domestic and foreign financing, estimates debt service levels. Upon issuance
of budget call, the Bureau of Treasury computes for the interest and principal payments for the year for all
direct national government borrowings and other liabilities assumed by the same.

2. Legislative authorization. — At this stage, Congress enters the picture and deliberates or acts on the budget
proposals of the President, and Congress in the exercise of its own judgment and wisdom formulates an
appropriation act precisely following the process established by the Constitution, which specifies that no
money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made by law.

6
 3. Budget Execution. Tasked on the Executive, the third phase of the budget process covers the various
operational aspects of budgeting. The establishment of obligation authority ceilings, the evaluation of work
and financial plans for individual activities, the continuing review of government fiscal position, the regulation
of funds releases, the implementation of cash payment schedules, and other related activities comprise this
phase of the budget cycle.

4. Budget accountability. The fourth phase refers to the evaluation of actual performance and initially approved
work targets, obligations incurred, personnel hired and work accomplished are compared with the targets set
at the time the agency budgets were approved.

While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution, Congress is mandated to "assign the highest
budgetary priority to education" in order to "insure that teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best
available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment," it does not thereby
follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the
national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives. Having faithfully complied therewith,
Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can
reasonably service our enormous debt, the greater portion of which was inherited from the previous administration. It
is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our
economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share
allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as
unconstitutional.

More significantly, there is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular form of words or
religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be 'made by law,'
such as precisely the authorization or appropriation under the questioned presidential decrees. In other words, in terms
of time horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past but subsisting legislations) as well as expressly
for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the present Congress), just as said appropriation may be made
in general as well as in specific terms. The Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual laws, such as a
general appropriations act or in special provisions of laws of general or special application which appropriate public
funds for specific public purposes, such as the questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is sufficient if the
legislative intention clearly and certainly appears from the language employed (In re Continuing Appropriations, 32 P.
272), whether in the past or in the present.

The Court, therefor, finds that R.A. No. 4860, as amended by P.D. No. 81, Section 31 of P.D. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967
constitute lawful authorizations or appropriations, unless they are repealed or otherwise amended by Congress. The
Executive was thus merely complying with the duty to implement the same.
Sec. 28
Section 28. (1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of
taxation.

(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.

(3) Charitable institutions, churches and personages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries,
and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or
educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.

(4) No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the
Congress.

Art. XIV, Sec. 4[3] and [4]

Section 4. (3) All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used actually, directly, and
exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties. Upon the dissolution or cessation of the
corporate existence of such institutions, their assets shall be disposed of in the manner provided by law.

Proprietary educational institutions, including those cooperatively owned, may likewise be entitled to such exemptions,
subject to the limitations provided by law, including restrictions on dividends and provisions for reinvestment.

(4) Subject to conditions prescribed by law, all grants, endowments, donations, or contributions used actually, directly,
and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from tax.

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Lung Center of the Phils. v. Quezon City and Constantino P. Rosas (City Assessor of Quezon City)
Lung Center of the Phils. is a non-stock and non-profit entity in Quezon City. In the middle of the lot (121,463 sq.m.),
is where the hospital is located. big space at the ground floor is being leased to private parties, for canteen and small
store spaces, and to medical or professional practitioners who use the same as their private clinics for their patients
whom they charge for their professional services. Almost one-half of the entire area on the left side of the building along
Quezon Avenue is vacant and idle, while a big portion on the right side, at the corner of Quezon Avenue and Elliptical
Road, is being leased for commercial purposes to a private enterprise known as the Elliptical Orchids and Garden
Center. The petitioner accepts paying and non-paying patients. It also renders medical services to out-patients, both
paying and non-paying. Aside from its income from paying patients, the petitioner receives annual subsidies from the
government.

On 1993, the City Assessor of Quezon City assessed the petitioner for real property taxes in the amount of P4,554,860
on the land and hospital building. Petitioner claims exemption on its claim that it is a charitable institution. The petitioner
alleged that under Section 28, paragraph 3 of the 1987 Constitution, the property is exempt from real property taxes. It
contends that the "exclusivity" required in the Constitution does not necessarily mean "solely." Hence, even if a portion
of its real estate is leased out to private individuals from whom it derives income, it does not lose its character as a
charitable institution, and its exemption from the payment of real estate taxes on its real property.

Respondents claim that the petitioner’s real property is not exempt from the payment of real estate taxes under P.D.
No. 1823 and even under the 1987 Constitution because it failed to prove that it is a charitable institution and that the
said property is actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes.

Issue: Whether the real properties are exempt from real property taxes
>Lung Center of the Phils. is a charitable institution. As a general principle, a charitable institution does not lose its
character as such and its exemption from taxes simply because it derives income from paying patients, whether
outpatient, or confined in the hospital, or receives subsidies from the government, so long as the money received is
devoted or used altogether to the charitable object which it is intended to achieve; and no money inures to the private
benefit of the persons managing or operating the institution.

Ruling: No. The tax exemption under this constitutional provision covers property taxes only. As Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr., then a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, explained: ". . . what is exempted is not the
institution itself . . .; those exempted from real estate taxes are lands, buildings and improvements actually, directly and
exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational purposes." What is meant by actual, direct and exclusive use
of the property for charitable purposes is the direct and immediate and actual application of the property itself to the
purposes for which the charitable institution is organized. It is not the use of the income from the real property that is
determinative of whether the property is used for tax-exempt purposes. The petitioner failed to discharge its burden to
prove that the entirety of its real property is actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes.

Accordingly, we hold that the portions of the land leased to private entities as well as those parts of the hospital leased
to private individuals are not exempt from such taxes. On the other hand, the portions of the land occupied by the
hospital and portions of the hospital used for its patients, whether paying or non-paying, are exempt from real property
taxes.
c.2. Procedure for passage of bills

Sec. 26[2] No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days,
and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except
when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon
the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance
Facts: Challenging the constitutionality of the RA7716—VAT system
Issue: Does it violate Art. VI, § 26(2) of the Constitution?
Ruling: We not pass to the next argument of petitioners that S. No. 1630 did not pass three readings on separate days
as required by the Constitution 8 because the second and third readings were done on the same day, March 24, 1994.
But this was because on February 24, 1994 9 and again on March 22, 1994, 10 the President had certified S. No. 1630
as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the
bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment,
etc." in Art. VI, § 26(2) qualified the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: (i) the bill has passed three
readings on separate days and (ii) it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally
approved.

8
It would also negate the very premise of the "except" clause: the necessity of securing the immediate enactment of a
bill which is certified in order to meet a public calamity or emergency. For if it is only the printing that is dispensed with
by presidential certification, the time saved would be so negligible as to be of any use in insuring immediate enactment.
It may well be doubted whether doing away with the necessity of printing and distributing copies of the bill three days
before the third reading would insure speedy enactment of a law in the face of an emergency requiring the calling of a
special election for President and Vice-President. Under the Constitution such a law is required to be made within
seven days of the convening of Congress in emergency session.

That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of three readings on separate days and of printing
and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice. For example, the bill defining
the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court which, in consolidation with the Senate version, became Republic Act No. 5440,
was passed on second and third readings in the House of Representatives on the same day (May 14, 1968) after the
bill had been certified by the President as urgent. There is, therefore, no merit in the contention that presidential
certification dispenses only with the requirement for the printing of the bill and its distribution three days before its
passage but not with the requirement of three readings on separate days, also.
Sec. 26[1] Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof.
 The proscription is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and logrolling legislation as well as
surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches. The provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its
subject finding expression in its title.

Farinas v. Exec. Sec.

The case revolves around the issue of constitutionality of Sec. 14 of RA 9006 (The Fair Election Act/ "An Act to Enhance
the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices,"), insofar as it
expressly repealed Sec. 67 of BP Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) for being in violation of Sec.26(1), Article VI
of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title; that any elective
official running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and
Vice- President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Petitioners claim that such provision in the law is a rider.
Issue: Is Sec. 14 of RA 9006 a rider?
Ruling: No. To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject of
an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that —
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly
construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be
expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be
comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without
expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere
details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.

The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include the
repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section
67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content. This Court has held
that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how
diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered
in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.

Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is
to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of
matters which have not received the notice, action and study of the legislators and the public. In this case, it cannot be
claimed that the legislators were not apprised of the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as the same
was amply and comprehensively deliberated upon by the members of the House.
c.3 Presidential Veto (Sec. 27)
Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he
approves the same he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House
where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such
reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with
the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the
Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas
or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall
communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof,
otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.

9
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill,
but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.
Bolinao Electronics Corp. v. Valencia
Bolinao Electronics Corporation, Chronicle Broadcasting Network and Monserrat Broadcasting System, owners and
operators of radio and television stations filed a petition to prohibit the respondents Secretary of Public Works and
Communications and Acting Chief of the Radio Control Division. The said respondents are conducting investigations
in connection with the petitioners’ applications for renewal of their station licenses.

Ruling: Under the Constitution, the President has the power to veto any particular item or items of an appropriation bill.
However, when a provision of an appropriation bill affects one or more items of the same, the President cannot veto
the provision without at the same time vetoing the particular item or items to which it relates. (Art. VI, Sec. 20)

It may be observed from the wordings of the Appropriations Act that the amount appropriated for the operation of the
Philippine Broadcasting Service was made subject to the condition that the same shall not be used or expended for
operation of television stations in Luzon where there are already existing commercial television stations. This gives rise
to the question of whether the President may legally veto a condition attached to an appropriation or item in the
appropriation bill. But this is not a novel question. A little effort to research on the subject would have yielded enough
authority to guide action on the matter.

For, in the leading case of State vs. Holder it was already declared that such action by the Chief Executive was illegal.
This ruling, that the executive's veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions, has
been adhered to in subsequent cases. If the veto is unconstitutional, it follows that the same produced no effect
whatsoever, and the restriction imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore, remains. Any expenditure made by the
intervenor PBS, for the purpose of installing or operating a television station in Manila, where there are already
television stations in operation, would be in violation of the express condition for the release of the appropriation and,
consequently, null and void. It is not difficult to see that even if it were able to prove its right to operate on Channel 9,
said intervenor would not have been entitled to reimbursement of its illegal expenditures.

● In the case of Bolinao Electronics Corporation v. Valencia, a public works bill contained an item appropriating a certain
sum for assistance to television stations, subject to the condition that the amount would not be available to places
where there were commercial television stations. Then President Macapagal approved the appropriation but vetoed
the condition. When challenged before this Court, it was held that the veto was ineffectual and that the approval of the
item carried with it the approval of the condition attached to it. In contrast with the case at bar, there is no condition, in
the budgetary sense of the term, attached to an appropriation or item in the appropriation bill which was struck out.

Gonzales v. Macaraig
Congress passed House Bill No. 19186, or the GAA of 1989. As passed, it eliminated or decreased certain items
included in the proposed budget submitted by the President.

When passed to the President for approval, the President signed the Bill into law, and declared the same to have
become Rep. Act No. 6688. In the process, seven (7) Special Provisions and Section 55, a "General Provision," were
vetoed. Senate then passed a resolution that claims that the president’s veto of Section 55 of the GENERAL
PROVISIONS of the General Appropriation Bill of 1989 (H.B. No. 19186) is unconstitutional.

The President promptly vetoed Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) because they nullify the authority of the
Chief Executive and heads of different branches of government to augment any item in the General Appropriations Law
for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations, as guaranteed by Article VI,
Section 25 (5) of the Constitution. Noteworthy is the fact that the power to augment from savings lies dormant until
authorized by law.

Petitioner’s cause proceeds on the following grounds:

1. the President's line-veto power as regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does not cover provision/s;
therefore, she exceeded her authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) which are
provisions;
2. when the President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto power but
should veto the entire bill;
3. the item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions for that would be
legislation, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers; and
4. the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided for by law
and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of that
power.

10
The Solicitor General counters that the issue at bar is a political question beyond the power of this Court to determine;
that petitioners had a political remedy, which was to override the veto; that Section 55 is a "rider" because it is
extraneous to the Appropriations Act and, therefore, merits the President's veto; that the power of the President to
augment items in the appropriations for the executive branches had already been provided for in the Budget Law,
specifically Sections 44 and 45 of Pres. Decree No. 1177, as amended by Rep. Act No. 6670 (4 August 1988); and that
the

Issue: Has the President the power to veto "provisions" of an Appropriations Bill?
[Petitioners contend that Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) are provisions and not items and are, therefore,
outside the scope of the item-veto power of the President.]

Ruling: Yes. Paragraph (1) refers to the general veto power of the President and if exercised would result in the veto
of the entire bill, as a general rule. Paragraph (2) is what is referred to as the item-veto power or the line-veto power. It
allows the exercise of the veto over a particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill. As specified,
the President may not veto less than all of an item of an Appropriations Bill. In other words, the power given the
executive to disapprove any item or items in an Appropriations Bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item
and to approve the remaining portion of the same item.

The terms item and provision in budgetary legislation and practice are concededly different. An item in a bill refers to
the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts . . . of the bill. The restrictive interpretation urged by
petitioners that the President may not veto a provision without vetoing the entire bill not only disregards the basic
principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto but also overlooks the
Constitutional mandate that any provision in the general appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some particular
appropriation therein and that any such provision shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates
(1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section 25 [2]). In other words, in the true sense of the term, a provision in an
Appropriations Bill is limited in its operation to some particular appropriation to which it relates, and does not relate to
the entire bill.

The Court went one step further and ruled that even assuming arguendo that "provisions" are beyond the executive
power to veto, and Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) were not "provisions" in the budgetary sense of the
term, they are "inappropriate provisions" that should be treated as "items" for the purpose of the President's veto
power.

Tested by these criteria, Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) must also be held to be inappropriate "conditions."
While they, particularly, Section 16 (FY '90), have been "artfully drafted" to appear as true conditions or limitations, they
are actually general law measures more appropriate for substantive and, therefore, separate legislation. The Court,
citing Henry v. Edwards, La., 346 So. 2d 153 (1977), said that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations
bill matters that should be more properly enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate
provisions inserted by it must be treated as "item", which can be vetoed by the President in the exercise of his
item-veto power.

The doctrine of separation of powers is in no way endangered because the transfer is made within a department (or
branch of government) and not from one department (branch) to another. The exercise of such authority in respect of
disapproved or reduced items by no means vests in the Executive the power to rewrite the entire budget, as petitioners
contend, the leeway granted being delimited to transfers within the department or branch concerned, the sourcing to
come only from savings.

The power of augmentation from savings, on the other hand, can by no means be considered a specific appropriation
of money. It is a non-appropriation item inserted in an appropriation measure. The same thing must be said of Section
55 (FY '89), taken in conjunction with Section 12, and Section 16 (FY '90), which prohibit the restoration or increase by
augmentation of appropriations disapproved and/or reduced by Congress. They are non-appropriation items, an
appropriation being a setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for a specific purpose (Bengzon v.
Secretary of Justice, 62 Phil. 912, 916 [1936]). It bears repeating that they are more of a substantive expression of a
legislative objective to restrict the power of augmentation granted to the President and other key officials. They are
actually matters of general law and more properly the subject of a separate legislation that will embody, define and
delimit the scope of the special power of augmentation from savings instead of being inappropriately incorporated
annually in the Appropriation Act. To sanction this practice would be to give the Legislature the freedom to grant or
withhold the power from the Executive and other officials, and thus put in yearly jeopardy the exercise of that power.

11
PHILCONSA v. Enriquez
Petitioners claim that the Congress and the President have
impermissibly exceeded their respective authorities. Suing as
members of the Senate and taxpayers, petitioners question: (1) the
constitutionality of the conditions imposed by the President in the
items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for the Supreme Court, (b) Commission
on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights
(CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU'S) and
(f) State Universities and Colleges (SUC's); and (2) the
constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in the
appropriation for debt service. They challenge the constitutionality of
the Presidential veto of the special provision in the appropriations for
debt service and the automatic appropriation of funds therefor.
Petitioners claim that the President cannot veto the Special Provision
on the appropriation for debt service without vetoing the entire
amount of P86,323,438.00 for said purpose (Rollo, G.R. No. 113105,
pp. 93-98; Rollo, G.R. No. 113174, pp. 16-18). The Solicitor General
counterposed that the Special Provision did not relate to the item of
appropriation for debt service and could therefore be the subject of
an item veto
Ruling: It is readily apparent that the Special Provision applicable to
the appropriation for debt service insofar as it refers to funds in
excess of the amount appropriated in the bill, is an "inappropriate"
provision referring to funds other than the P86,323,438,000.00
appropriated in the General Appropriations Act of 1991. Likewise the
vetoed provision is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No.
1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the
debt payment policy. As held by the Court in Gonzales, the repeal of
these laws should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations
law.
The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part
of the legislative process. That is why it is found in Article VI on the
Legislative Department rather than in Article VII on the Executive
Department in the Constitution. There is, therefore, sound basis to
indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on those questioning the validity thereof to show that
its use is a violation of the Constitution.
DOCTRINE OF "INAPPROPRIATE
PROVISION"
Just as the President may not use his item-veto
to usurp constitutional powers conferred on the
legislature, neither can the legislature deprive
the Governor of the constitutional powers
conferred on him as chief executive officer of the
state by including in a general appropriation bill
matters more properly enacted in separate
legislation. The Governor's constitutional power
to veto bills of general legislation . . . cannot be
abridged by the careful placement of such
measures in a general appropriation bill, thereby
forcing the Governor to choose between
approving unacceptable substantive legislation
or vetoing "items" of expenditures essential to
the operation of government. The legislature
cannot by location of a bill give it immunity from
executive veto. Nor can it circumvent the
Governor's veto power over substantive
legislation by artfully drafting general law
measures so that they appear to be true
conditions or limitations on an item of
appropriation. Otherwise, the legislature would
be permitted to impair the constitutional
responsibilities and functions of a co-equal
branch of government in contravention of the
separation of powers doctrine . . . We are no
more willing to allow the legislature to use its
appropriation power to infringe on the
Governor's constitutional right to veto matters of
substantive legislation than we are to allow the
Governor to encroach on the Constitutional
powers of the legislature. In order to avoid this
result, we hold that, when the legislature inserts
inappropriate provisions in a general
appropriation bill, such provisions must be
treated as "items" for purposes of the Governor's
item veto power over general appropriation bills.

Under his general veto power, the President has to veto the entire bill, not merely parts thereof (1987 Constitution, Art.
VI, Sec. 27[1]). The exception to the general veto power is the power given to the President to veto any particular item
or items in a general appropriations bill (1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 27[2]). In so doing, the President must veto the
entire item. A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited to specified sums of
money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit.

As the Constitution is explicit that the provision which Congress can include in an appropriations bill must "relate
specifically to some particular appropriation therein" and "be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it
relates," it follows that any provision which does not relate to any particular item, or which extends in its operation
beyond an item of appropriation, is considered "an inappropriate provision" which can be vetoed separately from an
item. Also to be included in the category of "inappropriate provisions" are unconstitutional provisions and provisions
which are intended to amend other laws, because clearly these kind of laws have no place in an appropriations bill.

c.4 Effectivity of Laws

Tanada v. Tuvera
Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in
the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive
orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.

Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the
1973 Philippine Constitution, as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the
Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated.

12
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity
of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential
issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette
is not indispensable for their effectivity.

Ruling: The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws
which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no
basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive
one. Without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been
promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees.

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a
requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall
have no force and effect. The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found
to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence
affording no basis for the challenged decree. Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to
their publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle
of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."

Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding
on the persons affected thereby. The Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and
effect.

EO 200 -providing for the publication of laws either in the official gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
philippines as a requirement for their effectivity
 publication only in the Official Gazette encountered problems: erratic release and limited readership
 newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of communicating the laws to the people
as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly
 amended so the laws to be effective must be published either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the country
Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette
or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.

PVB Employees v. Judge Vera

 Involves the liquidation proceedings of the Philippine Veterans Bank.
 Liquidation proceedings – is a legal process prelude to the eventual closure of a corporation. A process
where a corporation undergoing financial difficulty is subjected to winding up of its affairs where its
assets are converted into cash to be used in paying its obligations to its creditors prior to its closure.
 The Central Bank, the government office tasked with the duty to oversee the operations of banks, filed
an action in court for the liquidation of PVB. Some of the creditors of the bank were the employees of
the bank who were terminated as a result of the liquidation proceedings. These employees were
represented by their union, PVB employees union. They filed a complaint before the liquidation court claiming
payment of their unpaid wages and other monetary benefits. During the pendency of the liquidation
proceedings, a new law was passed RA 7169 mandating the rehabilitation of the PVB.
 Rehabilitation – Be restored to its former condition. The bank will have to be re-operated. The purpose of the
RA is diametrically opposed to the pending liquidation proceedings. While liquidation is a prelude to death,
rehabilitation is reviving a dying corporation.
 The union filed a petition before the labor court asking for reinstatement in the event that the bank is
rehabilitated. They also filed a motion before liquidation court to stop proceeding with the liquidation because
of the enactment of the new law. Judge Vega refused and so the matter was brought up to the SC. The Central
Bank argued that RA 7169 took effect on March 10, 1992, 15 days following its publication. It appears that

13
 the law was published on February 24. Also, the law was signed by Pres. Aquino on Jan 2, 1992. Central
Bank and the Board of liquidators view that RA 7169 took effect only on March 10.
Ruling:
 It did not take effect on March 10, 1992.
 While as general rule, publication is required for a law to be effective and valid, the legislative body
has the discretion to provide for an exception as when the law itself provides that it be effective upon
approval of the president. The law is deemed approved when it is signed by the president. (Sec 10 of RA 7169
– This law shall take effect upon approval.)
 When the law provides that it be effective upon approval, there is no need for publication because publication
legally and physically comes after approval. Publication is not indispensable at all for the legislative body
can dispense with the publication requirement in their discretion. Even assuming that publication is required
before RA 7169 can be effective, the records show that this law was actually published. Therefore, it
complied with the requirement of Art2.

LOGIC would tell us that presumably the later law supersedes the earlier law. A basic rule in statutory construction
would tell us that in case of conflicting judicial decisions, the latter decision prevails over the former. Hence, the
recent decision is the controlling decision. Main because when the court renders a decision today, it is presumed
that it considered the decisions in the past.

However – Tanada should still be the controlling law w/ regards to publication due to the ff. justifications:
1. Art 8, Sec. 4, par. 3 of the 1987 Constitution: no doctrine/ legal principle rendered by SC En Banc may be
rendered, modified, reversed IF not by SC En Banc.
 Tanada was ruled by Supreme Court En Banc while the PVB v. Vega was decided by Supreme Court
in division
2. Statement of SC in the decision in Phil Veteran’s only a mere OBITER DICTUM.
 None of the parties in the case ever raised the issue of lack of publication nor did they challenge the
validity of RA 7169 on the ground that it was not published, and yet the SC made a statement
about it. The only contention advanced by the respondents was on the actual date of effectivity
but never on the validity of the law vis-à-vis the requirement of publication.
 Obviously any discussion made by the SC involving the need of publication and its exception is more
of an obiter dictum. Hence, it cannot be cited as an authority, not a binding precedent and neither can
it revoke the ruling of Tanada.

c.5 Initiative and Referendum

R.A. #6735 - AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AND APPROPRIATING
FUNDS THEREFOR/ "The Initiative and Referendum Act"
 system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the
requirements of this Act
 "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact
legislations through an election called for the purpose.
1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution
2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and
3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city,
municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.
 "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to Congress or the local
legislative body for action.
 "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an election called for the
purpose. It may be of two classes, namely:
1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part thereof,
passed by Congress; and
2. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or ordinance
enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies.
 "Plebiscite" is the electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is approved or rejected by the
people.

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  "Petition" is the written instrument containing the proposition and the required number of signatories. It shall
be in a form to be determined by and submitted to the Commission on Elections, hereinafter referred to as the
Commission.
 Who may exercise? All registered voters of the country, autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities
and barangays.
 Requirements:
(a) To exercise the power of initiative or referendum, at least ten per centum (10%) of the total number of the
registered voters, of which every legislative district is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the
registered voters thereof, shall sign a petition for the purpose and register the same with the Commission.

(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total
number of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least
three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only
after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter.

(c) The petition shall state the following:

c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed,
as the case may be;
c.2. the proposition;
c.3. the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;
c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or printed
at the top of every page of the petition.

(d) A referendum or initiative affecting a law, resolution or ordinance passed by the legislative assembly of an
autonomous region, province or city is deemed validly initiated if the petition thereof is signed by at least ten
per centum (10%) of the registered voters in the province or city, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein; Provided, however, That if the
province or city is composed only of one (1) legislative district, then at least each municipality in a province or
each barangay in a city should be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters
therein.

(e) A referendum of initiative on an ordinance passed in a municipality shall be deemed validly initiated if the
petition therefor is signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in the municipality, of which
every barangay is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.

(f) A referendum or initiative on a barangay resolution or ordinance is deemed validly initiated if signed by at
least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in said barangay.
 Special Registration. at least three (3) weeks before a scheduled initiative or referendum.

Garcia v. COMELEC
The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong, Bataan agreed to the inclusion of the municipality of Morong as part of the Subic
Special Economic Zone in accord with RA7227. Petitioners filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to
annul Pambayang Kapasyahan. When the municipality of Morong did not take any action on the petition within 30 days
after submission, the petitioners resorted to their power of initiative under the LGC of 1991. They started to solicit the
required number of signatures 4 to cause the repeal of said resolution. Unknown to the petitioners, however, the Hon.
Edilberto M. de Leon, Vice Mayor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong, wrote a letter to the
Executive Director of COMELEC requesting the denial of the petition for a local initiative and/or referendum because
the exercise will just promote divisiveness, counter productive and futility.” The COMELEC En Banc resolved to deny
the petition for local initiative on the ground that its subject is "merely a resolution and not an ordinance."

Petitioners argue that COMELEC failed to observe due process in that it had issued the resolution without affording
petitioners and other proponents of the initiative the opportunity to be heard. They also file for mandamus to compel
the COMELEC to schedule the continuation of the signing of the petition because it’s power in the matter of local
initiative is only ministerial—supervising in the gathering of signatures in support of the petition.

Respondent COMELEC opposed the petition. Through the Solicitor General, it contends that under the Local
Government Code of 1991, a resolution cannot be the subject of a local initiative.

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Issue: Whether Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan is the
proper subject of an initiative

Ruling: Yes. The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances
but resolutions as appropriate subjects of a local initiative. Section 32
of Article VI provides in luminous language: "The Congress shall, as
early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum,
and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly
propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part
thereof passed by the Congress, or local legislative body . . ."
An act includes a resolution.
The constitutional command to include acts (i.e., resolutions) as
appropriate subjects of initiative was implemented by Congress when
it enacted Republic Act No. 6735 entitled "An Act Providing for a
System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds
Therefor." There can hardly be any doubt that when Congress
enacted Republic Act No. 6735 it intend resolutions to be proper
subjects of local initiatives.
Contrary to the submission of the respondents, the subsequent
enactment of the local Government Code of 1991 which also dealt
with local initiative did not change the scope of its coverage. More
specifically, the Code did not limit the coverage of local initiatives to
ordinances alone. Section 120, Chapter 2, Title IX Book I of the Code
cited by respondents merely defines the concept of local initiative as
the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government
unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance. It does
not, however, deal with the subjects or matters that can be taken up
in a local initiative. Direct initiative on the local lever may, therefore,
cover all kinds of measures provided that these are within the power
of the local Sanggunians to enact, subject of course to the other
requisites enumerated in the Section.
D. LIMITATIONS TO POWER OF LEGISLATION
d.1. Express Limitations
Art. III- Bill of Rights
Sec. 26
Section 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has
passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof
in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days
before its passage, except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto
shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
Sec. 28
Section 28. (1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of
taxation.
In any event, the framers of our 1987
Constitution realized the value of initiative and
referendum as an ultimate weapon of the people
to negate government malfeasance and
misfeasance and they put in place an
overarching system. Thus, thru an initiative, the
people were given the power to amend the
Constitution itself.
Sec. 2 of Art. XVII provides: "Amendments to this
Constitution may likewise be directly proposed
by the people through initiative upon a petition of
at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein."
Likewise, thru an initiative, the people were also
endowed with the power to enact or reject any
act or law by congress or local legislative body.
Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI provide:
Sec. 1. The legislative power shall be vested in
the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives except to the extent reserved to
the people by the provisions on initiative and
referendum.
The COMELEC was also empowered to enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative
to the conduct of an initiative and referendum.
Worthwhile noting is the scope of coverage of an
initiative or referendum as delineated by section
32 Art. VI of the Constitution, supra — any act or
law passed by Congress or local legislative
body.
In due time, Congress respondent to the
mandate of the Constitution. It enacted laws to
put into operation the constitutionalized concept
of initiative and referendum. On August 4, 1989,
it approved Republic Act No. 6735 entitled "An
Act Providing for a System of Initiative and
Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor."
Liberally borrowed from American laws, R.A. No.
6735, among others, spelled out the
requirements for the exercise of the power of
initiative and referendum, the conduct of national
initiative and referendum; procedure of local
initiative and referendum; and their limitations.
Then came Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as The Local Government Code of 1991.
Chapter 2, Title XI, Book I of the Code governed
the conduct of local initiative and referendum.

(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.

(3) Charitable institutions, churches and personages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries,
and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or
educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.

16
(4) No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the
Congress.

Art. XIV, Sec. 4[3]

Sec.4(3) All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used actually, directly, and exclusively
for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties. Upon the dissolution or cessation of the corporate
existence of such institutions, their assets shall be disposed of in the manner provided by law. Proprietary educational
institutions, including those cooperatively owned, may likewise be entitled to such exemptions, subject to the limitations
provided by law, including restrictions on dividends and provisions for reinvestment.

Sec. 29-31
Section 29. (1) No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.

(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use,
benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest,
preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary
is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.

(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such
purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any,
shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government.

Section 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this
Constitution without its advice and concurrence.

Section 31. No law granting a title of royalty or nobility shall be enacted.

Fabian v. Desierto (Ombudsman)

This is an appeal on the joint order issued by public respondents with regard to his administrative charges for inter alia
grave misconduct committed by him as then Assistant Regional Director, DPWH. Teresita G. Fabian was the major
stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the
construction business. Private respondent Nestor V. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineer of the First Metro
Manila Engineering District (FMED) when he allegedly committed the offenses for which he was administratively
charged in the Office of the Ombudsman.

PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction projects including those under the FMED, and private
respondent, reportedly taking advantage of his official position, inveigled petitioner into an amorous relationship. Their
affair lasted for some time, in the course of which private respondent gifted PROMAT with public works contracts and
interceded for it in problems concerning the same in his office. When their relationship turned sour, the petitioner filed
an administrative charge in a complaint against him for harassment, intimidation and threats. The complaint sought the
dismissal of the respondent for violation of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and PD#807.

Graft investigator issued a resolution finding the respondent guilty of grave misconduct and ordering his dismissal from
service with forfeiture of benefits under the law. When the respondent Ombudsman discovered however, that the
respondent’s counsel had been his classmate and close associate, he inhibited himself and the case was transferred
to respondent Deputy Ombudsman who exonerated private respondent from the administrative charges.

Petitioners points out that under Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman), when a respondent is absolved of the charges in an administrative proceeding the decision of the
Ombudsman is final and unappealable. She accordingly submits that the Office of the Ombudsman has no authority
under the law to restrict, in the manner provided in its aforesaid Rules, the right of appeal allowed by Republic Act No.
6770, nor to limit the power of review of this Court.

Respondents filed their respective comments and rejoined that the Office of the Ombudsman is empowered by the
Constitution and the law to promulgate its own rules of procedure. Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
provides, among others, that the Office of the Ombudsman can "(p)romulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such
other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law."

At issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 27 of R.A. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) which vests appellate
jurisdiction to the Supreme Court over decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman as it infringes the constitutional
proscription against laws increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court without its advise and consent.

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Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and effects, therefore, Section 27 of Republic Act No.
6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law
which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to
justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which was intended to give this Court a measure of control over
cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its
appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court.

d.2. Implied Substantive Limitations

d.2.a. Non-delegation of legislative powers
Ideally, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature so that there
will be nothing left for the delegate to do when it reaches him except enforce it. If there are gaps in the law that will
prevent its enforcement unless they are first filled, the delegate will then have been given the opportunity to step in the
shoes of the legislature and exercise a discretion essentially legislative in order to repair the omissions. This is invalid
delegation.
People v. Vera – People of the Phils. & HSBC vs. Jose Vera, judge, and Mariano Cu Unjieng
The proceedings have to do with the application of other body for those to which alone the people have
Mariano Cu Unjieng for probation from the criminal seen fit to confide this sovereign trust.” –Cooley on
case filed against him in CFI Manila. The Fiscal filed an Constitutional Limitations
opposition to the granting of probation. The private
respondent also filed an opposition alleging, among The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of
other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has legislative power is not absolute and inflexible. It
not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the admits of exceptions. An exceptions sanctioned by
Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1, immemorial practice permits the central legislative
subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities.
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. The private
prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition on In testing whether a statute constitute an undue
April 19, 1937, elaborating on the alleged delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to
unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms
delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature
of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution). so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other
appointee or delegate of the legislature. The general
The challenged section of Act. 4221 in Section 11 rule, however, is limited by another rule that to a certain
which reads as follows: extent matters of detail may be left to be filled in by
This Act shall apply only in those provinces in rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by
which the respective provincial boards have executive officers and administrative boards. As a rule,
provided for the salary of a probation officer at an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid
rates not lower than those now provided for if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by
provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall which the administrative officer or board may be guided
be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated
shall be subject to the discretion of the to it.
Probation Office.
In the case at bar, what rules are to guide the provincial
Issue: While the Probation Law does not encroach boards in the exercise of their discretionary power to
upon the pardoning power of the executive and is not determine whether or not the Probation Act shall apply
far for that reason void, does section 11 thereof in their respective provinces? What standards are fixed
constitute, as contended, an undue delegation. by the Act?

Ruling: Yes. The questioned section constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power.
“One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that
the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws
cannot be delegated by that department to any other
body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the
state has located the authority, there it must remain;
and by the constitutional agency alone the laws must
be made until the Constitution itself is changed. The
power to whose judgment, wisdom and patriotism this
high prerogative has been intrusted cannot relieve
itself of the responsibilities by choosing other agencies
upon which the power shall be deveolved, nor can it
substitute the judgment, wisdom and patriotism of any
We do not find any and none has been pointed to us
by the respondents. The probation Act does not, by the
force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the
provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise
of their discretionary power. What is granted, if we may
use the language of Justice Cardozo in the recent case
of Schecter, supra, is a “roving commission” which
enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary
discretion. By Sec. 11 of the Act, the legislature does
not seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits
of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality
leaves the entire matter for the various provincial
boards to determine. In other words, the provincial
boards of the various provinces are to determine for

18
themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to
their provinces or not at all. The applicability and
application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in
the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial
board does not wish to have the Act applied in its
province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate
the needed amount for the salary of the probation
officer. The plain language of the Act is not susceptible
to any other interpretation. This, to our minds, is a
virtual surrender of legislative power to the provincial
boards.
"The true distinction is between the delegation of power
to make the law, which necessarily involves discretion
as to what the law shall be, and conferring authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under
and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done;
to the latter no valid objection can be made." The first
cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be
made.
The principle which permits the legislature to provide
that the administrative agent may determine when the
circumstances are such as require the application of a
law is defended upon the ground that at the time this
authority is granted, the rule of public policy, which is
the essence of the legislative act, is determined by the
legislature. In other words, the legislature, as it its duty
to do, determines that, under given circumstances,
certain executive or administrative action is to be
takem, and that, under other circumstances, different
of no action at all is to be taken. What is thus left to the
administrative official is not the legislative
determination of what public policy demands, but
simply the ascertainment of what the facts of the case
require to be done according to the terms of the law by
which he is governed. The legislature then may provide
that a contingencies leaving to some other person or
body the power to determine when the specified
contingencies has arisen.
But in the case at bar, the legislature has not made the
operation of the Prohibition Act contingent upon
specified facts or conditions to be ascertained by the
provincial board. It leaves, as we have already said, the
entire operation or non-operation of the law upon the
provincial board. The discretion vested is arbitrary
because it is absolute and unlimited. A provincial board
need not investigate conditions or find any fact or await
the happening of any specified contingency. It is bound
by no rile,--limited by no principle of expediency
announced by legislature. It may take into
consideration certain facts or conditions; and again, it
may not. It may have any purpose or no purpose at all.
The provincial boards, are in practical effect, endowed
with the power of suspending the operation of the
Probation Law in their respective provinces. In some
jurisdiction, constitutions provided that laws may be
suspended only by the Legislature or by its authority.
True, the legislature may enact laws for a particular
locality different from those applicable to other
localities and, while recognizing the force of the
principle hereinabove expressed, courts in may
jurisdiction have sustained the constitutionality of the
submission of option laws to the vote of the people.
But option laws thus sustained treat of subjects purely
local in character which should receive different
treatment in different localities placed under different
circumstances. "They relate to subjects which, like the
retailing of intoxicating drinks, or the running at large of
cattle in the highways, may be differently regarded in
different localities, and they are sustained on what
seems to us the impregnable ground, that the subject,
though not embraced within the ordinary powers of
municipalities to make by--‐laws and ordinances, is
nevertheless within the class of public regulations, in
respect to which it is proper that the local judgment
should control."
So that, while we do not deny the right of local self-
government and the propriety of leaving matters of
purely local concern in the hands of local authorities or
for the people of small communities to pass upon, we
believe that in matters of general of general legislation
like that which treats of criminals in general, and as
regards the general subject of probation, discretion
may not be vested in a manner so unqualified and
absolute as provided in Act No. 4221.
True, the statute does not expressly state that the
provincial boards may suspend the operation of the
Probation Act in particular provinces but, considering
that, in being vested with the authority to appropriate or
not the necessary funds for the salaries of probation
officers, they thereby are given absolute discretion to
determine whether or not the law should take effect or
operate in their respective provinces, the provincial
boards are in reality empowered by the legislature to
suspend the operation of the Probation Act in particular
provinces, the Act to be held in abeyance until the
provincial boards should decide otherwise by
appropriating the necessary funds. The validity of a law
is not tested by what has been done but by what may
be done under its provisions.
It in conceded that a great deal of latitude should be
granted to the legislature not only in the expression of
what may be termed legislative policy but in the
elaboration and execution thereof. "Without this power,
legislation would become oppressive and yet
imbecile."
But, it should be borne in mind that a constitution is
both a grant and a limitation of power and one of these
time--‐honored limitations is that, subject to certain
exceptions, legislative power shall not be delegated.
We conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221
constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of
legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for
this reason, unconstitutional and void.
19
Romeo Edu (Land Transportation Commissioner) v. Hon. Vicente Ericta (CFI Judge) and Teddy Galo
Petitioner Romeo Edu, the Land Transportation Commissioner, would have the Court rule on the constitutionality of the
Reflector Law. Galo, on his behald and that of other motorists filed a suit attacking the validity of the challenged Act as
an invalid exercise of police power, for being violative of due process clause. Galo further submitted that as an
alternative remedy, that in the event that respondent judge would hold said statute constitutional, Administrative Order
No. 2 of the Land Transportation Commissioner implementing such legislation be nullified as an undue exercise of
legislative power.

Issue: Is Reflector Law and Administrative Order No. 2 valid? And is Administrative Order No. 2 violative of the
nondelegation of legislative power?

Ruling: Yes. The Court sustains the validity of the Reflector Law and Administrative Order No. 2 issued in the
implementation thereof, the imputation of constitutional infirmity being at best flimsy and insubstantial.

What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test
is the completeness of the statute in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature.
To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power, the inquiry must be directed to the scope
and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its function when it describes what job
must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that may indeed be the
only way in which legislative process can go forward.

To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature
itself determines matters of principle and lay down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication
may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, its maps out its boundaries and
specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be
effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative
office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The
standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard
though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered
as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety.

Justice J. B. L. Reyes in People vs. Exconde: "It is well establish in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a
non-delegable activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless the latter may constitutionally delegate
authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason
that the legislature often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and proved for the multifarious and
complex situations that may be met in carrying the law in effect. All that is required is that the regulation should germane
to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it; but conform to the standards
that the law prescribes.

Chief Justice, Concepcion: "Lastly, the legality of Circular No. 21 is assailed upon the ground that the grant of authority
to issue the same constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. It is true that, under our system of government,
said power may not be delegated except to local governments. However, one thing is to delegate the power to
determine what the law shall be, and another thing to delegate the authority to fix the details in the execution of
enforcement of a policy set out in the law itself. Briefly stated, the rule is that the delegated powers fall under the second
category, if the law authorizing the, delegation furnishes a reasonable standard which "sufficiently marks the field within
which the Administrator is to act so that it may be known whether he has kept within it in compliance with the legislative
will."

ACCFA vs CUGCO
(ACCFA) was a government agency created under Republic Act No. 821, as amended. Its administrative machinery
was reorganized and its name changed to Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA) under the Land Reform Code
(Republic Act No. 3844). On the other hand, the ACCFA Supervisors' Association (ASA) and the ACCFA Workers'
Association (AWA), referred to as the Unions, are labor organizations composed of the supervisors and the rank-and-
file employees, respectively, in the ACCFA (now ACA).

The Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO), filed a complaint against the ACCFA
for having allegedly committed acts of unfair labor practice, namely: violation of the collective bargaining agreement in
order to discourage the members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to self-organization, discrimination against
said members in the matter of promotions, and refusal to bargain. The ACCFA denied the charges.

20
Issue: WON the CIR has jurisdiction to entertain the petition of the Unions for certification election given that the mother
company (ACA) is engaged in governmental functions

Ruling: The Unions are not entitled. Decision modified.

Under Section 3 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code
the ACA was established, among other governmental
agencies, to extend credit and similar assistance to
agriculture.
According to the Land Reform Code, the administrative
machinery of the ACCFA shall be reorganized to
enable it to align its activities with the requirements and
objective of this Code and shall be known as the
Agricultural Credit Administration. These include
powers non really accorded to non-government entities
such as tax exemptions, registration of deeds, notarial
services, and prosecution of officials.
The power to audit the operations of farmers'
cooperatives and otherwise inquire into their affairs, as
given by Section 113, is in the nature of the visitorial
power of the sovereign, which only a government
agency specially delegated to do so by the Congress
may legally exercise.
Moreover, the ACA was delegated under the Land
Reform Project Administration , a government agency
tasked to implement land reform.
those regulating property and property rights, those
relating to the administration of justice and the
determination of political duties of citizens, and those
relating to national defense and foreign relations.
Under this traditional classification, such constituent
functions are exercised by the State as attributes of
sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare,
progress and prosperity of the people — these letter
functions being ministrant, he exercise of which is
optional on the part of the government.
The growing complexities of modern society, however,
have rendered this traditional classification of the
functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say
obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private
enterprise and initiative and which the government was
called upon to enter optionally, and only "because it
was better equipped to administer for the public welfare
than is any private individual or group of individuals."
continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to
be absorbed within activities that the government must
undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the
increasing social challenges of the times.

Moreover, the appointing authority for officials was the It was in furtherance of such policy that the Land
President himself. Reform Code was enacted and the various agencies,
the ACA among them, established to carry out its
The considerations set forth above militate quite purposes. There can be no dispute as to the fact that
strongly against the recognition of collective bargaining the land reform program contemplated in the said Code
powers in the respondent Unions within the context of is beyond the capabilities of any private enterprise to
Republic Act No. 875, and hence against the grant of translate into reality. It is a purely governmental
their basic petition for certification election as proper function, no less than, say, the establishment and
bargaining units. The ACA is a government office or maintenance of public schools and public hospitals.
agency engaged in governmental, not proprietary
functions. Given these, the respondent Unions are not entitled to
the certification election sought in the Court below.
These functions may not be strictly what President Such certification is admittedly for purposes of
Wilson described as "constituent" (as distinguished bargaining in behalf of the employees with respect to
from "ministrant"), such as those relating to the terms and conditions of employment, including the right
maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime, to strike as a coercive economic weapon.
Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan, March
15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA.
The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social
Security System and should have been filed against the State Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed
jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the complainant. The award
consisted of P180,000.00 as death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses. The petitioner immediately came to
this Court, prompting the Solicitor General to move for dismissal on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies. Petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the principle of non-
delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said
regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under
the principle, is not subject to delegation.

Issue: Is the Memorandum Circular No. 2 violative of the the principle of non-delegation of legislative power?

Ruling: No. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is an administrative regulation, not violative of the principle of non-delegation
of legislative power.

21
The second challenge is more serious as it is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law
cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the
law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be
abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz,
the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the completeness test, the law must be complete in
all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will
have to do is enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to
map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended
to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the
legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.
POWER OF SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope
directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created
peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization
even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the
legislature may not have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions.
These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields
assigned to them.

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to administrative
bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has
found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the
general provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation." With this power, administrative
bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in' the details which the Congress may not
have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as
supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code.
These regulations have the force and effect of law.

EXCEPTIONS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION

Sec. 23[2] and 28[2] – delegation to the President
Sec. 23 (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited
period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the
next adjournment thereof.

Section 28. (2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and
other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.

Sec. 32, Art. VI- delegation to the people

Section 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the
exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or
part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor signed by at
least ten per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by
at least three per centum of the registered voters thereof.

Art. X, Sec. 5-delegation to LGUs

Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes,
fees and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic
policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local governments.

d.2.b. Prohibition on passage of irrepealable laws

City of Davao v. RTC Davao
The GSIS Davao City branch office received a Notice of Public Auction scheduling the public bidding of GSIS properties
located in Matina and Ulas, Davao City for non-payment of realty taxes for the years 1992 to 1994 totaling P295,721.61.
The GSIS filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus And/Or Declaratory Relief with the RTC of Davao City.
RTC rendered the decision upholding the tax-exempt status of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for
the years 1992 to 1994 in contravention of the mandate under the Local Government Code of 1992. Petitioners now
file with the SC and argue that the exemption granted in Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146, as amended, was effectively

22
withdrawn upon the enactment of the Local Government Code, particularly Sections 193 and 294 thereof. These
provisions made the GSIS, along with all other GOCCs, subject to realty taxes.
Issue: Can the GSIS be subjected to realty taxes?
Ruling: YES. The GSIS can be subject to realty taxes.
Thus, reading together Sections 133, 232, and 234 of
the LGC, we conclude that as a general rule, as laid
down in Section 133, the taxing powers of local
government units cannot extend to the levy of, inter
alia, "taxes, fees and charges of any kind on the
National Government, its agencies and
instrumentalities, and local government units";
however, pursuant to Section 232, provinces, cities,
and municipalities in the Metropolitan Manila Area may
impose the real property tax except on, inter alia, "real
property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or
any of its political subdivisions except when the
beneficial use thereof has been granted, for
consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person," as
provided in item (a) of the first paragraph of Section
234.
As to tax exemptions or incentives granted to
or presently enjoyed by natural or judicial persons,
including government-owned and controlled
corporations, Section 193 of the LGC prescribes the
general rule, viz., they are withdrawn upon the
effectivity of the LGC, except those granted to local
water districts, cooperatives duly registered under R.A.
No. 6938, non-stock and non-profit hospitals and
educational institutions, and unless otherwise provided
in the LGC. The latter proviso could refer to Section
234 which enumerates the properties exempt from real
property tax. But the last paragraph of Section 234
further qualifies the retention of the exemption insofar
as real property taxes are concerned by limiting the
retention only to those enumerated therein; all others
not included in the enumeration lost the privilege upon
the effectivity of the LGC. Moreover, even as to real
property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or
any of its political subdivisions covered by item (a) of
the first paragraph of Section 234, the exemption is
withdrawn if the beneficial use of such property has
been granted to a taxable person for consideration or
otherwise.
Since the last paragraph of Section 234
unequivocally withdrew, upon the effectivity of the
LGC, exemptions from payment of real property taxes
granted to natural or juridical persons, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, except
as provided in the said section, and the petitioner is,
undoubtedly, a government-owned corporation, it
necessarily follows that its exemption from such tax
granted it in Section 14 of its Charter, R.A. No. 6958,
has been withdrawn. Any claim to the contrary can only
be justified if the petitioner can seek refuge under any
of the exceptions provided in Section 234, but not
under Section 133, as it now asserts, since, as shown
above, the said section is qualified by Sections 232 and
234. The second paragraph of Section 33 of P.D. No.
1146, as amended, effectively imposes restrictions on
the competency of the Congress to enact future
legislation on the taxability of the GSIS. This places an
undue restraint on the plenary power of the legislature
to amend or repeal laws, especially considering that it
is a lawmakers act that imposes such burden. Only the
Constitution may operate to preclude or place
restrictions on the amendment or repeal of laws.
Constitutional dicta is of higher order than legislative
statutes, and the latter should always yield to the
former in cases of irreconcilable conflict.
It is a basic precept that among the implied
substantive limitations on the legislative powers is the
prohibition against the passage of irrepealable
laws.Irrepealable laws deprive succeeding legislatures
of the fundamental best senses carte blanche in
crafting laws appropriate to the operative milieu. Their
allowance promotes an unhealthy stasis in the
legislative front and dissuades dynamic democratic
impetus that may be responsive to the times. As Senior
Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno once observed, [t]o
be sure, there are no irrepealable laws just as there are
no irrepealable Constitutions. Change is the predicate
of progress and we should not fear change.
Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to
democratic principles for a legislative body to have the
ability to bind the actions of future legislative body,
considering that both assemblies are regarded with
equal footing, exercising as they do the same plenary
powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of the attributes
desired in a legislative body, and a legislature which
attempts to forestall future amendments or repeals of
its enactments labors under delusions of omniscience.
In Duarte v. Dade, the Court cited with
approval Lewis Southerland on Statutory Construction,
which states:
A state legislature has a plenary law-making power
over all subjects, whether pertaining to persons or
things, within its territorial jurisdiction, either to
introduce new laws or repeal the old, unless
prohibited expressly or by implication by the federal
constitution or limited or restrained by its own. It
cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting
irrepealable laws except when so restrained. Every
legislative body may modify or abolish the acts
passed by itself or its predecessors. This power of
repeal may be exercised at the same session at
which the original act was passed; and even while
a bill is in its progress and before it becomes a
law. This legislature cannot bind a future
legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It
cannot declare in advance the intent of
subsequent legislatures or the effect of
subsequent legislation upon existing statutes.
These issuances cannot derogate from the binding
precept that one legislature cannot enact
irrepealable legislation or limit or restrict its own
power or the power of its successors as to the
repeal of statutes. The act of one legislature is not
binding upon and does not tie the hands of future
23
legislatures. The GSISs tax-exempt status, in sum, Section 39. The subject real property taxes for the
was withdrawn in 1992 by the Local Government Code years 1992 to 1994 were assessed against GSIS while
but restored by the Government Service Insurance the Local Government Code provisions prevailed and,
System Act of 1997, the operative provision of which is thus, may be collected by the City of Davao.

Compare: Government Service Insurance System v. City Treasurer of City of Manila AND Kida v. Senate of the
Philippines

Government Service Insurance System v. City Treasurer of City of Manila

Petitioner GSIS owns or used to own two (2) parcels of land. Title to the Concepcion-Arroceros property was transferred
to this Court in 2005. Both the GSIS and the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila occupy the Concepcion-
Arroceros property, while the Katigbak property was under lease. The controversy started when the City Treasurer of
Manila addressed a letter dated September 13, 2002 to GSIS President and General Manager Winston F. Garcia
informing him of the unpaid real property taxes due on the aforementioned properties for years 1992 to 2002, broken
down as follows: (a) PhP54,826,599.37 for the Katigbak property; and (b) PhP48,498,917.01 for the Concepcion-
Arroceros property. The letter warned of the inclusion of the subject properties in the scheduled October 30, 2002 public
auction of all delinquent properties in Manila should the unpaid taxes remain unsettled before that date.

Petitioner's posture that both its old charter, Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1146, and present charter, RA 8291 or the
GSIS Act of 1997, exempt the agency and its properties from all forms of taxes and assessments, inclusive of realty
tax. Excepting, respondents counter that GSIS may not successfully resist the city's notices and warrants of levy on
the basis of its exemption under RA 8291, real property taxation being governed by RA 7160 or the Local Government
Code of 1991 (LGC, hereinafter).

Issue: May GSIS be subject to real property taxes?

Ruling: No. GSIS' tax-exempt status withdrawn in 1992 by the LGC was restored in 1997 by RA 8291.
PD 1146, 12 otherwise known as the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977, was issued, providing for
an expanded insurance system for government employees and that the System, its assets, revenues including all
accruals thereto, and benefits paid, shall be exempt from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds.

RA 7160 lifted GSIS tax exemption. Then came the enactment in 1991 of the LGC or RA 7160, providing the exercise
of local government units (LGUs) of their power to tax, the scope and limitations thereof, and the exemptions from
taxations. Of particular pertinence is the general provision on withdrawal of tax exemption privileges in Sec. 193 of the
LGC, and the special provision on withdrawal of exemption from payment of real property taxes in
the last paragraph of the succeeding Sec. 234:

Sec. 193. Unless otherwise provided in this Code, tax exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all
persons, whether natural or juridical, including government-owned or –controlled corporations, except local water districts,
cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, are
hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.

Sec. 234. Except as provided herein, any exemption from payment of real property tax previously granted to, or presently
enjoyed by, all persons, whether natural or juridical, including all government-owned or controlled corporation are hereby
withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.

The foregoing exempting proviso, couched as it were in an encompassing manner, brooks no other construction but
that GSIS is exempt from all forms of taxes. While not determinative of this case, it is to be noted that prominently
added in GSIS' present charter is a paragraph precluding any implied repeal of the tax-exempt clause so as to protect
the solvency of GSIS funds. Moreover, an express repeal by a subsequent law would not suffice to affect the full
exemption benefits granted the GSIS, unless the following conditionalities are met: (1) The repealing clause must
expressly, specifically, and categorically revoke or repeal Sec. 39; and (2) a provision is enacted to substitute or replace
the exemption referred to herein as an essential factor to maintain or protect the solvency of the fund. These
restrictions for a future express repeal, notwithstanding, do not make the proviso an irrepealable law, for such
restrictions do not impinge or limit the carte blanche legislative authority of the legislature to so amend it. The
restrictions merely enhance other provisos in the law ensuring the solvency of the GSIS fund.

The issue of the propriety of the threatened levy of subject properties by the City of Manila to answer for the demanded
realty tax deficiency is now moot and academic. A valid tax levy presupposes a corresponding tax liability. Nonetheless,
it will not be remiss to note that it is without doubt that the subject GSIS properties are exempt from any attachment,
garnishment, execution, levy, or other legal processes. This is the clear import of the third paragraph of Sec. 39, RA
8291:

24
 SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien. — . . . .xxx xxx xxx The funds and/or the properties referred to
herein as well as the benefits, sums or monies corresponding to the benefits under this Act shall be exempt from attachment,
garnishment, execution, levy or other processes issued by the courts, quasi-judicial agencies or administrative bodies

Kida v. Senate of the Philippines

Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted by Congress. Republic
Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM
regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional
officials to the second Monday of September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November
26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on
the same date every 3 years thereafter.

Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC
had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices
to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May
2013 to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country. In these consolidated petitions filed directly
with the Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.

Issue: Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 requires a supermajority vote and plebiscite. Does the requirement of a
supermajority vote for amendments or revisions to RA No. 9054 violate Section 1 and Section 16 (2), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution and the corollary doctrine on irrepealable laws?

Ruling: Yes. It is a limitation in excess of what the Constitution requires on the passage of bills and is constitutionally
obnoxious because it significantly constricts the future legislators' room for action and flexibility.

Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact amend RA No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting
requirement required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 has to be struck down for giving RA No. 9054 the
character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the Constitution demands.

Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a "majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business." In other words, as long as majority of the members of the House of Representatives or the Senate are present,
these bodies have the quorum needed to conduct business and hold session. Within a quorum, a vote of majority is generally
sufficient to enact laws or approve acts.

In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of no less than two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of
the House of Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately, in order to effectively amend RA No. 9054. Clearly,
this 2/3 voting requirement is higher than what the Constitution requires for the passage of bills, and served
to restrain the plenary powers of Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it had passed. The Court's
pronouncement in City of Davao v. GSIS on this subject best explains the basis and reason for the unconstitutionality:

Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic principles for a legislative body to have the ability to bind the
actions of future legislative body, considering that both assemblies are regarded with equal footing, exercising as they do
the same plenary powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of the attributes desired in a legislative body, and a
legislature which attempts to forestall future amendments or repeals of its enactments labors under delusions of
omniscience.

A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects, whether pertaining to persons or things, within its
territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the old, unless prohibited expressly or by implication by the
federal constitution or limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws
except when so restrained. Every legislative body may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its predecessors. This
power of repeal may be exercised at the same session at which the original act was passed; and even while a bill is in its
progress and before it becomes a law. This legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It
cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent legislation upon existing statutes.

Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a limitation in excess of what the
Constitution requires on the passage of bills and is constitutionally obnoxious because it significantly
constricts the future legislators' room for action and flexibility.

d.3 Procedural Limitations

Sec. 26-27
Section 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof.

25
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and
printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when
the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the
last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter,
and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he
approves the same he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House
where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such
reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with
the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the
Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas
or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall
communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof,
otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.

(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill,
but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.
Phil. Judges Association v. Prado
Petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will be prejudiced by the
withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds,
along with certain other government offices. The National Land Registration Authority has taken common cause with
them insofar as its own activities, such as sending of requisite notices in registration cases, affect judicial proceedings.

The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces more than one
subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and
printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it is
discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary. The petitioners maintain that the second
paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the franking privilege from the petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207,
PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200.

Issues:
1. One Title, One Subject
2. Enrolled Bill Doctrine

Ruling:
1. One title, one subject. Withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the
accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and
effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did
not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law. The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent
hodge-podge or "log-rolling" legislation; (2) to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of
provisions in bills of which the title gives no intimation, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly
and unintentionally adopted; and (3) to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative
proceedings as is usually made, of the subject of legislation that is being considered, in order that they may
have opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire.

The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every
single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers
all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance
with the constitutional requirement.
To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general objectives of the statute to be
expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but would actually render legislation impossible. As has been
correctly explained:
The details of a legislative act need not be specifically stated in its title, but matter germane to the subject as expressed in the
title, and adopted to the accomplishment of the object in view, may properly be included in the act. Thus, it is proper to create in
the same act the machinery by which the act is to be enforced, to prescribe the penalties for its infraction, and to remove obstacles
in the way of its execution. If such matters are properly connected with the subject as expressed in the title, it is unnecessary
that they should also have special mention in the title.
This is particularly true of the repealing clause, on which Cooley writes: "The repeal of a statute on a given subject
is properly connected with the subject matter of a new statute on the same subject; and therefore a repealing section
in the new statute is valid, notwithstanding that the title is silent on the subject. It would be difficult to conceive of a

26
matter more germane to an act and to the object to be accomplished thereby than the repeal of previous legislations
connected therewith."
The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the effect and not the subject of the statute;
and it is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to be briefly expressed in its title. As observed in one
case, if the title of an act embraces only one subject, we apprehend it was never claimed that every other act which
repeals it or alters by implication must be mentioned in the title of the new act. Any such rule would be neither within
the reason of the Constitution, nor practicable.
2. Enrolled Bill Doctrine. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly
enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official
assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming
courtesy.
Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill
from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez7 laid down the rule that the enrolled
bill, is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on
the final reading of the bill).The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but
still valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons, where we explained the reason thus:
To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit,
would be to violate both the, letter and spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into
existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate
powers and functions, of the Legislature.

E. AIDS TO LEGISLATION
The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution which reads:

SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected.

This provision is worded exactly as Section 8 of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution except that, in the latter, it vests
the power of inquiry in the unicameral legislature established therein – the Batasang Pambansa – and its committees.

The 1935 Constitution did not contain a similar provision. Nonetheless, in Arnault v. Nazareno, a case decided in 1950
under that Constitution, the Court already recognized that the power of inquiry is inherent in the power to legislate.

That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch may be deduced from the same
case. The power of inquiry, the Court therein ruled, is co-extensive with the power to legislate. The matters which may
be a proper subject of legislation and those which may be a proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that the
operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation.

Legislative Investigations and Right to Privacy

Coextensive with the legislature’s power to investigate is the power to compel the attendance of witnesses in
investigations and to commit for contempt for refusal to testify. In practical terms, the power of inquiry ends at the point
a witness will be excused by the courts for refusing to obey a congressional summons to appear or produce papers or
for refusing to answer questions posed by a member or committee of Congress. The source of this power of compulsion
has been acknowledged to lie in the legislature’s need for self-help and self-defense.

Requisites:
1. Legislative inquiry must be in aid of legislation.
2. The inquiry must be in accordance with its Duly Published Rules of Procedure
3. The rights of Persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected

PERTINENCY OF THE QUESTION PROPOUNDED

The XXXXX ruling specified that for a witness to be punished for contempt for refusal to answer a question propounded
in a legislative inquiry, the question must be pertinent to the matter under inquiry.

Pertinency, however, has also been considered as a much broader test than relevancy; whereas the evidence adduced
at a trial must pertain to the issue of a particular case, a legislative inquiry must anticipate all possible cases which
might reasonably be the subject of legislative action.

The test of pertinency is whether a question itself is in the ultimate area of investigation; a question is pertinent
also if it is a “usual and necessary stone in the arch of a bridge over which an investigation must go.

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e.1 Question Hour
QUESTION HOUR (Sec. 22, Article VIII of the 1987 Const.)
Looking into the deliberations of the Constitutional Commissions, a distinction was made between inquiries in aid of
legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was
compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. During the deliberations Mr. Maambong moved to separate the positions of
the provisions with Section 21 (Legislative Inquiry—power of the Congress in lawmaking) be apart from Section 31
(Question Hour—said to be not actually a power in terms of its own lawmaking power).However, Commissioner Davide
opined (with the committee conferring) that the Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it
is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of
the Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of
legislation.

However, both Commissioners understood that the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is different from the
power to conduct inquiries during the question hour. Commissioner Davide’s only concern was that the two provisions
on these distinct powers be placed closely together, they being complementary to each other. Neither Commissioner
considered them as identical functions of Congress. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and
complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress.

Section 21 (legislation) SECTION 22 (oversight function)

power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation
the aim of which is to elicit information that may be
used for legislation
when the inquiry in which Congress requires their
appearance is "in aid of legislation" under section
21, the appearance is mandatory for the same
reasons stated in Arnault
power to conduct a question hour
the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit
of Congress' oversight function.
in keeping with the separation of powers, states that
Congress may only request their appearance.

 Basis: Separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot
frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information.
 In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it
is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission.

However, the framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the mandatory nature of such appearance during the question
hour in the present Constitution to conform with the system of separation of powers.

That department heads may not be required to appear in a question hour does not, however, mean that the legislature
is rendered powerless to elicit information from them in all circumstances. In fact, in light of the absence of a mandatory
question period, the need to enforce Congress' right to executive information in the performance of its legislative
function becomes more imperative.

Question Hour and Legislative Investigations

 Who may appear

 Who may conduct investigations

 As to subject matter

e.2. Legislative Investigations (Sec. 21)

Senate of the Phils. vs. Ermita
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that
the President has abused power by issuing E.O. 464 “Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers,
Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes”. Petitioners pray for its declaration as
null and void for being unconstitutional. In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through
its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the
attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in
Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine
National Police (PNP). The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department

28
for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive
election fraud in the Philippine elections, wiretapping, and the role of military in the so-called “Gloriagate Scandal”. Said
officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which
requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing
before either house of Congress.

Issue: Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent
of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional?

Ruling:
Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry, which
exemptions fall under the rubric of "executive privilege." (Executive Privilege-the power of the Government to withhold
information from the public, the courts, and the Congress)

Tribe, in fact, comments that while it is customary to employ the phrase "executive privilege," it may be more accurate
to speak of executive privileges "since presidential refusals to furnish information may be actuated by any of at least
three distinct kinds of considerations, and may be asserted, with differing degrees of success, in the context of either
judicial or legislative investigations."
Tribe’s classifications:
1. state secrets privilege- information is of such nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial military or
diplomatic objectives
2. informer’s privilege- privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of persons who furnish
information of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law
3. generic privilege for internal deliberations- attach to intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory
opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions
and policies are formulated.
Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to
certain types of information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof
may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent
is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being
executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily
against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure. Executive privilege, as discussed above, is properly invoked in
relation to specific categories of information and not to categories of persons.

Who may claim exemption?

1. President
2. members of the Supreme Court
3. Department heads-only when they have a valid claim of privilege

Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution and the absence of any reference
to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its application to appearances of department heads in
the question hour contemplated in the provision of said Section 22 of Article VI. The reading is dictated by the basic
rule of construction that issuances must be interpreted, as much as possible, in a way that will render it constitutional.

The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question
hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in
the question hour is discretionary on their part.

Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress
is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid
claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.

The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It
is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled
with an announcement that the President has not given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine
whether the withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the power
of inquiry of Congress.

In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the President the power to
invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which
case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is "By order of the President," which means that he personally
consulted with her. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in the

29
executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such power. There
is even less reason to uphold such authorization in the instant case where the authorization is not explicit but by mere
silence. Section 3, in relation to Section 2(b), is further invalid on this score.

Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee

PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan against Benjamin Romualdez, et al for engaging in devices, schemes and
stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of plaintiff and the Filipino people. The Senate Minority Floor
Leader Enrile delivered a speech before the Senate on the alleged take-over personal privilege before the Senate on
the alleged "takeover of SOLOIL Inc," the FlagShip of the First Manila Management of Companies or FMMC by Ricardo
Lopa and called upon the Senate to look into the possible violation of the law in the case with regard to RA 3019 (Anti
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (Committee on Accountability of Public Officers
[SBRC]) started its investigation on the matter. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the SBRC to appear
before it and testify on what they know regarding the sale of 36 corporations belonging to Benjamin Romualdez. Lopa
and Bengzon refused to testify, invoking their rights to due process, and that their testimony may unduly prejudice the
defendants and petitioners in case before the Sandiganbayan.

SBRC rejected the petitioner's plea to be excused from testifying and the SBRC continued its investigation of the matter.

The petitioners filed for prohibition with a prayer for TRO and/or injunctive relief, claiming that the SBRC in requiring
their attendance and testimony, acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose. The Supreme Court
intervened upon a motion for reconsideration filed by one of the defendants of the civil case.

Issue: Whether or not the SBRC's inquiry has valid legislative purpose

Ruling:
No. IN AID OF LEGISLATION. The power to conduct
formal inquiries or investigations in specifically
provided for in Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries
may refer to the implementation or re-examination of
any law or in connection with any proposed legislation
or the formulation of future legislation. They may also
extend to any and all matters vested by the
Constitution in Congress and/or in the Senate alone.
As held in Jean L. Arnault vs. Leon Nazareno, et al., 16
the inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative
body making it, must be material or necessary to the
exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution,
such as to legislate or to expel a member.
Under Sec. 4 of the aforementioned Rules, the Senate
may refer to any committee or committees any speech
or resolution filed by any Senator which in tis judgment
requires an appropriate inquiry in aid of legislation. In
order therefore to ascertain the character or nature of
an inquiry, resort must be had to the speech or
resolution under which such an inquiry is proposed to
be made.
Verily, the speech of Senator Enrile contained no
suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely
called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation
of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as "The
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." I other words,
the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by
respondent Blue Ribbon committee was to find out
whether or not the relatives of President Aquino,
particularly Mr. Ricardo Lopa, had violated the law in
connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39
corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy"
Romualdez to the Lopa Group. There appears to be,
therefore, no intended legislation involved.
The inquiry itself might not properly be in aid of
legislation, and thus beyond the constitutional power of
Congress. Such inquiry could not usurp judicial
functions. Parenthetically, one possible way for
Congress to avoid such a result as occurred in
Bengzon is to indicate in its invitations to the public
officials concerned, or to any person for that matter,
the possible needed statute which prompted the
need for the inquiry. Given such statement in its
invitations, along with the usual indication of the
subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in
furtherance thereof, there would be less room for
speculation on the part of the person invited on
whether the inquiry is in aid of legislation.
ENCROACHMENT TO OTHER BRANCHES OF THE
GOVT. It cannot be overlooked that when respondent
Committee decide to conduct its investigation of the
petitioners, the complaint in Civil No. 0035 had already
been filed with the Sandiganbayan. A perusal of that
complaint shows that one of its principal causes of
action against herein petitioners, as defendants
therein, is the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39)
corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy"
Romualdez. Since the issues in said complaint had
long been joined by the filing of petitioner's respective
answers thereto, the issue sought to be investigated by
the respondent Committee is one over which
jurisdiction had been acquired by the Sandiganbayan.
In short, the issue had been pre-empted by that court.
To allow the respondent Committee to conduct its own
investigation of an issue already before the
Sandiganbayan would not only pose the possibility of
conflicting judgments between legislative committee

30
and a judicial tribunal, but if the Committee's judgment
were to be reached before that of the Sandiganbayan,
the possibility of its influence being made to bear on
the ultimate judgment of the Sandiganbayan cannot be
discounted.
In fine, for the respondent Committee to probe and
inquire into the same justiciable controversy already
before the Sandiganbayan, would be an encroachment
into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that
had much earlier set in. In Baremblatt vs. United
States, it was held that:
Broad as it is, the power is not, however,
without limitations. Since congress may only
investigate into those areas in which it may
potentially legislate or appropriate, it cannot
inquire into matters which are within the
exclusive province of one of the other
branches of the government. Lacking the
judicial power given to the Judiciary, it cannot
inquire into mattes that are exclusively the
concern of the Judiciary. Neither can it
supplant the Executive in what exclusively
belongs to the Executive.
RIGHTS AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION. This right
construed as the right to remain completely silent may
be availed of by the accused in a criminal case; but it
may be invoked by other witnesses only as questions
are asked of them. “We did not therein state that since
he is not an accused and the case is not a criminal
case, Cabal cannot refuse to take the witness stand
and testify, and that he can invoke his right against self-
incrimination only when a question which tends to elicit
an answer that will incriminate him is propounded to
him. Clearly then, it is not the character of the suit
involved but the nature of the proceedings that
controls. The privilege has consistently been held to
extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law and to all
cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon
a witness, whether a party or not.”

Negros Oriental II Electric Coop. v. SP

In 1985, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Dumaguete sought to conduct an investigation in connection with
pending legislation related to the operations of public utilities. Invited in the hearing were the heads of NORECO II
(Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc.) – Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac. NORECO II is alleged to have
installed inefficient power lines in the said city. Torres and Umbac refused to appear before the SP and they alleged
that the power to investigate, and to order the improvement of, alleged inefficient power lines to conform to standards
is lodged exclusively with the National Electrification Administration (NEA); and neither the Charter of the City of
Dumaguete nor the [old] Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) grants the SP such power. The SP
averred that inherent in the legislative functions performed by the respondent SP is the power to conduct investigations
in aid of legislation and with it, the power to punish for contempt in inquiries on matters within its jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether or not LGUs can issue contempt

Ruling: No. There is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the LGC (BP 337) granting local
legislative bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses and the power to punish non-members for contempt. Absent a
constitutional or legal provision for the exercise of these powers, the only possible justification for the issuance of a
subpoena and for the punishment of non-members for contumacious behavior would be for said power to be deemed
implied in the statutory grant of delegated legislative power. But, the contempt power and the subpoena power partake
of a judicial nature. They cannot be implied in the grant of legislative power. Neither can they exist as mere incidents
of the performance of legislative functions. To allow local legislative bodies or administrative agencies to exercise these
powers without express statutory basis would run afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Thus, the contempt power, as well as the subpoena power, which the framers of the fundamental law did not
expressly provide for but which the then Congress has asserted essentially for self-preservation as one of three co-
equal branches of the government cannot be deemed implied in the delegation of certain legislative functions to local
legislative bodies. These cannot be presumed to exist in favor of the latter and must be considered as an exception to
Sec. 4 of B.P. 337 which provides for liberal rules of interpretation in favor of local autonomy. Since the existence of
the contempt power in conjunction with the subpoena power in any government body inevitably poses a potential
derogation of individual rights, i.e. compulsion of testimony and punishment for refusal to testify, the law cannot be
liberally construed to have impliedly granted such powers to local legislative bodies.
The Ad Hoc Committee of said legislative body has even less basis to claim that it can exercise these powers.
Even assuming that the SP and the Ad-Hoc Committee had the power to issue the subpoena and the order complained
of, such issuances would still be void for being ultra vires. The contempt power (and the subpoena power) if actually
possessed, may only be exercised where the subject matter of the investigation is within the jurisdiction of the legislative
body.
 The exercise by the legislature of the contempt power is a matter of self-preservation as that branch of the
government vested with the legislative power, independently of the judicial branch, asserts its authority and
punishes contempts thereof. The power attaches not to the discharge of legislative functions per se but to the
character of the legislature as one of the three independent and coordinate branches of government. The
same thing cannot be said of local legislative bodies which are creations of law.

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Arnault v. Nazareno
Arnault involved a Senate investigation of the reportedly anomalous purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong
Estates by the Rural Progress Administration. Arnault, who was considered a leading witness in the controversy, was
called to testify thereon by the Senate. On account of his refusal to answer the questions of the senators on an important
point, he was, by resolution of the Senate, detained for contempt. Upholding the Senate’s power to punish Arnault for
contempt, this Court held:
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to
make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and
effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry
– with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body
cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is
intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information – which
is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests
for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or
complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.

Senate Blue Ribbon Committee v. Majaducon

This case had its aegis when the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee conducted an inquiry into the alleged mismanagement
of the funds and investment of the Armed Forces Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS). During the
public hearings by the Blue Ribbon Committee, it appeared that the AFP-RSBS purchased a lot from Atty. Nilo J.
Flaviano worth P10,500 per square meter. However, the deed of sale filed with the Register of Deeds indicated that
the purchase price of the lot was only P3,000 per square meter. The Committee caused the service of a subpoena to
Atty. Flaviano, directing him to appear and testify before it. Respondent refused to appear and filed a petition for
prohibition and preliminary injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order with the RTC of General Santos City.
The trial court issued a TRO directing the committee to cease and desist from proceeding with the inquiry. The
Committee filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a valid cause of action. The
Trial Court denied the motion to dismiss. Hence, this petition for certiorari alleging that Judge Majaducon committed
grave abuse of discretion and acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether or not respondent Judge Jose Majaducon committed grave abuse of discretion when he dismissed the
petition for prohibition and issued the writ of preliminary injunction.

Ruling: The assailed resolution of respondent Judge Majaducon was issued without legal basis. The principle of
separation of powers essentially means that legislation belongs to Congress, execution to the Executive, and settlement
of legal controversies to the Judiciary. Each is prevented from invading the domain of the others. When the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee served subpoena on respondent Flaviano to appear and testify before it in connection with its
investigation of the alleged misuse and mismanagement of the AFP-RSBS funds, it did so pursuant to its authority to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. This is clearly provided in Article 6, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution:
The Senate of the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation
in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries
shall be respected.
Hence, the RTC of General Santos City, or any court for that matter, had no authority to prohibit the Committee
from requiring respondent t appear and testify before it.
Also, the ruling in Bengzon vs. Blue Ribbon Committee cited by the respondent does not apply in this case.
The factual circumstances therein are different from those in the case at bar. In Bengzon, no intended legislation was
involved and the subject matter of the inquiry was more within the province of the courts rather than the legislature. On
the other hand, there was in this case a clear legislative purpose, and this is to look into the reported misuse and
mismanagement of the AFP-RSBS funds, with the intention of enacting appropriate legislation to protect the rights and
interests of the officers and members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
In the instant case, the complaint against respondent Flaviano regarding the anomaly in the sale of Lot X, MR-
1160 was still pending before the Office of the Ombudsman when the Committee served subpoena on him. In other
words, no court had acquired jurisdiction over the matter. Thus, there was as yet no encroachment by the legislature
into the exclusive jurisdiction of another branch of the government.

In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Camilo Sabio
Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No. 455 (Senate Res. No. 455), directing
an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications
Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings
Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors.
Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 455, Senator Gordon requested PCGG Chairman Sabio and his
Commissioners to appear as resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. Chairman Sabio declined the

32
invitation because of prior commitment, and at the same time invoked Section 4(b) of EO No. 1: “No member or staff
of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative
proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.”

Issue: Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits power of legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG members or
staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding.

Ruling: No. Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution grants the power of inquiry not only to the Senate and the
House of Representatives, but also to any of their respective committees. Clearly, there is a direct conferral of
investigatory power to the committees and it means that the mechanism which the Houses can take in order to
effectively perform its investigative functions are also available to the
committees. CONTEMPT POWER OF CONGRESS. The
It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained principle that Congress or any of its bodies has
more solid existence and expansive construal. The Court’s high the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses is
regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, founded upon reason and policy. Said power
where it categorically ruled that “the power of inquiry is broad enough must be considered implied or incidental to the
to cover officials of the executive branch.” Verily, the Court reinforced exercise of legislative power. How could a
the doctrine in Arnault that “the operation of government, being a legislative body obtain the knowledge and
information on which to base intended
legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation”
legislation if it cannot require and compel
and that “the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to the disclosure of such knowledge and
legislate.” information if it is impotent to punish a
Considering these jurisprudential instructions, Section 4(b) defiance of its power and authority? When
is directly repugnant with Article VI, Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the framers of the Constitution adopted the
the PCGG members and staff from the Congress’ power of inquiry. principle of separation of powers, making each
This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any branch supreme within the realm of its
provision granting such exemption. The Congress’ power of inquiry, respective authority, it must have intended each
departments authority to be full and complete,
being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the
independently of the others authority or power.
administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly And how could the authority and power become
needed statutes. It even extends “to government agencies created complete if for every act of refusal, every act of
by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of defiance, every act of contumacy against it, the
Congress to regulate or even abolish.” PCGG belongs to this class. legislative body must resort to the judicial
A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not department for the appropriate remedy,
within the legislative power to enact; or it creates or establishes because it is impotent by itself to punish or deal
methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; or its purpose therewith, with the affronts committed against
its authority or dignity.
or effect violates the Constitution or its basic principles.
Moreover, Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 has been repealed by the
Constitution because it is inconsistent with the constitutional provisions on the Congress’ power of inquiry (Art. VI, Sec.
21), the principle of public accountability (Art. XI, Sec. 1), the policy of full disclosure (Art. II, Sec. 28), and the right of
access to public information (Art. III, Sec. 7). Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad
power of Congress, in the absence of any constitutional basis.
Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information
which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is
needed.
RIGHT OF PRIVACY. Our Bill of Rights, enshrined in Article III of the Constitution, provides at least two
guarantees that explicitly create zones of privacy. It highlights a persons right to be let alone or the right to determine
what, how much, to whom and when information about himself shall be disclosed. In evaluating a claim for violation of
the right to privacy, a court must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if
so, whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion. This goes to show that the right
to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state interest. In Morfe v. Mutuc, the Court, in line
with Whalen v. Roe, employed the rational basis relationship test when it held that there was no infringement of the
individuals right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose, i.e., to curtail and minimize
the opportunities for official corruption, maintain a standard of honesty in public service, and promote morality in public
administration.
RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION. only when the incriminating question is being asked, since they
have no way of knowing in advance the nature or effect of the questions to be asked of them; that this right may
possibly be violated or abused is no ground for denying respondent Senate Committees their power of inquiry.
Suffice it to state that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provide that
the filing or pendency of any prosecution of criminal or administrative action should not stop or abate any inquiry to
carry out a legislative purpose.

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Gudani vs. Senga
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election fraud and the surfacing of
the “Hello Garci” tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the executive department including the military
establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her consent. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a
Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from appearing before the Senate Committee without
Presidential approval. However, the two appeared before the Senate in spite the fact that a directive has been given to
them. As a result, the two were relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating the Articles of War and the time
honoured principle of the “Chain of Command.” Gen. Senga ordered them to be subjected before the General Court
Martial proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a superior officer.

Issue: Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP preventing them
from testifying before a legislative inquiry.

Ruling:
Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional
authority to do so, by virtue of her power as
commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a
military officer who defies such injunction is liable
under military justice. At the same time, any chamber
of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a
military officer against the consent of the President has
adequate remedies under law to compel such
attendance. Any military official whom Congress
summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so
by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the
President may be commanded by judicial order to
compel the attendance of the military officer. Final
judicial orders have the force of the law of the land
which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.
SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the
President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior
consent on executive officials summoned by the
legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In doing
so, the Court recognized the considerable limitations
on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege
must be formally invoked on specified grounds.
However, the ability of the President to prevent military
officers from testifying before Congress does not turn
on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s
power as commander-in-chief to control the actions
and speech of members of the armed forces. The
President’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief are
not hampered by the same limitations as in executive
privilege.
At the same time, the refusal of the President
to allow members of the military to appear before
Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The
Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature’s
functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation.
Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere
with the President’s power as commander-in-chief, it is
similarly detrimental for the President to unduly
interfere with Congress’s right to conduct legislative
inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this
petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the
presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with
its pronouncement today that the President has the
right to require prior consent from members of the
armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.
In Senate, the Court ruled that the President
could not impose a blanket prohibition barring
executive officials from testifying before Congress
without the President's consent notwithstanding the
invocation of executive privilege to justify such
prohibition. The Court did not rule that the power to
conduct legislative inquiry ipso facto superseded the
claim of executive privilege, acknowledging instead
that the viability of executive privilege stood on a case
to case basis. Should neither branch yield to the other
branch's assertion, the constitutional recourse is to
the courts, as the final arbiter if the dispute. It is only
the courts that can compel, with conclusiveness,
attendance or non-attendance in legislative inquiries.
The duty falls on the shoulders of the
President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the
appearance of the military officers before Congress.
Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the
notion of officers appearing before the legislature to
testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to
comply with the final orders of the courts.

Separate Opinion of J. Puno, Macalintal v. COMELEC

 Congressional investigation involves a more intense digging of facts.
 The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the scope of the congressional power of inquiry is penetrating and far-
reaching as the potential power to enact and appropriate under the Constitution. It encompasses everything
that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. In
the exercise of this power, congressional inquiries can reach all sources of information and in the absence of
countervailing constitutional privilege or self-imposed restrictions upon its authority, Congress and its
committees, have virtually, plenary power to compel information needed to discharge its legislative functions
from executive agencies, private persons and organizations.
 In McGrain v. Daugherty, it held that a legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence
of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to effect change. But while the
congressional power of inquiry is broad, it is not unlimited. No inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to,
and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of Congress. Moreover, an investigating committee has only the power
to inquire into matters within the scope of the authority delegated to it by its parent body. But once its

34
 jurisdiction and authority, and the pertinence of the matter under inquiry to its area of authority are established,
a committees investigative purview is substantial and wide-ranging.
 American jurisprudence upholding the inherent power of Congress to conduct investigation has been
adopted in our jurisdiction in Arnault v. Nazareno
 The Court further held that once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a
legislative body to make, the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any
question pertinent to that inquiry, subject to his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The
inquiry must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution. Hence, a
witness cannot be coerced to answer a question that obviously has no relation to the subject of the inquiry.
But the Court explained that the materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to the
subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The reason is that
the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the form and character of the action itself are
determined by the sum total of the information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not
by a fraction of such information elicited from a single question.
 It held that it is not enough for the witness to say that the answer will incriminate him for he is not the sole
judge of his liability, thus:
[T]he danger of self-incrimination must appear reasonable and real to the court, from all the
circumstances and from the whole case, as well as from his general conception of the relations of
the witness. The fact that the testimony of the witness may tend to show that he has violated the law
is not sufficient to entitle him to claim the protection of the constitutional provision against self-
incrimination, unless he is at the same time liable to prosecution and punishment for such violation.
The witness cannot assert his privilege by reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection against an
imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a third person.
 As now contained in the 1987 Constitution, the power of Congress to investigate is circumscribed by three
limitations, namely: (a) it must be in aid of its legislative functions, (b) it must be conducted in accordance
with duly published rules of procedure, and (c) the persons appearing therein are afforded their constitutional
rights.
 The conduct of legislative investigation is also subject to the rules of each House. In the House of
Representatives, an inquiry may be initiated or conducted by a committee motu proprio on any matter within
its jurisdiction upon a majority vote of all its Members or upon order of the House of Representatives through:
 the referral of a privilege speech containing or conveying a request or demand for the conduct of an
inquiry, to the appropriate committee, upon motion of the Majority Leader or his deputies; or
 the adoption of a resolution directing a committee to conduct an inquiry reported out by the Committee on
Rules after making a determination on the necessity and propriety of the conduct of an inquiry by such committee:
Provided, That all resolutions directing any committee to conduct an inquiry shall be referred to the Committee
on Rules; or
 the referral by the Committee on Rules to the appropriate committee, after making a determination on the
necessity and propriety of the conduct of inquiry by such committee, of a petition filed or information
given by a Member of the House requesting such inquiry and endorsed by the Speaker: Provided, That such
petition or information shall be given under oath, stating the facts upon which it is based, and accompanied by
supporting affidavits.
 The committee to which a privilege speech, resolution, petition or information requesting an inquiry is referred may constitute
and appoint sub-committees composed of at least one-third (1/3) of the committee for the purpose of performing any and
all acts which the committee as a whole is authorized to perform, except to punish for contempt. In case a privilege speech
is referred to two or more committees, a joint inquiry by the said committees shall be conducted. The inquiries are to be
held in public except when the committee or sub-committee deems that the examination of a witness in a public hearing
may endanger national security. In which case, it shall conduct the hearing in an executive session.
 The Rules further provide that the filing or pendency of a case before any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial or administrative
bodies shall not stop or abate any inquiry conducted to carry out a specific legislative purpose.
 In exercise of congressional inquiry, the committee has the power to issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum to a
witness in any part of the country, signed by the chairperson or acting chairperson and the Speaker or acting Speaker.
 Furthermore, the committee may, by a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of all its members constituting a quorum, punish for
contempt any person who:
a. refuses, after being duly summoned, to obey such summons without legal excuse;
b. refuses to be sworn or placed under affirmation;
c. refuses to answer any relevant inquiry;
d. refuses to produce any books, papers, documents or records that are relevant to the inquiry and are in his/her
possession;
e. acts in a disrespectful manner towards any member of the Committee or commits misbehavior in the presence of
the committee; or
f. unduly interferes in the conduct of proceedings during meetings.

Neri v. Senate Committee v. Majaducon

The Senate issued various Senate Resolutions directing SBRC, among others, to conduct an investigation regarding
the NBN-ZTE deal. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He disclosed

35
that the COMELEC Chairman Abalos offered him P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project, that he
informed PGMA about the bribery and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further
on what they discussed about the NBN Project, he refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he
refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or
not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. As a result, the Senate cited
him for contempt.

Issue: Whether or not the communications elicited by the 3 questions covered by executive privilege.

Ruling: Tthe U.S. Court of Appeals delved deeper. It ruled that there are two (2) kinds of executive privilege; one is the
presidential communications privilege ("communications, documents or other materials that reflect presidential
decision-making and deliberations and that the President believes should remain confidential"; applies to documents
in their entirety and covers final and post decisional materials as well as pre-deliberative ones) and, the other
is the deliberative process privilege (includes 'advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising
part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated"). PCP applies to decision-making of
the President while, the DPP, to decision-making of executive officials. PCP is rooted in the constitutional principle of
separation of power and the President’s unique constitutional role; DPP on common law privilege. As a consequence,
congressional or judicial negation of the presidential communications privilege is always subject to greater scrutiny than
denial of the deliberative process privilege.

The SC recognized the executive privilege which is the Presidential communications privilege on matters relating to
diplomacy or foreign relations. It pertains to “communications, documents or other materials that reflect presidential
decision-making and deliberations and that the President believes should remain confidential.” Presidential
communications privilege applies to decision-making of the President. It is rooted in the constitutional principle of
separation of power and the President’s unique constitutional role. The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized
in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such
as the area of military and foreign relations. The information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality
than others.

Elements of presidential communications privilege:

1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.” - i.e.
the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter
into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence as well as commander-in-chief power, appointment and removal power, the power to grant pardons and
reprieves, the sole-authority to receive ambassadors and other public officers, the power to negotiate treaties
2) Who are the officials covered by PCP? The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by
a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational
proximity” with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing
of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of
the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. - there is no adequate showing of a compelling
need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.

A claim of executive privilege is subject to balancing against other interest. In other words, confidentiality in executive
privilege is not absolutely protected by the Constitution. Presidential communications privilege are presumptively
privileged and that the presumption can be overcome only by mere showing of public need by the branch seeking
access to conversations. Here, the record is bereft of any categorical explanation from respondent Committees to show
a compelling or critical need for the answers to the three (3) questions in the enactment of a law. Instead, the questions
veer more towards the exercise of the legislative oversight function under Section 22 of Article VI rather than Section
21 of the same Article. In this regard, much will depend on the content of the questions and the manner the inquiry
is conducted. It is settled in United States v. Nixon that "demonstrated, specific need for evidence in pending criminal
trial" outweighs the President's "generalized interest in confidentiality."

Materiality: on the nature and appropriateness of the function in the performance of which the material was sought,
and the degree to which the material was necessary to its fulfillment

The sufficiency of the Committee's showing of need has come to depend, therefore, entirely on whether the subpoenaed
materials are critical to the performance of its legislative functions. There is a clear difference between Congress's
legislative tasks and the responsibility of a grand jury, or any institution engaged in like functions. While fact-finding
by a legislative committee is undeniably a part of its task, legislative judgments normally depend more on the

36
predicted consequences of proposed legislative actions and their political acceptability, than on precise
reconstruction of past events.

The right of Congress or any of its Committees to obtain information in aid of legislation cannot be equated with the
people’s right to public information. For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his
right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither
does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials. These powers
belong only to Congress, not to individual citizen. Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the
people, it does not follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people
are exercising their right to information.

THE CLAIM OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE IS PROPERLY INVOKED. For the claim to be properly invoked, there must
be a formal claim of privilege. A formal and proper claim of executive privilege requires a "precise and certain reason"
for preserving their confidentiality. With regard to the existence of "precise and certain reason", the particular ground
must only be specified. The enumeration is not even intended to be comprehensive." Congress must not require the
executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the
privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect to a coordinate and co-equal department.

RESPONDENT COMMITTEE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. On the ff. grounds:

1. There being a legitimate claim of executive privilege, the issuance of the contempt Order suffers from
constitutional infirmity.
2. Respondent Committees did not comply with the requirement in that the invitations should contain the
"possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry", along with "the usual indication of the
subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof." This must be so to ensure that the
rights of both persons appearing in or affected by such inquiry are respected as mandated by said Section 21
and by virtue of the express language of Section 22. Unfortunately, despite petitioner's repeated demands,
respondent Committees did not send him advance list of questions.
3. Third, a reading of the transcript of respondent Committees' January 30, 2008 proceeding reveals that only a
minority of the members of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee were present during the deliberation. Section
18 of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provides that the Committee, by a vote
of majority of all its members, may punish for contempt any witness before it who disobey any order. The
needed vote is a majority of all the members of the Committee. Apparently, members who did not actually
participate in the deliberation were made to sign the contempt Order.
4. Court finds merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees likewise violated Section 21 of
Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the "duly published rules of
procedure. Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted
by the 14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm.
5. Respondent Committees' issuance of the contempt Order is arbitrary and precipitate. It must be pointed out
that respondent Committees did not first pass upon the claim of executive privilege and inform petitioner of
their ruling. Instead, they curtly dismissed his explanation as "unsatisfactory" and simultaneously issued the
Order citing him in contempt and ordering his immediate arrest and detention.

Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks

SCB Phil Branch had criminal and civil charges against them before the courts in Metro Manila for selling unregistered
foreign securities in violation of Securities Regulation Code (RA 8799). Enrile, in his privileged speech, urged the
Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation, to prevent the occurrences of a similar fraudulent in the
future. The respondent Committee then set an initial hearing to investigate, in aid of legislation thereto. SCB stressed
that there were cases allegedly involving the same issues subject of legislative inquiry, thus posting a challenge to the
jurisdiction of respondent Committee to continue with the inquiry.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent Committee, by aid of legislation, would encroach upon the judicial powers vested
solely in the courts who took cognizance of the foregoing cases

Ruling: Yes. The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the resolution, as initiated in the privileged
speech of Senate President Enrile, was simply "to denounce the illegal practices committed by a foreign bank in selling
unregistered foreign securities xxx", and at the conclusion of the said speech "to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid
of legislation, so as to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent in the future."

The mere filing of a criminal or administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial body should not automatically
bar the conduct of legislation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress
through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint. The exercise of sovereign legislative

37
authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal
or an administrative investigation.

The exercise by Congress or by any of its committees of the power to punish contempt is based on the principle of self-
preservation. As the branch of the government vested with the legislative power, independently of the judicial branch,
it can assert its authority and punish contumacious acts against it.

The intent of legislative inquiries is to arrive at a policy determination, which may or may not be enacted into law. Except
only when it exercises the power to punish for contempt, the committees of the Senate or the House of Representatives
cannot penalize violators even there is overwhelmingly evidence of criminal culpability. Other than proposing or initiating
amendatory or remedial legislation, respondent Committee can only recommend measures to address or remedy
whatever irregularities may be unearthed during the investigation, although it may include in its Report a
recommendation for criminal indictment of persons who may appear liable. At best, the recommendation, along with
the evidence, contained in such Report would only be persuasive, but it is still up to the prosecutorial agencies and the
courts to determine the liabilities of the offender.

Romero II v. Estrada
On August 15, 2006, petitioner Reghis Romero II, as owner of R-II Builders, Inc., received from the Committee an
invitation, signed by the Legislative Committee Secretary, which was about conducting an investigation specifically
intended to aid the Senate in the review and possible amendments to the pertinent provisions of R.A. 8042, the Migrant
Workers Act and to craft a much needed legislation relative to the stated subject matter and purpose of the
aforementioned Resolutions. By virtue of the power vested in Congress by Section 21, Article VI of 1987 Constitution
regarding inquiries in aid of legislation, Romero was invited to shed light on any matter, within his knowledge and
competence, covered by the subject matter and purpose of the inquiry. He was also assured that his rights, when
properly invoked and not unfounded, will be duly respected. In reply to such invitation, Romero asked that he be
excused from attending the public hearing. However, the committee denied his request. Invitations were also sent to
the entire board of R-II Builders for the hearing on September 4, 2006. On August 30, 2006, petitioners filed the instant
petition, docketed as GR No. 174105, seeking to bar the Committee from continuing its inquiry and to enjoin it from
compelling petitioners to appear before it pursuant to the invitations thus issued. Failing to secure the desired TRO
sought in the petition, petitioner Romero II appeared at the September 4, 2006 Committee Investigation. He later on
filed another manifestation reiterating his plea for a TRO. Reghis and company argues in support of their petition that
the hearing in aid of inquiry was a violation of the sub judice rule as there is a pending case still pending before the
Supreme Court. The same is also a violation of their right against self-incrimination since the hearing was being
conducted to ascertain their liability for plunder and such is not in aid of legislation. The Senate Committee, in their
comment, argued that the conduct of inquiry in aid of legislation was a political question; that the pendency of another
case was not a valid ground to stop them from conducting the inquiry. The resource persons’ right against self-
incrimination are amply protected since they may invoke the right if they feel the question is incriminatory.

Issue: Whether or not the subject matter of the Committee’s inquiry is sub judice.

Ruling: NO. The subject matter of the Senate Inquiry is no longer sub judice. The sub judice issue has been rendered
moot and academic by the supervening issuance of the en banc Resolution of July 1, 2008 in G.R. No. 164527. Thus,
there is no more legal obstacle — on the ground of sub judice, assuming it is invocable — to the continuation of the
Committee's investigation challenged in this proceeding.

A legislative investigation in aid of legislation and court proceedings has different purposes. On one hand, courts
conduct hearings or like adjudicative procedures to settle, through the application of a law, actual controversies arising
between adverse litigants and involving demandable rights. On the other hand, inquiries in aid of legislation are, inter
alia, undertaken as tools to enable the legislative body to gather information and, thus, legislate wisely and effectively;
and to determine whether there is a need to improve existing laws or enact new or remedial legislation, albeit the inquiry
need not result in any potential legislation. On-going judicial proceedings do not preclude congressional hearings in aid
of legislation.

Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and even legislative
investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress
and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in the same
status, but as if presented for the first time. The logic and practicality of such rule is readily apparent considering that
the Senate of the succeeding Congress (which will typically have a different composition as that of the previous
Congress) should not be bound by the acts and deliberations of the Senate of which they had no part. . . .

The unremitting obligation of every citizen is to respond to subpoenae, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its
Committees, and to testify fully with respect to matters within the realm of proper investigation.

38
WHEREFORE, the requiring of attendance and testimony of the petitioners at an investigation should not be punished
for legislative contempt for their disobedience of said subpoena, is declared null and void for being ultra vires.

e.2.1. Publication Requirement

Garcillano v. HOR
The "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the President’s instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano
to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These recordings were to become the subject of
heated legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of both Houses of Congress. Intervenor Sagge alleges
violation of his right to due process considering that he is summoned to attend the Senate hearings without being
apprised not only of his rights therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a
taxpayer bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds involved in the conduct of the questioned
hearings.

The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in
1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its
members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first
opened their session.

Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the rules have
never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and
accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page.

Issue: Whether or not publication of the Rules of Procedures Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation through the
Senate’s website, satisfies the due process requirement of law

Ruling: The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. Publication
is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of
a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body," this Court sees fit to issue a clarification. Certainly, there is no
debate that the Senate as an institution is "continuing," as it is not dissolved as an entity with each national election or
change in the composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its day-to-day business the Senate of each
Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress before it. The Rules of the Senate itself
confirms this when it states:

All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be
taken by the succeeding Congress as if present for the first time.

Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and even legislative
investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are considered terminated upon the expiration of that
Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished
matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first time. The logic and practicality of such a
rule is readily apparent considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress (which will typically have a
different composition as that of the previous Congress) should not be bound by the acts and deliberations of
the Senate of which they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing body even with respect to the conduct of
its business, then pending matters will not be deemed terminated with the expiration of one Congress but will,
as a matter of course, continue into the next Congress with the same status.

The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet form available at the Senate, is
not sufficient under the Tañada v. Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that the rules "shall take effect seven (7) days
after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation," precluding any other form of publication. Publication in
accordance with Tañada is mandatory to comply with the due process requirement because the Rules of Procedure put
a person’s liberty at risk. A person who violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and detained by the Senate.

The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce
Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers
an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document only
for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the

39
original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents. It does not make the internet a medium for
publishing laws, rules and regulations.

Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its
unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so
only "in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."

Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial notice of this fact, the
recent publication does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant petitions. Insofar
as the consolidated cases are concerned, the legislative investigation subject thereof still could not be undertaken by
the respondent Senate Committees, because no published rules governed it, in clear contravention of the Constitution.

F. OTHER POWERS
f.1 As Board of Canvassers in Elections for Pres. & Vice-Pres. (Art. VII, Sec. 4)
Section 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the people for a term of six years
which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the
same date, six years thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any re-election. No person who has succeeded
as President and has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any
time.

No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length
of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for which he was
elected.

Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Vice-President shall be held on the second
Monday of May.

The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each
province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the
certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open
all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the
Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass
the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an
equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members
of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.

The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

f.2 Call Special Election for President and Vice-President (Art. VII, Sec. 10)
Section 10. The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of the third day after the vacancy in the offices of the
President and Vice-President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call and within seven days,
enact a law calling for a special election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be held not earlier than forty-five
days nor later than sixty days from the time of such call. The bill calling such special election shall be deemed certified
under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article V1 of this Constitution and shall become law upon its approval on third reading
by the Congress. Appropriations for the special election shall be charged against any current appropriations and shall
be exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25, Article V1 of this Constitution. The convening of the
Congress cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed. No special election shall be called if the vacancy
occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next presidential election.

f.3 Revoke/Extend suspension of privilege of writ of habeas corpus, declaration of martial law (Art. VII, Sec. 18)
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case
of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight
hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President
shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority

40
of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall
not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend
such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist
and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis
of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof,
and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts
or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians
where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion
or offenses inherent in, or directly connected with, invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, any person thus arrested or detained shall be
judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.

f.4 Approve Presidential Amnesties (Art. VII, Sec. 19)

Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.

f.5 Confirm certain appointments (Art. VII, Sec. 9 and 16)

Section 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President during the term for which he was elected,
the President shall nominate a Vice-President from among the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of
the Congress, voting separately.

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads
of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from
the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He
shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and
those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers
lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or
until the next adjournment of the Congress.

Sarmiento v. Mison
Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Carague as the Secretary of the Department
of Budget, without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Sarmiento assailed the appointments as
unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by CoA.

Issue: Whether or not the appointment is valid.

Ruling: Yes. The President acted within her constitutional authority and power in appointing Salvador Mison, without
submitting his nomination to the CoA for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full authority and functions of
the office and to receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.

Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of officers whom the President shall appoint:
1. appointment of executive departments and bureaus heads, ambassadors, other public ministers, consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers with the consent and
confirmation of the CoA.
2. all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
3. those whom the President may be authorized by the law to appoint;

41
 4. low-ranking officers whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

First group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such
officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the
President appoints.

2nd, 3rd and 4th group of officers are the present bone of contention. By following the accepted rule in constitutional
and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow
that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments.

As a result of the innovations introduced in Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are officers whose
appointments require no confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, even if such officers may be higher in rank,
compared to some officers whose appointments have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments under the
first sentence of the same Sec. 16, Art. VII. But these contrasts, while initially impressive, merely underscore the
purposive intention and deliberate judgment of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that, except as to those officers
whose appointments require the consent of the Commission on Appointments by express mandate of the first sentence
in Sec. 16, Art. VII, appointments of other officers are left to the President without need of confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.

It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the
first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. The 1987 Constitution
deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments.

f.6 Concur with treaties (Art. VII, Sec. 21)

Section 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds
of all the Members of the Senate.

Bayan Muna, as represented by Rep. Satur Ocampo v. Alberto Romulo

Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent the marginalized sectors of society.
Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the period material to this case.
Respondent Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then Executive Secretary.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court

Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC)
with “the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern x x x and
shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions.” The serious crimes adverted to cover those considered
grave under international law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression.

On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge d’Affaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by its
terms, is “subject to ratification, acceptance or approval” by the signatory states. As of the filing of the instant petition,
only 92 out of the 139 signatory countries appear to have completed the ratification, approval and concurrence process.
The Philippines is not among the 92.

RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement

On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note No. 0470 to the Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms of the non-surrender bilateral agreement (Agreement, hereinafter) between
the USA and the RP. Via Exchange of Notes No. BFO-028-037 dated May 13, 2003 (E/N BFO-028-03, hereinafter),
the RP, represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, agreed with and accepted the US proposals embodied under the US
Embassy Note adverted to and put in effect the Agreement with the US government. In esse, the Agreement aims to
protect what it refers to and defines as “persons” of the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits that might be
brought against them in international tribunals.8 It is reflective of the increasing pace of the strategic security and
defense partnership between the two countries. As of May 2, 2003, similar bilateral agreements have been effected by
and between the US and 33 other countries.

In response to a query of then Solicitor General Alfredo L. Benipayo on the status of the non-surrender agreement,
Ambassador Ricciardone replied in his letter of October 28, 2003 that the exchange of diplomatic notes constituted a
legally binding agreement under international law; and that, under US law, the said agreement did not require the advice
and consent of the US Senate.

42
In this proceeding, petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and ratifying the
Agreement and prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and effect.

Issue: Whether or not the RP-US NON SURRENDER AGREEMENT require Senate concurrence for its validity

Ruling: The petition is bereft of merit.

Senate Concurrence Not Required. Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a treaty as an
international agreement concluded between states in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied
in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation. International
agreements may be in the form of (1) treaties that require legislative concurrence after executive ratification; or (2)
executive agreements that are similar to treaties, except that they do not require legislative concurrence and are usually
less formal and deal with a narrower range of subject matters than treaties.

Under international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in terms of their binding
effects on the contracting states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their
powers. Neither, on the domestic sphere, can one be held valid if it violates the Constitution. Authorities are, however,
agreed that one is distinct from another for accepted reasons apart from the concurrence-requirement aspect. As has
been observed by US constitutional scholars, a treaty has greater dignity than an executive agreement, because its
constitutional efficacy is beyond doubt, a treaty having behind it the authority of the President, the Senate, and the
people; a ratified treaty, unlike an executive agreement, takes precedence over any prior statutory enactment.

The primary consideration in the choice of the form of agreement is the parties intent and desire to craft an international
agreement in the form they so wish to further their respective interests. Verily, the matter of form takes a back seat
when it comes to effectiveness and binding effect of the enforcement of a treaty or an executive agreement, as the
parties in either international agreement each labor under the pacta sunt servanda principle.

And lest it be overlooked, one type of executive agreement is a treaty-authorized or a treaty-implementing executive
agreement, which necessarily would cover the same matters subject of the underlying treaty.

When a treaty is required, the Constitution does not classify any subject, like that involving political issues, to be in the
form of, and ratified as, a treaty. What the Constitution merely prescribes is that treaties need the concurrence of the
Senate by a vote defined therein to complete the ratification process.

f.7 Declare war and delegate emergency powers (Sec. 23)

Section 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately,
shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.

(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period
and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof.

David vs. Arroyo

On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, [calling-out power] by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section
18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . .
may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief,
do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent
or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion ["take care" power] and to enforce
obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;
and [power to take over] as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.

On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017, directing the members of the AFP and PNP "to
immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism
and lawless violence."

David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a
subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional

43
guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly. They alleged “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest”
and “unlawful search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.
During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5 have factual basis, and
contended that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in determining the
necessity of calling out the armed forces. The petitioners did not contend the facts stated b the Solicitor General.
Issue: Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.
Ruling: Yes. It is constitutional.
First Provision: Calling Out Power. The only criterion
for the exercise of the calling-out power is that
“whenever it becomes necessary,” the President may
call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion.” (Integrated Bar of the
Philippines v. Zamora) President Arroyo’s declaration
of a “state of rebellion” was merely an act declaring a
status or condition of public moment or interest, a
declaration allowed under Section 4, Chap 2, Bk II of
the Revised Administration Code. Such declaration, in
the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal
significance, and deemed not written. In these cases,
PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of
national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely
on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a
provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied
on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the State’s
extraordinary power to take over privately-owned
public utility and business affected with public
interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an
awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation
cannot be deemed harmless. To clarify, PP 1017 is not
a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise
of President Arroyo’s calling-out power for the armed
forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing
lawless violence.
Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power. The
second provision pertains to the power of the President
to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. This is
based on Section 17, Article VII which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He
shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo
the authority to promulgate “decrees.” Legislative
power is peculiarly within the province of the
Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states
that “[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives.” To be sure,
neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state
of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of
legislative power by issuing decrees.
Third Provision: The Power to Take
Over. Distinction must be drawn between the
President’s authority to declare “a state of national
emergency” and to exercise emergency powers. To
the first, Section 18, Article VII grants the President
such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional
objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold
constitutional issues arise. Generally, Congress is the
repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the
tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to
delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a
body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon
it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies,
it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to
meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our
Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant
emergency powers to the President, subject to certain
conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions
as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry
out a national policy declared by Congress.
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect
of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of
private business affected with public interest is just
another facet of the emergency powers generally
reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17
states that the “the State may, during the emergency
and under reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any
privately owned public utility or business affected with
public interest,” it refers to Congress, not the
President. Now, whether or not the President may
exercise such power is dependent on whether
Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law
prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
Following our interpretation of Section 17,
Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP
1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not
authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take
over or direct the operation of any privately owned
public utility or business affected with public interest
without authority from Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can
declare a state of national emergency, however,
without legislation, he has no power to take over
privately-owned public utility or business affected with
public interest. Nor can he determine when such
exceptional circumstances have
ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President
has no power to point out the types of businesses
affected with public interest that should be taken
over. In short, the President has no absolute authority
to exercise all the powers of the State under Section
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17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers
act passed by Congress.
As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a
standard by which the AFP and the PNP should
implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is “necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and
prevent acts of lawless violence.” Considering that
“acts of terrorism” have not yet been defined and made
punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No.
5 is declared unconstitutional.

Agan v. PIATCO
On October 5, 1994, AEDC submitted an unsolicited
proposal to the Government through the DOTC/MIAA
for the development of NAIA International Passenger
Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). DOTC constituted the
Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC)
for the implementation of the project and submitted
with its endorsement proposal to the NEDA, which
approved the project.
On June 7, 14, and 21, 1996, DOTC/MIAA caused the
publication in two daily newspapers of an invitation for
competitive or comparative proposals on AEDC’s
unsolicited proposal, in accordance with Sec. 4-A of
RA 6957, as amended. On September 20, 1996, the
consortium composed of People’s Air Cargo and
Warehousing Co., Inc. (Paircargo), Phil. Air and
Grounds Services, Inc. (PAGS) and Security Bank
Corp. (Security Bank) (collectively, Paircargo
Consortium) submitted their competitive proposal to
the PBAC. PBAC awarded the project to Paircargo
Consortium. Because of that, it was incorporated into
Philippine International Airport Terminals Co., Inc.
AEDC subsequently protested the alleged undue
preference given to PIATCO and reiterated its
objections as regards the prequalification of PIATCO.
On July 12, 1997, the Government and PIATCO signed
the “Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-
Transfer Arrangement of the NAIA Passenger Terminal
III” (1997 Concession Agreement). The Government
granted PIATCO the franchise to operate and maintain
the said terminal during the concession period and to
collect the fees, rentals and other charges in
accordance with the rates or schedules stipulated in
the 1997 Concession Agreement. The Agreement
provided that the concession period shall be for twenty-
five (25) years commencing from the in-service date,
and may be renewed at the option of the Government
for a period not exceeding twenty-five (25) years. At
the end of the concession period, PIATCO shall
transfer the development facility to MIAA.
Meanwhile, the MIAA which is charged with the
maintenance and operation of the NAIA Terminals I
and II, had existing concession contracts with various
service providers to offer international airline airport
services, such as in-flight catering, passenger
handling, ramp and ground support, aircraft
maintenance and provisions, cargo handling and
warehousing, and other services, to several
international airlines at the NAIA.
On September 17, 2002, the workers of the
international airline service providers, claiming that
they would lose their job upon the implementation of
the questioned agreements, filed a petition for
prohibition. Several employees of MIAA likewise filed a
petition assailing the legality of the various
agreements.
During the pendency of the cases, PGMA, on her
speech, stated that she will not “honor (PIATCO)
contracts which the Executive Branch’s legal offices
have concluded (as) null and void.”

Issue: Whether or not the State can temporarily take over a business affected with public interest.

Ruling: Yes. PIATCO cannot, by mere contractual stipulation, contravene the Constitutional provision on temporary
government takeover and obligate the government to pay “reasonable cost for the use of the Terminal and/or
Terminal Complex.”

Article XII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the
emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately
owned public utility or business affected with public interest.

The above provision pertains to the right of the State in times of national emergency, and in the exercise of its police
power, to temporarily take over the operation of any business affected with public interest. The duration of the
emergency itself is the determining factor as to how long the temporary takeover by the government would last. The
temporary takeover by the government extends only to the operation of the business and not to the ownership thereof.
As such the government is not required to compensate the private entity-owner of the said business as there
is no transfer of ownership, whether permanent or temporary. The private entity-owner affected by the temporary
takeover cannot, likewise, claim just compensation for the use of the said business and its properties as the temporary
takeover by the government is in exercise of its police power and not of its power of eminent domain.

45
Article XII, section 17 of the 1987 Constitution envisions a situation wherein the exigencies of the times necessitate the
government to “temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected
with public interest.” It is the welfare and interest of the public which is the paramount consideration in determining
whether or not to temporarily take over a particular business. Clearly, the State in effecting the temporary takeover is
exercising its police power. Police power is the “most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers.” Its exercise
therefore must not be unreasonably hampered nor its exercise be a source of obligation by the government in the
absence of damage due to arbitrariness of its exercise. Thus, requiring the government to pay reasonable
compensation for the reasonable use of the property pursuant to the operation of the business contravenes the
Constitution.

f.8 Judge President’s fitness

Art. VII, Sec. 11 (4). If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session,
within twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately,
that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as President;
otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office.

Estrada v. Arroyo
It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal gambling, and other forms of
corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada
was impeached by the Hor and, on December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate during which
more serious allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada were made and were only stopped on January 16,
2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence against Estrada.
As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate
President Pimentel resigned after casting his vote against Estrada.

On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine. Estrada
called for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001.
He added that he will not run in this election. On January 20, SC declared that the seat of presidency was vacant,
saying that Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the
crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace. Erap, after his fall, filed
petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further
proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming
Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the
duties of his office.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner Is only temporarily unable to Act as President.

Ruling: 1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular
measure."

Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:
EDSA I EDSA II
exercise of the people power of exercise of people power of freedom of
revolution which overthrew the whole speech and freedom of assemblyto
government. petition the government for redress of
grievances which only affected the office of
the President.
extra constitutional and the legitimacy of intra constitutional and the resignation of
the new government that resulted from it the sitting President that it caused and the
cannot be the subject of judicial review succession of the Vice President as
President are subject to judicial review.
presented a political question; involves legal questions.
The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require the proper
interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the allocation of
governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity
from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity.

2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of relinquishment. Both were present when President
Estrada left the Palace.

46
Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence— bearing material relevant issues—
President Estrada is deemed to have resigned— constructive resignation. SC declared that the resignation of President
Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by his leaving Malacañan Palace. In the press release containing his final
statement:
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process
(he did not say that he was leaving due to any kind of disability and that he was going to reassume the
Presidency as soon as the disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as President (without doubt
referring to the past opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the same service of the country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity.
Intent to resign—must be accompanied by act of relinquishment—act or omission before, during and after
January 20, 2001.

4. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as
President of the Republic of the Philippines and subsequently passed H.R. 178 confirms the nomination of
Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As Vice President. Senate passed HR No. 83 declaring the Impeachment Courts as
Functius Officio and has been terminated. It is clear is that both houses of Congress recognized Arroyo as the
President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of Estrada is no longer temporary
as the Congress has clearly rejected his claim of inability.

The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of petitioner
Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as president
of the Philippines. Following Tañada v. Cuenco, we hold that this Court cannot exercise its judicial power or this is an
issue "in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative xxx branch of the
government." Or to use the language in Baker vs. Carr, there is a "textually demonstrable or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it." Clearly, the Court cannot pass upon petitioner's claim of
inability to discharge the power and duties of the presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed
solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue, which cannot be decided by this Court without
transgressing the principle of separation of powers.

In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a
President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to
rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch
of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

f.9 Power of Impeachment (Art. XI)

f.9.a Who may be impeached and Grounds (Art. XI, Sec. 2)
Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes,
or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by
law, but not by impeachment.

In re Gonzales, 160 SCRA 71

Gonzales was the Tanodbayan or Special Prosecutor. He forwarded a letter-complaint to Justice Fernan. The
letter was said to be from concerned employees of the SC (an anonymous letter). The letter was originally addressed
to Gonzales referring to the charges for disbarment sought by Mr. Miguel Cuenco against Justice Fernan, and asking
him (Gonzales) to do something about it. The Supreme Court furnished a copy to Gonzales, the per curiam Resolution
of the SC, dismissing the charges made by Cuenco against Justice Fernan for lack of merit. In that resolution, Cuenco
was asked to show cause why he should not be held administratively liable for making serious accusations against
Fernan.

Issue: Whether or not a Supreme Court justice can be disbarred during his term of office

Ruling: A public officer (such as Justice Fernan) who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the
Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from office only by
impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer. Further, such

47
public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan, or any other court, with
any offense which carries with it the penalty of removal from office.

Another reason why the complaint for disbarment should be dismissed is because under the Constitution,
members of the SC may be removed only by impeachment. The above provision proscribes removal from office by any
other method. Otherwise, to allow such public officer who may be removed solely by impeachment to be charged
criminally while holding his office with an office that carries the penalty of removal from office, would be violative of the
clear mandate of the Constitution.

The effect of impeachment is limited to the loss of position and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust or profit
under the Republic. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office. But the party convicted shall nevertheless be held liable and subject to prosecution,
trial and punishment according to law.

The court is not saying that the members and other constitutional officer are entitled to immunity from liability. What the
court is merely saying is that there is a fundamental procedural requirement that must be observed before such liability
ma be determined. A member of the SC must first be removed from office, via the constitutional route of impeachment,
and then only may he be held liable either criminally or administratively (that is, disbarment), for any wrong or
misbehavior in appropriate proceedings.

f.9.c Procedure (Article XI, Sec. 3[1] to [6])

Section 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment.

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by
any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of
Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter.
The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House
within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall
be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable
resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of
each Member shall be recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members
of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith
proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of
one year.

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that
purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the
concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The HOR Committee on Justice (02/15/2011)

The Ombudsman, Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez (petitioner), challenges via petition for certiorari and prohibition the
Resolutions of September 1 and 7, 2010 of the House of Representatives Committee on Justice (public respondent).
It was alleged in the 2 complaints against the Ombudsman that she committed culpable violation of the Constitution
and betrayal of public trust.

Petitioner basically anchors her claim on alleged violation of the due process clause (Art. III, Sec. 1) and of the one-
year bar provision (Art. XI, Sec 3, par. 5) of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether public respondent violated the one year bar provision for the issuance of 2 resolutions within a year

Ruling: No.
On the argument that impeachment proceedings
are beyond the reach of judicial review (debunked).
In Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives:

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 The major difference between the judicial power of
the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S.
Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial
review is only impliedly granted to the U.S.
Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that
granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower
courts, as expressly provided for in the
Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and
it was given an expanded definition to include the
power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on
the part of any government branch or
instrumentality. There are also glaring distinctions
between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine.
Constitution with respect to the power of the House
of Representatives over impeachment
proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows
sole power of impeachment to the House of
Representatives without limitation, our Constitution,
though vesting in the House of Representatives the
exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases,
provides for several limitations to the exercise of
such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4)
and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include
the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the
contention that the exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedings would upset the system
of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is
to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not
The one-year bar rule
Contrary to petitioners asseveration, Francisco states
that the term initiate means to file the complaint and
take initial action on it. The initiation starts with the filing
of the complaint which must be accompanied with an
action to set the complaint moving. It refers to the filing
of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress
taking initial action of said complaint. The initial action
taken by the House on the complaint is the referral of
the complaint to the Committee on Justice.
The term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the
impeachment complaint coupled with Congress'
taking initial action of said complaint. Having
concluded that the initiation takes place by the act
of filing and referral or endorsement of the
impeachment complaint to the House Committee
on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of
the members of the House of Representatives with
the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of
Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated, another
impeachment complaint may not be filed against
the same official within a one-year period.
The filing of an impeachment complaint is like the
lighting of a matchstick. Lighting the matchstick alone,
however, cannot light up the candle, unless the lighted
matchstick reaches or torches the candle
wick. Referring the complaint to the proper committee
ignites the impeachment proceeding. With
a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed,
more than one lighted matchsticks light the candle at
the same time. What is important is that there
should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a
year, such that once the candle starts burning,
the one year bar on the impeachment of one and
the same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial
review of impeachments undermines their finality
and may also lead to conflicts between Congress
and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to
exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that
"whenever possible, the Court should defer to the
judgment of the people expressed legislatively,
recognizing full well the perils of judicial willfulness
and pride."
But did not the people also express their will when
they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in
the Constitution? This shows that the Constitution
did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment
to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it
provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the
language of Baker v. Carr, "judicially discoverable
standards" for determining the validity of the
exercise of such discretion, through the power of
judicial review.
to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral
components of the calibrated system of
independence and interdependence that insures
that no branch of government act beyond the
powers assigned to it by the Constitution
subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the
candle.
The question as to who should administer or
pronounce that an impeachment proceeding has been
initiated rests also on the body that administers the
proceedings prior to the impeachment trial.
A proceeding which takes place not in the Senate
but in the House precedes the bringing of an
impeachment case to the Senate. In fact, petitioner
concedes that the initiation of impeachment
proceedings is within the sole and absolute control of
the House of Representatives.
Referral of the complaint to the proper committee is not
done by the House Speaker alone either, which
explains why there is a need to include it in the Order
of Business of the House. It is the House of
Representatives, in public plenary session, which has
the power to set its own chamber into special operation
by referring the complaint or to otherwise guard against
the initiation of a second impeachment proceeding by
rejecting a patently unconstitutional complaint.
Under the Rules of the House, a motion to refer is not
among those motions that shall be decided without
debate, but any debate thereon is only made subject to
the five-minute rule. With respect to complaints for
impeachment, the House has the discretion not to refer
a subsequent impeachment complaint to the
Committee on Justice where official records and further
debate show that an impeachment complaint filed
against the same impeachable officer has already
been referred to the said committee and the one year
period has not yet expired, lest it becomes instrumental
in perpetrating a constitutionally prohibited second
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impeachment proceeding. Far from being mechanical,
before the referral stage, a period of deliberation is
afforded the House, as the Constitution, in fact, grants
a maximum of three session days within which to make
the proper referral.
Deadlines. The Constitution states that [a] verified
complaint for impeachment may be filed by any
Member of the House of Representatives or by any
citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any
Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order
of Business within ten session days, and referred to the
proper Committee within three session days thereafter.
As pointed out in Francisco, the impeachment
proceeding is not initiated when the House deliberates
on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee,
because something prior to that has already been
done. The action of the House is already a further step
in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather,
the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified
complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on
Justice for action. This is the initiating step which
triggers the series of steps that follow
Justice Azcuna stated that the purpose of the one-year
bar is two-fold: to prevent undue or too frequent
harassment; and 2) to allow the legislature to do its
principal task [of] legislation. Impeachment
proceedings take a lot of time. It becomes clear that the
consideration behind the intended limitation refers to
the element of time, and not the number of
complaints. The impeachable officer should defend
himself in only one impeachment proceeding, so that
he will not be precluded from performing his official
functions and duties.

Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The HOR Committee on Justice (03/08/2011)

For resolution is petitioners "Motion for Reconsideration. To argue, as petitioner does, that there never was a
simultaneous referral of two impeachment complaints as they were actually referred to the committee "separately, one
after the other "is to dismantle her own interpretation of Francisco that the one-year bar is to be reckoned from the filing
of the impeachment complaint. Petitioners Motion concedes that the Francisco doctrine on the initiation of an
impeachment proceeding includes the Houses initial action on the complaint. By recognizing the legal import of a
referral, petitioner abandons her earlier claim that per Francisco an impeachment proceeding is initiated by the mere
filing of an impeachment complaint.

Having uprooted her reliance on the Francisco case in propping her position that the initiation of an impeachment
proceeding must be reckoned from the filing of the complaint, petitioner insists on actual initiation and not "constructive
initiation by legal fiction" as averred by Justice Adolfo Azcuna in his separate opinion in Francisco.

In Justice Azcunas opinion which concurred with the majority, what he similarly found untenable was the stretching of
the reckoning point of initiation to the time that the Committee on Justice (the Committee) report reaches the floor of
the House. Notably, the provisions of the Impeachment Rules of the 12th Congress that were successfully challenged
in Francisco provided that an impeachment proceeding was to be "deemed initiated" upon the Committees finding of
sufficiency of substance or upon the Houses affirmance or overturning of the Committees finding, which was clearly
referred to as the instances "presumably for internal purposes of the House, as to the timing of some of its internal
action on certain relevant matters. "Definitely, "constructive initiation by legal fiction" did not refer to the aspects of filing
and referral in the regular course of impeachment, for this was precisely the gist of Francisco in pronouncing what
initiation means.

The Court adhered to the Francisco-ordained balance in the tug-of-war between those who want to stretch and those
who want to shrink the term "initiate," either of which could disrupt the provisions congruency to the rationale of the
constitutional provision. Petitioners imputation that the Courts Decision presents a sharp deviation from Francisco as it
defers the operability of the one-year bar rule rings hollow.

Petitioner urges that the word "initiate" must be read in its plain, ordinary and technical meaning, for it is contrary to
reason, logic and common sense to reckon the beginning or start of the initiation process from its end or conclusion.

Petitioner would have been correct had the subject constitutional provision been worded as "no initiation process of the
impeachment proceeding shall be commenced against the same official more than once within a period of one year,"
in which case the reckoning would literally point to the "start of the beginning." To immediately reckon the initiation to
what petitioner herself concedes as the start of the initiation process is to countenance a raw or half-baked initiation.

In re-affirming what the phrase "no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated" means, the Court closely applied
Francisco on what comprises or completes the initiation phase. Nothing can be more unequivocal or well-defined than
the elucidation of filing-and-referral in Francisco. Petitioner must come to terms with her denial of the exact terms of
Francisco.

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Petitioner posits that referral is not an integral or indispensable part of the initiation of impeachment proceedings, in
case of a direct filing of a verified complaint or resolution of impeachment by at least one-third of all the Members of
the House.

Issue: Whether the period of one year to file impeachment complaint is mandatory.

Ruling: The decision is sustained

Impeachment. The House cannot indeed refuse to refer an impeachment complaint that is filed without a subsisting
bar. To refer an impeachment complaint within an existing one-year bar, however, is to commit the apparently
unconstitutional act of initiating a second impeachment proceeding, which may be struck down under Rule 65 for grave
abuse of discretion. It bears recalling that the one-year bar rule itself is a constitutional limitation on the Houses power
or function to refer a complaint.

Tackling on the House floor in its order of business a clearly constitutionally-prohibited second impeachment complaint
on the matter of whether to make the appropriate referral goes precisely into the propriety of the referral and not on the
merits of the complaint. The House needs only to ascertain the existence or expiry of the constitutional ban of one year,
without any regard to the claims set forth in the complaint.

To petitioner, the intervening days from the filing of the complaint to whatever completes the initiation of an
impeachment proceeding is immaterial in mitigating the influx of successive complaints since allowing multiple
impeachment charges would result to the same harassment and oppression. She particularly cites Constitutional
Commissioner Ricardo Romulos concerns on the amount of time spent if "multiple impeachment charges "are allowed.
She fails, however, to establish whether Commissioner Romulo limited or quantified his reference to not more than one
complaint or charge.

In sum, the Court did not deviate from, as it did apply the twin rule of filing and referral in the present case, with Francisco
as the guiding light. Petitioner refuses to see the other half of that light, however.

DENIED FOR BEING BEREFT OF MERIT.

f.9.d Effect (Article XI, Sec. 3[7])

Sec. 3 (7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall
nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment, according to law.

Barcenas v. HOR
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix William D.
Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner
of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund
(JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of
the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B.
Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee. The House Committee on Justice
ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same
on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been
sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and
three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House
Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of
the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution.
This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at
least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a political crisis.

Ruling:
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the
House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear.

51
Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first
impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with
seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5,
2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is
not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the
political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not
intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of
political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions." Truly political
questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be
maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which
are not truly political in nature.

f.10 Power to amend constitution

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