You are on page 1of 46

G.R. No.

174673

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,


vs.
FE ROA GIMENEZ AND IGNACIO B. GIMENEZ, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Rules of procedure are not ends in themselves. The object of these rules is to assist and facilitate a trial court's
function to be able to receive all the evidence of the parties, and evaluate their admissibility and probative value
in the context of the issues presented by the parties' pleadings in order to arrive at a conclusion as to the facts
that transpired. Having been able to establish the facts, the trial court will then be able to apply the law and
determine whether a complainant is deserving of the reliefs prayed for in the pleading.

Dismissal on the basis of a very strict interpretation of procedural rules without a clear demonstration of the
injury to a substantive right of the defendant weighed against 19 years of litigation actively participated in by
both parties should not be encouraged.

There is likewise serious reversible error, even grave abuse of discretion, when the Sandiganbayan dismisses
a case on demurrer to evidence without a full statement of its evaluation of the evidence presented and offered
and the interpretation of the relevant law. After all, dismissal on the basis of demurrer to evidence is similar to a
judgment. It is a final order ruling on the merits of a case.

This is a Petition1 for Review on Certiorari assailing the Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated May 25, 20062 and
September 13, 2006.3 The Sandiganbayan deemed petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) to have
waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence4 and granted the Motion to Dismiss of respondents Spouses
Ignacio Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez (Gimenez Spouses) based on demurrer to evidence.5

The Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), instituted a Complaint6 for
Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting, Restitution and Damages against the Gimenez Spouses before the
Sandiganbayan.7 "The Complaint seeks to recover . . . ill-gotten wealth . . . acquired by [the Gimenez Spouses]
as dummies, agents[,] or nominees of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda Marcos[.]"8

During trial, the Republic presented documentary evidence attesting to the positions held, business interests,
income, and pertinent transactions of the Gimenez Spouses.9 The Republic presented the testimonies of Atty.
Tereso Javier, Head of the Sequestered Assets Department of PCGG, and of Danilo R.V. Daniel, Director of
the Research and Development Department of PCGG.10 Witnesses testified on the bank accounts and
businesses owned or controlled by the Gimenez Spouses.11

On February 27, 2006, the Sandiganbayan denied a motion to recall Danilo R.V. Daniel’s testimony. 12 The
Republic then manifested that it was "no longer presenting further evidence."13 Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan
gave the Republic 30 days or until March 29, 2006 "to file its formal offer of evidence."14

On March 29, 2006, the Republic moved "for an extension of thirty (30) days or until April 28, 2006, within
which to file [its] formal offer of evidence."15 This Motion was granted by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution of
the same date.16

On April 27, 2006, the Republic moved for an additional 15 days or until May 13, 2006 within which to file its
Formal Offer of Evidence.17 This Motion was granted by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution dated May 8,
2006.18 Following this, no additional Motion for extension was filed by the Republic.

In the first assailed Resolution dated May 25, 2006, the Sandiganbayan noted that the Republic failed to file
its Formal Offer of Evidence notwithstanding repeated extensions and the lapse of 75 days from the date it

DEMURRER CASES – BRONDIAL LIST


terminated its presentation of evidence.19 Thus, it declared that the Republic waived the filing of its Formal Offer
of Evidence.20

The first assailed Resolution provides:

It appearing that the plaintiff has long terminated the presentation of its evidence on February 27, 2006, and it
appearing further that it failed or otherwise neglected to file its written formal offer of evidence for an
unreasonable period of time consisting of 75 days (i.e., 30 days original period plus two extension periods
totaling 45 days), the filing of said written formal offer of evidence is hereby deemed WAIVED.

WHEREFORE, the reception of the defendants’ evidence shall proceed on June 22 and 23, 2006, both at 8:30
o’clock [sic] in the morning as previously scheduled.21

Ignacio Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence dated May 30, 2006. 22 He argued that the
Republic showed no right to relief as there was no evidence to support its cause of action. 23 Fe Roa Gimenez
filed a Motion to Dismiss dated June 13, 2006 on the ground of failure to prosecute. 24 Through her own Motion
to Dismiss, she joined Ignacio Gimenez’s demurrer to evidence.25

Two days after Fe Roa Gimenez’s filing of the Motion to Dismiss or on June 15, 2006, the Republic filed a
Motion for Reconsideration [of the first assailed Resolution] and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of
Evidence.26 The pertinent portions of the Republic’s offer of documentary exhibits attached to the Motion are
summarized as follows:

Exhibits A to G and series consist of the Income Tax Returns, Certificate of Income Tax Withheld On
Compensation, Statement of Tax Withheld At Source, Schedule of Interest Income, Royalties and Withholding
Tax, Statement of Assets, Liabilities & Net Worth of Ignacio B. Gimenez from 1980-1986 proving his legitimate
income during said period. Exhibits H -J and series refer to the Deeds of Sale and Transfer Certificates of Title
proving that spouses Gimenezes acquired several real properties.

Exhibits K and series (K-1-K-4) pertain to Checking Statements Summary issued by the Bankers Trust
Company (BTC) proving that Fe Roa Gimenez maintained a current account under Account Number 34-714-
415 with BTC. Exhibits L and series (L1-L-114) are several BTC checks, proving that from June 1982 to April
1984, Fe Roa Gimenez issued several checks against her BTC Current Account No. 34-714-415 payable to
some individuals and entities such as Erlinda Oledan, Vilma Bautista, The Waldorf Towers, Cartier, Gliceria
Tantoco, Bulgari, Hammer Galleries and Renato Balestra, involving substantial amount of money in US
Dollars. Exhibits M and series (M1-M-25) are several The Chase Manhattan Bank (TCMB) checks drawn
against the account of Fe Roa Gimenez under Account Number 021000021, proving that she issued several
checks drawn against her TCMB account, payable to individuals and entities such as Gliceria Tantoco, Vilma
Bautista and The Waldorf Towers, involving substantial sums in US Dollars. Exhibit N is the Philippine National
Bank (PNB), New York Branch Office Charge Ticket No. FT 56880 dated December 9, 1982 in the amount of
US$30,000.00 for Fe Roa Gimenez proving that she received said enormous amount from the PNB, New York
Branch Office, with clearance from the Central Bank, which amount was charged against PNB Manila. Exhibit
N-1 is the PNB New York Branch Advice to Payee No. FT 56535 dated November 12, 1982 in the amount of
US$10,990.00 for Fe Roa Gimenez proving her receipt of such amount as remitted from California Overseas
Bank, Los Angeles. Exhibits O and series (O1-O-8) refer to several Advices made by Bankers Trust AG
Zurich-Geneve Bank in Switzerland to respondent Fe Roa Gimenez proving that she maintained a current
account with said bank under Account Number 107094.50 and that from July 30, 1984 to August 30, 1984, she
placed a substantial amount on time deposit in several banks, namely, Hypobank, Luzemburg, Luxemburg,
Societe Generale, Paris and Bank of Nova Scotia, London.

Exhibit P is the Certification dated March 19, 2002 issued by Director Florino O. Ibanez of the Office of the
President proving that Fe Roa Gimenez, from January 1, 1966 to April 1, 1986, worked with the Office of the
President under different positions, the last of which as Presidential Staff Director with a salary of P87,072.00
per annum.

DEMURRER CASES – BRONDIAL LIST


Exhibit Q and series (Q-1-Q-18) is the Affirmation of Ralph Shapiro filed with the United States Court of
Appeals in the case entitled, "The Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al." which discussed
certain acts of Fe Roa Gimenez and Vilma Bautista, among others, in relation to the funds of the Marcoses.

Exhibits R and S and series (R-1, R-9; S-1-S-10) refer to the Certificate of Filing of Amended Articles of
Incorporation of GEI Guaranteed Education, Inc., the Amended Articles of Incorporation of GEI Guaranteed
Education, Inc., the Treasurer’s Affidavit executed by Ignacio Gimenez and the Director’s Certificate executed
by Roberto B. Olanday, Ignacio Gimenez and Roberto Coyuto, Jr. proving Ignacio Gimenez and Roberto
Olanday’s interests in GEl Guaranteed Education, Inc.

Exhibits T and series (T-1-T-8) are the Advices made by the Bankers Trust AG Zurich-Geneve Bank in
Switzerland to Ignacio Gimenez proving that he maintained a current account with said bank under Account
Number 101045.50 and that from March to June, 1984, he placed a substantial amount on time deposit in
several banks, namely, Credit Lyonnais, Brussels, Societe Generale, Paris, Credit Commercial De France,
Paris and Bank of Nova Scotia, London.

Exhibits U and V and series (U-1-U-5; V1-V-18) consist of the Affidavit dated April 25, 1986 and the
Declaration dated June 23, 1987 including the attachments, of Oscar Carino, Vice-President and Manager of
the PNB New York Branch, narrating in detail how the funds of the PNB New York Branch were disbursed
outside regular banking business upon the instructions of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda
Marcos using Fe Roa Gimenez and others as conduit.

Exhibits W and series (W-1-W-4) are the Debit memos from the PNB to Fe Roa Gimenez while Exhibits X
and X-1 are the Acknowledgments of said respondent, proving that she received substantial amounts of money
which were coursed through the PNB to be used by the Marcos spouses for state visits and foreign trips.

Exhibit Y and series (Y-1-Y-2) is the Letter dated August 25, 1986 of Juan C. Gatmaitan, Assistant Chief
Legal Counsel of PNB to Charles G. LaBella, Assistant United States Attorney regarding the ongoing
investigation of irregular transactions at the PNB, New York Branch proving that PNB cooperated with the
United States government in connection with the investigation on the irregular transactions of Oscar Carino at
PNB New York Branch.

Exhibit Z is the service record of Fe Roa Gimenez issued by Florino O. Ibanez of the Office of the President
which proves that she worked with the Office of the President from 1966-1986 holding different positions, the
last of which was Presidential Staff Director.
1âwphi 1

Exhibits AA and series (AA-1 –AA-2) are the several Traders Royal Bank checks drawn against Account No.
74-702836-9 under the account name of Fe Roa Gimenez which prove that she issued said checks payable to
individuals and entities involving substantial amount of money.

Exhibits BB and CC and series (BB-1–BB-17; CC-1-CC-3) are the several Transfer of Funds Advice from
Traders Royal Bank Statements of Account of Fe Roa Gimenez, proving that she maintained a current account
under Account No. 74-7028369 at Traders Royal Bank.

Exhibits HH and series (HH-1-HH-3) are the Certification dated October 3, 2002 of Lamberto R. Barbin,
Officer-in-Charge, Malacanang Records Office, that the Statement of Assets and Liabilities of spouses
Marcoses for the years 1965 up to 1986 are not among the records on file in said Office except 1965, 1967 and
1969; the Statement of Assets and Liabilities as of December 31, 1969 and December 31, 1967 of former
President Ferdinand Marcos; and the Sworn Statement of Financial Condition, Assets, Income and Liabilities
as of December 31, 1965 of former President Ferdinand Marcos. These documentary exhibits prove the assets
and liabilities of former President Marcos for the years 1965,1967 and 1969.

Exhibit II and series is [sic] the Statement of Assets and Liabilities as of December 31,1969 submitted by Fe
Roa Gimenez which prove that her assets on that period amounted only to P39,500.00.

DEMURRER CASES – BRONDIAL LIST


Exhibit KK is the Table of Contents of Civil Case No. [0]007 before the Sandiganbayan entitled "Republic of
the Philippines vs. Ignacio B. Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez, et. al.", including its Annexes which prove the
assets and liabilities of spouses Gimenezes.

Exhibits KK-1 up to KK-12 are several transfer certificates of title and tax declarations in the names of
spouses Gimenezes, proving their acquisition of several real properties.

Exhibits KK-15, KK-18, KK-20 up to KK-27, KK-30, KK-32 up to KK-38 and KK-40 are the General
Information Sheet, Certificate of Filing of Amended Articles of Incorporation, and Amended Articles of
Incorporation of various corporations. These prove the corporations in which Ignacio B. Gimenez has
substantial interests.

Exhibits KK-41 up to KK-44 are the Writs and Letters of Sequestration issued by the PCGG which prove that
the shares of stocks of Ignacio Gimenez in Ignacio B. Gimenez, Securities, Inc. and the real properties covered
by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 137638, 132807, 126693 and 126694 located in San Fabian, Pangasinan,
were sequestered by the PCGG.

Exhibit KK-45 is the Memorandum dated August 1, 1988 of Atty. Ralph S. Lee and Alexander M. Berces,
Team Supervisor and Investiogator, [sic] respectively, of IRD, PCGG, proving that the PCGG conducted an
investigation on New City Builders, Inc., Transnational Construction Corporation, and OTO Construction and
Development Corporation in relation to Ignacio B. Gimenez and Roberto O. Olanday.

Exhibits KK-48, KK-49 and KK-50 are certain Lis Pendens from the PCGG addressed to the concerned
Register of Deeds informing that the real properties mentioned therein had been sequestered and are the
subject of Civil Case No. [0]007 before the Sandiganbayan.

Exhibits KK-51, KK-51-A, KK-52 and KK-52-A are the Letter and Writ of Sequestration issued by the PCGG
on Allied Banking Corporation and Guaranteed Education Inc. pursuant to its mandate to go after ill-gotten
wealth.

Exhibits NN, OO, PP, QQ and QQ-1 refer to the Memorandum To All Commercial Banks dated March 14,
1986 issued by then Central Bank Governor Jose B. Fernandez and the Letter dated March 13, 1986 of Mary
Concepcion Bautista, PCGG Commissioner addressed to then Central Bank Governor Fernandez requesting
that names be added to the earlier request of PCGG Chairman Jovito Salonga to instruct all commercial banks
not to allow any withdrawal or transfer of funds from the market placements under the names of said persons,
to include spouses Gimenezes, without authority from PCGG.

Exhibits KK and series, NN, OO, PP, QQ and QQ-1 which prove the various real properties, business
interests and bank accounts owned by spouses Gimenezes were part of the testimony of Atty. Tereso Javier.

Exhibit RR and series (RR-1-RR-23) are the Affidavit dated July 24, 1987 of Dominador Pangilinan, Acting
President and President of Trader’s Royal Bank, and the attached Recapitulation, Status of Banker’s
Acceptances, Status of Funds and Savings Account Ledger wherein he mentioned that Malacanang
maintained trust accounts at Trader’s Royal Bank, the balance of which is approximately 150-175 million
Pesos, and that he was informed by Mr. Rivera that the funds were given to him (Rivera) by Fe Roa Gimenez
for deposit to said accounts.

Exhibits SS and series (SS-1-SS-29) are the Affidavit dated July 23, 1987 of Apolinario K. Medina, Executive
Vice President of Traders Royal Bank and attachments, which include Recapitulation, Status of Funds, and
Messages from Traders Royal Bank Manila to various foreign banks. In his Affidavit, Medina divulged certain
numbered confidential trust accounts maintained by Malacanang with the Trader’s Royal Bank. He further
stated that the deposits were so substantial that he suspected that they had been made by President Marcos or
his family.

Exhibit TT and series (TT-1-TT-3) is [sic] the Memorandum dated July 19, 2005 of Danilo R.V. Daniel, then
Director of the Research and Development Department of PCGG regarding the investigation conducted on the

DEMURRER CASES – BRONDIAL LIST


ill-gotten wealth of spouses Gimenezes, the subject matter of Civil Case No. [0]007. He revealed that during
the investigation on the ill-gotten wealth of spouses Gimenezes, it was found out that from 1977 to 1982,
several withdrawals, in the total amount of P75,090,306.42 were made from Trust Account No. 128 (A/C 76-
128) in favor of I.B. Gimenez, I.B. Gimenez Securities and Fe Roa Gimenez.

Exhibits RR, SS, TT and their series prove that spouses Gimenez maintained bank accounts of substantial
amounts and gained control of various corporations. These are also being offered as part of the testimony of
1âwphi 1

Danilo R.V. Daniel.27 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

In the second assailed Resolution dated September 13, 2006, the Sandiganbayan denied the Republic’s
Motion for Reconsideration and granted the Gimenez Spouses’ Motion to Dismiss.28 According to the
Sandiganbayan:

While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities and that the higher ends of substantial justice
militate against dismissal of cases purely on technical grounds, the circumstances of this case show that the
ends of justice will not be served if this Court allows the wanton disregard of the Rules of Court and of the
Court’s orders. Rules of procedure are designed for the proper and prompt disposition of cases. . . .

The reasons invoked by the plaintiff to justify its failure to timely file the formal offer of evidence fail to persuade
this Court. The missing exhibits mentioned by the plaintiff’s counsel appear to be the same missing documents
since 2004, or almost two (2) years ago. The plaintiff had more than ample time to locate them for its purpose. .
. . Since they remain missing after lapse of the period indicated by the Court, there is no reason why the search
for these documents should delay the filing of the formal offer of evidence.

[Petitioner’s] counsel . . . admits that faced with other pressing matters, he lost track of the time. We cannot just
turn a blind eye on the negligence of the parties and in their failure to observe the orders of this Court. The
carelessness of [petitioner’s] counsel in keeping track of the deadlines is an unacceptable reason for the Court
to set aside its Order and relax the observance of the period set for filing the formal offer of evidence. 29 (Citation
omitted)

The Sandiganbayan also found that the Republic failed to prosecute its case for an unreasonable length of time
and to comply with the court’s rules.30 The court also noted that the documentary evidence presented by the
Republic consisted mostly of certified true copies.31 However, the persons who certified the documents as
copies of the original were not presented.32 Hence, the evidence lacked probative value.33 The dispositive
portion of the assailed Resolution reads:

ACCORDINGLY, there being no valid and cogent justification shown by the plaintiff for the Court to Grant its
Motion for Reconsideration and admit its Formal Offer of Evidence, the plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration
and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence is DENIED. The Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence
filed by the defendant Ignacio B. Gimenez and adopted by defendant Fe Roa Gimenez is GRANTED. The case
is then DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.34 (Emphasis in the original)

The Republic filed its Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 3, 2006 before this court. 35

The Gimenez Spouses were required to comment on the Petition.36 This court noted the separate
Comments37 filed by the Gimenez Spouses.38 The Republic responded to the Comments through a
Consolidated Reply39 dated June 22, 2007.

In the Resolution40 dated August 29, 2007, this court required the parties to submit their memoranda. 41

On February 18, 2008, this court resolved to require the parties to "move in the premises[.]"42

DEMURRER CASES – BRONDIAL LIST


On March 2, 2012, the Republic filed a Motion for Leave to Re-open Proceedings, to File and Admit Attached
Supplement to the Petition for Certiorari.43 In this Supplement, the Republic argued that the second assailed
Resolution dated September 13, 2006 was void for failing to state the facts and the law on which it was
based.44This Motion was granted, and the Gimenez Spouses were required to file their Comment on the
Supplement to the Petition.45 Thereafter, the Republic filed its Reply.46

Fe Roa Gimenez filed a Rejoinder47 dated December 19, 2012 which was expunged by this court in a
Resolution48dated January 23, 2013. Ignacio Gimenez’s Motion for Leave to File and Admit Attached
Rejoinder49 was denied.50

The Republic raised the following issues:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in dismissing the case in the light of the allegations in the
Complaint which were substantiated by overwhelming evidence presented vis-a-vis the material admissions of
spouses Gimenezes as their answer failed to specifically deny that they were dummies of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos and that they acquired illegal wealth grossly disproportionate to their lawful income in a
manner prohibited under the Constitution and Anti-Graft Statutes.

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in denying petitioner’s Motion to Admit Formal Offer of
Evidence on the basis of mere technicalities, depriving petitioner of its right to due process.

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in making a sweeping pronouncement that petitioner’s
evidence do not bear any probative value.51

The issues for consideration of this court are:

First, whether a Petition for Review on Certiorari was the proper remedy to assail the Sandiganbayan
Resolutions; and

Second, whether the Sandiganbayan erred in holding that petitioner Republic of the Philippines waived the
filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence and in granting respondents Ignacio Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez’s
Motion to Dismiss on demurrer to evidence.

We grant the Petition.

Respondent Ignacio Gimenez pictures petitioner as being confused as to the proper mode of review of the
Sandiganbayan Resolutions. According to him, petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion.52 Hence, petitioner should have filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and not a petition
for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.53 Nevertheless, the Sandiganbayan did not commit any error,
and petitioner has to show that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or
in excess of jurisdiction.54

Observance of the proper procedure before courts, especially before the Sandiganbayan, cannot be stressed
enough. Due process is enshrined in the Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights. 55 "Due process [in criminal
cases] guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved[.]"56 "Mere suspicion of
guilt should not sway judgment."57

To determine whether a petition for review is the proper remedy to assail the Sandiganbayan Resolutions, we
review the nature of actions for reconveyance, revision, accounting, restitution, and damages.

Actions for reconveyance, revision, accounting, restitution, and damages for ill-gotten wealth are also called
civil forfeiture proceedings.

DEMURRER CASES – BRONDIAL LIST


Republic Act No. 137958 provides for the procedure by which forfeiture proceedings may be instituted against
public officers or employees who "[have] acquired during his [or her] incumbency an amount of property which
is manifestly out of proportion to his [or her] salary as such public officer or employee and to his [or her] other
lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, [which] property shall be presumed prima
facie to have been unlawfully acquired."59

This court has already settled the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over civil forfeiture cases:

. . . violations of R.A. No. 1379 are placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, even though the
proceeding is civil in nature, since the forfeiture of the illegally acquired property amounts to a penalty.60

In Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,61 this court re-affirmed the doctrine that forfeiture proceedings under
Republic Act No. 1379 are civil in nature.62 Civil forfeiture proceedings were also differentiated from plunder
cases:

. . . a forfeiture case under RA 1379 arises out of a cause of action separate and different from a plunder case.
. . . In a prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be established is the commission of the criminal acts in
furtherance of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. . . . On the other hand, all that the court needs to determine,
by preponderance of evidence, under RA 1379 is the disproportion of respondent’s properties to his legitimate
income, it being unnecessary to prove how he acquired said properties. As correctly formulated by the Solicitor
General, the forfeitable nature of the properties under the provisions of RA 1379 does not proceed from a
determination of a specific overt act committed by the respondent public officer leading to the acquisition of the
illegal wealth.63(Citation omitted)

To stress, the quantum of evidence required for forfeiture proceedings under Republic Act No. 1379 is the
same with other civil cases — preponderance of evidence.64

When a criminal case based on demurrer to evidence is dismissed, the dismissal is equivalent to an acquittal. 65

As a rule, once the court grants the demurrer, the grant amounts to an acquittal; any further prosecution of the
accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. 66

Hence, the Republic may only assail an acquittal through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court:

Accordingly, a review of a dismissal order of the Sandiganbayan granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence
may be done via the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, based on the narrow ground of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.67 (Citation omitted)

In this case, a civil forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379, petitioner correctly filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Section 1 of the Rule provides the mode of appeal from
judgments, final orders, or resolutions of the Sandiganbayan:

SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.— A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or
final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts
whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The
petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.

II

Petitioner argues that substantial justice requires doing away with the procedural technicalities. 68 Loss of vital
documentary proof warranted extensions to file the Formal Offer of Evidence.69 Honest efforts to locate several
missing documents resulted in petitioner’s inability to file the pleading within the period granted by the
Sandiganbayan.70

DEMURRER CASES – BRONDIAL LIST


Respondent Ignacio Gimenez argues that petitioner cannot fault the Sandiganbayan for its incompetence
during trial.71 Even if the evidence were formally offered within the prescribed period, PCGG’s evidence still had
no probative value.72 It is solely petitioner’s fault "that the persons who certified to the photocopies of the
originals were not presented to testify[.]"73 It is also misleading to argue that the pieces of documentary
evidence presented are public documents.74 "The documents are not public in the sense that these are official
issuances of the Philippine government." 75 "The bulk consists mainly of notarized, private documents that have
simply been certified true and faithful."76

According to respondent Fe Roa Gimenez, petitioner tries to excuse its non-filing of the Formal Offer of
Evidence within the prescribed period by raising its efforts to locate the 66 missing documents. 77 However, the
issue of the missing documents was laid to rest during the hearing on November 16, 2004.78 The
Sandiganbayan gave petitioner until March 2005 to produce the documents; otherwise, these would be
excluded.79 The testimonies of the witnesses related to the missing documents would also be expunged from
the case records.80

Moreover, respondent Fe Roa Gimenez claims that "[t]he Sandiganbayan did not err when it ruled that the
great bulk of the documentary evidence offered by the PCGG have no probative value."81 Aside from the 66
missing documents it failed to present, almost all of petitioner’s pieces of documentary evidence were mere
photocopies.82The few that were certified true copies were not testified on by the persons who certified these
documents.83

Our Rules of Court lays down the procedure for the formal offer of evidence. Testimonial evidence is offered "at
the time [a] witness is called to testify."84 Documentary and object evidence, on the other hand, are offered
"after the presentation of a party’s testimonial evidence."85 Offer of documentary or object evidence is generally
done orally unless permission is given by the trial court for a written offer of evidence. 86

More importantly, the Rules specifically provides that evidence must be formally offered to be considered by
the court. Evidence not offered is excluded in the determination of the case.87 "Failure to make a formal offer
within a considerable period of time shall be deemed a waiver to submit it."88

Rule 132, Section 34 provides:

SEC. 34. Offer of evidence.— The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The
purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.

The rule on formal offer of evidence is intertwined with the constitutional guarantee of due process. Parties
must be given the opportunity to review the evidence submitted against them and take the necessary actions to
secure their case.89 Hence, any document or object that was marked for identification is not evidence unless it
was "formally offered and the opposing counsel [was] given an opportunity to object to it or cross-examine the
witness called upon to prove or identify it."90

This court explained further the reason for the rule:

The Rules of Court provides that "the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered." A
formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and their judgment only
and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its function is to enable the trial judge to know
the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is presenting the evidence. On the other hand, this allows
opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to its admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the
appellate court will not be required to review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial
court.91 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

To consider a party’s evidence which was not formally offered during trial would deprive the other party of due
process. Evidence not formally offered has no probative value and must be excluded by the court. 92

Petitioner’s failure to file its written Formal Offer of Evidence of the numerous documentary evidence presented
within the prescribed period is a non-issue. In its first assailed Resolution dated May 25, 2006, the

DEMURRER CASES – BRONDIAL LIST


Sandiganbayan declared that petitioner waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence when it failed to file the
pleading on May 13, 2006, the deadline based on the extended period granted by the court. Petitioner was
granted several extensions of time by the Sandiganbayan totalling 75 days from the date petitioner terminated
its presentation of evidence. Notably, this 75-day period included the original 30-day period. Subsequently,
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence, and the Formal
Offer of Evidence.

In resolving petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence, the
Sandiganbayan found the carelessness of petitioner’s counsel unacceptable. According to the Sandiganbayan,
it could not countenance the non-observance of the court’s orders.

This court has long acknowledged the policy of the government to recover the assets and properties illegally
acquired or misappropriated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his wife Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, their
close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents or nominees.93 Hence, this court has
adopted a liberal approach regarding technical rules of procedure in cases involving recovery of ill-gotten
wealth:

In all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the PCGG, this Court has seen fit to set aside technicalities
and formalities that merely serve to delay or impede judicious resolution. This Court prefers to have such cases
resolved on the merits at the Sandiganbayan. But substantial justice to the Filipino people and to all parties
concerned, not mere legalisms or perfection of form, should now be relentlessly and firmly pursued. Almost two
decades have passed since the government initiated its search for and reversion of such ill-gotten wealth. The
definitive resolution of such cases on the merits is thus long overdue. If there is proof of illegal acquisition,
accumulation, misappropriation, fraud or illicit conduct, let it be brought out now. Let the ownership of these
funds and other assets be finally determined and resolved with dispatch, free from all the delaying technicalities
and annoying procedural sidetracks.94 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

To be clear, petitioner was able to file its Formal Offer of Evidence, albeit, belatedly. Petitioner hurdled 19 years
of trial before the Sandiganbayan to present its evidence as shown in its extensive Formal Offer of Evidence.
As petitioner argues:

Undeniable from the records of the case is that petitioner was vigorous in prosecuting the case. The most
tedious and crucial stage of the litigation and presentation of evidence has been accomplished. Petitioner
completed its presentation of evidence proving the ill-gotten nature and character of the funds and assets
sought to be recovered in the present case. It presented vital testimonial and documentary evidence consisting
of voluminous record proving the gross disparity of the subject funds to spouses Gimenezes’ combined
declared income which must be reconveyed to the Republic for being acquired in blatant violation of the
Constitution and the Anti-Graft statutes.95

This court is not unmindful of the difficulty in gathering voluminous documentary evidence in cases of forfeiture
of ill-gotten wealth acquired throughout the years. It is never easy to prosecute corruption and take back what
rightfully belongs to the government and the people of the Republic.

This is not the first time that this court relaxed the rule on formal offer of evidence.

Tan v. Lim96 arose from two civil Complaints: one for injunction and another for legal redemption, which were
heard jointly before the trial court.97 The defendant did not file a Formal Offer of Evidence in the injunction
case98 and merely adopted the evidence offered in the legal redemption case.99 The trial court held that the
defendant’s failure to file his Formal Offer of Evidence in the injunction case rendered the plaintiff’s evidence
therein as uncontroverted.100 The Court of Appeals reversed the Decision and was affirmed by this court.101 This
court ruled that while the trial court’s reasoning in its Decision was technically sound, a liberal interpretation
was more appropriate and in line with substantial justice:

It may be true that Section 34, Rule 132 of the rules directs the court to consider no evidence which has not
been formally offered and that under Section 35, documentary evidence is offered after presentation of
testimonial evidence. However, a liberal interpretation of these Rules would have convinced the trial court that

DEMURRER CASES – BRONDIAL LIST


a separate formal offer of evidence in Civil Case No. 6518 was superfluous because not only was an offer of
evidence made in Civil Case No. 6521 that was being jointly heard by the trial court, counsel for Jose Renato
Lim had already declared he was adopting these evidences for Civil Case No. 6518. The trial court itself stated
that it would freely utilize in one case evidence adduced in the other only to later abandon this posture. Jose
Renato Lim testified in Civil Case No. 6518. The trial court should have at least considered his testimony since
at the time it was made, the rules provided that testimonial evidence is deemed offered at the time the witness
is called to testify. Rules of procedure should not be applied in a very rigid, technical case as they are devised
chiefly to secure and not defeat substantial justice.

....

The logic of the Court of Appeals is highly persuasive. Indeed, apparently, the trial court was being overly
technical about the nonsubmission of Jose Renato Lim’s formal offer of evidence. This posture not only goes
against Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure decreeing a liberal construction of the rules to
promote a just, speedy and inexpensive litigation but ignores the consistent rulings of the Court against utilizing
the rules to defeat the ends of substantial justice. Despite the intervening years, the language of the Court in
Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney-General, still remains relevant:

"x x x. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to
the rival claims of contending parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which courts are always striving to secure to
litigants. It is designed as the means best adapted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end.
It is the means by which the powers of the court are made effective in just judgments. When it loses the
character of the one and takes on that of the other the administration of justice becomes incomplete and
unsatisfactory and lays itself open to grave criticism."102 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Furthermore, "subsequent and substantial compliance . . . may call for the relaxation of the rules of
procedure."103

Weighing the amount of time spent in litigating the case against the number of delays petitioner incurred in
submitting its Formal Offer of Evidence and the state’s policy on recovering ill-gotten wealth, this court is of the
belief that it is but only just that the Rules be relaxed and petitioner be allowed to submit its written Formal Offer
of Evidence. The Sandiganbayan’s Resolutions should be reversed.

III

According to petitioner, the Sandiganbayan erred when it granted the demurrer to evidence filed by
respondents and dismissed the case despite a "prima facie foundation [based on the pleadings and documents
on record] that spouses Gimenezes amassed enormous wealth grossly disproportionate to their lawful income
or declared lawful assets."104

Similarly, the Complaint alleged specific acts committed by respondent Ignacio Gimenez:

[T]aking undue advantage of his relationship, influence, and connection, by himself and/or in unlawful concert
and active collaboration with former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos for the purpose of
mutually enriching themselves and preventing the disclosure and recovery of assets illegally obtained: (a) acted
as the dummy, nominee or agent of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos in several
corporations such as, the Allied Banking Corporation, Acoje Mining Corporation, Baguio Gold Mining, Multi
National Resources, Philippine Oversees, Inc. and Pioneer Natural Resources; (b) unlawfully obtained, through
corporations organized by them such as the New City Builders, Inc. (NCBI), multi-million peso contracts with
the government buildings, such as the University of Life Sports Complex and Dining Hall as well as projects of
the National Manpower Corporation, Human Settlements, GSIS, and Maharlika Livelihood, to the gross and
manifest disadvantage of the Government and the Filipino people; and (c) in furtherance of the above stated
illegal purposes, organized several establishments engaged in food, mining and other businesses such as the
Transnational Construction Corporation, Total Systems Technology, Inc., Pyro Control Technology
Corporation, Asian Alliance, Inc., A & T Development Corporation, RBO Agro Forestry Farm Development

DEMURRER CASES – BRONDIAL LIST


Corporation, Bathala Coal Mining Corporation, Coal Basis Mining Corporation, Titan Coal Mining Corporation,
GEI Guaranteed Education, Inc., and I.B. Gimenez Securities, Inc.105

Despite the specific allegations in the Complaint, petitioner contends that respondents merely gave general
denials to the allegations in the Complaint.106 "[N]o specific denial [was] made on the material allegations [in] the
[C]omplaint."107

Respondents, on the other hand, assert that the Sandiganbayan was correct in granting the Motion to Dismiss
on demurrer to evidence.

Respondent Ignacio Gimenez claims that petitioner cannot be excused from filing its Formal Offer of Evidence
considering the numerous extensions given by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner had all the resources and time to
gather, collate, and secure the necessary evidence to build its case. 108 Petitioner’s presentation of evidence
took 19 years to complete, and yet it failed to submit the necessary documents and pleading.109

Similarly, respondent Fe Roa Gimenez argues that petitioner was negligent in failing to comply with the
Sandiganbayan’s orders considering the inordinate amount of time given to petitioner to present evidence,
which resulted in only five witnesses in 19 years.110

To determine the propriety of granting respondents’ Motion to Dismiss based on Demurrer to Evidence, we
review the nature of demurrer.

Rule 33, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence.— After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the
defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no
right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on
appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.

In Oropesa v. Oropesa111 where this court affirmed the dismissal of the case on demurrer to evidence due to
petitioner’s non-submission of the Formal Offer of Evidence,112 demurrer to evidence was defined as:

. . . "an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary
produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue." We have
also held that a demurrer to evidence "authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the defendant
having to submit evidence on his part, as he would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff’s evidence shows that he is
not entitled to the relief sought."113 (Citations omitted)

This court has laid down the guidelines in resolving a demurrer to evidence:

A demurrer to evidence may be issued when, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to
relief. Where the plaintiff’s evidence together with such inferences and conclusions as may reasonably be
drawn therefrom does not warrant recovery against the defendant, a demurrer to evidence should be
sustained. A demurrer to evidence is likewise sustainable when, admitting every proven fact favorable to the
plaintiff and indulging in his favor all conclusions fairly and reasonably inferable therefrom, the plaintiff has
failed to make out one or more of the material elements of his case, or when there is no evidence to support an
allegation necessary to his claim. It should be sustained where the plaintiff’s evidence is prima facie insufficient
for a recovery.114

Furthermore, this court already clarified what the trial court determines when acting on a motion to dismiss
based on demurrer to evidence:

What should be resolved in a motion to dismiss based on a demurrer to evidence is whether the plaintiff is
entitled to the relief based on the facts and the law. The evidence contemplated by the rule on demurrer is that

DEMURRER CASES – BRONDIAL LIST


which pertains to the merits of the case, excluding technical aspects such as capacity to sue. . . . 115 (Emphasis
supplied, citation omitted)

Petitioner, in its Supplement to the Petition, argued that the testimonial evidence it had presented and offered
during trial warranted consideration and analysis.116 The Sandiganbayan erroneously excluded these
testimonies in determining whether to grant the motion to dismiss or not, hence:

. . . even assuming that the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s formal offer of evidence, petitioner still had
testimonial evidence in its favor which should [have] been considered. It behoved then upon the
Sandiganbayan to discuss or include in its discussion, at the very least, an analysis of petitioner’s testimonial
evidence.117

With our ruling reversing the Sandiganbayan’s Resolutions on petitioner’s Formal Offer of Evidence, what
should be determined now by the Sandiganbayan is whether petitioner’s evidence is sufficient to entitle it to the
relief it seeks after the Sandiganbayan rested its case. Petitioner is required to establish preponderance of
evidence.

In the second assailed Resolution, the Sandiganbayan granted respondents’ Motion to Dismiss based on the
lack of Formal Offer of Evidence of petitioner. At the same time, it observed that the pieces of documentary
evidence presented by petitioner were mostly certified true copies of the original. In passing upon the probative
value of petitioner’s evidence, the Sandiganbayan held:

On another note, the evidence presented by the plaintiff consisted mainly of certified true copies of the original.
These certified copies of documentary evidence presented by the plaintiff were not testified on by the person
who certified them to be photocopies of the original. Hence, these evidence do not appear to have significant
substantial probative value.118

Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for making "a general and sweeping statement that the evidence
presented by petitioner lacked probative value for the reason that they are mainly certified true copies which
had not been testified on by the person who certified [them]."119 Thus, its right to due process was violated when
the Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner’s documentary evidence in the same Resolution which dismissed the
case.120

Petitioner argues that: a) respondents unqualifiedly admitted the identity and authenticity of the documentary
evidence presented by petitioner;121 and b) the documents it presented were public documents, and there was
no need for the identification and authentication of the original documentary exhibits.122 Petitioner relies on the
Sandiganbayan Order123 dated August 6, 2002. The Order reads:

Considering the manifestation of Atty. Reno Gonzales, counsel for plaintiff/PCGG, that the defendant Fe Roa
Gimenez, through counsel, is willing to stipulate that the documents to be presented and identified by the
witness are in her custody as Records Officer of the PCGG, the parties agreed to dispense with the testimony
of Ma. Lourdes Magno.

WHEREFORE, and as prayed for, the continuation of the presentation of plaintiff’s evidence is set on October 9
and 10, 2002, both at 8:30 o’clock [sic] in the morning.

SO ORDERED.124 (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner claims that the following exhibits were acquired in relation to the PCGG’s functions prescribed under
Executive Order No. 1, Section 3(b),125 and form part of the official records of the PCGG:126 "Certifications as to
the various positions held in Government by Fe Roa-Gimenez, her salaries and compensation during her stint
as a public officer, the BIR Income Tax Returns and Statement of Assets and Liabilities showing the declared
income of spouses Gimenezes; the Articles of Incorporation of various corporations showing spouses
Gimenezes’ interests on various corporations; and several transactions involving huge amounts of money
which prove that they acted as conduit in the disbursement of government funds."127

DEMURRER CASES – BRONDIAL LIST


On the other hand, respondent Ignacio Gimenez argues that petitioner’s documents are not "official issuances
of the Philippine government."128 They are mostly notarized private documents.129 Petitioner’s evidence has no
probative value; hence, a dismissal on demurrer to evidence is only proper.130 Respondent Fe Roa Gimenez
claims that the Sandiganbayan did not err in holding that the majority of petitioner’s documentary evidence has
no probative value, considering that most of these documents are only photocopies.131

The evidence presented by petitioner before the Sandiganbayan deserves better treatment.

For instance, the nature and classification of the documents should have been ruled upon. Save for certain
cases, the original document must be presented during trial when the subject of the inquiry is the contents of
the document.132 This is the Best Evidence Rule provided under Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions.— When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following
cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on
the part of the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in
court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general
result of the whole; and

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
office.

In case of unavailability of the original document, secondary evidence may be presented133 as provided for
under Sections 5 to 7 of the same Rule:

SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable.— When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in
some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.

SEC. 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or control. — If the document is in the custody or
under the control of adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after
satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document, secondary evidence may be presented as
in the case of its loss. (5a)

SEC. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record.— When the original of a document is
in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy
issued by the public officer in custody thereof. (Emphasis supplied)

In Citibank, N.A. v. Sabeniano,134 citing Estrada v. Hon. Desierto,135 this court clarified the applicability of the
Best Evidence Rule:

As the afore-quoted provision states, the best evidence rule applies only when the subject of the inquiry is the
contents of the document. The scope of the rule is more extensively explained thus —

But even with respect to documentary evidence, the best evidence rule applies only when the content of such
document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether such document was actually
executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule

DEMURRER CASES – BRONDIAL LIST


does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible (5 Moran, op. cit., pp. 76-66; 4 Martin, op. cit., p. 78).
Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible without need for accounting for the original.

Thus, when a document is presented to prove its existence or condition it is offered not as documentary, but as
real, evidence. Parol evidence of the fact of execution of the documents is allowed (Hernaez, et al. vs.
McGrath, etc., et al., 91 Phil[.] 565). x x x

In Estrada v. Desierto, this Court had occasion to rule that —

It is true that the Court relied not upon the original but only [a] copy of the Angara Diary as published in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer on February 4-6, 2001. In doing so, the Court, did not, however, violate the best
evidence rule. Wigmore, in his book on evidence, states that:

"Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court’s discretion, whenever in the case in hand
the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be
served by requiring production.

"x x x x x x x x x

"In several Canadian provinces, the principle of unavailability has been abandoned, for certain documents in
which ordinarily no real dispute arised [sic]. This measure is a sensible and progressive one and deserves
universal adoption (post, sec. 1233). Its essential feature is that a copy may be used unconditionally, if the
opponent has been given an opportunity to inspect it."

This Court did not violate the best evidence rule when it considered and weighed in evidence the photocopies
and microfilm copies of the PNs, MCs, and letters submitted by the petitioners to establish the existence of
respondent’s loans. The terms or contents of these documents were never the point of contention in the
Petition at bar. It was respondent’s position that the PNs in the first set (with the exception of PN No. 34534)
never existed, while the PNs in the second set (again, excluding PN No. 34534) were merely executed to cover
simulated loan transactions. As for the MCs representing the proceeds of the loans, the respondent either
denied receipt of certain MCs or admitted receipt of the other MCs but for another purpose. Respondent further
admitted the letters she wrote personally or through her representatives to Mr. Tan of petitioner Citibank
acknowledging the loans, except that she claimed that these letters were just meant to keep up the ruse of the
simulated loans. Thus, respondent questioned the documents as to their existence or execution, or when the
former is admitted, as to the purpose for which the documents were executed, matters which are, undoubtedly,
external to the documents, and which had nothing to do with the contents thereof.

Alternatively, even if it is granted that the best evidence rule should apply to the evidence presented by
petitioners regarding the existence of respondent’s loans, it should be borne in mind that the rule admits of the
following exceptions under Rule 130, Section 5 of the revised Rules of Court[.]136 (Emphasis supplied, citation
omitted)

Furthermore, for purposes of presenting these as evidence before courts, documents are classified as either
public or private. Rule 132, Section 19 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 19. Classes of Documents.— For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either
public or private.

Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledge before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and

DEMURRER CASES – BRONDIAL LIST


(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.

All other writings are private.

The same Rule provides for the effect of public documents as evidence and the manner of proof for public
documents:

SEC. 23. Public documents as evidence.— Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public
documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the
date of the latter.

SEC. 24. Proof of official record.— The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19,
when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by
the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in
the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a
foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul,
vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.

SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state.— Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the
purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or
a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting
officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.

....

SEC. 27. Public record of a private document.— An authorized public record of a private document may be
proved by the original record, or by a copy thereof, attested by the legal custodian of the record, with an
appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody.

....

SEC. 30. Proof of notarial documents.— Every instrument duly acknowledged or proved and certified as
provided by law, may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being
prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved. (Emphasis supplied)

Emphasizing the importance of the correct classification of documents, this court pronounced:

The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be presented as
evidence in court. A public document, by virtue of its official or sovereign character, or because it has been
acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will) or a competent public official with the formalities
required by law, or because it is a public record of a private writing authorized by law, is self-authenticating and
requires no further authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court. In contrast, a private document
is any other writing, deed, or instrument executed by a private person without the intervention of a notary or
other person legally authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the
official or sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities prescribed by law, a private document
requires authentication in the manner allowed by law or the Rules of Court before its acceptance as evidence in
court.137 (Emphasis supplied)

The distinction as to the kind of public document under Rule 132, Section 19 of the Rules of Court is material
with regard to the fact the evidence proves. In Philippine Trust Company v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al.,138 this
court ruled that:

. . . not all types of public documents are deemed prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated:

DEMURRER CASES – BRONDIAL LIST


....

"Public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer" include those specified as public
documents under Section 19(a), Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the acknowledgement, affirmation or oath,
or jurat portion of public documents under Section 19(c). Hence, under Section 23, notarized documents are
merely proof of the fact which gave rise to their execution (e.g., the notarized Answer to Interrogatories . . . is
proof that Philtrust had been served with Written Interrogatories), and of the date of the latter (e.g., the
notarized Answer to Interrogatories is proof that the same was executed on October 12, 1992, the date stated
thereon), but is not prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Additionally, under Section 30 of the same
Rule, the acknowledgement in notarized documents is prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument
or document involved (e.g., the notarized Answer to Interrogatories is prima facie proof that petitioner executed
the same).

The reason for the distinction lies with the respective official duties attending the execution of the different kinds
of public instruments. Official duties are disputably presumed to have been regularly performed. As regards
affidavits, including Answers to Interrogatories which are required to be sworn to by the person making them,
the only portion thereof executed by the person authorized to take oaths is the jurat. The presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed therefore applies only to the latter portion, wherein the notary public
merely attests that the affidavit was subscribed and sworn to before him or her, on the date mentioned thereon.
Thus, even though affidavits are notarized documents, we have ruled that affidavits, being self-serving, must be
received with caution.139 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

In Salas v. Sta. Mesa Market Corporation,140 this court discussed the difference between mere copies of audited
financial statements submitted to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), and certified true copies of audited financial statements obtained or secured from the BIR
or the SEC which are public documents under Rule 132, Section 19(c) of the Revised Rules of Evidence:

The documents in question were supposedly copies of the audited financial statements of SMMC. Financial
statements (which include the balance sheet, income statement and statement of cash flow) show the fiscal
condition of a particular entity within a specified period. The financial statements prepared by external auditors
who are certified public accountants (like those presented by petitioner) are audited financial
statements. Financial statements, whether audited or not, are, as [a] general rule, private documents. However,
once financial statements are filed with a government office pursuant to a provision of law, they become public
documents.

Whether a document is public or private is relevant in determining its admissibility as evidence. Public
documents are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due execution and genuineness. On
the other hand, private documents are inadmissible in evidence unless they are properly authenticated. Section
20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:

....

Petitioner and respondents agree that the documents presented as evidence were mere copies of the audited
financial statements submitted to the BIR and SEC. Neither party claimed that copies presented were certified
true copies of audited financial statements obtained or secured from the BIR or the SEC which under Section
19(c), Rule 132 would have been public documents. Thus, the statements presented were private documents.
Consequently, authentication was a precondition to their admissibility in evidence.

During authentication in court, a witness positively testifies that a document presented as evidence is genuine
and has been duly executed or that the document is neither spurious nor counterfeit nor executed by mistake
or under duress. In this case, petitioner merely presented a memorandum attesting to the increase in the
corporation’s monthly market revenue, prepared by a member of his management team. While there is no fixed
criterion as to what constitutes competent evidence to establish the authenticity of a private document, the best
proof available must be presented. The best proof available, in this instance, would have been the testimony of
a representative of SMMC’s external auditor who prepared the audited financial statements. Inasmuch as there
was none, the audited financial statements were never authenticated.141 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

DEMURRER CASES – BRONDIAL LIST


Indeed, in Republic v. Marcos-Manotoc,142 this court held that mere collection of documents by the PCGG does
not make such documents public documents per se under Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:

The fact that these documents were collected by the PCGG in the course of its investigations does not make
them per se public records referred to in the quoted rule.

Petitioner presented as witness its records officer, Maria Lourdes Magno, who testified that these public and
private documents had been gathered by and taken into the custody of the PCGG in the course of the
Commission’s investigation of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses. However, given the purposes for
which these documents were submitted, Magno was not a credible witness who could testify as to their
contents. To reiterate, "[i]f the writings have subscribing witnesses to them, they must be proved by those
witnesses." Witnesses can testify only to those facts which are of their personal knowledge; that is, those
derived from their own perception. Thus, Magno could only testify as to how she obtained custody of these
documents, but not as to the contents of the documents themselves.

Neither did petitioner present as witnesses the affiants of these Affidavits or Memoranda submitted to the court.
Basic is the rule that, while affidavits may be considered as public documents if they are acknowledged before
a notary public, these Affidavits are still classified as hearsay evidence. The reason for this rule is that they are
not generally prepared by the affiant, but by another one who uses his or her own language in writing the
affiant’s statements, parts of which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them.
Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants. For this reason,
affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness
stand to testify thereon.143(Citations omitted)

Notably, the Sandiganbayan’s evaluation of the evidence presented by petitioner was cursory. Its main reason
for granting the Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence was that there was no evidence to consider due to
petitioner’s failure to file its Formal Offer of Evidence. It brushed off the totality of evidence on which petitioner
built its case.

Even assuming that no documentary evidence was properly offered, this court finds it clear from the second
assailed Resolution that the Sandiganbayan did not even consider other evidence presented by petitioner
during the 19 years of trial. The Sandiganbayan erred in ignoring petitioner’s testimonial evidence without any
basis or justification. Numerous exhibits were offered as part of the testimonies of petitioner’s witnesses.

Petitioner presented both testimonial and documentary evidence that tended to establish a presumption that
respondents acquired ill-gotten wealth during respondent Fe Roa Gimenez’s incumbency as public officer and
which total amount or value was manifestly out of proportion to her and her husband’s salaries and to their
other lawful income or properties.

Petitioner presented five (5) witnesses, two (2) of which were Atty. Tereso Javier and Director Danilo R.V.
Daniel, both from the PCGG:

Petitioner presented as witnesses Atty. Tereso Javier, then Head of the Sequestered Assets Department of
PCGG, and Danilo R.V. Daniel, then Director of the Research and Development Department of PCGG, who
testified on the bank accounts and businesses owned and/ or under the control of spouses Gimenezes. 144

Several exhibits excluded by the Sandiganbayan were offered as part of petitioner’s testimonial evidence:

1) Exhibit "KK"145 was offered "for the purpose of proving the assets or properties of the spouses
Ignacio B. Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez, and as part of the testimony of Tereso Javier."146

2) Exhibits "KK-1" to "KK-12"147 inclusive of sub-markings, were offered "for the purpose of proving the
real properties acquired by the spouses Ignacio B. Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez, and as part of the
testimony of Tereso Javier."148

DEMURRER CASES – BRONDIAL LIST


3) Exhibits "KK-15," "KK-18," "KK-20," "KK-27," "KK-30," "KK-32" to "KK-38" and "KK-40"149 were
offered "for the purpose of proving the corporations in which Ignacio B. Gimenez has interest, and as
part of the testimony of Tereso Javier."150

4) Exhibit "KK-45"151 was offered "for the purpose of proving that the PCGG conducted an investigation
of New City Builders, Inc., Transnational Construction Corporation, and OTO Construction and
Development Corporation in relation to Ignacio B. Gimenez and Roberto O. Olanday, and as part of
the testimony of Tereso Javier."152

5) Exhibits "KK-48" to "KK-50"153 were offered "for the purpose of proving that the PCGG formally filed
notices of lis pendens with the Registers of Deeds of Taytay, Rizal, Lucena City, Quezon and San
Fabian, Pangasinan over the properties mentioned in said notices in connection with Civil Case No.
[0]007 pending with the Sandiganbayan, and as part of the testimony of Tereso Javier."154

6) Exhibits "KK-51" to "KK-52"155 and their sub-markings were offered "for the purpose of proving that
the PCGG sequestered the shares of stock in Allied Banking Corporation and Guaranteed Education,
Inc. as stated in the said writ/letter of sequestration, and as part of the testimony of Tereso Javier."156

7) Exhibits "NN" to "QQ"157 and their sub-markings were offered "for the purpose of proving that the
PCGG formally requested the Central Bank to freeze the bank accounts of the spouses Igancio [sic] B.
Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez and that the Central Bank, acting on said request, issued a
memorandum to all commercial banks relative thereto. They are also being offered as part of the
testimony of Tereso Javier."158

8) Exhibits "RR" to "RR-23"159 were offered "for the purpose of proving that Dominador Pangilinan,
former Acting President and President of Traders Royal Bank, executed an affidavit on July 24, 1987
wherein he mentioned Malacanang trust accounts maintained with the Traders Royal Bank the
balance of which was very high, approximately 150-175 million pesos, as indicated in the monthly
statements attached to his affidavit. They are also being offered as part of the testimony of Danilo R.V.
Daniel."160

9) Exhibits "SS" to "SS-29"161 were offered "for the purpose of proving that Apolinario K. Medina,
Executive Vice President of Traders Royal Bank, executed an Affidavit on July 23, 1987 wherein he
mentioned about certain numbered (confidential) trust accounts maintained with the Traders Royal
Bank, the deposits to which ‘were so substantial in amount that (he) suspected that they had been
made by President Marcos or his family. They are also being offered as part of the testimony of Danilo
R.V. Daniel."162

10) Exhibits "TT" to "TT-3"163 were offered "for the purpose of proving that Director Danilo R.V. Daniel
of the Research and Development Department of the PCGG conducted an investigation on the ill-
gotten wealth of the spouses Ignacio and Fe Roa Gimenez and found that from 1977 to 1982, the total
sum of P75,090,306.42 was withdrawn from the account No. 128 (A/C 76-128) in favor of I.B Gimenez,
I.B. Gimenez Securities and Fe Roa Gimenez. They are also being offered as part of the testimony of
Director Danilo R.V. Daniel."164

The court cannot arbitrarily disregard evidence especially when resolving a demurrer to evidence which tests
the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence.

The difference between the admissibility of evidence and the determination of its probative weight is
canonical.165

Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is to [be]
considered at all. On the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the question of whether or not it
proves an issue. Thus, a letter may be offered in evidence and admitted as such but its evidentiary weight
depends upon the observance of the rules on evidence. Accordingly, the author of the letter should be
presented as witness to provide the other party to the litigation the opportunity to question him on the contents

DEMURRER CASES – BRONDIAL LIST


of the letter. Being mere hearsay evidence, failure to present the author of the letter renders its contents
suspect. As earlier stated, hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value. 166 (Citations
omitted)

The Sandiganbayan should have considered Atienza v. Board of Medicine, et al.167 where this court held that it
is better to admit and consider evidence for determination of its probative value than to outright reject it based
on very rigid and technical grounds.168

Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the rules of evidence, in connection with
evidence which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, we have held that:

[I]t is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting them
unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection places them beyond the
consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found relevant or competent; on the other hand, their
admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely
discarding them or ignoring them.169(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

A liberal application of the Rules is in line with the state’s policy to recover ill-gotten wealth. In case of doubt,
courts should proceed with caution in granting a motion to dismiss based on demurrer to evidence. An order
granting demurrer to evidence is a judgment on the merits.170 This is because while a demurrer "is an aid or
instrument for the expeditious termination of an action,"171 it specifically "pertains to the merits of the case."172

In Cabreza, Jr., et al. v. Cabreza,173 this court defined a judgment rendered on the merits:

A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the merits "when it determines the rights and liabilities of
the parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objections"; or when the
judgment is rendered "after a determination of which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered
upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical point."174 (Citations omitted)

To reiterate, "[d]emurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the defendant
having to submit evidence on his [or her] part, as he [or she] would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff’s evidence
shows that he [or she] is not entitled to the relief sought."175 The order of dismissal must be clearly supported by
facts and law since an order granting demurrer is a judgment on the merits:

As it is settled that an order dismissing a case for insufficient evidence is a judgment on the merits, it is
imperative that it be a reasoned decision clearly and distinctly stating therein the facts and the law on which it is
based.176(Citation omitted)

To erroneously grant a dismissal simply based on the delay to formally offer documentary evidence essentially
deprives one party of due process.

IV

Respondents did not fail to specifically deny material averments in the Complaint.

Under Rule 8, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, the "defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the
truth of which he does not admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon
which he relies to support his denial."177 There are three modes of specific denial provided for under the Rules:

1) by specifying each material allegation of the fact in the complaint, the truth of which the defendant does not
admit, and whenever practicable, setting forth the substance of the matters which he will rely upon to support
his denial; (2) by specifying so much of an averment in the complaint as is true and material and denying only
the remainder; (3) by stating that the defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as
to the truth of a material averment in the complaint, which has the effect of a denial.178

DEMURRER CASES – BRONDIAL LIST


In paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the PCGG, through the Office of the Solicitor General, averred that:

14. Defendant Fe Roa Gimenez, by herself and/or in unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos
and Imelda R. Marcos, taking undue advantage of her position, influence and connection and with grave abuse
of power and authority, in order to prevent disclosure and recovery of assets illegally obtained:

(a) actively participated in the unlawful transfer of millions of dollars of government funds into several
accounts in her name in foreign countries;

(b) disbursed such funds from her various personal accounts for Defendants’ own use[,] benefit and
enrichment;

(c) acted as conduit of the Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos in purchasing the
New York properties, particularly, the Crown Building, Herald Center, 40 Wall Street, 200 Wall Street,
Lindenmere Estate and expensive works of arts;179

In their Answer, respondents claimed that;

9. Defendants Spouses Gimenez and Fe Roa specifically deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 14(a),
14(b) and 14(c), the truth being that defendant Fe Roa never took advantage of her position or alleged
connection and influence to allegedly prevent disclosure and recovery of alleged illegally obtained assets, in
the manner alleged in said paragraphs.180

Similarly, the PCGG made material allegations in paragraph 16 of the Complaint:

16. Defendant Ignacio B. Gimenez, taking undue advantage of his relationship, influence, and connection, by
himself and/or in unlawful concert and active collaboration with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R.
Marcos, for the purpose of mutually enriching themselves and preventing the disclosure and recovery of assets
illegally obtained, among others:

(a) acted as the dummy, nominee or agent of Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos,
in several corporations such as, the Allied Banking Corporation, Acoje Mining Corporation, Baguio
Gold Mining, Multi National Resources, Philippine Overseas, Inc. and Pioneer Natural Resources;

(b) unlawfully obtained, through corporations organized by them such as the the [sic] New City
Builders, Inc. (NCBI), multimillion peso contracts with the government for the construction of
government buildings, such as the University of Life Sports Complex and Dining Hall as well as
projects of the National Manpower Corporation, Human Settlements, GSIS, and Maharlika Livelihood,
to the gross and manifest disadvantage to Plaintiff and the Filipino people.

(c) in furtherance of the above stated illegal purposes, organized several establishments engaged in
food, mining and other businesses such as the Transnational Construction Corporation, Total Systems
Technology, Inc., Pyro Control Technology Corporation, Asian Alliance, Inc., A & T Development
Corporation, RBO Agro Forestry Farm Development Corporation, Bathala Coal Mining Corporation,
Coal Basis Mining Corporation, Titan Coal Mining Corporation, GEI Guaranteed Education, Inc., and
I.B. Gimenez Securities, Inc.181

To which respondents specifically denied through the following paragraph:

11. Defendants Spouses Gimenez and Fe Roa specifically deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 16,
16(a), 16(b) and 16(c) that defendant Gimenez allegedly took advantage of his alleged relationship, influence
and connection, and that by himself or in alleged unlawful concert with defendants Marcos and Imelda, for the
alleged purpose of enriching themselves and preventing the discovery of alleged illegally obtained assets: (1)
allegedly acted as dummy, nominee or agent of defendants Marcos and Imelda; (2) allegedly obtained multi-
million peso projects unlawfully; and (3) allegedly organized several establishments, the truth being: (1) that

DEMURRER CASES – BRONDIAL LIST


defendant Gimenez never acted as dummy, nominee or agent of defendants Marcos and Imelda; (2) that
defendant Gimen[e]z never once obtained any contract unlawfully; and (3) that defendant Gimenez is a
legitimate businessman and organized business establishments legally and as he saw fit, all in accordance with
his own plans and for his own purposes.182

In Aquintey v. Spouses Tibong,183 this court held that using "specifically" in a general denial does not
automatically convert that general denial to a specific one.184 The denial in the answer must be so definite as to
what is admitted and what is denied:

A denial is not made specific simply because it is so qualified by the defendant. A general denial does not
become specific by the use of the word "specifically." When matters of whether the defendant alleges having
no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief are plainly and necessarily within the defendant’s
knowledge, an alleged "ignorance or lack of information" will not be considered as a specific denial. Section 11,
Rule 8 of the Rules also provides that material averments in the complaint other than those as to the amount of
unliquidated damages shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied. Thus, the answer should be so
definite and certain in its allegations that the pleader’s adversary should not be left in doubt as to what is
admitted, what is denied, and what is covered by denials of knowledge as sufficient to form a
belief.185 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

However, the allegations in the pleadings "must be contextualized and interpreted in relation to the rest of the
statements in the pleading."186 The denials in respondents’ Answer comply with the modes provided for under
the Rules. We have held that the purpose of requiring specific denials from the defendant is to make the
defendant disclose the "matters alleged in the complaint which he [or she] succinctly intends to disprove at the
trial, together with the matter which he [or she] relied upon to support the denial."187 The denials proffered by
respondents sufficiently disclosed the matters they wished to disprove and those they would rely upon in
making their denials.

To summarize, the Sandiganbayan erred in granting the Motion to Dismiss on demurrer to evidence. It erred in
making a sweeping declaration on the probative value of the documentary evidence offered by petitioner and in
excluding other evidence offered during trial without full evaluation based on reasons grounded in law and/or
jurisprudence.

The third part of Rule 33, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides that "[i]f the motion [to dismiss] is granted but
on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed [the movant] shall be deemed to have waived the right to present
evidence." As this court held:

[I]f a demurrer to evidence is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed, the movant shall be
deemed to have waived the right to present evidence. The movant who presents a demurrer to the plaintiff’s
evidence retains the right to present their own evidence, if the trial court disagrees with them; if the trial court
agrees with them, but on appeal, the appellate court disagrees with both of them and reverses the dismissal
order, the defendants lose the right to present their own evidence. The appellate court shall, in addition, resolve
the case and render judgment on the merits, inasmuch as a demurrer aims to discourage prolonged
litigations.188 (Citations omitted)

This procedure, however, does not apply.

In this case, we principally nullify the assailed Resolutions that denied the admission of the Formal Offer of
Evidence. It only follows that the Order granting demurrer should be denied. This is not the situation
contemplated in Rule 33, Section 1.189 Respondents were not able to even comment on the Formal Offer of
Evidence. Due process now requires that we remand the case to the Sandiganbayan. Respondents may, at
their option and through proper motion, submit their Comment. The Sandiganbayan should then rule on the
admissibility of the documentary and object evidence covered by the Formal Offer submitted by petitioner.
Respondents then may avail themselves of any remedy thereafter allowed by the Rules.

DEMURRER CASES – BRONDIAL LIST


WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated May 25, 2006 and September 13,
2006 of the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division in Civil Case No. 0007 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case
is remanded to the. Sandiganbayan for further proceedings with due and deliberate dispatch in accordance
with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 119010 September 5, 1997

PAZ T. BERNARDO, petitioner,


vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. OSCAR L. LEVISTE and FLORITA RONQUILLO-CONCEPCION, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

For an orderly procedure in the disposition of criminal cases the Rules of Court provides that the prosecution
and the defense present their evidence in the other prescribed in Sec. 3, Rule 119, after which, evaluating the
evidence presented, the trial court renders judgment either of acquittal or conviction. Under Sec. 15 of the
same Rule, after the prosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss the case on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence either on its own initiative after giving the prosecution an opportunity to be heard, or
on motion of the accused filed with prior leave of court. If the court denies the demurrer or motion to dismiss,
the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the accused files such motion to dismiss without
express leave of court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis
of the evidence for the prosecution.

The new rule on demurrer to evidence was first incorporated in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which
significantly changed the ruling in People v. Mamacol1 and Abriol v. Homeres2 that when a motion to dismiss on
insufficiency of evidence is denied the accused has a right to present evidence in his behalf. Earlier the rule
was, when after the prosecution has rested its case, and the accused files a motion to dismiss on insufficiency
of evidence, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the
evidence of the prosecution.3 The rule was further modified in 1988 to the effect that only when the accused
files a demurrer or motion to dismiss on insufficiency of evidence without express leave of court that the
accused may be deemed to have waived his right to present evidence and the case considered submitted for
decision on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. If the accused has obtained prior leave of court, in
case of denial of his motion to dismiss, he retains his right to present evidence in his behalf. The court may
also motu proprio dismiss the case on insufficiency of evidence, but before doing so, it should give the
prosecution an opportunity to be heard and to oppose the motion.4

We are now called upon to apply the new rule on demurrer to evidence.

Pat T. Bernardo was originally charged with four (4) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. Q-93-46792-95. Subsequently, private complainant,
respondent Florlita Ronquillo-Concepcion, executed an Affidavit of Desistance which led to the dismissal of
Crim. Cases Nos. Q-93-46794 and Q-93-46795, thus leaving Crim. Cases Nos. Q-93-46792 and Q-93-46793
to be disposed of by the trial court.

On 20 May 1994, after presenting its last witness, the prosecution rested its case and formally offered its
exhibits. That hearing was set at 8:30 a.m. on that date for continuation of the reception of the evidence for the
prosecution as reflected in the calendar of the court.5 After the prosecution had formally offered its evidence,
the following transpired in open court —

COURT:

DEMURRER CASES – BRONDIAL LIST


Alright, prosecution having rested, defense will now present its evidence. Proceed.

ATTY. MIRAVITE:

Your honor, we respectfully ask for a resetting, for leave of court to file demurrer to
evidence(emphasis supplied).

COURT:

On what ground?

ATTY. MIRAVITE:

On the ground that the prosecution failed to elicit the fact where the checks were
issued and where they were actually dishonored. This is material, your honor, for
purposes of determining jurisdiction. Also, your honor, as we mentioned in our
comments to the evidence presented by the prosecution, there has been no valid
notice of dishonor of the subject checks upon the accused. So, upon those grounds,
we believe that the prosecution has not duly made out a case against the accused,
and we feel those are sufficient for the dismissal of the case as against the accused.

COURT:

So as to avoid reviewing the records, would you admit that there is no proof where
the checks were issued and where they were dishonored?

PRIVATE PROSECUTOR:

No, we would not admit that, your honor. They were dishonored actually in Manila,
but the check was deposited in the bank of PAR CREDIT ENTERPRISES in Quezon
City, and it was naturally forwarded to the Philippine National Bank where the same
was returned to the bank of PAR CREDIT ENTERPRISES here in Quezon City.

COURT:

Where does it appear?

PRIVATE PROSECUTOR:

It is at the back of Exhibit A, your honor.

COURT:

Is it mark(ed)?

PRIVATE PROSECUTOR:

Your honor, it states here, deposited to Philippine National Bank, West Avenue,
Quezon City which is at the check marked as exhibit A-4.

COURT:

So, that takes jurisprudence. The elements happened in Quezon City.

DEMURRER CASES – BRONDIAL LIST


PRIVATE PROSECUTOR:

Yes, your honor.

ATTY. MIRAVITE:

The notation read by counsel, your honor, was not marked in evidence, what was
marked is B-4 appearing at the dorsal portion of the check which pertains only for
(sic) the dishonor, the initial and the date. Nothing was presented as to the fact. If that
is so, that was indeed deposited at West Avenue, Quezon City.

PRIVATE PROSECUTOR:

There is, your honor. The stamp received by the Cashier Division, PNB, Quezon City,
West Avenue.

COURT:

Anyway, was there an offer of that document?

PRIVATE PROSECUTOR:

Yes, there was an offer of exhibit A-4, your honor. The record would show that we
manifested that exhibit B-4 are stamps of the bank reading DAIF over which there are
other stamps.

COURT:

You are saying that the word DAIF was marked at the back and offered as proof of
the dishonor and the place was evidence?

PRIVATE PROSECUTOR:

Yes, your honor, immediately on top of the word, DAIF.

COURT:

Is there any evidence testimonial that these were encashed and dishonored?

PRIVATE PROSECUTOR:

Yes, your honor, the testimony of this witness is very clear that the checks were
deposited and the same was (sic) dishonored by the bank.

COURT:

Do you admit that there was no notice of dishonor?

PRIVATE PROSECUTOR:

We don't admit that, your honor. In fact, there are admissions in handwriting
regarding the claim.

DEMURRER CASES – BRONDIAL LIST


COURT:

Is there any evidence presented that these checks were not paid up to now?

PRIVATE PROSECUTOR:

Yes, your honor. First, is the oral testimony of the witness, that it has not been paid;
second, exhibits 1 and 1-1, which is the Complaint Affidavit of the witness.

COURT:

Alright, in view of the objections, and in view of the manifestations of the private
prosecutor, the defense grounds for demurrer, the same not being well taken is
hereby DENIED (emphasis supplied). You will now present your evidence.

ATTY. MIRAVITE:

If your honor please, may we just ask for a reconsideration (emphasis supplied)?

COURT:

If you will waive your right to present your evidence, the Court will give you a period
to file a demurrer to evidence. And, if you don't present your evidence now, you will
be considered to have waived your right to present evidence (emphasis supplied).

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. MIRAVITE:

If your honor please, we would like to reiterate our motion to file a demurrer to
evidence(emphasis supplied)?

COURT:

But you have already orally made that demurrer which has been denied (emphasis
supplied).

ATTY. MIRAVITE:

In which case your honor, if there is no leave of court, we will be filing our demurrer to
evidence, your honor (emphasis supplied).

COURT:

That is tantamount to postpone (sic) this case. The Court considers that motion
dilatory(emphasis supplied).

ATTY. MIRAVITE:

Your honor, I think within the option of the parties to take remedies and at this point,
we did prepare for our purposes, that instead of presenting the accused or presenting
our witnesses, we would just prefer to move for a demurrer to evidence (emphasis
supplied).

DEMURRER CASES – BRONDIAL LIST


COURT:

You may include that in your motion for reconsideration. Alright, the prosecution
having rested, and the defense having been considered to have waived his right to
present his evidence, this case is deemed submitted for decision. Set the
promulgation of this case to June 6, 1994 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning (emphasis
supplied).6

Petitioner assailed the Order of respondent judge hereinbefore immediately quoted before the Court of Appeals
by way of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner argued that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion in considering her to have waived her right to present evidence after the denial of her motion for
leave to file demurrer to evidence.

On 30 September 1994 the Court of Appeals rendered a decision modifying in effect that portion of the
questioned Order of the RTC-Br. 97, Quezon City, of 20 May 1994 which states that "the defense having been
considered to have waived her right to present her evidence, this case is deemed submitted for decision"7 by
directing the trial court to set Crim. Cases Nos. Q-93-46792 and Q-93-467938 "for trial for reception of evidence
for the petitioner."9Petitioner moved for partial reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals but her
motion was denied on 7 February 1995.

Petitioner Bernardo filed the instant petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals on
the ground that when it refused to allow petitioner to demur to the evidence the appellate court decided the
matter not in accordance with law and applicable decisions of this Court.10 Petitioner submits that when her
counsel moved for leave to file a demurrer to evidence on 20 May 1994 this meant that she intended to make a
written demurrer after extensive research and with proper authorities to support the same; that when the trial
court denied her motion, it was in effect a denial only of the motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence and
not the demurrer to evidence itself and, therefore, the order of respondent appellate court allowing petitioner to
present her evidence was premature. Petitioner further contends that she should first be given the opportunity
to file her demurrer to evidence and wait for its denial with finality before she could be directed to present her
evidence before the trial court.11

We cannot sustain petitioner. As the trial court observed, her move, expressed through counsel, was merely
"dilatory."12 But neither can we affirm the ruling of respondent Court of Appeals directing the trial court to receive
the evidence of the defense after its motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence was denied. It is contrary to
the letter and spirit of Sec. 15, Rule 119, of the Rules of Court.

The implications and consequences of obtaining prior leave before the accused files a demurrer to evidence
were discussed by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules as reflected in its Minutes of 18 February 1997.
Mr. Justice Jose Y. Feria, Co-Chairman of the Committee, explained—

Objections were raised against the new Rule on the ground that it was prejudicial to the accused.
Hence, the present amended provision was adopted. It is only when the accused files such a motion to
dismiss without express leave of court that he waives the right to present evidence and submits the
case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution . . . . .13

Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, Chairman of the Committee, suggested


that —

. . . there may be instances where it is very plain that the evidence is insufficient, but there are also
instances where the court is in doubt . . . . it is the court that will now determine whether a demurrer
should be filed or not after getting the opinion of both sides . . . . If the accused asks for leave of court
and the court supports it, it is good; but . . . if it finds the motion dilatory, then it denies it. But . . . there
should be no waiver if the demurrer is with leave of court, because there may be a situation where the
court itself may want to dismiss the case . . . . If leave is denied, and the accused still files the
demurrer, then there is waiver (emphasis
supplied).14

DEMURRER CASES – BRONDIAL LIST


The Committee finally approved the following propositions of the Chief Justice: (a) The court on its initiative can
dismiss the case after giving prior notice to the prosecution; (b) The accused can file a demurrer only if he is
granted prior leave of court; (c) If the motion for leave or the demurrer is denied, the accused can present his
evidence, and there is no waiver; and, (d) If the accused files a demurrer without leave, his right to present
evidence is waived.15

In fine, under the new rule on demurrer to evidence the accused has the right to file a demurrer to evidence
after the prosecution has rested its case. If the accused obtained prior leave of court before filing his demurrer,
he can still present evidence if his demurrer is denied. However, if he demurs without prior leave of court, or
after his motion for leave is denied, he waives his right to present evidence and submits the case for decision
on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. This power to grant leave to the accused to file a demurrer is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. The purpose is to determine whether the accused in filing
his demurrer is merely stalling the proceedings.16

In the case at bar, petitioner admits that in the hearing of 20 May 1994 the trial court denied her motion for
leave to file a demurrer to evidence. In such case, the only right petitioner has under Sec. 15, Rule 119, of the
Rules of Court after having been denied leave to submit a demurrer is to adduce evidence in her defense.
However, even without express leave of the trial court, nay, after her motion for leave was denied, petitioner
insisted on filing a demurrer instead of presenting evidence in her defense.

Judicial action to grant prior leave to file demurrer to evidence is discretionary upon the trial court. But to allow
the accused to present evidence after he was denied prior leave to file demurrer is not discretionary. Once prior
leave is denied and the accused still files his demurrer to evidence or motion to dismiss, the court no longer
has discretion to allow the accused to present evidence. The only recourse left for the court is to decide the
case on the basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution. And, unless there is grave abuse thereof
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which is not present in the instant case, the trial court's denial of
prior leave to file demurrer to evidence or motion to dismiss may not be disturbed.17 However, any judgment of
conviction by a trial court may still be elevated by the accused to the appellate court.18

WHEREFORE, the Petition to allow petitioner to file a demurrer to evidence is DENIED. The ruling of
respondent Court of Appeals directing the trial court to hear the evidence of the accused is SET ASIDE. The
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is directed to decide the remaining Crim. Cases Nos. Q-93-46792 and Q-
93-46793 on the basis of the evidence already presented by the prosecution.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 138739 July 6, 2000

RADIOWEALTH FINANCE COMPANY, petitioner,


vs.
Spouses VICENTE and MA. SUMILANG DEL ROSARIO, respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

When a demurrer to evidence granted by a trial court is reversed on appeal, the reviewing court cannot remand
the case for further proceedings. Rather, it should render judgment on the basis of the evidence proffered by
the plaintiff. Inasmuch as defendants in the present case admitted the due execution of the Promissory Note
both in their Answer and during the pretrial, the appellate court should have rendered judgment on the bases of
that Note and on the other pieces of evidence adduced during the trial.

The Case

DEMURRER CASES – BRONDIAL LIST


Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the December 9, 1997 Decision1 and the May 3, 1999
Resolution2of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 47737. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed order (dated November 4, 1994) of the Regional Trial
Court (Branch XIV) in the City of Manila in Civil Case No. 93-66507 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let
the records of this case be remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to
costs."3

The assailed Resolution denied the petitioner’s Partial Motion for Reconsideration. 4

The Facts

The facts of this case are undisputed. On March 2, 1991, Spouses Vicente and Maria Sumilang del Rosario
(herein respondents), jointly and severally executed, signed and delivered in favor of Radiowealth Finance
Company (herein petitioner), a Promissory Note5 for ₱138,948. Pertinent provisions of the Promissory Note
read:

"FOR VALUE RECEIVED, on or before the date listed below, I/We promise to pay jointly and
severally Radiowealth Finance Co. or order the sum of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY EIGHT THOUSAND NINE
HUNDRED FORTY EIGHTPesos (₱138,948.00) without need of notice or demand, in installments as follows:

₱11,579.00 payable for 12 consecutive months starting on ________ 19__ until the amount of ₱11,579.00 is
fully paid. Each installment shall be due every ____ day of each month. A late payment penalty charge of two
and a half (2.5%) percent per month shall be added to each unpaid installment from due date thereof until fully
paid.

xxx xxx xxx

It is hereby agreed that if default be made in the payment of any of the installments or late payment charges
thereon as and when the same becomes due and payable as specified above, the total principal sum then
remaining unpaid, together with the agreed late payment charges thereon, shall at once become due and
payable without need of notice or demand.

xxx xxx xxx

If any amount due on this Note is not paid at its maturity and this Note is placed in the hands of an attorney or
collection agency for collection, I/We jointly and severally agree to pay, in addition to the aggregate of the
principal amount and interest due, a sum equivalent to ten (10%) per cent thereof as attorney’s and/or
collection fees, in case no legal action is filed, otherwise, the sum will be equivalent to twenty-five (25%)
percent of the amount due which shall not in any case be less than FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) plus
the cost of suit and other litigation expenses and, in addition, a further sum of ten per cent (10%) of said
amount which in no case shall be less than FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00), as and for liquidated
damages."6

Thereafter, respondents defaulted on the monthly installments. Despite repeated demands, they failed to pay
their obligations under their Promissory Note.

On June 7, 1993, petitioner filed a Complaint7 for the collection of a sum of money before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 14.8 During the trial, Jasmer Famatico, the credit and collection officer of petitioner,
presented in evidence the respondents’ check payments, the demand letter dated July 12, 1991, the
customer’s ledger card for the respondents, another demand letter and Metropolitan Bank dishonor slips.
Famatico admitted that he did not have personal knowledge of the transaction or the execution of any of these
pieces of documentary evidence, which had merely been endorsed to him.

DEMURRER CASES – BRONDIAL LIST


On July 4, 1994, the trial court issued an Order terminating the presentation of evidence for the
petitioner.9 Thus, the latter formally offered its evidence and exhibits and rested its case on July 5, 1994.

Respondents filed on July 29, 1994 a Demurrer to Evidence10 for alleged lack of cause of action. On November
4, 1994, the trial court dismissed11 the complaint for failure of petitioner to substantiate its claims, the evidence it
had presented being merely hearsay.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Hence, this recourse.12

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

According to the appellate court, the judicial admissions of respondents established their indebtedness to the
petitioner, on the grounds that they admitted the due execution of the Promissory Note, and that their only
defense was the absence of an agreement on when the installment payments were to begin. Indeed, during the
pretrial, they admitted the genuineness not only of the Promissory Note, but also of the demand letter dated
July 12, 1991. Even if the petitioner’s witness had no personal knowledge of these documents, they would still
be admissible "if the purpose for which [they are] produced is merely to establish the fact that the statement or
document was in fact made or to show its tenor[,] and such fact or tenor is of independent relevance."

Besides, Articles 19 and 22 of the Civil Code require that every person must -- in the exercise of rights and in
the performance of duties -- act with justice, give all else their due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Further, the rules on evidence are to be liberally construed in order to promote their objective and to assist the
parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of an action.

Issue

The petitioner raises this lone issue:

"The Honorable Court of Appeals patently erred in ordering the remand of this case to the trial court instead of
rendering judgment on the basis of petitioner’s evidence."13

For an orderly discussion, we shall divide the issue into two parts: (a) legal effect of the Demurrer to Evidence,
and (b) the date when the obligation became due and demandable.

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition has merit. While the CA correctly reversed the trial court, it erred in remanding the case "for further
proceedings."

Consequences of a Reversal, on Appeal, of a Demurrer to Evidence

Petitioner contends that if a demurrer to evidence is reversed on appeal, the defendant should be deemed to
have waived the right to present evidence, and the appellate court should render judgment on the basis of the
evidence submitted by the plaintiff. A remand to the trial court "for further proceedings" would be an outright
defiance of Rule 33, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Court.

On the other hand, respondents argue that the petitioner was not necessarily entitled to its claim, simply on the
ground that they lost their right to present evidence in support of their defense when the Demurrer to Evidence
was reversed on appeal. They stress that the CA merely found them indebted to petitioner, but was silent on
when their obligation became due and demandable.

DEMURRER CASES – BRONDIAL LIST


The old Rule 35 of the Rules of Court was reworded under Rule 33 of the 1997 Rules, but the consequence on
appeal of a demurrer to evidence was not changed. As amended, the pertinent provision of Rule 33 reads as
follows:

"SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence.—After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the
defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no
right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on
appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence." 14

Explaining the consequence of a demurrer to evidence, the Court in Villanueva Transit v.


Javellana15 pronounced:

"The rationale behind the rule and doctrine is simple and logical. The defendant is permitted, without waiving
his right to offer evidence in the event that his motion is not granted, to move for a dismissal (i.e., demur to the
plaintiff’s evidence) on the ground that upon the facts as thus established and the applicable law, the plaintiff
has shown no right to relief. If the trial court denies the dismissal motion, i.e., finds that plaintiff’s evidence is
sufficient for an award of judgment in the absence of contrary evidence, the case still remains before the trial
court which should then proceed to hear and receive the defendant’s evidence so that all the facts and
evidence of the contending parties may be properly placed before it for adjudication as well as before the
appellate courts, in case of appeal. Nothing is lost. The doctrine is but in line with the established procedural
precepts in the conduct of trials that the trial court liberally receive all proffered evidence at the trial to enable it
to render its decision with all possibly relevant proofs in the record, thus assuring that the appellate courts upon
appeal have all the material before them necessary to make a correct judgment, and avoiding the need of
remanding the case for retrial or reception of improperly excluded evidence, with the possibility thereafter of still
another appeal, with all the concomitant delays. The rule, however, imposes the condition by the same token
that if his demurrer is granted by the trial court, and the order of dismissal is reversed on appeal, the movant
losses his right to present evidence in his behalf and he shall have been deemed to have elected to stand on
the insufficiency of plaintiff’s case and evidence. In such event, the appellate court which reverses the order of
dismissal shall proceed to render judgment on the merits on the basis of plaintiff’s evidence." (Underscoring
supplied)

In other words, defendants who present a demurrer to the plaintiff’s evidence retain the right to present their
own evidence, if the trial court disagrees with them; if the trial court agrees with them, but on appeal, the
appellate court disagrees with both of them and reverses the dismissal order, the defendants lose the right to
present their own evidence.16 The appellate court shall, in addition, resolve the case and render judgment on the
merits, inasmuch as a demurrer aims to discourage prolonged litigations.17

In the case at bar, the trial court, acting on respondents’ demurrer to evidence, dismissed the Complaint on the
ground that the plaintiff had adduced mere hearsay evidence. However, on appeal, the appellate court
reversed the trial court because the genuineness and the due execution of the disputed pieces of evidence had
in fact been admitted by defendants.

Applying Rule 33, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Court, the CA should have rendered judgment on the basis of
the evidence submitted by the petitioner. While the appellate court correctly ruled that "the documentary
evidence submitted by the [petitioner] should have been allowed and appreciated xxx," and that "the petitioner
presented quite a number of documentary exhibits xxx enumerated in the appealed order,"18 we agree with
petitioner that the CA had sufficient evidence on record to decide the collection suit. A remand is not only
frowned upon by the Rules, it is also logically unnecessary on the basis of the facts on record.

Due and Demandable Obligation

Petitioner claims that respondents are liable for the whole amount of their debt and the interest thereon, after
they defaulted on the monthly installments.

Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the installments were not yet due and demandable. Petitioner
had allegedly allowed them to apply their promotion services for its financing business as payment of the

DEMURRER CASES – BRONDIAL LIST


Promissory Note. This was supposedly evidenced by the blank space left for the date on which the installments
should have commenced.19 In other words, respondents theorize that the action for immediate enforcement of
their obligation is premature because its fulfillment is dependent on the sole will of the debtor. Hence, they
consider that the proper court should first fix a period for payment, pursuant to Articles 1180 and 1197 of the
Civil Code.

This contention is untenable. The act of leaving blank the due date of the first installment did not necessarily
mean that the debtors were allowed to pay as and when they could. If this was the intention of the parties, they
should have so indicated in the Promissory Note. However, it did not reflect any such intention.

On the contrary, the Note expressly stipulated that the debt should be amortized monthly in installments of
₱11,579 for twelve consecutive months. While the specific date on which each installment would be due was
left blank, the Note clearly provided that each installment should be payable each month.

Furthermore, it also provided for an acceleration clause and a late payment penalty, both of which showed the
intention of the parties that the installments should be paid at a definite date. Had they intended that the
debtors could pay as and when they could, there would have been no need for these two clauses.

Verily, the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties manifest their intention and knowledge that the
monthly installments would be due and demandable each month. 20 In this case, the conclusion that the
installments had already became due and demandable is bolstered by the fact that respondents started paying
installments on the Promissory Note, even if the checks were dishonored by their drawee bank. We are
convinced neither by their avowals that the obligation had not yet matured nor by their claim that a period for
payment should be fixed by a court.

Convincingly, petitioner has established not only a cause of action against the respondents, but also a due and
demandable obligation. The obligation of the respondents had matured and they clearly defaulted when their
checks bounced. Per the acceleration clause, the whole debt became due one month (April 2, 1991) after the
date of the Note because the check representing their first installment bounced.

As for the disputed documents submitted by the petitioner, the CA ruling in favor of their admissibility, which
was not challenged by the respondents, stands. A party who did not appeal cannot obtain affirmative relief
other than that granted in the appealed decision.21

It should be stressed that respondents do not contest the amount of the principal obligation. Their liability as
1âw phi 1

expressly stated in the Promissory Note and found by the CA is "₱13[8],948.00 22 which is payable in twelve (12)
installments at ₱11,579.00 a month for twelve (12) consecutive months." As correctly found by the CA, the
"ambiguity" in the Promissory Note is clearly attributable to human error. 23

Petitioner, in its Complaint, prayed for "14% interest per annum from May 6, 1993 until fully paid." We
disagree. The Note already stipulated a late payment penalty of 2.5 percent monthly to be added to each
1âw phi 1

unpaid installment until fully paid. Payment of interest was not expressly stipulated in the Note. Thus, it should
be deemed included in such penalty.

In addition, the Note also provided that the debtors would be liable for attorney’s fees equivalent to 25 percent
of the amount due in case a legal action was instituted and 10 percent of the same amount as liquidated
damages. Liquidated damages, however, should no longer be imposed for being unconscionable. 24 Such
damages should also be deemed included in the 2.5 percent monthly penalty. Furthermore, we hold that
petitioner is entitled to attorney’s fees, but only in a sum equal to 10 percent of the amount due which we deem
reasonable under the proven facts.25

The Court deems it improper to discuss respondents' claim for moral and other damages. Not having appealed
the CA Decision, they are not entitled to affirmative relief, as already explained earlier.26

DEMURRER CASES – BRONDIAL LIST


WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The appealed Decision is MODIFIED in that the remand is SET
ASIDE and respondents are ordered TO PAY ₱138,948, plus 2.5 percent penalty charge per month beginning
April 2, 1991 until fully paid, and 10 percent of the amount due as attorney’s fees. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 186001 October 2, 2009

ANTONIO CABADOR, Petitioner,


vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari, assailing the Court of Appeals’ (CA) Decision of August 4,
20081 and Resolution of October 28, 20082 in CA-G.R. SP 100431 that affirmed the August 31, 2006 Order3 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City.

The facts are not disputed.

On June 23, 2000 the public prosecutor accused petitioner Antonio Cabador before the RTC of Quezon City in
Criminal Case Q-00-93291 of murdering, in conspiracy with others, Atty. Jun N. Valerio.4 On February 13,
2006, after presenting only five witnesses over five years of intermittent trial, the RTC declared at an end the
prosecution’s presentation of evidence and required the prosecution to make a written or formal offer of its
documentary evidence within 15 days from notice.5 But the public prosecutor asked for three extensions of
time, the last of which was to end on July 28, 2006. Still, the prosecution did not make the required written
offer.

On August 1, 2006 petitioner Cabador filed a motion to dismiss the case,6 complaining of a turtle-paced
proceeding in the case since his arrest and detention in 2001 and invoking his right to a speedy trial. Further,
he claimed that in the circumstances, the trial court could not consider any evidence against him that had not
been formally offered. He also pointed out that the prosecution witnesses did not have knowledge of his alleged
part in the crime charged.

Unknown to petitioner Cabador, however, four days earlier or on July 28, 2006 the prosecution asked the RTC
for another extension of the period for its formal offer, which offer it eventually made on August 1, 2006, the day
Cabador filed his motion to dismiss.7

On August 31, 2006 the RTC issued an Order treating petitioner Cabador’s August 1, 2006 motion to dismiss
as a demurrer to evidence. And, since he filed his motion without leave of court, the RTC declared him to have
waived his right to present evidence in his defense. The trial court deemed the case submitted for decision
insofar as he was concerned. Cabador filed a motion for reconsideration of this Order but the RTC denied it on
February 19, 2007.8 Cabador questioned the RTC’s actions before the CA but on August 4, 2008 the latter
denied his petition and affirmed the lower court’s actions.9 With the CA’s denial of his motion for
reconsideration, on October 28, 2008 petitioner came to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari.

The issue in this case is whether or not petitioner Cabador’s motion to dismiss before the trial court was in fact
a demurrer to evidence filed without leave of court, with the result that he effectively waived his right to present
evidence in his defense and submitted the case for decision insofar as he was concerned.

The trial proper in a criminal case usually has two stages: first, the prosecution’s presentation of evidence
against the accused and, second, the accused’s presentation of evidence in his defense. If, after the
prosecution has presented its evidence, the same appears insufficient to support a conviction, the trial court

DEMURRER CASES – BRONDIAL LIST


may at its own initiative or on motion of the accused dispense with the second stage and dismiss the criminal
action.10 There is no point for the trial court to hear the evidence of the accused in such a case since the
prosecution bears the burden of proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The order of dismissal amounts to
an acquittal.

But because some have in the past used the demurrer in order to delay the proceedings in the case, the
remedy now carries a caveat. When the accused files a demurrer without leave of court, he shall be deemed to
have waived the right to present evidence and the case shall be considered submitted for judgment.11 On
occasions, this presents a problem such as when, like the situation in this case, the accused files a motion to
dismiss that, to the RTC, had the appearance of a demurrer to evidence. Cabador insists that it is not one but
the CA, like the lower court, ruled that it is.

This Court held in Enojas, Jr. v. Commission on Elections12 that, to determine whether the pleading filed is a
demurer to evidence or a motion to dismiss, the Court must consider (1) the allegations in it made in good faith;
(2) the stage of the proceeding at which it is filed; and (3) the primary objective of the party filing it.

Here, the pertinent portions of petitioner Cabador’s motion to dismiss read as follows:

2. On November 9, 2001, the accused was arrested and subsequently brought to the Quezon City jail
through a commitment order dated November 21, 2001 where he had been detained during the course
of this case.

3. The accused was arraigned on January 8, 2002 and trial began soon after.

4. UP-OLA entered its appearance as counsel for the accused on January 20, 2005.

5. On February 10, 2006, the Honorable Court terminated the presentation of evidence for the
prosecution considering that the case has been going on for 5 years already and during that period the
prosecution has only presented 5 witnesses. Moreover, xxx there had been numerous postponements
due to failure of the prosecution to ensure the presence of its witnesses.

6. In an order dated March 31, 2006, the Honorable court required the public prosecutor to submit its
formal offer of evidence within fifteen (15) days from receipt of such order.

7. On April 17, 2006, the public prosecutor was again absent so the presentation of evidence for the
accused was reset to June 6, 2006.

8. During the same hearing, the Prosecution was again granted an additional fifteen (15) days within
which to file their formal offer of evidence.

9. On June 6, 2006, the public prosecutor again failed to appear and to file their formal offer of
evidence. In an order, the Honorable Court again extended to the prosecution an additional fifteen (15)
days from receipt of the order within which to file their formal offer of evidence.

10. On June 28, 2006, the Honorable Court issued an order granting the prosecution a thirty-day
extension, or until July 28, 2006 within which to file their formal offer of evidence since the public
prosecutor was on leave.

11. Upon the expiration of the extension granted by the Honorable Court, the prosecution failed to file
their formal offer of evidence.

10. (Sic) Despite three (3) extensions, the prosecution failed to file formal offer of evidence.

11. (Sic) Sec. 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that "the court shall consider no evidence
which has not been formally offered." A formal offer is necessary, since judges are required to base

DEMURRER CASES – BRONDIAL LIST


their findings of fact and their judgment solely and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at
the trial (Ong vs. CA, GR No. 117103). Hence, without any formal offer of evidence, this Honorable
Court has no evidence to consider.

12. The charge against the accused has no leg to stand on. The witnesses that had been presented by
the prosecution testified mainly on the occurrences on the night of the incident and had no knowledge
of any connection with or any participation by the accused in the incident.

13. The hearings of the case have been delayed since 2001 through no fault of the defense to the
prejudice of the rights of the accused to a speedy trial, mandated by no less than Art. III, Sec. 16 of the
Constitution.

14. Since UP-OLA had entered its appearance in 2005, the case had been reset for twelve (12) times,
most of which are due to the fault or absence of the prosecution. For the five year duration of the case,
the prosecution still has not presented any evidence to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. Meanwhile, the accused has been unduly stripped of this liberty for more than five
(5) years upon an unsubstantiated charge.

15. The accused was injured and debilitated in the course of his arrest which resulted in the
amputation of his left leg. His movement is severely hampered and his living conditions are less
adequate. To subject him to further delays when there is no substance to the charge against him
would tantamount to injustice.13

It can be seen from the above that petitioner Cabador took pains to point out in paragraphs 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,
10, 11, "10 (sic)," 13, 14, and 15 above how trial in the case had painfully dragged on for years. The gaps
between proceedings were long, with hearings often postponed because of the prosecutor’s absence. This was
further compounded, Cabador said, by the prosecution’s repeated motions for extension of time to file its formal
offer and its failure to file it within such time. Cabador then invoked in paragraph 13 above his right to speedy
trial. But the RTC and the CA simply chose to ignore these extensive averments and altogether treated
Cabador’s motion as a demurrer to evidence because of a few observations he made in paragraphs "11 (sic)"
and 12 regarding the inadequacy of the evidence against him.

In criminal cases, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground of denial of the accused’s right to speedy
trial.14This denial is characterized by unreasonable, vexatious, and oppressive delays without fault of the
accused, or by unjustified postponements that unreasonably prolonged the trial.15 This was the main thrust of
Cabador’s motion to dismiss and he had the right to bring this up for a ruling by the trial court.

Cabador of course dropped a few lines in his motion to dismiss in paragraphs "11 (sic)" and 12, saying that the
trial court "has no evidence to consider," "the charge has no leg to stand on," and that "the witnesses x x x had
no knowledge of any connection with or any participation by the accused in the incident." But these were mere
conclusions, highlighting what five years of trial had accomplished.

The fact is that Cabador did not even bother to do what is so fundamental in any demurrer. He did not state
what evidence the prosecution had presented against him to show in what respects such evidence failed to
meet the elements of the crime charged. His so-called "demurrer" did not touch on any particular testimony of
even one witness. He cited no documentary exhibit. Indeed, he could not because, he did not know that the
prosecution finally made its formal offer of exhibits on the same date he filed his motion to dismiss.16 To say
that Cabador filed a demurrer to evidence is equivalent to the proverbial blind man, touching the side of an
elephant, and exclaiming that he had touched a wall.

Besides, a demurrer to evidence assumes that the prosecution has already rested its case. Section 23, Rule
119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, reads:

Demurrer to evidence. – After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2)
upon demurrer to the evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court. (Emphasis supplied) 1awphi1

DEMURRER CASES – BRONDIAL LIST


Here, after the prosecution filed its formal offer of exhibits on August 1, 2006, the same day Cabador filed his
motion to dismiss, the trial court still needed to give him an opportunity to object to the admission of those
exhibits. It also needed to rule on the formal offer. And only after such a ruling could the prosecution be
deemed to have rested its case. Since Cabador filed his motion to dismiss before he could object to the
prosecution’s formal offer, before the trial court could act on the offer, and before the prosecution could rest its
case, it could not be said that he had intended his motion to dismiss to serve as a demurrer to evidence.

In sum, tested against the criteria laid down in Enojas, the Court finds that petitioner Cabador filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial, not a demurrer to evidence. He cannot be
declared to have waived his right to present evidence in his defense.

On a final note, a demurrer to evidence shortens the proceedings in criminal cases. Caution must, however, be
exercised17 in view of its pernicious consequence on the right of the accused to present evidence in his
defense, the seriousness of the crime charged, and the gravity of the penalty involved.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the August 4, 2008 Decision and the October 28, 2008 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 100431 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the August 31, 2006 Order
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81 is NULLIFIED. The latter court is DIRECTED to resolve
petitioner Antonio Cabador’s motion to dismiss based on the circumstances surrounding the trial in the case.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 185590 December 3, 2014

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner,


vs.
LEY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and SPOUSES MANUEL LEY and JANET
LEY,Respondents.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks the reversal of the Court of
Appeals' Decision1 dated September 4, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 75590 dismissing the appeal of petitioner
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company assailing the dismissal of its complaint by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City, Branch 56, and the Resolution2 dated December 5, 2008 denying the Bank's motion for
reconsideration.

The Court of Appeals adopted the following recital of facts in the Decision3 dated July 3, 2001 of the RTC in
Civil Case No. 91-1878:

This is an action for recovery of a sum of money and damages with a prayer for the issuance of writ of
preliminary attachment filed by the plaintiff Philippine Banking Corporation4 against the defendants, namely: Ley
Construction and Development Corporation (hereafter "LCDC") and Spouses Manuel and Janet C. Ley
(hereafter "[defendant]-spouses").

The complaint alleges that: Defendant LCDC, a general contracting firm, through the oral representations of
defendant-spouses, applied with plaintiff, a commercial bank, for the opening of a Letter of Credit. Plaintiff
issued, on April 26, 1990, Letter of Credit DC 90[-]303-C in favor of the supplier-beneficiary Global Enterprises
Limited, in the amount of Eight Hundred Two Thousand Five Hundred U.S. Dollars (USD 802,500.00). The
letter of credit covered the importation by defendant LCDC of Fifteen Thousand (15,000) metric tons of Iraqi
cement from Iraq. Defendant applied for and filed with plaintiff two (2) Applications for Amendment of Letter of
Credit on May 3, 1990 and May 11, 1990, respectively.

DEMURRER CASES – BRONDIAL LIST


Thereafter, the supplier-beneficiary Global Enterprises, Inc. negotiated its Letter of Credit with the negotiating
bank Credit Suisse of Zurich, Switzerland. Credit Suisse then sent a reimbursement claim by telex to American
Express Bank Ltd., New York on July 25, 1990 for the amount of Seven Hundred Sixty[-]Six Thousand Seven
Hundred Eight U.S. Dollars (USD 766,708.00) with a certification that all terms and conditions of the credit were
complied with. Accordingly, on July 30, 1990, American Express Bank debited plaintiff’s account Seven
Hundred Seventy Thousand Six Hundred Ninety[-]One U.S. Dollars and Thirty Cents (USD 770,691.30) and
credited Credit Suisse Zurich Account with American Express Bank, Ltd., New Yorkfor the negotiation of Letter
of Credit. On August 6, 1990, plaintiff received from Credit Suisse the necessary shipping documents
pertaining to Letter of Credit DC 90-303-C that were in turn delivered to the defendant. Upon receipt of the
aforesaid documents, defendants executed a trust receipt. However, the cement that was to be imported
through the opening of the subject Letter of Credit never arrived in the Philippines.

The prompt payment of the obligation of the defendant LCDC was guaranteed by [defendant]-spouses under
the Continuing Surety Agreement executed by the latter in favor of the defendant. The obligation covered by
the subject Letter of Credit in the amount of USD 802,500.00 has long been overdue and unpaid,
notwithstanding repeated demands for payment thereof. Plaintiff, therefore, instituted the instant complaint for
recovery of the following amounts: Twenty[-]Three [M]illion Two Hundred [F]ifty[-]Nine Thousand One Hundred
Twenty[-]Four Pesos and Fourteen Centavos (PH₱23,259,124.14) as of June 15, 1991, inclusive of interestand
penalty, plus additional interest thereon of Thirty percent (30%) per annum; attorney’s fees equivalent to
Twenty[-]Five percent [25%] of the total obligation; and costs of suit.

In support of its cause of action against defendant, plaintiff presented the testimony of Mr. Fenelito Cabrera,
Head of the Foreign Department of plaintiff’s Head Office. (T.S.N. dated June 16, 1995, p. 4) There being no
other witness to be presented by the plaintiff (Order dated June 27, 1997), the plaintiff filed its formal offer of
exhibits dated July 18, 1997 to which defendant filed its comments/objections to formal offer of evidence dated
February 23, 1998. In an order dated March 4, 1998, Exhibits "A" to "N" to "N-4" including [their] sub-markings
were admitted for the purposes they were respectively offered. However, on defendants’ motion for
reconsideration dated [March 30,] 1998 that was duly opposed by the plaintiff in itsopposition dated June 3,
1998, this Court partially granted defendants’ motion for reconsideration. Consequently, Exhibits "D", "E",
"H","I", "J", "K", "L", and "M" and their sub-markings were not admitted for not being properly identified and
authenticated by a competent witness. Only Exhibits "A", "B", "C", "C-1", and "N", "N-1" to "N-4" remain
admitted in evidence. (Order dated September 9, 1998) Defendant filed a motion to dismiss by way of demurrer
to evidence on the ground that plaintiff’s witness Mr. Fenelito Cabrera was incompetent to testify with respect
tothe transaction between the plaintiff and the defendant and that the plaintiff’s documentary exhibits were not
properly identified and authenticated.5

The trial court found that the Bank’s only witness, Fenelito Cabrera, was incompetent to testify on the
documents presented by the Bank during the trial. Cabrera was with the Bank’s Dasmariñas Branch and not
with the Head Office from March 1990 to June 1991, the period the transaction covered by the documents took
place. Thus, he could not have properly identified and authenticated the Bank’s documentary exhibits. His lack
of competence was even admitted by the Bank’s counsel who did not even ask Cabrera to identify the
documents. Asthe documents were not identified and duly authenticated, the Bank’s evidence was not
preponderant enough to establish its right to recover from LCDC and the spouses Ley.6

The trial court further ruled that only the following documents remained admitted in evidence:

Exhibit Document
"A" Continuing Surety Agreement dated July 25, 1989
"B" Application and Agreement for Commercial Letter of Credit
"C" and "C-1" Letter of Credit No. DC 90-303-C
"N" and "N-1" to "N-4" Statement of Outstanding Obligations

For the trial court, these were insufficient to show that LCDC and the spouses Ley were responsible for the
improper negotiation of the letter of credit. Thus, the trial court concluded in its Decision dated July 3, 2001 that

DEMURRER CASES – BRONDIAL LIST


the Bank failed to establish its cause ofaction and to make a sufficient or preponderant case. 7 The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the demurrer to evidence is granted. The case is dismissed.8 The Bank appealed to the Court
of Appeals. It claimed that the trial court erred in granting the demurrer toevidence of LCDC and the spouses
Ley on the ground that the Bank failed to establish its cause of action. The Bank insisted that, even without
considering the exhibits excluded in evidence by the trial court, the Bank was able to prove by preponderant
evidence that it had a right and that right was violated by LCDC and the spouses Ley. It explained that the trial
court was wrong in considering only Exhibits "A," "B," "C," "C-1," "N" and "N-1" to "N-4" as the following
documents were also admitted in evidence and should have been considered in the resolution of the demurrer
to evidence.9

Exhibit Document
"F" Register Copy or Memorandum on the Letter of Credit
"G" Trust Receipt No. TRI432/90 dated August 16, 1990
"G-1" Bank Draft
"G-2" Bill of Exchange

The Bank asserted that the consideration of Exhibits "F," "G" and "G-1" to "G-2" would have established the
following:

(a) On August 16, 1990, LCDC and the spouses Ley received from the Bank the necessary shipping
documents relative to the Letter of Credit evidencing title to the goods subject matter of the importation
which the Bank had previously received from Credit Suisse;

(b) Upon receipt of the shipping documents, LCDC and the spouses Ley executed a trust receipt, Trust
Receipt No. TRI432/90, in favor of the Bank covering the importation of cement under Letter of Credit
No. DC 90-303-C;

(c) The issuance of the trust receipt was an acknowledgement by LCDC and the spouses Ley of their
receipt of the shipping documents and of their liability to the Bank;

(d) By signing the trust receipt, constituted an admission by LCDC and the spouses Ley that the Letter
of Credit was in order, including the Bank’s payment of the amountof US$766,708.00 under the Letter
of Credit.10

Thus, even with only the testimony ofCabrera and Exhibits "A," "B," "C," "C-1," "N" and "N-1" to "N-4" and "F,"
"G" and "G-1" to "G-2," the demurrer should have been denied and LCDC and the spouses Ley held liable to
the Bank.

Moreover, the Bank contended that its Exhibits "D," "E," "H," and "I" should have been also admitted in
evidence because LCDC and the spouses Ley effectively admitted the authenticity of the said documents when
they stated in the pre-trial brief which they submitted during the pretrial of the case atthe trial court:

III. DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS

Defendants shall adopt the documents submitted by plaintiff and marked as Annexes "A", "B", "C", "D","E", "E-
1", "F", "G", "G-1", "H" and "H-1" in the plaintiff’s complaint.

Defendants reserve the right tomark or adopt such other documentary evidence as may be discovered or
warranted to support its claim in the course of the trial. x x x.11

DEMURRER CASES – BRONDIAL LIST


The Court of Appeals found no merit in the Bank’s appeal. It observed that Cabrera, the Bank’s onlywitness,
prepared and properly identified Exhibits "F," "G," "N" and "N-1" to "N-4" only. The Bank’s counsel even
admitted in open court during Cabrera’s direct examination that Cabrera was incompetent to testify onthe rest
of the Exhibits. The trial court was therefore correct in not giving any evidentiary weight to those Exhibits not
properly identified by Cabrera.12

For the Court of Appeals, the statement in the pre-trial brief that LCDC and the spouses Ley "shall adopt"
Annexes "A," "B," "C," "D," "E," "E-1," "F," "G," "G-1," "H" and "H-1" of the Bank’s complaint did not constitute
an admission of the said documents by LCDC and the spouses Ley. However, the appellate court noted that
LCDC and the spouses Ley admitted the existence and authenticity of the Bank’s Exhibits "A," "B," "C," "C-1,"
and "G."13

Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals ruled that the following Exhibits of the Bank were admitted in evidence:

Exhibit Document
"A" Continuing Surety Agreement dated July 25, 1989
"B" Application and Agreement for Commercial Letter of Credit
"C" and "C-1" Letter of Credit No. DC 90-303-C
"F" Register Copy or Memorandum on the Letter of Credit
"G" Trust Receipt No. TRI432/90 dated August 16, 1990
"N" and "N-1" to "N-4" Statement of Outstanding Obligations

Even upon inclusion and consideration of the above-mentioned exhibits, the Court of Appeals held that the
Bank still failed to show that LCDC and the spouses Ley were directly responsible for the improper negotiation
of the letter of credit. Thus, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated September 4, 2008, dismissed the
appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial court.14 The dispositive portion of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed decision of the
RTC, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 56, Makati City in Civil Case No. 91-1878 is AFFIRMED.15

The Court of Appeals denied the Bank’s motion for reconsideration, prompting the Bank to file this petition.

The Bank insists that it has been ableto establish its cause of action not only through preponderance of
evidence but even by the admissions of LCDC and the spouses Ley. It maintains that its cause of action is not
predicated on the improper negotiation of the letter of credit but on the breach of the terms and conditions of
the trust receipt.16

The petition fails.

First, the Bank’s petition suffers from a fatal infirmity. In particular, it contravenes the elementary rule of
appellate procedure that an appeal to this Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court "shall raise only questions of law."17 The rule is based on the nature of this Court’s appellate function –
this Court is not a trier of facts18 – and on the evidentiary weight given to the findings of fact of the trial court
which have been affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeals – they are conclusive on this Court.19 While there
are recognized exceptions to the rule,20 this Court sees no reason to apply the exception and not the rule in this
case.

The conceptual distinction between a question of law and a question of fact is well-settled in case law:

DEMURRER CASES – BRONDIAL LIST


There is a "question of law" when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
and which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-
litigants. On the other hand, there is a "question of fact" when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or
falsity of the alleged facts. x x x.21

The issue of whether or not the Bank was able to establish its cause of action by preponderant evidence is
essentially a question of fact. Stated in another way, the issue which the Bank raises in this petition is whether
the evidence it presented during the trial was preponderant enough to hold LCDC and the spouses Ley liable.

The required burden of proof, or that amount of evidence necessary and sufficient to establish one’s claim or
defense, in civil cases is preponderance of evidence.22 Preponderance of evidence is defined as follows:

Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is
usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of evidence" or "greater weight of the
credible evidence." Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability to
truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthier of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto.23(Emphasis supplied, citation omitted.)

As preponderance of evidence refers to the probability to truth of the matters intended to be proven as facts, it
concerns a determination of the truth or falsity of the alleged facts based on the evidence presented. Thus, a
review of the respective findings of the trial and the appellate courts as to the preponderance of a party’s
evidence requires that the reviewing court address a question of fact.

Moreover, a demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. Evidence is
the means, sanctioned by the Rules of Court, of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a
matter of fact.24 As such, the question of sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence, the basic issue presented by
the Bank, pertains to the question of whether the factual matters alleged by the Bank are true. Plainly, it is a
question of fact and, as such, not proper subject of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court. It was incumbent upon the Bank to demonstrate that this case fell under any of the exceptions to this
rule but it failed to do so.

Second, the Bank attempts to avoid the "only questions of law" rule for appeals filed under Rule 45 by invoking
the misapprehension of facts exception.25 According to the Bank, the trial and the appellate courts
misapprehended the facts with respect tothe determination of the basis of the Bank’s cause of action. 26 In
particular, the Bank contends that both the trial and the appellate courts erred in the consideration of the proper
actionable document upon which the Bank based its cause of action. The Bank asserts that its cause of action
isnot grounded on the Letter of Credit but on the Trust Receipt.

The Bank’s reference to the Trust Receipt as its "primary actionable document"27 is mistaken and misleading.

The nature of the cause of action isdetermined by the facts alleged in the complaint.28 A party’s cause of action
is not what the party says it is, nor is it what the designation of the complaint states, but what the allegations in
the body define and describe.29

In this case, the Bank’s allegations asto the basis of its cause of action against LCDC and the spouses Ley,
however, belie the Bank’s claim. In particular, the relevant portion of the Bank’s Complaint 30 reads:

1.2 The defendants:

a. Ley Construction and Development Corporation (LCDC) is a general contracting firm


engaged in the construction of buildings, infrastructures, and other civil works with principal
office at Mapulang Lupa St., Malinta, Valenzuela, Metro Manila where it [may be] served with
summons and other processes of this Court.

DEMURRER CASES – BRONDIAL LIST


b. Sps. Manuel and Janet C. Ley, the major stockholders of defendant (LCDC)with business
address at 23rd Floor Pacific Star Bldg., Makati Avenue, Makati, Metro Manila where the
processes of this Honorable Court [may be] served upon them are impleaded herein in their
capacity as Surety for the obligation incurred by defendant LCDC with the herein plaintiff by
virtue of a Continuing Surety Agreement they executed in favor of the plaintiff, a copy of which
is hereto attached as Annex "A";

2. STATEMENT OF CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT LCDC AND SPOUSES MANUEL AND
JANET LEY

2.1 In conjunction with its business, defendant LCDC sought to import "Iraqi Cement" from
Iraq thru its supplier "Global Enterprises, Limited" with address at 15 A. Tuckeys Lane,
Gibraltar.

2.2 To finance this importation, defendant LCDC applied with the plaintiff for the opening of
Letter of Credit as evidenced by the Application and Agreement for Commercial Letter of
Credit, copy of which is marked as Annex "B" and made integral part hereof.

2.3 Acting on defendant[’]s oral representation and those stated in its application (Annex "B"),
plaintiff issued on April 26, 1990 its Letter of Credit No. DC 90[-]303-C in favor of the supplier
Global Enterprises Limited, as beneficiary in the amount of U.S. Dollars: EIGHT HUNDRED
TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (US $802,500) for the account of defendant, covering the
importation of 15,000 metric tons of Iraqi Cement from Iraq, copy of the Letter of Credit is
marked as Annex "C" and made integral part hereof;

2.4 On May 3, 1990, defendant applied for and filed with plaintiff an Application for
Amendment of Letter of Credit, copy of which is attached as Annex "D" hereof, and another
application for amendment was filed on May 11, 1990 copy of which is marked as Annexes
"E" and "E-1" hereof;

2.5 After these amendments were communicated to the negotiating bank, Credit Suisse of
Zurich, Switzerland, the beneficiary negotiated its Letter of Credit therewith. Thereafter, Credit
Suisse sent a reimbursement claim by telex to American Express Bank Ltd., New York on July
25, 1990 for the amount of US$766,708.00 with a Certification that all terms and conditions of
the credit were complied with;

2.6 Accordingly, on July 30, 1990, American Express Bank debited plaintiff’s account
US$770,691.30 and credited Credit Suisse Zurich Account with American Express Bank Ltd.,
New York for the negotiation of Letter of Credit;

2.7 On August 6, 1990, plaintiff received from Credit Suisse the necessary shipping
documents pertaining to Letter of Credit DC 90-303-C all of which were in turn delivered and
received by the defendant on August 16, 1990 as evidenced by their acknowledgment
appearing on the plaintiff’s register copy, a copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "F";

2.8 Upon defendant’s receipt of the shipping documents and other documents of title to the
imported goods, defendant signed a trust receipt manifesting its acceptance/conformity that
the negotiation of the LC is in order. A copy of the TR and the draft issued by the defendant
as a means of paying its LC obligation to the plaintiff are hereto attached and marked as
Annexes "G" and "G-1" hereof;

2.9 Sometime during the 3rd week of August, defendant LCDC informed the plaintiff that the
expected shipment of cement subject matter of the LC was allegedly held up in Iraq
purportedly on account of the trade embargo imposed against it by the United Nation[s] and
sought assistance from the plaintiff to secure no-dollar import permit from the Central Bank as

DEMURRER CASES – BRONDIAL LIST


defendant was negotiating with its supplier Global Enterprises Limited, Inc. for an alternate
shipment of Syrian Cement.

2.10 Plaintiff acceded to the request of the defendant and conformably secured the requested
approval from Central Bank to allow the defendant to import cement on a no-dollar basis, a
copy of the defendant’s request as well as the Central Bank approval are hereto attached as
Annexes "H" and "H-1".

2.11 About two months after the plaintiff has obtained the requested Central Bank approval
(Annex "H-1")[,] plaintiff was again advised by the defendant that the alternate shipment of
Syrian Cement is no longer forthcoming and that defendant LCDC after a series of negotiation
with its supplier has agreed with the latter for a reimbursement of the value of the negotiated
Letter of Credit.

2.12 While defendant was negotiating with its supplier for that replacement of Syrian cement,
defendant advised plaintiff not to initiate any move as it might jeopardize defendant’s
negotiation with its supplier.

2.13 In December 1990, four (4) months from defendant’s receipt of the shipping and export
documents from plaintiff, as it became perceptible that defendant’s negotiation with its
supplier for reimbursement or replacement would fail[,] defendant for the first time asked for
copies of the beneficiary’s draft, the Charter Party Agreement even as it contested the validity
of defendant’s obligation to plaintiff.

2.14 For the first time, defendant also began to assail the validity of the payment made by the
plaintiff to the supplier (Global Enterprises Ltd.) through Credit Suisse, with the intention of
avoiding the payment of its lawful obligation to reimburse the plaintiff the amount of US
$802,500 which obligation is now long overdue and unpaid notwithstanding repeated
demands.

2.15 The obligation covered by the aforesaid Letter of Credit bears interest and charges at the
rateof 30% per annum which rate [may be] increased or decreased within the limits allowed by
the law.

2.16 The prompt payment of the obligations contracted by defendant LCDC from the plaintiff
inclusive of the subject Letter of Creditis guaranteed by defendant Sps.Manuel and Janet Ley
by making themselves jointly and severally liable with the defendant LCDC in accordance with
the terms of a Continuing Surety Agreement which they executed in favor of the plaintiff
(Annex "A").31 (Emphases supplied.)

That the Bank’s cause of action was hinged on the Letter of Credit is unmistakable. Taken as a whole, the
Bank’s allegations make a cause of action based on the Letter of Credit. The Trust Receipt was mentioned
incidentally and appears only in paragraph 2.8 of the Complaint.32 In stark contrast, the Letter of Credit figures
prominently in the Complaint as it is mentioned in almost all of the paragraphs of Part 2 (Statement of Cause of
Action Against Defendant LCDC and Spouses Manuel and Janet Ley). More tellingly, in paragraph 2.15, the
Bank speaks of "the obligation covered by the aforesaid Letter of Credit."33

Moreover, under paragraphs1.2(b) and 2.16 of the Complaint, the spouses Ley have been impleaded as co-
defendants of LCDC on account of their execution of a Continuing Surety Agreement in the Bank’s favor to
guarantee the "prompt payment of the obligations contracted by defendant LCDC from the plaintiff inclusive of
the subject Letter of Credit."34 In short, the Bank seeks to hold liable (1) LCDC for its obligations under the
Letter of Credit, and (2) the spouses Ley for their obligations under the Continuing Surety Agreement which
stands as security for the Letter of Credit and not for the Trust Receipt.

Another significant factor that contradicts the Bank’s assertion that its "primary actionable document" is the
Trust Receipt is the manner it pleaded the Letter of Credit and the Trust Receipt, respectively.

DEMURRER CASES – BRONDIAL LIST


The relevant rule on actionable documents is Section 7, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court which provides:

Section 7. Action or defense based on document. – Whenever an action or defense is based upon a written
instrument or document, the substance of such instrument or document shall be set forth in the pleading, and
the original or a copy thereof shall be attached to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall be deemed to be a
part of the pleading, or said copy may with like effect be set forth in the pleading.

An "actionable document" is a written instrument or document on which an action or defense is founded. It may
be pleaded in either of two ways:

(1) by setting forth the substance ofsuch document in the pleading and attaching the document thereto
as an annex, or

(2) by setting forth said document verbatim in the pleading.35

A look at the allegations in the Complaint quoted abovewill show that the Bank did not set forth the contents of
the Trust Receipt verbatim in the pleading. The Bank did not also set forth the substance of the Trust Receipt in
the Complaint but simply attached a copy thereof as an annex. Rather than setting forth the substance of the
Trust Receipt, paragraph 2.8 of the Complaint shows that the Bank simply described the Trust Receipt as
LCDC’s manifestation of "its acceptance/conformity that the negotiation of the [Letter of Credit] is in order." 36

In contrast, while the Bank did not set forth the contents of the Letter of Credit verbatim in the Complaint, the
Bank set forth the substance of the Letter of Credit in paragraph 2.3 of the Complaint and attached a copy
thereof as Annex "C" of the Complaint. The Bank stated that it "issued on April 26, 1990 its Letter of Credit No.
1awp++i 1

DC 90[-]303-C in favor of the supplier Global Enterprises Limited, as beneficiary[,] in the amount of U.S.
Dollars: EIGHT HUNDRED TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (US$802,500.00) for the account of defendant
[LCDC], covering the importation of 15,000 metric tonsof Iraqi Cement from Iraq."37

Thus, the Bank’s attempt to cling to the Trust Receipt as its so-called "primary actionable document" is negated
by the manner of its allegations in the Complaint. Thus, too, the trial and the appellate courts did not
misapprehend the facts when they considered the Letter of Credit as the basis of the Bank’s cause of action.

Third, a look at the Letter of Credit, the actionable document on which the Bank relied in its case against LCDC
and the spouses Ley, confirms the identical findings of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.

In Keng Hua Paper Products Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we held38:

In a letter of credit, there are three distinct and independent contracts: (1) the contract of sale between the
buyer and the seller, (2) the contract of the buyer with the issuing bank, and (3) the letter of credit proper in
which the bank promises to pay the seller pursuant to the terms and conditions stated therein. x x x.

Here, what is involved is the second contract – the contract of LCDC, as the buyer of Iraqi cement, with the
Bank, as the issuer of the Letter of Credit. The Bank refers to that contract in the Petition for Review on
Certiorari and the Memorandum filed by the Bank in this case when the Bank argues that, as LCDC and the
spouses Ley have admitted the issuance of the Letter of Credit in their favor, they are "deemed to have
likewise admitted the terms and conditions thereof, as evidenced by the stipulation therein appearing above the
signature of respondent Janet Ley,"39 viz:

"In consideration of your arranging, at my/o[u]r request[,] for the establishment of this commercial letter of credit
(thereinafter referred to as the ["]Credit["]) substantially in accordance with the foregoing, I/we hereby covenant
and agree to eachand all of [the] provisions and conditions stipulated on the reverse side hereof." 40

The above stipulation actually appears on the Application and Agreement for Commercial Letter of Credit, the
Bank’s Exhibit "B." It is the contract which contains the provisions and conditions governing the legal
relationship of the Bank and LCDC, particularly their respective rights and obligations, in connection with the

DEMURRER CASES – BRONDIAL LIST


Bank’s issuance of Letter of Credit No. DC 90-303-C. The importance of the provisions and conditions
supposed to be stipulated on the reverse side of the Application and Agreement for Commercial Letter of Credit
is underscored by the following note appearing below the space for the signature of Janet Ley:

IMPORTANT: PLEASE READ PROVISIONS AND CONDITIONS ON REVERSE SIDE HEREOF BEFORE
SIGNING ABOVE.41

However, the Bank’s Exhibit "B" has nothing on its reverse side. In other words, the reverse side of the
Application and Agreement for Commercial Letter of Credit is a blank page.42 Even the copy of the Application
and Agreement for Commercial Letter of Credit attached to the Bank’s Complaint also has nothing on its back
page.43

A cause of action – the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another44 – has three essential
elements:

(1) the existence of a legal right in favor of the plaintiff;

(2) a correlative legal duty of the defendant to respect such right; and

(3) an act or omission by such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff with a resulting injury or
damage to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for the recovery of relief from the
defendant.45

Although the first two elements may exist, a cause of action arises only upon the occurrence of the last
element, giving the plaintiff the right to maintain an action in court for recovery of damages or other appropriate
relief.46 In this case, however, even the legal rights of the Bank and the correlative legal duty of LCDC have not
been sufficiently established by the Bank in view of the failure of the Bank's evidence to show the provisions
and conditions that govern its legal relationship with LCDC, particularly the absence of the provisions and
conditions supposedly printed at the back of the Application and Agreement for Commercial Letter of Credit.
Even assuming arguendo that there was no impropriety in the negotiation of the Letter of Credit and the Bank's
cause of action was simply for the collection of what it paid under said Letter of Credit, the Bank did not
discharge its burden to prove every element of its cause of action against LCDC.

This failure of the Bank to present preponderant evidence that will establish the liability of LCDC under the
Letter of Credit necessarily benefits the spouses Ley whose liability is supposed to be based on a Continuing
Surety Agreement guaranteeing the liability of LCDC under the Letter of Credit.

The Court therefore finds no reason to disturb the rulings of the courts a quo as the petition put forward
insufficient basis to warrant their reversal.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 191849

FREDERICK F. FELIPE, Petitioners,


vs.
MGM MOTOR TRADING CORPORATION, doing business under the name and style NISSAN GALLERY-
ORTIGAS, and AYALA GENERAL INSURANCE CORPORATION, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

PEREZ, J.:

DEMURRER CASES – BRONDIAL LIST


This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the 14 January 2010 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals and its 16
March 2010 Resolution2 in CAG. R. CV No. 89665 affirming the 22 February 2005 Order3 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 80 which dismissed the case for· specific performance and damages on
demurrer to evidence.

In his Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against respondents MGM Motors, Inc. (MGM Motors)
and Ayala General Insurance Corporation (Ayala Insurance), petitioner Frederick Felipe claimed. that he
purchased on installment basis a Nissan Terrano Wagon through MGM Motors' authorized representative Jane
Sarmiento (Sarmiento). Petitioner allegedly gave a P200,000.00 downpayment and P5,000.00 reservation fee
to Sarmiento. He further issued seven (7) Allied Bank checks, each bearing the amount of P24,165.00 payable
to MGM Motors. On 14 May 1997, MGM Motors delivered the subject vehicle to petitioner. He then insured the
vehicle with Ayala Insurance under Policy No. PC970000440001-00-000 and paid a premium of P40,220.67.
On 15 November 1997, the subject vehicle, while parked along Adriatico Street in Manila, was reportedly lost.
He tried to claim from Ayala Insurance but the latter refused to pay its liability causing damages to petitioner.
On the other hand, MGM Motors refused to produce, despite repeated demands, the document of sale by
installment covering the vehicle. Petitioner allegedly paid additional P200,000.00 on 7 May 1998 as partial
payment for the vehicle. The refusal of MGM Motors to produce the document and its renouncement of the
existence of the installment sale; and the subsequent unlawful insistence on a cash transaction agreement, had
caused damages to petitioner.4

In its Answer, MGM Motors denied receiving the down payment of P200,000.00 and P5,000.00 reservation fee
paid through Sarmiento. The following is its version of the controversy:

MGM Motors offered Petitioner a discount of P220,000.00 if the latter would pay in cash. MGM Motors averred
that the vehicle was delivered to petitioner on 14 May 1997 but the latter failed to pay in cash, thus MGM
Motors did not give the registration papers to petitioner. MGM Motors sent two letters to petitioner demanding
the payment for the said vehicle but the latter refused or failed to pay. MGM Motors stated that petitioner was
able. to fraudulently register the vehicle with the Land Transportation Office in his name and insure the same
with Ayala Insurance. During a negotiation, the parties agreed that petitioner's obligation amounted to
Pl,020,000.00. In an effort to settle petitioner's obligation, his mother Purificacion issued a postdated check for
Pl,020,000.00 as full payment for the subject vehicle but, upon maturity, the check bounced. Consequently,
MGM Motors filed a case for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22) against petitioner's mother. In
order to settle the civil aspect of the BP 22 case, petitioner paid P200,00.00 to MGM Motors. MGM Motors
counterclaimed for damages.5

Ayala Insurance, for its part, contended that petitioner had no valid cause of action against it. Ayala Insurance.
asserted that petitioner had no insurable interest because he is not the owner of the vehicle that he had insured
with it. Ayala Insurance also counterclaimed for damages.6

Trial proceeded with petitioner and his father Alberto Felipe (Alberto) testifying on the behalf of the former.
Petitioner's testimony was however stricken off the record because he failed to return, despite numerous
opportunities, to the witness stand for cross-examination. Only two pieces of evidence were admitted by the
trial court: (1) the Official Receipt dated 7 May 1998 issued by MGM Motors wherein it acknowledged receipt of
P200,000.00 from petitioner; and (2) the testimony of his father Alberto that he was present when petitioner
paid P200,000.00 to MGM Motors.

MGM Motors and Ayala Insurance filed their respective Motions to Dismiss on demurrer to evidence.

On 22 February 2005, the RTC dismissed the case. The trial court reasoned that the evidence admitted
by the trial court do not prove the material allegations of petitioner's complaint, as well as the alleged
liability of Ayala Insurance.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration from said Order but it was denied by the trial court on 23 May
2005.7

Meanwhile, the trial, with respect to MGM Motor's counterclaim, subsisted.

DEMURRER CASES – BRONDIAL LIST


On 6 June 2007, the trial court awarded P25,000.00 in attorney's fees to MGM Motors.8

Petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. On 14 January 2010, the appellate court gave weight to
the factual findings of the trial court and found no reason to reverse its ruling.9 Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was likewise denied by the Court of Appeals.

In the instant petition for review on certiorari, petitioner raises a lone argument, to wit:

THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DISPOSED OF PETITIONER'S (PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT THEREIN)


APPEAL IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS
HONORABLE TRIBUNAL, THUS COMMITTING ERRORS THAT WARRANT REVERSAL BY THIS
HONORABLE TRIBUNAL THIS HAPPENED WHEN:

THE COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT FAILED/REFUSED TO
GRANT PETITIONER THE RELIEFS PRAYED FOR IN THE COMPLAINT DESPITE THE FACT THAT WITH
THE EVIDENCE THAT HE ADDUCED HE HAS CLEARLY, CONVINCINGLY AND PREPONDERANTLY
PROVEN HIS CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS (DEFENDANTS). THIS IS TRUE EVEN
IF A CONSIDERABLE PORTION OF HIS EVIDENCE WAS DENIED ADMISSION BY THE TRIAL COURT. 10

Petitioner insists that the two pieces of evidence admitted by the trial court are sufficient to substantiate the
material allegations of the complaint. Petitioner stresses that Alberto's testimony established that the purchase
of the subject vehicle was on installment basis from MGM Motors; that Petitioner paid additional 1!200,000.00;
and that MGM Motors failed and refused to deliver the promised documents. of sale on installment despite
payments having been made. The fact of sale on installment, according to petitioner, was further proved by the
receipt issued by MGM Motors. Petitioner highlights the fact that the vehicle was actually delivered to him, thus
.ownership was transferred to him upon delivery thereof. Proceeding from the same line of argument, petitioner
states that with respect to Ayala Insurance, he is already the owner of the subject vehicle when the insurance
on it was taken and when the subject vehicle was lost. Assuming arguendo that title to the subject vehicle
remained with MGM Motors, petitioner addsthat his insurable interest on the vehicle consisted of the
substantial amount that he had paid on the purchase price of the vehicle.

MGM Motors cites the Municipal Trial Court's (MTC) finding in the criminal complaint for BP 22 against
petitioner's mother that the agreement for the purchase of the subject vehicle was on cash basis and not
installment MGM Motors echoes the trial court's ruling that petitioner failed to substantiate the material
allegations in his complaint.

On its part, Ayala Insurance puts up the argument that the only evidence submitted by petitioner against it was
the receipt of the P200,000.00 that he paid to MGM Motors. The evidence does not constitute proof of the
1âw phi 1

insurable interest. Moreover, Ayala Insurance asserts that petitioner also failed to establish the following proof:
(1) premium payment; (2) that the insurable interest existed at the time of the loss; (3) deed of sale; (4)
proximate cause of the loss is one of the perils insured against; (5) existence of the original insurance policy.
Ayala Insurance maintains that Petitioner failed to establish his case by preponderance of evidence.

The basic issue is whether the trial court correctly granted the demurrer to evidence and subsequently
dismissed the complaint.

We agree:

A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and is presented after
the plaintiff rests his case. It is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence
which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain
the issue.11

Rule 33, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

DEMURRER CASES – BRONDIAL LIST


Section 1. Demurrer to evidence.-After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the
defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no
right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on
appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.

The essential question to be resolved in a demurrer to evidence is whether the plaintiff has been able to show
that he is entitled to his claim, and it is incumbent upon the trial court judge to make such a determination.12

A review of the dismissal of the complaint naturally entails a Calibration of the evidence to determine whether
the material allegations of the complaint were sufficiently backed by evidence. We have repeatedly stressed
that the remedy of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court contemplates only questions of law,
not of fact.

A question of law exists when there is doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a certain state of facts.
There is a question of fact when doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the statement of facts. The resolution of
a question of fact necessarily involves a calibration of the evidence, the credibility of the witnesses, the
existence and the relevance of surrounding circumstances, and the probability of specific situations. It is for this
reason that this Court defers to the factual findings of a trial judge, who has had the distinct advantage of
directly observing the witnesses on the stand and determining from their demeanor whether they· were
speaking or distorting the truth.13

The questions on whether the sale was on cash or installment basis and whether petitioner had insurable
interest on the subject car are evidently questions of fact which are beyond the purview of the instant petition.

In any event, a perusal of the records show that the trial court correctly dismissed petitioner's complaint on
demurrer to evidence.

Well-established is the rule that the burden of proof lies on the party who makes the allegations. 14 There is no
dispute that the only pieces of evidence admitted in court are the testimony of Alberto and the receipt showing
MGM Motors receiving P200,000.00 from petitioner as partial payment of the subject car. The allegation that
the purchase of the vehicle was on an installment basis was not supported by any evidence. The receipt of a
partial payment does not suffice to prove that the purchase was made on an installment basis. Petitioner did
not present any document to prove said allegation while MGM Motors produced a sales invoice wherein it was
stated that the mode of payment is "COD" or cash on delivery.

In the same vein, petitioner failed to substantiate his allegation against Ayala Insurance. Petitioner has the
burden of proof to show that a loss occurred and said loss was covered by his insurance policy. Considering
that the trial court only admitted two pieces of evidence in petitioner's favor and none of those tend to prove
loss of the subject car and coverage thereof under the insurance policy, petitioner is not entitled to the reliefs
he had prayed for.

BASED ON THE FOREGOING, the Petition is DENIED. The 14 January 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals
and its 16 March 2010 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 89665are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DEMURRER CASES – BRONDIAL LIST

You might also like