Art. 2195.

The provisions of this Title shall be respectively applicable to all obligations mentioned in
Article 1157.

Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:

(1) Law;
(2) Contracts;
(3) Quasi-contracts;
(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
(5) Quasi-delicts.

Art. 2196. The rules under this Title are without prejudice to special provisions on damages formulated
elsewhere in this Code. Compensation for workmen and other employees in case of death, injury or
illness is regulated by special laws. Rules governing damages laid down in other laws shall be
observed insofar as they are not in conflict with this Code.

HEIRS OF SIMEON BORLADO, namely, ADELAIDA BORLADO, LORETO BORLADO,

REYNALDO BORLADO, RICARDO BORLADO, FRANCISCO BORLADO and ALADINO DORADO,
petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and SALVACION VDA. DE BULAN, BIENVENIDO BULAN, JR., NORMA B.
CLARITO and THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF CAPIZ, respondents.

he case is an appeal via certiorari from a decision1 of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of
the trial court, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered dismissing plaintiffs' complaint for lack of cause of action
and ordering as vacated the restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction issued in this
case; and
"1. Plaintiffs to be jointly and solidarily liable to defendants the quantity of one hundred (100)
cavans of palay every year from 1972 until plaintiffs vacate the premises of the land in
question;
"2. Declaring defendants as owner of the land and entitled to possession;
"3. Ordering plaintiffs to pay defendants the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees and the sum
of P5,000.00 as litigation expenses; and
"4. To pay the costs of the suit.
"SO ORDERED.
"Roxas City, Philippines, March 18, 1988.
"(Sgd.) JONAS A. ABELLAR
"Judge"2

The Facts
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
"The records show that plaintiffs-appellants3 (petitioners) are the heirs of Simeon Borlado
whose parents were Serapio Borlado and Balbina Bulan. The original owner of the lot in
question, Lot No. 2097 of the Pontevedra Cadastre, Maayon, Capiz, was Serapio
Borlado, grandfather of petitioners.
"On 15 April 1942, Serapio sold the lot to Francisco Bacero (Exh. "C", p. 247, MTC Record) for
Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00). After the death of Francisco on 26 February 1948, his widow
Amparo Dionisio Vda. de Bacero, in her capacity as legal guardian of her minor children,
namely: Nicolas, Valentin and Luzviminda, all surnamed Bacero and forced heirs of Francisco
 Bacero sold it (the lot) to the Spouses Bienvenido Bulan and Salvacion Borbon, through a
Deed of Absolute Sale dated 27 August 1954 (Exh. 65, pp. 243-245, id.).
"Upon the execution of the Deed of Sale and even prior thereto, actual possession of Lot
No. 2057 was with the vendees-spouses Bulans in view of a loan obtained by Francisco
Bacero from them in December 1947 (Exh. "65", supra). Exercising their right of
ownership under the Deed of Sale, Salvacion Borbon Vda. de Bulan declared the lot in
her name in 1900 for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 2232 (Exh. "F", p. 254,
Record [MTC]). She paid the corresponding taxes as evidenced by the Tax Receipts
marked as Exhibits "K", "J", "I", "G", "F" and "H" (pp. 248-253, Record, id.). Salvacion
and her co-defendants-appellees'4 possession of the lot was continuous, peaceful,
uninterrupted, adverse and exclusive until November 4, 1972, when petitioners forcibly
entered and wrested physical possession thereof from them.
"On 23 November 1972, respondents filed with the Municipal Court of Maayon, Capiz a
complaint for ejectment docketed as Civil Case No. A-1, against petitioners (p. 1, id.). The
ejectment case was decided in favor of the respondents whereby the petitioners, their agents,
tenants, privies and members of their families were ordered to vacate Lot No. 2079 and deliver
possession to the respondents together with all improvements and standing crops; to pay said
respondents One Hundred (100) cavans of palay annually from 1972 to the present or in the
total amount of One Thousand One Hundred (1,100) cavans of palay; and to pay the sum of
Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos as reimbursement for the amount respondents had paid
their lawyer to protect their rights; and, the costs of suit (Exh. "57", pp. 256-261, id.). Instead of
appealing the adverse decision to the Court of First Instance (now RTC), on 8 November 1983,
petitioners filed the present case with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Roxas City,
docketed as Civil Case No. V-4887. This case was dismissed for lack of cause of action in a
decision, the decretal portion of which was quoted earlier."5
On 24 November 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision affirming in toto the appealed
decision.6
Hence, this appeal.7
The Issue
The issue raised is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondents were the owners of
the lot in question.
The Court's Ruling
We deny the petition. The issue is factual. In an appeal via certiorari, we may not review the findings of
fact of the Court of Appeals.8 When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, 9
unless the case falls under any of the exceptions to the rule.10
Petitioner failed to prove that the case falls within the exceptions. 11 The Supreme Court is not a trier
of facts.12 It is not our function to review, examine and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the
evidence presented.13 A question of fact would arise in such event. 14 Questions of fact cannot be
raised in an appeal via certiorari before the Supreme Court and are not proper for its consideration.15
Nevertheless, as a matter of law, the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in holding
petitioners liable to pay respondents one hundred (100) cavans of palay every year from 1972
until they vacate the premises of the land in question.
The one hundred cavans of palay was awarded as a form of damages. We cannot sustain the
award. "Palay" is not legal tender currency in the Philippines.
El Fallo del Tribunal
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 18980 with modification that petitioners' liability to pay respondents one hundred
(100) cavans of palay every year from 1972 until petitioners vacate the land in question is deleted, for
lack of basis.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SPOUSES CRISTINO and BRIGIDA CUSTODIO and SPOUSES LITO and MARIA CRISTINA
SANTOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF PACIFICO C. MABASA and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
PASIG, METRO MANILA, BRANCH 181

This petition for review on certiorari assails the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 29115, promulgated on November 10, 1993, which affirmed with modification the decision of
the trial court, as well as its resolution dated July 8, 1994 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.1
On August 26, 1982, Civil Case No. 47466 for the grant of an easement of right of way was filed by
Pacifico Mabasa against Cristino Custodio, Brigida R. Custodio, Rosalina R. Morato, Lito Santos and
Maria Cristina C. Santos before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig and assigned to Branch 22 thereof.2
The generative facts of the case, as synthesized by the trial court and adopted by the Court of
Appeals, are as follows:
Perusing the record, this Court finds that the original plaintiff Pacifico Mabasa died during the
pendency of this case and was substituted by Ofelia Mabasa, his surviving spouse [and
children].
The plaintiff owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected thereon situated at
Interior P. Burgos St., Palingon, Tipas, Tagig, Metro Manila. The plaintiff was able to acquire
said property through a contract of sale with spouses Mamerto Rayos and Teodora Quintero as
vendors last September 1981. Said property may be described to be surrounded by other
immovables pertaining to defendants herein. Taking P. Burgos Street as the point of reference,
on the left side, going to plaintiff's property, the row of houses will be as follows: That of
defendants Cristino and Brigido Custodio, then that of Lito and Maria Cristina Santos and then
that of Ofelia Mabasa. On the right side (is) that of defendant Rosalina Morato and then a
Septic Tank (Exhibit "D"). As an access to P. Burgos Street from plaintiff's property, there are
two possible passageways. The first passageway is approximately one meter wide and is
about 20 meters distan(t) from Mabasa's residence to P. Burgos Street. Such path is passing in
between the previously mentioned row of houses. The second passageway is about 3 meters
in width and length from plaintiff Mabasa's residence to P. Burgos Street; it is about 26 meters.
In passing thru said passageway, a less than a meter wide path through the septic tank and
with 5-6 meters in length, has to be traversed.
When said property was purchased by Mabasa, there were tenants occupying the remises and
who were acknowledged by plaintiff Mabasa as tenants. However, sometime in February,
1982, one of said tenants vacated the apartment and when plaintiff Mabasa went to see the
premises, he saw that there had been built an adobe fence in the first passageway making it
narrower in width. Said adobe fence was first constructed by defendants Santoses along their
property which is also along the first passageway. Defendant Morato constructed her adobe
fence and even extended said fence in such a way that the entire passageway was enclosed.
(Exhibit "1-Santoses and Custodios, Exh. "D" for plaintiff, Exhs. "1-C", "1-D" and "1-E") And it
was then that the remaining tenants of said apartment vacated the area. Defendant Ma.
Cristina Santos testified that she constructed said fence because there was an incident when
her daughter was dragged by a bicycle pedalled by a son of one of the tenants in said
apartment along the first passageway. She also mentioned some other inconveniences of
having (at) the front of her house a pathway such as when some of the tenants were drunk and
would bang their doors and windows. Some of their footwear were even lost. . . . 3 (Emphasis in
original text; corrections in parentheses supplied)
On February 27, 1990, a decision was rendered by the trial court, with this dispositive part:
Accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Ordering defendants Custodios and Santoses to give plaintiff permanent access ingress and
egress, to the public street;
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendants Custodios and Santoses the sum of Eight Thousand
Pesos (P8,000) as indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway.
The parties to shoulder their respective litigation expenses.4
Not satisfied therewith, therein plaintiff represented by his heirs, herein private respondents, went to
the Court of Appeals raising the sole issue of whether or not the lower court erred in not awarding
damages in their favor. On November 10, 1993, as earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its
decision affirming the judgment of the trial court with modification, the decretal portion of which
disposes as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION only insofar as the herein grant of damages to plaintiffs-appellants. The Court
 hereby orders defendants-appellees to pay plaintiffs-appellants the sum of Sixty Five Thousand
(P65,000) Pesos as Actual Damages, Thirty Thousand (P30,000) Pesos as Moral Damages,
and Ten Thousand (P10,000) Pesos as Exemplary Damages. The rest of the appealed
decision is affirmed to all respects.5
On July 8, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 6 Petitioners then
took the present recourse to us, raising two issues, namely, whether or not the grant of right of way to
herein private respondents is proper, and whether or not the award of damages is in order.
With respect to the first issue, herein petitioners are already barred from raising the same. Petitioners
did not appeal from the decision of the court a quo granting private respondents the right of way,
hence they are presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication therein. With the finality of the judgment
of the trial court as to petitioners, the issue of propriety of the grant of right of way has already been
laid to rest.
For failure to appeal the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, petitioners cannot obtain
any affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision of the trial court. That decision of the
court below has become final as against them and can no longer be reviewed, much less reversed, by
this Court. The rule in this jurisdiction is that whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case, an appellee
who has not himself appealed may not obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than
what was granted in the decision of the lower court. The appellee can only advance any argument that
he may deem necessary to defeat the appellant's claim or to uphold the decision that is being
disputed, and he can assign errors in his brief if such is required to strengthen the views expressed by
the court a quo. These assigned errors, in turn, may be considered by the appellate court solely to
maintain the appealed decision on other grounds, but not for the purpose of reversing or modifying the
judgment in the appellee's favor and giving him other affirmative reliefs.7
However, with respect to the second issue, we agree with petitioners that the Court of Appeals erred in
awarding damages in favor of private respondents. The award of damages has no substantial legal
basis. A reading of the decision of the Court of Appeals will show that the award of damages was
based solely on the fact that the original plaintiff, Pacifico Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of
unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated the leased premises by reason of the closure of the
passageway.
However, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover
damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong
inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or
damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the
remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.8
There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a
legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are
the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be
damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a
violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.9
In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must
establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the
plaintiff a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing
it.10 The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was
injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be the breach of some duty and the
imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; it is not sufficient to
state that there should be tort liability merely because the plaintiff suffered some pain and
suffering.11
Many accidents occur and many injuries are inflicted by acts or omissions which cause
damage or loss to another but which violate no legal duty to such other person, and
consequently create no cause of action in his favor. In such cases, the consequences must be
borne by the injured person alone. The law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an
act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong.12
In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act must
be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria.13 If, as may happen in
many cases, a person sustains actual damage, that is, harm or loss to his person or property,
without sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act or omission which the law does not deem an
injury, the damage is regarded as damnum absque injuria.14
In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the claim
of private respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of
right. In order that the principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be
applied, it is essential that the following requisites concur: (1) The defendant should have
acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The acts
should be willful; and (3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff. 15
The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners,
hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right
to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law. 16 It is within
the right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code
provides that "(e)very owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches,
live or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon."
At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes. There was no
easement of way existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or by contract. The fact that
private respondents had no existing right over the said passageway is confirmed by the very decision
of the trial court granting a compulsory right of way in their favor after payment of just compensation. It
was only that decision which gave private respondents the right to use the said passageway after
payment of the compensation and imposed a corresponding duty on petitioners not to interfere in the
exercise of said right.
Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute right over their property and their act of
fencing and enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully perform in the employment and
exercise of said right. To repeat, whatever injury or damage may have been sustained by private
respondents by reason of the rightful use of the said land by petitioners is damnum absque injuria.17
A person has a right to the natural use and enjoyment of his own property, according to his pleasure,
for all the purposes to which such property is usually applied. As a general rule, therefore, there is no
cause of action for acts done by one person upon his own property in a lawful and proper manner,
although such acts incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss to another, as such damage or
loss is damnum absque injuria. 18 When the owner of property makes use thereof in the general and
ordinary manner in which the property is used, such as fencing or enclosing the same as in this case,
nobody can complain of having been injured, because the incovenience arising from said use can be
considered as a mere consequence of community life. 19
The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action will lie, 20
although the act may result in damage to another, for no legal right has been invaded. 21 One may
use any lawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose and though the means adopted may cause
damage to another, no cause of action arises in the latter's favor. An injury or damage occasioned
thereby is damnum absque injuria. The courts can give no redress for hardship to an individual
resulting from action reasonably calculated to achieve a lawful means. 22
WHEREFORE, under the compulsion of the foregoing premises, the appealed decision of respondent
Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the judgment of the trial court is
correspondingly REINSTATED.
CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC., SABINO R. DAPAT, RUBEN D. ALMENDRAS, JULIUS Z. NERI,
DOUGLAS L. LUYM, CESAR T. LIBI, RAMONTITO* E. GARCIA and JOSE B. SALA, petitioners,
vs.
RICARDO F. ELIZAGAQUE,

Cebu Country Club, Inc. (CCCI), petitioner, is a domestic corporation operating as a non-profit and
non-stock private membership club, having its principal place of business in Banilad, Cebu City.
Petitioners herein are members of its Board of Directors.
Sometime in 1987, San Miguel Corporation, a special company proprietary member of CCCI,
designated respondent Ricardo F. Elizagaque, its Senior Vice President and Operations Manager for
the Visayas and Mindanao, as a special non-proprietary member. The designation was thereafter
approved by the CCCI’s Board of Directors.
In 1996, respondent filed with CCCI an application for proprietary membership. The application was
indorsed by CCCI’s two (2) proprietary members, namely: Edmundo T. Misa and Silvano Ludo.
As the price of a proprietary share was around the P5 million range, Benito Unchuan, then president of
CCCI, offered to sell respondent a share for only P3.5 million. Respondent, however, purchased the
share of a certain Dr. Butalid for only P3 million. Consequently, on September 6, 1996, CCCI issued
Proprietary Ownership Certificate No. 1446 to respondent.
During the meetings dated April 4, 1997 and May 30, 1997 of the CCCI Board of Directors, action on
respondent’s application for proprietary membership was deferred. In another Board meeting held on
July 30, 1997, respondent’s application was voted upon. Subsequently, or on August 1, 1997,
respondent received a letter from Julius Z. Neri, CCCI’s corporate secretary, informing him that the
Board disapproved his application for proprietary membership.
On August 6, 1997, Edmundo T. Misa, on behalf of respondent, wrote CCCI a letter of reconsideration.
As CCCI did not answer, respondent, on October 7, 1997, wrote another letter of reconsideration. Still,
CCCI kept silent. On November 5, 1997, respondent again sent CCCI a letter inquiring whether any
member of the Board objected to his application. Again, CCCI did not reply.
Consequently, on December 23, 1998, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
71, Pasig City a complaint for damages against petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. 67190.
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated February 14, 2001 in favor of respondent, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff:
1. Ordering defendants to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff the amount of P2,340,000.00 as
actual or compensatory damages.
2. Ordering defendants to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff the amount of P5,000,000.00 as
moral damages.
3. Ordering defendants to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff the amount of P1,000,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
4. Ordering defendants to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff the amount of P1,000,000.00 as
and by way of attorney’s fees and P80,000.00 as litigation expenses.
5. Costs of suit.
Counterclaims are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.2
On appeal by petitioners, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated January 31, 2003, affirmed the
trial court’s Decision with modification, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated February 14, 2001 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City in Civil Case No. 67190 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION as follows:
1. Ordering defendants-appellants to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff-appellee the amount of
P2,000,000.00 as moral damages;
2. Ordering defendants-appellants to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff-appellee the amount of
P1,000,000.00 as exemplary damages;
3. Ordering defendants-appellants to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff-appellee the mount of
P500,000.00 as attorney’s fees and P50,000.00 as litigation expenses; and
4. Costs of the suit.
The counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.3
On March 3, 2003, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and motion for leave to set the motion
for oral arguments. In its Resolution 4 dated October 2, 2003, the appellate court denied the motions
for lack of merit.
Hence, the present petition.
The issue for our resolution is whether in disapproving respondent’s application for proprietary
membership with CCCI, petitioners are liable to respondent for damages, and if so, whether their
liability is joint and several.
Petitioners contend, inter alia, that the Court of Appeals erred in awarding exorbitant damages
to respondent despite the lack of evidence that they acted in bad faith in disapproving the
latter’s application; and in disregarding their defense of damnum absque injuria.
For his part, respondent maintains that the petition lacks merit, hence, should be denied.
CCCI’s Articles of Incorporation provide in part:
SEVENTH: That this is a non-stock corporation and membership therein as well as the right of
participation in its assets shall be limited to qualified persons who are duly accredited owners
of Proprietary Ownership Certificates issued by the corporation in accordance with its By-Laws.
Corollary, Section 3, Article 1 of CCCI’s Amended By-Laws provides:
 SECTION 3. HOW MEMBERS ARE ELECTED – The procedure for the admission of new
members of the Club shall be as follows:
(a) Any proprietary member, seconded by another voting proprietary member, shall submit to
the Secretary a written proposal for the admission of a candidate to the "Eligible-for-
Membership List";
(b) Such proposal shall be posted by the Secretary for a period of thirty (30) days on the Club
bulletin board during which time any member may interpose objections to the admission of the
applicant by communicating the same to the Board of Directors;
(c) After the expiration of the aforesaid thirty (30) days, if no objections have been filed or if
there are, the Board considers the objections unmeritorious, the candidate shall be qualified for
inclusion in the "Eligible-for-Membership List";
(d) Once included in the "Eligible-for-Membership List" and after the candidate shall have
acquired in his name a valid POC duly recorded in the books of the corporation as his own, he
shall become a Proprietary Member, upon a non-refundable admission fee of P1,000.00,
provided that admission fees will only be collected once from any person.
On March 1, 1978, Section 3(c) was amended to read as follows:
(c) After the expiration of the aforesaid thirty (30) days, the Board may, by unanimous vote of
all directors present at a regular or special meeting, approve the inclusion of the candidate
in the "Eligible-for-Membership List".
As shown by the records, the Board adopted a secret balloting known as the "black ball system" of
voting wherein each member will drop a ball in the ballot box. A white ball represents conformity to the
admission of an applicant, while a black ball means disapproval. Pursuant to Section 3(c), as
amended, cited above, a unanimous vote of the directors is required. When respondent’s application
for proprietary membership was voted upon during the Board meeting on July 30, 1997, the ballot box
contained one (1) black ball. Thus, for lack of unanimity, his application was disapproved.
Obviously, the CCCI Board of Directors, under its Articles of Incorporation, has the right to approve or
disapprove an application for proprietary membership. But such right should not be exercised
arbitrarily. Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code on the Chapter on Human Relations provide
restrictions, thus:
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
In GF Equity, Inc. v. Valenzona,5 we expounded Article 19 and correlated it with Article 21, thus:
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights,
sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also
in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to
give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a
primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in
Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted
by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19
and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the
government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a
remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21
would be proper. (Emphasis in the original)
In rejecting respondent’s application for proprietary membership, we find that petitioners violated the
rules governing human relations, the basic principles to be observed for the rightful relationship
between human beings and for the stability of social order. The trial court and the Court of Appeals
aptly held that petitioners committed fraud and evident bad faith in disapproving respondent’s
applications. This is contrary to morals, good custom or public policy. Hence, petitioners are liable for
damages pursuant to Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the same Code.
It bears stressing that the amendment to Section 3(c) of CCCI’s Amended By-Laws requiring the
unanimous vote of the directors present at a special or regular meeting was not printed on the
application form respondent filled and submitted to CCCI. What was printed thereon was the original
provision of Section 3(c) which was silent on the required number of votes needed for admission of an
applicant as a proprietary member.
Petitioners explained that the amendment was not printed on the application form due to economic
reasons. We find this excuse flimsy and unconvincing. Such amendment, aside from being extremely
significant, was introduced way back in 1978 or almost twenty (20) years before respondent filed his
application. We cannot fathom why such a prestigious and exclusive golf country club, like the CCCI,
whose members are all affluent, did not have enough money to cause the printing of an updated
application form.
It is thus clear that respondent was left groping in the dark wondering why his application was
disapproved. He was not even informed that a unanimous vote of the Board members was required.
When he sent a letter for reconsideration and an inquiry whether there was an objection to his
application, petitioners apparently ignored him. Certainly, respondent did not deserve this kind of
treatment. Having been designated by San Miguel Corporation as a special non-proprietary member
of CCCI, he should have been treated by petitioners with courtesy and civility. At the very least, they
should have informed him why his application was disapproved.
The exercise of a right, though legal by itself, must nonetheless be in accordance with the proper
norm. When the right is exercised arbitrarily, unjustly or excessively and results in damage to another,
a legal wrong is committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. 6 It bears reiterating that
the trial court and the Court of Appeals held that petitioners’ disapproval of respondent’s application is
characterized by bad faith.
As to petitioners’ reliance on the principle of damnum absque injuria or damage without injury,
suffice it to state that the same is misplaced. In Amonoy v. Gutierrez,7 we held that this
principle does not apply when there is an abuse of a person’s right, as in this case.
As to the appellate court’s award to respondent of moral damages, we find the same in order. Under
Article 2219 of the New Civil Code, moral damages may be recovered, among others, in acts and
actions referred to in Article 21. We believe respondent’s testimony that he suffered mental anguish,
social humiliation and wounded feelings as a result of the arbitrary denial of his application. However,
the amount of P2,000,000.00 is excessive. While there is no hard-and-fast rule in determining what
would be a fair and reasonable amount of moral damages, the same should not be palpably and
scandalously excessive. Moral damages are not intended to impose a penalty to the wrongdoer,
neither to enrich the claimant at the expense of the defendant.8 Taking into consideration the
attending circumstances here, we hold that an award to respondent of P50,000.00, instead of
P2,000,000.00, as moral damages is reasonable.
Anent the award of exemplary damages, Article 2229 allows it by way of example or correction for the
public good. Nonetheless, since exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich one party or
impoverish another but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially
deleterious actions,9 we reduce the amount from P1,000,000.00 to P25,000.00 only.
On the matter of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, Article 2208 of the same Code provides,
among others, that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation may be recovered in cases when
exemplary damages are awarded and where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees
and expenses of litigation should be recovered, as in this case. In any event, however, such award
must be reasonable, just and equitable. Thus, we reduce the amount of attorney’s fees (P500,000.00)
and litigation expenses (P50,000.00) to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively.
Lastly, petitioners’ argument that they could not be held jointly and severally liable for damages
because only one (1) voted for the disapproval of respondent’s application lacks merit.
Section 31 of the Corporation Code provides:
SEC. 31. Liability of directors, trustees or officers. — Directors or trustees who willfully and
knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or who are guilty of
gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the corporation or acquire any personal
or pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such directors, or trustees shall be liable
jointly and severally for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation, its
stockholders or members and other persons. (Emphasis ours)
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71506 are AFFIRMED with modification in the sense that (a) the award of
moral damages is reduced from P2,000,000.00 to P50,000.00; (b) the award of exemplary damages is
reduced from P1,000,000.00 to P25,000.00; and (c) the award of attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses is reduced from P500,000.00 and P50,000.00 to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively.
Heirs of PURISIMA NALA, represented by their attorney-in-fact EFEGENIA DIGNA DUYAN,
petitioners,
vs.
ARTEMIO CABANSAG,
Artemio Cabansag (respondent) filed Civil Case No. Q-91-10541 for damages in October 1991.
According to respondent, he bought a 50-square meter property from spouses Eugenio Gomez, Jr.
and Felisa Duyan Gomez on July 23, 1990. Said property is part of a 400-square meter lot registered
in the name of the Gomez spouses. In October 1991, he received a demand letter from Atty.
Alexander del Prado (Atty. Del Prado), in behalf of Purisima Nala (Nala), asking for the payment of
rentals from 1987 to 1991 until he leaves the premises, as said property is owned by Nala, failing
which criminal and civil actions will be filed against him. Another demand letter was sent on May 14,
1991. Because of such demands, respondent suffered damages and was constrained to file the case
against Nala and Atty. Del Prado.3
Atty. Del Prado claimed that he sent the demand letters in good faith and that he was merely acting in
behalf of his client, Nala, who disputed respondent's claim of ownership. Nala alleged that said
property is part of an 800-square meter property owned by her late husband, Eulogio Duyan, which
was subsequently divided into two parts. The 400-square meter property was conveyed to spouses
Gomez in a fictitious deed of sale, with the agreement that it will be merely held by them in trust for the
Duyan's children. Said property is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 281115 in the
name of spouses Gomez. Nala also claimed that respondent is only renting the property which he
occupies.4
After trial, the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 93, rendered its Decision on August 10, 1994, in favor of
respondent. The dispositive portion of the Decision provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, by preponderance of evidence, the Court finds in favor of
the plaintiff and hereby orders the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the
following:
1. P150,000.00 by way of moral damages;
2. P30,000.00 by way of exemplary damages;
3. P20,000.00 as and for reasonable attorney's fees and other litigation expenses; and
4. to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.5
Nala and Atty. Del Prado appealed to the CA. The herein assailed CA Decision dated December 19,
2002 affirmed the RTC Decision with modification, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-91-10541 is
heretofore AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Defendants-appellants are ordered to pay, jointly
and severally, plaintiff-appellee the amount of P30,000.00 by way of moral damages. It is
further ordered to pay him exemplary damages in the amount of P10,000.00 and P10,000.00,
attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.6
In affirming the RTC Decision, the CA took note of the Decision dated September 5, 1994 rendered by
the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 80, dismissing Civil Case No. 91-8821, an action for reconveyance of
real property and cancellation of TCT No. 281115 with damages, filed by Nala against spouses
Gomez.7
Hence, herein petition by the heirs of Nala (petitioners)8 with the following assignment of errors:
a) Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not considering the right of Purisima Nala to assert
her rights and interest over the property.
b) Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not considering the Decision rendered by the Court of
Appeals in the case for reconveyance which upheld the rights and interest of Purisima Nala
and her children over a certain parcel of land, a portion of which is subject of the present case.
c) Respondent Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages and attorney's fees without any
basis.9
Atty. Del Prado filed a motion for extension of time to file his separate petition but it was denied by the
Court per its Resolution dated January 19, 2004 issued in G.R. No. 160829.
Petitioners argue that their predecessor-in-interest had every right to protect and assert her interests
over the property. Nala had no knowledge that the property was sold by spouses Gomez to
respondent when the demand letters were sent. What she was aware of was the fact that spouses
Gomez were managing the rentals on the property by virtue of the implied trust created between them
and Eulogio Duyan. When spouses Gomez failed to remit the rentals and claimed ownership of the
property, it was then that Nala decided to procure the services of legal counsel to protect their rights
over the property.
Petitioners also contend that it was error for the CA to take note of the RTC Decision in Civil Case No.
91-8821 without further noting that the CA had already reversed and set aside said RTC Decision and
ordered reconveyance of the property to Nala and her children in a Decision dated March 8, 2000
rendered in CA-G.R. CV No. 49163. Petitioners also argue that respondent did not substantiate his
claim for damages.
Preliminarily, the Court notes that both the RTC and the CA failed to indicate the particular provision of
law under which it held petitioners liable for damages. Nevertheless, based on the allegations in
respondent's complaint, it may be gathered that the basis for his claim for damages is Article 19 of the
Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
The foregoing provision sets the standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one's
rights but also in the performance of one's duties. When a right is exercised in a manner which does
not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But a right, though by itself
legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some
illegality. A person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right; that is,
when he acts with prudence and in good faith, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse. There
is an abuse of right when it is exercised only for the purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. The
exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established, and must not
be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to injure another.[10]
In order to be liable for damages under the abuse of rights principle, the following requisites must
concur: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole
intent of prejudicing or injuring another.11
It should be stressed that malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith is
presumed, and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. 12 Bad faith, on the other
hand, does not simply connote bad judgment to simple negligence, dishonest purpose or some moral
obloquy and conscious doing of a wrong, or a breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or
ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response
to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.13
In the present case, there is nothing on record which will prove that Nala and her counsel, Atty. Del
Prado, acted in bad faith or malice in sending the demand letters to respondent. In the first place,
there was ground for Nala's actions since she believed that the property was owned by her husband
Eulogio Duyan and that respondent was illegally occupying the same. She had no knowledge that
spouses Gomez violated the trust imposed on them by Eulogio and surreptitiously sold a portion of the
property to respondent. It was only after respondent filed the case for damages against Nala that
she learned of such sale. The bare fact that respondent claims ownership over the property does not
give rise to the conclusion that the sending of the demand letters by Nala was done in bad faith.
Absent any evidence presented by respondent, bad faith or malice could not be attributed to petitioner
since Nala was only trying to protect their interests over the property.
Moreover, respondent failed to show that Nala and Atty. Del Prado's acts were done with the
sole intention of prejudicing and injuring him. It may be true that respondent suffered mental
anguish, serious anxiety and sleepless nights when he received the demand letters; however,
there is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the legal invasion of a
legal right while damage is the hurt, loss or harm which results from the injury. 14 Thus, there
can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result
of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured
person alone; the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not
amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.15
Nala was acting well within her rights when she instructed Atty. Del Prado to send the demand letters.
She had to take all the necessary legal steps to enforce her legal/equitable rights over the property
occupied by respondent. One who makes use of his own legal right does no injury. 16 Thus, whatever
damages are suffered by respondent should be borne solely by him.
Nala's acts in protecting her rights over the property find further solid ground in the fact that the
property has already been ordered reconveyed to her and her heirs. In its Decision dated March 8,
2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 49163, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision and ordered the
reconveyance of the property to petitioners, and TCT No. 281115 was declared canceled. Said CA
Decision was affirmed by this Court in its Decision dated March 18, 2005 in G.R. No. 144148, which
became final and executory on July 27, 2005.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated December 19, 2002 and Resolution
dated October 28, 2003 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48580 are NULLIFIED.
Civil Case No. Q-91-10541 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.