Overview

A global energy assessment

Michael Jefferson*

Against the background of IIASA’s massive (their word) ‘global energy assessment’
(GEA), this paper takes a closer look at the challenges posed by population growth,
energy poverty, the fossil fuels and carbon storage, renewable energy, energy effi-
ciency, natural catastrophes, and potential climatic change to offer a somber,
although arguably more realistic, overview of what the future may hold than the
GEA achieved. © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd
How to cite this article:
WIREs Energy Environ 2016, 5:7–15. doi: 10.1002/wene.179

INTRODUCTION arising from urbanization; linkages to land and water

n 2012, a 1865 page book: ‘Global Energy Assess-
I ment: Toward a Sustainable Future’ was published,
largely under the aegis of the highly respected Interna-
tional Institute of Applied Systems Analysis.1 In this
writer’s opinion, while agreeing that the book was ‘a
massive assessment’, it was also too massive for pur-
pose and too varied in quality and coverage.2 This
paper surveys the IIASA report, the issues which should
arise in any current global energy assessment (GEA)
and the challenges which do—or may—lie ahead.
The GEA highlighted the following energy chal-
lenges of the 21st century: the aim of providing afford-
able energy services for the well-being of all the world’s
human population (projected to rise to 9 billion by
2050 and possibly to over 12 billion by 2100, yet over
2.6 billion people are currently without access to mod-
ern energy services); increasing energy supply security
for all (including reducing the risks usually associated
with some forms of energy, guarding against intermit-
tency and other potential supply disruptions, and
expanding energy storage capacities); and reducing
local and regional pollution and curbing so-called
greenhouse gas emissions in order to limit enhanced
near surface warming to no more than 2 C.
The GEA also addressed energy resources and
their potentials; fossil fuels (including carbon capture
and storage); renewable energy; nuclear energy; energy
supply and demand systems—their security and transi-
tion; pathways to sustainable development; challenges
*Correspondence to: mjefferson@escpeurope.eu
Department of Energy, ESCP Europe Business School, London, UK
Conflict of interest: The author has declared no conflict of interest for
this article.
availability; support for well-being and lifestyles; and
energy policies intended to relate to the above.
In this paper, we consider the above issues and the
challenges to fulfillment of the various policy goals in
circulation. Some other future challenges relating to
global energy are touched upon—population growth
and movement; risks arising from conflicts and poten-
tial natural disasters; and stresses likely to arise from
scarcity of resources and limits to technological innova-
tions and their diffusion.
ENERGY POVERTY
People do not want energy as such, but the useful
energy that can provide modern energy services. There
is clearly a link, in general, between being unable to
access modern energy services and poverty. The GEA
was on firm ground in pointing out that there is a
vicious circle whereby those who lack access to modern
energy services are often trapped in a self-reinforcing
cycle of deprivation, lower incomes and means to
improve their living standards, while using up signifi-
cant amounts of their limited income and time on the
available, often unhealthy, forms of energy they can
access. The GEA is on much less firm ground when it
claims that universal access to cleaner cooking fuels
and electricity by 2030 is possible. With some 2.8 bil-
lion people currently without cleaner cooking fuels,
around 1.4 billion without electricity, and about 1 bil-
lion more people coming into the World by 2030,
mainly in already deprived communities, this goal—
desirable though it is—is well out of practical reach.
Looking further ahead, with another 1 billion people
anticipated to inhabit the Earth between 2030 and

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 Overview
2050, and possibly a further 3 billion or so by 2100, the
long-term challenges are huge.
Of the 2.8 billion people currently reliant on
traditional forms of biomass for cooking, some 750
million are in sub-Saharan Africa and 1.95 billion in
Asia (of which under 400 million are in China; over
850 million are in India; and nearly 700 million
are elsewhere in Asia). About 85 million are in Latin
America. Of the 1.4 billion people without access to
electricity, nearly 600 million exist in sub-Saharan
Africa and 800 million in Asia—some 400 million in
India and nearly 400 million elsewhere in Asia
(although in China the figure is under 10 million)
[Correction added on 16 October 2015 after first
online publication: the number of people 750,000;
850,000; 700,000; 600,000; 800,000 and 400,000
(twice) have been changed to 750 million, 850 million,
700 million, 600 million, 800 million, and 400 million,
respectively.].
The issue is that, apart from China, progress in
reducing the number of people without access to clean
cooking facilities and electricity has been extremely
slow. The challenge is greatest in sub-Saharan Africa.
Nearly 75% of the population of sub-Saharan Africa
reliant on traditional biomass for cooking are rural
dwellers, nearly 90% in India and nearly 85% else-
where in Asia (excluding China). The proportions of
those without electricity are of a similar order of mag-
nitude: rural dwellers account for 80% in sub-Saharan
Africa; 94% in India; and 85% in Other Asia (exclud-
ing China). The increasing urbanization of the World’s
population through the 21st Century can be expected
to alleviate these figures. Yet it has been estimated that
an additional investment of US$ 700 billion (at 2009
prices) would be required between 2010 and 2030 sim-
ply to maintain a total of 2.8 billion people primarily
reliant on traditional biomass for cooking (one third
of them in sub-Saharan Africa), and to reduce the num-
ber of people without access to electricity by 200 million
by 2030 (of the 1.2 billion without electricity, 54%
would be in sub-Saharan Africa).3 Other ‘goals’
abound: targets have been produced in recent years
for increasing access to modern energy by 50% to
100% by 2015, which should be a source of embarrass-
ment for those engaging in them.4
Prospects are made worse, of course, by projected
human population increases to some 9 billion by 2050,
and possibly in excess of 12 billion by 2100. The pres-
sures of such numbers on natural resources—food,
potable water, minerals, and metals (and not least
energy-related resources)—will be huge. Not only are
the aspirations of those existing in energy poverty likely
to go unfulfilled in many cases, the lifestyles of many of
those who are better off materially are also likely to be
8 © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd
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severely challenged. In the following sections, energy
resources and usage will be considered critically along-
side the positions taken in the GEA.
The scope for conflict during the 21st century is
large and likely to intensify. Nor can we overlook the
potential for large-scale natural disasters—epidemics
and pandemics, volcanic eruptions, and tsunamis—
which have challenged the human race for over
70,000 years, and which with larger, more concen-
trated, populations (many close to the sea and deltas)
could again have a catastrophic impact. Many assume
that technological advances and progress in medical
science will be able to assuage these challenges. Many
also focus firmly on anthropogenic causes and conse-
quences of near surface climatic change, although
warming over the past century has been modest and
projections disputed, while the course of human history
points to cooling rather than warming as the biggest
challenge, at least until the debates over the past
30 years.5–9
ENERGY SUPPLIES—FOSSIL FUELS
There is strong vocal support for a shift from the fossil
fuels to renewable forms of energy, and to increasing
the efficiency of energy production and use. The fact
that around 80% of the World’s current energy supply
comes from fossil fuels, and some 90% of the World’s
transportation is fuelled by oil products, fails to deter
extravagant claims about what is realistically achieva-
ble within the coming decades. As with eliminating
energy poverty, such targets are desirable were they fea-
sible within the time periods envisaged in many quar-
ters, including the GEA.
Of the fossil fuels currently providing 80% or so
of the World’s primary energy supply, coal accounts
for about 29% of the total; oil for about 31%; and nat-
ural gas for about 21%. Hydroelectricity provides for a
modest amount of global primary energy supply, but
around 16% of the World’s electricity supplies (varying
from year to year, of course, due to annual precipita-
tion levels); nuclear for under 5%; ‘new’ renewables
(‘modern’ biomass and biofuels, solar, wind, geother-
mal, and wave/tidal) for just under 3%; and traditional
biomass for just under 8%.10
China now accounts for over 46% of World coal
production and consumption11 and, but for the 50%
increase in China’s coal output since the beginning of
this century, World coal production and consumption
would have risen by barely 10% since 2000. Instead
they have risen by just over 50%. Concerns about
the ‘greenhouse’ gas emissions associated with coal
production and use, and both local and regional
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 WIREs Energy and Environment
pollution, have resulted in ongoing discussions of the
potential for carbon capture and storage (CCS) as a
means of blunting the related carbon emissions. This
is a subject that has become well-worn over the past
20 years, with warnings about the limits to sequestra-
tion, the need for closed aquifers, and questioning of
the assumption that carbon dioxide can stably be
injected below the Earth’s surface.12 In the 1990s, there
was considerable discussion about the feasibility of
large horizontal aquifers for effective carbon storage.
More cautious views have reigned since. But even in
those years, it was recognized that closed aquifers with
structural traps offered a very limited sequestration
potential—about 50 GtC, less than 10 years of global
carbon dioxide emissions from burning fossil fuel, even
before the upswing in China’s production and use of
coal (and remembering that India has more than
doubled its coal consumption since 2000, and currently
intends to continue on this path). The latest research
findings suggest that, even where carbon dioxide is
transferred deep below the Earth’s surface, much of
the injected carbon dioxide may not turn to rock, but
instead remain gaseous or liquid with the potential of
returning to the atmosphere.13 Despite proved coal
reserves still amounting to about 250 years of current
annual consumption, concerns about its environmental
impacts (especially enhanced global warming)
remain high.
The GEA recognized that successful CCS would
be required if continued use of coal and other fossil
fuels was to occur in a carbon-constrained world. In
Chapter 13 of the GEA CCS is discussed at length,
but despite every effort to appear optimistic about
the technical potential of CCS the authors recognize
that: ‘there is still considerable debate about how much
storage capacity actually exists’ (GEA, p. 997). ‘Ocean
storage is not being considered at this time’, but saline
aquifers and depleted oil and gas wells plus some deep
coal beds remain under review (GEA, p. 1036). In fact,
carbon storage in depleted oil and gas wells has been
going on for some 20 years, and recent developments
such as the Petro Nova project in Texas and the go-
ahead for the Meredosia (Illinois) scheme indicate that
efforts are at last being made onshore—but the pace is
slow and costs uncertain. Even the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change’s Special Report: ‘Carbon
Dioxide Capture and Storage’, published in 2005,
warned policymakers:
‘There is a need for improved storage capacity esti-
mates at the global, regional, and local levels, and for
a better understanding of long-term storage, migration,
and leakage processes. Addressing the latter issue will
require an enhanced ability to monitor and verify the
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A global energy assessment
behavior of geologically stored CO2. The implementa-
tion of more pilot and demonstration storage projects
in a range of geological, geographical, and economic
settings would be important to improve our under-
standing of these issues. Major knowledge gaps that
should be filled before the risks and potential for ocean
storage can be assessed concern the ecological impacts
of CO2 in the deep ocean’. (Ref 14, p. 48)
The World’s dependence upon oil, mainly in the
transportation sector but also important for heating
and cooking in many rural areas where natural gas
remains unavailable, is also an unavoidable challenge.
Here, the GEA essentially ducked the issue of ‘peak oil’
with the statement:
‘Considering oil reserves in a narrow sense, largely con-
ventional oil, cumulative production to date is roughly
equal to the remaining proven reserves—for the propo-
nents of “peak oil” a clear indication of the imminent
peak’. (GEA, p. 439)
This was rather odd. First, because the evidence
suggests that the global production of conventional
oil plateaued and may have begun to decline from
2005.15 Second, because the five major Middle East
oil exporters altered the basis of their definition of
‘proved’ conventional oil reserves from a 90% proba-
bility down to a 50% probability from 1984. The result
has been an apparent (but not real) increase in their
‘proved’ conventional oil reserves of some 435 billion
barrels. These arguably inflated conventional proved
oil reserves figures are then published in the standard
sources: the Oil & Gas Journal, BP’s Annual Statistical
Review of World Energy, and the US Energy Informa-
tion Administration. Third, the standard published oil
reserves figures include Venezuelan heavy oil and
Canadian tar sands, which although more difficult
and costly to extract (and of poorer quality in general
than conventional oil) inflate the standard figures by a
further 440 billion barrels (Venezuela accounting for
some 270 billion barrels of this and Canada for some
170 billion barrels). Put bluntly, the standard claim
that the world has proved conventional oil reserves
of nearly 1.7 trillion barrels is overstated by about
875 billion barrels.16 Thus, despite the fall in crude
oil prices from a new peak in June, 2014, after that
of July, 2008, the ‘peak oil’ issue remains with us,
and broad economic recovery combined with the con-
sequences of recent oil exploration and production cut-
backs will bring back further major oil price rises.
The recent cutbacks in upstream oil expenditure
and employment have mirrored those that took place
between 1982 and 1986 when, for example, UK North
9
 Overview
Sea drilling rates fell by up to 50% and semi-submers-
ible rates fell 40% in the last few months of 1985 and
into 1986. Major cutbacks in drilling rates have not
only occurred in the USA and the North Sea, but also
on- and off-shore Africa and Latin America. Upstream
investment in the Eastern Mediterranean is expected to
take a big hit. Offshore upstream activity around the
USA has also been severely affected by the Deepwater
Horizon incident in 2010, following which the finan-
cial penalties imposed on BP appear to many to have
been seriously unbalanced (and still not finally
resolved). The size of these penalties is possibly up to
US$ 60 billion. By contrast, Halliburton has faced US
$ 200,000, despite providing faulty cement which ren-
dered the blow-out preventer ineffectual and admitting
to having destroyed evidence. Questions have been
raised about the third party involved in the drilling,
Transocean, whose rig was claimed to be faulty, and
a key employee of which was closely engaged in the dis-
cussions which occurred on board before the blow-out
in which he died. Transocean have faced damages of US
$ 1.4 billion. Transocean merged with Global Santa Fe
in 2007.
In December, 2012, Shell’s Arctic exploration
efforts with the Kulluk received a major blow, and
the decision to scrap the rig was taken in 2014,
although Shell has decided to press on with exploration
in the Chukchi Sea. This is largely—it is believed—
because its exploration rights begin to end from
2017. With the US Administration announcing further
restrictions on where exploration may take place in the
Chukchi Sea, and with claims that 87% of US offshore
waters are now closed to oil and natural gas leasing,17
tighter oil supplies in the short and medium term
appear unavoidable.
On the up-side, hydraulic fracturing (fracking)
and horizontal drilling have continued apace in the
USA, but most tight oil fields have exhibited declines
within a few years of operations beginning. There is
some evidence that the exploitation of tight gas fields
(e.g., exploitation of the Haynesville Shale formation
which stretches across North-West Louisiana, East
Texas, and South-West Arkansas) is showing a similar
pattern. Despite the optimism exhibited by the US
Energy Information Administration’s Annual Energy
Outlook (2015), doubts persist about how long-lived
output from oil and gas fracking in the USA will
be—some sources suggest less than 15 years—although
US oil production in 2015 could be as high as 9.3 mil-
lion barrels per day. This is an important element in
recent oil price falls and OPEC’s response to them since
November, 2014.
For natural gas, supply availability is less of a
major issue over the next two to three decades,
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provided no disruptions occur. There are, however,
already concerns that North American demand is likely
to outpace production in the fairly near future.18 Dis-
ruptions have already occurred for some countries as
a result of curbs on Russian gas exports, while lack
of gas storage is a potentially serious issue for some
other countries—notably the UK. Ever since the year
2000 warnings have gone out that the UK’s 15 days’
gas storage capacity is insufficient to provide supply
security; the major gas supplier, Centrica, has argued
for more seasonal storage capacity (but has been
unwilling to invest £1.4 billion in additional capacity
without subsidy); and recent UK government state-
ments have included the refusal to provide any subsidy
and claims that there is an adequately diverse network
of international supplies and storage infrastructure.
Nevertheless, a previous Energy Minister (Charles
Hendry, who served until 2012) has stated that the
UK has relied on ‘luck’ so far; that in four of the last
nine winters gas reserves fell to ‘disturbingly low’
levels; and in March, 2013, UK gas prices tripled when
a key import pipeline was temporarily closed while gas
storage facilities were almost empty.
There is also the issue of strategic oil and gas stocks
which, despite the efforts made over the past 40 years in
respect of oil stocks, continues to cause concern even
within the policy review nexus. Although substantial
reserves exist world-wide, they have not been used effec-
tively to offset economic downturns in the past, and
with the expansion of US nonconventional oil output,
there is weaker rationale for the US to hold strategic
stocks rendering much of the rest of the world more vul-
nerable to supply disruption and its effects.19
The issues of upstream oil and gas expenditure
cutbacks and lack of oil or gas storage were not covered
in the GEA. When it comes to those forms of renewable
energy which are intermittent, notably wind energy,
storage issues are a key element, which the GEA did
refer to. (GEA, p. 775)
ENERGY SUPPLIES—RENEWABLES
AND NUCLEAR
The GEA recognized that ‘fossil fuels will dominate
energy use for decades to come’ (GEA, p. 904), but
in Chapters 7 and 11 stressed that annual renewable
energy flows exceed all future energy demand specula-
tions (GEA, p. 431), with resources potentially even
10 to 100 times this demand (GEA, p. 767). The main
requirement to realize this potential is the investment
needed to develop ‘adequate technologies to manage
the often low or varying energy densities and supply
intermittencies, and convert them into usable fuels’
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 WIREs Energy and Environment
(GEA, p. 431). Both in Chapter 7 and in Chapter 11,
the GEA’s emphasis was on the technical potential of
the various forms of renewable energy, with insuffi-
cient regard for constraints. For biomass and biofuels,
it was assumed that higher yields would produce the
desired results and cropped areas were unlikely to
expand given the expected future increases in the
demand for food, animal feed, and fibers (GEA,
p. 480). Yet, already diversion of food crops for bio-
fuel, biomass, and electricity (e.g., using palm oil as a
feedstock) production have severely impacted food
availability and prices (a major factor in food price riots
in 2008), while deforestation (with consequential hab-
itat and species loss for wildlife) has also resulted.20
Perhaps of even greater concern for a GEA are the
consequences of intermittency arising from growing
dependence upon wind and (in many parts of the
World) solar PV—the need for back-up from more
dependable sources of energy and the enormous need
for storage. The issue of intermittency is regularly
downplayed or evaded by many in the wind energy sec-
tor, and there is a frequent tendency to exaggerate or
ignore capacity factors achieved.20–22 The use of salts
in concentrating solar power (CSP) developments has
helped to provide some storage for a limited period
each day, but such optimal locations for CSP as the
Sahara desert (with Ultra High Voltage Direct Current
transmission to Europe and sub-Saharan Africa) are
hemmed about by concerns over sociopolitical stability
and hence supply security. It was notable that the GEA
explicitly excluded consideration of ‘localized factors
such as siting and transmission issues’ (GEA, p. 496).
The GEA was more alert to the potential impacts of
ocean, wave, and tidal (especially tidal barrages) on
ecosystems and marine life, although overlooking
potential adverse effects on wading birds.20
The delays in addressing relevant issues in the
energy field over long periods in the past should serve
as a stern warning against over-optimism and unrealis-
tic targets and assumed potentials. Even in the rela-
tively simple example of pumped storage, senior
advisors to government have pointed out the opportu-
nities which have not yet been exploited (such as the
13 sites identified in Scotland alone).23
But we can readily see some even more extreme
examples. The first parabolic mirrors were constructed
by Dositheius about 2300 years ago, and Frank Shu-
man placed an array of parabolic mirrors at Meadi,
near Cairo, over 100 years ago.24 Some 175 years have
passed since the work on solar photovoltaics and also
on the fuel cell began. Already, concerns are being
expressed about the dependence of current solar and
wind energy technologies on ‘rare earth’ or scarce
materials, although there are numerous proposals as
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A global energy assessment
to how such challenges can be met.25 We lay great store
by human ingenuity in the field of technological prog-
ress, and the discovery of new materials and processes,
but the examination of the historic record should instill
a sense of wariness about future claims.
There are further reasons to be wary. One is the
fact that we humans, like most creatures, seek out the
most convenient and closest resources to exploit first.
But, as these resources are exploited so the marginal
returns on their production decline. Energy production
is no exception to this general rule.26 Hence, the con-
cept of Energy Return On (Energy) Invested (EROI),
which has been discussed and debated by such energy
analyst luminaries as Charles Hall, Cutler Cleveland,
and David Murphy.16,27–29 Although the estimated
EROIs of the fossil fuels have tended to decline in recent
decades they remain well above those of ‘new’ or ‘mod-
ern’ renewable energy forms with the possible excep-
tion of hydro, and wind in a few exceptionally
favorable locations. This differential in EROI’s is insuf-
ficiently recognized as an obstacle to the expansion of
renewable energy provision. In addition, of course,
there are the widely expressed concerns about the inter-
mittency of output of renewable energy forms such as
wind and solar, and the need for back-up from fossil
fuel or nuclear plants.
Reinforcing this distinction is the low power den-
sity (Watts per square meter) of renewable energy forms,
as has been set out by Vaclav Smil and others.20,30–32
The GEA referred to the ‘often low spatial-energy inten-
sity or energy intensity’ of renewable energy forms com-
pared with most fossil fuel and nuclear resources (GEA,
p. 768), but appears to have preferred to place its empha-
sis on technical potentials rather than limitations.
Nuclear power, like solar power, has huge techni-
cal potential which could be enhanced by the greater
use of thorium as well as uranium in fissile systems.
Nuclear fusion, although considered by its advocates
to offer substantial safety benefits, remains elusive.
Yet again it is not the technical potential that represents
the greatest challenge but other concerns—safety and
public acceptance.
ENERGY EFFICIENCY
The GEA emphasized the need to shift to higher effi-
ciency in energy provision and use, which would
require accelerated and up-front energy-related invest-
ments over the coming decades, while warning that
demand responds only slowly to price changes (GEA,
p. 417). Yet nearly 150 years ago Jevons warned about
the ‘paradox’ that ‘it is wholly a confusion of ideas to
suppose that the economical use of fuel is equivalent to
a diminished consumption. The very contrary is the
11
 Overview
truth’.33,34 The point here is that increased efficiency is
liable to make the fuel cheaper, hence encouraging
greater use, or freeing up income which can be spent
on more fuel-consuming items or activities. Although
what is now referred to as ‘the rebound effect’ is rather
more complicated than such general statements
suggest—the ‘effect’ varies between countries and
regions within countries (e.g., there is relative disinter-
est in energy efficiency in the south-eastern parts of the
USA)—it is an important feature of energy efficiency
and policy analysis.35–39 Once again a realistic GEA
has to take full account of the limitations existing in
the real world. It may sound comforting to refer to
‘definitive guides’40 but things are never so simple. Cer-
tainly international action to raise energy efficiency in
provision and use has been ineffectual to date in large
parts of the World despite the lip service paid to its
desirability.41
POTENTIAL CATASTROPHES
It would, perhaps, be considered unreasonable to
expect a GEA—even of over 1800 pages in length—
to cover potential catastrophes. Scenarios developed
by business concerns, such as those produced by the
Royal Dutch/Shell Group, have explicitly ruled out
such considerations as being beyond their remit and
control. In recent years, a few authors have raised con-
cerns as to whether the human race can continue to
master its environment and achieve a sustainable
future—hence the question whether the twilight of
‘the Anthropocene Age’ is becoming apparent.16
Vaclav Smil31 has considered natural catastrophes such
as epidemics and volcanic eruptions, and it is important
to do so in any multidisciplinary approach to a GEA. In
doing so, the intention is not to seek to forecast the
future, but to consider possibilities which may arise
in an unknown and essentially unknowable future.
A suitable starting point is the prospect of 9 billion
people on Earth by 2050, and perhaps over 12 billion
by 2100. The total numbers, and the pressures of
migration, are likely to enhance the likelihood of local,
regional, and possibly global conflict. The depletion,
degradation, or exhaustion of many critical resources
may well provide the basis for conflict. Then there is
the rapidly rising urban population—which now com-
prises 55% of the World’s total population (compared
with 34% in 1960), and which is projected by the UN
to rise to 66% by 2050. Other projections suggest a fig-
ure of 80% by 2100. The basic numbers are even more
compelling: there were less than 750 million urban
dwellers in 1950, there are now nearly 4 billion, and
the figure is projected to exceed 6 billion by 2045.
India, China, and parts of West Africa are anticipated
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to account for much of these increases. Population
pressure, and population movement, is a longstanding
source of conflict as can be urbanization:
‘if managed poorly, urbanization could lead to declin-
ing quality of life, greater environmental degradation,
accelerating greenhouse gas emissions, social stresses
and political turbulence’.42
Urban dwellers may benefit from proximity to
mass transit systems, but their food and many other
essential requirements will need well-developed trans-
portation systems from outside and the fuels to
run them.
These developments carry with them other con-
cerns. Although medical science has greatly improved,
and the numbers of people with access to medication
has risen, urbanization and the greater volume of
movement carry with them higher risks from epidemics
(Ref 43, p. 475–477). Familiar though many people
may be with the Black Death and subsequent outbreaks
of bubonic plague which covered the period
1346–1834 AD, recent research suggests that the great
gerbil and some other rodents in Central Asia were the
source of contamination of black rats subsequently car-
rying fleas infected by the bacterium Yersinia pestis
around Europe.44–46 It has also been claimed that this
transference was ‘climate-driven’, based on examina-
tion of tree rings and with the implication that this
was the result of warming—despite the Little Ice Age
having begun some 150 years prior to the first out-
break.45 There is also the influenza epidemic of 1918/
1919, with which many are familiar. It is perhaps more
surprising that the plague which had a profound influ-
ence around the World between 536 and 750 AD has
attracted significant attention in recent years.47–49 This
plague, it has been robustly claimed, ushered out an
‘Old World’ around the globe with ‘the Dark Ages’,
and set the scene for the Middle Ages.
This outbreak of the plague is believed to have
followed the Tierra Blanca Joven eruption on the Ilo-
pango caldera in El Salvador in 536 AD (the suggestion
that a volcanic eruption close to Krakatoa, in Indone-
sia, is nowadays discounted). Volcanic eruptions and
tsunamis are among the natural phenomena, together
with the spread of disease and ineffectual efforts to stem
it, associated with a significant number of human
deaths and those of other species. Earlier volcanic erup-
tions, such as that of Lake Toba (Indonesia), some
70,000 years ago; Santorini, over a lengthy period
some 3500 years ago (which caused the collapse of
the Minoan civilization); Laki (Iceland) in 1783—
probably causing directly the greatest number of
human fatalities—several million50; and Mount
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 WIREs Energy and Environment
Tambora (Indonesia) in 181551 are considered to have
caused the largest number of human fatalities
(Krakatoa in 1883 is believed to have caused a rela-
tively modest 36,000 deaths).
One study of volcanic eruptions begins with
Mount Toba but ends with potential eruptions from
the Yellowstone National Park and California’s Long
Valley, which could cause massive loss of life and dis-
ruption, although the authors consider ‘we can, and
will, survive’.52 Others have considered catastrophic
volcanic eruption scenarios.53 Yet so often the human
race more generally is caught by surprise. The word tsu-
nami may now be widely known, but was it before
2004, when the Indian Ocean tsunami carried around
300,000 people to their deaths? How many people—
even Europeans—know of the Great Lisbon earth-
quake of November, 1755, and its subsequent tsunami,
which killed an estimated 30,000–50,000 people,
many of them in Lisbon but also in the Algarve and
as far away as Morocco? With the possibility of two
thirds of the World’s population being urbanized by
2050, and perhaps 80% by 2100, and dense urbanized
populations often living at low levels close to river estu-
aries and the sea, both the threat of tsunamis and vol-
canic eruptions take on even greater seriousness.
It is about 70,000 years since volcanic activity
destroyed a large proportion of the then existing
human race. Medical science has greatly advanced over
the past 250 years, and especially over the last 80 years,
yet there is growing concern whether modern antibiotic
remedies will be able to keep up with the increasing
resistance and changes in viruses.
By comparison enhanced near-surface global
warming due to human and human-related activities is
a topic rarely out of the daily media over the past
30 years, and yet it is a topic mired in speculation and
controversy.54,55 The history of the human race, at least
over the past 12,000 years, has indicated that near-
surface cooling has had more widespread effects than
any warming, but to ignore uncertainties and fail to take
sound precautionary measures would appear irresponsi-
ble. It was concerns about enhanced global warming
which were justifiably a major motivator for the GEA.
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