IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY
MONTEJO, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it
effective operation and suppress the mischief at which it is
aimed.1 The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for
election to the House of Representatives be "a registered voter in
the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for
a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the
election."2 The mischief which this provision — reproduced
verbatim from the 1973 Constitution — seeks to prevent is the
possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the
conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the
latter, from an elective office to serve that community."3
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of
Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of
Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995,
providing the following information in item no. 8:4
RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I
SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY
PRECEDING THE ELECTION: __________
Years and seven Months.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the
incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a
candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation
and Disqualification"5 with the Commission on Elections alleging
that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for
residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs.
Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement
for candidates for the House of Representatives on the evidence
of declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No.
33497726 and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an
order be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling
the certificate of candidacy."7
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected
Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry "seven" months to
"since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate.8 On the
same day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed
petitioner that:
[T]his office cannot receive or accept the
aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on the
ground that it is filed out of time, the deadline for
the filing of the same having already lapsed on
March 20, 1995. The Corrected/Amended
Certificate of Candidacy should have been filed
on or before the March 20, 1995 deadline.9
Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate
of Candidacy with the COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros,
Manila on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in
SPA No. 95-009 was likewise filed with the head office on the
same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the
word "seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the
result of an "honest misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to
rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has
always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or
residence. 11 Impugning respondent's motive in filing the petition
seeking her disqualification, she noted that:
When respondent (petitioner herein) announced
that she was intending to register as a voter in
 Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First
District of Leyte, petitioner immediately opposed
her intended registration by writing a letter stating
that "she is not a resident of said city but of
Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent
had registered as a voter in Tolosa following
completion of her six month actual residence
therein, petitioner filed a petition with the
COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the
First District to the Second District and pursued
such a move up to the Supreme Court, his
purpose being to remove respondent as
petitioner's opponent in the congressional election
in the First District. He also filed a bill, along with
other Leyte Congressmen, seeking the creation of
another legislative district to remove the town of
Tolosa out of the First District, to achieve his
purpose. However, such bill did not pass the
Senate. Having failed on such moves, petitioner
now filed the instant petition for the same
objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to
submit along with respondent for the judgment
and verdict of the electorate of the First District of
Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful, free and
clean elections on May 8, 1995. 12
On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), by a vote of 2 to 1, 13 came up with a
Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for
Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off
petitioner's Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March
31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate of
Candidacy. 14 Dealing with two primary issues, namely, the validity
of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse
of the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy, and petitioner's
compliance with the one year residency requirement, the Second
Division held:
Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her
Answer that the printed word "Seven" (months)
was a result of an "honest misinterpretation or
honest mistake" on her part and, therefore, an
amendment should subsequently be allowed. She
averred that she thought that what was asked was
her "actual and physical" presence in Tolosa and
not residence of origin or domicile in the First
Legislative District, to which she could have
responded "since childhood." In an accompanying
affidavit, she stated that her domicile is Tacloban
City, a component of the First District, to which
she always intended to return whenever absent
and which she has never abandoned.
Furthermore, in her memorandum, she tried to
discredit petitioner's theory of disqualification by
alleging that she has been a resident of the First
Legislative District of Leyte since childhood,
although she only became a resident of the
Municipality of Tolosa for seven months. She
asserts that she has always been a resident of
Tacloban City, a component of the First District,
before coming to the Municipality of Tolosa.
Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior
to her registration in Tolosa, respondent
announced that she would be registering in
Tacloban City so that she can be a candidate for
the District. However, this intention was rebuffed
when petitioner wrote the Election Officer of
Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is a
resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban. She never
disputed this claim and instead implicitly acceded
to it by registering in Tolosa.
This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest
misinterpretation or honest mistake." Besides, the
Certificate of Candidacy only asks for
RESIDENCE. Since on the basis of her Answer,
she was quite aware of "residence of origin" which
she interprets to be Tacloban City, it is curious
why she did not cite Tacloban City in her
Certificate of Candidacy. Her explanation that she
thought what was asked was her actual and
physical presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe
because there is none in the question that
insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8 in the
Certificate of Candidacy speaks clearly of
"Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I seek
to be elected immediately preceding the election."
Thus, the explanation of respondent fails to be
persuasive.
From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an
honest mistake or misinterpretation, therefore, is
devoid of merit.
To further buttress respondent's contention that
an amendment may be made, she cited the case
of Alialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The
reliance of respondent on the case of Alialy is
misplaced. The case only applies to the
"inconsequential deviations which cannot affect
the result of the election, or deviations from
provisions intended primarily to secure timely and
orderly conduct of elections." The Supreme Court
in that case considered the amendment only as a
matter of form. But in the instant case, the
amendment cannot be considered as a matter of
form or an inconsequential deviation. The change
in the number of years of residence in the place
where respondent seeks to be elected is a
substantial matter which determines her
qualification as a candidacy, specially those
intended to suppress, accurate material
representation in the original certificate which
adversely affects the filer. To admit the amended
certificate is to condone the evils brought by the
shifting minds of manipulating candidate, of the
detriment of the integrity of the election.
Moreover, to allow respondent to change the
seven (7) month period of her residency in order
to prolong it by claiming it was "since childhood" is
to allow an untruthfulness to be committed before
this Commission. The arithmetical accuracy of the
7 months residency the respondent indicated in
her certificate of candidacy can be gleaned from
her entry in her Voter's Registration Record
accomplished on January 28, 1995 which reflects
that she is a resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
for 6 months at the time of the said registration
(Annex A, Petition). Said accuracy is further
buttressed by her letter to the election officer of
San Juan, Metro Manila, dated August 24, 1994,
requesting for the cancellation of her registration
in the Permanent List of Voters thereat so that
she can be re-registered or transferred to Brgy.
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. The dates of these three (3)
different documents show the respondent's
consistent conviction that she has transferred her
residence to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte from Metro
Manila only for such limited period of time, starting
in the last week of August 1994 which on March
8, 1995 will only sum up to 7 months. The
Commission, therefore, cannot be persuaded to
believe in the respondent's contention that it was
an error.
xxx xxx xxx
Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected
Certificate of Candidacy cannot be admitted by
this Commission.
 xxx xxx xxx
Anent the second issue, and based on the
foregoing discussion, it is clear that respondent
has not complied with the one year residency
requirement of the Constitution.
In election cases, the term "residence" has always
been considered as synonymous with "domicile"
which imports not only the intention to reside in a
fixed place but also personal presence in-that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent for business or
pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to
return. (Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96
Phil 294; Romualdez vs. RTC-Tacloban, 226
SCRA 408). In respondent's case, when she
returned to the Philippines in 1991, the residence
she chose was not Tacloban but San Juan, Metro
Manila. Thus, her animus revertendi is pointed to
Metro Manila and not Tacloban.
This Division is aware that her claim that she has
been a resident of the First District since
childhood is nothing more than to give her a color
of qualification where she is otherwise
constitutionally disqualified. It cannot hold ground
in the face of the facts admitted by the respondent
in her affidavit. Except for the time that she
studied and worked for some years after
graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously
lived in Manila. In 1959, after her husband was
elected Senator, she lived and resided in San
Juan, Metro Manila where she was a registered
voter. In 1965, she lived in San Miguel, Manila
where she was again a registered voter. In 1978,
she served as member of the Batasang
Pambansa as the representative of the City of
Manila and later on served as the Governor of
Metro Manila. She could not have served these
positions if she had not been a resident of the City
of Manila. Furthermore, when she filed her
certificate of candidacy for the office of the
President in 1992, she claimed to be a resident of
San Juan, Metro Manila. As a matter of fact on
August 24, 1994, respondent wrote a letter with
the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila
requesting for the cancellation of her registration
in the permanent list of voters that she may be re-
registered or transferred to Barangay Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte. These facts manifest that she
could not have been a resident of Tacloban City
since childhood up to the time she filed her
certificate of candidacy because she became a
resident of many places, including Metro Manila.
This debunks her claim that prior to her residence
in Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of the First
Legislative District of Leyte since childhood.
In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her
lack of intention to make Tacloban her domicile.
She registered as a voter in different places and
on several occasions declared that she was a
resident of Manila. Although she spent her school
days in Tacloban, she is considered to have
abandoned such place when she chose to stay
and reside in other different places. In the case
of Romualdez vs. RTC (226 SCRA 408) the Court
explained how one acquires a new domicile by
choice. There must concur: (1) residence or bodily
presence in the new locality; (2) intention to
remain there; and (3) intention to abandon the old
domicile. In other words there must basically
be animus manendi with animus non revertendi.
When respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later
on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay
there by registering as a voter there and expressly
declaring that she is a resident of that place, she
is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City,
where she spent her childhood and school days,
as her place of domicile.
Pure intention to reside in that place is not
sufficient, there must likewise be conduct
indicative of such intention. Respondent's
statements to the effect that she has always
intended to return to Tacloban, without the
accompanying conduct to prove that intention, is
not conclusive of her choice of residence.
Respondent has not presented any evidence to
show that her conduct, one year prior the election,
showed intention to reside in Tacloban. Worse,
what was evident was that prior to her residence
in Tolosa, she had been a resident of Manila.
It is evident from these circumstances that she
was not a resident of the First District of Leyte
"since childhood."
To further support the assertion that she could
have not been a resident of the First District of
Leyte for more than one year, petitioner correctly
pointed out that on January 28, 1995 respondent
registered as a voter at precinct No. 18-A of Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she placed in her
Voter Registration Record that she resided in the
municipality of Tolosa for a period of six months.
This may be inconsequential as argued by the
respondent since it refers only to her residence in
Tolosa, Leyte. But her failure to prove that she
was a resident of the First District of Leyte prior to
her residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a
convincing proof that she had been a resident of
the district for six months only. 15
In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995
elections, the COMELEC en banc denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration 16 of the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring her
not qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte. 17 The
Resolution tersely stated:
After deliberating on the Motion for
Reconsideration, the Commission RESOLVED to
DENY it, no new substantial matters having been
raised therein to warrant re-examination of the
resolution granting the petition for
disqualification. 18
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing
petitioner's proclamation should the results of the canvass show
that she obtained the highest number of votes in the
congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. On the same
day, however, the COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second
Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be
suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of
votes. 19
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred
that she was the overwhelming winner of the elections for the
congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held May 8, 1995
based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass
showed that she obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the
36,833 votes received by Respondent Montejo. A copy of said
Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental Petition.
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from
running for the congressional seat of the First District of Leyte
and the public respondent's Resolution suspending her
proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for relief.
Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental
Petitions. The principal issues may be classified into two general
areas:
I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for
election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for
a period of one year at the time of the May 9,
1995 elections.
II. The Jurisdictional Issue
a) Prior to the elections
Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised
its jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioner outside
the period mandated by the Omnibus Election
Code for disqualification cases under Article 78 of
the said Code.
b) After the Elections
Whether or not the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction
over the question of petitioner's qualifications after
the May 8, 1995 elections.
I. Petitioner's qualification
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division
reveals a startling confusion in the application of settled concepts
of "Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. While the
COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the general
proposition that for the purposes of election law, residence is
synonymous with domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to
substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence,
a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a
candidate's qualifications for election to the House of
Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. As it were,
residence, for the purpose of meeting the qualification for an
elective position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil
rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural
persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong
vs. Republic 20 this court took the concept of domicile to mean an
individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever
absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and
depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they
disclose intent." 21Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the
twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a
fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning
there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual
relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical
presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The
essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that
residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which
the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place
for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's
intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to
leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. 22 It is
thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different
residences in various places. However, a person can only have a
single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully
abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice.
In Uytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we laid this distinction quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and
residence. "Residence" is used to indicate a place
 of abode, whether permanent or temporary;
"domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which, when absent, one has the intention of
returning. A man may have a residence in one
place and a domicile in another. Residence is not
domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with
the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A
man can have but one domicile for the same
purpose at any time, but he may have numerous
places of residence. His place of residence is
generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any
means necessarily so since no length of
residence without intention of remaining will
constitute domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are
dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these
concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and
unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election
purposes is used synonymously with domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence. . . is
synonymous with domicile which imports not only intention to
reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." 25 Larena
vs. Teves 26 reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the
qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of Municipal
President of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon
vs. Quirino, 27 held that the absence from residence to pursue
studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other
than in the place where one is elected does not constitute loss of
residence. 28 So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election
law that in these and other election law cases, this Court has
stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent
residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a
loss or change of domicile.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence
qualification for certain elective positions have placed beyond
doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of
"residence" in election law, it actually means only "domicile" to
wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I
remember that in the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, there was an attempt to require
residence in the place not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of the elections.
So my question is: What is the Committee's
concept of residence of a candidate for the
legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the
concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the
regular members of the National Assembly are
concerned, the proposed section merely provides,
among others, "and a resident thereof", that is, in
the district for a period of not less than one year
preceding the day of the election. This was in
effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the
interpretation given to it was domicile. 29
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on
Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo
has raised the same point that "resident" has
been interpreted at times as a matter of intention
rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
 Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman
consider at the proper time to go back to actual
residence rather than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some
difficulty especially considering that a provision in
the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says
that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted
by law. So, we have to stick to the original
concept that it should be by domicile and not
physical residence. 30
In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives, 31 this Court concluded that the framers of the
1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to the
term residence in election law, regarding it as having the same
meaning as domicile. 32
In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda
Romualdez Marcos satisfied the residency requirement mandated
by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what
significance is the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of
Candidacy stating her residence in the First Legislative District of
Leyte as seven (7) months?
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of
candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or
not and individual has satisfied the constitution's residency
qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material
only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate
to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of
candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an
honest mistake in jotting the word "seven" in the space provided
for the residency qualification requirement. The circumstances
leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the
subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down
the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period
of residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in
the space provided. These circumstances and events are amply
detailed in the COMELEC's Second Division's questioned
resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance,
when herein petitioner announced that she would be registering
in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in the First District,
private respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming that
petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner
then registered in her place of actual residence in the First
District, which is Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently
noted down in her Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said
certificate would reveal the possible source of the confusion: the
entry for residence (Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the
entry for residence in the constituency where a candidate seeks
election thus:
7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte
POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION
PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY
WHERE I SEEK TO
BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE
ELECTION:_________ Years and Seven Months.
Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place
of actual residence in Leyte instead of petitioner's claimed
domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of
stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of
entries in Item 7 and Item 8 — the first requiring actual residence
and the second requiring domicile — coupled with the
circumstances surrounding petitioner's registration as a voter in
Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for
which she could be disqualified. This honest mistake should not,
however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First
District if such fact were established by means more convincing
than a mere entry on a piece of paper.
We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.
In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not
possibly be in the First District of Leyte, the Second Division of
the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24,1995
maintains that "except for the time when (petitioner) studied and
worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she
continuously lived in Manila." The Resolution additionally cites
certain facts as indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile
ought to be any place where she lived in the last few decades
except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the Resolution,
petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she
was also registered voter. Then, in 1965, following the election of
her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in San
Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In 1978 and thereafter, she
served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of
Metro Manila. "She could not, have served these positions if she
had not been a resident of Metro Manila," the COMELEC
stressed. Here is where the confusion lies.
We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does
not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained
residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating,
implies a factual relationship to a given place for various
purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to
pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary
or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence.
Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have
been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time
she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a
resident of many places" flies in the face of settled jurisprudence
in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual)
residence and domicile for election law purposes. In Larena
vs. Teves, 33 supra, we stressed:
[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a
person who has his own house wherein he lives
with his family in a municipality without having
ever had the intention of abandoning it, and
without having lived either alone or with his family
in another municipality, has his residence in the
former municipality, notwithstanding his having
registered as an elector in the other municipality
in question and having been a candidate for
various insular and provincial positions, stating
every time that he is a resident of the latter
municipality.
More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34 We explained that:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look
for "greener pastures," as the saying goes, to
improve his lot, and that, of course includes study
in other places, practice of his avocation, or
engaging in business. When an election is to be
held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve
his lot may desire to return to his native town to
cast his ballot but for professional or business
reasons, or for any other reason, he may not
absent himself from his professional or business
activities; so there he registers himself as voter as
he has the qualifications to be one and is not
willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose
the officials who are to run the government
especially in national elections. Despite such
registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to
his domicile or residence of origin has not
forsaken him. This may be the explanation why
the registration of a voter in a place other than his
residence of origin has not been deemed
 sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of
such residence. It finds justification in the natural
desire and longing of every person to return to his
place of birth. This strong feeling of attachment to
the place of one's birth must be overcome by
positive proof of abandonment for another.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited
statements supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible
to run for the position of Representative of the First District of
Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's
various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile. In doing so,
it not only ignored settled jurisprudence on residence in election
law and the deliberations of the constitutional commission but
also the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881). 35
What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which
establish the fact of petitioner's domicile, which we lift verbatim
from the COMELEC's Second Division's assailed Resolution: 36
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little
over 8 years old, she established her domicile in
Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in
the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to
1949 when she graduated from high school. She
pursued her college studies in St. Paul's College,
now Divine Word University in Tacloban, where
she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter,
she taught in the Leyte Chinese School, still in
Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work
with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z.
Romualdez in his office in the House of
Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-
President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still
a congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered
there as a voter. When her husband was elected
Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her
husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where
she registered as a voter. In 1965, when her
husband was elected President of the Republic of
the Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang
Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel,
Manila.
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her
family were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu,
Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to
Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for election as
President of the Philippines and filed her
Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated
that she is a resident and registered voter of San
Juan, Metro Manila.
Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by
COMELEC, what is inescapable is that petitioner held various
residences for different purposes during the last four decades.
None of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to
abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover,
while petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally
followed the domicile of her parents. She grew up in Tacloban,
reached her adulthood there and eventually established
residence in different parts of the country for various reasons.
Even during her husband's presidency, at the height of the
Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties to her
domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban,
celebrating her birthdays and other important personal milestones
in her home province, instituting well-publicized projects for the
benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a political
power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions
of power either through the ballot or by appointment, always with
either her influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her
domicile of origin are part of the history and lore of the quarter
century of Marcos power in our country. Either they were entirely
ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of the
COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country always
knew: the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.
Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was
not petitioner's domicile of origin because she did not live there
until she was eight years old. He avers that after leaving the place
in 1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many
years and . . . (could not) re-establish her domicile in said place
by merely expressing her intention to live there again." We do not
agree.
First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once
acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in
spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban,
Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile
was not established only when her father brought his family back
to Leyte contrary to private respondent's averments.
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect
a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: 37
1. An actual removal or an actual change of
domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former
place of residence and establishing a new one;
and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria,
the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with
evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the
presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change
of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and
one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. 38 In the
case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent
plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince
this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a
domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment
requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former
domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of
her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost
her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her
marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For
there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code
concepts of "domicile" and "residence." 39 The presumption that
the wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation
of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term
"residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil
Code is one area where the two concepts are well delineated. Dr.
Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific area explains:
In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference
between domicile and residence. Both terms
imply relations between a person and a place; but
in residence, the relation is one of fact while in
domicile it is legal or juridical, independent of the
necessity of physical presence. 40
Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. — The husband shall fix the residence of
the family. But the court may exempt the wife from
living with the husband if he should live abroad
unless in the service of the Republic.
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the
concepts of domicile or residence as they affect the female
spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that
the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in
favor of the husband's choice of residence upon marriage.
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish
Civil Code of 1889 which states:
 La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido
donde quiera que fije su residencia. Los
Tribunales, sin embargo, podran con justa causa
eximirla de esta obligacion cuando el marido
transende su residencia a ultramar o' a pais
extranjero.
Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in
the aforequoted article, which means wherever (the
husband) wishes to establish residence. This part of the article
clearly contemplates only actual residence because it refers to a
positive act of fixing a family home or residence. Moreover, this
interpretation is further strengthened by the phrase "cuando el
marido translade su residencia" in the same provision which
means, "when the husband shall transfer his residence," referring
to another positive act of relocating the family to another home or
place of actual residence. The article obviously cannot be
understood to refer to domicile which is a fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility
of transferring from one place to another not only once, but as
often as the husband may deem fit to move his family, a
circumstance more consistent with the concept of actual
residence.
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony
with the intention of the law to strengthen and unify the family,
recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the
marriage different domiciles (of origin). This difference could, for
the sake of family unity, be reconciled only by allowing the
husband to fix a single place of actual residence.
Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under
Title V under the heading: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding Article
110 is Article 109 which obliges the husband and wife to live
together, thus:
Art. 109. — The husband and wife are obligated
to live together, observe mutual respect and
fidelity and render mutual help and support.
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and
wife are physically together. This takes into account the situations
where the couple has many residences (as in the case of the
petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of
their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order
that they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that
Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise, we
shall be faced with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile
while the husband, for professional or other reasons, stays in one
of their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:
Residence and Domicile — Whether the word
"residence" as used with reference to particular
matters is synonymous with "domicile" is a
question of some difficulty, and the ultimate
decision must be made from a consideration of
the purpose and intent with which the word is
used. Sometimes they are used synonymously, at
other times they are distinguished from one
another.
xxx xxx xxx
Residence in the civil law is a material fact,
referring to the physical presence of a person in a
place. A person can have two or more residences,
such as a country residence and a city residence.
Residence is acquired by living in place; on the
other hand, domicile can exist without actually
living in the place. The important thing for domicile
is that, once residence has been established in
one place, there be an intention to stay there
permanently, even if residence is also established
 in some other
place. 41
In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the
husband and the wife during the marriage is not an iron-clad
principle; In cases applying the Civil Code on the question of a
common matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has
recognized certain situations 42 where the spouses could not be
compelled to live with each other such that the wife is either
allowed to maintain a residence different from that of her husband
or, for obviously practical reasons, revert to her original domicile
(apart from being allowed to opt for a new one). In De la Vina
vs.Villareal 43 this Court held that "[a] married woman may acquire
a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband during
the existence of the marriage where the husband has given
cause for divorce." 44 Note that the Court allowed the wife either to
obtain new residence or to choose a new domicile in such an
event. In instances where the wife actually opts, .under the Civil
Code, to live separately from her husband either by taking new
residence or reverting to her domicile of origin, the Court has held
that the wife could not be compelled to live with her husband on
pain of contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasques de Arroyo 45 the Court
held that:
Upon examination of the authorities, we are
convinced that it is not within the province of the
courts of this country to attempt to compel one of
the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal
rights to, the other. Of course where the property
rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action for
restitution of such rights can be maintained. But
we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an
order, enforcible (sic) by process of contempt,
may be entered to compel the restitution of the
purely personal right of consortium. At best such
an order can be effective for no other purpose
than to compel the spouses to live under the
same roof; and he experience of those countries
where the courts of justice have assumed to
compel the cohabitation of married people shows
that the policy of the practice is extremely
questionable. Thus in England, formerly the
Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the
restitution of conjugal rights at the instance of
either husband or wife; and if the facts were found
to warrant it, that court would make a mandatory
decree, enforceable by process of contempt in
case of disobedience, requiring the delinquent
party to live with the other and render conjugal
rights. Yet this practice was sometimes criticized
even by the judges who felt bound to enforce
such orders, and in Weldon v. Weldon (9 P.D.
52), decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen,
President in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty
Division of the High Court of Justice, expressed
his regret that the English law on the subject was
not the same as that which prevailed in Scotland,
where a decree of adherence, equivalent to the
decree for the restitution of conjugal rights in
England, could be obtained by the injured spouse,
but could not be enforced by imprisonment.
Accordingly, in obedience to the growing
sentiment against the practice, the Matrimonial
Causes Act (1884) abolished the remedy of
imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution
of conjugal rights can still be procured, and in
case of disobedience may serve in appropriate
cases as the basis of an order for the periodical
payment of a stipend in the character of alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United
States, only one court, so far as we can discover,
has ever attempted to make a preemptory order
requiring one of the spouses to live with the other;
and that was in a case where a wife was ordered
to follow and live with her husband, who had
 changed his domicile to the City of New Orleans.
The decision referred to (Bahn v. Darby, 36 La.
Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the Civil
Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the
Spanish Civil Code. It was decided many years
ago, and the doctrine evidently has not been
fruitful even in the State of Louisiana. In other
states of the American Union the idea of enforcing
cohabitation by process of contempt is rejected.
(21 Cyc., 1148).
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme
Court of Spain appears to have affirmed an order
of the Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring
a wife to return to the marital domicile, and in the
alternative, upon her failure to do so, to make a
particular disposition of certain money and effects
then in her possession and to deliver to her
husband, as administrator of the ganancial
property, all income, rents, and interest which
might accrue to her from the property which she
had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1,
11) But it does not appear that this order for the
return of the wife to the marital domicile was
sanctioned by any other penalty than the
consequences that would be visited upon her in
respect to the use and control of her property; and
it does not appear that her disobedience to that
order would necessarily have been followed by
imprisonment for contempt.
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then
Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obliged — by
virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code — to follow her husband's
actual place of residence fixed by him. The problem here is that
at that time, Mr. Marcos had several places of residence, among
which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no
showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family's
residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these
places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon
marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of
origin.
On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial
domicile" appears to have been incorporated, as a result of our
jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of
1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the difference
between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code
drafters, the term residence has been supplanted by the term
domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in
meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110. The provision
recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women's
rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a
product of mutual agreement between the spouses. 46
Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may
mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite
another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as
the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of
husband and wife — the term residence should only be
interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable
conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation
therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President in
1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new
home, not a domicilium necessarium.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a
new "domicile" after her marriage and only acquired a right to
choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts
following her return to the country clearly indicate that she not
only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin
(assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This
"choice" was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the
Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's
permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and
Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make them livable for the Marcos family
to have a home in our homeland." 47 Furthermore, petitioner
obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte,
while living in her brother's house, an act which supports the
domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG
Chairman. She could not have gone straight to her home in San
Juan, as it was in a state of disrepair, having been previously
looted by vandals. Her "homes" and "residences" following her
arrival in various parts of Metro Manila merely qualified as
temporary or "actual residences," not domicile. Moreover, and
proceeding from our discussion pointing out specific situations
where the female spouse either reverts to her domicile of origin or
chooses a new one during the subsistence of the marriage, it
would be highly illogical for us to assume that she cannot regain
her original domicile upon the death of her husband absent a
positive act of selecting a new one where situations exist within
the subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife gains a
domicile different from her husband.
In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile
enunciated by this court up to this point, we are persuaded that
the facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a
conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of legal residence or
domicile in the First District of Leyte.
II. The jurisdictional issue
Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had
already lapsed considering that the assailed resolutions were
rendered on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election
in violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code. 48 Moreover, petitioner contends that it is the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC which
has jurisdiction over the election of members of the House of
Representatives in accordance with Article VI Sec. 17 of the
Constitution. This is untenable.
It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of
judgment within a specified time is generally construed to be
merely directory, 49 "so that non-compliance with them does not
invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had
intended such result it would have clearly indicated it." 50 The
difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often
made on grounds of necessity. Adopting the same view held by
several American authorities, this court in Marcelino vs. Cruz held
that: 51
The difference between a mandatory and
directory provision is often determined on grounds
of expediency, the reason being that less injury
results to the general public by disregarding than
enforcing the letter of the law.
In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the
interpretation of a statute containing a limitation of
thirty (30) days within which a decree may be
entered without the consent of counsel, it was
held that "the statutory provisions which may be
thus departed from with impunity, without affecting
the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually
those which relate to the mode or time of doing
that which is essential to effect the aim and
purpose of the Legislature or some incident of the
essential act." Thus, in said case, the statute
under examination was construed merely to be
directory.
The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should
have abstained from rendering a decision after the period stated
in the Omnibus Election Code because it lacked jurisdiction, lies
in the fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would
then refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of having
failed to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period.
In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646
in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, 52 it is evident that the
respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and
decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P.
881 even after the elections.
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed
assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's
qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that
HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress
begins only after a candidate has become a member of the
House of Representatives. 53 Petitioner not being a member of the
House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this
point has no jurisdiction over the question.
It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the
1987 Constitution for us to either to ignore or deliberately make
distinctions in law solely on the basis of the personality of a
petitioner in a case. Obviously a distinction was made on such a
ground here. Surely, many established principles of law, even of
election laws were flouted for the sake perpetuating power during
the pre-EDSA regime. We renege on these sacred ideals,
including the meaning and spirit of EDSA ourselves bending
established principles of principles of law to deny an individual
what he or she justly deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we
condemn ourselves to repeat the mistakes of the past.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the
necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House
of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's
questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May
25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is
hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to
proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First
District of Leyte.
SO ORDERED.
ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner,
vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and
the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent
Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the
City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one
was Gabriel V. Daza III.The results of the election were as
follows:
Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853
Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894
Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275[1]
The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in
view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain
Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a
citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998,[2] the Second Division
of the COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered
the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private
respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under
40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual
citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective
position. The COMELECs Second Division said:
What is presented before the Commission is a petition
for disqualification of Eduardo Barrios Manzano as
candidate for the office of Vice-Mayor of Makati City
in the May 11, 1998 elections. The petition is based on
the ground that the respondent is an American citizen
based on the record of the Bureau of Immigration and
misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino
citizen.
In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the
respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner
with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate
of Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a
Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a
Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in
the United States, San Francisco, California, on
September 14, 1955, and is considered an American
citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his
registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his
Filipino citizenship.
Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that
respondent Manzano is both a Filipino and a US
citizen. In other words, he holds dual citizenship.
The question presented is whether under our laws, he is
disqualified from the position for which he filed his
certificate of candidacy. Is he eligible for the office he
seeks to be elected?
Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code,
those holding dual citizenship are disqualified from
running for any elective local position.
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the
respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano DISQUALIFIED
as candidate for Vice-Mayor of Makati City.
On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration.[3] The motion remained pending even until
after the election held on May 11, 1998.
Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044,
dated May 10, 1998, of the COMELEC, the board of
canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati
City but suspended the proclamation of the winner.
On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the
case for disqualification.[4] Petitioners motion was opposed by
private respondent.
The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998,
the COMELEC en banc rendered its resolution. Voting 4 to 1,
with one commissioner abstaining, the COMELEC en banc
reversed the ruling of its Second Division and declared private
respondent qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of
Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.[5] The pertinent portions
of the resolution of the COMELEC en banc read:
As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was
born in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. He acquired
US citizenship by operation of the United States
Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli.
He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation
of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as his father and
mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the age
of six (6), his parents brought him to the Philippines
using an American passport as travel document. His
parents also registered him as an alien with the
Philippine Bureau of Immigration. He was issued an
alien certificate of registration. This, however, did not
result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did
not renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an
oath of allegiance to the United States.
It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained
the age of majority, he registered himself as a voter, and
voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which
effectively renounced his US citizenship under
American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had
U.S. citizenship.
At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution
of the Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, was
not yet final. Respondent Manzano obtained the highest
number of votes among the candidates for vice-mayor
of Makati City, garnering one hundred three thousand
eight hundred fifty three (103,853) votes over his
closest rival, Ernesto S. Mercado, who obtained one
hundred thousand eight hundred ninety four (100,894)
votes, or a margin of two thousand nine hundred fifty
nine (2,959) votes. Gabriel Daza III obtained third place
with fifty four thousand two hundred seventy five
(54,275) votes. In applying election laws, it would be
far better to err in favor of the popular choice than be
embroiled in complex legal issues involving private
international law which may well be settled before the
highest court (Cf. Frivaldo vs. Commission on
Elections, 257 SCRA 727).
WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby
REVERSES the resolution of the Second Division,
adopted on May 7, 1998, ordering the cancellation of
the respondents certificate of candidacy.
We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano
to be QUALIFIED as a candidate for the position of
vice-mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998,
elections.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati
City Board of Canvassers, upon proper notice to the
parties, to reconvene and proclaim the respondent
Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano as the winning
candidate for vice-mayor of Makati City.
Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the
board of canvassers, on the evening of August 31, 1998,
proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of the City of
Makati.
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the
aforesaid resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to declare
private respondent disqualified to hold the office of vice mayor
of Makati City.Petitioner contends that
[T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:
A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S.
citizen when he:
1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained
the age of majority when he was already 37 years old;
and,
2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely)
registered himself as a voter and voted in the elections
of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the
elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati;
C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the
resolution of the Second Division adopted on 7 May
1998 was not yet final so that, effectively, petitioner
may not be declared the winner even assuming that
Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold the elective
office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.
We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by
private respondent Manzano whether petitioner Mercado has
personality to bring this suit considering that he was not an
original party in the case for disqualification filed by Ernesto
Mamaril nor was petitioners motion for leave to intervene
granted.
I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT
Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8
of the Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC in support of his
claim that petitioner has no right to intervene and, therefore,
cannot bring this suit to set aside the ruling denying his motion
for intervention:
Section 1. When proper and when may be permitted to
intervene. Any person allowed to initiate an action or
proceeding may, before or during the trial of an action
or proceeding, be permitted by the Commission, in its
discretion to intervene in such action or proceeding, if
he has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against
both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely
affected by such action or proceeding.
....
Section 3. Discretion of Commission. In allowing or
disallowing a motion for intervention, the Commission
or the Division, in the exercise of its discretion, shall
consider whether or not the intervention will unduly
delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties and whether or not the intervenors rights
may be fully protected in a separate action or
proceeding.
Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal
interest in the matter in litigation nor an interest to protect
because he is a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post
of Makati City [who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor
of Makati City even if the private respondent be ultimately
disqualified by final and executory judgment.
The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time
petitioner sought to intervene in the proceedings before the
COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of the
results of the election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati
City, on the basis of which petitioner came out only second to
private respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been no
proclamation at that time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still
has, an interest in ousting private respondent from the race at
the time he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo v.
COMELEC,[6] reiterated in several cases,[7] only applies to cases
in which the election of the respondent is contested, and the
question is whether one who placed second to the disqualified
candidate may be declared the winner. In the present case, at
the time petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File Intervention
on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the
winner, and petitioners purpose was precisely to have private
respondent disqualified from running for [an] elective local
position under 40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril
(who originally instituted the disqualification proceedings), a
registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the
action, so was petitioner since the latter was a rival candidate
for vice mayor of Makati City.
Nor is petitioners interest in the matter in litigation any
less because he filed a motion for intervention only on May 20,
1998, after private respondent had been shown to have
garnered the highest number of votes among the candidates for
vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage
of the proceedings for the disqualification against private
respondent is clear from 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known
as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides:
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment
to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes
cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election,
the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial
and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence
of guilt is strong.
Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in
proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has
yet been no final judgment rendered.
The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve
petitioners motion for intervention was tantamount to a denial
of the motion, justifying petitioner in filing the instant petition
for certiorari. As the COMELEC en banc instead decided the
merits of the case, the present petition properly deals not only
with the denial of petitioners motion for intervention but also
with the substantive issues respecting private respondents
alleged disqualification on the ground of dual citizenship.
This brings us to the next question, namely, whether
private respondent Manzano possesses dual citizenship and, if
so, whether he is disqualified from being a candidate for vice
mayor of Makati City.
II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION
The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is
being sought under 40 of the Local Government Code of 1991
(R.A. No. 7160), which declares as disqualified from running
for any elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dual
citizenship. This provision is incorporated in the Charter of the
City of Makati.[8]
Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as
the Solicitor General, who sides with him in this case, contends
that through 40(d) of the Local Government Code, Congress
has command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons
possessing dual allegiance to hold local elective office.
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual
allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the
concurrent application of the different laws of two or more
states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the
said states.[9] For instance, such a situation may arise when a
person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to
the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows
the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without
any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a
citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art.
IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes
of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in
foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and
alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers country such
children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters
country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act
or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine
citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the
Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a citizen
of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given
the constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation
in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act,
loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is
involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals
volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the
Constitution provides: Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to
the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. This
provision was included in the 1987 Constitution at the instance
of Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained its necessity as
follows:[10]
. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual
allegiance is not dual citizenship. I have circulated a
memorandum to the Bernas Committee according to
which a dual allegiance  and I reiterate a dual
allegiance  is larger and more threatening than that of
mere double citizenship which is seldom intentional
and, perhaps, never insidious. That is often a function of
the accident of mixed marriages or of birth on foreign
soil. And so, I do not question double citizenship at all.
What we would like the Committee to consider is to
take constitutional cognizance of the problem of dual
allegiance. For example, we all know what happens in
the triennial elections of the Federation of Filipino-
Chinese Chambers of Commerce which consists of
about 600 chapters all over the country. There is a
Peking ticket, as well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely
known is the fact that the Filipino-Chinese community
is represented in the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of
China in Taiwan. And until recently, the sponsor might
recall, in Mainland China in the Peoples Republic of
China, they have the Associated Legislative Council for
overseas Chinese wherein all of Southeast Asia
including some European and Latin countries were
represented, which was dissolved after several years
because of diplomatic friction. At that time, the
Filipino-Chinese were also represented in that Overseas
Council.
When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of
this unsettled kind of allegiance of Filipinos, of citizens
who are already Filipinos but who, by their acts, may be
said to be bound by a second allegiance, either to
Peking or Taiwan. I also took close note of the concern
expressed by some Commissioners yesterday, including
Commissioner Villacorta, who were concerned about
the lack of guarantees of thorough assimilation, and
especially Commissioner Concepcion who has always
been worried about minority claims on our natural
resources.
Dual allegiance can actually siphon scarce national
capital to Taiwan, Singapore, China or Malaysia, and
this is already happening. Some of the great commercial
places in downtown Taipei are Filipino-owned, owned
by Filipino-Chinese it is of common knowledge in
Manila. It can mean a tragic capital outflow when we
have to endure a capital famine which also means
economic stagnation, worsening unemployment and
social unrest.
And so, this is exactly what we ask that the Committee
kindly consider incorporating a new section, probably
Section 5, in the article on Citizenship which will read
as follows: DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO
CITIZENSHIP AND SHALL BE DEALT WITH
ACCORDING TO LAW.
In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the
problem of these citizens with dual allegiance, thus:[11]
. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed
their concern about dual citizenship in the sense that it
implies a double allegiance under a double sovereignty
which some of us who spoke then in a freewheeling
debate thought would be repugnant to the sovereignty
which pervades the Constitution and to citizenship itself
which implies a uniqueness and which elsewhere in the
Constitution is defined in terms of rights and obligations
exclusive to that citizenship including, of course, the
obligation to rise to the defense of the State when it is
threatened, and back of this, Commissioner Bernas, is,
of course, the concern for national security. In the
course of those debates, I think some noted the fact that
as a result of the wave of naturalizations since the
decision to establish diplomatic relations with the
Peoples Republic of China was made in 1975, a good
number of these naturalized Filipinos still routinely go
to Taipei every October 10; and it is asserted that some
of them do renew their oath of allegiance to a foreign
government maybe just to enter into the spirit of the
occasion when the anniversary of the Sun Yat-Sen
Republic is commemorated. And so, I have detected a
genuine and deep concern about double citizenship,
with its attendant risk of double allegiance which is
repugnant to our sovereignty and national security. I
appreciate what the Committee said that this could be
left to the determination of a future legislature. But
considering the scale of the problem, the real impact on
the security of this country, arising from, let us say,
potentially great numbers of double citizens professing
double allegiance, will the Committee entertain a
proposed amendment at the proper time that will
prohibit, in effect, or regulate double citizenship?
Clearly, in including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the
concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual
citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their
allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No.
7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, 20 must be understood as
referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere
dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike
those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to
strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for
candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the
filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine
citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual
citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable
consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin
G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the
Constitutional Commission, pointed out: [D]ual citizenship is
just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the
laws on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of
a Filipino mother. But whether or not she is considered a
citizen of another country is something completely beyond our
control.[12]
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the
same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which
they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual
citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign
state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively
renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the
following discussion on 40(d) between Senators Enrile and
Pimentel clearly shows:[13]
SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask
clarification of line 41, page 17: Any person with dual
citizenship is disqualified to run for any elective local
position. Under the present Constitution, Mr. President,
someone whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines but his
father is a foreigner is a natural-born citizen of the
Republic. There is no requirement that such a natural born
citizen, upon reaching the age of majority, must elect or give
up Philippine citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports,
one belonging to the country of his or her father and one
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, may such a
situation disqualify the person to run for a local government
position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only
means that at the moment when he would want to run for
public office, he has to repudiate one of his citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine
passport but the country of origin or the country of the father
claims that person, nevertheless, as a citizen? No one can
renounce. There are such countries in the world.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for
public office would, in effect, be an election for him of his
desire to be considered as a Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the
Constitution does not require an election. Under the
Constitution, a person whose mother is a citizen of the
Philippines is, at birth, a citizen without any overt act to
claim the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President,
is: Under the Gentlemans example, if he does not renounce
his other citizenship, then he is opening himself to
question. So, if he is really interested to run, the first thing he
should do is to say in the Certificate of Candidacy that: I am
a Filipino citizen, and I have only one citizenship.
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of
Philippine law, Mr. President. He will always have one
citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested upon him or
her in the Constitution of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he
exercises acts that will prove that he also acknowledges
other citizenships, then he will probably fall under this
disqualification.
This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for
naturalization must renounce all allegiance and fidelity to any
foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty[14] of which at
the time he is a subject or citizen before he can be issued a
certificate of naturalization as a citizen of the
Philippines. In Parado v. Republic,[15] it was held:
[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by
naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty
to any other country or government and solemnly
declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is
satisfied and complied with. The determination whether
such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the
provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the
province and is an exclusive prerogative of our
courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by
the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign
law may or should interfere with its operation and
application. If the requirement of the Chinese Law of
Nationality were to be read into our Naturalization Law,
we would be applying not what our legislative
department has deemed it wise to require, but what a
foreign government has thought or intended to
exact. That, of course, is absurd. It must be resisted by
all means and at all cost. It would be a brazen
encroachment upon the sovereign will and power of the
people of this Republic.
III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
The record shows that private respondent was born in San
Francisco, California on September 4, 1955, of Filipino
parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis, while the United States follows the doctrine of jus
soli, the parties agree that, at birth at least, he was a national
both of the Philippines and of the United States. However, the
COMELEC en banc held that, by participating in Philippine
elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private respondent
effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law,
so that now he is solely a Philippine national.
Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely
taking part in Philippine elections is not sufficient evidence of
renunciation and that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation
was made when private respondent was already 37 years old, it
was ineffective as it should have been made when he reached
the age of majority.
In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private
respondent renounced his American citizenship, the
COMELEC must have in mind 349 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of the United States, which provided that A
person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth
or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . . . (e) Voting in
a political election in a foreign state or participating in an
election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign
territory. To be sure this provision was declared
unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in Afroyim v.
Rusk[16] as beyond the power given to the U.S. Congress to
regulate foreign relations. However, by filing a certificate of
candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent
elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his
American citizenship. Private respondents certificate of
candidacy, filed on March 27, 1998, contained the following
statements made under oath:
6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF NATURAL-
BORN OR NATURALIZED) NATURAL-BORN
....
10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO.
747-A, BARANGAY SAN LORENZO,
CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, PROVINCE
OF NCR .
11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR
IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.
12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE
ELECTED. I WILL SUPPORT AND DEFEND THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILL
MAINTAIN TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE
THERETO; THAT I WILL OBEY THE LAWS,
LEGAL ORDERS AND DECREES PROMULGATED
BY THE DULY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND THAT
I IMPOSE THIS OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF
VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT MENTAL
 RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION. I
HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FACTS STATED
HEREIN ARE TRUE AND CORRECT OF MY OWN
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE.
The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to
renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. Thus,
in Frivaldo v. COMELEC it was held:[17]
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo
became an American. Would the retroactivity of his
repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship,
which under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code
would disqualify him from running for any elective
local position? We answer this question in the negative,
as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really
STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance
and even before that, when he ran for governor in
1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he had long
renounced and had long abandoned his American
citizenshiplong before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo
was stateless in the interimwhen he abandoned and
renounced his US citizenship but before he was
repatriated to his Filipino citizenship.
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution
dated December 19, 1995:
By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost
his American citizenship when he took his oath of
allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran
for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995.Every
certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to
the Philippine Government.
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign
nationality long before the elections of 1995 have not
been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is
basic that such findings of the Commission are
conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of
capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse.
There is, therefore, no merit in petitioners contention that
the oath of allegiance contained in private respondents
certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute
renunciation of his American citizenship. Equally without
merit is petitioners contention that, to be effective, such
renunciation should have been made upon private respondent
reaching the age of majority since no law requires the election
of Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.
Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent
admitted that he is registered as an American citizen in the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an
American passport which he used in his last travel to the
United States on April 22, 1997. There is no merit in this. Until
the filing of his certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, he
had dual citizenship. The acts attributed to him can be
considered simply as the assertion of his American nationality
before the termination of his American citizenship. What this
Court said in Aznar v. COMELEC[18] applies mutatis
mutandis to private respondent in the case at bar:
. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was
both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he
has a Certificate stating he is an American does not
mean that he is not still a Filipino. . . . [T]he
Certification that he is an American does not mean that
he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both
nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express
renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell,
there is even no implied renunciation of said
citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation
needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be express, it
stands to reason that there can be no such loss of
Philippine citizenship when there is no renunciation,
either express or implied.
To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy
that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident
or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and
support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith
and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental
reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this
country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American
citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a
dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance
to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has
spent his youth and adulthood, received his education,
practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past
elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of
Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will
fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that
trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his
Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate
proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago,[19] we sustained the
denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that,
after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the
renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial
documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese
national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who,
in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign
nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting
renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
GAUDENCIO M. CORDORA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and GUSTAVO S.
TAMBUNTING, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus, with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
In EO Case No. 05-17, Gaudencio M. Cordora (Cordora) accused
Gustavo S. Tambunting (Tambunting) of an election offense for
violating Section 74 in relation to Section 262 of the Omnibus
Election Code. The Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC) En
Banc dismissed Cordora’s complaint in a Resolution1 dated 18
August 2006. The present petition seeks to reverse the 18 August
2006 Resolution as well as the Resolution2 dated 20 February
2007 of the COMELEC En Banc which denied Cordora’s motion
for reconsideration.
The Facts
In his complaint affidavit filed before the COMELEC Law
Department, Cordora asserted that Tambunting made false
assertions in the following items:
That Annex A [Tambunting’s Certificate of Candidacy for the 2001
elections] and Annex B [Tambunting’s Certificate of Candidacy for
the 2004 elections] state, among others, as follows, particularly
Nos. 6, 9 and 12 thereof:
1. No. 6 – I am a Natural Born/Filipino Citizen
2. No. 9 – No. of years of Residence before May 14,
2001.
36 in the Philippines and 25 in the Constituency where I
seek to be elected;
3. No. 12 – I am ELIGIBLE for the office I seek to be
elected.3 (Boldface and capitalization in the original)
Cordora stated that Tambunting was not eligible to run for local
public office because Tambunting lacked the required citizenship
and residency requirements.
To disprove Tambunting’s claim of being a natural-born Filipino
citizen, Cordora presented a certification from the Bureau of
Immigration which stated that, in two instances, Tambunting
claimed that he is an American: upon arrival in the Philippines on
16 December 2000 and upon departure from the Philippines on
17 June 2001. According to Cordora, these travel dates
confirmed that Tambunting acquired American citizenship through
naturalization in Honolulu, Hawaii on 2 December 2000. Cordora
concluded:
That Councilor Gustavo S. Tambunting contrary to the provision
of Sec 74 (OEC): [sic] Re: CONTENTS OF CERTIFICATE OF
CANDIDACY: which requires the declarant/affiant to state, among
others, under oath, that he is a Filipino (No. 6), No. 9-
residence requirement which he lost when [he was]
naturalized as an American Citizen on December 2, 2000 at [sic]
Honolulu, Hawaii, knowingly and
willfully affirmed and reiterated that he possesses the
above basic requirements under No. 12 – that he is indeed
eligible for the office to which he seeks to be elected, when in
truth and in fact, the contrary is indubitably established by his
own statements before the Philippine Bureau of Immigration x x
x.4 (Emphases in the original)
Tambunting, on the other hand, maintained that he did not make
any misrepresentation in his certificates of candidacy. To refute
Cordora’s claim that Tambunting is not a natural-born Filipino,
Tambunting presented a copy of his birth certificate which
showed that he was born of a Filipino mother and an American
father. Tambunting further denied that he was naturalized as an
American citizen. The certificate of citizenship conferred by the
US government after Tambunting’s father petitioned him through
INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative) merely confirmed
Tambunting’s citizenship which he acquired at birth.
Tambunting’s possession of an American passport did not mean
that Tambunting is not a Filipino citizen. Tambunting also took an
oath of allegiance on 18 November 2003 pursuant to Republic
Act No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225), or the Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003.
Tambunting further stated that he has resided in the Philippines
since birth. Tambunting has imbibed the Filipino culture, has
spoken the Filipino language, and has been educated in Filipino
schools. Tambunting maintained that proof of his loyalty and
devotion to the Philippines was shown by his service as councilor
of Parañaque.
To refute Cordora’s claim that the number of years of residency
stated in Tambunting’s certificates of candidacy is false because
Tambunting lost his residency because of his naturalization as an
American citizen, Tambunting contended that the residency
requirement is not the same as citizenship.
The Ruling of the COMELEC Law Department
The COMELEC Law Department recommended the dismissal of
Cordora’s complaint against Tambunting because Cordora failed
to substantiate his charges against Tambunting. Cordora’s
reliance on the certification of the Bureau of Immigration that
Tambunting traveled on an American passport is not sufficient to
prove that Tambunting is an American citizen.
The Ruling of the COMELEC En Banc
The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings and the resolution
of the COMELEC Law Department. The COMELEC En Banc was
convinced that Cordora failed to support his accusation against
Tambunting by sufficient and convincing evidence.
The dispositive portion of the COMELEC En Banc’s Resolution
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant complaint is
hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence to establish
probable cause.
SO ORDERED.5
Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento (Commissioner Sarmiento)
wrote a separate opinion which concurred with the findings of
the En Banc Resolution. Commissioner Sarmiento pointed out
that Tambunting could be considered a dual citizen. Moreover,
Tambunting effectively renounced his American citizenship when
he filed his certificates of candidacy in 2001 and 2004 and ran for
public office.
Cordora filed a motion for reconsideration which raised the same
grounds and the same arguments in his complaint. In its
Resolution promulgated on 20 February 2007, the COMELEC En
Banc dismissed Cordora’s motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit.
The Issue
Cordora submits that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
declared that there is no sufficient evidence to support probable
cause that may warrant the prosecution of Tambunting for an
election offense.
Cordora’s petition is not an action to disqualify Tambunting
because of Tambunting’s failure to meet citizenship and
residency requirements. Neither is the present petition an action
to declare Tambunting a non-Filipino and a non-resident. The
present petition seeks to prosecute Tambunting for knowingly
making untruthful statements in his certificates of candidacy.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit. We affirm the ruling of the
COMELEC En Banc.
Whether there is Probable Cause to Hold Tambunting for
Trial for Having Committed an Election Offense
There was no grave abuse of discretion in the COMELEC En
Banc’s ruling that there is no sufficient and convincing evidence
to support a finding of probable cause to hold Tambunting for trial
for violation of Section 74 in relation to Section 262 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
Probable cause constitutes those facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed. Determining probable cause is
an intellectual activity premised on the prior physical presentation
or submission of documentary or testimonial proofs either
confirming, negating or qualifying the allegations in the
complaint.6
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code reads as follows:
Contents of certificate of candidacy. — The certificate of
candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his
candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for
said office; x x x the political party to which he belongs; civil
status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all
election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will
support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the
laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or
immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his
oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of
candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
xxx
The person filing a certificate of candidacy shall also affix his
latest photograph, passport size; a statement in duplicate
containing his bio-data and program of government not exceeding
one hundred words, if he so desires.
Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other hand,
provides that violation of Section 74, among other sections in the
Code, shall constitute an election offense.
Tambunting’s Dual Citizenship
Tambunting does not deny that he is born of a Filipino mother
and an American father. Neither does he deny that he underwent
the process involved in INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative)
because of his father’s citizenship. Tambunting claims that
because of his parents’ differing citizenships, he is both Filipino
and American by birth. Cordora, on the other hand, insists that
Tambunting is a naturalized American citizen.
We agree with Commissioner Sarmiento’s observation that
Tambunting possesses dual citizenship. Because of the
circumstances of his birth, it was no longer necessary for
Tambunting to undergo the naturalization process to acquire
American citizenship. The process involved in INS Form I-130
only served to confirm the American citizenship which
Tambunting acquired at birth. The certification from the Bureau of
Immigration which Cordora presented contained two trips where
Tambunting claimed that he is an American. However, the same
certification showed nine other trips where Tambunting claimed
that he is Filipino. Clearly, Tambunting possessed dual
citizenship prior to the filing of his certificate of candidacy before
the 2001 elections. The fact that Tambunting had dual citizenship
did not disqualify him from running for public office.7
Requirements for dual citizens from birth who desire to run
for public office
We deem it necessary to reiterate our previous ruling in Mercado
v. Manzano, wherein we ruled that dual citizenship is not a
ground for disqualification from running for any elective local
position.
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance.
The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application
of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For
instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose
parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle
of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus
soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on
his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it
is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines
to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in
foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and
alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers’ country such
children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s
country the former are considered citizens, unless by their
act or omission they are deemed to have renounced
Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines
may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of another
state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the
constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which
a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to
two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual
allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition.
xxx
[I]n including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the
Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but
with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their
countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the
phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No.
7854, §20 must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall
under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance,
who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with
respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with
dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to
terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the unavoidable
consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As
Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the
Constitutional Commission, pointed out: "[D]ual citizenship is just
a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws
on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a
Filipino mother. But whether or not she is considered a citizen of
another country is something completely beyond our control."
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same
time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are
also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It
may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its
laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign
citizenship. That is of no moment as the following discussion on
§40(d) between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows:
SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification
of line 41, page 17: "Any person with dual citizenship" is
disqualified to run for any elective local position. Under the
present Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose mother is a
citizen of the Philippines but his father is a foreigner is a natural-
born citizen of the Republic. There is no requirement that such a
natural-born citizen, upon reaching the age of majority, must elect
or give up Philippine citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports,
one belonging to the country of his or her father and one
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, may such a situation
disqualify the person to run for a local government position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means
that at the moment when he would want to run for public office,
he has to repudiate one of his citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine
passport but the country of origin or the country of the father
claims that person, nevertheless, as a citizen,? No one can
renounce. There are such countries in the world. 1 av vp hi 1
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for
public office would, in effect, be an election for him of his desire to
be considered a Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the
Constitution does not require an election. Under the Constitution,
a person whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines is, at birth, a
citizen without any overt act to claim the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President,
is: Under the Gentleman’s example, if he does not renounce his
other citizenship, then he is opening himself to question. So, if he
is really interested to run, the first thing he should do is to say in
the Certificate of Candidacy that: "I am a Filipino citizen, and I
have only one citizenship."
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of
Philippine law, Mr. President. He will always have one citizenship,
and that is the citizenship invested upon him or her in the
Constitution of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he
exercises acts that will prove that he also acknowledges other
citizenships, then he will probably fall under this
disqualification.8 (Emphasis supplied)
We have to consider the present case in consonance with our
rulings in Mercado v. Manzano,9 Valles v.
COMELEC, 10 and AASJS v.
Datumanong.11 Mercado and Valles involve similar operative facts
as the present case. Manzano and Valles, like Tambunting,
possessed dual citizenship by the circumstances of their birth.
Manzano was born to Filipino parents in the United States which
follows the doctrine of jus soli. Valles was born to an Australian
mother and a Filipino father in Australia. Our rulings
in Manzano and Valles stated that dual citizenship is different
from dual allegiance both by cause and, for those desiring to run
for public office, by effect. Dual citizenship is involuntary and
arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the
different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states. Thus, like any other
natural-born Filipino, it is enough for a person with dual
citizenship who seeks public office to file his certificate of
candidacy and swear to the oath of allegiance contained therein.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, is brought about by the
individual’s active participation in the naturalization
process. AASJS states that, under R.A. No. 9225, a Filipino who
becomes a naturalized citizen of another country is allowed to
retain his Filipino citizenship by swearing to the supreme authority
of the Republic of the Philippines. The act of taking an oath of
allegiance is an implicit renunciation of a naturalized citizen’s a naturalized citizen of another country. Hence, the twin
foreign citizenship. requirements in R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to him.

R.A. No. 9225, or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act Tambunting’s residency
of 2003, was enacted years after the promulgation
of Manzano and Valles. The oath found in Section 3 of R.A. No. Cordora concluded that Tambunting failed to meet the residency
9225 reads as follows: requirement because of Tambunting’s naturalization as an
American. Cordora’s reasoning fails because Tambunting is not a
I __________ , solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and naturalized American. Moreover, residency, for the purpose of
defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and election laws, includes the twin elements of the fact of residing in
obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly a fixed place and the intention to return there permanently, 16 and
constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare is not dependent upon citizenship.
that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and In view of the above, we hold that Cordora failed to establish that
that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without Tambunting indeed willfully made false entries in his certificates
mental reservation or purpose of evasion. of candidacy. On the contrary, Tambunting sufficiently proved his
innocence of the charge filed against him. Tambunting is eligible
In Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 9225, the framers were not for the office which he sought to be elected and fulfilled the
concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of citizenship and residency requirements prescribed by law.
naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their
countries of origin even after their naturalization.12 Section 5(3) of WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the
R.A. No. 9225 states that naturalized citizens who reacquire Resolutions of the Commission on Elections En Banc dated 18
Filipino citizenship and desire to run for elective public office in August 2006 and 20 February 2007 in EO Case No. 05-17.
the Philippines shall "meet the qualifications for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws SO ORDERED.
and, at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" aside
from the oath of allegiance prescribed in Section 3 of R.A. No.
9225. The twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance
and executing a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship served as
the bases for our recent rulings in Jacot v. Dal and
COMELEC, 13 Velasco v. COMELEC,14 and Japzon v.
COMELEC, 15 all of which involve natural-born Filipinos who later
became naturalized citizens of another country and thereafter ran
for elective office in the Philippines. In the present case,
Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino, did not subsequently become
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y
CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
THE CASE
This is a Petition for Certiorari ender Rule 64 in conjunction with
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to review the Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The Resolution1 in SPA
No. 10-1 09(DC) of the COMELEC First Division dated 5 October
201 0 is being assailed for applying Section 44 of the Local
Government Code while the Resolution2 of the COMELEC En
Banc dated 2 February 2011 is being questioned for finding that
respondent Rommel Arnado y Cagoco (respondent
Arnado/Arnado) is solely a Filipino citizen qualified to run for
public office despite his continued use of a U.S. passport.
FACTS
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.3 However,
as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of
the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship.
Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San
Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines on 10 July 2008.4 On the same day an Order of
Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was
issued in his favor.5
The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will support and
defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and
obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities of the Philippines and I hereby declare that
I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines
and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I
impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion.6
On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign
citizenship, which states:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I absolutely
and perpetually renounce all allegiance and fidelity to the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA of which I am a citizen, and I
divest myself of full employment of all civil and political rights and
privileges of the United States of America.
I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true and
correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.7
On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy
for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, which contains,
among others, the following statements:
I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino citizen.
I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign
country.
I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.
I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. I
will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the
duly constituted authorities.
I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion.8
On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another
mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to
cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010
local and national elections.9
Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching
thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated
23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-
American."10To further bolster his claim of Arnado’s US
citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-
generated travel record11 dated 03 December 2009 indicating that
Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in
entering and departing the Philippines. The said record shows
that Arnado left the country on 14 April 2009 and returned on 25
June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009, arriving back in
the Philippines on 24 November 2009.
Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of
Immigration dated 23 April 2010, certifying that the name
"Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in the available Computer
Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April
2010, with the following pertinent travel records:
DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 057782700
DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 05778270012
On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an
Order13 requiring the respondent to personally file his answer and
memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof.
After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare
him in default and to present evidence ex-parte.
Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the
2010 elections where Arnado garnered the highest number of
votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate
for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified
answer, submitting the following documents as evidence:14
1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines dated 03 April 2009;
2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno,
Virginia Branzuela, Leoncio Daligdig, and Jessy Corpin,
all neighbors of Arnado, attesting that Arnado is a long-
time resident of Kauswagan and that he has been
conspicuously and continuously residing in his family’s
ancestral house in Kauswagan;
3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion,
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte dated 03 June 2010 stating
that Arnado is a bona fide resident of his barangay and
that Arnado went to the United States in 1985 to work and
returned to the Philippines in 2009;
4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the Municipal
Local Government Operations Office of Kauswagan
stating that Dr. Maximo P. Arnado, Sr. served as Mayor of
 Kauswagan, from January 1964 to June 1974 and from
15 February 1979 to 15 April 1986; and
5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of
Kauswagan certifying that Arnado has been a registered
voter of Kauswagan since 03 April 2009.
THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION
Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of
a certificate of candidacy based on misrepresentation,15 the
COMELEC First Division considered it as one for disqualification.
Balua’s contention that Arnado is a resident of the United States
was dismissed upon the finding that "Balua failed to present any
evidence to support his contention,"16 whereas the First Division
still could "not conclude that Arnado failed to meet the one-year
residency requirement under the Local Government Code."17
In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First
Division disagreed with Arnado’s claim that he is a Filipino
citizen.18
We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially
complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225, Arnado’s act of
consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US
citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of
Renunciation.
xxxx
Arnado’s continued use of his US passport is a strong indication
that Arnado had no real intention to renounce his US citizenship
and that he only executed an Affidavit of Renunciation to enable
him to run for office. We cannot turn a blind eye to the glaring
inconsistency between Arnado’s unexplained use of a US
passport six times and his claim that he re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship and renounced his US citizenship. As noted by the
Supreme Court in the Yu case, "a passport is defined as an
official document of identity and nationality issued to a person
intending to travel or sojourn in foreign countries." Surely, one
who truly divested himself of US citizenship would not continue to
avail of privileges reserved solely for US nationals.19
The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the
COMELEC
First Division reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for
disqualification and/or to cancel the certificate of candidacy of
Rommel C. Arnado is hereby GRANTED. Rommel C. Arnado’s
proclamation as the winning candidate for Municipal Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Nore is hereby ANNULLED. Let the order
of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code of
1991 take effect.20
The Motion for Reconsideration and
the Motion for Intervention
Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the
COMELEC En Banc on the ground that "the evidence is
insufficient to justify the Resolution and that the said Resolution is
contrary to law."21 He raised the following contentions:22
1. The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not
supported by the evidence consisting of his Oath of
Allegiance and the Affidavit of Renunciation, which show
that he has substantially complied with the requirements
of R.A. No. 9225;
2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his
renunciation of his American citizenship is not tantamount
to a repudiation of his Filipino citizenship, as he did not
 perform any act to swear allegiance to a country other
than the Philippines;
3. He used his US passport only because he was not
informed of the issuance of his Philippine passport, and
that he used his Philippine passport after he obtained it;
4. Balua’s petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of
Arnado was filed out of time, and the First Division’s
treatment of the petition as one for disqualification
constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
of jurisdiction;23
5. He is undoubtedly the people’s choice as indicated by
his winning the elections;
6. His proclamation as the winning candidate ousted the
COMELEC from jurisdiction over the case; and
7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is
through a petition for quo warranto, which should have
been filed within ten days from his proclamation.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another
candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who garnered the
second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened
in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for
Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnado’s
Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that
while the First Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of
succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code is
not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the
cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy and the nullification of his
proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who
obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be
proclaimed as the winner.
Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his Motion
for Intervention and his Motion for Reconsideration. Arnado
opposed all motions filed by Maquiling, claiming that intervention
is prohibited after a decision has already been rendered, and that
as a second-placer, Maquiling undoubtedly lost the elections and
thus does not stand to be prejudiced or benefitted by the final
adjudication of the case.
RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC
In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc
held that under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, the
Commission "shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest even after the proclamation of the
candidate whose qualifications for office is questioned."
As to Maquiling’s intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also cited
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which allows intervention in
proceedings for disqualification even after elections if no final
judgment has been rendered, but went on further to say that
Maquiling, as the second placer, would not be prejudiced by the
outcome of the case as it agrees with the dispositive portion of
the Resolution of the First Division allowing the order of
succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code to
take effect.
The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First
Division of the petition as one for disqualification, and ruled that
the petition was filed well within the period prescribed by
law,24 having been filed on 28 April 2010, which is not later than
11 May 2010, the date of proclamation.
However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the
ruling of the First Division and granted Arnado’s Motion for
Reconsideration, on the following premises:
First:
By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225,
the respondent embraced his Philippine citizenship as though he
never became a citizen of another country. It was at that time,
April 3, 2009, that the respondent became a pure Philippine
Citizen again.
xxxx
The use of a US passport … does not operate to revert back his
status as a dual citizen prior to his renunciation as there is no law
saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport does not
operate to "un-renounce" what he has earlier on renounced. The
First Division’s reliance in the case of In Re: Petition for Habeas
Corpus of Willy Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, et al. is misplaced. The
petitioner in the said case is a naturalized citizen who, after taking
his oath as a naturalized Filipino, applied for the renewal of his
Portuguese passport. Strict policy is maintained in the conduct of
citizens who are not natural born, who acquire their citizenship by
choice, thus discarding their original citizenship. The Philippine
State expects strict conduct of allegiance to those who choose to
be its citizens. In the present case, respondent is not a
naturalized citizen but a natural born citizen who chose greener
pastures by working abroad and then decided to repatriate to
supposedly help in the progress of Kauswagan. He did not apply
for a US passport after his renunciation. Thus the mentioned case
is not on all fours with the case at bar.
xxxx
The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to the use
of his US passport. Although he applied for a Philippine passport,
the passport was only issued on June 18, 2009. However, he was
not notified of the issuance of his Philippine passport so that he
was actually able to get it about three (3) months later. Yet as
soon as he was in possession of his Philippine passport, the
respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels
abroad. This fact is proven by the respondent’s submission of a
certified true copy of his passport showing that he used the same
for his travels on the following dates: January 31, 2010, April 16,
2010, May 20, 2010, January 12, 2010, March 31, 2010 and June
4, 2010. This then shows that the use of the US passport was
because to his knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet
issued to him for his use. As probably pressing needs might be
undertaken, the respondent used whatever is within his control
during that time.25
In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman Sixto
Brillantes cited that the use of foreign passport is not one of the
grounds provided for under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No.
63 through which Philippine citizenship may be lost.
"The application of the more assimilative principle of continuity of
citizenship is more appropriate in this case. Under said principle,
once a person becomes a citizen, either by birth or naturalization,
it is assumed that he desires to continue to be a citizen, and this
assumption stands until he voluntarily denationalizes or
expatriates himself. Thus, in the instant case respondent after
reacquiring his Philippine citizenship should be presumed to have
remained a Filipino despite his use of his American passport in
the absence of clear, unequivocal and competent proof of
expatriation. Accordingly, all doubts should be resolved in favor of
retention of citizenship."26
On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented,
thus:
Respondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and
wholeheartedly abandoned his allegiance to the United States.
The latter’s continued use of his US passport and enjoyment of all
the privileges of a US citizen despite his previous renunciation of
the afore-mentioned citizenship runs contrary to his declaration
that he chose to retain only his Philippine citizenship.
Respondent’s submission with the twin requirements was
obviously only for the purpose of complying with the requirements
for running for the mayoralty post in connection with the May 10,
2010 Automated National and Local Elections.
Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are
continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during his
incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. If a
candidate is not a citizen at the time he ran for office or if he lost
his citizenship after his election to office, he is disqualified to
serve as such. Neither does the fact that respondent obtained the
plurality of votes for the mayoralty post cure the latter’s failure to
comply with the qualification requirements regarding his
citizenship.
Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of
the law, his having received the highest number of votes does not
validate his election. It has been held that where a petition for
disqualification was filed before election against a candidate but
was adversely resolved against him after election, his having
obtained the highest number of votes did not make his election
valid. His ouster from office does not violate the principle of vox
populi suprema est lex because the application of the
constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a
matter of popularity. To apply it is to breath[e] life to the sovereign
will of the people who expressed it when they ratified the
Constitution and when they elected their representatives who
enacted the law.27
THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT
Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of
declaring Arnado qualified to run for public office despite his
continued use of a US passport, and praying that Maquiling be
proclaimed as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible error on
the part of the COMELEC En Banc for ruling that Arnado is a
Filipino citizen despite his continued use of a US passport,
Maquiling now seeks to reverse the finding of the COMELEC En
Banc that Arnado is qualified to run for public office.
Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the COMELEC En
Banc or to affirm the First Division’s disqualification of Arnado,
Maquiling also seeks the review of the applicability of Section 44
of the Local Government Code, claiming that the COMELEC
committed reversible error in ruling that "the succession of the
vice mayor in case the respondent is disqualified is in order."
There are three questions posed by the parties before this Court
which will be addressed seriatim as the subsequent questions
hinge on the result of the first.
The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed in a
disqualification case.
The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign
passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to undoing
a renunciation earlier made.
A better framing of the question though should be whether or not
the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship
affects one’s qualifications to run for public office.
The third question is whether or not the rule on succession in the
Local Government Code is applicable to this case.
OUR RULING
Intervention of a rival candidate in a
disqualification case is proper when
there has not yet been any
proclamation of the winner.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage when
respondent Arnado filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the First
Division Resolution before the COMELEC En Banc. As the
candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes,
Maquiling contends that he has an interest in the disqualification
case filed against Arnado, considering that in the event the latter
is disqualified, the votes cast for him should be considered stray
and the second-placer should be proclaimed as the winner in the
elections.
It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the
COMELEC is one for cancellation of the certificate of candidacy
and / or disqualification, the COMELEC First Division and the
COMELEC En Banc correctly treated the petition as one for
disqualification.
The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of
R.A. No. 6646:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has
been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for
any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before
an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong.
Mercado v. Manzano 28
clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In that
case, the Court said:
That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the
proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is
clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides: Any candidate
who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted.
If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court
or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of guilt is strong. Under this provision, intervention may
be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if
there has yet been no final judgment rendered.29
Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The
fact that the COMELEC En Banc has already ruled that Maquiling
has not shown that the requisites for the exemption to the
second-placer rule set forth in Sinsuat v. COMELEC30 are present
and therefore would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the
case, does not deprive Maquiling of the right to elevate the matter
before this Court.
Arnado’s claim that the main case has attained finality as the
original petitioner and respondents therein have not appealed the
decision of the COMELEC En Banc, cannot be sustained. The
elevation of the case by the intervenor prevents it from attaining
finality. It is only after this Court has ruled upon the issues raised
in this instant petition that the disqualification case originally filed
by Balua against Arnado will attain finality.
The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign
citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation
as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest
Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the
Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an
elective position.
Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act
of 2003 provides:
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this
Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the
qualification for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.
x x x31
Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for
a public office. He took the Oath of Allegiance and renounced his
foreign citizenship. There is no question that after performing
these twin requirements required under Section 5(2) of R.A. No.
9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003,
he became eligible to run for public office.
Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but
twice: first, on 10 July 2008 when he applied for repatriation
before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco,
USA, and again on 03 April 2009 simultaneous with the execution
of his Affidavit of Renunciation. By taking the Oath of Allegiance
to the Republic, Arnado re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. At
the time, however, he likewise possessed American citizenship.
Arnado had therefore become a dual citizen.
After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his
American citizenship by executing an Affidavit of Renunciation,
thus completing the requirements for eligibility to run for public
office.
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be
solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such
renunciation under the laws of the foreign country.32
However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently
and is open to attack when, after renouncing the foreign
citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his
continued possession of a foreign citizenship.33
Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack
when, after renouncing his foreign citizenship, he continued to
use his US passport to travel in and out of the country before
filing his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009. The
pivotal question to determine is whether he was solely and
exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his certificate of
candidacy, thereby rendering him eligible to run for public office.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign
citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he
used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the
affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his
foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented
himself as an American, in effect declaring before immigration
authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with
all attendant rights and privileges granted by the United States of
America.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that
can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated the next
day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the
foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political
rights granted by the foreign country which granted the
citizenship.
Mercado v. Manzano 34 already hinted at this situation when the
Court declared:
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his
undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there
are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine
citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu
v. Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into the
country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a
naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese
passport and declared in commercial documents executed
abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can
be taken against anyone who, in electing Philippine citizenship,
renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some
act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts
enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting
renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship,35 it is nevertheless
an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for
a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to
be qualified to run for a local elective position.
When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just
eleven days after he renounced his American citizenship, he
recanted his Oath of Renunciation36 that he "absolutely and
perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA" 37 and that he "divest(s) himself of full
employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the
United States of America."38
We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a
foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship,
which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing
himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively
reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was
not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented
himself as an American citizen by using his US passport.
This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign
citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for public office, as it effectively
imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local
position.
Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign
citizenship is acquired through a positive act of applying for
naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens
by virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the oath of
renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy
already carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign
citizenship.39 Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other hand,
are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce
foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for public
office.
By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November
2009, Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges
of Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but
by the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code, 40 he was not qualified to run for a local
elective position.
In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only
for a period of eleven days, or from 3 April 2009 until 14 April
2009, on which date he first used his American passport after
renouncing his American citizenship.
This Court has previously ruled that:
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and
must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election
or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once
any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be
seasonably challenged. x x x.41
The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a
continuing one. It must be possessed not just at the time of the
renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act
which violates the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship
issue to attack.
We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First
Division that "Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport
effectively negated his "Affidavit of Renunciation."42 This does not
mean, that he failed to comply with the twin requirements under
R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did.
It was after complying with the requirements that he performed
positive acts which effectively disqualified him from running for an
elective public office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code of 1991.
The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual
citizens from running for any elective public office would be
thwarted if we were to allow a person who has earlier renounced
his foreign citizenship, but who subsequently represents himself
as a foreign citizen, to hold any public office.
Arnado justifies the continued use of his US passport with the
explanation that he was not notified of the issuance of his
Philippine passport on 18 June 2009, as a result of which he was
only able to obtain his Philippine passport three (3) months
later.43
The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from Willy Yu, the
Portuguese national who sought naturalization as a Filipino
citizen and later applied for the renewal of his Portuguese
passport. That Arnado did not apply for a US passport after his
renunciation does not make his use of a US passport less of an
act that violated the Oath of Renunciation he took. It was still a
positive act of representation as a US citizen before the
immigration officials of this country.
The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated "Yet, as
soon as he was in possession of his Philippine passport, the
respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels
abroad."44 We cannot agree with the COMELEC. Three months
from June is September. If indeed, Arnado used his Philippine
passport as soon as he was in possession of it, he would not
have used his US passport on 24 November 2009.
Besides, Arnado’s subsequent use of his Philippine passport
does not correct the fact that after he renounced his foreign
citizenship and prior to filing his certificate of candidacy, he used
his US passport. In the same way that the use of his foreign
passport does not undo his Oath of Renunciation, his subsequent
use of his Philippine passport does not undo his earlier use of his
US passport.
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity
that comes with attendant civil and political rights accorded by the
state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to
maintain allegiance to one’s flag and country. While those who
acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right of
suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public office
are required to renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving
of the public trust. Holding public office demands full and
undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after
renouncing his American citizenship, has recanted the same Oath
of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government
Code applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from
holding the public office but even from becoming a candidate in
the May 2010 elections.
We now resolve the next issue.
Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v.
Paredes45 which is the jurisprudential spring of the principle that a
second-placer cannot be proclaimed as the winner in an election
contest. This doctrine must be re-examined and its soundness
once again put to the test to address the ever-recurring issue that
a second-placer who loses to an ineligible candidate cannot be
proclaimed as the winner in the elections.
The Facts of the case are as follows:
On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of Imus,
Province of Cavite, to fill the office of municipal president. The
petitioner, Felipe Topacio, and the respondent, Maximo Abad,
were opposing candidates for that office. Topacio received 430
votes, and Abad 281. Abad contested the election upon the sole
ground that Topacio was ineligible in that he was reelected the
second time to the office of the municipal president on June 4,
1912, without the four years required by Act No. 2045 having
intervened. 46
Abad thus questioned the eligibility of To p a c i o on the basis of
a statutory prohibition for seeking a second re-election absent the
four year interruption.
The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the
wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible
candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the
eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast
ballots."47
This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter
dictum. The Court was comparing "the effect of a decision that a
candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or
irregularities in the elections x x x with that produced by declaring
a person ineligible to hold such an office."
The complete sentence where the phrase is found is part of a
comparison and contrast between the two situations, thus:
Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to
the office because of fraud or irregularities in the elections is quite
different from that produced by declaring a person ineligible to
hold such an office. In the former case the court, after an
examination of the ballots may find that some other person than
the candidate declared to have received a plurality by the board
of canvassers actually received the greater number of votes, in
which case the court issues its mandamus to the board of
canvassers to correct the returns accordingly; or it may find that
the manner of holding the election and the returns are so tainted
with fraud or illegality that it cannot be determined who received a
plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the latter case, no question
as to the correctness of the returns or the manner of casting and
counting the ballots is before the deciding power, and generally
the only result can be that the election fails entirely. In the former,
we have a contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the
opposing parties are striving for supremacy. If it be found that the
successful candidate (according to the board of canvassers)
obtained a plurality in an illegal manner, and that another
candidate was the real victor, the former must retire in favor of the
latter. In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest,
as the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible
candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the
eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots.
In the one case the question is as to who received a plurality of
the legally cast ballots; in the other, the question is confined to
the personal character and circumstances of a single
individual.48 (Emphasis supplied)
Note that the sentence where the phrase is found starts with "In
the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest" in
contrast to the earlier statement, "In the former, we have a
contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the opposing
parties are striving for supremacy."
The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to have held that
"the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible
candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the
eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast
ballots."
A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that
since the Court of First Instance is without jurisdiction to try a
disqualification case based on the eligibility of the person who
obtained the highest number of votes in the election, its
jurisdiction being confined "to determine which of the contestants
has been duly elected" the judge exceeded his jurisdiction when
he "declared that no one had been legally elected president of the
municipality of Imus at the general election held in that town on 4
June 1912" where "the only question raised was whether or not
Topacio was eligible to be elected and to hold the office of
municipal president."
The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that
Abad as the second placer cannot be proclaimed in his stead.
The Court therein ruled:
For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold that
the respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction in declaring in
those proceedings that no one was elected municipal president of
the municipality of Imus at the last general election; and that said
order and all subsequent proceedings based thereon are null and
void and of no effect; and, although this decision is rendered on
respondents' answer to the order to show cause, unless
respondents raised some new and additional issues, let judgment
be entered accordingly in 5 days, without costs. So ordered. 49
On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of decisions
does not even have a legal basis to stand on. It was a mere
pronouncement of the Court comparing one process with another
and explaining the effects thereof. As an independent statement,
it is even illogical.
Let us examine the statement:
"x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an
ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole
question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the
legally cast ballots."
What prevents the transfer of the wreath of victory from the
ineligible candidate to another candidate?
When the issue being decided upon by the Court is the eligibility
of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots and
ineligibility is thereafter established, what stops the Court from
adjudging another eligible candidate who received the next
highest number of votes as the winner and bestowing upon him
that "wreath?"
An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes
is a wrongful winner. By express legal mandate, he could not
even have been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the
lack of material time or any other intervening circumstances, his
ineligibility might not have been passed upon prior to election
date. Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to hold
himself out to the electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified
candidate. However, notwithstanding the outcome of the
elections, his ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged.
Ineligibility does not only pertain to his qualifications as a
candidate but necessarily affects his right to hold public office.
The number of ballots cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of
failure to qualify with the substantive legal requirements of
eligibility to run for public office.
The popular vote does not cure the
ineligibility of a candidate.
The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory
requirements for qualifications and disqualifications of candidates.
When the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or
that certain disqualifications be not possessed by persons
desiring to serve as elective public officials, those qualifications
must be met before one even becomes a candidate. When a
person who is not qualified is voted for and eventually garners the
highest number of votes, even the will of the electorate expressed
through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of
the candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample upon and rent
asunder the very law that sets forth the qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates. We might as well write off our
election laws if the voice of the electorate is the sole determinant
of who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions
in our republic.
This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in Frivaldo
v. COMELEC50 when we pronounced:
x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon
does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting
public office and employment only to the citizens of this country.
The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased
by the electorate alone.
The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot
cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed,
as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this
rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of
citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the
Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only,
abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other
state.51 (Emphasis supplied)
This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco v.
COMELEC52 where the Court ruled that the ruling in Quizon and
Saya-ang cannot be interpreted without qualifications lest
"Election victory x x x becomes a magic formula to bypass
election eligibility requirements."53
We have ruled in the past that a candidate’s victory in the election
may be considered a sufficient basis to rule in favor of the
candidate sought to be disqualified if the main issue involves
defects in the candidate’s certificate of candidacy. We said that
while provisions relating to certificates of candidacy are
mandatory in terms, it is an established rule of interpretation as
regards election laws, that mandatory provisions requiring certain
steps before elections will be construed as directory after the
elections, to give effect to the will of the people. We so ruled in
Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-ang v. COMELEC:
The present case perhaps presents the proper time and
opportunity to fine-tune our above ruling. We say this with the
realization that a blanket and unqualified reading and application
of this ruling can be fraught with dangerous significance for the
rule of law and the integrity of our elections. For one, such
blanket/unqualified reading may provide a way around the law
that effectively negates election requirements aimed at providing
the electorate with the basic information to make an informed
choice about a candidate’s eligibility and fitness for office.
The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is
made is Section 39 of the LGC which specifies the basic
qualifications of local government officials. Equally susceptive of
being rendered toothless is Section 74 of the OEC that sets out
what should be stated in a COC. Section 78 may likewise be
emasculated as mere delay in the resolution of the petition to
cancel or deny due course to a COC can render a Section 78
petition useless if a candidate with false COC data wins. To state
the obvious, candidates may risk falsifying their COC
qualifications if they know that an election victory will cure any
defect that their COCs may have. Election victory then becomes
a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements.
(Citations omitted)
What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from filing a
seemingly valid COC, concealing any disqualification, and
employing every strategy to delay any disqualification case filed
against him so he can submit himself to the electorate and win, if
winning the election will guarantee a disregard of constitutional
and statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of
candidates?
It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice
through the ballot by ensuring that its exercise respects the rule
of law. To allow the sovereign voice spoken through the ballot to
trump constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates is not democracy or republicanism.
It is electoral anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and only
the electorate’s voice spoken through the ballot is made to matter
in the end, it precisely serves as an open invitation for electoral
anarchy to set in.
1 â wp h i1
Maquiling is not a second-placer as
he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified
candidates.
With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the
winner in the election as he obtained the highest number of votes
from among the qualified candidates.
We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC 54 and
Jalosjos v. COMELEC 55 that a void COC cannot produce any
legal effect.
Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not
considered at all in determining the winner of an election.
Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded,
the will of the electorate is still respected, and even more so. The
votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the
sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast
in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that
voice and must also be respected.
As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine
the qualifications and disqualifications of those who are allowed
to participate as players. When there are participants who turn
out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is
awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any of the
disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules
to be eligible as candidates.
There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v.
COMELEC56 that when the voters are well aware within the realm
of notoriety of a candidate’s disqualification and still cast their
votes in favor said candidate, then the eligible candidate
obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed
elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further complicated
the rules affecting qualified candidates who placed second to
ineligible ones.
The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is
not a prerequisite for the disqualification to attach to the
candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance
makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a
candidate’s disqualification is not necessary before a qualified
candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be
proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in the vote count is
actually the first-placer among the qualified candidates.
That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and
has assumed office is of no moment. The subsequent
disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior
to the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC
but also the proclamation.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who
has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not
be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for
any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before
an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong.
There was no chance for Arnado’s proclamation to be suspended
under this rule because Arnado failed to file his answer to the
petition seeking his disqualification. Arnado only filed his Answer
on 15 June 2010, long after the elections and after he was
already proclaimed as the winner.
The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s candidacy
involves his citizenship. It does not involve the commission of
election offenses as provided for in the first sentence of Section
68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to
disqualify the individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he
has already been elected, from holding the office.
The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship.
As earlier discussed, Arnado was both a Filipino and an American
citizen when he filed his certificate of candidacy. He was a dual
citizen disqualified to run for public office based on Section 40(d)
of the Local Government Code.
Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are
disqualified from running for any elective local position." The
prohibition serves as a bar against the individuals who fall under
any of the enumeration from participating as candidates in the
election.
With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his
certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning.
It could not have produced any other legal effect except that
Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior to
the elections because he filed his answer to the petition when the
elections were conducted already and he was already proclaimed
the winner.
To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory
character of the disqualification which Arnado possessed even
prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The affirmation of
Arnado's disqualification, although made long after the elections,
reaches back to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is
declared to be not a candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections.
Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should
not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore,
the rule on succession under the Local Government Code will not
apply.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED.
The Resolution of the COMELEC En Bane dated 2 February
2011 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent
ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO is disqualified from running for
any local elective position. CASAN MACODE MAQUILING is
hereby DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte in the 10 May 2010 elections.
This Decision is immediately executory.
Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties
and the Commission on Elections.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO LONZANIDA, petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON
ELECTION and EUFEMIO
MULI, repondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court seeks to set aside the resolutions issued by the
COMELEC First Division dated May 21, 1998 and by the
COMELEC En Banc dated August 11, 1998 in SPA 98-190
entitled, In the matter of the Petition to Disqualify Mayoralty
Candidate Romeo Lonzanida of San Antonio,
Zambales. Eufemio Muli, petitioner, vs. Romeo Lonzanida,
respondent. The assailed resolutions declared herein petitioner
Romeo Lonzanida disqualified to run for Mayor in the
municipality of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 1998
elections and that all votes cast in his favor shall not be counted
and if he has been proclaimed winner the said proclamation is
declared null and void.
Petitioner Romeo Lonzanida was duly elected and served
two consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales prior to the May 8, 1995 elections. In the May 1995
elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales
and was again proclaimed winner. He assumed office and
discharged the duties thereof. His proclamation in 1995 was
however contested by his then opponent Juan Alvez who filed
an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of
Zambales, which in a decision dated January 9, 1997 declared a
failure of elections. The court ruled:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this court hereby renders
judgment declaring the results of the election for the
office of the mayor in San Antonio, Zambales last May
8, 1995 as null and void on the ground that there was a
failure of election.
Accordingly, the office of the mayor of the Municipality
of San Antonio, Zambales is hereby declared vacant.
Both parties appealed to the COMELEC. On November 13,
1997 the COMELEC resolved the election protest filed by
Alvez and after a revision and re-appreciation of the contested
ballots declared Alvez the duly elected mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales by plurality of votes cast in his favor totaling 1,720
votes as against 1,488 votes for Lonzanida. On February 27,
1998 the COMELEC issued a writ of execution ordering
Lonzanida to vacate the post, which obeyed, and Alvez
assumed office for the remainder of the term.
In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again filed his
certificate of candidacy for mayor of San Antonio. On April
21, 1998 his opponent Eufemio Muli timely filed a petition to
disqualify Lonzanida from running for mayor of San Antonio
in the 1998 elections on the ground that he had served three
consecutive terms in the same post. On May 13, 1998,
petitioner Lonzanida was proclaimed winner. On May 21, 1998
the First Division of the COMELEC issued the questioned
resolution granting the petition for disqualification upon a
finding that Lonzanida had served three consecutive terms as
mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and he is therefore
disqualified to run for the same post for the fourth time. The
COMELEC found that Lonzanidas assumption of office by
virtue of his proclamation in May 1995, although he was later
unseated before the expiration of the term, should be counted
as service for one full term in computing the three term limit
under the Constitution and the Local Government Code. The
finding of the COMELEC First Division was affirmed by the
COMELEC En Banc in a resolution dated August 11, 1998.
Petitioner Lonzanida challenges the validity of the
COMELEC resolutions finding him disqualified to run for
mayor of San Antonio Zambales in the 1998 elections. He
maintains that he was duly elected mayor for only two
consecutive terms and that his assumption of office in 1995
cannot be counted as service of a term for the purpose of
applying the three term limit for local government officials,
because he was not the duly elected mayor of San Antonio in
the May 1995 elections as evidenced by the COMELEC
decision dated November 13, 1997 in EAC no. 6-97 entitled
Juan Alvez, Protestant-Appellee vs. Romeo Lonzanida,
Protestee-Appellant, wherein the COMELEC declared Juan
Alvez as the duly elected mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales. Petitioner also argues that the COMELEC ceased to
have jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification after he
was proclaimed winner in the 1998 mayoral elections; as the
proper remedy is a petition for quo warranto with the
appropriate regional trial court under Rule 36 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Private respondent Eufemio Muli filed comment to the
petition asking this court to sustain the questioned resolutions
of the COMELEC and to uphold its jurisdiction over the
petition for disqualification.The private respondent states that
the petition for disqualification was filed on April 21, 1998 or
before the May 1998 mayoral elections. Under section 6, RA
6646 and Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
petitions for disqualification filed with the COMELEC before
the elections and/or proclamation of the party sought to be
disqualified may still be herd and decided by the COMELEC
after the election and proclamation of the said party without
distinction as to the alleged ground for disqualification,
whether for acts constituting an election offense or for
ineligibility. Accordingly, it is argued that the resolutions of
the COMELEC on the merits of the petition for disqualification
were issued within the commissions jurisdiction. As regards
the merits of the case, the private respondent maintains that the
petitioners assumption of office in 1995 should be considered
as service of one full term because he discharged the duties of
mayor for almost three years until March 1, 1998 or barely a
few months before the next mayoral elections.
The Solicitor-General filed comment to the petition for the
respondent COMELEC praying for the dismissal of the
petition. The Solicitor-General stressed that section 8, Art. X of
the Constitution and section 43 (b), Chapter I of the Local
Government Code which bar a local government official from
serving more than three consecutive terms in the same position
speaks of service of a term and so the rule should be examined
in this light. The public respondent contends that petitioner
Lonzanida discharged the rights and duties of mayor from 1995
to 1998 which should be counted as service of one full term,
albeit he was later unseated, because he served as mayor for the
greater part of the term. The issue of whether or not Lonzanida
served as a de jure or de facto mayor for the 1995-1998 term is
inconsequential in the application of the three term limit
because the prohibition speaks of service of a term which was
intended by the framers of the Constitution to foil any attempt
to monopolize political power. It is likewise argued by the
respondent that a petition for quo warranto with the regional
trial court is proper when the petition for disqualification is
filed after the elections and so the instant petition for
disqualification which was filed before the elections may be
resolved by the COMELEC thereafter regardless of the
imputed basis of disqualification.
The petitioner filed Reply to the comment. It is maintained
that the petitioner could not have served a valid term from
1995 to 1998 although he assumed office as mayor for that
period because he was no t lawfully elected to the said
office. Moreover, the petitioner was unseated before the
expiration of the term and so his service for the period cannot
be considered as one full term. As regards the issue of
jurisdiction, the petitioner reiterated in his Reply that the
COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction to hear the election
protest after the petitioners proclamation.
The petition has merit.
Section 8, Art. X of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials,
except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law shall be three years and no such officials shall serve
for more than three consecutive terms.Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Section 43 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No.
7160) restates the same rule:
Sec. 43. Term of Office.
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
service for the full term for which the elective official
concerned was elected.
The issue before us is whether petitioner Lonzanidas
assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales from
May 1995 to March 1998 may be considered as service of one
full term for the purpose of applying the three-term limit for
elective local government officials.
The records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show
that the three-term limit which is now embodied in section 8,
Art. X of the Constitution was initially proposed to be an
absolute bar to any elective local government official from
running for the same position after serving three consecutive
terms. The said disqualification was primarily intended to
forestall the accumulation of massive political power by an
elective local government official in a given locality in order to
perpetuate his tenure in office. The delegates also considered
the need to broaden the choices of the electorate of the
candidates who will run for office, and to infuse new blood in
the political arena by disqualifying officials from running for
the same office after a term of nine years. The mayor was
compared by some delegates to the President of the Republic as
he is a powerful chief executive of his political territory and is
most likely to form a political dynasty.[1] The drafters however,
recognized and took note of the fact that some local
government officials run for office before they reach forty
years of age; thus to perpetually bar them from running for the
same office after serving nine consecutive years may deprive
the people of qualified candidates to choose from. As finally
voted upon, it was agreed that an elective local government
official should be barred from running for the same post after
three consecutive terms. After a hiatus of at least one term, he
may again run for the same office.[2]
The scope of the constitutional provision barring elective
officials with the exception of barangay officials from serving
more than three consecutive terms was discussed at length in
the case of Benjamin Borja, Jr., vs. COMELEC and Jose
Capco, Jr.[3] where the issue raised was whether a vice-mayor
who succeeds to the office of the mayor by operation of law
upon the death of the incumbent mayor and served the
remainder of the term should be considered to have served a
term in that office for the purpose of computing the three term
limit. This court pointed out that from the discussions of the
Constitutional Convention it is evident that the delegates
proceeded from the premise that the officials assumption of
office is by reason of election. This Court stated:[4]
Two ideas emerge from a consideration of the
proceedings of the Constitutional Commission. The first
is the notion of service of term, derived from the
concern about the accumulation of power as a result of a
prolonged stay in office. The second is the idea of
election, derived from the concern that the right of the
people to choose those whom they wish to govern them
be preserved.
It is likewise noteworthy that, in discussing term limits,
the drafters of the Constitution did so on the assumption
that the officials concerned were serving by reason of
election. This is clear from the following exchange in
the Constitutional Commission concerning term limits,
now embodied in Art. VI sections 4 and 7 of the
Constitution, for members of Congress:
MR. GASCON. I would like to ask a question with regard to the
issue after the second term. We will allow the Senator to rest
for a period of time before he can run again?
MR. DAVIDE. That is correct.
MR. GASCON. And the question that we left behind before-if the
Gentlemen will remember-was: How long will that period of
rest be? Will it be one election which is three years or one
term which is six years?
MR. DAVIDE. If the Gentlemen will remember, Commissioner
Rodrigo expressed the view that during
the election following the expiration of the first 12 years,
whether such election will be on the third year or on the
sixth year thereafter, his particular member of the Senate
can run. So it is not really a period of hibernation for six
years. That was the Committees stand.
xxxx xxxx xxxx
Second, not only historical examination but textual
analysis as well supports the ruling of the COMELEC
that Art X, section 8 contemplates service by local
officials for three consecutive terms as a result of
election. The first sentence speaks of the term of office
of elective local officials and bars such officials from
serving for more than three consecutive terms. The
second sentence, in explaining when an elective official
may be deemed to have served his full term of office,
states that voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected. The term served must therefore
be one for which the the official concerned was elected.
The purpose of the provision is to prevent a
circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms
an elective official may serve.
This Court held that two conditions for the application of the
disqualification must concur: 1) that the official concerned has
been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post and 2) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms. It stated:
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials
must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well
as the right to serve in the same elective
position. Consequently, it is not enough that an
individual has served three consecutive terms in an
elective local office, he must also have been elected to
the same position for the same number of times before
the disqualification can apply.
It is not disputed that the petitioner was previously elected
and served two consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio
Zambales prior to the May 1995 mayoral elections. In the May
1995 elections he again ran for mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales and was proclaimed winner. He assumed office and
discharged the rights and duties of mayor until March 1998
when he was ordered to vacate the post by reason of the
COMELEC decision dated November 13, 1997 on the election
protest against the petitioner which declared his opponent Juan
Alvez, the duly elected mayor of San Antonio. Alvez served
the remaining portion of the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
The two requisites for the application of the three term rule
are absent. First, the petitioner cannot be considered as having
been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and
second, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998
mayoral term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of
office. After a re-appreciation and revision of the contested
ballots the COMELEC itself declared by final judgment that
petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections
and his previous proclamation as winner was declared null and
void. His assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to
have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void
proclamation. It has been repeatedly held by this court that a
proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation at
all[5] and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office on
the strength of the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he
is only a presumptive winner who assumes office subject to the
final outcome of the election protest.[6] Petitioner Lonzanida did
not serve a term as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales from May
1995 to March 1998 because he was not duly elected to the
post; he merely assumed office as presumptive winner, which
presumption was later overturned by the COMELEC when it
decided with finality that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995
mayoral elections.
Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served
the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate
his post before the expiration of the term. The respondents
contention that the petitioner should be deemed to have served
one full term from May 1995-1998 because he served the
greater portion of that term has no legal basis to support it; it
disregards the second requisite for the application of the
disqualification, i.e., that he has fully served three consecutive
terms. The second sentence of the constitutional provision
under scrutiny states, Voluntary renunciation of office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected.
The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any
attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary
renunciation of office and at the same time respect the peoples
choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is
evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does
not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three
term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for
any length of time short of the full term porvided by law
amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The
petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next
mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in
compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued
by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance
from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus,
the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
In sum, the petitioner was not the duly elected mayor and
that he did not hold office for the full term; hence, his
assumption of office from May 1995 to March 1998 cannot be
counted as a term for purposes of computing the three term
limit. The Resolution of the COMELEC finding him
disqualified on this ground to run in the May 1998 mayoral
elections should therefore be set aside.
The respondents harp on the delay in resolving the election
protest between petitioner and his then opponent Alvez which
took roughly about three years and resultantly extended the
petitioners incumbency in an office to which he was not
lawfully elected. We note that such delay cannot be imputed to
the petitioner. There is no specific allegation nor proof that the
delay was due to any political maneuvering on his part to
prolong his stay in office. Moreover, protestant Alvez, was not
without legal recourse to move for the early resolution of the
election protest while it was pending before the regional trial
court or to file a motion for the execution of the regional trial
courts decision declaring the position of mayor vacant and
ordering the vice-mayor to assume office while the appeal was
pending with the COMELEC. Such delay which is not here
shown to have been intentionally sought by the petitioner to
prolong his stay in office cannot serve as basis to bar his right
to be elected and to serve his chosen local government post in
the succeeding mayoral election.
The petitioners contention that the COMELEC ceased to
have jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification after he
was proclaimed winner is without merit. The instant petition
for disqualification was filed on April 21, 1998 or before the
May 1998 elections and was resolved on May 21, 1998 or after
the petitioners proclamation. It was held in the case of
Sunga vs. COMELEC and Trinidad[7] that the proclamation nor
the assumption of office of a candidate against whom a petition
for disqualification is pending before the COMELEC does not
divest the COMELEC of jurisdiction to continue hearing the
case and to resolve it on the merits.
Section 6 of RA 6646 specifically mandates that:
Sec. 6. Effects of disqualification Case.- any candidate
who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for
him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is
not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the court or
commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of
the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence
of his guilt is strong.
This court held that the clear legislative intent is that the
COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of the
disqualification case to its conclusion i.e., until judgment is
rendered. The outright dismissal of the petition for
disqualification filed before the election but which remained
unresolved after the proclamation of the candidate sought to be
disqualified will unduly reward the said candidate and may
encourage him to employ delaying tactics to impede the
resolution of the petition until after he has been proclaimed.
The court stated:
Clearly, the legislative intent is that the COMELEC
should continue the trial and hearing of the
disqualification case to its conclusion, i.e., until
judgment is rendered thereon. The word shall signified
that this requirement of the law is mandatory, operating
to impose a positive duty which must be
enforced. Theimplication is that the COMELEC is left
with no discretion but to proceed with the
disqualification case even after the election. Thus, in
providing for the outright dismissal of the
disqualification case which remains unresolved after the
election, Silvestre vs. Duavit in effect disallows what R.
A. No. 6646 imperatively requires. This amounts to a
quasi-judicial legislation by the COMELEC which
cannot be countenanced and is invalid for having been
issued beyond the scope of its authority. Interpretative
rulings of quasi-judicial bodies or administrative
agencies must always be in perfect harmony with
statutes and should be for the sole purpose of carrying
their general provisions into effect. By such
interpretative or administrative rulings, of course, the
scope of the law itself cannot be limited. Indeed, a
quasi-judicial body or an administrative agency for that
matter cannot amend an act of Congress.Hence, in case
of a discrepancy between the basic law and an
interpretative or administrative ruling, the basic law
prevails.
Besides, the deleterious effect of the Silvestre ruling is
not difficult to forsee. A candidate guilty of election
offenses would be undeservedly rewarded, instead of
punished, by the dismissal of thedisqualification case
against him simply because the investigating body was
unable, for any reason caused upon it, to determine
before the election if the offenses were indeed
committed by the candidate sought to be
disqualified. All that the erring aspirant would need to
do is to employ delaying tactics so that the
disqualification case based on the commission of
election offenses would not be decided before the
election. This scenario is productive of more fraud
which certainly is not the main intent and purpose of the
law.
The fact that Trinidad was already proclaimed and had
assumed the position of mayor did not divest the
COMELEC of authority and jurisdiction to continue the
hearing and eventually decide the disqualification
case. In Aguam v. COMELEC this Court held-
Time and again this Court has given its imprimatur on
the principle that COMELEC is with authority to annul
any canvass and proclamation which was illegally
made. The fact that a candidate proclaimed has assumed
office, we have said, is no bar to the exercise of such
power. It of course may not be availed of where there
has been a valid proclamation. Since private
respondents petition before the COMELEC is precisely
directed at the annulment of the canvass and
proclamation, we perceive that inquiry into this issue is
within the area allocated by the Constitution and law to
COMELEC xxx Really, were a victim of a proclamation
to be precluded from challenging the validity thereof
after that proclamation and the assumption of office
thereunder, baneful effects may easily supervene.
It must be emphasized that the purpose of a
disqualification proceeding is to prevent the candidate
from running or, if elected. From serving, or to
prosecute him for violation of the election
laws. Obviously, the fact that a candidate has been
proclaimed elected does not signify that his
disqualification is deemed condoned and may no longer
be the subject of a separate investigation.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted. The assailed
resolutions of the COMELEC declaring petitioner Lonzanida
disqualified to run for mayor in the 1998 mayoral elections are
hereby set aside.
SO ORDERED.
PABLO C.
VILLABER, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS and REP. DOUGLAS R.
CAGAS, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
In this petition for certiorari, Pablo C. Villaber, petitioner,
seeks the nullification of two Resolutions of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) in SPA-01-058. The first one was
issued by its Second Division on April 30, 2001, disqualifying
him as a candidate for the position of Congressman in the First
District of the Province of Davao del Sur in the last May 14,
2001 elections, and cancelling his certificate of candidacy; and
the second is the en banc Resolution dated May 10, 2001
denying his motion for reconsideration.
Both petitioner Villaber and respondent Douglas R. Cagas
were rival candidates for a congressional seat in the First
District of Davao del Sur during the May 14, 2001
elections. Villaber filed his certificate of candidacy for
Congressman on February 19, 2001,[1] while Cagas filed his on
February 28, 2001.[2]
On March 4, 2001, Cagas filed with the Office of the
Provincial Election Supervisor, Commission On Elections
(COMELEC), Davao del Sur, a consolidated petition[3] to
disqualify Villaber and to cancel the latters certificate of
candidacy. Cagas alleged in the said consolidated petition that
on March 2, 1990, Villaber was convicted by the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 15, in Criminal Case No. 86-
46197 for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and was
sentenced to suffer one (1) year imprisonment. The check that
bounced was in the sum of P100,000.00.[4] Cagas further
alleged that this crime involves moral turpitude; hence, under
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, he is disqualified to
run for any public office. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
(Tenth Division), in its Decision dated April 23, 1992 in CA-
G.R. CR No. 09017,[5] affirmed the RTC Decision. Undaunted,
Villaber filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari
assailing the Court of Appeals Decision, docketed as G.R. No.
106709.However, in its Resolution[6] of October 26, 1992, this
Court (Third Division) dismissed the petition. On February 2,
1993, our Resolution became final and executory.[7] Cagas also
asserted that Villaber made a false material representation in
his certificate of candidacy that he is Eligible for the office I
seek to be elected which false statement is a ground to deny
due course or cancel the said certificate pursuant to Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code.
In his answer[8] to the disqualification suit, Villaber
countered mainly that his conviction has not become final and
executory because the affirmed Decision was not remanded to
the trial court for promulgation in his presence.[9] Furthermore,
even if the judgment of conviction was already final and
executory, it cannot be the basis for his disqualification since
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not involve moral turpitude.
After the opposing parties submitted their respective
position papers, the case was forwarded to the COMELEC,
Manila, for resolution.
On April 30, 2001, the COMELEC (Second Division),
finding merit in Cagas petition, issued the challenged
Resolution[10] in SPA 01-058 declaring Villaber disqualified as
a candidate for and from holding any elective public office and
canceling his certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC ruled
that a conviction for violation of B.P Blg. 22 involves moral
turpitude following the ruling of this Court en banc in the
administrative case of People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda.[11]
Villaber filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied
by the COMELEC en banc in a Resolution[12] dated May 10,
2001.
Hence, this petition.
The sole issue for our Resolution is whether or not
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude.
The COMELEC believes it is. In disqualifying petitioner
Villaber from being a candidate for Congressman, the
COMELEC applied Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code
which provides:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been
declared by competent authority insane or incompetent,
or has been sentenced by final judgment for
subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense
for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more
than eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral
turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and
to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary
pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided
shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by
competent authority that said insanity or incompetence
had been removed or after the expiration of a period of
five years from his service of sentence, unless within the
same period he again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis
ours)
As to the meaning of moral turpitude, we have consistently
adopted the definition in Blacks Law Dictionary as an act of
baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a
man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to
the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man
and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty,
or good morals.[13]
In In re Vinzon,[14] the term moral turpitude is considered
as encompassing everything which is done contrary to justice,
honesty, or good morals.
We, however, clarified in Dela Torre vs. Commission on
Elections[15] that not every criminal act involves moral
turpitude, and that as to what crime involves moral turpitude is
for the Supreme Court to determine.[16] We further pronounced
therein that:
in International Rice Research Institute vs.
NLRC (221 SCRA 760 [1993]), the Court admitted that
it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude
does or does not exist by merely classifying a crime
as malum in se or as malum prohibitum. There are
crimes which are mala in se and yet but rarely involve
moral turpitude, and there are crimes which involve
moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. In the
final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral
turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and
frequently depends on all the circumstances
surrounding the violation of the statute.(Emphasis
ours)
We reiterate here our ruling in Dela Torre[17] that the
determination of whether a crime involves moral turpitude is a
question of fact and frequently depends on all the
circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute.
In the case at bar, petitioner does not assail the facts and
circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime. In
effect, he admits all the elements of the crime for which he was
convicted. At any rate, the question of whether or not the crime
involves moral turpitude can be resolved by analyzing its
elements alone, as we did in Dela Torre which involves the
crime of fencing punishable by a special law.[18]
Petitioner was charged for violating B.P. Blg. 22 under the
following Information:
That on or about February 13, 1986, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and
issue to Efren D. Sawal to apply on account or for value
Bank of Philippine Islands (Plaza Cervantes, Manila)
Check No. 958214 dated February 13, 1986 payable to
Efren D. Sawal in the amount of P100,000.00, said
accused well knowing that at the time of issue he did
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for payment of such check in full upon its
presentment, which check, when presented for
payment within ninety (90) days from the date
thereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds, and despite receipt
of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay
said Efren D. Sawal the amount of said check or to
make arrangement for full payment of the same
within five (5) banking days after receiving said
notice. (Emphasis ours)
He was convicted for violating Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22
which provides:
SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. - Any
person who makes or draws and issues any check to
apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of
issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such
check in full upon its presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less
than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a
fine of not less than but not more than double the
amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed
Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court. (Emphasis
ours).
The elements of the offense under the above provision are:
1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply
to account or for value;
2. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he
or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit
with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check
in full upon its presentment; and
3. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or it would
have been dishonored for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to
stop payment.[19]
The presence of the second element manifests moral
turpitude. In People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda [20] we held that a
conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imports deceit and
certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a
person.[21] The effects of the issuance of a worthless check, as
we held in the landmark case of Lozano vs.
Martinez,[22] through Justice Pedro L. Yap, transcends the
private interests of the parties directly involved in the
transaction and touches the interests of the community at
large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee
or holder, but also an injury to the public since the circulation
of valueless commercial papers can very well pollute the
channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public
interest.[23]Thus, paraphrasing Blacks definition, a drawer who
issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private
duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary
to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice,
honesty or good morals.
Petitioner contends that this Courts pronouncement
in People v. Atty. Fe Tuanda,[24] insofar as it states that
conviction under B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude, does
not apply to him since he is not a lawyer.
This argument is erroneous.
In that case, the Court of Appeals affirmed Atty. Fe
Tuandas conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and, in
addition, suspended her from the practice of law pursuant to
Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Her motion seeking the lifting of her suspension was
denied by this Court on the ground that the said offense
involves moral turpitude. There we said in part:
We should add that the crimes of which respondent
was convicted also import deceit and violation of her
attorneys oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, under both of which she was bound to
obey the laws of the land. Conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant
case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the
exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it
certainly relates to and affects the good moral
character of a person convicted of such offense. x x
x.[25] (Emphasis ours)
Clearly, in Tuanda, this Court did not make a distinction
whether the offender is a lawyer or a non-lawyer. Nor did it
declare that such offense constitutes moral turpitude when
committed by a member of the Bar but is not so when
committed by a non-member.
We cannot go along with petitioners contention that this
Courts ruling in Tuanda has been abandoned or modified in
the recent case of Rosa Lim vs. People of the
Philippines,[26] which reiterated the ruling in Vaca vs. Court of
Appeals.[27] In these two latter cases, the penalty of
imprisonment imposed on the accused for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 was deleted by this Court. Only a fine was
imposed.Petitioner insists that with the deletion of the prison
sentence, the offense no longer involves moral turpitude. We
made no such pronouncement. This is what we said in Rosa
Lim:
In Vaca v. Court of Appeals, we held that in
determining the penalty to be imposed for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22, the philosophy underlying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law applies. The philosophy is
to redeem valuable human material, and to prevent
unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and
economic usefulness with due regard to the protection
of the social order. There we deleted the prison sentence
imposed on petitioners. We imposed on them only a fine
double the amount of the check issued. We considered
the fact that petitioners brought the appeal, believing in
good faith, that no violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was
committed, otherwise, they would have simply accepted
the judgment of the trial court and applied for probation
to evade prison term. We do the same here. We believe
such would best serve the ends of criminal justice.
In fine, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by
respondent COMELEC in issuing the assailed Resolutions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Farinas vs COMELEC / Salappudin vs comelec ?
Before the Court are two Petitions under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to
declare as unconstitutional Section 14 of Republic
Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it
expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) which
provides:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. Any
elective official, whether national or local, running for
any office other than the one which he is holding in a
permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-
President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from
his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
The petition for certiorari and prohibition in G.R.
No. 147387 was filed by Rodolfo C. Farias, Manuel
M. Garcia, Francis G. Escudero and Agapito A.
Aquino. At the time of filing of the petition, the
petitioners were members of the minority bloc in
the House of Representatives. Impleaded as
respondents are: the Executive Secretary, then
Speaker of the House of Representatives Feliciano
R. Belmonte, Jr., the Commission on Elections, the
Secretary of the Department of the Interior and
Local Government (DILG), the Secretary of the
Senate and the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives.
The petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 152161
was filed by Gerry A. Salapuddin, then also a
member of the House of
Representatives. Impleaded as respondent is the
COMELEC.
Legislative History of Republic Act No. 9006
Rep. Act No. 9006, entitled An Act to Enhance
the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and
Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices,
is a consolidation of the following bills originating
from the House of Representatives and the
Senate, respectively:
House Bill (HB) No. 9000 entitled AN ACT
ALLOWING THE USE OF MASS MEDIA FOR
ELECTION PROPAGANDA, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 881,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE OMNIBUS
ELECTION CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES; [1]
Senate Bill (SB) No. 1742 entitled AN ACT TO
ENHANCE THE HOLDING OF FREE, ORDERLY,
HONEST, PEACEFUL, AND CREDIBLE
ELECTIONS THROUGH FAIR ELECTION
PRACTICES. [2]
A Bicameral Conference Committee,
composed of eight members of the Senate and [3]
sixteen (16) members of the House of
Representatives, was formed to reconcile the
[4]
conflicting provisions of the House and Senate
versions of the bill.
On November 29, 2000, the Bicameral
Conference Committee submitted its
Report, signed by its members, recommending
[5]
the approval of the bill as reconciled and approved
by the conferees.
During the plenary session of the House of
Representatives on February 5, 2001, Rep. Jacinto
V. Paras proposed an amendment to the
Bicameral Conference Committee Report. Rep.
Didagen P. Dilangalen raised a point of order
commenting that the House could no longer submit
an amendment thereto. Rep. Sergio A.F. Apostol
thereupon moved that the House return the report
to the Bicameral Conference Committee in view of
the proposed amendment thereto. Rep. Dilangalen
expressed his objection to the proposal. However,
upon viva voce voting, the majority of the House
approved the return of the report to the Bicameral
Conference Committee for proper action.[6]
In view of the proposed amendment, the House
of Representatives elected anew its conferees to [7]
the Bicameral Conference Committee. Then [8]
again, for unclear reasons, upon the motion of
Rep. Ignacio R. Bunye, the House elected another
set of conferees to the Bicameral Conference
[9]
Committee. [10]
On February 7, 2001, during the plenary
session of the House of Representatives, Rep.
Bunye moved that the House consider the
Bicameral Conference Committee Report on the
contrasting provisions of HB No. 9000 and SB No.
1742. Rep. Dilangalen observed that the report
had been recommitted to the Bicameral
Conference Committee. The Chair responded that
the Bicameral Conference Report was a new one,
and was a result of the reconvening of a new
Bicameral Conference Committee. Rep.
Dilangalen then asked that he be given time to
examine the new report. Upon motion of Rep.
Apostol, the House deferred the approval of the
report until the other members were given a copy
thereof.
[11]
After taking up other pending matters, the
House proceeded to vote on the Bicameral
Conference Committee Report on the disagreeing
provisions of HB No. 9000 and SB No. 1742.The
House approved the report with 125 affirmative
votes, 3 negative votes and no abstention. In
explaining their negative votes, Reps. Farias and
Garcia expressed their belief that Section 14
thereof was a rider. Even Rep. Escudero, who
voted in the affirmative, expressed his doubts on
the constitutionality of Section 14. Prior to casting
his vote, Rep. Dilangalen observed that no senator
signed the Bicameral Conference Committee
Report and asked if this procedure was regular. [12]
On the same day, the Senate likewise
approved the Bicameral Conference Committee
Report on the contrasting provisions of SB No.
1742 and HB No. 9000.
Thereafter, Rep. Act No. 9006 was duly signed
by then Senate President Aquilino Pimentel, Jr.
and then Speaker of the House of Representatives
Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr. and was duly certified
by the Secretary of the Senate Lutgardo B. Barbo
and the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives Robert P. Nazareno as the
consolidation of House Bill No. 9000 and Senate
Bill No. 1742, and finally passed by both Houses
on February 7, 2001.
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed
Rep. Act No. 9006 into law on February 12, 2001.
The Petitioners Case
The petitioners now come to the Court alleging
in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006,
insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in
violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution, requiring every law to have only one
subject which should be expressed in its title.
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of
Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a
proscribed rider. They point out the dissimilarity in
the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the
one hand, and Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily
deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media
for election propaganda and the elimination of
unfair election practices, while Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation on
elective officials who run for an office other than
the one they are holding in a permanent capacity
by considering them as ipso facto resigned
therefrom upon filing of the certificate of
candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in
the title, nor germane to the subject matter of Rep.
Act No. 9006.
The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of
Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection
clause of the Constitution because it repeals
Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code,
leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a
similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:
SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or
position. Any person holding a public appointive office
or position, including active members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy.
They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No.
9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By
the repeal of Section 67, an elective official who
runs for office other than the one which he is
holding is no longer considered ipso facto resigned
therefrom upon filing his certificate of
candidacy. Elective officials continue in public
office even as they campaign for reelection or
election for another elective position. On the other
hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, the
limitation on appointive officials remains - they are
still considered ipso facto resigned from their
offices upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy.
The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is
null and void in its entirety as irregularities
attended its enactment into law. The law, not only
Section 14 thereof, should be declared null and
void. Even Section 16 of the law which provides
that [t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval is
a violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which
require publication of the law before it becomes
effective.
Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67
of the Omnibus Election Code is a good law;
hence, should not have been repealed. The
petitioners cited the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo
v. Mitra, Jr., that Section 67 of the Omnibus
[13]
Election Code is based on the constitutional
mandate on the Accountability of Public Officers: [14]
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice,
and lead modest lives.
Consequently, the respondents Speaker and
Secretary General of the House of
Representatives acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction for not considering those members of
the House who ran for a seat in the Senate during
the May 14, 2001 elections as ipso facto resigned
therefrom, upon the filing of their respective
certificates of candidacy.
The Respondents Arguments
For their part, the respondents, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, urge this Court to
dismiss the petitions contending, preliminarily, that
the petitioners have no legal standing to institute
the present suit. Except for the fact that their
negative votes were overruled by the majority of
the members of the House of Representatives, the
petitioners have not shown that they have suffered
harm as a result of the passage of Rep. Act No.
9006. Neither do petitioners have any interest as
taxpayers since the assailed statute does not
involve the exercise by Congress of its taxing or
spending power.
Invoking the enrolled bill doctrine, the
respondents refute the petitioners allegations that
irregularities attended the enactment of Rep. Act
No. 9006. The signatures of the Senate President
and the Speaker of the House, appearing on the
bill and the certification signed by the respective
Secretaries of both houses of Congress, constitute
proof beyond cavil that the bill was duly enacted
into law.
The respondents contend that Section 14 of
Rep. Act No. 9006, as it repeals Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code, is not a proscribed rider
nor does it violate Section 26(1) of Article VI of the
Constitution. The title of Rep. Act No. 9006, An Act
to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest,
Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair
Election Practices, is so broad that it encompasses
all the processes involved in an election exercise,
including the filing of certificates of candidacy by
elective officials.
They argue that the repeal of Section 67 is
germane to the general subject of Rep. Act No.
9006 as expressed in its title as it eliminates the
effect of prematurely terminating the term of an
elective official by his filing of a certificate of
candidacy for an office other than the one which he
is permanently holding, such that he is no longer
considered ipso facto resigned therefrom. The
legislature, by including the repeal of Section 67 of
the Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006,
has deemed it fit to remove the unfairness of
considering an elective official ipso facto resigned
from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy for another elective office. With the
repeal of Section 67, all elective officials are now
placed on equal footing as they are allowed to
finish their respective terms even if they run for any
office, whether the presidency, vice-presidency or
other elective positions, other than the one they
are holding in a permanent capacity.
The respondents assert that the repeal of
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code need not
be expressly stated in the title of Rep. Act No.
9006 as the legislature is not required to make the
title of the act a complete index of its contents. It
must be deemed sufficient that the title be
comprehensive enough reasonably to include the
general subject which the statute seeks to effect
without expressing each and every means
necessary for its accomplishment. Section 26(1) of
Article VI of the Constitution merely calls for all the
parts of an act relating to its subject to find
expression in its title. Mere details need not be set
forth.
According to the respondents, Section 14 of
Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section
67, leaving Section 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code intact and effective, does not violate the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. Section
67 pertains to elective officials while Section 66
pertains to appointive officials. A substantial
distinction exists between these two sets of
officials; elective officials occupy their office by
virtue of their mandate based upon the popular
will, while the appointive officials are not elected by
popular will. The latter cannot, therefore, be
similarly treated as the former. Equal protection
simply requires that all persons or things similarly
situated are treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed.
Further, Section 16, or the Effectivity clause, of
Rep. Act No. 9006 does not run afoul of the due
process clause of the Constitution as it does not
entail any arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty and
property. Specifically, the section providing for
penalties in cases of violations thereof presume
that the formalities of the law would be
observed, i.e., charges would first be filed, and the
accused would be entitled to a hearing before
judgment is rendered by a court having
jurisdiction. In any case, the issue about lack of
due process is premature as no one has, as yet,
been charged with violation of Rep. Act No. 9006.
Finally, the respondents submit that the
respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the
House of Representatives did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in not excluding from the Rolls
those members thereof who ran for the Senate
during the May 14, 2001 elections. These
respondents merely complied with Rep. Act No.
9006, which enjoys the presumption of validity until
declared otherwise by the Court.
The Courts Ruling
Before resolving the petitions on their merits,
the Court shall first rule on the procedural issue
raised by the respondents, i.e., whether the
petitioners have the legal standing or locus
standi to file the petitions at bar.
The petitions were filed by the petitioners in
their capacities as members of the House of
Representatives, and as taxpayers and registered
voters.
Generally, a party who impugns the validity of a
statute must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or
will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. The rationale for requiring a party
[15]
who challenges the constitutionality of a statute to
allege such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy is to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions.
[16]
However, being merely a matter of procedure,
this Court, in several cases involving issues of
overarching significance to our society, had [17]
adopted a liberal stance on standing. Thus,
in Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of
Energy, this Court brushed aside the procedural
[18]
requirement of standing, took cognizance of, and
subsequently granted, the petitions separately filed
by then Senator Francisco Tatad and several
members of the House of Representatives
assailing the constitutionality of Rep. Act No. 8180
(An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry
and For Other Purposes).
The Court likewise took cognizance of the
petition filed by then members of the House of
Representatives which impugned as
unconstitutional the validity of a provision of Rep.
Act No. 6734 (Organic Act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao) in Chiongbian v.
Orbos. Similarly, the Court took cognizance of the
[19]
petition filed by then members of the Senate,
joined by other petitioners, which challenged the
validity of Rep. Act No. 7716 (Expanded Value
Added Tax Law) in Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance. [20]
 Members of Congress, such as the petitioners,
were likewise allowed by this Court to challenge
the validity of acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of
various government agencies or instrumentalities
in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation, Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona,
[21]
Jr., Philippine
[22]
Constitution Association v.
Enriquez, Albano v. Reyes, and Bagatsing v.
[23] [24]
Committee on Privatization. [25]
Certainly, the principal issue posed by the
petitions, i.e., whether Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code, which this Court had declared
in Dimaporo as deriving its existence from the
[26]
constitutional provision on accountability of public
officers, has been validly repealed by Section 14 of
Rep. Act No. 9006, is one of overarching
significance that justifies this Courts adoption of a
liberal stance vis--vis the procedural matter on
standing. Moreover, with the national elections
barely seven months away, it behooves the Court
to confront the issue now and resolve the same
forthrightly. The following pronouncement of the
Court is quite apropos:
... All await the decision of this Court on the
constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the
importance which the instant case has assumed and to
prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public
policy demand that [its] constitutionality . . . be now
resolved. It may likewise be added that the exceptional
character of the situation that confronts us, the
paramount public interest, and the undeniable necessity
for a ruling, the national elections beings barely six
months away, reinforce our stand.[27]
Every statute is presumed valid. The [28]
presumption is that the legislature intended to
enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which
operates no further than may be necessary to
effectuate the specific purpose of the law. [29]
It is equally well-established, however, that the
courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the
inherent authority to determine whether a statute
enacted by the legislature transcends the limit
imposed by the fundamental law. And where the
[30]
acts of the other branches of government run afoul
of the Constitution, it is the judiciarys solemn and
sacred duty to nullify the same. [31]
Proceeding from these guideposts, the Court
shall now resolve the substantial issues raised by
the petitions.
Section 14 of Rep. Act
No. 9006 Is Not a Rider [32]
 At the core of the controversy is Section 14, the
repealing clause of Rep. Act No. 9006, which
provides:
Sec. 14. Sections 67 and 85 of the Omnibus Election
Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) and Sections 10 and
11 of Republic Act No. 6646 are hereby repealed. As a
consequence, the first proviso in the third paragraph of
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 is rendered
ineffective. All laws, presidential decrees, executive
orders, rules and regulations, or any part thereof
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby
repealed or modified or amended accordingly.
The repealed provision, Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code, quoted earlier, reads:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. Any
elective official, whether national or local, running for
any office other than the one which he is holding in a
permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-
President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from
his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution
provides:
SEC. 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in
the title thereof.
The proscription is aimed against the evils of
the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling
legislation as well as surreptitious and/or
unconsidered encroaches. The provision merely
calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject
finding expression in its title. [33]
To determine whether there has been
compliance with the constitutional requirement that
the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title,
the Court laid down the rule that
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter
and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly
construed as to cripple or impede the power of
legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act
shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable
and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the
title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the
general object which a statute seeks to effect, without
expressing each and every end and means necessary or
convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere
details need not be set forth. The title need not be an
abstract or index of the Act.[34]
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: An Act to
Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest,
Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair
Election Practices. Section 2 of the law provides
not only the declaration of principles but also the
objectives thereof:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Principles. The State shall,
during the election period, supervise or regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for
the operation of media of communication or information
to guarantee or ensure equal opportunity for public
service, including access to media time and space, and
the equitable right to reply, for public information
campaigns and fora among candidates and assure free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
The State shall ensure that bona fide candidates for any
public office shall be free from any form of harassment
and discrimination.[35]
The Court is convinced that the title and the
objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are
comprehensive enough to include the repeal of
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its
contemplation. To require that the said repeal of
Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is
to insist that the title be a complete index of its
content. [36]
The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a
limitation on elective officials who run for an office
other than the one they are holding, to the other
provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with
the lifting of the ban on the use of media for
election propaganda, does not violate the one
subject-one title rule. This Court has held that an
act having a single general subject, indicated in the
title, may contain any number of provisions, no
matter how diverse they may be, so long as they
are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject, and may be considered in furtherance of
such subject by providing for the method and
means of carrying out the general subject. [37]
The deliberations of the Bicameral Conference
Committee on the particular matter are particularly
instructive:
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:
Yes, Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to clarify.
So all were looking for now is an appropriate title
to make it broader so that it would cover this
provision [referring to the repeal of Section 67 of
the Omnibus Election Code], is that
correct?Thats all. Because I believe ...
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):
We are looking for an appropriate coverage
which will result in the nomenclature or title.
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:
Because I really do not believe that it is out of
place. I think that even with the term fair election
practice, it really covers it, because as expressed
by Senator Roco, those conditions inserted
 earlier seemed unfair and it is an election
practice and, therefore, I think, Im very
comfortable with the title Fair Election Practice so
that we can get over with these things so that we
dont come back again until we find the title. I
mean, its one provision which I think is fair for
everybody. It may seem like a limitation but this
limitation actually provides for fairness in election
practices as the title implies.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):
Yes.
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:
So I would want to beg the House contingent,
lets get it over with. To me, ha, its not a very
touchy issue. For me, its even a very correct
provision. I feel very comfortable with it and it
was voted in the Senate, at least, so I would like
to appeal to the ... para matapos na, then we
come back as a Bicam just for the title Is that
what youre ...?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):
Its not the title per se, its the coverage. So if you
will just kindly bear with us. Im happy that there is
already one comfortable senator there among ...
several of us were also comfortable with it.But it
would be well that when we rise from this Bicam
that were all comfortable with it.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Yes. Anyway, lets listen to Congressman
Marcos.
REP. MARCOS:
Mr. Chairman, may I just make the observation
that although it is true that the bulk of provisions
deals with the area of propaganda and political
advertising, the complete title is actually one that
indulge full coverage. It says An Act to enhance
the holding of free, orderly, honest ... elections
through fair election practices. But as you said,
we will put that aside to discuss later one.
Secondly, I think the Declaration of Principles
contained in Section 2, paragraph 2 is perfectly
adequate in that it says that it shall ensure
candidates for public office that may be free from
any form of harassment and discrimination.
Surely this provision in Section 67 of the old
Election Code of the existing Omnibus Election
Code is a form of harassment or
discrimination. And so I think that in the effort at
leveling the playing field, we can cover this and it
should not be considered a rider.
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:
I agree, Mr. Chairman. I think the
Congresswoman from Ilocos had very clearly put
it, that it is covered in the Declaration of
Principles and in the objective of this bill. And
therefore, I hope that the House contingent would
agree to this so that we can finish it now. And it
expressly provides for fair election practices
because ...
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Yeah, I think what is on the table is that we are
not disputing this, but we are looking for a title
that is more generic so that then we have less of
 an objection on constitutionality. I think thats the THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
theory. So, there is acceptance of this.
Ah - - - ayaw mo iyong practice. O, give me
Maybe we should not call it na limitation on another noun.
elected officials. Maybe we should say the
REP. MARCOS:
special provision on elected officials. So how is
that? Alam mo ito ... The Fair Election.
REP. MARCOS: THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
I think we just change the Section 1, the short O, Fair Election Act.
title.
REP. MACARAMBON:
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Nagbi-brainstorm tayo dito, eh. How about if we
Also, Then we say - - on the short title of the Act, change the title to enhance the holding of free,
we say ... orderly, honest, peaceful and ensure equal
opportunity for public service through fair election
REP. MARCOS:
practices?
What if we say fair election practices? Maybe
that should be changed... REP. PICHAY:

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): Fair election practices?

O, sige, fine, fine. Lets a brainstorm. Equal... REP. MACARAMBON:

REP. PADILLA: Yeah. To ensure equal opportunity for public

service through fair ...
Mr. Chairman, why dont we use An Act
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
rationalizing the holding of free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections, amending for the Wala nang practices nga.
purpose Batasang Pambansa known as the
Omnibus Election Code? REP. PICHAY:

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): Wala nang practices.

Why dont we remove fair and then this shall be THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
cited as Election Practices Act? It shall be cited as Fair Election Act.
REP. PICHAY: (Informal discussions)
Thats not an election practice. Thats a limitation. REP. PICHAY:
 Approve na iyan. The legislators considered Section 67 of the
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): Omnibus Election Code as a form of harassment
Done. So, okay na iyon. The title will be Fair
or discrimination that had to be done away with
Election Act. and repealed. The executive department found
cause with Congress when the President of
The rest wala nang problema ano?
the Philippines signed the measure into law. For
VOICES: sure, some sectors of society and in government
Wala na. may believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad
REP. MACARAMBON: policy as it would encourage political
adventurism. But policy matters are not the
Wala na iyong practices?
concern of the Court. Government policy is within
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): the exclusive dominion of the political branches of
Wala na, wala na. Mahina tayo sa practice, eh. the government. It is not for this Court to look into
[39]

the wisdom or propriety of legislative

O, wala na? We will clean up.
determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is
REP. MARCOS: wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound
Title? economic theory, whether it is the best means to
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the
legislative discretion within its prescribed limits
The short title, This Act ...
should be exercised in a particular manner are
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO): matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the
Youre back to your No. 21 already. serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring
REP. MARCOS:
them within the range of judicial
cognizance. Congress is not precluded from
[40]

The full title, the same? repealing Section 67 by the ruling of the Court
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): in Dimaporo v. Mitra upholding the validity of the
[41]

Iyon na nga. The full title is An Act to enhance provision and by its pronouncement in the same
the holding ... Thats the House version, eh, dahil case that the provision has a laudable
pareho, hindi ba? Then the short title This Act purpose. Over time, Congress may find it
shall be known as the Fair Election Act. [38] imperative to repeal the law on its belief that the
election process is thereby enhanced and the
paramount objective of election laws the fair,
honest and orderly election of truly deserving
members of Congress is achieved.
Moreover, the avowed purpose of the
constitutional directive that the subject of a bill
should be embraced in its title is to apprise the
legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope
of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into
law of matters which have not received the notice,
action and study of the legislators and the
public. In this case, it cannot be claimed that the
[42]
legislators were not apprised of the repeal of
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as the
same was amply and comprehensively deliberated
upon by the members of the House. In fact, the
petitioners, as members of the House of
Representatives, expressed their reservations
regarding its validity prior to casting their
votes. Undoubtedly, the legislators were aware of
the existence of the provision repealing Section 67
of the Omnibus Election Code.
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006
Is Not Violative of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution [43]
The petitioners contention, that the repeal of
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
pertaining to elective officials gives undue benefit
to such officials as against the appointive ones and
violates the equal protection clause of the
constitution, is tenuous.
The equal protection of the law clause in the
Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to
reasonable classification. If the groupings are
characterized by substantial distinctions that make
real differences, one class may be treated and
regulated differently from the other. The Court
[44]
has explained the nature of the equal protection
guarantee in this manner:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue
favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not
intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in
the object to which it is directed or by territory within
which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute
equality among residents; it merely requires that all
persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances
and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not
infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike
to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds
exist for making a distinction between those who fall
within such class and those who do not.[45]
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between
elective officials and appointive officials. The
former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate
of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a
definite term and may be removed therefrom only
upon stringent conditions. On the other hand,
[46]
appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their
designation thereto by an appointing
authority. Some appointive officials hold their office
in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security
of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the
[47]
appointing authority. [48]
Another substantial distinction between the two
sets of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8,
Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission,
Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987
(Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as
officers and employees in the civil service, are
strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan
political activity or take part in any election except
to vote. Under the same provision, elective
officials, or officers or employees holding political
offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take
part in political and electoral activities. [49]
By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section
66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators
deemed it proper to treat these two classes of
officials differently with respect to the effect on
their tenure in the office of the filing of the
certificates of candidacy for any position other than
those occupied by them. Again, it is not within the
power of the Court to pass upon or look into the
wisdom of this classification.
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of
Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis-a-
vis appointive officials, is anchored upon material
and significant distinctions and all the persons
belonging under the same classification are
similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the
Constitution is, thus, not infringed.
The Enrolled Bill Doctrine
Is Applicable In this Case
Not content with their plea for the nullification of
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, the petitioners
insist that the entire law should be nullified. They
contend that irregularities attended the passage of
the said law particularly in the House of
Representatives catalogued thus:
a. Creation of two (2) sets of BCC (Bicameral
Conference Committee) members by the
 House during its session on February 5,
2001;
b. No communication from the Senate for a
conference on the compromise bill
submitted by the BCC on November 29,
2000;
c. The new Report submitted by the 2nd/3rd BCC
was presented for approval on the floor
without copies thereof being furnished the
members;
d. The 2nd/3rd BCC has no record of its
proceedings, and the Report submitted by
it was not signed by the Chairman (Sen.
Roco) thereof as well as its senator-
members at the time it was presented to
and rammed for approval by the House;
e. There was no meeting actually conducted by
the 2nd/3rd BCC and that its alleged Report
was instantly made and passed around for
the signature of the BCC members;
f. The Senate has no record of the creation of a
2nd BCC but only of the first one that
convened on November 23, 2000;
g. The Effectivity clauses of SB No. 1741 and
HB No. 9000, as well as that of the
compromise bill submitted by the BCC
that convened on November 20, 2000,
were couched in terms that comply with
the publication required by the Civil Code
and jurisprudence, to wit:
...
However, it was surreptitiously replaced in
its final form as it appears in 16, R.A. No.
9006, with the provision that This Act
shall take effect immediately upon its
approval;
h. The copy of the compromise bill submitted
by the 2nd/3rd BCC that was furnished the
members during its consideration on
February 7, 2001, did not have the same 16
as it now appears in RA No. 9006, but 16
of the compromise bill, HB 9000 and SB
1742, reasons for which no objection
thereto was made;
i. The alleged BCC Report presented to the
House on February 7, 2001, did
not contain a detailed, sufficiently explicit
statement of the changes in or amendments
to the subject measure; and
 j. The disappearance of the Cayetano
amendment, which is Section 12 of the
compromise bill submitted by the BCC. In
fact, this was the subject of the purported
proposed amendment to the compromise
bill of Member Paras as stated in
paragraph 7 hereof. The said provision
states, thusly:
Sec. 12. Limitation on
Elected Officials. Any
elected official who runs for
president and vice-president
shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his
office upon the filing of the
certificate of candidacy.[50]
The petitioners, thus, urge the Court to go
behind the enrolled copy of the bill. The Court is
not persuaded. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the
signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and
the Senate President and the certification of the
Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was
passed are conclusive of its due enactment. A
review of cases reveals the Courts consistent
[51]
adherence to the rule. The Court finds no reason
to deviate from the salutary rule in this case where
the irregularities alleged by the petitioners mostly
involved the internal rules of Congress, e.g.,
creation of the 2nd or 3rd Bicameral Conference
Committee by the House. This Court is not the
proper forum for the enforcement of these internal
rules of Congress, whether House or Senate.
Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with
their observance the courts have no
concern. Whatever doubts there may be as to the
[52]
formal validity of Rep. Act No. 9006 must be
resolved in its favor. The Court reiterates its ruling
in Arroyo v. De Venecia, viz.:
[53]
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of
expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire
into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of
Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the
absence of showing that there was a violation of a
constitutional provision or the rights of private
individuals. In Osmea v. Pendatun, it was held: At any
rate, courts have declared that the rules adopted by
deliberative bodies are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them. And it has been said that Parliamentary
rules are merely procedural, and with their observance,
the courts have no concern. They may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere
failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not
invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body)
when the requisite number of members have agreed to a
particular measure.
The Effectivity Clause
Is Defective
Finally, the Effectivity clause (Section 16) of
Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it shall take
effect immediately upon its approval, is
defective. However, the same does not render the
entire law invalid. In Taada v. Tuvera, this Court
[54]
laid down the rule:
... the clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the
date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be
omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislator
may make the law effective immediately upon approval,
or on any other date without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the
legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual
fifteen-period shall be shortened or extended. [55]
Following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the [56]
doctrine enunciated in Taada, Rep. Act No. 9006,
notwithstanding its express statement, took effect
fifteen days after its publication in the Official
Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation.
In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of
the firmly entrenched principles in constitutional
law is that the courts do not involve themselves
with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a
statute. That is the exclusive concern of the
legislative branch of the government. When the
validity of a statute is challenged on constitutional
grounds, the sole function of the court is to
determine whether it transcends constitutional
limitations or the limits of legislative power. No
[57]
such transgression has been shown in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are
DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED
Bantay Republic vs COMELEC (2007)
Before the Court are these two consolidated petitions
for certiorari and mandamus to nullify and set aside
certain issuances of the Commission on Elections
(Comelec) respecting party-list groups which have
manifested their intention to participate in the party-
list elections on May 14, 2007.
In the first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 177271,
petitioners Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941, for
short) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR,
for short) assail the various Comelec resolutions
accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to comply with the guidelines prescribed by the
to participate in the forthcoming party-list [Court] in [Ang Bagong Bayani v.
[2]
elections on May 14, 2007 without simultaneously Comelec ] and, 2) correspondingly, that the
determining whether or not their respective nominees Comelec be enjoined from allowing respondent
possess the requisite qualifications defined in groups from participating in the May 2007 elections.
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, or the Party-List
System Act and belong to the marginalized and In separate resolutions both dated April 24, 2007, the
underrepresented sector each seeks to represent. In the Court en banc required the public and private
second, docketed as G.R. No. 177314, petitioners respondents to file their respective comments on the
Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation and petitions within a non-extendible period of five (5)
Bantay Katarungan Foundation days from notice. Apart from respondent Comelec,
impugn Comelec Resolution 07-0724 dated April 3, seven (7) private respondents[3] in G.R. No.
[4]
2007 effectively denying their request for the release 177271 and one party-list group mentioned
or disclosure of the names of the nominees of in G.R. No. 177314 submitted their separate
the fourteen (14) accredited participating party-list comments. In the main, the separate comments
groups mentioned in petitioner Rosales previous of the private respondents focused on the untenability
letter-request. and prematurity of the plea of petitioners BA-RA
7941 and UP-LR to nullify their accreditation as
While both petitions commonly seek to compel the party-list groups and thus disqualify them and their
Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the respective nominees from participating in the May 14,
nominees of the various party-list groups named in the 2007 party-list elections.
petitions,[1] the petitioners in G.R. No. 177271 have
the following additional prayers: 1) that the 33 private The facts:
respondents named therein be declare[d] as
unqualified to participate in the party-list elections as On January 12, 2007, the Comelec issued Resolution
sectoral organizations, parties or coalition for failure No. 7804 prescribing rules and regulations to govern
the filing of manifestation of intent to participate and Meanwhile, reacting to the emerging public
submission of names of nominees under the party-list perception that the individuals behind the
system of representation in connection with the May aforementioned 14 party-list groups do not, as they
14, 2007 elections. Pursuant thereto, a number of should, actually represent the poor and marginalized
organized groups filed the necessary manifestations. sectors, petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No.
Among these and ostensibly subsequently accredited 177314, addressed a letter[5] dated March 29, 2007 to
by the Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections - Director Alioden Dalaig of the Comelecs Law
are 14 party-list groups, namely: (1) BABAE KA; Department requesting a list of that groups nominees.
(2) ANG KASANGGA; (3) AKBAY PINOY; (4) AKSA; Another letter[6] of the same tenor dated March 31,
(5) KAKUSA; (6) AHON PINOY; (7) OFW PARTY; 2007 followed, this time petitioner Rosales
(8) BIYAHENG PINOY; (9) ANAD; (10) AANGAT impressing upon Atty. Dalaig the particular urgency
ANG KABUHAYAN; (11) AGBIAG; (12) BANAT; of the subject request.
(13) BANTAY LIPAD; (14) AGING
PINOY. Petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR Neither the Comelec Proper nor its Law Department
presented a longer, albeit an overlapping, list. officially responded to petitioner
Subsequent events saw BA-RA 7941 and UP- Rosales requests. The April 13, 2007 issue of
LR filing with the Comelec an Urgent Petition to the Manila Bulletin, however, carried the front-
Disqualify, thereunder seeking to disqualify page banner headline COMELEC WONT BARE
the nominees of certain party-list PARTY-LIST NOMINEES,[7] with the following sub-
organizations. Both petitioners appear not to have the heading: Abalos says party-list polls not personality
names of the nominees sought to be oriented.
disqualified since they still asked for a copy of the list
of nominees. Docketed in the Comelec as SPA Case On April 16, 2007, Atty. Emilio Capulong, Jr.
No 07-026, this urgent petition has yet to be resolved. and ex-Senator Jovito R. Salonga, in their own
behalves and as counsels of petitioner
Rosales, forwarded a letter[8] to the Comelec formally
requesting action and definitive decision on
Rosales earlier plea for information regarding the
names of several party-list nominees. Invoking their
constitutionally-guaranteed right to information,
Messrs. Capulong and Salonga at the same time drew
attention to the banner headline adverted to earlier,
with a request for the Comelec, collectively or
individually, to issue a formal clarification, either
confirming or denying the banner headline and the
alleged statement of Chairman Benjamin Abalos, Sr.
xxx Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et
al., was the issuance of Comelec en banc Resolution
07-0724[9] under date April 3, 2007 virtually declaring
the nominees names confidential and in net effect
denying petitioner Rosales basic disclosure request. In
its relevant part, Resolution 07-0724 reads as follows:
RESOLVED, moreover, that the Commission
will disclose/publicize the names of party-
list nominees in connection with the May
14, 2007 Elections only after 3:00
p.m. on election day.
Let the Law Department implement this
resolution and reply to all letters addressed
to the Commission inquiring on the party-
list nominees. (Emphasis added.)
According to petitioner Rosales, she was able to
obtain a copy of the April 3,
2007 Resolution only on April 21, 2007. She would
later state the observation that the last part of
the Order empowering the Law Department to
implement this resolution and reply to all letters
inquiring on the party-list nominees is apparently a
fool-proof bureaucratic way to distort and mangle the
truth and give the impression that the antedated
Resolution of April 3, 2007 is the final answer to the
two formal requests of Petitioners.[10]
The herein consolidated petitions are cast against the
foregoing factual setting, albeit petitioners BA-
RA 7941 and UP-LR appear not to be aware, when
they filed their petition on April 18, 2007, of the April
3, 2007 Comelec Resolution 07-0724.
To start off, petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR
would have the Court cancel the accreditation
accorded by the Comelec to the respondent party-list
groups named in their petition on the ground that
these groups and their respective nominees do not
appear to be qualified. In the words of petitioners BA-
RA 7941 and UP-LR, Comelec -
xxx committed grave abuse of
discretion when it granted the assailed
accreditations even
without simultaneously determining
whether the nominees of herein private
respondents are qualified or not, or
whether or not the nominees are likewise
belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector they claim to
represent in Congress, in accordance
with No. 7 of the eight-point guidelines
prescribed by the Honorable Supreme in
the Ang Bagong Bayani[11] case which
states that, not only the candidate party or
organization must represent
marginalized and
underrepresented sectors; so also must its
nominees. In the case of private
respondents, public respondent Comelec
granted accreditations without the
required simultaneous determination of the
qualification of the nominees as part of the
accreditation process of the party-list
organization itself. (Words in bracket
added; italization in the original) [12]
The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of
petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for cancellation
of accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their
petition. For, such course of action would
entail going over and evaluating the qualities of the
sectoral groups or parties in question, particularly
whether or not they indeed represent
marginalized/underrepresented groups. The exercise
would require the Court to make a factual
determination, a matter which is outside the office of
judicial review by way of special civil action
for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the Court is
not called upon to decide factual issues and the case
must be decided on the undisputed facts on
record.[13] The sole function of a writ of certiorari is to
address issues of want of jurisdiction or grave abuse
of discretion and does not include a review of the
tribunals evaluation of the evidence.[14]
Not lost on the Court of course is the pendency
before the Comelec of SPA Case No. 07-026 in which
petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR themselves seek Now to the other but core issues of the
to disqualifythe nominees of the respondent party-list case. The petition in G.R. No. 177314 formulates and
groups named in their petition. captures the main issues tendered by the petitioners in
these consolidated cases and they may be summarized
Petitioners BA-RA 7941s and UP-LRs posture as follows:
that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion
1. Whether respondent Comelec, by
when it granted the assailed accreditations
refusing to reveal the names of the
without simultaneouslydetermining the qualifications nominees of the various party-list
of their nominees is without basis. Nowhere in R.A. groups, has violated the right to
information and free access
No. 7941 is there a requirement that the qualification to documents as guaranteed by the
of a party-list nominee be determined simultaneously Constitution; and
with the accreditation of an organization. And as aptly
2. Whether respondent
pointed out by private respondent Babae Para sa Comelec is mandated by the
Kaunlaran (Babae Ka), Section 4 of R.A. No. 7941 Constitution to disclose to the
requires a petition for registration of a party-list public the names of said nominees.
organization to be filed with the Comelec not later
While the Comelec did not explicitly say so, it
than ninety (90) days before the election whereas the
based its refusal to disclose the names of the nominees
succeeding Section 8 requires the submission not later
of subject party-list groups on Section 7 of R.A. 7941.
than forty-five (45) days before the election of the list
This provision, while commanding
of names whence party-list representatives shall be
the publication and the posting in polling places
chosen.
of a certified list of party-list system participating

groups, nonetheless tells the Comelec not to show or
include the names of the party-list nominees in
said certified list. Thus:
SEC. 7. Certified List of Registered
Parties.- The COMELEC shall, not later
than sixty (60) days before
election, prepare a certified list of
national, regional, or sectoral parties,
organizations or coalitions which have
applied or who have manifested their
desire to participate under the party-list
system and distribute copies thereof to all
precincts for posting in the polling places
on election day. The names of the party-
list nominees shall not be shown on the
certified list. (Emphasis added.)
And doubtless part of Comelecs reason for
keeping the names of the party list nominees away
from the public is deducible from the following
excerpts of the news report appearing in the
adverted April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin:
The Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) firmed up yesterday its decision
not to release the names of nominees of sectoral
parties, organizations, or coalitions accredited to
participate in the party-list election which will
be held simultaneously with the May 14 mid-
term polls.
COMELEC Chairman Benjamin S.
Abalos, Sr. said he and [the other five
COMELEC] Commissioners --- believe that
the party list elections must not be
personality oriented.
Abalos said under [R.A.] 7941 ,
the people are to vote for sectoral parties,
organizations, or coalitions, not for their
nominees.
He said there is nothing in R.A. 7941
that requires the Comelec to disclose the names
of nominees. xxx (Words in brackets and
emphasis added)
Insofar as the disclosure issue is concerned, the
petitions are impressed with merit.
Assayed against the non-disclosure stance of
the Comelec and the given rationale therefor is the
right to information enshrined in the self-
executory[15] Section 7, Article III of the
Constitution, viz:
 Sec.7. The right of the people to
information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well to government research
data used as basis for policy development,
shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by
law.
Complementing and going hand in hand with
the right to information is another constitutional
provision enunciating the policy of full disclosure and
transparency in Government. We refer to Section 28,
Article II of the Constitution reading:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law, the State
adopts and implements a policy of full
public disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest.
The right to information is a public right where the
real parties in interest are the public, or the citizens to
be precise. And for every right of the people
recognized as fundamentallies a corresponding duty
on the part of those who govern to respect and protect
that right. This is the essence of the Bill of Rights in a
constitutional regime.[16] Without a governments
acceptance of the limitations upon it by the
Constitution in order to uphold individual liberties,
without an acknowledgment on its part of those duties
exacted by the rights pertaining to the citizens, the
Bill of Rights becomes a sophistry.
By weight of jurisprudence, any citizen can challenge
any attempt to obstruct the exercise of his right to
information and may seek its enforcement by
mandamus.[17] And since every citizen by the simple
fact of his citizenship possesses the right to be
informed, objections on
ground of locus standi are ordinarily unavailing.[18]
Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the
right to information and its companion right of access
to official records are not absolute. As articulated
in Legaspi, supra, the peoples right to know is limited
to matters of public concern and is further subject to
such limitation as may be provided by law. Similarly,
the policy of full disclosure is confined to transactions
involving public interest and is subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law. Too, there is also the
need of preserving a measure of confidentiality on
some matters, such as military, trade, banking and
diplomatic secrets or those affecting national
security.[19]
The terms public concerns and public
interest have eluded precise definition. But both terms
embrace, to borrow from Legaspi, a broad spectrum
of subjects which the public may want to know, either
because these directly affect their lives, or simply
because such matters naturally whet the interest of an
ordinary citizen. At the end of the day, it is for the
courts to determine, on a case to case basis, whether
or not at issue is of interest or importance to the
public.
If, as in Legaspi, it was the legitimate concern
of a citizen to know if certain persons employed as
sanitarians of a health department of a city are civil
service eligibles, surely the identity of candidates for a
lofty elective public office should be a matter of
highest public concern and interest.
As may be noted, no national security or like
concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of
the nominees of the party-list groups in
question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave
abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands
of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the
party-list groups subject of their respective
petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies.
The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941
reading: [T]he names of the party-list nominees shall
not be shown on the certified
list is certainly not a justifying card for the
Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. To us, the
prohibition imposed on the Comelec under said
Section 7 is limited in scope and duration,
meaning, that it extends only to the certified
list which the same provision requires to be posted in
the polling places on election day. To stretch the
coverage of the prohibition to the absolute is to read
into the law something that is not intended. As it
were, there is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941
that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even
publishing through mediums other than the Certified
List the names of the party-list nominees. The
Comelec obviously misread the limited non-disclosure
aspect of the provision as an absolute bar to public
disclosure before the May 2007 elections. The
interpretation thus given by the Comelec virtually
tacks an unconstitutional dimension on the last
sentence of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7941.
The Comelecs reasoning that a party-list
election is not an election of personalities is valid to a
point. It cannot be taken, however, to justify its
assailed non-disclosure stance which comes, as it
were, with a weighty presumption of invalidity,
impinging, as it does, on a fundamental right to
information.[20] While the vote cast in a party-list
elections is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end,
would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate
cases, would eventually sit in the House of
Representatives.
The Court is very much aware of newspaper
reports detailing the purported reasons behind the
Comelecs disinclination to release the names of party-
list nominees. It is to be stressed, however, that the
Court is in the business of dispensing justice on the
basis of hard facts and applicable statutory and
decisional laws. And lest it be overlooked, the Court
always assumes, at the first instance, the presumptive
validity and regularity of official acts of government
officials and offices.
It has been repeatedly said in various contexts
that the people have the right to elect their
representatives on the basis of an informed
judgment. Hence the need for voters to be informed
about matters that have a bearing on their choice. The
ideal cannot be achieved in a system of blind voting,
as veritably advocated in the assailed resolution of the
Comelec. The Court, since the 1914 case of Gardiner
v. Romulo,[21] has consistently made it clear that it
frowns upon any interpretation of the law or rules that
would hinder in any way the free and intelligent
casting of the votes in an election.[22] So it must be
here for still other reasons articulated earlier.
In all, we agree with the petitioners that
respondent Comelec has a constitutional duty to
disclose and release the names of the nominees of the
party-list groups named in the herein petitions.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 177271 is
partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify the
accreditation of the respondents named therein.
However, insofar as it seeks to compel the Comelec to
disclose or publish the names of the nominees of
party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited
to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections, the same
petition and the petition in G.R. No.
177314 are GRANTED. Accordingly, the Comelec is
hereby ORDERED to immediately disclose and
release the names of the nominees of the party-list
groups, sectors or organizations accredited to
participate in the May 14, 2007 party-list elections.
The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to the
Court its compliance herewith within five (5) days
from notice hereof.
This Decision is declared immediately executory upon
its receipt by the Comelec.
No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
De Guzman vs COMELEC (2009)
This petition[1] for certiorari with prayer for
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order assails the June 15, 2007 Resolution [2] of the
First Division of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) in SPA No. 07-211, disqualifying
petitioner Roseller De Guzman from running as vice-
mayor in the May 14, 2007 Synchronized National
and Local Elections. Also assailed is the October 9,
2007 Resolution[3] of the COMELEC En
Banc denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner De Guzman and private respondent
Angelina DG. Dela Cruz were candidates for vice-
mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14,
2007 elections. On April 3, 2007, private respondent
filed against petitioner a petition [4] for disqualification
docketed as SPA No. 07-211, alleging that petitioner
is not a citizen of the Philippines, but an immigrant
and resident of the United States of America.
In his answer, petitioner admitted that he was a
naturalized American. However, on January 25, 2006,
he applied for dual citizenship under Republic Act
No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225), otherwise known as the
Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
2003.[5] Upon approval of his application, he took his
oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines on September 6, 2006. He argued that,
having re-acquired Philippine citizenship, he is
entitled to exercise full civil and political rights. As
such, he is qualified to run as vice-mayor of Guimba,
Nueva Ecija.
During the May 14, 2007 elections, private respondent
won as vice-mayor. Petitioner filed an election protest
on grounds of irregularities and massive cheating. The
case was filed before Branch 31 of the Regional Trial
Court of Guimba, Nueva Ecija and was docketed as
Election Protest No. 07-01.
Meanwhile, in SPA No. 07-211, the
COMELEC First Division rendered its June 15, 2007
Resolution disqualifying petitioner, which reads as
follows:
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 states:
Retention of Philippine Citizenship.
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines
who have lost their Philippine citizenship
by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country are hereby
deemed to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship upon taking the following oath
of allegiance to the Republic: x x x
Hence, under the provisions of the
aforementioned law, respondent has
validly reacquired Filipino citizenship. By
taking this Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines on September
6, 2006 before Mary Jo Bernardo Aragon,
Deputy Consul General at the Philippine
Consulate General, Los
Angeles, California respondent was
deemed a dual citizen, possessing both
Filipino and American citizenship.
However, subparagraph (2), Section 5 of
the aforementioned Act also provides:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights
and Liabilities -- Those who retain or re-
acquire Philippine Citizenship under this
Act shall enjoy full civil and political
rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under
existing laws of the Philippines and the
following conditions:
xxxx
 (2) Those seeking elective public
office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing
of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an
oath.
As can be gleaned from the above cited
provision, respondent [herein petitioner]
should have renounced his American
citizenship before he can run for any
public elective position. This respondent
did not do. The Oath of Allegiance taken
by respondent was for the purpose of re-
acquiring Philippine citizenship. It did not,
at the same time, mean that respondent has
renounced his American citizenship. Thus,
at the time respondent filed his certificate
of candidacy for the position of Vice-
Mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija he was,
and still is, a dual citizen, possessing both
Philippine and American citizenship. For
this reason alone, respondent is
disqualified to run for the abovementioned
elective position.
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the Commission (First
Division) RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES, to GRANT the instant
petition finding it IMBUED WITH
MERIT. Hence, respondent (petitioner
herein) Roseller T. De Guzman is
disqualified to run as Vice-Mayor of
Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007
Synchronized National and Local
[6]
Elections.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but
it was dismissed on October 9, 2007 by the
COMELEC En Banc for having been rendered moot
in view of private respondents victory.
Thereafter, the trial court in Election Protest
No. 07-01 rendered a Decision,[7] dated November 26,
2007, declaring petitioner as the winner for the Vice-
Mayoralty position. It held:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring protestant ROSELLER
T. DE GUZMAN, as the winner for the
Vice-Mayoralty position with a plurality of
776 votes over the protestee, ANGELINA
 D.G. DELA CRUZ, in the May 14,
2007 Local Elections in Guimba, Nueva
Ecija. With costs against the protestee.
There being no evidence presented
as to the damages by both parties, the same
are hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Petitioner filed the instant petition
for certiorari, alleging that the COMELEC acted with
grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying him from
running as Vice-Mayor because of his failure to
renounce his American citizenship, and in dismissing
the motion for reconsideration for being moot.
Petitioner invokes the rulings in Frivaldo v.
Commission on Elections[9] and Mercado v.
[10]
Manzano, that the filing by a person with dual
citizenship of a certificate of candidacy, containing an
oath of allegiance, constituted as a renunciation of his
foreign citizenship. Moreover, he claims that the
COMELEC En Banc prematurely dismissed the
motion for reconsideration because at that time, there
was a pending election protest which was later
decided in his favor.
Meanwhile, private respondent claims that the passage
of R.A. No. 9225 effectively abandoned the Courts
rulings in Frivaldo and Mercado; that the current law
requires a personal and sworn renunciation of any and
all foreign citizenship; and that petitioner, having
failed to renounce his American citizenship, remains a
dual citizen and is therefore disqualified from running
for an elective public position under Section 40 [11] of
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991 (LGC).
The issues for resolution are: 1) whether the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
dismissing petitioners motion for reconsideration for
being moot; and 2) whether petitioner is disqualified
from running for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija
in the May 14, 2007 elections for having failed to
renounce his American citizenship in accordance with
R.A. No. 9225.
An issue becomes moot when it ceases to present a
justifiable controversy so that a determination thereof
would be without practical use and value.[12] In this
case, the pendency of petitioners election protest
assailing the results of the election did not render
moot the motion for reconsideration which he filed
assailing his disqualification. Stated otherwise, the
issue of petitioners citizenship did not become moot;
the resolution of the issue remained relevant because
it could significantly affect the outcome of the
election protest. Philippine citizenship is an
indispensable requirement for holding an elective
office. As mandated by law: An elective local official
must be a citizen of the Philippines.[13] It bears
stressing that the Regional Trial Court later ruled in
favor of petitioner in the election protest and declared
him the winner. In view thereof, a definitive ruling on
the issue of petitioners citizenship was clearly
necessary. Hence, the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners motion
for reconsideration solely on the ground that the same
was rendered moot because he lost to private
respondent.
Anent the second issue, we find that petitioner
is disqualified from running for public office in view
of his failure to renounce his American citizenship.
R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-
acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship for:
1) natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens
of a foreign country; and 2) natural-born citizens of
the Philippines who, after the effectivity of the law,
become citizens of a foreign country.The law provides
that they are deemed to have re-acquired or retained
their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of
allegiance.[14]
Petitioner falls under the first category, being a
natural-born citizen who lost his Philippine
citizenship upon his naturalization as an American
citizen. In the instant case, there is no question that
petitioner re-acquired his Philippine citizenship after
taking the oath of allegiance on September 6,
2006. However, it must be emphasized that R.A. No.
9225 imposes an additional requirement on those who
wish to seek elective public office, as follows:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights
and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-
acquire Philippine Citizenship under this
Act shall enjoy full civil and political
rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under
existing laws of the Philippines and the
following conditions:
 xxxx
(2) Those seeking
elective public office in the
Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding
such public office as required
by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time
of the filing of the certificate
of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to
administer an oath.
Contrary to petitioners claims, the filing of a
certificate of candidacy does not ipso facto amount to
a renunciation of his foreign citizenship under R.A.
No. 9225. Our rulings in the cases
of Frivaldo and Mercado are not applicable to the
instant case because R.A. No. 9225 provides for more
requirements.
Thus, in Japzon v. COMELEC,[15] the Court held
that Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 requires the twin
requirements of swearing to an Oath of
Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of Foreign
Citizenship, viz:
Breaking down the afore-quoted provision,
for a natural born Filipino, who reacquired
or retained his Philippine citizenship under
Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public
office, he must: (1) meet the qualifications
for holding such public office as required
by the Constitution and existing laws; and
(2) make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenships before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath.
Further, in Jacot v. Dal and COMELEC,[16] the
Court ruled that a candidates oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and his Certificate of
Candidacy do not substantially comply with the
requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation of
foreign citizenship. Thus:
The law categorically requires persons
seeking elective public office, who either
retained their Philippine citizenship or
those who reacquired it, to make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before a public
officer authorized to administer an oath
simultaneous with or before the filing of
the certificate of candidacy.
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No.
9225 compels natural-born Filipinos,
who have been naturalized as citizens of
a foreign country, but who reacquired
or retained their Philippine citizenship
(1) to take the oath of allegiance under
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and
(2) for those seeking elective public
offices in the Philippines, to additionally
execute a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before an authorized public
officer prior or simultaneous to the filing
of their certificates of candidacy, to
qualify as candidates in Philippine
elections.
Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No.
9225 (on the making of a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship) requires of the Filipinos
availing themselves of the benefits under
the said Act to accomplish an undertaking
other than that which they have
presumably complied with under Section 3
thereof (oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines). This is made clear in
the discussion of the Bicameral
Conference Committee on Disagreeing
Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and
Senate Bill No. 2130 held on 18 August
2003 (precursors of Republic Act No.
9225), where the Hon. Chairman Franklin
Drilon and Hon. Representative Arthur
Defensor explained to Hon. Representative
Exequiel Javier that the oath of allegiance
is different from the renunciation of
foreign citizenship:
CHAIRMAN DRILON. Okay.
So, No. 2. Those seeking
elective public office in the
Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding
such public office as required
by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time
of the filing of the certificate
of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to
administer an oath. I think its
very good, ha? No problem?
REP. JAVIER. I think its
already covered by the oath.
CHAIRMAN DRILON.
Renouncing foreign
citizenship.
REP. JAVIER. Ah but he has
taken his oath already.
CHAIRMAN DRILON. Nono,
renouncing foreign
citizenship.
xxxx
CHAIRMAN DRILON. Can I
go back to No. 2. Whats your
problem, Boy? Those seeking
elective office in
the Philippines.
REP. JAVIER. They are
trying to make him renounce
his citizenship thinking that
ano
CHAIRMAN DRILON. His
American citizenship.
REP. JAVIER. To discourage
him from running?
CHAIRMAN DRILON. No.
REP. A.D. DEFENSOR.
No. When he runs he will
only have one
citizenship. When he runs
for office, he will have only
one. (Emphasis ours.)
There is little doubt, therefore, that the
intent of the legislators was not only for
Filipinos reacquiring or retaining their
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act
No. 9225 to take their oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, but also to
explicitly renounce their foreign
citizenship if they wish to run for elective
posts in the Philippines. To qualify as a
candidate in Philippine elections, Filipinos
must only have one citizenship, namely,
Philippine citizenship.
By the same token, the oath of allegiance
contained in the Certificate of Candidacy,
which is substantially similar to the one
contained in Section 3 of Republic Act No.
9225, does not constitute the personal and
 sworn renunciation sought under Section
5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225. It bears to
emphasize that the said oath of allegiance
is a general requirement for all those who
wish to run as candidates in Philippine
elections; while the renunciation of foreign
citizenship is an additional requisite only
for those who have retained or reacquired
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act
No. 9225 and who seek elective public
posts, considering their special
circumstance of having more than one
citizenship.
In the instant case, petitioners Oath of Allegiance and
Certificate of Candidacy did not comply with Section
5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 which further requires those
seeking elective public office in the Philippines to
make a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship. Petitioner failed to renounce his American
citizenship; as such, he is disqualified from running
for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May
14, 2007 elections.
WHEREFORE, the petition
is DISMISSED. Petitioner is
declared DISQUALIFIED from running for Vice-
Mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007
elections because of his failure to renounce his foreign
citizenship pursuant to Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
SO ORDERED.
Quinto vs COMELEC
NACHURA, J.:
In our predisposition to discover the original
intent of a statute, courts become the unfeeling pillars
of the status quo. Little do we realize that statutes or
even constitutions are bundles of compromises thrown
our way by their framers. Unless we exercise
vigilance, the statute may already be out of tune and
irrelevant to our day.[1] It is in this light that we should
address the instant case.
Before the Court is a petition for prohibition
and certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary
injunction, assailing Section 4(a) of Resolution No.
8678 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
In view of pressing contemporary events, the petition
begs for immediate resolution.
The Antecedents
This controversy actually stems from the law
authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated
election system (AES).
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8436, entitled AN ACT
AUTHORIZING THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS TO USE AN AUTOMATED
ELECTION SYSTEM IN THE MAY 11, 1998
NATIONAL OR LOCAL ELECTIONS AND IN
SUBSEQUENT NATIONAL AND LOCAL
ELECTORAL EXERCISES, PROVIDING FUNDS
THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Section 11 thereof reads:
SEC. 11. Official Ballot.The
Commission shall prescribe the size and
form of the official ballot which shall
contain the titles of the positions to be
filled and/or the propositions to be voted
upon in an initiative, referendum or
plebiscite. Under each position, the names
of candidates shall be arranged
alphabetically by surname and uniformly
printed using the same type size. A fixed
space where the chairman of the Board of
Election inspectors shall affix his/her
signature to authenticate the official ballot
shall be provided.
Both sides of the ballots may be
used when necessary.
For this purpose, the deadline for
the filing of certificate of
candidacy/petition for
registration/manifestation to participate
in the election shall not be later than one
hundred twenty (120) days before the
elections: Provided, That, any elective
official, whether national or local,
running for any office other than the
one which he/she is holding in a
permanent capacity, except for
president and vice president, shall be
deemed resigned only upon the start of
the campaign period corresponding to
the position for which he/she is
running: Provided, further, That,
unlawful acts or omissions applicable to
a candidate shall take effect upon the
start of the aforesaid campaign
period: Provided, finally, That, for
purposes of the May 11, 1998 elections,
the deadline for filing of the certificate of
candidacy for the positions of President,
Vice President, Senators and candidates
under the Party-List System as well as
petitions for registration and/or
manifestation to participate in the Party-
List System shall be on February 9, 1998
while the deadline for the filing of
certificate of candidacy for other positions
shall be on March 27, 1998.
The official ballots shall be printed
by the National Printing Office and/or
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas at the
price comparable with that of private
printers under proper security measures
which the Commission shall adopt. The
Commission may contract the services of
private printers upon certification by the
National Printing Office/Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas that it cannot meet the
printing requirements. Accredited political
parties and deputized citizens' arms of the
Commission may assign watchers in the
printing, storage and distribution of official
ballots.
To prevent the use of fake ballots,
the Commission through the Committee
shall ensure that the serial number on the
ballot stub shall be printed in magnetic ink
that shall be easily detectable by
inexpensive hardware and shall be
impossible to reproduce on a photocopying
machine and that identification marks,
magnetic strips, bar codes and other
technical and security markings, are
provided on the ballot.
The official ballots shall be printed
and distributed to each city/municipality at
the rate of one (1) ballot for every
registered voter with a provision of
additional four (4) ballots per precinct.[2]
Almost a decade thereafter, Congress amended
the law on January 23, 2007 by enacting R.A. No.
9369, entitled AN ACT AMENDING REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 8436, ENTITLED AN ACT
AUTHORIZING THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS TO USE AN AUTOMATED
ELECTION SYSTEM IN THE MAY 11, 1998
NATIONAL OR LOCAL ELECTIONS AND IN
SUBSEQUENT NATIONAL AND LOCAL
ELECTORAL EXERCISES, TO ENCOURAGE
TRANSPARENCY, CREDIBILITY, FAIRNESS
AND ACCURACY OF ELECTIONS, AMENDING
FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMPANSA BLG.
881, AS AMEMDED, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7166
AND OTHER RELATED ELECTION LAWS,
PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES. Section 13 of the amendatory
law modified Section 11 of R.A. No. 8436, thus:
SEC. 13. Section 11 of Republic
Act No. 8436 is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 15. Official Ballot.The
Commission shall prescribe the format of
the electronic display and/or the size and
form of the official ballot, which shall
contain the titles of the position to be filled
and/or the propositions to be voted upon in
an initiative, referendum or plebiscite.
Where practicable, electronic displays
must be constructed to present the names
of all candidates for the same position in
the same page or screen, otherwise, the
electronic displays must be constructed to
present the entire ballot to the voter, in a
series of sequential pages, and to ensure
that the voter sees all of the ballot options
on all pages before completing his or her
vote and to allow the voter to review and
change all ballot choices prior to
completing and casting his or her ballot.
Under each position to be filled, the names
of candidates shall be arranged
alphabetically by surname and uniformly
indicated using the same type size. The
maiden or married name shall be listed in
the official ballot, as preferred by the
female candidate. Under each proposition
to be vote upon, the choices should be
uniformly indicated using the same font
and size.
A fixed space where the chairman
of the board of election inspectors shall
affix his/her signature to authenticate the
official ballot shall be provided.
For this purpose, the Commission
shall set the deadline for the filing of
certificate of candidacy/petition of
registration/manifestation to participate
in the election. Any person who files his
certificate of candidacy within this
period shall only be considered as a
candidate at the start of the campaign
period for which he filed his certificate
of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful
acts or omissions applicable to a
candidate shall take effect only upon the
start of the aforesaid campaign
period: Provided, finally, That any
person holding a public appointive
office or position, including active
members of the armed forces, and
officers and employees in government-
owned or -controlled corporations, shall
be considered ipso facto resigned from
his/her office and must vacate the same
at the start of the day of the filing of
his/her certificate of candidacy.
Political parties may hold political
conventions to nominate their official
candidates within thirty (30) days before
the start of the period for filing a certificate
of candidacy.
With respect to a paper-based
election system, the official ballots shall be
printed by the National Printing Office
and/or the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas at
the price comparable with that of private
printers under proper security measures
which the Commission shall adopt. The
Commission may contract the services of
private printers upon certification by the
National Printing Office/Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas that it cannot meet the
printing requirements. Accredited political
parties and deputized citizens arms of the
Commission shall assign watchers in the
printing, storage and distribution of official
ballots.
To prevent the use of fake ballots,
the Commission through the Committee
shall ensure that the necessary safeguards,
such as, but not limited to, bar codes,
holograms, color shifting ink,
microprinting, are provided on the ballot.
The official ballots shall be printed
and distributed to each city/municipality at
the rate of one ballot for every registered
voter with a provision of additional three
ballots per precinct.[3]
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to
enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC
issued Resolution No. 8678,[4] the Guidelines on the
Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and
Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered
Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010
National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of
Resolution No. 8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing
Certificates of Candidacy.a) Any person
holding a public appointive office or
position including active members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other
officers and employees in government-
owned or controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his
office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
b) Any person holding an elective
office or position shall not be considered
resigned upon the filing of his certificate
of candidacy for the same or any other
elective office or position.
SEC. 5. Period for filing Certificate
of Candidacy.The certificate of candidacy
shall be filed on regular days, from
November 20 to 30, 2009, during office
hours, except on the last day, which shall
be until midnight.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso
facto resigned from their offices the moment they file
their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino
A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the
government and who intend to run in the coming
elections,[5] filed the instant petition for prohibition
and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-
quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null
and void.
The Petitioners Contention
Petitioners contend that the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion when it issued the assailed
Resolution. They aver that the advance filing of CoCs
for the 2010 elections is intended merely for the
purpose of early printing of the official ballots in
order to cope with time limitations. Such advance
filing does not automatically make the person who
filed the CoC a candidate at the moment of filing. In
fact, the law considers him a candidate only at the
start of the campaign period. Petitioners then assert
that this being so, they should not be deemed ipso
facto resigned from their government offices when
they file their CoCs, because at such time they are not
yet treated by law as candidates. They should be
considered resigned from their respective offices only
at the start of the campaign period when they are, by
law, already considered as candidates. [6]
Petitioners also contend that Section 13 of R.A.
No. 9369, the basis of the assailed COMELEC
resolution, contains two conflicting provisions. These
must be harmonized or reconciled to give effect to
both and to arrive at a declaration that they are
not ipso facto resigned from their positions upon the
filing of their CoCs.[7]
Petitioners further posit that the provision
considering them as ipso facto resigned from office
upon the filing of their CoCs is discriminatory and
violates the equal protection clause in the
Constitution.[8]
The Respondents Arguments
On the procedural aspect of the petition, the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), representing respondent
COMELEC, argues that petitioners have no legal
standing to institute the suit. Petitioners have not yet
filed their CoCs, hence, they are not yet affected by
the assailed provision in the COMELEC resolution.
The OSG further claims that the petition is premature
or unripe for judicial determination. Petitioners have
admitted that they are merely planning to file their
CoCs for the coming 2010 elections. Their interest in
the present controversy is thus merely speculative and
contingent upon the filing of the same. The OSG
likewise contends that petitioners availed of the wrong
remedy. They are questioning an issuance of the
COMELEC made in the exercise of the latters rule-
making power. Certiorari under Rule 65 is then an
improper remedy.[9]
On the substantive aspect, the OSG maintains that the
COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in
phrasing Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 for it
merely copied what is in the law. The OSG, however,
agrees with petitioners that there is a conflict in
Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 that should be resolved.
According to the OSG, there seems to be no basis to
consider appointive officials as ipso facto resigned
and to require them to vacate their positions on the
same day that they file their CoCs, because they are
not yet considered as candidates at that time. Further,
this deemed resigned provision existed in Batas
Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 881, and no longer finds
a place in our present election laws with the
innovations brought about by the automated
system.[10]
Our Ruling
I.
At first glance, the petition suffers from an
incipient procedural defect. What petitioners assail in
their petition is a resolution issued by the COMELEC
in the exercise of its quasi-legislative
power. Certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to Rule
64, cannot be availed of, because it is a remedy to
question decisions, resolutions and issuances made in
the exercise of a judicial or quasi-judicial
function.[11] Prohibition is also an inappropriate
remedy, because what petitioners actually seek from
the Court is a determination of the proper construction
of a statute and a declaration of their rights
thereunder. Obviously, their petition is one for
declaratory relief,[12] over which this Court does not
exercise original jurisdiction.[13]
However, petitioners raise a challenge on the
constitutionality of the questioned provisions of both
the COMELEC resolution and the law. Given this
scenario, the Court may step in and resolve the instant
petition.
The transcendental nature and paramount
importance of the issues raised and the compelling
state interest involved in their early resolutionthe
period for the filing of CoCs for the 2010 elections
has already started and hundreds of civil servants
intending to run for elective offices are to lose their
employment, thereby causing imminent and
irreparable damage to their means of livelihood and,
at the same time, crippling the governments
manpowerfurther dictate that the Court must, for
propriety, if only from a sense of obligation, entertain
the petition so as to expedite the adjudication of all,
especially the constitutional, issues.
In any event, the Court has ample authority to
set aside errors of practice or technicalities of
procedure and resolve the merits of a case. Repeatedly
stressed in our prior decisions is the principle that the
Rules were promulgated to provide guidelines for the
orderly administration of justice, not to shackle the
hand that dispenses it. Otherwise, the courts would be
consigned to being mere slaves to technical rules,
deprived of their judicial discretion. [14]
 owned or -controlled corporations, shall
II. be considered ipso facto resigned from
his/her office and must vacate the same
To put things in their proper perspective, it is at the start of the day of the filing of
his/her certificate of candidacy.[15]
imperative that we trace the brief history of the
assailed provision. Section 4(a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8678 is a reproduction of the second Notably, this proviso is not present in Section
proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. 11 of R.A. No. 8436, the law amended by R.A. No.
No. 9369, which for ready reference is quoted as 9369. The proviso was lifted from Section 66 of B.P.
follows: Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) of
the Philippines, which reads:
For this purpose, the Commission
shall set the deadline for the filing of
Sec. 66. Candidates holding
certificate of candidacy/petition for
appointive office or position.Any person
registration/manifestation to participate in
holding a public appointive office or
the election. Any person who files his
position, including active members of the
certificate of candidacy within this period
Armed Forces of the Philippines, and
shall only be considered as a candidate at
officers and employees in government-
the start of the campaign period for which
owned or controlled corporations, shall be
he filed his certificate of
considered ipso facto resigned from his
candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts
office upon the filing of his certificate of
or omissions applicable to a candidate
candidacy.
shall take effect only upon the start of the
aforesaid campaign period: Provided,
finally, That any person holding a public
appointive office or position, including It may be recalledin inverse chronologythat
active members of the armed forces, and earlier, Presidential Decree No. 1296, or the 1978
officers and employees in government- Election Code, contained a similar provision, thus

SECTION 29. Candidates holding
appointive office or position. Every person
holding a public appointive office or
position, including active members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, and
officers and employees in government-
owned or controlled corporations,
shall ipso facto cease in his office or
position on the date he files his certificate
of candidacy. Members of the Cabinet
shall continue in the offices they presently
hold notwithstanding the filing of
certificate of candidacy, subject to the
pleasure of the President of
the Philippines.
Much earlier, R.A. No. 6388, or the Election
Code of 1971, likewise stated in its Section 23 the
following:
SECTION 23. Candidates Holding
Appointive Office or Position. Every
person holding a public appointive office
or position, including active members of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
every officer or employee in government-
owned or controlled corporations,
shall ipso facto cease in his office or
position on the date he files his certificate
of candidacy: Provided, That the filing of a
certificate of candidacy shall not affect
whatever civil, criminal or administrative
liabilities which he may have incurred.
Going further back in history, R.A. No. 180, or
the Revised Election Code approved on June 21,
1947, also provided that
SECTION 26. Automatic cessation
of appointive officers and employees who
are candidates. Every person holding a
public appointive office or position
shall ipso facto cease in his office or
position on the date he files his certificate
of candidacy.
During the Commonwealth era,
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 725, entitled AN ACT
TO PROVIDE FOR THE NEXT ELECTION FOR
PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES, SENATORS AND MEMBERS OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND
APPROPRIATING THE NECESSARY FUNDS
THEREFOR, approved on January 5, 1946,
contained, in the last paragraph of its Section 2, the
following:
A person occupying any civil office by
appointment in the government or any of
its political subdivisions or agencies or
government-owned or controlled
corporations, whether such office by
appointive or elective, shall be considered
to have resigned from such office from the
moment of the filing of such certificate of
candidacy.
Significantly, however, C.A. No. 666, entitled AN
ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE FIRST ELECTION
FOR PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT OF
THE PHILIPPINES, SENATORS, AND MEMBERS
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
AMENDMENTS THEREOF, enacted without
executive approval on June 22, 1941, the precursor of
C.A. No. 725, only provided for automatic resignation
of elective, but not appointive, officials.
Nevertheless, C.A. No. 357, or the Election
Code approved on August 22, 1938, had, in its
Section 22, the same verbatim provision as Section 26
of R.A. No. 180.
The earliest recorded Philippine law on the
subject is Act No. 1582, or the Election Law enacted
by the Philippine Commission in 1907, the last
paragraph of Section 29 of which reads:
Sec. 29. Penalties upon officers. x x
x.
No public officer shall offer himself
as a candidate for election, nor shall he be
eligible during the time that he holds said
public office to election, at any municipal,
provincial or Assembly election, except for
reelection to the position which he may be
holding, and no judge of the Court of First
Instance, justice of the peace, provincial
fiscal, or officer or employee of the Bureau
of Constabulary or of the Bureau of
Education shall aid any candidate or
influence in any manner or take any part in
any municipal, provincial, or Assembly
election under penalty of being deprived of
his office and being disqualified to hold
any public office whatever for a term of
five years: Provided, however, That the
foregoing provisions shall not be construed
 to deprive any person otherwise qualified HOLDING [means currently] A PUBLIC
of the right to vote at any election. APPOINTIVE POSITION SHALL BE
CONSIDERED IPSO FACTO
RESIGNED [which means that the
From this brief historical excursion, it may be prohibition extends only to appointive
gleaned that the second proviso in the third paragraph officials] INCLUDING ACTIVE
MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES,
of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369that any person
OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES This is a
holding a public appointive office or position, prohibition, Mr. President. This means if
including active members of the armed forces, and one is chairman of SSS or PDIC, he is
officers, and employees in government-owned or deemed ipso facto resigned when he files
controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso his certificate of candidacy. Is that the
facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the intention?
same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her
Senator Gordon. This is really an old
certificate of candidacytraces its roots to the period of provision, Mr. President.
the American occupation.
Senator Osmea. It is in bold letters, so I
In fact, during the deliberations of Senate Bill think it was a Committee amendment.
No. 2231, the bill later to be consolidated with House
Bill No. 5352 and enacted as R.A. No. 9369, Senator Senator Gordon. No, it has always been
there.
Richard Gordon, the principal author of the bill,
acknowledged that the said proviso in the proposed Senator Osmea. I see.
legislative measure is an old provision which was
merely copied from earlier existing legislation, thus Senator Gordon. I guess the intention is
not to give them undue advantage,
Senator Osmea. May I just opine here and especially certain people.
perhaps obtain the opinion of the good
Sponsor. This reads like, ANY PERSON Senator Osmea. All right.[16]

In that Senate deliberation, however, Senator
Miriam Defensor-Santiago expressed her concern
over the inclusion of the said provision in the new
law, given that the same would be disadvantageous
and unfair to potential candidates holding appointive
positions, while it grants a consequent preferential
treatment to elective officials, thus
Senator Santiago. On page 15, line 31, I
know that this is a losing cause, so I make
this point more as a matter of record than
of any feasible hope that it can possibly be
either accepted or if we come to a division
of the House, it will be upheld by the
majority.
I am referring to page 15, line 21. The
proviso begins: PROVIDED
FINALLY, THAT ANY PERSON
HOLDING A PUBLIC APPOINTIVE
OFFICESHALL BE CONSIDERED IPSO
FACTO RESIGNED FROM HIS/HER
OFFICE.
The point that I made during the
appropriate debate in the past in this Hall
is that there is, for me, no valid reason for
exempting elective officials from this
inhibition or disqualification imposed by
the law. If we are going to consider
appointive officers of the government,
including AFP members and officers of
government-owned and controlled
corporations, or any other member of the
appointive sector of the civil service, why
should it not apply to the elective sector
for, after all, even senators and
congressmen are members of the civil
service as well?
Further, it is self-serving for the Senate, or
for the Congress in general, to give an
exception to itself which is not available to
other similarly situated officials of
government. Of course, the answer is, the
reason why we are special is that we are
elected. Since we are imposing a
disqualification on all other government
officials except ourselves, I think, it is the
better part of delicadeza to inhibit
ourselves as well, so that if we want to stay
as senators, we wait until our term
expires. But if we want to run for some
other elective office during our term, then
we have to be considered resigned just like
everybody else. That is my proposed
amendment. But if it is unacceptable to the
 distinguished Sponsor, because of
sensitivity to the convictions of the rest of
our colleagues, I will understand.
Senator Gordon. Mr. President, I think the
suggestion is well-thought of. It is a good
policy. However, this is something that is
already in the old law which was upheld
by the Supreme court in a recent case that
the rider was not upheld and that it was
valid.[17]
The obvious inequality brought about by the
provision on automatic resignation of appointive civil
servants must have been the reason why Senator
Recto proposed the inclusion of the following during
the period of amendments: ANY PERSON WHO
FILES HIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY
WITHIN THIS PERIOD SHALL ONLY BE
CONSIDERED AS A CANDIDATE AT THE
START OF THE CAMPAIGN PERIOD FOR
WHICH HE FILED HIS COC.[18] The said proviso
seems to mitigate the situation of disadvantage
afflicting appointive officials by considering persons
who filed their CoCs as candidates only at the start of
the campaign period, thereby, conveying the tacit
intent that persons holding appointive positions will
only be considered as resigned at the start of the
campaign period when they are already treated by law
as candidates.
Parenthetically, it may be remembered that
Section 67 of the OEC and Section 11 of R.A. No.
8436 contained a similar provision on automatic
resignation of elective officials upon the filing of their
CoCs for any office other than that which they hold in
a permanent capacity or for President or Vice-
President. However, with the enactment of R.A. No.
9006, or the Fair Election Act,[19] in 2001, this
provision was repealed by Section 14 [20] of the said
act. There was, thus, created a situation of obvious
discrimination against appointive officials who were
deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices upon
the filing of their CoCs, while elective officials were
not.
This situation was incidentally addressed by the
Court in Farias v. The Executive Secretary[21] when it
ruled that
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006
Is Not Violative of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution
The petitioners contention, that the
repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code pertaining to elective
officials gives undue benefit to such
officials as against the appointive ones and
violates the equal protection clause of the
constitution, is tenuous.
The equal protection of the law
clause in the Constitution is not absolute,
but is subject to reasonable
classification. If the groupings are
characterized by substantial distinctions
that make real differences, one class may
be treated and regulated differently from
the other. The Court has explained the
nature of the equal protection guarantee in
this manner:
The equal protection
of the law clause is against
undue favor and individual or
class privilege, as well as
hostile discrimination or the
oppression of inequality. It is
not intended to prohibit
legislation which is limited
either in the object to which it
is directed or by territory
within which it is to
operate. It does not demand
absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires
that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like
circumstances and
conditions both as to
privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. The equal
protection clause is not
infringed by legislation
which applies only to those
persons falling within a
specified class, if it applies
alike to all persons within
such class, and reasonable
grounds exist for making a
distinction between those
who fall within such class
and those who do not.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist
between elective officials and appointive
officials. The former occupy their office
by virtue of the mandate of the electorate.
They are elected to an office for a definite
term and may be removed therefrom only
upon stringent conditions. On the other
hand, appointive officials hold their office
by virtue of their designation thereto by an
appointing authority. Some appointive
officials hold their office in a permanent
capacity and are entitled to security of
tenure while others serve at the pleasure of
the appointing authority.
Another substantial distinction
between the two sets of officials is that
under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I,
Subsection A. Civil Service Commission,
Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987 (Executive Order No. 292),
appointive officials, as officers and
employees in the civil service, are strictly
prohibited from engaging in any partisan
political activity or take part in any
election except to vote. Under the same
provision, elective officials, or officers or
employees holding political offices, are
obviously expressly allowed to take part in
political and electoral activities.
By repealing Section 67 but
retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code, the legislators deemed it
proper to treat these two classes of
officials differently with respect to the
effect on their tenure in the office of the
filing of the certificates of candidacy for
any position other than those occupied by
them. Again, it is not within the power of
the Court to pass upon or look into the
wisdom of this classification.
Since the classification justifying
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e.,
elected officials vis-a-vis appointive
officials, is anchored upon material and
significant distinctions and all the persons
belonging under the same classification are
similarly treated, the equal protection
clause of the Constitution is, thus, not
infringed.[22]
However, it must be remembered that the
Court, in Farias, was intently focused on the main
issue of whether the repealing clause in the Fair
Election Act was a constitutionally proscribed rider,
in that it unwittingly failed to ascertain with stricter
scrutiny the impact of the retention of the provision on
automatic resignation of persons holding appointive
positions (Section 66) in the OEC, vis--vis the equal
protection clause. Moreover, the Courts vision
in Farias was shrouded by the fact that petitioners
therein, Farias et al., never posed a direct challenge to
the constitutionality of Section 66 of the OEC. Farias
et al. rather merely questioned, on constitutional
grounds, the repealing clause, or Section 14 of the
Fair Election Act. The Courts afore-quoted
declaration in Farias may then very well be
considered as an obiter dictum.
III.
The instant case presents a rare opportunity for
the Court, in view of the constitutional challenge
advanced by petitioners, once and for all, to settle the
issue of whether the second proviso in the third
paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, a
reproduction of Section 66 of the OEC, which, as
shown above, was based on provisions dating back to
the American occupation, is violative of the equal
protection clause.
But before delving into the constitutional issue,
we shall first address the issues on legal standing and
on the existence of an actual controversy.
Central to the determination of locus standi is
the question of whether a party has alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.[23] In this case, petitioners allege that they
will be directly affected by COMELEC Resolution
No. 8678 for they intend, and they all have the
qualifications, to run in the 2010 elections. The OSG,
for its part, contends that since petitioners have not
yet filed their CoCs, they are not yet candidates;
hence, they are not yet directly affected by the
assailed provision in the COMELEC resolution.
The Court, nevertheless, finds that, while
petitioners are not yet candidates, they have the
standing to raise the constitutional challenge, simply
because they are qualified voters. A restriction on
candidacy, such as the challenged measure herein,
affects the rights of voters to choose their public
officials. The rights of voters and the rights of
candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation;
laws that affect candidates always have at least some
theoretical, correlative effect on voters.[24] The Court
believes that both candidates and voters may
challenge, on grounds of equal protection, the assailed
measure because of its impact on voting rights.[25]
 In any event, in recent cases, this Court has
relaxed the stringent direct injury test and has
observed a liberal policy allowing ordinary citizens,
members of Congress, and civil organizations to
prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or
validity of laws, regulations and rulings. [26]
We have also stressed in our prior decisions
that the exercise by this Court of judicial power is
limited to the determination and resolution of actual
cases and controversies.[27] The Court, in this case,
finds that an actual case or controversy exists between
the petitioners and the COMELEC, the body charged
with the enforcement and administration of all
election laws. Petitioners have alleged in a precise
manner that they would engage in the very acts that
would trigger the enforcement of the provisionthey
would file their CoCs and run in the 2010 elections.
Given that the assailed provision provides for ipso
facto resignation upon the filing of the CoC, it cannot
be said that it presents only a speculative or
hypothetical obstacle to petitioners candidacy. [28]
IV.
Having hurdled what the OSG posed as
obstacles to judicial review, the Court now delves into
the constitutional challenge.
It is noteworthy to point out that the right to run
for public office touches on two fundamental
freedoms, those of expression and of association. This
premise is best explained in Mancuso v. Taft,[29] viz.:
Freedom of expression guarantees
to the individual the opportunity to write a
letter to the local newspaper, speak out in a
public park, distribute handbills
advocating radical reform, or picket an
official building to seek redress of
grievances. All of these activities are
protected by the First Amendment if done
in a manner consistent with a narrowly
defined concept of public order and safety.
The choice of means will likely depend on
the amount of time and energy the
individual wishes to expend and on his
perception as to the most effective method
of projecting his message to the public.
But interest and commitment are evolving
phenomena. What is an effective means
for protest at one point in time may not
seem so effective at a later date. The
dilettante who participates in a picket line
may decide to devote additional time and
resources to his expressive activity. As his
commitment increases, the means of
effective expression changes, but the
expressive quality remains constant. He
may decide to lead the picket line, or to
publish the newspaper. At one point in
time he may decide that the most effective
way to give expression to his views and to
get the attention of an appropriate audience
is to become a candidate for public office-
means generally considered among the
most appropriate for those desiring to
effect change in our governmental
systems. He may seek to become a
candidate by filing in a general election as
an independent or by seeking the
nomination of a political party. And in the
latter instance, the individual's expressive
activity has two dimensions: besides
urging that his views be the views of the
elected public official, he is also
attempting to become a spokesman for a
political party whose substantive program
extends beyond the particular office in
question. But Cranston has said that a
certain type of its citizenry, the public
employee, may not become a candidate
and may not engage in any campaign
activity that promotes himself as a
candidate for public office. Thus the city
has stifled what may be the most important
expression an individual can summon,
namely that which he would be willing to
effectuate, by means of concrete public
action, were he to be selected by the
voters.
It is impossible to ignore the
additional fact that the right to run for
office also affects the freedom to associate.
In Williams v. Rhodes, supra, the Court
used strict review to invalidate
an Ohio election system that made it
virtually impossible for third parties to
secure a place on the ballot. The Court
found that the First Amendment protected
the freedom to associate by forming and
promoting a political party and that that
freedom was infringed when the state
effectively denied a party access to its
electoral machinery. The Cranston charter
provision before us also affects
associational rights, albeit in a slightly
different way. An individual may decide to
join or participate in an organization or
political party that shares his beliefs. He
may even form a new group to forward his
ideas. And at some juncture his supporters
and fellow party members may decide that
he is the ideal person to carry the group's
standard into the electoral fray. To thus
restrict the options available to political
organization as the Cranston charter
provision has done is to limit the
effectiveness of association; and the
freedom to associate is intimately related
with the concept of making expression
effective. Party access to the ballot
becomes less meaningful if some of those
selected by party machinery to carry the
party's programs to the people are
precluded from doing so because those
nominees are civil servants.
Whether the right to run for office is
looked at from the point of view of
individual expression or associational
effectiveness, wide opportunities exist for
the individual who seeks public office. The
fact of candidacy alone may open
previously closed doors of the media. The
candidate may be invited to discuss his
views on radio talk shows; he may be able
to secure equal time on television to
elaborate his campaign program; the
newspapers may cover his candidacy; he
may be invited to debate before various
groups that had theretofore never heard of
him or his views. In short, the fact of
candidacy opens up a variety of
communicative possibilities that are not
available to even the most diligent of
picketers or the most loyal of party
followers. A view today, that running for
public office is not an interest protected by
the First Amendment, seems to us an
outlook stemming from an earlier era when
public office was the preserve of the
professional and the
wealthy. Consequently we hold that
candidacy is both a protected First
Amendment right and a fundamental
interest. Hence any legislative
classification that significantly burdens
that interest must be subjected to strict
equal protection review.[30]
Here, petitioners interest in running for public
office, an interest protected by Sections 4 and 8 of
Article III of the Constitution, is breached by the
proviso in Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369. It is now the
opportune time for the Court to strike down the said
proviso for being violative of the equal protection
clause and for being overbroad.
In considering persons holding appointive positions
as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing
of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all
other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the
law unduly discriminates against the first class. The
fact alone that there is substantial distinction between
those who hold appointive positions and those
occupying elective posts, does not justify such
differential treatment.
In order that there can be valid classification so that a
discriminatory governmental act may pass the
constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary
that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be
complied with, namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial
distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of
the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of
the class.
The first requirement means that there must be
real and substantial differences between the classes
treated differently. As illustrated in the fairly
recent Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and
Highways,[31] a real and substantial distinction exists
between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles
sufficient to justify its classification among those
prohibited from plying the toll ways. Not all
motorized vehicles are created equala two-wheeled
vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than
a four-wheel vehicle.
Nevertheless, the classification would still be
invalid if it does not comply with the second
requirementif it is not germane to the purpose of the
law. Justice Isagani A. Cruz (Ret.), in his treatise on
constitutional law, explains,
The classification, even if based on
substantial distinctions, will still be invalid
if it is not germane to the purpose of the
law. To illustrate, the accepted difference
in physical stamina between men and
women will justify the prohibition of the
latter from employment as miners or
stevedores or in other heavy and strenuous
work. On the basis of this same
classification, however, the law cannot
provide for a lower passing average for
 women in the bar examinations because
physical strength is not the test for
admission to the legal profession. Imported
cars may be taxed at a higher rate than
locally assembled automobiles for the
protection of the national economy, but
their difference in origin is no justification
for treating them differently when it comes
to punishing violations of traffic
regulations. The source of the vehicle has
no relation to the observance of these
rules.[32]
The third requirement means that the classification
must be enforced not only for the present but as long
as the problem sought to be corrected continues to
exist. And, under the last requirement, the
classification would be regarded as invalid if all the
members of the class are not treated similarly, both as
to rights conferred and obligations imposed. [33]
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the
Court finds that the differential treatment of persons
holding appointive offices as opposed to those
holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes
of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to
prevent the use of a governmental position to promote
ones candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or
coercive influence on the electorate. The measure is
further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity,
and discipline of the public service by eliminating the
danger that the discharge of official duty would be
motivated by political considerations rather than the
welfare of the public.[34] The restriction is also
justified by the proposition that the entry of civil
servants to the electoral arena, while still in office,
could result in neglect or inefficiency in the
performance of duty because they would be attending
to their campaign rather than to their office work.
If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the
law, then the assailed provision cannot be
constitutionally rescued on the ground of valid
classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite that the
classification must be germane to the purposes of the
law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive office or
an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by
the measure remain. For example, the Executive
Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that
matter, could wield the same influence as the Vice-
President who at the same time is appointed to a
Cabinet post (in the recent past, elected Vice-
Presidents were appointed to take charge of national
housing, social welfare development, interior and
local government, and foreign affairs). With the fact
that they both head executive offices, there is no valid
justification to treat them differently when both file
their CoCs for the elections. Under the present state of
our law, the Vice-President, in the example, running
this time, let us say, for President, retains his position
during the entire election period and can still use the
resources of his office to support his campaign.
As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or
partisanship in the discharge of the functions of his
appointive office, the inverse could be just as true and
compelling. The public officer who files his certificate
of candidacy would be driven by a greater impetus for
excellent performance to show his fitness for the
position aspired for.
Mancuso v. Taft,[35] cited above, explains that the
measure on automatic resignation, which restricts the
rights of civil servants to run for officea right
inextricably linked to their freedom of expression and
association, is not reasonably necessary to the
satisfaction of the state interest. Thus, in striking
down a similar measure in the United
States, Mancusosuccinctly declares
In proceeding to the second stage of
active equal protection review, however,
we do see some contemporary relevance of
the Mitchell decision. National Ass'n of
Letter Carriers, supra. In order for
the Cranston charter provision to withstand
strict scrutiny, the city must show that the
exclusion of all government employees
from candidacy is necessary to achieve a
compelling state interest. And, as stated
in Mitchell and other cases dealing with
similar statutes, see Wisconsin State
Employees, supra; Broadrick, supra,
government at all levels has a substantial
interest in protecting the integrity of its
civil service. It is obviously conceivable
that the impartial character of the civil
service would be seriously jeopardized if
people in positions of authority used their
discretion to forward their electoral
ambitions rather than the public welfare.
Similarly if a public employee pressured
other fellow employees to engage in
corrupt practices in return for promises of
post-election reward, or if an employee
invoked the power of the office he was
seeking to extract special favors from his
superiors, the civil service would be done
irreparable injury. Conversely, members of
the public, fellow-employees, or
supervisors might themselves request
favors from the candidate or might
improperly adjust their own official
behavior towards him. Even if none of
these abuses actually materialize, the
possibility of their occurrence might
seriously erode the public's confidence in
its public employees. For the reputation of
impartiality is probably as crucial as the
impartiality itself; the knowledge that a
clerk in the assessor's office who is
running for the local zoning board has
access to confidential files which could
provide pressure points for furthering his
campaign is destructive regardless of
whether the clerk actually takes advantage
of his opportunities. For all of these
reasons we find that the state indeed has a
compelling interest in maintaining the
honesty and impartiality of its public work
force.
We do not, however, consider the
exclusionary measure taken by Cranston-a
flat prohibition on office-seeking of all
kinds by all kinds of public employees-as
even reasonably necessary to satisfaction
of this state interest. As Justice Marshall
pointed out in Dunn v.
Blumstein, [s]tatutes affecting
constitutional rights must be drawn with
precision. For three sets of reasons we
conclude that the Cranston charter
provision pursues its objective in a far too
heavy-handed manner and hence must fall
under the equal protection clause. First, we
think the nature of the regulation-a broad
prophylactic rule-may be unnecessary to
fulfillment of the city's objective. Second,
even granting some sort of prophylactic
rule may be required, the provision here
prohibits candidacies for all types of public
office, including many which would pose
none of the problems at which the law is
aimed. Third, the provision excludes the
candidacies of all types of public
employees, without any attempt to limit
exclusion to those employees whose
positions make them vulnerable to
corruption and conflicts of interest.
There is thus no valid justification to treat
appointive officials differently from the elective
ones. The classification simply fails to meet the test
that it should be germane to the purposes of the
law. The measure encapsulated in the second proviso
of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369
and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal
protection clause.
V.
The challenged provision also suffers from the
infirmity of being overbroad.
First, the provision pertains to all civil servants
holding appointive posts without distinction as to
whether they occupy high positions in government or
not. Certainly, a utility worker in the government will
also be considered as ipso facto resigned once he files
his CoC for the 2010 elections. This scenario is
absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can use
his position in the government to wield influence in
the political world.
While it may be admitted that most appointive
officials who seek public elective office are those who
occupy relatively high positions in government, laws
cannot be legislated for them alone, or with them
alone in mind. For the right to seek public elective
office is universal, open and unrestrained, subject only
to the qualification standards prescribed in the
Constitution and in the laws. These qualifications are,
as we all know, general and basic so as to allow the
widest participation of the citizenry and to give free
rein for the pursuit of ones highest aspirations to
public office. Such is the essence of democracy.
Second, the provision is directed to the activity
of seeking any and all public offices, whether they be
partisan or nonpartisan in character, whether they be
in the national, municipal or barangay level. Congress
has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict
the fundamental right involved on such a sweeping
scale.[36]
Specific evils require specific treatments, not
through overly broad measures that unduly restrict
guaranteed freedoms of the citizenry. After all,
sovereignty resides in the people, and all
governmental power emanates from them.
Mancuso v. Taft,[37] on this point, instructs
As to approaches less restrictive
than a prophylactic rule, there exists the
device of the leave of absence. Some
system of leaves of absence would permit
the public employee to take time off to
pursue his candidacy while assuring him
his old job should his candidacy be
unsuccessful. Moreover, a leave of
absence policy would eliminate many of
the opportunities for engaging in the
questionable practices that the statute is
designed to prevent. While campaigning,
the candidate would feel no conflict
between his desire for election and his
publicly entrusted discretion, nor any
conflict between his efforts to persuade the
public and his access to confidential
documents. But instead of adopting a
reasonable leave of absence
policy, Cranston has chosen a provision
that makes the public employee cast off
the security of hard-won public
employment should he desire to compete
for elected office.
The city might also promote its
interest in the integrity of the civil service
by enforcing, through dismissal, discipline,
or criminal prosecution, rules or statutes
that treat conflict of interests, bribery, or
other forms of official corruption. By thus
attacking the problem directly, instead of
using a broad prophylactic rule, the city
could pursue its objective without unduly
burdening the First Amendment rights of
its employees and the voting rights of its
citizens. Last term in Dunn v. Blumstein,
the Supreme Court faced an analogous
question when the State
of Tennessee asserted that the interest of
ballot box purity justified its imposition of
one year and three month residency
requirements before a citizen could vote.
Justice Marshall stated, inter
alia,that Tennessee had available a number
of criminal statutes that could be used to
punish voter fraud without unnecessary
infringement on the newcomer's right to
vote. Similarly, it appears from the record
in this case that the Cranston charter
contains some provisions that might be
used against opportunistic public
employees.
Even if some sort of prophylactic
rule is necessary, we cannot say
that Cranston has put much effort into
tailoring a narrow provision that attempts
to match the prohibition with the problem.
The charter forbids a Cranston public
employee from running for any office,
anywhere. The prohibition is not limited
to the local offices of Cranston, but rather
extends to statewide offices and even to
national offices. It is difficult for us to see
that a public employee running for the
United States Congress poses quite the
same threat to the civil service as would
the same employee if he were running for
a local office where the contacts and
information provided by his job related
directly to the position he was seeking, and
hence where the potential for various
abuses was greater. Nor does
the Cranston charter except the public
employee who works in Cranston but
aspires to office in another local
jurisdiction, most probably his town of
residence. Here again the charter precludes
candidacies which can pose only a remote
threat to the civil service. Finally, the
charter does not limit its prohibition to
partisan office-seeking, but sterilizes also
those public employees who would seek
nonpartisan elective office. The statute
reviewed in Mitchell was limited to
partisan political activity, and since that
time other courts have found the partisan-
nonpartisan distinction a material one. See
Kinnear,
supra; Wisconsin State Employees,
supra; Gray v. Toledo, supra. While the
line between nonpartisan and partisan can
often be blurred by systems whose true
characters are disguised by the names
given them by their architects, it seems
clear that the concerns of a truly partisan
office and the temptations it fosters are
sufficiently different from those involved
in an office removed from regular party
politics to warrant distinctive treatment in
a charter of this sort.
The third and last area of excessive
and overinclusive coverage of
the Cranston charter relates not to the type
of office sought, but to the type of
employee seeking the office. As Justice
Douglas pointed out in his dissent
in Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 120-126, 67 S.Ct.
556, restrictions on administrative
employees who either participate in
decision-making or at least have some
access to information concerning policy
matters are much more justifiable than
restrictions on industrial employees, who,
but for the fact that the government owns
the plant they work in, are, for purposes of
access to official information, identically
situated to all other industrial workers.
Thus, a worker in the Philadelphia mint
could be distinguished from a secretary in
an office of the Department of Agriculture;
so also could a janitor in the public schools
of Cranston be distinguished from an
assistant comptroller of the same city. A
second line of distinction that focuses on
the type of employee is illustrated by the
cases of Kinnear and Minielly, supra. In
both of these cases a civil service deputy
decided to run for the elected office of
sheriff. The courts in both cases felt that
the no-candidacy laws in question were
much too broad and indicated that perhaps
the only situation sensitive enough to
justify a flat rule was one in which an
inferior in a public office electorally
challenged his immediate superior. Given
all these considerations, we
think Cranston has not given adequate
attention to the problem of narrowing the
terms of its charter to deal with the specific
kinds of conflict-of-interest problems it
seeks to avoid.
We also do not find convincing the
arguments that after-hours campaigning
will drain the energy of the public
employee to the extent that he is incapable
of performing his job effectively and that
inevitable on-the-job campaigning and
discussion of his candidacy will disrupt the
work of others. Although it is indisputable
that the city has a compelling interest in
the performance of official work, the
exclusion is not well-tailored to effectuate
that interest. Presumably the city could fire
the individual if he clearly shirks his
employment responsibilities or disrupts the
work of others. Also, the efficiency
rationale common to both arguments is
significantly underinclusive. It applies
equally well to a number of non-political,
extracurricular activities that are not
prohibited by the Cranston charter. Finally,
the connection between after-hours
campaigning and the state interest seems
tenuous; in many cases a public employee
would be able to campaign aggressively
and still continue to do his job well. [38]
Incidentally, Clements v. Fashing[39] sustained
as constitutional a provision on the automatic
resignation of District Clerks, County Clerks, County
Judges, County Treasurers, Criminal District
Attorneys, County Surveyors, Inspectors of Hides and
Animals, County Commissioners, Justices of the
Peace, Sheriffs, Assessors and Collectors of Taxes,
District Attorneys, County Attorneys, Public
Weighers, and Constables if they announce their
candidacy or if they become candidates in any
general, special or primary election.
In Clements, it may be readily observed that a
provision treating differently particular officials, as
distinguished from all others, under a classification
that is germane to the purposes of the law, merits the
stamp of approval from American courts. Not,
however, a general and sweeping provision, and more
so one violative of the second requisite for a valid
classification, which is on its face unconstitutional.
On a final note, it may not be amiss to state that
the Americans, from whom we copied the provision in
question, had already stricken down a similar measure
for being unconstitutional. It is high-time that we, too,
should follow suit and, thus, uphold fundamental
liberties over age-old, but barren, restrictions to such
freedoms.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition is GRANTED. The second proviso in the
third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No.
9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and
Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are
declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
SO ORDERED.
Penera vs COMELEC
ROSALINDA A. PENERA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDGAR T.
ANDANAR, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
We grant Rosalinda A. Penera’s (Penera) motion for
reconsideration of this Court’s Decision of 11 September 2009
(Decision).
The assailed Decision dismissed Penera’s petition and affirmed
the Resolution dated 30 July 2008 of the COMELEC En Banc as
well as the Resolution dated 24 July 2007 of the COMELEC
Second Division. The Decision disqualified Penera from running
for the office of Mayor in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte and
declared that the Vice-Mayor should succeed Penera.
In support of her motion for reconsideration, Penera submits the
following arguments:
 1. Penera was not yet a candidate at the time of the
incident under Section 11 of RA 8436 as amended by
Section 13 of RA 9369.
2. The petition for disqualification failed to submit
convincing and substantial evidence against Penera for
violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.
3. Penera never admitted the allegations of the petition for
disqualification and has consistently disputed the charge
of premature campaigning.
4. The admission that Penera participated in a motorcade
is not the same as admitting she engaged in premature
election campaigning.
Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code defines a
"candidate" as "any person aspiring for or seeking an elective
public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy x x x." The
second sentence, third paragraph, Section 15 of RA 8436, as
amended by Section 13 of RA 9369, provides that "[a]ny person
who files his certificate of candidacy within [the period for
filing] shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the
campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy."
The immediately succeeding proviso in the same third paragraph
states that "unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate
shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign
period." These two provisions determine the resolution of this
case.
The Decision states that "[w]hen the campaign period starts and
[the person who filed his certificate of candidacy] proceeds with
his/her candidacy, his/her intent turning into actuality, we can
already consider his/her acts, after the filing of his/her COC and
prior to the campaign period, as the promotion of his/her election
as a candidate, hence, constituting premature campaigning, for
which he/she may be disqualified."1
Under the Decision, a candidate may already be liable for
premature campaigning after the filing of the certificate of
candidacy but even before the start of the campaign period. From
the filing of the certificate of candidacy, even long before the start
of the campaign period, the Decision considers the partisan
political acts of a person so filing a certificate of candidacy "as the
promotion of his/her election as a candidate." Thus, such person
can be disqualified for premature campaigning for acts done
before the start of the campaign period. In short, the Decision
considers a person who files a certificate of candidacy already a
"candidate" even before the start of the campaign period. l a wp h il
The assailed Decision is contrary to the clear intent and letter of
the law.
The Decision reverses Lanot v. COMELEC, 2 which held that a
person who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate
until the start of the campaign period. In Lanot, this
Court explained:
Thus, the essential elements for violation of Section 80 of the
Omnibus Election Code are: (1) a person engages in an election
campaign or partisan political activity; (2) the act is designed to
promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or
candidates; (3) the act is done outside the campaign period.
The second element requires the existence of a "candidate."
Under Section 79(a), a candidate is one who "has filed a
certificate of candidacy" to an elective public office. Unless one
has filed his certificate of candidacy, he is not a "candidate." The
third element requires that the campaign period has not started
when the election campaign or partisan political activity is
committed.
Assuming that all candidates to a public office file their certificates
of candidacy on the last day, which under Section 75 of the
Omnibus Election Code is the day before the start of the
campaign period, then no one can be prosecuted for violation of
Section 80 for acts done prior to such last day. Before such last
day, there is no "particular candidate or candidates" to campaign
for or against. On the day immediately after the last day of filing,
the campaign period starts and Section 80 ceases to apply since
Section 80 covers only acts done "outside" the campaign period.
Thus, if all candidates file their certificates of candidacy on the
last day, Section 80 may only apply to acts done on such last
day, which is before the start of the campaign period and after at
least one candidate has filed his certificate of candidacy. This is
perhaps the reason why those running for elective public office
usually file their certificates of candidacy on the last day or close
to the last day.
There is no dispute that Eusebio’s acts of election campaigning or
partisan political activities were committed outside of the
campaign period. The only question is whether Eusebio, who filed
his certificate of candidacy on 29 December 2003, was a
"candidate" when he committed those acts before the start of the
campaign period on 24 March 2004.
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 ("RA 8436") moved the
deadline for the filing of certificates of candidacy to 120 days
before election day. Thus, the original deadline was moved from
23 March 2004 to 2 January 2004, or 81 days earlier. The crucial
question is: did this change in the deadline for filing the certificate
of candidacy make one who filed his certificate of candidacy
before 2 January 2004 immediately liable for violation of Section
80 if he engaged in election campaign or partisan political
activities prior to the start of the campaign period on 24 March
2004?
Section 11 of RA 8436 provides:
SECTION 11. Official Ballot. – The Commission shall prescribe
the size and form of the official ballot which shall contain the titles
of the positions to be filled and/or the propositions to be voted
upon in an initiative, referendum or plebiscite. Under each
position, the names of candidates shall be arranged
alphabetically by surname and uniformly printed using the same
type size. A fixed space where the chairman of the Board of
Election Inspectors shall affix his/her signature to authenticate the
official ballot shall be provided.
Both sides of the ballots may be used when necessary.
For this purpose, the deadline for the filing of certificate of
candidacy/petition for registration/ manifestation to participate in
the election shall not be later than one hundred twenty (120) days
before the elections: Provided, That, any elective official, whether
national or local, running for any office other than the one which
he/she is holding in a permanent capacity, except for president
and vice-president, shall be deemed resigned only upon the start
of the campaign period corresponding to the position for which
he/she is running: Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or
omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect upon the
start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That, for
purposes of the May 11, 1998 elections, the deadline for filing of
the certificate of candidacy for the positions of President, Vice-
President, Senators and candidates under the party-list system
as well as petitions for registration and/or manifestation to
participate in the party-list system shall be on February 9, 1998
while the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy for other
positions shall be on March 27, 1998.
The official ballots shall be printed by the National Printing Office
and/or the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas at the price comparable
with that of private printers under proper security measures which
the Commission shall adopt. The Commission may contract the
services of private printers upon certification by the National
Printing Office/Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas that it cannot meet the
printing requirements. Accredited political parties and deputized
citizens’ arms of the Commission may assign watchers in the
printing, storage and distribution of official ballots.
To prevent the use of fake ballots, the Commission through the
Committee shall ensure that the serial number on the ballot stub
shall be printed in magnetic ink that shall be easily detectable by
inexpensive hardware and shall be impossible to reproduce on a
photocopying machine, and that identification marks, magnetic
strips, bar codes and other technical and security markings, are
provided on the ballot.
The official ballots shall be printed and distributed to each
city/municipality at the rate of one (1) ballot for every registered
voter with a provision of additional four (4) ballots per precinct.
Under Section 11 of RA 8436, the only purpose for the early filing
of certificates of candidacy is to give ample time for the printing of
official ballots. This is clear from the following deliberations of the
Bicameral Conference Committee:
SENATOR GONZALES. Okay. Then, how about the campaign
period, would it be the same[,] uniform for local and national
officials?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Personally, I would agree
to retaining it at the present periods.
SENATOR GONZALES. But the moment one files a certificate of
candidacy, he’s already a candidate, and there are many
prohibited acts on the part of candidate.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Unless we. . . .
SENATOR GONZALES. And you cannot say that the campaign
period has not yet began (sic).
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). If we don’t provide that
the filing of the certificate will not bring about one’s being a
candidate.
SENATOR GONZALES. If that’s a fact, the law cannot change a
fact.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). No, but if we can provide
that the filing of the certificate of candidacy will not result in that
official vacating his position, we can also provide that insofar he is
concerned, election period or his being a candidate will not yet
commence. Because here, the reason why we are doing an early
filing is to afford enough time to prepare this machine readable
ballots.
So, with the manifestations from the Commission on Elections,
Mr. Chairman, the House Panel will withdraw its proposal and will
agree to the 120-day period provided in the Senate version.
THE CHAIRMAN (SENATOR FERNAN). Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
xxxx
SENATOR GONZALES. How about prohibition against
campaigning or doing partisan acts which apply immediately upon
being a candidate?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Again, since the intention
of this provision is just to afford the Comelec enough time to print
the ballots, this provision does not intend to change the campaign
periods as presently, or rather election periods as presently fixed
by existing law.
THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (SEN. FERNAN). So, it should be
subject to the other prohibition.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). That’s right.
THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (SEN. FERNAN). Okay.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). In other words, actually,
there would be no conflict anymore because we are talking about
the 120-day period before election as the last day of filing a
certificate of candidacy, election period starts 120 days also. So
that is election period already. But he will still not be considered
as a candidate.
Thus, because of the early deadline of 2 January 2004 for
purposes of printing of official ballots, Eusebio filed his certificate
of candidacy on 29 December 2003. Congress, however, never
intended the filing of a certificate of candidacy before 2 January
2004 to make the person filing to become immediately a
"candidate" for purposes other than the printing of ballots. This
legislative intent prevents the immediate application of Section 80
of the Omnibus Election Code to those filing to meet the early
deadline. The clear intention of Congress was to preserve the
"election periods as x x x fixed by existing law" prior to RA 8436
and that one who files to meet the early deadline "will still not be
considered as a candidate."3 (Emphasis in the original)
Lanot was decided on the ground that one who files a certificate
of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign
period. This ground was based on the deliberations of the
legislators who explained the intent of the provisions of RA 8436,
which laid the legal framework for an automated election system.
There was no express provision in the original RA 8436 stating
that one who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate
until the start of the campaign period.
When Congress amended RA 8436, Congress decided to
expressly incorporate the Lanot doctrine into law, realizing that
Lanot merely relied on the deliberations of Congress in holding
that —
The clear intention of Congress was to preserve the "election
periods as x x x fixed by existing law" prior to RA 8436 and that
one who files to meet the early deadline "will still not be
considered as a candidate."4 (Emphasis supplied)
Congress wanted to insure that no person filing a certificate of
candidacy under the early deadline required by the automated
election system would be disqualified or penalized for any
partisan political act done before the start of the campaign period.
Thus, in enacting RA 9369, Congress expressly wrote the Lanot
doctrine into the second sentence, third paragraph of the
amended Section 15 of RA 8436, thus:
xxx
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the
filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for
registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any
person who files his certificate of candidacy within this
period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the
campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy:
Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a
candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid
campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a
public appointive office or position, including active members of
the armed forces, and officers and employees in government-
owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start
of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy.
(Boldfacing and underlining supplied)
Congress elevated the Lanot doctrine into a statute by specifically
inserting it as the second sentence of the third paragraph of the
amended Section 15 of RA 8436, which cannot be annulled by
this Court except on the sole ground of its unconstitutionality. The
Decision cannot reverse Lanot without repealing this second
sentence, because to reverse Lanot would mean repealing this
second sentence.
The assailed Decision, however, in reversing Lanot does not
claim that this second sentence or any portion of Section 15 of
RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, is unconstitutional. In fact,
the Decision considers the entire Section 15 good law. Thus, the
Decision is self-contradictory — reversing Lanot but maintaining
the constitutionality of the second sentence, which embodies the
Lanot doctrine. In so doing, the Decision is irreconcilably in
conflict with the clear intent and letter of the second sentence,
third paragraph, Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA
9369.
In enacting RA 9369, Congress even further clarified the first
proviso in the third paragraph of Section 15 of RA 8436. The
original provision in RA 8436 states —
x x x Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or omissions
applicable to a candidate shall take effect upon the start of the
aforesaid campaign period, x x x.
In RA 9369, Congress inserted the word "only" so that the first
proviso now reads —
x x x Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a
candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid
campaign period x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Congress not only reiterated but also strengthened its
mandatory directive that election offenses can be committed by a
candidate "only" upon the start of the campaign period. This
clearly means that before the start of the campaign period, such
election offenses cannot be so committed.
When the applicable provisions of RA 8436, as amended by RA
9369, are read together, these provisions of law do not consider
Penera a candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots,
until the start of the campaign period. There is absolutely no room
for any other interpretation.
We quote with approval the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Antonio
T. Carpio:
x x x The definition of a "candidate" in Section 79(a) of the
Omnibus Election Code should be read together with the
amended Section 15 of RA 8436. A "‘candidate’ refers to any
person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, who has
filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an accredited
political party, aggroupment or coalition of parties." However, it is
no longer enough to merely file a certificate of candidacy for a
person to be considered a candidate because "any person who
files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall only
be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period for
which he filed his certificate of candidacy." Any person may thus
file a certificate of candidacy on any day within the prescribed
period for filing a certificate of candidacy yet that person shall be
considered a candidate, for purposes of determining one’s
possible violations of election laws, only during the campaign
period. Indeed, there is no "election campaign" or "partisan
political activity" designed to promote the election or defeat of a
particular candidate or candidates to public office simply because
there is no "candidate" to speak of prior to the start of the
campaign period. Therefore, despite the filing of her certificate of
candidacy, the law does not consider Penera a candidate at the
time of the questioned motorcade which was conducted a day
before the start of the campaign period. x x x
The campaign period for local officials began on 30 March 2007
and ended on 12 May 2007. Penera filed her certificate of
candidacy on 29 March 2007. Penera was thus a candidate on 29
March 2009 only for purposes of printing the ballots. On 29 March
2007, the law still did not consider Penera a candidate for
purposes other than the printing of ballots. Acts committed by
Penera prior to 30 March 2007, the date when she became a
"candidate," even if constituting election campaigning or partisan
political activities, are not punishable under Section 80 of the
Omnibus Election Code. Such acts are within the realm of a
citizen’s protected freedom of expression. Acts committed by
Penera within the campaign period are not covered by Section 80
as Section 80 punishes only acts outside the campaign period.5
The assailed Decision gives a specious reason in explaining
away the first proviso in the third paragraph, the amended
Section 15 of RA 8436 that election offenses applicable to
candidates take effect only upon the start of the campaign period.
The Decision states that:
x x x [T]he line in Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as
amended, which provides that "any unlawful act or omission
applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of
the campaign period," does not mean that the acts constituting
premature campaigning can only be committed, for which the
offender may be disqualified, during the campaign period.
Contrary to the pronouncement in the dissent, nowhere in said
proviso was it stated that campaigning before the start of the
campaign period is lawful, such that the offender may freely carry
out the same with impunity.
As previously established, a person, after filing his/her COC but
prior to his/her becoming a candidate (thus, prior to the start of
the campaign period), can already commit the acts described
under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code as election
campaign or partisan political activity, However, only after said
person officially becomes a candidate, at the beginning of the
campaign period, can said acts be given effect as premature
campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the start
of the campaign period, can his/her disqualification be sought for
acts constituting premature campaigning. Obviously, it is only at
the start of the campaign period, when the person officially
becomes a candidate, that the undue and iniquitous advantages
of his/her prior acts, constituting premature campaigning, shall
accrue to his/her benefit. Compared to the other candidates who
are only about to begin their election campaign, a candidate who
had previously engaged in premature campaigning already
enjoys an unfair headstart in promoting his/her
candidacy. 6(Emphasis supplied)
It is a basic principle of law that any act is lawful unless expressly
declared unlawful by law. This is specially true to expression or
speech, which Congress cannot outlaw except on very narrow
grounds involving clear, present and imminent danger to the
State. The mere fact that the law does not declare an act unlawful
ipso facto means that the act is lawful. Thus, there is no need for
Congress to declare in Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by
RA 9369, that political partisan activities before the start of the
campaign period are lawful. It is sufficient for Congress to state
that "any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall
take effect only upon the start of the campaign period." The only
inescapable and logical result is that the same acts, if done
before the start of the campaign period, are lawful.
In layman’s language, this means that a candidate is liable for an
election offense only for acts done during the campaign period,
not before. The law is clear as daylight — any election offense
that may be committed by a candidate under any election law
cannot be committed before the start of the campaign period. In
ruling that Penera is liable for premature campaigning for partisan
political acts before the start of the campaigning, the assailed
Decision ignores the clear and express provision of the law.
The Decision rationalizes that a candidate who commits
premature campaigning can be disqualified or prosecuted only
after the start of the campaign period. This is not what the law
says. What the law says is "any unlawful act or omission
applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of
the campaign period." The plain meaning of this provision is that
the effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful as
to a candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the
start of the campaign period, the same partisan political acts are
lawful.
The law does not state, as the assailed Decision asserts, that
partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign
period are unlawful, but may be prosecuted only upon the start of
the campaign period. Neither does the law state that partisan
political acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are Aldovino vs COMELEC
temporarily lawful, but becomes unlawful upon the start of the
campaign period. This is clearly not the language of the law.
Besides, such a law as envisioned in the Decision, which defines
a criminal act and curtails freedom of expression and speech, Is the preventive suspension of an elected
would be void for vagueness. public official an interruption of his term of office for
Congress has laid down the law — a candidate is liable for purposes of the three-term limit rule under Section 8,
election offenses only upon the start of the campaign period. This
Court has no power to ignore the clear and express mandate of Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of
the law that "any person who files his certificate of candidacy Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160, or the Local
within [the filing] period shall only be considered a candidate at
the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of Government Code)?
candidacy." Neither can this Court turn a blind eye to the express
and clear language of the law that "any unlawful act or omission
applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of
the campaign period." The respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) ruled that preventive suspension is an
The forum for examining the wisdom of the law, and enacting
remedial measures, is not this Court but the Legislature. This effective interruption because it renders the suspended
Court has no recourse but to apply a law that is as clear, concise
and express as the second sentence, and its immediately public official unable to provide complete service for
succeeding proviso, as written in the third paragraph of Section
15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369.
the full term; thus, such term should not be counted
for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT petitioner Rosalinda A. Penera’s
Motion for Reconsideration. We SET ASIDE the Decision of this
Court in G.R. No. 181613 promulgated on 11 September 2009,
as well as the Resolutions dated 24 July 2007 and 30 January
The present petition[1] seeks to annul and set
2008 of the COMELEC Second Division and the COMELEC En aside this COMELEC ruling for having been issued
Banc, respectively, in SPA No. 07-224. Rosalinda A. Penera shall
continue as Mayor of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte. with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
SO ORDERED. excess of jurisdiction.

THE ANTECEDENTS
 The respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was
elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive
terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007
terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during his
2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan
preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation
with a criminal case he then faced. This Court,
however, subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayans
suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the
functions of his office and finished his term.
In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate
of candidacy for the same position. The petitioners
Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and
Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought to
deny due course to Asilos certificate of candidacy or
to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and
had served for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth
term therefore violated the three-term limit rule under
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section
43(b) of RA 7160.
The COMELECs Second Division ruled against
the petitioners and in Asilos favour in its Resolution
of November 28, 2007. It reasoned out that the three-
term limit rule did not apply, as Asilo failed to render
complete service for the 2004-2007 term because of
the suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered.
The COMELEC en banc refused to reconsider
the Second Divisions ruling in its October 7,
2008 Resolution; hence, the PRESENT
PETITION raising the following ISSUES:
1. Whether preventive suspension of an elected
local official is an interruption of the three-term
limit rule; and
2. Whether preventive suspension is considered
involuntary renunciation as contemplated in
Section 43(b) of RA 7160
Thus presented, the case raises the direct issue of
whether Asilos preventive suspension constituted an
interruption that allowed him to run for a 4 th term.
 THE COURTS RULING
We find the petition meritorious.
General Considerations
The present case is not the first before this
Court on the three-term limit provision of the
Constitution, but is the first on the effect of preventive
suspension on the continuity of an elective officials
term. To be sure, preventive suspension, as an
interruption in the term of an elective public official,
has been mentioned as an example in Borja v.
Commission on Elections.[2] Doctrinally,
however, Borja is not a controlling ruling; it did not
deal with preventive suspension, but with the
application of the three-term rule on the term that an
elective official acquired by succession.
a. The Three-term Limit Rule:
The Constitutional Provision Analyzed
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective
local officials, except barangay officials, which shall
be determined by law, shall be three years and no
such official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.
Section 43 (b) of RA 7160 practically repeats
the constitutional provision, and any difference in
wording does not assume any significance in this case.
As worded, the constitutional provision fixes
the term of a local elective office and limits an
elective officials stay in office to no more than three
consecutive terms. This is the first branch of the rule
embodied in Section 8, Article X.
Significantly, this provision refers to a term as
a period of time three years during which an official
has title to office and can serve. Appari v. Court of
Appeals,[3] a Resolution promulgated on November
28, 2007, succinctly discusses what a term connotes,
as follows:
The word term in a legal sense means a fixed
and definite period of time which the law
describes that an officer may hold an
office. According to Mechem, the term of office
is the period during which an office may be
held. Upon expiration of the officers term,
unless he is authorized by law to holdover, his
rights, duties and authority as a public officer
must ipso factocease. In the law of public
officers, the most and natural frequent method
by which a public officer ceases to be such is by
the expiration of the terms for which he was
elected or appointed. [Emphasis supplied].
A later case, Gaminde v. Commission
Audit,[4] reiterated that [T]he term means the time
during which the officer may claim to hold office as
of right, and fixes the interval after which the several
incumbents shall succeed one another.
The limitation under this first branch of the
provision is expressed in the negative no such official
shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. This formulation no more than three
consecutive terms is a clear command suggesting the
existence of an inflexible rule. While it gives no exact
indication of what to serve. . . three consecutive terms
exactly connotes, the meaning is clear reference is
to the term, not to the service that a public official
may render. In other words, the limitation refers to the
term.
The second branch relates to the provisions
express initiative to prevent any circumvention of the
limitation through voluntary severance of ties with the
public office; it expressly states that voluntary
on renunciation of office shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected. This declaration
complements the term limitation mandated by the first
branch.
A notable feature of the second branch is that it
does not textually state that voluntary renunciation is
the only actual interruption of service that does not
affect continuity of service for a full term for purposes
of the three-term limit rule. It is a pure declaratory
statement of what does not serve as an interruption of
service for a full term, but the phrase voluntary
renunciation, by itself, is not without significance in
determining constitutional intent.
The word renunciation carries the dictionary
meaning of abandonment. To renounce is to give up,
abandon, decline, or resign.[5] It is an act that
emanates from its author, as contrasted to an act that
operates from the outside. Read with the definition of
a term in mind, renunciation, as mentioned under the
second branch of the constitutional provision, cannot
but mean an act that results in cutting short the term,
i.e., the loss of title to office. The descriptive word
voluntary linked together with renunciation signifies
an act of surrender based on the surenderees own
freely exercised will; in other words, a loss of title to
office by conscious choice. In the context of the three-
term limit rule, such loss of title is not considered an
interruption because it is presumed to be purposely
sought to avoid the application of the term limitation.
The following exchanges in the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission on the term voluntary
renunciation shed further light on the extent of the
term voluntary renunciation:
MR. MAAMBONG. Could I address the
clarificatory question to the Committee? This
term voluntary renunciation does not appear in
Section 3 [of Article VI]; it also appears in
Section 6 [of Article VI].
MR DAVIDE. Yes.
MR. MAAMBONG. It is also a recurring phrase
all over the Constitution. Could the Committee
please enlighten us exactly what voluntary
renunciation mean? Is this akin to
abandonment?
MR. DAVIDE. Abandonment is voluntary. In
other words, he cannot circumvent the
restriction by merely resigning at any given time
on the second term.
MR. MAAMBONG. Is the Committee saying
that the term voluntary renunciation is more
general than abandonment and resignation?
 MR. DAVIDE. It is more general, more
embracing.[6]
From this exchange and Commissioner Davides
expansive interpretation of the term voluntary
renunciation, the framers intent apparently was to
close all gaps that an elective official may seize to
defeat the three-term limit rule, in the way that
voluntary renunciation has been rendered unavailable
as a mode of defeating the three-term limit rule.
Harking back to the text of the constitutional
provision, we note further that Commissioner Davides
view is consistent with the negative formulation of the
first branch of the provision and the inflexible
interpretation that it suggests.
This examination of the wording of the constitutional
provision and of the circumstances surrounding its
formulation impresses upon us the clear intent to
make term limitation a high priority constitutional
objective whose terms must be strictly construed and
which cannot be defeated by, nor sacrificed for,
values of less than equal constitutional worth.We
view preventive suspension vis--vis term limitation
with this firm mindset.
b. Relevant Jurisprudence on the
Three-term Limit Rule
Other than the above-cited materials,
jurisprudence best gives us a lead into the concepts
within the provisions contemplation, particularly on
the interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term that it speaks of.
Lonzanida v. Commission on
Elections[7] presented the question of whether the
disqualification on the basis of the three-term limit
applies if the election of the public official (to be
strictly accurate, the proclamation as winner of the
public official) for his supposedly third term had been
declared invalid in a final and executory
judgment. We ruled that the two requisites for the
application of the disqualification (viz., 1. that the
official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post;
and 2. that he has fully served three consecutive
terms) were not present. In so ruling, we said:
The clear intent of the framers of the
constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the
three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of
office and at the same time respect the peoples
choice and grant their elected official full
service of a term is evident in this
provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term
does not cancel the renounced term in the
computation of the three term
limit; conversely, involuntary severance from
office for any length of time short of the full
term provided by law amounts to an
interruption of continuity of service. The
petitioner vacated his post a few months before
the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary
renunciation but in compliance with the legal
process of writ of execution issued by the
COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary
severance from office is an interruption of
continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did
not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
[Emphasis supplied]
Our intended meaning under this ruling is clear: it is
severance from office, or to be exact, loss of title, that
renders the three-term limit rule inapplicable.
Ong v. Alegre[8] and Rivera v.
COMELEC,[9] like Lonzanida, also involved the issue
of whether there had been a completed term for
purposes of the three-term limit disqualification.
These cases, however, presented an interesting twist,
as their final judgments in the electoral contest came
after the term of the contested office had expired so
that the elective officials in these cases were never
effectively unseated.
Despite the ruling that Ong was never entitled
to the office (and thus was never validly elected), the
Court concluded that there was nevertheless an
election and service for a full term in contemplation of
the three-term rule based on the following premises:
(1) the final decision that the third-termer lost the
election was without practical and legal use and value,
having been promulgated after the term of the
contested office had expired; and (2) the official
assumed and continuously exercised the functions of
the office from the start to the end of the term. The
Court noted in Ong the absurdity and the deleterious
effect of a contrary view that the official (referring to
the winner in the election protest) would, under the
three-term rule, be considered to have served a term
by virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest
ruling, when another actually served the term pursuant
to a proclamation made in due course after an
election. This factual variation led the Court to rule
differently from Lonzanida.
In the same vein, the Court in Rivera rejected
the theory that the official who finally lost the election
contest was merely a caretaker of the office or a mere
de facto officer.The Court obeserved that Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution is violated and its
purpose defeated when an official fully served in the
same position for three consecutive terms. Whether as
caretaker or de facto officer, he exercised the powers
and enjoyed the perquisites of the office that enabled
him to stay on indefinitely.
Ong and Rivera are important rulings for
purposes of the three-term limitation because of what
they directly imply. Although the election requisite
was not actually present, the Court still gave full
effect to the three-term limitation because of the
constitutional intent to strictly limit elective officials
to service for three terms. By so ruling, the Court
signalled how zealously it guards the three-term limit
rule. Effectively, these cases teach us to strictly
interpret the term limitation rule in favor of limitation
rather than its exception.
Adormeo v. Commission on Elections[10] dealt
with the effect of recall on the three-term limit
disqualification. The case presented the question of
whether the disqualification applies if the official lost
in the regular election for the supposed third term, but
was elected in a recall election covering that
term. The Court upheld the COMELECs ruling that
the official was not elected for three (3) consecutive
terms. The Court reasoned out that for nearly two
years, the official was a private citizen; hence, the

continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his
defeat in the election for the third term.
Socrates v. Commission on Elections[11] also
tackled recall vis--vis the three-term limit
disqualification. Edward Hagedorn served three full
terms as mayor. As he was disqualified to run for a
fourth term, he did not participate in the election that
immediately followed his third term. In this election,
the petitioner Victorino Dennis M. Socrates was
elected mayor. Less than 1 years after Mayor Socrates
assumed the functions of the office, recall proceedings
were initiated against him, leading to the call for a
recall election. Hagedorn filed his certificate of
candidacy for mayor in the recall election, but
Socrates sought his disqualification on the ground that
he (Hagedorn) had fully served three terms prior to
the recall election and was therefore disqualified to
run because of the three-term limit rule. We decided
in Hagedorns favor, ruling that:
After three consecutive terms, an
elective local official cannot seek immediate
reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited
election refers to the next regular election for
the same office following the end of the third
consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like
a recall election, is no longer covered by the
prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent
election like a recall election is no longer an
immediate reelection after three consecutive
terms. Second, the intervening period
constitutes an involuntary interruption in the
continuity of service.
When the framers of the Constitution
debated on the term limit of elective local
officials, the question asked was whether there
would be no further election after three terms, or
whether there would be no immediate
reelection after three terms.
xxxx
Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits
is an immediate reelection for a fourth term
following three consecutive terms. The
Constitution, however, does not prohibit a
subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long
as the reelection is not immediately after the end
of the third consecutive term. A recall election
mid-way in the term following the third
consecutive term is a subsequent election but
not an immediate reelection after the third term.
Neither does the Constitution prohibit
one barred from seeking immediate reelection to
run in any other subsequent election involving
 the same term of office. What the Constitution
prohibits is a consecutive fourth term.[12]
Latasa v. Commission on Elections[13] presented
the novel question of whether a municipal mayor who
had fully served for three consecutive terms could run
as city mayor in light of the intervening conversion of
the municipality into a city. During the third term, the
municipality was converted into a city; the cityhood
charter provided that the elective officials of the
municipality shall, in a holdover capacity, continue to
exercise their powers and functions until elections
were held for the new city officials. The Court ruled
that the conversion of the municipality into a city did
not convert the office of the municipal mayor into a
local government post different from the office of the
city mayor the territorial jurisdiction of the city was
the same as that of the municipality; the inhabitants
were the same group of voters who elected the
municipal mayor for 3 consecutive terms; and they
were the same inhabitants over whom the municipal
mayor held power and authority as their chief
executive for nine years. The Court said:
This Court reiterates that the framers
of the Constitution specifically included an
exception to the peoples freedom to choose
those who will govern them in order to avoid
the evil of a single person accumulating
excessive power over a particular territorial
jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in
the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to
vie for the position of city mayor after having
served for three consecutive terms as a
municipal mayor would obviously defeat the
very intent of the framers when they wrote this
exception. Should he be allowed another three
consecutive terms as mayor of the City
of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly
holding office as chief executive over the same
territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total
of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very
scenario sought to be avoided by the
Constitution, if not abhorred by it.[14]
Latasa instructively highlights, after a review
of Lonzanida, Adormeo and Socrates, that no three-
term limit violation results if a rest period or break in
the service between terms or tenure in a given elective
post intervened. In Lonzanida, the petitioner was a
private citizen with no title to any elective office for a
few months before the next mayoral
elections. Similarly, in Adormeo and Socrates, the
private respondents lived as private citizens for two
years and fifteen months, respectively. Thus, these
cases establish that the law contemplates a complete
break from office during which the local elective
official steps down and ceases to exercise power or
authority over the inhabitants of the territorial
jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.
identifies Montebon with the rest, however, is that the
elective official vacated the office of councilor and
assumed the higher post of vice-mayor by operation of
law. Thus, for a time he ceased to be councilor an
interruption that effectively placed him outside the
ambit of the three-term limit rule.

c. Conclusion Based on Law

Seemingly differing from these results is the
and Jurisprudence
case of Montebon v. Commission on
Elections,[15] where the highest-ranking municipal
From all the above, we conclude that the
councilor succeeded to the position of vice-mayor by
interruption of a term exempting an elective official
operation of law. The question posed when he
from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no
subsequently ran for councilor was whether his
less than the involuntary loss of title to office. The
assumption as vice-mayor was an interruption of his
elective official must have involuntarily left his office
term as councilor that would place him outside the
for a length of time, however short, for an effective
operation of the three-term limit rule. We ruled that an
interruption to occur. This has to be the case if the
interruption had intervened so that he could again run
thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strict intent are to
as councilor. This result seemingly deviates from the
be faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective officials
results in the cases heretofore discussed since the
continuous stay in office to no more than three
elective official continued to hold public office and
consecutive terms, using voluntary renunciation as an
did not become a private citizen during the
interim. The common thread that
example and standard of what does not constitute an
interruption.
Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by
operation of law, being involuntary, is an effective
interruption of service within a term, as we held
in Montebon. On the other hand, temporary inability
or disqualification to exercise the functions of an
elective post, even if involuntary, should not be
considered an effective interruption of a term because
it does not involve the loss of title to office or at least
an effective break from holding office; the office
holder, while retaining title, is simply barred from
exercising the functions of his office for a reason
provided by law.
An interruption occurs when the term is broken
because the office holder lost the right to hold on to
his office, and cannot be equated with the failure to
render service. The latter occurs during an office
holders term when he retains title to the office but
cannot exercise his functions for reasons established
by law. Of course, the term failure to serve cannot be
used once the right to office is lost; without the right
to hold office or to serve, then no service can be
rendered so that none is really lost.
To put it differently although at the risk of repetition,
Section 8, Article X both by structure and substance
fixes an elective officials term of office and limits his
stay in office to three consecutive terms as an
inflexible rule that is stressed, no less, by citing
voluntary renunciation as an example of a
circumvention. The provision should be read in the
context of interruption of term, not in the context of
interrupting the full continuity of the exercise of the
powers of the elective position. The voluntary
renunciation it speaks of refers only to the elective
officials voluntary relinquishment of office and loss of
title to this office. It does not speak of the temporary
cessation of the exercise of power or authority that
may occur for various reasons, with preventive
suspension being only one of them. To quote Latasa
v. Comelec:[16]
 Indeed, [T]he law contemplates a rest period
during which the local elective official steps
down from office and ceases to exercise power
or authority over the inhabitants of the
territorial jurisdiction of a particular local
government unit. [Emphasis supplied].
Preventive Suspension and
the Three-Term Limit Rule
a. Nature of Preventive Suspension
Preventive suspension whether under the Local
[17]
Government Code, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act,[18] or the Ombudsman Act[19] is
an interim remedial measure to address the situation
of an official who have been charged administratively
or criminally, where the evidence preliminarily
indicates the likelihood of or potential for eventual
guilt or liability.
Preventive suspension is imposed
the Local Government Code when the evidence of
guilt is strong and given the gravity of the offense,
there is a possibility that the continuance in office of
the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a
threat to the safety and integrity of the records and
other evidence. Under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, it is imposed after a valid information
(that requires a finding of probable cause) has been
filed in court, while under the Ombudsman Act, it is
imposed when, in the judgment of the Ombudsman,
the evidence of guilt is strong; and (a) the charge
involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct
or neglect in the performance of duty; or (b) the
charges would warrant removal from the service; or
(c) the respondents continued stay in office may
prejudice the case filed against him.
Notably in all cases of preventive suspension,
the suspended official is barred from performing the
functions of his office and does not receive salary in
the meanwhile, but does not vacate and lose title to his
under office; loss of office is a consequence that only results
upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability.

Preventive suspension is a remedial measure that
operates under closely-controlled conditions and gives
a premium to the protection of the service rather than
to the interests of the individual office holder. Even
then, protection of the service goes only as far as
a temporary prohibition on the exercise of the
functions of the officials office; the official is
reinstated to the exercise of his position as soon as the
preventive suspension is lifted. Thus, while a
temporary incapacity in the exercise of power results,
no position is vacated when a public official is
preventively suspended. This was what exactly
happened to Asilo.
That the imposition of preventive suspension
can be abused is a reality that is true in the exercise of
all powers and prerogative under the Constitution and
the laws. The imposition of preventive suspension,
however, is not an unlimited power; there are
limitations built into the laws[20] themselves that the
courts can enforce when these limitations are
transgressed, particularly when grave abuse of
discretion is present. In light of this well-defined
parameters in the imposition of preventive suspension,
we should not view preventive suspension from the
extreme situation that it can totally deprive an elective
office holder of the prerogative to serve and is thus an
effective interruption of an election officials term.
Term limitation and preventive suspension are
two vastly different aspects of an elective officials
service in office and they do not overlap. As already
mentioned above, preventive suspension involves
protection of the service and of the people being
served, and prevents the office holder from
temporarily exercising the power of his office. Term
limitation, on the other hand, is triggered after an
elective official has served his three terms in office
without any break. Its companion concept interruption
of a term on the other hand, requires loss of title to
office. If preventive suspension and term limitation or
interruption have any commonality at all, this
common point may be with respect to the
discontinuity of service that may occur in both. But
even on this point, they merely run parallel to each
other and never intersect; preventive suspension, by its
nature, is a temporary incapacity to render
service during an unbroken term; in the context of
term limitation, interruption of service occurs after
there has been a break in the term.
b. Preventive Suspension and
the Intent of the Three-Term
Limit Rule
Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term
limit rule demands that preventive suspension should
not be considered an interruption that allows an
elective officials stay in office beyond three terms. A
preventive suspension cannot simply be a term
interruption because the suspended official continues
to stay in office although he is barred from exercising
the functions and prerogatives of the office within the
suspension period. The best indicator of the
suspended officials continuity in office is the absence
of a permanent replacement and the lack of the
authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.
To allow a preventively suspended elective
official to run for a fourth and prohibited term is to
close our eyes to this reality and to allow a
constitutional violation through sophistry by equating
the temporary inability to discharge the functions of
office with the interruption of term that the
constitutional provision contemplates. To be sure,
many reasons exist, voluntary or involuntary some of
them personal and some of them by operation of law
that may temporarily prevent an elective office holder
from exercising the functions of his office in the way
that preventive suspension does. A serious extended
illness, inability through force majeure, or the
enforcement of a suspension as a penalty, to cite some
involuntary examples, may prevent an office holder
from exercising the functions of his office for a time
without forfeiting title to office. Preventive
suspension is no different because it disrupts actual
delivery of service for a time within a term. Adopting
such interruption of actual service as the standard to
determine effective interruption of term under the
three-term rule raises at least the possibility of
confusion in implementing this rule, given the many
modes and occasions when actual service may be
interrupted in the course of serving a term of
office. The standard may reduce the enforcement of
the three-term limit rule to a case-to-case and possibly
see-sawing determination of what an effective
interruption is.
c. Preventive Suspension and
Voluntary Renunciation
Preventive suspension, because it is imposed by
operation of law, does not involve a voluntary act on
the part of the suspended official, except in the
indirect sense that he may have voluntarily committed
the act that became the basis of the charge against
him. From this perspective, preventive suspension
does not have the element of voluntariness that
voluntary renunciation embodies. Neither does it
contain the element of renunciation or loss of title to
office as it merely involves the temporary incapacity
to perform the service that an elective office demands.
Thus viewed, preventive suspension is by its very
nature the exact opposite of voluntary renunciation; it
is involuntary and temporary, and involves only the
actual delivery of service, not the title to the
office. The easy conclusion therefore is that they are,
by nature, different and non-comparable.
But beyond the obvious comparison of their
respective natures is the more important consideration
of how they affect the three-term limit rule.
Voluntary renunciation, while involving loss of
office and the total incapacity to render service, is
disallowed by the Constitution as an effective
interruption of a term. It is therefore not allowed as a
mode of circumventing the three-term limit rule.
Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not
involve an effective interruption of a term and should
therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term
limitation. It can pose as a threat, however, if we shall granted due course to Asilos certificate of candidacy
disregard its nature and consider it an effective for a prohibited fourth term. By so refusing, the
interruption of a term. Let it be noted that a preventive COMELEC effectively committed grave abuse of
suspension is easier to undertake than voluntary discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
renunciation, as it does not require relinquishment or its action was a refusal to perform a positive duty
loss of office even for the briefest time. It merely required by no less than the Constitution and was one
requires an easily fabricated administrative charge undertaken outside the contemplation of law. [21]
that can be dismissed soon after a preventive
suspension has been imposed. In this sense, WHEREFORE, premises considered,
recognizing preventive suspension as an effective we GRANT the petition and
interruption of a term can serve as a circumvention accordingly NULLIFY the assailed
more potent than the voluntary renunciation that the COMELEC rulings. The private respondent Wilfredo
Constitution expressly disallows as an interruption. F. Asilo is declared DISQUALIFIED to run, and
perforce to serve, as Councilor of Lucena City for a
Conclusion prohibited fourth term. Costs against private
respondent Asilo.
To recapitulate, Asilos 2004-2007 term was not
interrupted by the Sandiganbayan-imposed preventive SO ORDERED.
suspension in 2005, as preventive suspension does not ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
interrupt an elective officials term. Thus, the
COMELEC refused to apply the legal command of
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution when it