2.) G.R. No.

191185, February 01, 2016

GUILBEMER FRANCO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

The Constitution presumes a person innocent until proven guilty by proof beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution cannot
be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense's evidence for it has the onus probandi in establishing the
guilt of the accused - ei incumbit probatio qui elicit, non que negat— he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove.1 chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

Nature of the Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court where petitioner Guilbemer
Franco (Franco) assails the Decision3 dated September 16, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR No. 31706,
affirming the Decision4 dated February 27, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 15, in Criminal Case No.
05-238613. The RTC convicted Franco of the crime of Theft under an Information, which reads as follows: ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary

That on or about November 3, 2004, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and
carry away one (1) Nokia 3660 Model cellular phone worth Php 18,500.00 belonging to BENJAMIN JOSEPH NAKAMOTO Y
ERGUIZA to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the aforesaid amount of Php 18,500.00, Philippine Currency.

Contrary to law.5 chanroblesvi rtua llawli bra ry

On September 5, 2005, Franco, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.6 chanRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

The Facts

The evidence for the prosecution established the following facts:

On November 3, 2004 at around 11:00 a.m., Benjamin Joseph Nakamoto (Nakamoto) went to work out at the Body Shape
Gym located at Malong Street, Tondo, Manila. After he finished working out, he placed his Nokia 3660 cell phone worth
PI8,500.00 on the altar where gym users usually put their valuables and proceeded to the comfort room to change his
clothes. After ten minutes, he returned to get his cell phone, but it was already missing. Arnie Rosario (Rosario), who was
also working out, informed him that he saw Franco get a cap and a cell phone from the altar. Nakamoto requested everyone
not to leave the gym, but upon verification from the logbook, he found out that Franco had left within the time that he was
in the shower.7chan roblesv irt uallawl ibra ry

The gym's caretaker, Virgilio Ramos (Ramos), testified that he saw Franco in the gym but he was not working out and was
just going around the area. In fact, it was just Franco's second time at the gym. Ramos even met him near the door and as
Franco did not log out, he was the one who indicated it in their logbook. When Nakamoto announced that his cell phone was
missing and asked that nobody leaves the place, he put an asterisk opposite the name of Franco in the logbook to indicate
that he was the only one who left the gym after the cell phone was declared lost.8 chan roblesv irt uallawl ibra ry

Nakamoto, together with Jeoffrey Masangkay, a police officer who was also working out at the gym, tried to locate Franco
within the gym's vicinity but they failed to find him. They proceeded to the police station and while there, a report was
received from another police officer that somebody saw Franco along Coral Street, which is near the gym and that he was
holding a cell phone. They went to Coral Street but he was already gone. A vendor told them that he saw a person who was
holding a cell phone, which was then ringing and that the person was trying to shut it off. When they went to Franco's
house, they were initially not allowed to come in but were eventually let in by Franco's mother. They talked to Franco who
denied having taken the cell phone.9 chanro blesvi rtua llawli bra ry

Nakamoto then filed a complaint with the barangay but no settlement was arrived thereat; hence, a criminal complaint for
theft was filed against Franco before the City Prosecutor's Office of Manila, docketed as I.S. No. 04K-25849.10 chanroble svirtuallaw lib rary

In his defense, Franco denied the charge, alleging that if Nakamoto had indeed lost his cell phone at around 1:00 p.m., he
and his witnesses could have confronted him as at that time, he was still at the gym, having left only at around 2:45
p.m.11 He also admitted to have taken a cap and cell phone from the altar but claimed these to be his.12 chanRoble svi rtual Lawli bra ry

Ruling of the RTC

In its Decision dated February 27, 2008, the RTC convicted Franco of theft, the dispositive portion of which reads: ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds [Franco], GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of theft penalized in
paragraph I of Article 309 in relation to Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of
imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day as minimum to seven (7) years and four (4) months as
maximum and to pay the complainant Php 18,500.00.

SO ORDERED.13 chanroblesv irtuallawl ib rary

The RTC did not find Franco's defense credible and ruled that his denial cannot be given evidentiary value over the positive
testimony of Rosario.14 chan roblesv irt uallawl ibrary

Franco then appealed to the CA.15 chanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary

Ruling of the CA

In affirming the RTC decision, the CA found the elements of theft to have been duly established. It relied heavily on the
"positive testimony" of Rosario who declared to have seen Franco take a cap and a cell phone from the altar. The CA
likewise gave credence to the testimony of Ramos who confirmed that it was only Franco who left the gym immediately
before Nakamoto announced that his cell phone was missing. Ramos also presented the logbook and affirmed having put an

1
asterisk opposite the name "ELMER," which was entered by the accused upon logging in. The CA stated that taken together,
the foregoing circumstances are sufficient to support a moral conviction that Franco is guilty, and at the same time,
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent.16 The CA further ruled that the RTC cannot be faulted for giving more
weight to the testimony of Nakamoto17 and Rosario,18 considering that Franco failed to show that they were impelled by an
ill or improper motive to falsely testify against him.19 chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry

In his petition for review, Franco presented the following issues for resolution, to wit: ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary

I.

WHETHER THE HONORABLE [CA] ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES'
INCONSISTENT AND IRRECONCILABLE TESTIMONIES. chanRoblesvirt ualLawl ibra ry

II.

WHETHER THE HONORABLE [CA] ERRED IN AFFIRMING [FRANCO'S] CONVICTION DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAME WAS
BASED ON FABRICATIONS AND PRESUMPTIONS. chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

III.

WHETHER. THE HONORABLE [CA] ERRED IN ACCEPTING THE VALUE OF THE ALLEGEDLY STOLEN CELLULAR PHONE
WITHOUT SUBSTANTIATING EVIDENCE.20 chanrob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry

Ruling of the Court

Preliminarily, the Court restates the rule that only errors of law and not of facts are reviewable by this Court in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. This rule applies with greater force when the factual
findings of the CA are in full agreement with that of the RTC.21 chanroble svirtual lawlib rary

The rule, however, is not ironclad. A departure therefrom may be warranted when it is established that the RTC ignored,
overlooked, misconstrued or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances, which, if considered, will change the outcome
of the case. Considering that what is at stake here is liberty, the Court has carefully reviewed the records of the case22 and
finds that Franco should be acquitted.

Failure of the prosecution to prove Franco's guilt beyond reasonable doubt

The burden of such proof rests with the prosecution, which must rely on the strength of its case rather than on the
weakness of the case for the defense. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a
moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome
the constitutional presumption of innocence.23 chanrob lesvi rtua llawli bra ry

In every criminal conviction, the prosecution is required to prove two things beyond reasonable doubt: first, the fact of the
commission of the crime charged, or the presence of all the elements of the offense; and second, the fact that the accused
was the perpetrator of the crime.24 cha nro blesvi rtua llawli bra ry

Under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, the essential elements of the crime of theft are: (1) the taking of personal
property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking away was done with intent to gain; (4) the taking away was
done without the consent of the owner; and (5) the taking away is accomplished without violence or intimidation against
person or force upon things.25 cralaw red

The corpus delicti in theft has two elements, to wit: (1) that the property was lost by the owner; and (2) that it was lost by
felonious taking.26 In this case, the crucial issue is whether the prosecution has presented proof beyond reasonable doubt to
establish the corpus delicti of the crime. In affirming Franco's conviction, the CA ruled that the elements were established.
Moreover, the RTC and the CA apparently relied heavily on circumstantial evidence.

To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that the
following requisites must concur: (1) there must be more than one circumstance to convict; (2) the facts on which the
inference of guilt is based must be proved; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. With respect to the third requisite, it is essential that the circumstantial evidence
presented must constitute an unbroken chain, which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused,
to the exclusion of others, as the guilty person.27 chan rob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry

The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses - Nakamoto, the complainant; Ramos, the gym's caretaker; and Rosario,
another gym user.

Their testimonies established the following circumstances: (1) Nakamoto placed his cell phone on the altar,28 left and went
to change his clothes, and alter ten minutes, returned to get his cell phone but the same was already missing;29 (2) Rosario
saw Franco get a cap and a cell phone from the same place;30and (3) Ramos saw Franco leave the gym at 1:15 p.m. and
the latter failed to log out in the logbook.31The RTC and the CA wove these circumstances in order to arrive at the "positive
identification" of Franco as the perpetrator.32 cha nrob lesvi rtua llawli bra ry

A perusal of their testimonies, however, shows that certain facts have been overlooked by both courts.

For one, it was only Rosario who saw Franco get a cap and a cell phone from the altar. His lone testimony, however, cannot
be considered a positive identification of Franco as the perpetrator.33 cha nrob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry

In People v. Pondivida,34 the Court held: ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary

Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being an eyewitness to the very act of
commission of the crime. There are two types of positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused in a
criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. This
constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be instances where, although a witness may not have actually seen the
very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a
crime as for instance when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and

2
right after the commission of the crime. This is the second, type of positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial
evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to only fair and
reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others. x x x.35 (Emphasis
omitted and underscoring ours)
Rosario's testimony definitely cannot fall under the first category of positive identification. While it may support the
conclusion that Franco took a cell phone from the altar, it does not establish with certainty that what Franco feloniously
took, assuming that he did, was Nakamoto's cell phone. Rosario merely testified that Franco took "a cell phone." He
stated:ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry

Q: How did you know that the said cell phone was taken by the accused?

A: [W]e were then in a conversation when I asked him to spot or assist me with the
weights that I intended to carry. We were then situated in an area very near the
altar where his cap and cell phone were placed. After assisting me, he went to
the area and took the cell phone and the cap at the same time.

Q: [W]ho were you talking [sic] at that time?

A: Guilbemer Franco.

Q: It was also [G]uilbemer Franco who helped or spot you in the work out?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And after assisting you, what did Franco do?

A: He took the cell phone of Mr. Nakamoto and his cap at the same time and covered
the cell phone by his cap and left the place.

Q: Where was that cell phone of the private complainant placed at that time?

A: At the top of the altar where is [sic] cap is also located.

Q: How far was that altar from where you were working?

A: Only inches.

Q: It was directly in front of you?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What did you do when the accused took the cap as well as the cell phone
of the private complainant?

A: None, sir. I thought the cap and cell phone was his.

Q: How did you know that the cell phone belongs to the private complainant?

A: After Mr. Nakamoto came out from the shower, he went directly to the
altar to get his cell phone which was not there anymore and asked us
where his cell phone and I told him that I saw Mr. Franco get a cell phone
from that area.36 (Emphasis ours)
On cross-examination, Rosario also stated that he did not actually see Franco take Nakamoto's cell phone37 but on re-direct,
he clarified that he did not see the cell phone of Nakamoto because he thought that the cell phone was owned by
Franco.38 chanroble svirtuallaw lib rary

What was firmly established by Rosarios testimony is that Franco took a cell phone from the altar. But Franco even admitted
such fact.39 What stands out from Rosario's testimony is that he was unable to particularly describe at first instance what or
whose cell phone Franco took from the altar. lie only assumed that it was Nakamoto's at the time the latter announced that
his cell phone was missing. This was, in tact, observed by the RTC in the course of Rosario's testimony, thus: ChanRoblesVirt uala wlibra ry

3
COURT: What you actually saw was, [G]uilbemer Franco was taking his cap together
with the cell phone placed beside the cap but you do not know that [the] cell
phone was Bj's or Nakamoto's?

A: [Y]es, Your Honor.

COURT: You just presumed that the cell phone taken by Guilbemer Franco
was his?

A: Yes, Ma'am.40 (Emphasis ours)

Moreover, it must be noted that save for Nakamoto's statement that he placed his cell phone at the altar, no one saw him
actually place his cell phone there. This was confirmed by Rosario -

COURT:

Q: And on that day, you were able to see that Nakamoto on four incidents, when he
logged-in, during work-out and when he went inside the C.[R].?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Therefore, you did not see Nakamoto place his cell phone at the Altar?

A: Yes, sir.41 (Emphasis ours)

Ramos, the gym caretaker, also testified that he did not see Franco take Nakamoto's cell phone and only assumed that the
cell phone on the altar was Nakamoto's, thus -

Q: And do you know who owns that cell phone put [sic] over the altar?

A: Benjamin Nakamoto.

Q: How do you know that it belongs to Benjamin Nakamoto?

A: He is the only one who brings a cell phone to the gym.

xxxx

Q: [D]id you actually see him take the cell phone of Nakamoto?

A: I did not see him take the [cell] phone but as soon as the cell phone was lost, he
was the only one who left the gym.42 chan roble svirtuallaw lib rary

Neither can the prosecution's testimonial evidence fall under the second category of positive identification, that is, Franco
having been identified as the person or one of the persons last seen immediately before and right after the commission of
the theft. Records show that there were other people in the gym before and after Nakamoto lost his cell phone. In fact,
Nakamoto himself suspected Rosario of having taken his cell phone, thus: ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary

ATTY. SANCHEZ:

Q: You said that you stayed inside the rest room for more or less 10 minutes?

A: [Y]es, sir.

Q: After 10 minutes, you don't know whether aside from Franco somebody went out
from the gym because you were inside the c.r.?

A: Yes. sir.

xxxx

4
Q: As a matter of fact, one of your witness[es] who went near the place where your
cell phone was placed was this Arnie Rosario?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And it was only the accused and [Rosario] who were near the place where you said
you placed the cell phone?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: You did not suspect [Rosario] to have taken the cell phone?

A: I also suspected, sir.43 (Emphasis ours)

Moreover, the prosecution witnesses confirmed that the altar is the usual spot where the gym users place their valuables.
According to Rosario: ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

ATTY. SANCHEZ:

Q: And in that place, you said there was a Sto. Nino?

A: At the Altar.

Q: Those who work-out in that gym usually place their things [on top of] the
altar.

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Therefore, there were people who place their cell phones on top [of] the
Altar?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Aside from Nakamoto, other people place their things on top [of] the
Altar?

A: Yes, sir.44 (Emphasis ours)

The prosecution's evidence does not rule out the following possibilities: one, that what Franco took was his own cell
phone; two, even on the assumption that Franco stole a cell phone from the altar, that what he feloniously took was
Nakamoto's cell phone, considering the feet that at the time Nakamoto was inside the changing room, other people may
have placed their cell phone on the same spot; and three, that some other person may have taken Nakamoto's cell phone.

It must be emphasized that "[c]ourts must judge the guilt or innocence of the accused based on facts and not on mere
conjectures, presumptions, or suspicions."45 It is iniquitous to base Franco's guilt on the presumptions of the prosecution's
witnesses for the Court has, time and again, declared that if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or
more interpretations, one of which being consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other or others consistent
with his guilt, then the evidence in view of the constitutional presumption of innocence has not fulfilled the test of moral
certainty and is thus insufficient to support a conviction.46 chan roble svirtuallaw lib rary

Franco also asserts that the logbook from which his time in and time out at the gym was based was not identified during the
trial and was only produced after Ramos testified.47 Ramos testified that when Nakamoto announced that his cell phone was
missing and asked that nobody leaves the place, he put an asterisk opposite the name of Franco in the logbook to indicate
that he was the only one who left the gym after the cell phone was declared lost.48 chan roble svirtualla wlibra ry

Under the Rules on Evidence, documents are either public or private. Private documents are those that do not fall under any
of the enumerations in Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.49 Section 20 of the same Rule, in turn, provides that
before any private document is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either by anyone
who saw the document executed or written, or by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the
maker.50chanro blesvi rtua llawli bra ry

In this case, the foregoing rule was not followed. The testimony of Ramos shows that the logbook, indeed, was not
identified and authenticated during the course of Ramos' testimony. At the time when Ramos was testifying, he merely
referred to the log in and log out time and the name of the person at page 104 of the logbook that appears on line 22 of the
entries for November 3, 2004. This was photocopied and marked as Exhibit "C-1."51 Meanwhile, when Nakamoto was
presented as rebuttal witness, a page from the logbook was again marked as Exhibit "D."52 The logbook or the particular

5
page referred to by Ramos was neither identified nor confirmed by him as the same logbook which he used to log the ins
and outs of the gym users, or that the writing and notations on said logbook was his.

The prosecution contends, meanwhile, that the RTC's evaluation of the witnesses' credibility may no longer be questioned at
this stage.53 The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the assignment of value and weight to the testimony of a witness is
best left to the discretion of the RTC. But an exception to that rule shall be applied in this ease where certain facts of
substance and value, if considered, may affect the result.54 In Lejano v. People,55 the Court stated: ChanRoblesVi rtualaw lib rary

A judge must keep an open mind. He must guard against slipping into hasty conclusion, often arising from a desire to
quickly finish the job of deciding a case. A positive declaration from a witness that he saw the accused commit the crime
should not automatically cancel out the accused's claim that he did not do it. A lying witness can make as positive an
identification as a truthful witness can. The lying witness can also say as forthrightly and unequivocally, "He did it!" without
blinking an eye.56 cha nrob lesvi rtua llawli bra ry

The facts and circumstances proven by the prosecution, taken together, are not sufficient to justify the unequivocal
conclusion that Franco feloniously took Nakamoto's cell phone. No other convincing evidence was presented by the
prosecution that would link him to the theft.57 The fact Franco took a cell phone from the altar does not necessarily point to
the conclusion that it was Nakamoto's cell phone that he took. In the appreciation of circumstantial evidence, the rule
is that the circumstances must be proved, and not themselves presumed. The circumstantial evidence must exclude
the possibility that some other person has committed the offense charged.58 chanro blesvi rt uallawl ibra ry

Franco, therefore, cannot be convicted of the crime charged in this case. There is not enough evidence to do so. As a rule,
in order to support a conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence, all the circumstances must be consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty. In this case, not all the facts on which the inference of guilt is based were proved. The
matter of what and whose cell phone Franco took from the altar still remains uncertain. chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ib rary

Franco's defense of denial

The evidence of the prosecution must stand on its own weight and not rely on the weakness of the defense.59 In this case,
Franco did not deny that he was at the Body Shape Gym on November 3, 2004, at around 1:00 p.m. and left the place at
around 2:45 p.m.60 He did not even deny that he took a cell phone from the altar together with his cap. What he denied is
that he took Nakamoto's cell phone and instead, claimed that what he took is his own cell phone.61 Denial may be weak but
courts should not at once look at them with disfavor. There are situations where an accused may really have no other
defenses but denial, which, if established to be the truth, may tilt the scales of justice in his favor, especially when the
prosecution evidence itself is weak.62 chanroble svi rtual lawlib rary

While it is true that denial partakes of the nature of negative and self-serving evidence and is seldom given weight in
law,63 the Court admits an exception established by jurisprudence that the defense of denial assumes: significance when the
prosecution's evidence is such that it does not prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.64 The exception applies in the case at
hand. The prosecution failed to produce sufficient evidence to overturn the constitutional guarantee that Franco is presumed
to be innocent.chanRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

Value of the cell phone

It is also argued by Franco that the value of the cell phone must be duly proved with reasonable degree of certainty. On the
other hand, the people contended that there has been a judicial admission of the same.65 This issue, however, is now moot
and academic considering Franco's acquittal. chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

Conclusion

The circumstantial evidence proven by the prosecution in this case failed to pass the test of moral certainty necessary to
warrant Franco's conviction. Accusation is not synonymous with guilt.66 Not only that, where the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations or interpretations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of
the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not meet or hurdle the test of moral certainty
required for conviction.67 chan rob lesvi rtual lawlib rary

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 16, 2009 in CA-GR. CR No.
31706 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Guilbemer Franco is ACQUITTED of the crime of Theft charged in
Criminal Case No. 05-238613 because his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

No costs.

SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibra ry

6
3.) [ GR No. 192233, Feb 17, 2016 ]

PEOPLE v. SPO1 CATALINO GONZALES +

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:
On appeal is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02638,
affirming with modification the Judgment[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Trece
Martirez City, Branch 23, convicting accused-appellant SPO1 Catalino Gonzales, Jr. for
the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom.

On 30 January 2006, appellant was charged with Kidnapping for Ransom in the
following Information:

That on December 28, 2005, at about 10:30 o'clock in the morning in the Municipality
of Tanza, Province of Cavite and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping one another,
with threats and/or intimidation and through the use of force, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously take, carry away, and deprive PETER TAN and
his son MICHAEL TAN, a minor of two . (2) years of age, of their respective liberties
against their will for the purpose of extorting money as in fact a demand for money in
the amount of Three Million (P3,000,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, was
demanded as a condition for their safe release to their damage and prejudice.

With the attendance of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of authority

against SPO1 CATALINO GONZALES, PS1 NATHANIEL CAPITENEA and
PO2 ARDEN G. LANAZA, being active members of the Philippine National
Police.[3]

On arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued.

The victim Peter Tan (Tan) and his wife Huang Haitao (Haitao) lived in Retirees'
Village in Tanza, Cavite. They operated a stall in a market also in Tanza.

Haitao narrated in her Sworn Statement[4] that in the morning of 28 December 2005,
Haitao left the house ahead of Tan and their two-year old son to go to the market.
When Haitao arrived at their stall, she tried calling Tan in his phone but the latter did
not answer. Finally, the call was answered by someone who introduced himself as a
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agent and who told Haitao that her husband
was arrested for illegal possession of shabu. Haitao immediately asked for her
husband's whereabouts but the alleged NBI agent hung up. Haitao then called Tan's
phone again. Before she could talk to her husband, someone snatched the phone away
from Tan and told her that someone would get in touch with her. At around 10:30
a.m., an unknown Chinese man called up Haitao and informed her that her husband
and son were detained for possession of drugs, and that she should pay off the captors.
That evening, a man called Haitao and demanded P5,000,000.00 for the release of
her husband and son. The demand was lowered to P3,000,000.00. Haitao was
ordered by the captor to prepare the money and go to Luneta Park on the following
day.

7
Haitao reported the incident to the Philippine Anti-Crime Emergency Response Unit
(PACER) of the Philippine National Police. The Luneta Park meeting did not push
through. Haitao still received various instructions from the captors to fetch her son
until the PACER received information that Haitao's son was in White Cross Children's
Home. Haitao was eventually reunited with her son.

On 15 January 2006, Haitao received a text message from an unidentified man who
claimed that he knew about Tan's kidnapping and demanded £30,000.00 from
Haitao. They met at McDonald's restaurant in Tanza, Cavite. When the man, later
identified as Edwin Torrente (Torrente) approached Haitao, he was arrested by
PACER agents.

It turned out that Torrente was part of the group which forcibly took Tan and his son.
In exchange for the needed information, Torrente was placed under the Witness
Protection Program and was utilized as a state witness.

In his Sworn Statement,[5] Torrente narrated that on 27 December 2005, he was

approached by appellant and told about a plan to arrest Tan, an alleged drug pusher in
Tanza, Cavite. At around 7:00 a.m. on 28 December 2005, Torrente received a text
message from appellant asking him to proceed to the Shell Gas Station along Coastal
Road in Imus, Cavite. Thereat, Torrente met appellant, his son, Joy Gonzales, Lt.
Capitanea, and nine other people. The group then proceeded to the Retirees' Village in
Tanza, Cavite to conduct a surveillance of the house of appellant. At around 11:00 a.m.,
the group left the village and went to a nearby Me Donald's restaurant to have some
snacks. After eating, the group went back to the village and chanced upon Tan who
was inside his Ford vehicle. They immediately blocked Tan's car, forced him and his
son to alight from the vehicle, and boarded them into another vehicle. Torrente then
went back to the gas station to get his motorcycle and proceeded to his house. On 31
December 2005, Torrente received a call from appellant informing him that Tan would
soon be released as negotiations were ongoing. Torrente admitted that he called
Haitao and asked for a meeting. When Torrente sensed the presence of policemen, he
immediately surrendered and voluntarily gave his statement.

Appellant denied the charges against him and proffered the defense of alibi. Appellant
claimed that on 28 December 2005, at 10:08 a.m., he was at the Land Bank of the
Philippines branch in Dasmarinas, Cavite to encash his check. After encashing his
check, appellant went home and stayed there until 8:00 p.m. to attend a party. On 31
December 2005, Torrente went to his house and together, they conducted a
surveillance against drug suspects.

On 17 January 2006, he planned to meet up with Torrente at the Shell Station along
Anabu Road in Imus, Cavite. When appellant arrived at the gas station, two armed
men alighted from their vehicles and poked their guns on him. Appellant was then
forcibly dragged into the vehicle. Appellant claimed that he was subjected to physical
and mental torture before he was brought to the PACER office.[6]

The branch manager of Land Bank, Mr. Edgar Deligero, corroborated appellant's alibi.
He acknowledged that a check under appellant's name was encashed on 28 December
2005 at 10:08 a.m. He noted that based on the bank's verification procedure, the
signature of appellant is valid and an identification document was presented by the
appellant. Hence, the bank manager confirmed that it was indeed appellant who
personally encashed the check.[7]

8
Appellant's daughter corroborated appellant's statement that he was tortured. Jocelyn
Gonzales witnessed his father's condition while the latter was detained in the PACER's
office. She also saw a first medical certificate and heard the DOJ prosecutor order a
second medical examination. Dr. Edilberto Antonio confirmed the issuance of two
medical certificates certifying the injuries suffered by appellant.

On 12 July 2006, the trial court rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay P200,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Appellant challenged the trial court's decision affirming his conviction on the ground
of alleged discrepancies in the testimonies and statements of prosecution witnesses.
Appellant specifically pointed out the discrepancy in the time of the commission of the
crime. Appellant asserted that based on the statement of Haitao, the kidnapping
incident took place at around 10:30 a.m. while state witness Torrente, claimed that the
kidnapping occurred after 11:00 a.m. Furthermore, appellant insisted that Torrente's
claim that he and appellant were together from 7:30 a.m. up to after 11:00 a.m. on 28
December 2005 is inconsistent with the fact that appellant, as confirmed by the
branch manager, was at the Land Bank branch in Dasmarinas, Cavite at 10:08 a.m. to
encash a check. Based on these inconsistencies, appellant maintained that he should
be acquitted. Appellant also argued that the absence of the victim puts in serious doubt
the presence of the corpus delicti.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for its part, recommended that appellant be
held guilty of kidnapping for ransom. The OSG contended that there is no material
discrepancy as to time that would tend to create reasonable doubt as to appellant's
guilt. The OSG stressed that the corpus delicti in this case is the actual confinement,
detention and restraint on the victims. The OSG asserted that the prosecution has
proven that the detention of the victims was perpetrated by appellant, among others.

In a Decision[8] dated 12 November 2009, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of
the trial court.

The appellate court rejected appellants' defense of alibi and held that it cannot prevail
over the positive identification by the state witness. The appellate court also dismissed
the alleged disparities on the sworn statements and testimonies of prosecution
witnesses as trivial and minor details that do not detract in any way from the main
thrust of what the prosecution witnesses related in court.

On 7 July 2010, this Court required the parties to simultaneously file their respective
Supplemental Briefs.[9] While the OSG manifested that it is adopting its brief earlier
filed before the Court of Appeals,[10] appellant filed his Supplemental
Brief[11] reiterating that the inconsistent statements of the prosecution witnesses with
respect to the time of the commission of the crime are so crucial to merit his acquittal.
Appellant maintains that he was at the bank at 10:08 a.m. Using this as a reckoning
point, both of the prosecution witnesses' claim of the time of kidnapping are
erroneous. The disparity in the statements of the prosecution witnesses creates a
doubt in the guilt of the accused which, according to appellant, should work for his
acquittal.

The bone of contention in this case is whether the inconsistent statements of

prosecution witnesses with regard to the time of the commission of the crime will
exonerate appellant.
9
In People v. Delfin,[12] a case involving simple rape, the Court held that where the
inconsistency is not an essential element of the crime, such inconsistency is
insignificant and cannot have any bearing on the essential fact testified to. In a case for
illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs,[13] the Court ruled that inconsistencies
and discrepancies in the testimony referring to minor details and not upon the basic
aspect of the crime do not diminish the witnesses' credibility. An inconsistency, which
has nothing to do with the elements of a crime, is not a ground to reverse a conviction.
In fact in People v. Macapanas,[14] we added that these inconsistencies bolster the
credibility of the witness's testimony as it erases the suspicion of the witness having
been coached or rehearsed.

The alleged inconsistencies related to the time the kidnapping was committed. The
elements of kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), as amended, are as follows: (a) intent on the part of the accused to deprive the
victim of his liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and (c) motive of
the accused, which is extorting ransom for the release of the victim.[15]Time is not a
material ingredient in the crime of kidnapping. As long as all these elements were
sufficiently established by the prosecution, a conviction for kidnapping is in order.

At any rate, Torrente declared during the cross-examination that he tried to rectify the
error with regard to the time, thus:

CROSS-EXAMINATION OF THE WITNESS

CONDUCTED BY ATTY. MAPILE:
ATTY. MAPILE:
Mr. Witness, you said you talked to the Prosecutor before taking to the
Q
witness stand, is it not?
WITNESS:
A Yes, sir. He explained to me that if I am telling the truth, sir.
And he also explained to you the need of correcting paragraph 5 in your
Q
sworn statement, is it not because of a typographical error?
A Yes, sir.
And except for that error, you confirmed everything to be true and accurate
Q
on figures and dates especially the time, am I right?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. MAPILE:
And you have nothing, you have no desire subsequent to correct, to make
Q
any further correction?
WITNESS:
A I have, sir. With respect to time only.
Q What time are you talking about Mr. Witness?
When Peter Tan was taken, it could be more or less 10:00 in the morning,
A
sir.
Instead of what? What appears in your statement when he was abducted or
Q
taken?
A No more, sir. He was abducted more or less 10:00 o'clock in the morning.
You had occasion to read how many times your sworn statement before
Q
signing it?
A For about five (5) times, sir.
Q Why did you notice for the first time that Number 5, question number 5

10
 and answer number 5 should be corrected?
A For the third time, sir.
ATTY. MAPILE:
And when was the time when you also discovered that the abduction was
Q
10:00 o'clock instead of beyond 10:00 o'clock of December 28, 2005?
WITNESS:
A For the second time, sir.
You mean for the second time, the second time that you read your
Q
statement?
A Yes, sir.
Q When was that Mr. Witness?
A Before I signed it, sir.
Before you signed it, it was stated you did not forget the one who prepared
Q
your statement?
A I called the attention of the one who prepared, sir.
Q But what he say?
A According to the Investigator, they changed it already, sir.
So you did not sign that purported sworn statement, that sworn statement
Q
was already changed?
COURT:
Let us make this clear counsel. As per statement given on January 17 and
one January 24.
ATTY. MAPILE:
I'm merely referring to the 17, Your Honor.
COURT:
17.
WITNESS:
A I did not, sir.
ATTY. MAPILE:
Q You did not because you pointed out the mistake?
A Yes, sir.
When you refused to sign because you disclosed to get the error, did the
Q
Investigator changed your statement?
A Yes, sir.
PROSE. PARICO:
Your Honor, the witness answered earlier "Binago Na Po", that was his
statement, Your Honor.
WITNESS:
A The sworn statement is the same, sir.
ATTY. MAPILE:
Q In short, they did not correct the error that.you pointed out?
A No, sir. I did not change it.
Q And despite pointing out the error, they did not change it anymore?
A I do not know the reason, sir.[16]

Appellant now seeks to assail the testimony of Torrente as a "last-minute adjustment"

which weakens the testimony.

It has been consistently held that discrepancies and/or inconsistencies between a

witness' affidavit and testimony do not necessarily impair his credibility as affidavits
are taken ex parte and are often incomplete or inaccurate for lack or absence of
searching inquiries by the investigating officer. What is important is, in the over-all
analysis of the case, the trial court's findings and conclusions are duly supported by
11
the evidence on record.[17]

In this case, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals gave credit to Torrente's
statement. It is a well-settled rule that factual findings of the trial court regarding the
credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight and respect especially if affirmed by
the Court of Appeals. The Court shall not supplant its own interpretation of the
testimonies for that of the trial judge since he is in the best position to determine the
issue of credibility of witnesses.[18]

A concomitant issue is whether the corpus delicti was proven despite the non-
presentation of the kidnap victims during trial. Appellant stresses that the corpus
delicti was not proven because Tan[19] could not be found.

Corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime which may be proved by the
testimony of the witnesses who saw it.[20] Thecorpus delicti in the crime of kidnapping
for ransom is the fact that an individual has been in any manner deprived of his liberty
for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person.[21]

To prove the corpus delicti, it is sufficient for the prosecution to be able to show that
(1) a certain fact has been proven — say, a person has died or a building has been
burned; and (2) a particular person is criminally responsible for the act.[22]

The fact of kidnapping has been duly proved by Haitao who categorically testified that
a kidnapping transpired, to wit:

PROSE. PARICO:

May i manifest, Your Honor, that while the witness is reading intensely the affidavit
No. 8, she is continues crying, Your Honor.

COURT:

Okay, noted the manifestation of the counsel is granted that while witness is reading
paragraph No. 8 question and answer the witness is crying. Noted. Can you interpret
in Chinese?

WITNESS:

And when she went to the PalengkE, they were not in the same car. She went
ahead and then Peter and the son followed in another car with Plate No. PTY-
955. She called her husband five times and nobody was answering, sir. The
husband was not answering the cellphone, her cellphone and somebody
answered a voice, the voice of a male, Filipino voice. The man said that they
A
arrested Peter, they are from NBI and they arrested him because he has in
possession one (1) kilo of shabu, sir. She said that she cannot believe it. They
are just telling lies. She could not believe that Peter Tan is in possession of
shabu and if Peter will be arrested why will be include my son. She said that
she has a business in the market doing glassware and houseware in Tanza, sir.
xxxx
I called again the cellphone of Peter, sir. She got to talk on Peter at the
A
cellphone and Peter clearly told her in Chinese to ask them where is the child,

12
 a boy and quickly, they cut the cellphone. So when she got to talk to the
person on the other line, they answered if he is Chinese or Filipino and she
said she is Chinese and there somebody who speak to her in Chinese, sir. The
Chines[e] told her that his friend gave this Chinese her cellphone number.
The Chinese said that they arrested him because her husband has shabu and
had a case, sir. And the Chinese said that they are kidnapping the husband
and they wanted for ransom and the Chinese said that he is not going to help
anymore he wants to go home. He doesn't want to get involve. He doesn't
want to get anymore and he wants to go home. She asked again, what is really
the case and please don't get the child, don't involve the child in this case, in
the case of her husband. She said she was asking the other line where did they
bring my husband and what office they brought him to and if she knows the
office, she is going to get a lawyer. Then she asked them to return the child,
her son back to her. The Chinese said that Yah, why did you involve the child
and after that switch off the cellphone, sir.[23]

Torrente, on the other hand, identified appellant as one of the captors.

Article 267 of the RPC provides that the penalty of death shall be imposed if the
kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom, thus:

Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal "detention. - Any private individual who shall
kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have.lasted more than three days.

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped
or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is
any of the parents, female or a public officer;

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the
purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the
circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is

subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.

Pursuant to R.A. No. 9346, the penalty is correctly reduced to reclusion perpetua,
without eligibility for parole.

We observe that the lower courts failed to award civil indemnity and moral damages in
this case. Civil indemnity is awarded if the crime is qualified by circumstances
warranting the imposition of the death penalty.[24] On the other hand, moral damages
is warranted. Under Article 2217 of the New Civil Code, moral damages include
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, moral
shock and similar injury.
13
There is no doubt that Haitao suffered physical, mental and emotional trauma over the
kidnapping of Tan and her two-year old son.

In conformity with prevailing jurisprudence,[25] the following amount of damages

should be imposed:

1) P100,000.00 as civil indemnity;

2) P100,000.00 as moral damages; and
3) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.

In addition, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all
the damages awarded, to earn from the date of the finality of the Court's Decision until
fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The appealed decision

is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that appellant SPO1 Catalino Gonzales, Jr.
is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole,
and to pay the family of the kidnap victim Peter Tan the following amounts: (1)
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) P100,000.00 as moral damages; and (3)
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

4.) G.R. No. 208320, August 19, 2015

GRACE DAVID Y CESAR, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

This is a petition for review1 assailing the 23 January 2013 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33310,
affirming the trial court's decision, finding petitioner Grace David y Cesar (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of commercial documents.

The Facts

Petitioner was charged with estafa through falsification of commercial documents. The Information against petitioner
reads:Lawlib ra ryofCRAlaw

CRIM. CASE NO. 9693-02

That or (sic) about or within the period from August 24, 1999 to January 21, 2000, in the Municipality of Dasmariñas,
Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to
defraud, with deceit and abuse of confidence, while then being an employee of Hella Philippines, Inc., did [then and there]
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsified Land Bank commercial documents, making it appear that said Hella Philippines,
Inc., was assessed additional customs duties amounting to EIGHT HUNDRED FIFTY FIVE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED
NINETY FIVE PESOS (P855,995.00) more or less for the release of its imports and obtaining from said Hella Philippines, Inc.,
the said amount purportedly for payment of assessed additional customs duties when in fact and in truth no such additional
duties have been assessed and misappropriating the said amount for her own personal use and benefits, to the damage and

14
prejudice of Hella Philippines, Inc.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

On 16 November 1989, Hella Philippines, Inc. (Hella), which imports automotive lighting and signaling equipment, hired
petitioner as Traffic and Customs Coordinator.4 Petitioner's principal duties and responsibilities as the in-house Traffic and
Customs Coordinator were to: (1) perform activities relating to shipment, delivery, documentation and clearing of
importations; (2) ensure the economical and efficient transportation of shipment or deliveries; (3) update information on
current transportation facilities and rates; (4) coordinate with various government agencies, like the Bureau of Customs
(BOC), regarding the company's imports and exports; and (5) perform tasks according to quality systems procedure.5 reda rclaw

The standard operating procedure regarding Hella's imports was as follows: (1) whenever Hella's suppliers abroad would
ship supplies to Hella, petitioner would handle all the shipping documents relative thereto, compute and assess the taxes
due, and fill up BOC Import Entry Release Document (IERD); (2) petitioner's initial computations and assessments were
then written on the IERD; (3) petitioner would submit the completed IERD forms to Hella which would then instruct its
depositary banks, namely Bank of the Philippine Islands and Security Bank to debit the computed amount in the name of
the BOC; (4) petitioner would then process the release of the shipments; (5) the shipments would then be released,
provided the taxes and duties paid were correct; (6) if there was discrepancy in the computation and the assessment of
taxes due, the BOC would impose additional duties and taxes; (7) if there were additional duties and taxes imposed,
petitioner would fill up and submit a cash advance request at Hella's accounting department; (8) based on petitioner's
requested amount, Hella would then release a check in petitioner's name; (9) petitioner would then encash the check and
use the proceeds to pay the additional assessed taxes and duties at BOC's authorized banks such as the Land Bank of the
Philippines (Land Bank); (10) the authorized collecting bank would then issue BOC Form No. 38-A to be filled up by
petitioner; (11) upon validation, the BOC Form No. 38-A would serve as an official receipt supplied by the BOC General
Services Department to the Land Bank BOC-MICP; (12) after payment, the BOC Form No. 38-A, with its serial number,
would also bear the Land Bank's rubber stamp and the bank teller's name, evidencing receipt of payment by Land Bank;
(13) upon completion of this procedure, the goods would then be released to Hella, and petitioner would begin liquidating
her cash advances by submitting the same validated BOC Form No. 38-A to the accounting department; (14) after
liquidation, petitioner would then be cleared of her cash advances.

The prosecution alleged that sometime in January 2000, Hella learned that petitioner had been misrepresenting the
amounts she wrote on several BOC Form No. 38-A. Petitioner made it appear that payments of additional taxes were made
to BOC, when in fact there was none. Petitioner falsified Land Bank commercial documents by making it appear that Hella
was assessed additional customs duties totaling P855,995 for the release of its imports. The various amounts which were
purportedly for the payment of the assessed additional customs duties were misappropriated by petitioner for her own
personal use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of Hella.

Upon learning that Hella discovered her misrepresentations, petitioner filed her irrevocable letter of resignation on 12
January 2000. In a memorandum6 dated 1 February 2000, Hella required petitioner to settle first all her unliquidated cash
advances and clear all her accountabilities, without prejudice to whatever actions Hella might take under the circumstances.

In a letter7 dated 24 March 2000, Hella requested Land Bank "to check/verify the authenticity of the "Official Receipt, Date,
Amount, Series Number and the Teller who accepted payment" of several BOC Forms No. 38-A. In her reply, the Land Bank
Manager wrote: Lawlibra ryofCRAlaw

April 07, 2000

MR. ANTONIO A. YULO

Managing Director
HELLA-PHILS, INC.

In response to your letter dated March 24, 2000 requesting our office to check/verify the authenticity of the attached
photocopies and upon presentment of the original copies of BOC Form No. 38-A based on our reports, we noted the
following: Lawli bra ryofCRAlaw

1. Serial Numbers BOC Official Receipt were not issued to Land Bank Philippines MICP EO;
2. BOC Additional Duties System will decline entry of the same Official Receipt Numbers;
3. Teller name and Number do not match;
4. Rubber stamp used differs from LandBank, and
5. Fonts of the computer printing differs from the prints produced by LandBank printer.

We hope that the informations above cited answers you[r] inquiries regarding the above subject.

Very truly yours,

(signed)
LEONOR E. YAP
Dept. Manager III8

Hella conducted an investigation on the matter and required petitioner to explain but she failed to reasonably justify her
involvement in the matter. The minutes of the 26 April 2000 meeting with Hella and petitioner were read and signed by
petitioner.9 redarclaw

For her part, petitioner argued that she merely followed the standard operating procedure of BOC in processing documents
for the release of Hella's imports. Petitioner denied that she committed estafa, insisting that she did not make erroneous
computations or assessments. She clarified that she did not always encash checks since Hella sometimes just gave her cash
for the payment of additional taxes and duties. Besides, she claimed that she always submitted supporting documents for
liquidation purposes.

On 6 January 2010, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: Lawlib raryofCRAlaw

15
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Grace David guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the complex crime of Estafa [through] Falsification of Commercial Documents. Accordingly, she is sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of Four (4) Years and Two (2) Months of prision correccional as minimum to Twenty (20)
Years of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Accused is likewise ordered to pay a fine of P3,000.00 and to indemnify the offended party the total amount of P855,995.00
by way of actual damages with interest at the legal rate from date of filing of the information until fully paid, attorney's fees
in the amount of P100,000.00 and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.10

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that
petitioner falsified commercial documents, as defined under Article 171, and penalized under Article 172, of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC). It was established during the trial that in her liquidation reports, petitioner submitted various BOC Forms
No. 38-A wherein she made it appear that Hella was assessed additional customs duties for the release of Hella's imports,
and that she paid the additional customs duties to the BOC through authorized Land Bank branches. The testimonies of the
officers and employees of Land Bank proved that the BOC forms submitted by petitioner were falsified. The Court of Appeals
held that petitioner committed estafa when she used the falsified BOC Form No. 38-A to deceive Hella to release money to
her, allegedly for the payment of additional taxes or duties with the BOC through the different branches of Land Bank.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution dated 19 July 2013. Hence,
this appeal.

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues: Lawli bra ryofCRAlaw

(1) THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE (RESPONDENT HEREIN)
WAS ABLE TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED- APPELLANT (PETITIONER HEREIN) BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT,
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PRESENT AS WITNESS ANY BUREAU OF CUSTOMS (BOC)
OFFICIAL OR REPRESENTATIVE TO TESTIFY ON THE VARIOUS BOC FORM 38-A WHICH HAD ALLEGEDLY BEEN FALSIFIED.

(2) THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE RESPONDENT HEREIN WAS ABLE TO PROVE THE
GUILT OF THE PETITIONER HEREIN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PRESENT IN EVIDENCE THE LIQUIDATION REPORTS OF SAID PETITIONER SHOWING THE CASH
ADVANCES SHE MADE AND SUBMITTED BY HER TO HELLA PHILIPPINES, INC.

(3) THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT OVERLOOKED THE FACT OR CIRCUMSTANCE THAT THE
PROSECUTION FAILED TO PRESENT CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT HELLA PHILIPPINES, INC. WAS
ASSESSED ADDITIONAL CUSTOMS DUTIES AMOUNTING TO P855,995.00 FOR THE RELEASE OF ITS IMPORTS. 11

The Court's Ruling

We find the appeal without merit. The Court of Appeals was correct in affirming the ruling of the trial court that petitioner is
guilty of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of commercial documents. The categorical testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses and the voluminous documentary evidence submitted by the prosecution clearly established
petitioner's guilt.

Well-settled is the rule that the trial court, having the opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor during the
trial, can best assess the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies.12Petitioner's mere denial cannot prevail over the
positive and categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.13 Factual findings of the trial court, especially when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are deemed binding and conclusive unless substantial facts and circumstances have been
overlooked or misconstrued, which if considered might affect the result of the case,14 and absent any clear showing of
abuse, arbitrariness or capriciousness.15

Under Article 4816 of the RPC, when a single act constitutes two or more crimes, a complex crime is committed for which
only one penalty is imposed. Complex crimes under Article 48 refer to either (1) an act which constitutes two or more grave
or less grave offenses; or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for committing another.17 The phrase "necessary
means" in Article 48 does not mean indispensable; otherwise, the offense as a "necessary means" to commit another would
be an indispensable element of the latter and would be an ingredient thereof.18 For instance, the crime of simple estafa is
ordinarily committed in the manner defined under the RPC; but if the accused resorts to falsification merely to facilitate and
insure the commission of estafa, then he is guilty of the complex crime of estafa through falsification.19 redarclaw

In this case, it was duly proven during the trial that petitioner falsified several BOC Form No. 38-A, a commercial document,
in order to facilitate and insure the commission of estafa. BOC Form No. 38-A is a commercial document used by authorized
collecting banks, such as Land Bank, as official receipt for the payment of additional or deficiency customs taxes and
duties.20 The falsification of the BOC forms, which are commercial documents, was a necessary means to commit estafa.21 redarclaw

The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses clearly established that petitioner used fake BOC forms to liquidate her cash
advances for the alleged payment of additional taxes and duties to the BOC through the authorized Land Bank branches. In
particular, Ms. Leonor Yap, the department manager of the Land Bank Bureau of Customs MICP, belied the authenticity of
the BOC forms submitted by petitioner to Flella to justify the additional taxes and duties allegedly assessed by BOC. In her
testimony, Ms. Yap explained how she arrived at the conclusion that the BOC forms sent to them by Hella for verification
were falsified, thus:
Lawl ib raryofCRAlaw

Q: As Department Manger of Land Bank of the Philippines Bureau of Customs MICP, will you please tell the court your duties
and responsibilities?

16
A: I was assigned to the Land Bank Bureau of Customs last August 2, 1999. I am responsible for the oversee (sic), the
Branch Operation regarding deposit of client[s], the acceptance of payment from Brokers for payment to Bureau of Customs
and the marketing operation of the plaintiff.

Q: You mentioned about the acceptance of payment as one of your responsibilities?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Do you remember having receive[d] sometime 24 March 2000 a letter from Hella Philippines?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: If this letter will be shown to you, will you be able to recognize the same?
A: Yes, sir.

Atty. Roxas: For record purposes, we would manifest that the letter she is referring was previously marked Exh. "V". I am
showing to you this document dated March 24, 2000 consisting of two pages, addressed to the Land Bank of the Philippines,
Attention to Leonor Yap, signed by Antonio Yulo at the left hand corner of the document. Will you kindly go over the
document and tell this court if this is the letter that you received on 24 March 2000?

A: This is the document we received dated March 27, 2000. That is received by the cashier of Land Bank Bureau of
Customs, Conchita, I forgot the surname.

Q: But after this was received by one of the employees, this was referred to you?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: As a result of this letter, what did you do after Mrs. Yap?

A: I gathered the document[s], I verified the record[s] and we found out that the document being presented or stated in
the letter by Mr. Yulo is xxx not issued by Land Bank Bureau of Customs MICP.

Q: When you say that's not issued by Land Bank of the Philippines Bureau of Customs MICP, what did you do?
A: The serial number of the Official receipt stated on the request [was] not part [of] the Bureau of Customs report[s], the
daily reports produced by the bank.

Q: And what else if there are? (sic)

A: The front of the official report as presented, the original copy of the official receipt presented to us does not tally [with]
the bank['s] official receipt that we had issued.

Q: And what else if there are? (sic)

A: The rubber stamp does not (sic) the official receipt presented to us, is not the one we are presently using.

Q: Are there anything more observation?

A: The initial of the teller differentiate the one using (sic).

Q: Being the Department Manager of Land Bank and based on what you testified, am I correct to say that the Bureau of
Custom forms submitted to you for inspection were all fake?

xxxx

Court: The question propounded [to] the witness was - what was your observation?

xxxx

Court: Witness may answer.

A: When the original receipt was presented to us as the attachment document in the letter of Mr. Yulo, we immediately saw
the discrepancy like the serial number of the stated official receipt in the request [was] not issued by Land Bank.

Arty. Roxas: What else did you observe?

xxxx

A: The serial number when the data entered into the computer of additional system of the Bureau of Customs, the computer
rejects the serial number because [it] is not authorize[d], [it] is not the sequence authorize[d] by the Bureau of Customs.

xxxx

Atty. Roxas: What other observation?

A: The teller's name and the number do not match.

xxxx

A: The rubberstamp using are in the branch (sic) is not the rubberstamp used in the original official receipt presented to us.

xxxx

A: The last observation is the printing of official receipt, computer printing in the official receipt, the original official receipt
presented to us differs from the bank file copy, sir.

xxxx

Atty. Roxas: As far as your No. 1 observation (sic), you said that the serial number of Bureau of Customs Official receipt
[was] not issued to Land Bank of the Philippines MICP?

17
A: Yes sir.

Q: What do you mean by serial number of the Bureau of Customs official receipt?
A: The form of Bureau of Customs official receipt.

xxxx

Atty. Roxas: x x x [Y]ou are mentioning something about the serial number official receipt?
A: The Bureau of Customs official receipts used in this request are supplied by the Bureau of Customs General Services
Department and the seriel (sic) as stated in the request were not the series issued to us by the Bureau of Customs General
Services Department.22

Ms. Leonor Yap also testified that most of the BOC forms in the list of BOC Form No. 38-A stated in Hella's letter requesting
for verification were not reflected in the reports23 generated from the BOC system called the Automated Matching of
Payments and Payables, which indicates the date of payments, official receipts of the BOC forms, the names of the
consignees and the importers, and the amount of payments made by the broker or importer. Ms. Leonor Yap explained that
if the BOC Form No. 38-A is not included in the daily report of collection, it means that there was no payment made to Land
Bank Bureau of Customs MICP.

The prosecution proved that the total amount defrauded was P2,074,326. However, since the Information only charged
petitioner with estafa through falsification of commercial documents for the amount of P855,995, the trial court ruled that
petitioner can only be held liable for such amount as charged and not the P2,074,326 which was the total amount defrauded
as proved by the prosecution. To hold otherwise would be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against her.

We agree with the trial court that petitioner cannot be held liable for more than the amount stated in the Information. The
Information only charged petitioner with estafa through falsification of commercial documents for the amount of P855,995.
The allegations of facts constituting the offense charged are substantial matters, and the right of the accused to question his
or her conviction based on facts not alleged in the Information cannot be waived.24 Thus, petitioner can only be held liable
for P855,995, and not the P2,074,326 proved by the prosecution.

Petitioner argues that the presentation of a BOC official as witness to testify on the falsified BOC forms is crucial to establish
her guilt. Petitioner insists that the testimonies of the Land Bank officials and employees are not sufficient to establish her
guilt.

Petitioner's argument is flawed. It should be emphasized that petitioner never denied that she used the falsified BOC forms
for the liquidation of her cash advances supposedly for additional taxes or duties imposed by the BOC. These BOC forms
(BOC Form No. 38-A) are used by authorized collecting banks, such as Land Bank, as official receipts for the payment of
additional or deficiency taxes and duties. Since the falsified BOC forms were made to appear as issued by Land Bank as
receipts for the payments of additional customs duties and taxes, the Land Bank officials and employees are the most
qualified to testify on their authenticity.

Petitioner likewise harps on the non-presentation of the liquidation reports as evidence. As held by the Court of Appeals, the
overwhelming evidence presented against petitioner are more than enough to prove her culpability for the crime charged
and the non-presentation of the liquidation reports did not make the other evidence against her less convincing.

On petitioner's third assignment of error, suffice it to say that Hella is precisely disputing the alleged assessed additional
customs duties amounting to P855,995 by proving that petitioner used falsified BOC forms to support her claim of payment
of the alleged additional customs duties.

Thus, we affirm the finding of both the trial court and the appellate court that petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the complex crime of estafa through falsification of commercial documents.

WHEREFORE, the 23 January 2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33310 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibra ry

Brion, Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

5.) G.R. Nos. 216007-09, December 08, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. LUZVIMINDA S. VALDEZ AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIFTH
DIVISION), Respondent.

18
 DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to nullify and set aside the October
10, 2014 Resolution1 of public respondent Sandiganbayan Fifth Division, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the (i) Motion to Set Aside No Bail Recommendation and to Fix the Amount of Bail and the (ii) Urgent
Supplemental Motion to the Motion to Set Aside No Bail Recommendation and to Fix the Amount of Bail with Additional
Prayer to Recall/List Warrant of Arrest filed by accused Luzviminda S. Valdez, are GRANTED.

Let the Order of Arrest issued in Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0321, 0322 and 0324 adopting the "no bail"
recommendation of the Office of the Ombudsman be RECALLED. Instead, let an Order of arrest in said cases be issued
anew, this time, fixing the bail for each offense charged in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00).

SO ORDERED.2 ChanRoblesVi rtualaw lib rary

The case stemmed from the Joint Affidavit3 executed by Sheila S. Velmonte-Portal and Mylene T. Romero, both State
Auditors of the Commission on Audit Region VI in Pavia, Iloilo, who conducted a post-audit of the disbursement vouchers
(D.V.) of the Bacolod City Government. Among the subjects thereof were the reimbursements of expenses of private
respondent Luzviminda S. Valdez (Valdez), a former mayor of Bacolod City, particularly:

1. D.V. No. 6 dated January 8, 2004 amounting to P80,000.00;

2. D.V. No. 220 dated March 24, 2004 amounting to P68,000.00;

3. D.V. No. 278 dated April 13, 2004 amounting to P19,350.00; and

4. D.V. No. 325 dated April 30, 2004 amounting to P111,800.00 for Cash Slip No. 193402.4

Based on the verification conducted in the establishments that issued the official receipts, it was alleged that the cash slips
were altered/falsified to enable Valdez to claim/receive reimbursement from the Government the total amount of
P279,150.00 instead of only P4,843.25; thus, an aggregate overclaim of P274,306.75.

The Public Assistance and Corruption Prevention Office (PACPO), Office of the Ombudsman - Visayas received the joint
affidavit, which was thereafter resolved adverse to Valdez.

Consequently, Valdez was charged with eight cases four of which (SB-14-CRM-0317 to 0320) were for Violation of Section 3
(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, while the remaining half (SB-14-CRM-0321 to 0324) were for the complex crime of
Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents under Articles 2175 and 171,6 in relation to Article
487 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). All the cases were raffled before public respondent.

Since the Ombudsman recommended "no bail" in SB-14-CRM-0321, 0322, and 0324, Valdez, who is still at-large, caused
the filing of a Motion to Set Aside No Bail Recommendation and to Fix the Amount of Bail.8 She argued that the three cases
are bailable as a matter of right because no aggravating or modifying circumstance was alleged; the maximum of the
indeterminate sentence shall be taken from the medium period that ranged from 18 years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years;
and applying Article 48 of the RPC, the imposable penalty is 20 years, which is the maximum of the medium period.

Petitioner countered in its Comment/Opposition9 that the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL) is inapplicable as the attending
circumstances are immaterial because the charge constituting the complex crime have the corresponding penalty
of reclusion perpetua. Since the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua, bail is discretionary. Instead of a motion to fix
bail, a summary hearing to determine if the evidence of guilt is strong is, therefore, necessary conformably with Section 13,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution and Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules.

Due to the issuance and release of a warrant of arrest, Valdez subsequently filed an Urgent Supplemental Motion to the
Motion to Set Aside No Bail Recommendation and to Fix the Amount of Bail with Additional Prayer to Recall/Lift Warrant of
Arrest.10 Petitioner filed a Comment/Opposition thereto.11 Later, the parties filed their respective Memorandum of
Authorities.12

As aforesaid, on October 10, 2014, public respondent granted the motions of Valdez. It recalled the arrest order issued in
Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0321, 0322 and 0324. In lieu thereof, a new arrest order was issued, fixing the bail for each
offense charged in said cases in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00). Without filing a motion for
reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter before Us to resolve the lone issue of whether an accused indicted for the
complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents involving an amount that
exceeds P22,000.00 is entitled to bail as a matter of right.

The Court shall first tackle Valdez's procedural objection. She avers that the petition must be dismissed outright on the
ground that it was filed without first filing a motion for reconsideration before public respondent, and that, even if there are
exceptions to the general rule, this case does not fall under any of them.

We disagree.

The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before a petition for certiorari may lie, its
purpose being to grant an opportunity for the court a quo to correct any error attributed to it by a re-examination of the
legal and factual circumstances of the case.

However, the rule is not absolute and jurisprudence has laid down the following exceptions when the filing of a petition
for certiorari is proper notwithstanding the failure to file a motion for reconsideration:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;

19
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or
are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;

(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests
of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the petition is perishable;

(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;

(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;

(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is
improbable;

(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;

(h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and,

(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.13Cha nRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

The issue being raised here is one purely of law and all the argument, pros and cons were already raised in and passed
upon by public respondent; thus, filing a motion for reconsideration would be an exercise in futility. Likewise, as petitioner
claims, the resolution of the question raised in this case is of urgent necessity considering its implications on similar cases
filed and pending before the Sandiganbayan. As it appears, there have been conflicting views on the matter such that the
different divisions of the anti-graft court issue varying resolutions. Undeniably, the issue is of extreme importance affecting
public interest. It involves not just the right of the State to prosecute criminal offenders but, more importantly, the
constitutional right of the accused to bail.

Now, on the main issue: chanRoblesvi rtual Lawli bra ry

The controversy is, in fact, not one of first impression. Mañalac, Jr. v. People14 already resolved that an accused charged
with Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents where the amount involved exceeds
P22,000.00 is not entitled to bail as a matter of right because it has an actual imposable penalty of reclusion perpetua.

In Mañalac, Jr., the defendants argued that they should be allowed to post bail since reclusion perpetua is not the
prescribed penalty for the offense but merely describes the penalty actually imposed on account of the fraud involved. It
was also posited that Article 48 of the RPC applies "only after the accused has been convicted in a full-blown trial such that
the court is mandated to impose the penalty of the most serious crime," and that the reason for the imposition of the
penalty of the most serious offense is "only for the purpose of determining the correct penalty upon the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law." This Court, through the Third Division, however, denied the petition and resolved in the
affirmative the issue of whether the constitutional right to bail of an accused is restricted in cases whose imposable penalty
ranges from reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua. Citing People v. Pantaleon, Jr., et al.,15 in relation to
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution and Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules, it was held that Mañalac, Jr. is not entitled to
bail as a matter of right since he is charged with a crime whose penalty is reclusion perpetua.

To recall, the amounts involved in Pantaleon, Jr. were manifestly in excess of P22,000.00. We opined that the
Sandiganbayan correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua and that the ISL is inapplicable since it is an indivisible
penalty. The Court's pronouncement is consistent with the earlier cases of People v. Conwi, Jr.,16People v.
Enfermo,17 and People v. Pajaro, et al.18 as well as with the fairly recent case of Zafra v. People.19

The rulings in Pantaleon, Jr. and analogous cases are in keeping with the provisions of the RPC. Specifically, Article 48 of
which states that in complex crimes, "the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period." Thus, in Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents, the prescribed
penalties for malversation and falsification should be taken into account. Under the RPC, the penalty for malversation of
public funds or property if the amount involved exceeds P22,000.00 shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua, aside from perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or
equal to the total value of the property embezzled.20 On the other hand, the penalty ofprision mayor and a fine not to
exceed P5,000.00 shall be imposed for falsification committed by a public officer.21 Considering that malversation is the
more serious offense, the imposable penalty for Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents
if the amount involved exceeds P22,000.00 is reclusion perpetua, it being the maximum period of the prescribed penalty
of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.

For purposes of bail application, however, the ruling in Mañalac, Jr. should be revisited on the ground that Pantaleon, Jr. (as
well as Conwi, Jr., Enfermo, Pajaro, et al., and Zafra) was disposed in the context of a judgment of conviction rendered by
the lower court and affirmed on appeal by this Court. As will be shown below, the appropriate rule is to grant bail as a
matter of right to an accused who is charged with a complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of
Official/Public Documents involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00.

Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:

SECTION 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by
law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail
shall not be required.22Cha nRobles Vi rtu alawlib ra ry

Pursuant thereto, Sections 4 and 7, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provide:
SEC. 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. - All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with
sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or after conviction by the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. (4a)

SEC. 7. Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. - No
person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. (7a)23 ChanRobles Vi rtualawl ib rary

20
The pivotal question is: How should We construe the term "punishable" under the provisions above-quoted?

In Our mind, the term "punishable" should refer to prescribed, not imposable, penalty. People v. Temporada,24 which was
even cited by petitioner, perceptibly distinguished these two concepts:
The RPC provides for an initial penalty as a general prescription for the felonies defined therein which consists of a range of
period of time. This is what is referred to as the "prescribed penalty." For instance, under Article 249 of the RPC, the
prescribed penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal which ranges from 12 years and 1 day to 20 years of imprisonment.
Further, the Code provides for attending or modifying circumstances which when present in the commission of a felony
affects the computation of the penalty to be imposed on a convict. This penalty, as thus modified, is referred to as the
"imposable penalty." In the case of homicide which is committed with one ordinary aggravating circumstance and no
mitigating circumstances, the imposable penalty under the RPC shall be the prescribed penalty in its maximum period. From
this imposable penalty, the court chooses a single fixed penalty (also called a straight penalty) which is the "penalty
actually imposed" on a convict, i.e., the prison term he has to serve.25 ChanRoblesVirt ualawli bra ry

Petitioner contends that the imposable penalty is the one provided by the RPC before conviction to determine whether the
charge is bailable or not, while the penalty actually imposed pertains to the prison sentence upon conviction.26 Hence, it
is maintained that the penalty imposable for the offense charged against private respondent is reclusion perpetua, which
makes Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0321, 0322 and 0324 non-bailable.

The argument is erroneous.

Following Temporada, for the complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents
involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00, the "prescribed penalty" is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua. After trial, should the commission of such crime be proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt,
the "imposable penalty" is reclusion perpetua in view of the RPC mandate that the prescribed penalty of reclusion
temporalmaximum to reclusion perpetua shall be applied in its maximum.27 The falsification, which is the means used to
commit the crime of malversation, is in the nature of a generic aggravating circumstance that effectively directs the
imposition of the prescribed penalty in its maximum period.28 The phrases "shall be applied" and "shall impose," found in
Articles 63 and 64, respectively, of the RPC, are of similar import as the phrase "shall be imposed" found in Article 48. Both
Articles 63 and 64 refer to the penalty to be imposed after considering the aggravating or mitigating circumstance/s. Finally,
the "penalty actually imposed" is still reclusion perpetua, considering that the ISL finds no application as the penalty is
indivisible.29

The October 10, 2014 Resolution of public respondent is spot on had it not confused imposable penalty
with prescribed penalty. Nonetheless, reading through the text of the assailed Resolution reveals that the anti-graft court
actually meant prescribed penalty whenever it referred to imposable penalty. Therefore, in essence, the ruling is correct.
Respondent court held:
If the complex crime of Malversation thru Falsification be imposed in its maximum period, there is no doubt that, in case of
conviction, the penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua. The cases, however, are still at their inception. Criminal
proceedings are yet to ensue. This is not the proper time, therefore, to call for the application of the penalty contemplated
under Article 48 by imposing the same in its maximum period.

For purposes of determining whether a person can be admitted to bail as a matter of right, it is the imposable
penalty prescribed by law for the crime charged which should be considered and, not the penalty to be actually imposed.
Illustrative cases such as Catiis v. Court of Appeals, et al. and People v. Hu Ruey Chun evidently confirm this to be so.

xxxx

In both cases, therefore, it is the penalty imposable for the offense charged that was considered for purposes of bail.

A circumspect reading of substantive law validates this view. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that: x x x x

On the other hand, Section 4, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, provides: c hanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry

xxxx

Notably, the word used is ["punishable,"] which practically bears the same meaning as "imposable." It is only logical that
the reference has a direct correlation with the time frame "before conviction" since trial is yet to begin; hence, it can only be
the penalty imposable of the offense charged that can be considered for purposes of bail.

In these cases, the offenses charged are the complex crimes of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of
Official/Public Documents. In determining the penalty imposable, it is the penalty for the most serious crime which is
considered. Between Malversation and Falsification, it is Malversation which provides the graver penalty. As thus provided
under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, "[i]f the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in
its maximum period to reclusion perpetua."

The penalty, however, cannot be immediately applied in its maximum period, or reclusion perpetua, since this will already
consider the application of the penalty in the event of a conviction.

A clear perusal of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code states: chanRoblesvi rt ual Lawlib rary

xxxx

The word used is "imposed," not imposable. Thus, the reference can only point to the time when a judgment of conviction is
impending. If and when "the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
period," is thus applied in the proper application of the penalty to be imposed on the accused. Certainly, this cannot be
considered for purposes of bail.30ChanRobles Vi rt ualawlib ra ry

Indeed, the trial is yet to proceed and the prosecution must still prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It
is not amiss to point that in charging a complex crime, the information should allege each element of the complex offense
with the same precision as if the two (2) constituent offenses were the subject of separate prosecutions.31 Where a complex
crime is charged and the evidence fails to support the charge as to one of the component offenses, the defendant can be
convicted of the offense proven.32

21
At this point, there is no certainty that Valdez would be found guilty of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of
Official/Public Documents involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00. Falsification, like an aggravating circumstance,
must be alleged and proved during the trial. For purposes of bail proceedings, it would be premature to rule that the
supposed crime committed is a complex crime since it is only when the trial has terminated that falsification could be
appreciated as a means of committing malversation. Further, it is possible that only the elements of one of the constituent
offenses, i.e., either malversation or falsification, or worse, none of them, would be proven after full-blown trial.

It would be the height of absurdity to deny Valdez the right to bail and grant her the same only after trial if it turns out that
there is no complex crime committed. Likewise, it is unjust for Us to give a stamp of approval in depriving the accused
person's constitutional right to bail for allegedly committing a complex crime that is not even considered as inherently
grievous, odious and hateful. To note, Article 48 of the RPC on complex crimes does not change the nature of the
constituent offenses; it only requires the imposition of the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law. When
committed through falsification of official/public documents, the RPC does not intend to classify malversation as a capital
offense. Otherwise, the complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents
involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00 should have been expressly included in Republic Act No. 7659.33 If truly a
non-bailable offense, the law should have already considered it as a special complex crime like robbery with rape, robbery
with homicide, rape with homicide, and kidnapping with murder or homicide, which have prescribed penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

Just to stress, the inequity of denying bail as a matter of right to an accused charged with Malversation of Public Funds thru
Falsification of Official/Public Documents involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00 is palpable when compared with an
accused indicted for plunder, which is a heinous crime punishable under R.A. No. 7080,34 as amended by R.A. No.
765935 and R.A. No. 9346.36 Observe that bail is not a matter of right in plunder committed through malversation of public
funds, but the aggregate amount or total value of ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired must be at least Fifty
Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00). In contrast, an accused who is alleged to have committed malversation of public funds thru
falsification of official/public documents, which is not a capital offense, is no longer entitled to bail as a matter of right if the
amount exceeds P22,000.00, or as low as P22,000.01. Such distinction is glaringly unfair and could not have been
contemplated by the law.

The foregoing interpretation is more favorable to Valdez as an accused following the rule of lenity:
Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity. The rule applies when the court is faced with two
possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that is prejudicial to the accused and another that is favorable to him. The
rule calls for the adoption of an interpretation which is more lenient to the accused.37 ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

The time-honored principle is that penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the
accused.38 When there is doubt on the interpretation of criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of the accused.39 Since
penal laws should not be applied mechanically, the Court must determine whether their application is consistent with the
purpose and reason of the law.40

For having ruled that an accused charged with the complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of
Official/Public Documents that involves an amount in excess of P22,000.00 is entitled to bail as a matter of right, a
summary hearing on bail application is, therefore, unnecessary. Consistent with Miranda v. Tuliao,41 an affirmative relief
may be obtained from the court despite the accused being still at-large. Except in petition for bail, custody of the law is not
required for the adjudication of reliefs sought by the defendant (such as a motion to set aside no bail recommendation and
to fix the amount of bail in this case) where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused.42

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Private respondent Luzviminda S. Valdez is
entitled to bail, as a matter of right, in Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0321, 0322 and 0324. Public respondent
Sandiganbayan Fifth Division should be guided by the latest Bailbond Guide. In any case, the amount should correspond to
the medium penalty multiplied by Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for every year of imprisonment.

SO ORDERED.

22