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PEOPLE VS ASINAS

FACTS: Canuto Asinas and his brother Eugenio were charged in the justice of the peace
court of Catubig, Province of Samar, with the crime of parricide of their father Aniceto
Asinas by and with the aid of Leon Ogacho and Felipe Credo. On or about the night of 4th
of October 1927, in the barrio of Tagabiran, CAtubig, Samar, the defendants brothers,
Canuti Asinas and Eugenio Asinas, through conspiracy and mutual help, with evident
premeditation and treachery, enter the house of Aniceto Asinas, father of said defendants,
held him while he was asleep, and the accused Canuto Asinas beat on the nape of his
neck, pressing his neck strongly until Aniceto Asinas died, while the other accused
Eugenio Asinas was holding the feet assisted by his other companions named Leon
Ogacho and Felipe Credo, who also held the deceased by both hands or arms to prevent
him from making any defense, that after killing said Aniceto Asinas, the two defendants,
together with their two companions, built a fire outside of the house and put the dead
body on the fire with the intention of reducing it to coal, contrary to article 402 of the Penal
Code.

For the prosecution, corporal Marcelo Relampagos testified how and in what manner he
obtained the confession of Ogacho.

Visitacion Golondrina, over the strenuous objection of the defendants, testified that in May
last, 1927, the defendant brothers tied their father to a papaya tree in the sitio of Maglolo.
That she was then in a house 25 meters distant from the place where it occurred. On
cross-examination she could not give the day or the date, and said that there were other
houses near the papaya tree.

Nazario Opinion testified that about 3 years ago Canuto Asinas tried to drown his father
in the river in Maglolo. On cross-examination he said he never told anybody about it until
the present trial. He also admitted that he was doing business in the same sitio of Inoman
where the defendant Canuto Asinas has a store, and that they were business rivals.

Cirilo Mercader testified that about 2 years ago in Canuto's house in Inoman, Canuto got
hold of his father and wanted to throw him in the pool. He admitted that he was indebted
to Canuto Asinas in the sum of P69.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of Nazario Opinon, Visitacion Golondrina and
Cirilo Mercader are admissible as evidence.

RULING: The general rule is that the evidence is not admissible which shows, or tends
to show, that the accused in the criminal case has committed a crime wholly independent
of the offense for which he is on trial. It is not competent to prove that he committed other
crimes of a like nature for the purpose of showing that he would likely commit the crime
charged in the indictment. A man may be a notorious criminal, but this fact may not be
shown to influence a jury in passing upon the question of his guilt or innocence for the
particular offense for which he is on trial. To permit proof of other crimes would naturally
predispose the minds of the jurors against the defendant. One who commits one crime
may be more likely to commit another; yet, logically, one crime does not prove another,
nor tend to prove another, unless there is a relation between them that proof of one tends
to prove the other. Unless such a relation exists, it is illegal and manifestly unfair to require
a man, who, is charged with specific crime in the indictment, to prepare a defense against
other crimes that the state may prove against him, but which are not charged in the
indictment. The general rule, should, therefore, be strictly enforced in all cases where
applicable.

That is good law, and the only theory upon which the testimony of Visitacion Golondrina,
Nazario Opinion, and Cirilo Mercader is admissible that the relation as to the matter about
which they testified tends to prove the commission of the crime in the manner in which it
was committed, and unless there is such a relation, their evidence is illegal and manifestly
unfair to the defendants. As stated we very much doubt the truth of the testimony of those
witnesses, and we have a serious doubt about the admissibility of their evidence for any
purpose.
PEOPLE VS. BABIERA

FACTS: Justo Babiera was the owner of two parcels of land situated in the Municipality
of Oton. Babiera executed a contract of sale with the right if repurchase in favour of Basilio
Copreros Copreros whereby he sold the two parcels of land to the latter for the sum of
P124 with the condition that if the vendor did not repurchase them on or before August 1,
1923, the sale would become absolute and irrevocable. The period for repurchase having
expired, Basilio Copreros took possession of said two parcels of land, and on March 24,
1927, made application to the registrar of deeds for the Province of Iloilo for the
registration of the consolidation of his title to said parcels. On the 26th of the said month,
Basilio Copreros leased said parcels to Severino Haro, municipal president of Oton

On August 21, 1927, Severino Haro, as usual, went to visit his land in the barrio of Bita,
accompanied by Gregorio Torrija, Benito Carreon and Pedro Tauro. On arriving there
Fermin Bruces, his copartner on shares, told him that the day before he had found
Clemente Babiera's cow grazing on that land. It happened at that moment Clemente
Babiera, daughter of Justo Babiera and Dominga Bores, Justo’s mistress, were passing
by. Severino Haro then informed Clemente Babiera of what his cow had done on the
former's land and told him to take better care of his cow in future and not to let it run loose.
He then ordered Fermin Bruces to take the animal to where the Babiera family lived.
Severino Haro was not able to return to town until almost 7 o'clock in the evening. As it
was already dark, he and his companions had to make use of a torch made out of split
bamboo to light them on their way. Severino Haro went ahead, followed by Pedro Tauro,
who carried the torch, some 8 brazas behind, with Gregorio Torrija and Benito Carreon
following. On Coming to a place in the road near Rosendo Paycol's house, Clemente
Babiera suddenly sprang from the cogon grass, went after Severino Haro and struck him
with his bolo in the back. On turning his head to see who had attacked him Severino Haro
received another bolo blow in the forehead near the right eyebrow. In trying to defend
himself with his hand he was wounded between the index finger and the thumb. He then
tried to grasp his assailant but did not succeed and he fell to the ground. Then Justo
Babiera appeared and placing himself upon Severino Haro's stomach, held the latter's
hands. Later, Dominga Bores appeared on the scene and held both knees of the wounded
man. When Justo Babiera arrived, a voice was heard saying: "Hold him, papa," and at
the same time, Severino Haro's voice was heard saying: "Help! help!" Pedro Tauro wished
to come near in order to help Severino Haro, but Clemente Babiera raised his bolo in the
air and kept on brandishing it to warn everybody off. Pedro Tauro, in fear, stepped back,
dropping the torch he carried. Not far from there were also Buenaventura Gabalfin and
Gregorio Paycol, who threatened to kill Severino Haro's companions if they helped him.
After the torch had been extinguished they heard a voice which they recognized as
Severino Haro's saying: "Uncle Justo, have patience with me, for I have done no wrong."
Then they heard another voice, that of Dominga Bores, which said: "Here is the revolver;
let us return." Before the assailants left two or three revolver shots were heard. When
Severino Haro's companions saw that their assailants had already departed, they drew
near to where Severino lay stretched out to see what had happened to him. Severino
Haro told them not to fear for he did not feel as if he were going to die, and calling his
copartner on shares, Fermin Bruces, directed him to bring a cot and take him to town.
Pedro Tauro and Gregorio Torrija did as Severino Haro wished, and on arriving at the
barrio of Santa Monica, they by chance came upon a truck in which were some policemen.
They place the wounded man in the same truck and took him to Saint Paul's Hospital in
the City of Iloilo. When Severino Haro was taken to the town he did not have his revolver
and the cartridge belt, without the holster, was found by Gregorio Torrija near where the
incident took place.

Clemente Babiera contended that she only acted in defense of his life and property. She
also attempted to prove that Severino Haro was of a quarrelsome disposition, provoking,
irascible, and fond of starting quarrels in the municipality of Oton

ISSUE: Whether or not the conduct and character of Severino Haro is admissible as
evidence to prove that he began the attack.

RULING: While it is true that when the defense of the accused is that he acted in self-
defense, he may prove the deceased to have been of a quarrelsome, provoking and
irascible disposition, the proof must be of his general reputation in the community and not
of isolated and specific acts, such as the accused Clemente Babiera tried to prove, and
hence the lower court did not err in not admitting such proof. But even if it had been
proved by competent evidence that the deceased was of such a disposition, nevertheless,
it would not have been sufficient to overthrow the conclusive proof that it was the said
accused who treacherously attacked the deceased.
PEOPLE VS. CHENG

FACTS: On February 20, 1989, jail guards Edwin Ramos and Redentor Lamiao were in
the night shift at Gate 1 of the Manila City Jail, their tour of duty commencing at 7 P.M.
and ending at 7 A.M. the following day. Early in the morning of February 21, 1989, Ramos
allowed Yehia Aburawash, an Egyptian national who had been previously detained in the
city jail, to enter the premises together with a female companion. Before 4 A.M.,
Aburawash and his companion went out of the jail and some time thereafter, or at about
4 A.M., accused-appellant who was then on duty on the night shift escorted out co-
accused and then a detainee in the said city jail, Patrolman Alex Malubay, without any
authorization from the desk officer or platoon commander on duty. Jail Guard Ramos
asked accused-appellant to secure the approval of the desk officer but accused-appellant
simply ignored Ramos and continued on his way out.

At about 4:30 o'clock that same morning, Emma Ruth Ilocso and her companions Catalina
Balboa, and Marivic Policarpio, having just come from a disco joint, were at the corner of
Claro M. Recto Avenue and Quezon Boulevard, right outside the vicinity of Manila City
Jail. Ilocso decided to pass by the city jail to see her brother who was detained thereat.
She, however, stopped at a nearby Burger Machine stand to have the P100.00 she
intended to give her brother broken to smaller denominations.

It was while she was at the burger stand that Ilocso witnessed the commission of the
crime. Ilocso saw the Egyptian national, Yehia Aburawash, at the center island of Quezon
Boulevard. She recognized him because she had previously seen him while the latter was
detained at the same city jail for swindling. She also saw Aburawash's female companion
who was later identified to be Esperanza Viterbo. Ilocso observed that Aburawash and
Viterbo were then engaged in an argument with accused-appellant, Sioco, and a third
man. Thereupon, she heard the first gunfire from accused-appellant which caused
Aburawash to fall to the ground. Two shots then quickly followed, one from Sioco, and
another from accused-appellant. Afterwards, accused-appellant and Sioco went after
Viterbo who ran towards the burger stand. Accused-appellant and Sioco told Viterbo that
she would be brought to a waiting cab. However, when the two were already beside her,
they both shot her, after which the two ran towards the direction of the Central Market.

Accused-appellant also assails the credibility of Emma Ruth Ilocso who rendered an
eyewitness account of the killing of Esperanza Viterbo and Yehia Aburawash
Mohammed. Accused-appellant claims that there appear in the record some facts or
circumstances of weight and influence which were misappreciated by the trial court. One
is the alleged loose morals of Emma Ruth Ilocso. Another such factor would refer to the
supposed inconsistencies in some of the details between her declarations during the
administrative proceedings and the trial of the criminal case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of Emma Ruth Ilocso is admissible as evidence.

RULING: Accused-appellant's efforts to discredit Emma Ruth Ilocso are futile.


We stress that in this jurisdiction, loose morals per se is not a ground to discredit a
witness. There must be clear indications militating against her credibility other than her
being a person of ill repute. Otherwise stated, even a prostitute may be a competent
witness to the extent that even with her sole testimony an accused may be duly convicted,
provided that such witness is not coached and her testimony is not rehearsed and on all
other counts worthy of credence beyond reasonable doubt.

The all too sweeping contention in accused-appellant's motion for reconsideration that it
is improbable that Ilocso will tell the exact truth where there is the slightest motive for
testifying falsely as she would probably be willing to bring her evidence to market as she
was ready to offer her person for sale, presents a cynical and too dark an outlook of a
human person for acceptance. In the first place, Ilocso has not been shown to be a person
of ill repute. Then too, the reputation of this witness is not germane to the case.

To further discredit Emma Ruth Ilocso, accused-appellant capitalizes on the supposed


discrepancies in her answers as to exactly where she and her companions came from
before they came to the city jail, or who her companions were. He also points out her
supposed lie concerning her personal circumstances such as her educational
background. Ilocso was forthright enough to say that some of her statements in the
administrative case are not correct and true. But she ascribes, with reason we believe,
the same to her constant fear as she was threatened by accused-appellant, a policeman
whom she knows could kill as he did kill the herein victims. In any event, the supposed
untrue statements do not deal with Ilocso's positive identification of accused-appellant
and his companion, Sioco, both of whom Ilocso had known 2 years previous to the
incident.

Under the foregoing consideration, there is no cogent reason for the Court to depart
from the well established doctrine that on questions of credibility of witnesses, this Court
will hold with high respect the factual findings of the trial judge who actually observed
the demeanor of the witnesses at the witness stand.

Accused-appellant's argument that conspiracy has hot been established in the instant
case with the same quantum of evidence required for conviction does not persuade us.
The unity of purpose of accused-appellant and co-accused Sioco was clearly established
by the plain and clear testimony of witness Ilocso. She saw the two co-accused engaged
in an argument with Aburawash before both accused shot the latter. Immediately
thereafter, both accused went after a defenseless woman, Viterbo, who ran towards the
burger stand and there they shot her too. There is no indication whatsoever that either of
them desisted from executing all the overt acts necessary to perpetrate the two crimes of
murder. Clearly, there was conspiracy.
ESTRADA VS. DESIERTO

FACTS: It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-
taking, illegal gambling, and other forms of corruption were made against Estrada before
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by
the Hor and, on December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate during
which more serious allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada were made and
were only stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President,
succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence against Estrada. As a result, the
impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out
and Senate President Pimentel resigned after casting his vote against Estrada.

On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the
crowd at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held
concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he
will not run in this election. As events approached January 20, we can have an
authoritative window on the state of mind of the petitioner. The window is provided in the
"Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada," the diary of Executive Secretary Angara
serialized in the Philippine Daily Inquirer. On January 20, SC declared that the seat of
presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. At noon,
Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the cr2owd at EDSA as the 14th
President. Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace. Erap, after his fall, filed
petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman
from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as
president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming Estrada to be the lawful and
incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge
the duties of his office.

ISSUE: Whether or not the use of Angara Diary violates the rule against the admission
of hearsay evidence

RULING: We are unpersuaded. To begin with, the Angara diary is not an out of court
statement. The Angara Diary is part of the pleadings in the cases at bar. Petitioner
cannot complain he was not furnished a copy of the Angara Diary. Nor can he feign
surprise on its use. To be sure, the said Diary was frequently referred to by the parties in
their pleadings.[3] The three parts of the Diary published in the PDI from February 4-6,
2001 were attached as Annexes A-C, respectively, of the Memorandum of private
respondents Romeo T. Capulong, et al., dated February 20, 2001. The second and third
parts of the Diary were earlier also attached as Annexes 12 and 13 of the Comment of
private respondents Capulong, et al., dated February 12, 2001. In fact, petitioner even
cited in his Second Supplemental Reply Memorandum both the second part of the diary,
published on February 5, 2001, and the third part, published on February 6, 2001. It was
also extensively used by Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez in his oral
arguments. Thus, petitioner had all the opportunity to contest the use of the Diary but
unfortunately failed to do so.
Even assuming arguendo that the Angara Diary was an out of court statement, still its use
is not covered by the hearsay rule. Evidence is called hearsay when its probative force
depends, in whole or in part, on the competency and credibility of some persons other
than the witness by whom it is sought to produce it. There are three reasons for excluding
hearsay evidence: (1) absence of cross examination; (2) absence of demeanor evidence,
and (3) absence of the oath. Not at all hearsay evidence, however, is inadmissible as
evidence. Over the years, a huge body of hearsay evidence has been admitted by courts
due to their relevance, trustworthiness and necessity. The emergence of these exceptions
and their wide spread acceptance is well-explained by Weinstein, Mansfield, Abrams and
Berger as follows:

xxx

On the other hand, we all make decisions in our everyday lives on the basis of other
persons accounts of what happened, and verdicts are usually sustained and affirmed
even if they are based on hearsay erroneously admitted, or admitted because no
objection was made. See Shepp v. Uehlinger, 775 F 2d 452, 454-455 (1st Cir. 1985)
(hearsay evidence alone can support a verdict). Although volumes have been written
suggesting ways to revise the hearsay rule, no one advocates a rule that would bar all
hearsay evidence. Indeed, the decided historical trend has been to exclude
categories of highly probative statements from the definition of hearsay (sections
2 and 3, infra), and to develop more class exceptions to the hearsay rule (sections
4-11, infra).Furthermore, many states have added to their rules the residual, or
catch-all, exceptions first pioneered by the Federal Rules which authorize the
admission of hearsay that does not satisfy a class exception, provided it is
adequately trustworthy and probative (section 12, infra).

Moreover, some commentators believe that the hearsay rule should be abolished
altogether instead of being loosened. See, e.g., Note, The Theoretical Foundation of
the Hearsay Rules, 93 Harv.L.Rev. 1786, 1804-1805, 1815 (1980) (footnotes omitted):

The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that [a]lthough relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. Under this structure, exclusion is justified by fears of how the jury will be
influenced by the evidence. However, it is not traditional to think of hearsay as merely a
subdivision of this structure, and the Federal Rules do not conceive of hearsay in that
manner. Prejudice refers to the jurys use of evidence for inferences other than those for
which the evidence is legally relevant; by contrast, the rule against hearsay questions the
jurys ability to evaluate the strength of a legitimate inference to be drawn from the
evidence. For example, were a judge to exclude testimony because a witness was
particularly smooth or convincing, there would be no doubt as to the usurpation of the
jurys function. Thus, unlike prejudices recognized by the evidence rules, such as those
stemming from racial or religious biases or from the introduction of photographs of a
victims final state, the exclusion of hearsay on the basis of misperception strikes at the
root of the jurys function by usurping its power to process quite ordinary evidence, the
type of information routinely encountered by jurors in their everyday lives.
Since virtually all criteria seeking to distinguish between good and bad hearsay are either
incoherent, inconsistent, or indeterminate, the only altenative to a general rule of
admission would be an absolute rule of exclusion, which is surely inferior. More important,
the assumptions necessary to justify a rule against hearsay seem insupportable and, in
any event, are inconsistent with accepted notions of the function of the jury. Therefore,
the hearsay rules should be abolished.

Some support for this view can be found in the limited empirical research now available
which is, however, derived from simulations that suggests that admitting hearsay has
little effect on trial outcomes because jurors discount the value of hearsay
evidence. See Rakos & Landsman, Researching the Hearsay Rule: Emerging Findings,
General Issues, and Future Directions, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 655 (1992); Miene, Park, &
Borgidas, Jury Decision Making and the Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, 76 Minn.L.Rev.
683 (1992); Kovera, Park, & Penrod, Jurors Perceptions of Eyewitness and Hearsay
Evidence, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 703 (1992); Landsman & Rakos, Research Essay: A
Preliminary Empirical Enquiry Concerning the prohibition of Hearsay Evidence in
American Courts, 15 Law & Psychol. Rev. 65 (1991).

Others, even if they concede that restrictions on hearsay have some utility,
question whether the benefits outweigh the cost:

The cost of maintaining the rule is not just a function of its contribution to justice. It also
includes the time spent on litigating the rule. And of course this is not just a cost voluntarily
borne by the parties, for in our system virtually all the cost of the court salaries,
administrative costs, and capital costs are borne by the public. As expensive as litigation
is for the parties, it is supported by an enormous public subsidy. Each time a hearsay
question is litigated, the public pays. The rule imposes other costs as well. Enormous
time is spent teaching and writing about the hearsay rule, which are both costly
enterprises. In some law schools, students spend over half their time in evidence classes
learning the intricacies of the hearsay rule, and enormous academic resources are
expended on the rule.

Allen, Commentary on Professor Friendmans Article: The Evolution of the Hearsay Rule
to a Rule of Admission, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 797, 800 [1992] (but would abolish rule only in
civil cases). See also Friedman, Toward a Partial Economic, Game-Theoretic Analysis of
Hearsay, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 723 (1992).

A complete analysis of any hearsay problem requires that we further


determine whether the hearsay evidence is one exempted from the rules of
exclusion. A more circumspect examination of our rules of exclusion will show that
they do not cover admissions of a party and the Angara Diary belongs to this
class. Section 26 of Rule 130 provides that the act, declaration or omission of a party as
to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. It has long been settled that
these admissions are admissible even if they are hearsay. Retired Justice Oscar
Herrera of the Court of Appeals cites the various authorities who explain why admissions
are not covered by the hearsay rule:
Wigmore, after pointing out that the partys declaration has generally the probative
value of any other persons asssertion, argued that it had a special value when offered
against the party. In that circumstance, the admission discredits the partys statement
with the present claim asserted in pleadings and testimony, much like a witness
impeached by contradictory statements. Moreover, he continued, admissions pass the
gauntlet of the hearsay rule, which requires that extrajudicial assertions be excluded if
there was no opportunity for the opponent to cross-examine because it is the opponents
own declaration, and he does not need to cross examine himself. Wigmore then
added that the Hearsay Rule is satisfied since the party now as opponent has the full
opportunity to put himself on the stand and explain his former assertion. (Wigmore on
evidence, Sec. 1048 (Chadbourn Rev. 1972), cited in Sec. 154, McCormick)

According to Morgan: The admissibility of an admission made by the party himself rests
not upon any notion that the circumstances in which it was made furnish the trier means
of evaluating it fairly, but upon the adversary theory of litigation. A party can hardly
object that he had no opportunity to cross-examine himself or that he is unworthy
of credence save when speaking under sanction of an oath.

A mans acts, conduct, and declaration, wherever made, if voluntary, are admissible
against him, for the reason that it is fair to presume that they correspond with the truth,
and it is his fault if they do not. (U.S. vs. Ching Po, 23 Phil. 578, 583).

The Angara Diary contains direct statements of petitioner which can be categorized
as admissions of a party: his proposal for a snap presidential election where he would
not be a candidate; his statement that he only wanted the five-day period promised by
Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes; his statements that he would leave by Monday if the second
envelope would be opened by Monday and Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na, masyado
nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I dont
want any more of this its too painful. Im tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the
intrigue). I just want to clear my name, then I will go. We noted that days before, petitioner
had repeatedly declared that he would not resign despite the growing clamor for his
resignation. The reason for the meltdown is obvious - - - his will not to resign has wilted.

It is, however, argued that the Angara Diary is not the diary of the petitioner, hence,
non-binding on him. The argument overlooks the doctrine of adoptive admission. An
adoptive admission is a partys reaction to a statement or action by another person when
it is reasonable to treat the partys reaction as an admission of something stated or
implied by the other person. [Jones explains that the basis for admissibility
of admissions made vicariously is that arising from the ratification or adoption by the
party of the statements which the other person had made. To use the blunt language of
Mueller and Kirkpatrick, this process of attribution is not mumbo jumbo but common
sense. In the Angara Diary, the options of the petitioner started to dwindle when the
armed forces withdrew its support from him as President and commander-in-chief. Thus,
Executive Secretary Angara had to ask Senate President Pimentel to advise petitioner to
consider the option of dignified exit or resignation. Petitioner did not object to the
suggested option but simply said he could never leave the country. Petitioners silence on
this and other related suggestions can be taken as an admission by him.

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