People v.

Lagman

FACTS:

In 1936, Tranquilino Lagman reached the age of 20. He is being compelled by Section 60 of
Commonwealth Act 1 (National Defense Law) to join the military service. Lagman refused to do so
because he has a father to support, has no military leanings and he does not wish to kill or be killed.
Lagman further assailed the constitutionality of the said law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the National Defense Law is constitutional.

HELD:
Yes. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army.
To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the
Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein. Hence, the
National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go against this
constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. “The defense of the
State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by
law to render personal military or civil service.”

Marcos v. Manglapus

FACTS:
Former President Marcos, after his and his family spent three-year exile in Hawaii, USA, sought to
return to the Philippines. The call is about to request of Marcos family to order the respondents to
issue travel order to them and to enjoin the petition of the President's decision to bar their return to the
Philippines.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit
the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

RULING:
Yes
According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: "The executive power shall be vested in
the President of the Philippines." The phrase, however, does not define what is meant by executive
power although the same article tackles on exercises of certain powers by the President such as
appointing power during recess of the Congress (S.16), control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices (Section 17), power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit
fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment (Section 19), treaty making power (Section 21),
borrowing power (Section 20), budgetary power (Section 22), informing power (Section 23).
The Constitution may have grant powers to the President, it cannot be said to be limited only to the
specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. Whatever power inherent in the government that is
neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.

Bayan v. Zamora

THE FACTS

The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an agreement
called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine
government and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total
membership of the Philippine Senate.

The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides
for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine
governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and
exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.

Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates §25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines
except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State.”

II. THE ISSUE

Was the VFA unconstitutional?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions, held that the petitioners did not commit
grave abuse of discretion, and sustained the constitutionality of the VFA.]

NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.

Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country,
unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty
must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority
of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting state.

There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The
concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of
the Constitution . . . the provision in [in §25, Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the votes
cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it.

Nicolas v. Romulo

FACTS:
On the 1st of November 2005, Daniel Smith committed the crime of rape against Nicole. He was
convicted of the said crime and was ordered by the court to suffer imprisonment. Smith was a US
serviceman convicted of a crime against our penal laws and the crime was committed within the
country’s jurisdiction. But pursuant to the VFA, a treaty between the US and Philippines, the US
embassy was granted custody over Smith. Nicole, together with the other petitioners appealed before
the SC assailing the validity of the VFA. Their contention is that the VFA was not ratified by the US
senate in the same way our senate ratified the VFA.
ISSUE: Is the VFA void and unconstitutional & whether or not it is self-executing.
HELD: The VFA is a self-executing Agreement because the parties intend its provisions to be
enforceable, precisely because the VFA is intended to carry out obligations and undertakings under
the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. As a matter of fact, the VFA has been implemented and executed,
with the US faithfully complying with its obligation to produce Smith before the court during the trial.
The VFA is covered by implementing legislation inasmuch as it is the very purpose and intent of the
US Congress that executive agreements registered under this Act within 60 days from their ratification
be immediately implemented. The SC noted that the VFA is not like other treaties that need
implementing legislation such as the Vienna Convention. As regards the implementation of the RP-
US Mutual Defense Treaty, military aid or assistance has been given under it and this can only be
done through implementing legislation. The VFA itself is another form of implementation of its
provisions.

Lance Corporal Daniel Smith, member of the US Armed Forces, was found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape in the RTC of Makati. The court ordered Smith detained at the Makati City
Jail until further orders.

On December 19 and 22, 2006, Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo and US
Ambassador Kristie Kenney executed agreements that pursuant to the VFA, Smith be returned to the
US military custody and be detained at the first floor, Rowe Building, US Embassy Compound.
Petitioner Jovito Salonga, et al. challenged the validity of the said agreements contending that the
Philippines should have custody of Smith because, first of all, the VFA is void and unconstitutional
since it violates Art. XVlll, Sec. 25 of the constitution.

Is the VFA constitutional? Granting that it is constitutional, Are the Romulo-Kenney Agreements in
accordance with the provisions of the VFA itself?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The SC ruled The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the
United States, entered into on February 10, 1998, is constitutional, but the Romulo-Kenney
Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006 are DECLARED not in accordance with the VFA.

VFA is Constitutional

The SC ruled that “the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized
as a treaty by the United States,” and “the fact that (it) was not submitted for advice and consent of
the United States does not detract from its status as a binding international agreement or treaty
recognized by the said State.”

Section 25, Article XVIII, 1987 Constitution provides that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities
shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and,
when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national
referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.”

The issue, the Court said, is “whether or not the presence of the US Armed Forces in Philippine territory
pursuant to the VFA is allowed ‘under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and recognized as a
treaty by the other contracting State.’” “It is,” the Court ruled. “The VFA, which is the instrument agreed
upon to provide for the joint RP-US military exercises, is simply an implementing agreement to the
main RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty,” the Court held. visit fellester.blogspot.com The RP-US Mutual
Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951 was signed and duly ratified with the concurrence of both the
Philippine Senate and the United States Senate.

Romulo-Kenney Agreements not in accord with the VFA itself

The Court however ruled that “the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006, which
are agreements on the detention of the accused in the United States Embassy, are not in accord with
the VFA itself because such detention is not “by Philippine authorities.” Article V, Section 10 of the
VFA provides that “the confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of the United States
personnel shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by appropriate Philippines and United States
authorities.” (Suzette Nicolas y Sombilon Vs. Alberto Romulo, G.R. No. 175888, February 11, 2009)

DISSENTING OPINION

In his dissent, Chief Justice Puno maintained his view in the earlier case of Bayan v. Zamora that the
VFA falls short of the requirement set by Sec. 25, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution, which provides that
the agreement allowing the presence of foreign military troops in the Philippines must be “recognized
as a treaty by the other contracting state.” For the Chief Justice, the majority of the Court in Bayan v.
Zamora gave undue deference to the statement of former US Ambassador Thomas Hubbard that US
Senate advice and consent was not needed to consider a treaty binding on the US, “then jumped to
the conclusion that the US recognized the VFA as a treaty, and that the constitutional requirements
had been satisfied.” (Suzette Nicolas y Sombilon Vs. Alberto Romulo, G.R. No. 175888, February 11,
2009)

Saguisag v. Ochoa

FACTS:

 EDCA or Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement is an agreement between the

Philippines and America wherein it authorizes the U.S. military forces to have access to and
conduct activities within certain "Agreed Locations" in the country.
 After eight rounds of negotiations for two years, the Secretary of National Defense and the
U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines signed the agreement on 28 April 2014. President Benigno
S. Aquino III ratified EDCA on 6 June 2014.
 It was not transmitted to the Senate on the executive's understanding that to do so was no
longer necessary.
 Senators file Senate Resolution No. (SR) 105.91. The resolution expresses the "strong sense"
of the Senators that for EDCA to become valid and effective, it must first be transmitted to the
Senate for deliberation and concurrence

ISSUE:

Whether the provisions under EDCA are consistent with the Constitution, as well as with existing laws
and treaties.
RULING:

 The manner of the President's execution of the law, even if not expressly granted by the law,
is justified by necessity and limited only by law, since the President must "take necessary and
proper steps to carry into execution the law”.
 The role of the President as the executor of the law includes the duty to defend the
State, for which purpose he may use that power in the conduct of foreign relations. It is
the President's prerogative to do whatever is legal and necessary for Philippine defense
interests (commander-in-chief powers).

 The President, however, may enter into an executive agreement on foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities, if (a) it is not the instrument that allows the presence of
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities; or (b) it merely aims to implement an existing
law or treaty. No court can tell the President to desist from choosing an executive agreement
over a treaty to embody an international agreement, unless the case falls squarely within
Article VIII, Section 25.

 EDCA is considered an executive agreement, therefore may be bound through the President
without the need of senatorial votes for its execution. EDCA did not go beyond the framework.
The entry of US troops has long been authorized under a valid and subsisting treaty, which is
the Visiting Forces Agreement. Reading the VFA along with the longstanding Mutual Defense
Treaty led this Court to the conclusion that an executive agreement such as the EDCA was
well within the bounds of the obligations imposed by both treaties

Magallona v. Ermita

Facts:

In March 2009, R.A. 9522 was enacted by the Congress to comply with the terms of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified on February
27, 1984.

Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among others,
that the law decreased the national territory of the Philippines. Some of their particular arguments
are as follows:

RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine state’s
sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the terms of the Treaty
of Paris and ancillary treaties.
RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels
and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the country’s
nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions.
RA 9522’s treatmentof the KIG as “regime of islands” not only results in the loss of a large maritime
area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.

Hence, petitioners files action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 95221 (RA 9522) adjusting the country’s archipelagic baselines and classifying the
baseline regime of nearby territories.

Issues:
Whether or not RA 9522, the amendatory Philippine Baseline Law is unconstitutional.

Discussions:
The provision of Art I 198 Constitution clearly affirms the archipelagic doctrine, which we connect the
outermost points of our archipelago with straight baselines and consider all the waters enclosed
thereby as internal waters. RA 9522, as a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country’s Maritime Zones
and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, gave nothing less than an explicit definition in congruent
with the archipelagic doctrine.

Rulings:
No. The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional. It is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country’s
Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine Territory. It is a
vital step in safeguarding the country’s maritime zones. It also allows an internationally-recognized
delimitation of the breadth of the Philippine’s maritime zones and continental shelf.

Additionally, The Court finds that the conversion of internal waters into archipelagic waters will not
risk the Philippines as affirmed in the Article 49 of the UNCLOS III, an archipelagic State has
sovereign power that extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines, regardless of
their depth or distance from the coast. It is further stated that the regime of archipelagic sea lanes
passage will not affect the status of its archipelagic waters or the exercise of sovereignty over waters
and air space, bed and subsoil and the resources therein.

The Court further stressed that the baseline laws are mere mechanisms for the UNCLOS III to
precisely describe the delimitations. It serves as a notice to the international family of states and it is
in no way affecting or producing any effect like enlargement or diminution of territories.
 Aglipay v. Ruiz

Facts:
Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed a writ of prohibition against respondent
Ruiz, the Director of Post, enjoining the latter from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative
of the 33rd Intl Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic. The petitioner invokes that
such issuance and selling, as authorized by Act 4052 by the Phil. Legislature, contemplates religious
purpose – for the benefit of a particular sect or church. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps is constitutional?

Held/Reason:
The Court said YES, the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by the respondent does not
contemplate any favor upon a particular sect or church, but the purpose was only ‘to advertise the
Philippines and attract more tourist’ and the government just took advantage of an event considered
of international importance, thus, not violating the Constitution on its provision on the separation of the
Church and State. Moreover, the Court stressed that ‘Religious freedom, as a constitutional mandate
is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs’.
Emphasizing that, ‘when the Filipino people ‘implored the aid of Divine Providence’, they thereby
manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence
of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are
indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations.’

Estrada v. Escritor

Facts:
Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with
Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a son with him as
well. Respondent’s husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still
legally married to another woman.

Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to
complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if the
court allows such act.

Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the Jehovah’s
Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a ‘Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective when
legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.

Issue: Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.

Held: No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion.
The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our
Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The State’s
interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently
compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete
interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus the
State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition.

Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept
in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.

The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives
room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This
benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does
not offend compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state
interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so
that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the
state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption to the law
based on her right to freedom of religion.

Calalang v. Williams

The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the
Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-
drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the following for a period of one year from the date
of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:

1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas

Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and

2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to
Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm

The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of
Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of
thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of theCom
monwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from the
Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate
and control the use of and traffic on national roads.

On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the recommendations
made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public
Works approved the recommendations on August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief
of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a
consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places
above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.

Issues:
1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of
Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and
abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?

2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding
the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people?

Held:
1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on
national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National
Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the
desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies at the
bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote the general welfare may
interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property
may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health,
and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual
are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over authority because
society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the
individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is
precisely the very means of insuring its preserving.

2) No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice
in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means
the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated
to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a
proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through
the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of
salus populi estsuprema lex.

Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers
and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all
groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and
paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing
about “the greatest good to the greatest number.”

Association of Small Landowners v Secretary of Agrarian Reform

FACTS

The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and
corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same.
Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually
cultivating lands. The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their
right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing
rules required under the abovementioned decree.

ISSUE
Whether or not PD No. 27 is valid

RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court sustained the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. All major obstacles to
the comprehensive agrarian reform program are removed, to clear the way for the true freedom of the
farmer. We may now glimpse the day he will be released not only from want but also from exploitation
or disdain of the past and from his own feelings of inadequacy and helplessness. Wherefore, the Court
holds that landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under PD No. 27 shall
enjoy the retention rights granted by RA No. 6657 under the conditions therein prescribed.

Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.

Facts:

Petitioner, Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow
Navigation Co., Inc., under a POEA-approved contract of employment for 12 months, as Chief Officer.
On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a downgraded
employment contract for the position of Second Officer upon the assurance and representation of
respondents that he would be Chief Officer by the end of April 1998. Respondents did not deliver on
their promise. Hence, Serrano refused to stay on as second Officer and was repatriated to the
Philippines serving only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired
portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days.
Serrano filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for constructive dismissal
and for payment of his money claims in the total amount of US$26,442.73 (based on the computation
of $2590/month from June 1998 to February 1999, $413.90 for March 1998, and $1640 for March
1999) as well as moral and exemplary damages. The LA declared the petitioner's dismissal illegal and
awarded him US$8,770, representing his salaray for three (3) months of the unexpired portion of the
aforesaid contract of employment, plus $45 for salary differential and for attorney's fees equivalent to
10% of the total amount; however, no compensation for damages as prayed was awarded.
On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision and awarded Serrano $4669.50, representing three
(3) months salary at $1400/month, plus 445 salary differential and 10% for attorney's fees. This
decision was based on the provision of RA 8042, which was made into law on July 15, 1995. Serrano
filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the constitutionality of the last
clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of RA 8042, which reads:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or
authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement
of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the
unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less.
The NLRC denied the Motion; hence, Serrano filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals
(CA), reiterating the constitutional challenge against the subject clause. The CA affirmed the NLRC
ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate, but skirted the constitutional issue raised by herein
petitioner Serrano.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18,
Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector.

Ruling:
The answer is in the affirmative. Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all
members of the labor sector, without distinction as to place of deployment, full protection of their rights
and welfare. To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions
translate to economic security and parity: all monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by workers
of similar category, while all monetary obligations should be borne by them in equal degree; none
should be denied the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed on,
others in like circumstances.
The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in the
computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes
a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts,
but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause
singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage. There being a
suspect classification involving a vulnerable sector protected by the Constitution, the Court now
subjects the classification to a strict judicial scrutiny, and determines whether it serves a compelling
state interest through the least restrictive means.
It must be stressed that Section 3, Article XIII does not directly bestow on the working class
any actual enforceable right, but merely clothes it with the status of a sector for whom the Constitution
urges protection through executive or legislative action and judicial recognition. Its utility is best limited
to being an impetus not just for the executive and legislative departments, but for the judiciary as well,
to protect the welfare of the working class. And it was in fact consistent with that constitutional agenda
that the Court in Central Bank (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) Employee Association, Inc. v. Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas, 446 SCRA 299 (2004), formulated the judicial precept that when the challenge to
a statute is premised on the perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with
special protection—such as the working class or a section thereof—the Court may recognize the
existence of a suspect classification and subject the same to strict judicial scrutiny.
The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose; and it is for
that precise reason that the clause violates not just petitioner’s right to equal protection, but also her
right to substantive due process under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.

Manuel v. People

FACTS:
This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of Court of Appeals affirming the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, convicting the petitioner for the crime of bigamy.

Eduardo P. Manuel, herein petitioner, was first married to Rubylus Gaña on July 18, 1975, who,
according to the former, was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned and was never
seen again by him after his last visit. Manuel met Tina B. Gandalera in January 1996 when the latter
was only 21 years old. Three months after their meeting, the two got married through a civil wedding
in Baguio City without Gandalera’s knowledge of Manuel’s first marriage. In the course of their
marriage, things got rocky and Gandalera learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when he
married him. She then filed a criminal case of bigamy against Eduardo Manuel. The latter’s defense
being that his declaration of “single” in his marriage contract with Gandalera was done because he
believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid and that he did not know that he had to go to
court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. The Regional Trial Court
ruled against him sentencing him of imprisonment of from 6 years and 10 months to ten years, and an
amount 0f P200,000.00 for moral damages.

Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy
because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious
intent. The CA ruled against the petitioner but with modification on the RTC’s decision. Imprisonment
was from 2 years, months and 1 day to ten years. Pecuniary reward for moral damages was affirmed.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it ruled that petitioner’s
wife cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there was no judicial
declaration of presumptive death as provided for under Article 41 of the Family Code.

2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it affirmed the award
of Php200,000.00 as moral damages as it has no basis in fact and in law.

HELD:

The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the State. Under Article II,
Section 12 of the Constitution, the State shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution. Marriage is a social institution of the highest importance. Public policy, good morals
and the interest of society require that the marital relation should be surrounded with every safeguard
and its severance only in the manner prescribed and the causes specified by law.[37] The laws
regulating civil marriages are necessary to serve the interest, safety, good order, comfort or general
welfare of the community and the parties can waive nothing essential to the validity of the proceedings.
A civil marriage anchors an ordered society by encouraging stable relationships over transient ones;
it enhances the welfare of the community.

In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two willing spouses and an
approving State. On marriage, the parties assume new relations to each other and the State touching
nearly on every aspect of life and death. The consequences of an invalid marriage to the parties, to
innocent parties and to society, are so serious that the law may well take means calculated to ensure
the procurement of the most positive evidence of death of the first spouse or of the presumptive death
of the absent spouse[38] after the lapse of the period provided for under the law. One such means is
the requirement of the declaration by a competent court of the presumptive death of an absent spouse
as proof that the present spouse contracts a subsequent marriage on a well-grounded belief of the
death of the first spouse. Indeed, men readily believe what they wish to be true, is a maxim of the old
jurists. To sustain a second marriage and to vacate a first because one of the parties believed the
other to be dead would make the existence of the marital relation determinable, not by certain extrinsic
facts, easily capable of forensic ascertainment and proof, but by the subjective condition of
individuals.[39] Only with such proof can marriage be treated as so dissolved as to permit second
marriages.[40] Thus, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code has made the dissolution of marriage
dependent not only upon the personal belief of parties, but upon certain objective facts easily capable
of accurate judicial cognizance,[41] namely, a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse.

1. The petition is denied for lack of merit. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil
intent when he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the
accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or
criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to
know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Where a spouse is absent for the requisite period,
the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a judgment declaring the
presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the present
spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead. Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the present spouse who contracted a
subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the absentee
spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime.

The court ruled against the petitioner.

2. The Court rules that the petitioner’s collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after his
marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the
latter. The Court thus declares that the petitioner’s acts are against public policy as they undermine
and subvert the family as a social institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of
society. Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s perfidy, she is not
barred from claiming moral damages. Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court
finds the award of P200,000.00 for moral damages to be just and reasonable.

Garcia v. Drilon

FACTS:
Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) admitted having an affair with a bank manager. His infidelity
emotionally wounded private respondent which spawned several quarrels that left respondent
wounded. Petitioner also unconscionably beat up their daughter, Jo-ann.

The private respondent was determined to separate from petitioner. But she was afraid he would take
away their children and deprive her of financial support. He warned her that if she pursued legal battle,
she would not get a single centavo from him. After she confronted him of his affair, he forbade her to
hold office. This deprived her of access to full information about their businesses. Hence, no source
of income.

Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of violence against
respondent and her children and issued a series of Temporary Protection Orders (TPO) pursuant to
RA 9262.

Republic Act No. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against
women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners.

Petitioner hence, challenged the constitutionality of RA 9262 on making a gender-based classification.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust, and violative of the equal protection clause.

RULING:
No. The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition against
classification. The non-identical treatment of women and men under RA 9262 is justified to put them
on equal footing and to give substance to the policy and aim of the state to ensure the equality of
women and men in light of the biological, historical, social, and culturally endowed differences between
men and women.

RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are vulnerable
victims of domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental objectives of protecting
human rights, insuring gender equality, and empowering women. The gender-based classification and
the special remedies prescribed by said law in favor of women and children are substantially related,
in fact essentially necessary, to achieve such objectives. Hence, said Act survives the intermediate
review or middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The gender-based classification therein is therefore not violative
of the equal protection clause embodied in the 1987 Constitution.

Imbong v. Ochoa

FACTS:

 Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
 Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said
Act. The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:
 The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.
 The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against
hazardous products.
 The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
 The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.
 The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.
 The RH Law violates the right to free speech.
 The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution.
 The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family protected by the
Constitution

ISSUE:

Whether RA 10354 or Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the right to
health; 4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)

5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom

RULING:

 Petitioners claim that the right to health is violated by the RH Law because it requires the
inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal,
non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies in the National Drug
Formulary and in the regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all national
 hospitals (Section 9 of the RH Law). They cite risks of getting diseases gained by using e.g.
oral contraceptive pills.

 Some petitioners do not question contraception and contraceptives per se. Rather, they pray
that the status quo under RA 4729 and 5921 be maintained. These laws prohibit the sale and
distribution of contraceptives without the prescription of a duly-licensed physician.

 The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the
Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are
made available to the public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH
must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall be
from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual
distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following a
prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.

Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered “mandatory” only

after these devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the
FDA. Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective
4.) Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the consent of the
spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and
autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social
institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a)
the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands
of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family associations to participate in the
planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe
upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the institutions of marriage and the family.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent
or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section
12 of the Constitution, which states: “The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing
of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of
the Government.” In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads “in the case of minors, the
written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising parental authority
or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures” is invalid as it denies the right of
parental authority in cases where what is involved is “non-surgical procedures.”
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning services.
Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this situation and
may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received. In addition, an
exception may be made in life-threatening procedures.
5.) The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates
the State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although
educators might raise their objection to their participation in the RH education program, the Court
reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has not yet
formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the
development of their children with the use of the term “primary”. The right of parents in upbringing their
youth is superior to that of the State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement
(rather than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest groups in
developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the program will be in line with
the religious beliefs of the petitioners.

PT&T Co. v. NLRC

FACTS:

Grace de Guzman was hired by PT&T as a Supernumerary Project Worker for a fixed period from
November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 as reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity
leave. Under the Reliever Agreement signed by Grace, her employment was to be immediately
terminated upon expiration of the agreed period. From June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991, and from July
19, 1991 to August 8, 1991, PT&T again engaged the services of Grace as reliever for Erlinda F. Dizon
who went on leave during both periods. On September 2, 1991, Grace was asked to join petitioner
company as a probationary employee. In the job application form furnished to Grace, she indicated in
the civil status that she was single although she had in fact contracted marriage on May 26, 1991. This
meant she was not single, as she had represented herself, when she signed the reliever agreements
on June 10, 1991 and July 8, 1991. Petitioner dismissed Grace from the company after learning about
Grace’s real civil status and being unconvinced of Grace’s explanation for the discrepancy. Grace
immediately filed a complaint for illegal dismissal coupled with a claim for non-payment of cost of living
allowances (COLA), before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in Baguio City. At the preliminary conference, Grace volunteered the information
that she had failed to remit the amount of P2,380.75 of her collections, and executed a promissory
note for that amount in favor of petitioner. The Labor Arbiter handed down a decision declaring that
private respondent, who had already gained the status of a regular employee, was illegally dismissed
by petitioner and ordered her reinstatement plus payment of the corresponding back wages and
COLA. On appeal, the NLRC upheld the Labor Arbiter but modified the Labor Arbiter’s decision with
the qualification that Grace de Guzman deserved to be suspended for three months due to the
dishonest nature of her acts which should not be condoned.

ISSUE:

Can the alleged concealment of civil status be a ground for terminating the services of an employee?

HELD:

No. The Constitution provides a gamut of protective provisions due to the disparity in rights between
men and women in almost all phases of social and political life. Article II Section 14 of the 1987
Constitution states that “The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure
the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.” Corollary to this is Article XIII Section 3
which states that “The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all” and
Article XIII Section 14 which states that “The State shall protect working women by providing safe and
healthful working conditions, taking into account their maternal functions, and such facilities and
opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the service
of the nation.” Since the Labor Code was enacted on May 1, 1974, corrective labor and social laws on
gender inequality have emerged with more frequency in the years. Two of these are Republic Act No.
6727 which explicitly prohibits discrimination against women with respect to terms and conditions of
employment, promotion, and training opportunities; and Republic Act No. 7192 or the Women in
Development and Nation Building Act which, among others, affords women equal opportunities with
men to act and to enter into contracts. In the Labor Code, Article 136 explicitly prohibits discrimination
merely by reason of the marriage of a female employee. The private respondent’s act of concealing
the true nature of her status from PT&T could not be properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as
she was moved to act the way she did mainly because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a
stable company. In other words, she was practically forced by that very same illegal company policy
into misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being disqualified from work.

Resident Marine Mammals v. Secretary Reyes

FACTS

Two sets of petitioners separately filed an action challenging the legality of Service Contract No. 46
(SC-46) awarded to Japan Petroleum Exploration Co. (JAPEX), which allowed JAPEX for the
exploration, development and exploitation of petroleum resources in the Tañon Strait situated between
Negros and Cebu.

The first petition was brought on behalf of resident marine mammals in the Tañon Strait by two
individuals namely Gloria Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio acting as legal guardians of
the marine mammals. Petitioners collectively referred to as "Resident Marine Mammals” are the
toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, which inhabit the waters in and
around the Tañon Strait.

The second petition was filed by the Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center (FIDEC)
representing the interests of the fisherfolks in Region VII, along with representatives from fishing
communities affected by the exploration activities.

The petitioners filed their cases shortly after JAPEX began conducting exploration and drilling
activities in the strait. Petitioner Resident Marine Mammals avers that a study made after the seismic
survey showed that the fish catch was reduced drastically by 50 to 70 percent and incidences of fish
kill have also been observed. FIDEC confirmed the allegations of the petitioner Resident Marine
Mammals.
 In 2008, JAPEX and the Government of the Philippines, through the Department of Energy
and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, mutually terminated the service contract
and the oil exploration activities ceased.

ISSUES

Main issue: Whether or not energy resource exploitation and utilization is allowed in Tañon Strait.

Sub-issue: Whether or not Service Contract No. 46 is violative of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and
other relevant laws.

RULING

True to the constitutional policy provided in Section 16 of Article II that the "State shall protect and
advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature," Congress enacted the NIPAS Act to secure the perpetual existence of all native
plants and animals through the establishment of a comprehensive system of integrated protected
areas. The exploitation and utilization of this energy resource in the present case may be allowed only
through a law passed by Congress since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area. But since there is no such
law specifically allowing oil exploration and/or extraction in the Tañon Strait, no energy resource
exploitation and utilization may be done in said protected seascape.

The Court finds that Service Contract No. 46 is null and void for non-compliance with the
requirements of the Constitution. Section 2 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution requires that the
President himself enter into any service contract for the exploration of petroleum. SC-46 appeared to
have been entered into and signed only by the DOE through its then Secretary, Vicente S. Perez, Jr.,
likewise, the contract had not been reported to the Philippine Congress, contrary to the said
constitutional requirement.

Laguna Lake Development Authority v CA

FACTS:

The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City Government of Caloocan was
maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area without first securing an Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, as required under Presidential Decree No.
1586, and clearance from LLDA as required under Republic Act N o. 4850 and issued a CEASE and
DESIST ORDER (CDO) for the City Government of Caloocan to stop the use of the dumpsite.
ISSUES:

1. Does the LLDA and its amendatory laws, have the authority to entertain the complaint against
the dumping of garbage in the open dumpsite in Barangay Camarin authorized by the City
Government of Caloocan?

APPLICABLE LAWS:

• Executive Order No. 927 series of 1983 which provides, thus: Sec. 4. Additional Powers and
Functions. The authority shall have the following powers and functions: (d) Make, alter or modify
orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution specifying the conditions and the time within
which such discontinuance must be accomplished

• As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication
Board (PAB), except in cases w here the special law provides for another forum

RULING:

1. YES, LLDA has authority. It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized
administrative agency, is specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory
law s to carry out and make effective the declared national policy of promoting and accelerating the
development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of
Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan with due
regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the
quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances,
deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant and power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of
its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake
region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from
the surrounding areas.

1. LLDA is mandated by law to manage the environment, preserve the quality of human life and
ecological systems and prevent undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution in the
Laguna Lake area and surrounding provinces and cities, including Caloocan.
· While pollution cases are generally under the Pollution Adjudication Board under the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources, it does not preclude mandate from special laws that provide
another forum.

· In this case, RA No. 4850 provides that mandate to the LLDA. It is mandated to pass upon or
approve or disapprove plans and programs of local government offices and agencies within the region
and their underlying environmental/ecological repercussions.

· The DENR even recognized the primary jurisdiction of the LLDA over the case when the DENR
acted as intermediary at a meeting among the representatives of the city government, LLDA and the
residents.

Oposa vs. Factoran

Facts:
The principal petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded
as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and
non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for
the protection of our environment and natural resources. The petitioners alleged the respondent,
Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), continued approval of the Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to numerous
commercial logging companies to cut and deforest the remaining forests of the country. Petitioners
request the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

 Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

 Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements.

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation
are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial
notice. This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource
property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations. Plaintiff have
exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant’s office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served
upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country. Defendant, however, fails
and refuses to cancel the existing TLA’s to the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of
plaintiffs.

Issues:

 Whether or not the petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the Court.
 Whether or not the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by
the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law.
 Whether or not petitioners’ proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the
requisite hearing violates the requirements of due process.

Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:

 The petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the Court.
1. The case at bar is subject to judicial review by the Court. Justice Davide, Jr. precisely identified
in his opinion the requisites for a case to be subjected for the judicial review by the Court.
According to him, the subject matter of the complaint is of common interest, making this civil
case a class suit and proving the existence of an actual controversy. He strengthens this
conclusion by citing in the decision Section 1, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution.
2. The petitioners can file a class suit because they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can
only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded,
considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature.” Nature means the created world in its entirety.
Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land,
waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as
future generations.
3. Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the
full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors’ assertion
of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
 The Court does not agree with the trial court’s conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with
sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that
the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data.
1. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation’s constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides:

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

1. This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same
article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.

1. While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less
important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to
a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-
perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may
even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights
need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind.

 The Court are not persuaded by the trial court’s pronouncement.

1. The respondent Secretary did not invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause.
If he had done so, Justice Feliciano would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government
by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders
because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses
according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of
public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into
every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705)
which provides that when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify,
replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege
granted herein .
2. All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property
or a property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution.

Hence, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18
July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 was set aside. The petitioners amend their complaint to
implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.

MMDA v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay

FACTS:

The complaint by the residents alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way
below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or
the Philippine Environment Code and that ALL defendants (public officials) must be jointly and/or
solidarily liable and collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class
B, waters fit for swimming, diving, and other forms of contact recreation.

ISSUES:

(1) WON Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water Quality and
Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited only to the cleanup of
specific pollution incidents;
(2) WON petitioners be compel led by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay.

APPLICABLE LAWS:

PD 1152 Philippine Environmental Code Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.–– Where the
quality of water has deteriorated t o a degree where it s state will adversely affect its best u
sage, the government agencies concerned shall take such measures as may be necessary
to upgrade the quality of such water to meet the prescribed water quality standards. Section
20. Clean-up Operations.––It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to contain , remove and
clean - up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the
government agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up operations
and expenses incurred in said operation shall be charged against the persons and/ or entities
responsible for such pollution.

HELD:

(1) Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought to
confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a specific
pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence
of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality “has deteriorated to a degree where its
state will adversely affect its best usage.” Section 17 & 20 are of general application and are not for
specific pollution incidents only. The fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such magnitude
and scope that it is well -nigh impossible to draw the line between a specific and a general
pollution incident.

(2) The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus. While the
implementation of the MMDA's mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the
enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial
in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. Under what other judicial discipline describes
as “continuing mandamus ,” the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives
with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by administrative
inaction or indifference.
NOTE: This continuing mandamus is no longer applicable, since this is institutionalized in the rules of
procedure for environmental cases.

20 days – Temporary restraining order

ICHONG vs. HERNANDEZ

Facts:
This Court has before it the delicate task of passing upon the validity and constitutionality of a
legislative enactment, fundamental and far‐reaching in significance. The enactment poses questions
of due process, police power and equal protection of the laws. It also poses an important issue of fact,
that is whether the conditions which the disputed law purports to remedy really or actually exist.
Admittedly springing from a deep, militant, and positive nationalistic impulse, the law purports to
protect citizen and country from the alien retailer. Through it, and within the field of economy it
regulates, Congress attempts to translate national aspirations for economic independence and
national security, rooted in the drive and urge for national survival and welfare, into a concrete and
tangible measures designed to free the national retailer from the competing dominance of the alien,
so that the country and the nation may be free from a supposed economic dependence and bondage.
Do the facts and circumstances justify the enactment?

Held:
It has been said the police power is so far ‐ reaching in scope, that it has become almost
impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State
itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co‐extensive with
self‐protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental
processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern
democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost
unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost boundless,
just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost all‐embracing and
have transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee the needs and
demands of public interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive world, so
we cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and through which
the State seeks to attain or achieve interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define
the scope or extent of the police power of the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations
thereof. The most important of these are the due process clause and the equal protection
clause.

Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real
actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail
business and free citizens and country from dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls
within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality
and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the
exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is
prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and
reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives
appear to us to be plainly evident — as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually
necessary — and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with
whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere; that the
provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not
misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void
for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the
subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other
conventional agreement.

Espina vs. Zamora, Jr.

National Economy and Patrimony; While Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution requires the
development of a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipino
entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of Filipino monopoly of the economic environment.—As the
Court explained in Tañada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18 (1997), the provisions of Article II of the 1987
Constitution, the declarations of principles and state policies, are not self-executing. Legislative failure
to pursue such policies cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts. The Court further explained
in Tañada that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution lays down the ideals of economic nationalism: (1)
by expressing preference in favor of qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony and in the use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and
locally-produced goods; (2) by mandating the State to adopt measures that help make them
competitive; and (3) by requiring the State to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos. In other words, while Section 19, Article II of the 1987
Constitutionrequires the development of a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of Filipino monopoly of the economic
environment. The objective is simply to prohibit foreign powers or interests from maneuvering our
economic policies and ensure that Filipinos are given preference in all areas of development.

Same; While the Constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and
enterprises, it also recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases
of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition
and trade practices that are unfair.—Indeed, the 1987 Constitution takes into account the realities of
the outside world as it requires the pursuit of a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes
all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity; and speaks of
industries which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets as well as of the protection of
Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices. Thus, while the Constitution
mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, it also recognizes the need
for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits
protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair.

Same; Trade and Industry; Police Power; Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution gives
Congress the discretion to reserve to Filipinos certain areas of investments upon the recommendation
of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) and when the national interest
requires.—Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution gives Congress the discretion to reserve to
Filipinos certain areas of investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the national
interest requires. Thus, Congress can determine what policy to pass and when to pass it depending
on the economic exigencies. It can enact laws allowing the entry of foreigners into certain industries
not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens. In this case, Congress has decided to open certain
areas of the retail trade business to foreign investments instead of reserving them exclusively to
Filipino citizens. The NEDA has not opposed such policy.

Same; Same; Retail Trade Liberalization Act (R.A. 8762); Police Power; The control and regulation of
trade in the interest of the public welfare is of course an exercise of the police power of the State; To
the extent that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8762, the Retail Trade Liberalization Act, lessens the restraint
on the foreigners’ right to property or to engage in an ordinarily lawful business, it cannot be said that
the law amounts to a denial of the Filipinos’ right to property and to due process of law.—The control
and regulation of trade in the interest of the public welfare is of course an exercise of the police power
of the State. A person’s right to property, whether he is a Filipino citizen or foreign national, cannot be
taken from him without due process of law. In 1954, Congress enacted the Retail Trade Nationalization
Act or R.A. 1180 that restricts the retail business to Filipino citizens. In denying the petition assailing
the validity of such Act for violation of the foreigner’s right to substantive due process of law, the
Supreme Court held that the law constituted a valid exercise of police power. The State had an interest
in preventing alien control of the retail trade and R.A. 1180 was reasonably related to that purpose.
That law is not arbitrary. Here, to the extent that R.A. 8762, the Retail Trade Liberalization Act, lessens
the restraint on the foreigners’ right to property or to engage in an ordinarily lawful business, it cannot
be said that the law amounts to a denial of the Filipinos’ right to property and to due process of law.
Filipinos continue to have the right to engage in the kinds of retail business to which the law in question
has permitted the entry of foreign investors.

Same; Same; Police Power; It is not within the province of the Court to inquire into the wisdom of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8762 save when it blatantly violates the Constitution.—It is not within the
province of the Court to inquire into the wisdom of R.A. 8762 save when it blatantly violates the
Constitution. But as the Court has said, there is no showing that the law has contravened any
constitutional mandate. The Court is not convinced that the implementation of R.A. 8762 would
eventually lead to alien control of the retail trade business. Petitioners have not mustered any concrete
and strong argument to support its thesis. The law itself has provided strict safeguards on foreign
participation in that business.

Tatad vs Secretary of Energy

Facts:
In December 9, 1992, the Department of Energy was created (through the enactment of R.A. No.
7638) to control energy-related government activities. In March 1996, R.A. No. 8180 (Downstream Oil
Industry Deregulation Act of 1996) was enacted in pursuance to the deregulation of the power and
energy thrust under R.A. 7638. Under the R.A. No. 8180, any person or entity was allowed to import
and market crude oil and petroleum products, and to lease or own and operate refineries and other
downstream oil facilities.
Petitioner Francisco Tatad questions the constitutionality of Section 5 of R.A. No. 8180 since the
imposition of tarrif violates the equal protection clause and bars the entry of others in the oil industry
business. Also, the inclusion of tarrif violates Section 26 (1) of Article VI of the constitution requiring
every law to have only one subject which shall be expressed in its title.
In a separate petition (G.R. 127867), petitioners Edcel Lagman, Joker Arroyo, Enrique Garcia,
Wigberto Tanada, Flag Human Rights Foundation, Inc., Freedom from Debt Coalition and Sanlakas
argued that R.A. No. 8180, specifically Section 15 is unconstitutional because it: (1) gives undue
delegation of legislative power to the President and the Secretary of Energy by not providing a
determinate or determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining when to implement
the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry; (2) Executive Order No. 392, an order declaring
the implementation of the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry, is arbitrary and
unreasonable because it was enacted due to the alleged depletion of the Oil Price Stabilization Plan-
a condition not found in R.A. No. 8180; and (3) Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392 allow
the formation of a de facto cartel among Petron, Caltex and Shell in violation of constitutional
prohibition against monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition.

Respondents, on the other hand, declares the petitions not justiciable (cannot be settled by the court)
and that the petitioners have no locus standi since they did not sustain direct injury as a result of the
implementation of R.A. No. 8180.

Issues:
1. Whether or not R.A. no. 8180 is unconstitutional.
2. Whether or not E. O. no. 392 is arbitrary and unreasonable.

3. Whether or not Section 5 of R.A. no. 8180 violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
4. Whether or not Section 15 of R.A. no. 8180 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power.

Held:

1. No, R.A. No. 8180 is unconstitutional. It violated Section 19, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting
monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition. The deregulation act only
benefits Petron, Shell and Caltex, the three major league players in the oil industry.

On the other hand, section 19 of Article XII of the Constitution allegedly violated by the aforestated
provisions of R.A. No. 8180 mandates: "The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the
public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be
allowed."

A monopoly is a privilege or peculiar advantage vested in one or more persons or companies,

consisting in the exclusive right or power to carry on a particular business or trade, manufacture a
particular article, or control the sale or the whole supply of a particular commodity. It is a form of
market structure in which one or only a few firms dominate the total sales of a product or
service.28 On the other hand, a combination in restraint of trade is an agreement or understanding
between two or more persons, in the form of a contract, trust, pool, holding company, or other form
of association, for the purpose of unduly restricting competition, monopolizing trade and commerce
in a certain commodity, controlling its, production, distribution and price, or otherwise interfering with
freedom of trade without statutory authority.29 Combination in restraint of trade refers to the means
while monopoly refers to the end.30

Section 19, Article XII of our Constitution is anti-trust in history and in spirit. It espouses competition.
The desirability of competition is the reason for the prohibition against restraint of trade, the reason for
the interdiction of unfair competition, and the reason for regulation of unmitigated monopolies.
Competition is thus the underlying principle of section 19, Article XII of our Constitution which cannot
be violated by R.A. No. 8180. We subscribe to the observation of Prof. Gellhorn that the objective of
anti-trust law is to assure a competitive economy, based upon the belief that through competition
producers will strive to satisfy consumer wants at the lowest price with the sacrifice of the fewest
resources. Competition among producers allows consumers to bid for goods and services, and thus
matches their desires with societys opportunity costs. He adds with appropriateness that there is a
reliance upon the operation of the market system (free enterprise) to decide what shall be produced,
how resources shall be allocated in the production process, and to whom the various products will be
distributed. The market system relies on the consumer to decide what and how much shall be
produced, and on competition, among producers to determine who will manufacture it.6 (Corona)
2. Yes, Executive Order No. 392 was arbitrary and unreasonable and therefore considered void. The
depletion of OFSP is not one of the factors enumerated in R.A. No. 8180 to be considered in declaring
full deregulation of the oil industry. Therefore, the executive department, in its declaration of E.O. No.
392, failed to follow faithfully the standards set in R.A. No. 8180, making it void.
3. No, section 5 of R.A. No. 8180 does not violate Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution. A law
having a single general subject indicated in the title may contain any number of provisions as long as
they are not inconsistent with the foreign subject. Section 5 providing for tariff differential is germane
to the subject of the deregulation of the downstream industry which is R.A. No 8180, therefore it does
not violate the one title-one subject rule.

4. No, Section 15 did not violate the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of legislative power.
The tests to determine the validity of delegation of legislative power are the completeness test and the
sufficiency test. The completeness test demands that the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions such that when it reaches the delegate, all it must do is enforce it. The sufficiency test
demand an adequate guideline or limitation in the law to delineate the delegate’s authority. Section 15
provides for the time to start the full deregulation, which answers the completeness test. It also laid
down standard guide for the judgement of the President- he is to time it as far as practicable when the
prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange
rate of peso to dollar is stable- which answers the sufficiency test.

Tanada v. Angara

THE FACTS

Petitioners Senators Tañada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the concurrence by the
Philippine Senate of the President’s ratification of the international Agreement establishing the World
Trade Organization (WTO). They argued that the WTO Agreement violates the mandate of the 1987
Constitution to “develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino
labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.” Further, they contended that the “national
treatment” and “parity provisions” of the WTO Agreement “place nationals and products of member
countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products,” in contravention of the “Filipino First”
policy of our Constitution, and render meaningless the phrase “effectively controlled by Filipinos.”

II. THE ISSUE

Does the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from participating in worldwide trade
liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is liberalized,
deregulated and privatized?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DISMISSED the petition. It sustained the concurrence of the Philippine Senate of
the President’s ratification of the Agreement establishing the WTO.]

NO, the 1987 Constitution DOES NOT prohibit our country from participating in
worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global
economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized.

There are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the
Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement.

[W]hile the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and
enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world
on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign
competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue
an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development
of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign
goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either.In fact, it allows an
exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.

xxx xxx xxx

[T]he constitutional policy of a “self-reliant and independent national economy” does not
necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither
“economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international community.” As explained by Constitutional
Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional policy:
Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly aware of
overdependence on external assistance for even its most basic needs. It does not mean autarky or
economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding mendicancy in the international community.
Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the national economy, especially in
such strategic industries as in the development of natural resources and public utilities.

The WTO reliance on “most favored nation,” “national treatment,” and “trade without
discrimination” cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and
reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on “equality
and reciprocity,” the fundamental law encourages industries that are “competitive in both domestic and
foreign markets,” thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade
environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with
the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown
capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free trade environment, Filipino
entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to
prosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.

xxx xxx xxx

It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the State to
develop an independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to protect and/or
prefer Filipino labor, products, domestic materials and locally produced goods. But it is equally true
that such principles — while serving as judicial and legislative guides — are not in themselves sources
of causes of action. Moreover, there are other equally fundamental constitutional principles relied upon
by the Senate which mandate the pursuit of a “trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes
all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity” and the promotion
of industries “which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,” thereby justifying its
acceptance of said treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative
and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of the generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the land and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation
and amity with all nations.

That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent
to the WTO Agreement thereby making it “a part of the law of the land” is a legitimate exercise of its
sovereign duty and power. We find no “patent and gross” arbitrariness or despotism “by reason of
passion or personal hostility” in such exercise. It is not impossible to surmise that this Court, or at least
some of its members, may even agree with petitioners that it is more advantageous to the national
interest to strike down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal reason to attribute grave abuse
of discretion to the Senate and to nullify its decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse in the
exercise of our own judicial power and duty. Ineludibly, what the Senate did was a valid exercise of its
authority. As to whether such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial
inquiry and review. That is a matter between the elected policy makers and the people. As to whether
the nation should join the worldwide march toward trade liberalization and economic globalization is a
matter that our people should determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO Agreement
allows withdrawal of membership, should this be the political desire of a member.

Cruz vs Secretary of DENR

FACTS:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as
citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371,
otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules
and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground
that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain
as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied
in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is
nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their
ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the
State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral
domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found,
the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large
scale development and exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public
domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private
land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership
and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does
not include the right to alienate the same.

Belgica v. Executive Secretary

The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is
commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent
several legal designations from “Congressional Pork Barrel” to the latest “Priority Development
Assistance Fund” or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the annual General
Appropriations Act(GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to – P40 million for “hard projects”
(infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for “soft projects”
(scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for
soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million
for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet members
may request for the realignment of funds into their department provided that the request for
realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called
presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas
Project – this has been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from
the earnings of PAGCOR – this has been around since about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six
whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork
barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in
funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGO’s (non-government organizations)
which would make it appear that government funds are being used in legit existing projects but are in
fact going to “ghost” projects. An audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results
thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the
Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it violates
the following principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the purse).
The executive, on the other hand, implements the laws – this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is
a part of. Only the executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel system, what’s
happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to
which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to – a clear act of implementing the law they
enacted – a violation of the principle of separation of powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA
vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel, then called as CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund,
was constitutional insofar as the legislators only recommend where their pork barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get the
concurrence of the legislator concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the
people legislative power but only insofar as the processes of referendum and initiative are concerned).
That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate further that which
was delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to
such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to which his
PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The power
to appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and not
lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the Congress
can delegate the power to the individual member of Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items in the
GAA which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined because of
the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to which he will
appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto the appropriation made by the
legislator if the appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA – again, “Congress cannot choose
a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President
useless.”
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their Local
Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies concerning
their localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the house of
representatives, what’s happening is that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by
the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national government (note, a
congressman is a national officer) meddles with the affairs of the local government – and this is
contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on local autonomy. It’s good if that’s all that
is happening under the pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on
the part of legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional
because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and
PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as
PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for the
appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain energy-related
ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance
energy resource development and for other purposes which the President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCOR’s earnings shall be
allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government
infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The
appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a
general appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.

Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong Vs. Commission on Elections

FACTS:

Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC
declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign
and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a
national constituency.
Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC
violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the
1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage
a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in
disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he
possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of
waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he
also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries,
and he has a platform of government.

ISSUE:

Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?

RULING:

No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to
limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an
enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust
or justifies an interpretation of the sort.

The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration
of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-
executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access"
provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any
judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive
action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.

Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would
accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves
much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the
clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly
defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be
entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service"
are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not
the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which
innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.

The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some
valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates.” As long as the limitations apply to everybody
equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not
sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one
who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person
is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.

The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates
who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a
compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards
this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably,
the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to
mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. The organization
of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates
with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral
process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-
note joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral
process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless
sacrifice on the part of the State.

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis
of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of
further evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence,
to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as
contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Angara v. Electoral Commission

FACTS:

Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the
position of member of the National Assembly for the 1st district of Tayabas province.
On Oct 17 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the Nat'l
Assembly for garnering the most number of votes. He then took his oath of office on Nov 15th. On Dec
3rd, Nat'l Assembly passed Res. No 8 which declared with finality the victory of Angara. On Dec 8,
Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a motion of protest against the election of Angara, that
he be declared elected member of the Nat'l Assembly. Electoral Commission passed a resolution in
Dec 9th as the last day for the filing of the protests against the election, returns and qualifications of
the members of the National Assembly. On Dec 20, Angara filed before the Elec. Commission a motion
to dismiss the protest that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period. The Elec.
Commission denied Angara's petition.
Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission
taking further cognizance of Ynsua's protest. He contended that the Constitution confers exclusive
jurisdiction upon the said Electoral Commissions as regards the merits of contested elections to the
Nat'l Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy;
Whether or not The Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.

RULING:

[The Court DENIED the petition.]

NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
taking cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the
previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly.
 The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative
in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of
the petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any manner
toll the time for filing election protests against members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing
of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the
Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. xxx.

[T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative
in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. [W]here a
general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the
one or the performance of the other is also conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional
provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission,
therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its
exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the
Electoral Commission.

Arnault v. Nazareno

FACTS:
This case arose from the legislative inquiry into the acquisition by the Philippine Government of the
Buenavista and Tambobong estates sometime in 1949. Among the witnesses called to be examined
by the special committee created by a Senate resolution was Jean L. Arnault, a lawyer who delivered
a partial of the purchase price to a representative of the vendor. During the Senate investigation,
Arnault refused to reveal the identity of said representative, at the same time invoking his constitutional
right against self-incrimination. The Senate adopted a resolution committing Arnault to the custody of
the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned “until he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the
Senate . . . the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent
questions in connection therewith.” Arnault petitioned for a writ of Habeas Corpus

ISSUE:
Can the senate impose penalty against those who refuse to answer its questions in a congressional
hearing in aid of legislation.

HELD:
It is the inherent right of the Senate to impose penalty in carrying out their duty to conduct inquiry in
aid of legislation. But it must be herein established that a witness who refuses to answer a query by
the Committee may be detained during the term of the members imposing said penalty but the
detention should not be too long as to violate the witness’ right to due process of law.
In other words, the power of inquiry — with process to enforce it — is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to effect or change;
and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information — which is not
infrequently true — recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that
mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered
is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is
needed. (McGrain vs. Daugherty, 273 U.S., 135; 71 L. ed., 580; 50 A.L R., 1.) The fact that the
Constitution expressly gives to Congress the power to punish its Members for disorderly behavior,
does not by necessary implication exclude the power to punish for contempt any other person.

IN RE DICK

Facts:

R. McCulloch Dick, is the editor and proprietor of the Philippines Free Press, a periodical published
weekly in the city of Manila. There was a publication of certain articles in that paper which tends to
obstruct the Government of the Philippine Islands in policies inaugurated for the prosecution of the
war between the United States and the German Empire, and other articles which have tended to
create a feeling of unrest and uneasiness in the community. He is being detained because the
Governor-General of the Philippines ordered his deportation but before the Governor-General gave
his order, there was an investigation in the manner and form prescribed in Sec. 69 of the
Administrative Code. Petitioner, filed for a writ of habeas corpus so that he may be discharged from
detention by the acting chief of police of the city of Manila.

Issue:

Whether or not the Governor General could exercise the deportation power in the absence of statutory
authority?

Held:

Yes, the Governor-General has the power to institute and maintain deportation proceedings.

The discretionary power to deport "undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the Philippine
Islands is a menace to the peace and safety of the community," as an act of state, having been
conferred upon the Governor-General, to be exercised by him upon his own opinion as to whether the
facts disclosed by an investigation had in accord with section 69 of the Administrative Code justify or
necessitate deportation in a particular case, he is the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of
those facts, and no other tribunal is at liberty to re examine or controvert the sufficiency of the evidence
on which he acted
 In re Integration of the Bar

FACTS:

Republic Act. No. 6397 entitled “An Act Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar and
Appropriating Funds Therefore” was passed in September 1971, ordaining “Within two years from the
approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the
Philippine Bar.” The Supreme Court formed a Commission on Bar Integration and in December 1972,
the Commission earnestly recommended the integration of the bar. The Court accepted all comments
on the proposed integration.

ISSUES:
Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine bar?
Would the integration of the bar be constitutional?

Should the Court ordain the integration of the bar at this time?
RULING:
In ruling on the issues raised, the Court first adopted the definition given by the Commission to
“integration” in this wise: “Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire
lawyer population of the Philippines. This requires membership and financial support (in reasonable
amount) of every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his
name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.” The term “Bar” refers to the collectivity of all
persons whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or unified Bar) perforce must
include all lawyers.

Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to do so; the State.
Bar integration therefore, signifies the setting up by government authority of a national organization of
the legal profession based on the recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the court.

Designed to improve the positions of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the rule of law,
integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their own organized action and
participation, the promotion of the objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to the principle of
maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court.

On the first issue, the Court held that it may integrate the Bar in the exercise of its power “to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of
law.” Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court’s constitutional authority over the
Bar.

The second issue hinges on the following constitutional rights: freedom of association and of speech,
as well as the nature of the dues exacted from the lawyer, i.e., whether or not the Court thus levies a
tax. The Court held:

Integration is not violative of freedom of association because it does not compel a lawyer to become
a member of any group of which he is not already a member. All that it does is “to provide an official
national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer
is already a member.” The lawyer too is not compelled to attend meetings, participate of activities, etc.
The only compulsion is the payment of annual dues. Assuming, however, that it does compel a lawyer
to be a member of an integrated bar, the court held that “such compulsion is justified as an exercise
of the police power of the state”

Santiago v. Vazquez
FACTS:
Petitioner posted a cash bond for her provisionary liberty in connection with an information filed against
her for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Sandiganbayan issued a hold-
departure order after it was revealed in the media that she intended to leave the country to study.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the hold-departure order violates petitioner’s right to travel.

RULING:
NO. The hold-departure order is but an exercise of the court’s inherent power to preserve and to
maintain the effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused. Under the
obligations assumed by petitioner in her bail bond she holds herself amenable at all times to the orders
and processes of the court, she may legally be prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency
of the case.

Courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general grant of
jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly conferred on them.24 These inherent powers are such
powers as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction;25 or essential to the
existence, dignity and functions of the courts,26 as well as to the due administration of justice;27 or are
directly appropriate, convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted powers;28 and include
the power to maintain the court's jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the litigants.29

Echegeray v. Secretary of Justice

FACTS:

 BACKGROUND: The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the
crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition upon
him of the death penalty for the said crime was all set.
 On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray
scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance
of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment
but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on
the execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already been rendered…
that by granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive
function.

RULING:

The finality of judgment does not mean that the SC has lost all its powers or the case. By the finality
of the judgment, what the SC loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after
the judgment has become final, the SC retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it.
The power to control the execution of the SC’s decision is an essential aspect of its jurisdiction. It
cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for the Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power
in one SC and in such lower courts as may be established by law. The important part of a litigation,
whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where supervening events may
change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the
litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforeseen, supervening contingencies that
courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and orders
to make them conformable to law and justice.

The Court also rejected public respondent’s contention that by granting the TRO, the Court has in
effect granted reprieve which is an executive function under Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution. In
truth, an accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these
rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who becomes insane
after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity. The suspension of such a
death sentence is indisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential
power of reprieve though its effects are the same as the temporary suspension of the execution of the
death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend the Death
Penalty Law by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment
is like that of commutation of sentence. But the exercise of Congress of its plenary power to amend
laws cannot be considered as a violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences of
conviction. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death
convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to
life. To contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final
conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the 3 branches of the
government.

It bears repeating that what the Court restrained temporarily is the execution of its own Decision to
give it reasonable time to check its fairness in light of supervening events in Congress as alleged by
petitioner. The Court, contrary to popular misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of a law enacted
by Congress.

The more disquieting dimension of the submission of the public respondents that this Court has no
jurisdiction to restrain the execution of petitioner is that it can diminish the independence of the
judiciary. Since the implant of republicanism in our soil, our courts have been conceded the jurisdiction
to enforce their final decisions. In accord with this unquestioned jurisdiction, this Court promulgated
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure which, among others, spelled out the rules on
execution of judgments. These rules are all predicated on the assumption that courts have the
inherent, necessary and incidental power to control and supervise the process of execution of their
decisions.

Phil Cocunut Producers Federation v. Republic

GOVERNMENT OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS. SPRINGER
(The appointment of managers of property or a business in which the government is interested
essentially an executive act)
ISSUE: Where does the power to appoint to Public Office reside? W/N section 4 of Act No. 2705, as
amended by section 2 of Act No. 2822 is constitutional and valid.

HELD: (1) The right to appoint to office has been confided, with certain well defined exceptions, by
the Government of the United States to the executive branch of the government which it has set up in
the Philippines; (2) Section 4 of Act No. 2705, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2822 is
unconstitutional and void
 RATIO: The applicable legal doctrines are found in the Organic Law, particularly in the Organic Act,
the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, and in statutes enacted under authority of that Act, and in
decisions interpretative of it. It is true that the Organic Act contains no general distributing clause. But
the principle is clearly deducible from the grant of powers. It is expressly incorporated in our
Administrative Code. It has time and again been approvingly enforced by this court. No department of
the Government of the Philippine Islands may legally exercise any of the powers conferred by the
Organic Law upon any of the others. Again it is true that the Organic Law contains no such explicit
prohibition. But it is fairly implied by the division of the Government into three departments. The effect
is the same whether the prohibition is expressed or not. It has repeatedly been announced by this
court that each of the branches of the Government is in the main independent of the others.

The Organic Act vests the:

a.) EXECUTIVE POWER in the Governor- General of the Philippine Islands.
execute the law
power of appointment; membership in the voting committee in question is an office or executive function
he is given general supervision and control of all the departments and bureaus of the government of
the Philippine Islands as far as is not inconsistent with the provisions of this act.
made responsible for the faithful execution of the laws of the Philippine Islands and of the United States
operative within Philippine Islands.
By the Administrative Code, "the Governor-General, as chief Executive of the Islands, is charged with
the executive control of the Philippine Government, to be exercised in person or through the
Secretaries of Departments, or other proper agency, according to law."

b.) LEGISLATIVE POWER except as otherwise provided therein to the Philippine Legislature.
make the law.

c.) JUDICIAL POWER is conferred on the Supreme Courts, Courts of First Instance, and inferior courts.
construe the law

Doctrine of separation of powers

the Supreme Court emphasized that the power of appointment in the Philippines appertains, with minor
exceptions, to the executive department; that membership in the voting committee in question is an
office or executive function; that the NCC and similar corporations are instrumentalities of the
Government; that the duty to look after government agencies and government property belongs to the
executive department; that the placing of members of the Philippine Legislature on the voting
committee constitutes an invasion by the Legislative Department of the privileges of the Executive
Department. Under a system of government of delegated powers, under which delegation legislative
power vests in the Philippine Legislature and executive power vests in the Governor-General, and
under which Governor-General and a specified power of appointment resides in the Philippine
Legislature, the latter cannot directly or indirectly perform functions of an executive nature through the
designation of its presiding officers as majority members of a body which has executive functions. That
is the meaning we gather from the tri-partite theory of the division of powers. That is the purport of the
provisions of the Organic Law.

Section 4 of Act No. 2705, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2822, as purports to vest the voting
power of the government-owned stock in the National Coal Company in the President of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, is unconstitutional and void. However, the
Supreme Court notes that indeed there are exceptions to this rule where the legislature may appoint
persons to fill public office. Such exception can be found in the appointment by the legislature of
persons to fill offices within the legislative branch – this exception is allowable because it does not
weaken the executive branch.
 Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza and Binay Law Offices vs. The Court of
Appeals

FACTS:
Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the
constitutionality of Section 11 of R.A No. 9160, the Anti-Money Laundering Act, as amended,
specifically the Anti-Money Laundering Council's authority to file with the Court of Appeals (CA) in this
case, an ex-parte application for inquiry into certain bank deposits and investments, including related
accounts based on probable cause.

In 2015, a year before the 2016 presidential elections, reports abounded on the supposed
disproportionate wealth of then Vice President Jejomar Binay and the rest of his family, some of whom
were likewise elected public officers. The Office of the Ombudsman and the Senate conducted
investigations and inquiries thereon.

From various news reports announcing the inquiry into then Vice President Binay's bank accounts,
including accounts of members of his family, petitioner Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza & Binay
Law Firm (SPCMB) was most concerned with the article published in the Manila Times on 25 February
2015 entitled "Inspect Binay Bank Accounts" which read, in pertinent part:

xxx The Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) asked the Court of Appeals (CA) to allow the
[C]ouncil to peek into the bank accounts of the Binays, their corporations, and a law office where a
family member was once a partner.

xx xx
Also the bank accounts of the law office linked to the family, the Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza &
Binay Law Firm, where the Vice President's daughter Abigail was a former partner.

By 8 March 2015, the Manila Times published another article entitled, "CA orders probe of Binay 's
assets" reporting that the appellate court had issued a Resolution granting the ex-parte application of
the AMLC to examine the bank accounts of SPCMB. Forestalled in the CA thus alleging that it had no
ordinary, plain, speedy, and adequate remedy to protect its rights and interests in the purported
ongoing unconstitutional examination of its bank accounts by public respondent Anti-Money
Laundering Council (AMLC), SPCMB undertook direct resort to this Court via this petition for certiorari
and prohibition on the following grounds that the he Anti-Money Laundering Act is unconstitutional
insofar as it allows the examination of a bank account without any notice to the affected party: (1) It
violates the person's right to due process; and (2) It violates the person's right to privacy.

In their Comment, the AMLC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), points out a supposed
jurisdictional defect of the instant petition, i.e., SPCMB failed to implead the House of Representatives
which enacted the AMLA and its amendments
ISSUES:
1. Whether Section 11 of R.A No. 9160 violates substantial due process.
2. Whether Section 11 of R.A No. 9160 violates procedural due process.
3. Whether Section 11 of R.A No. 9160 is violative of the constitutional right to privacy
enshrined in Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.

RULINGS:
1. No. We do not subscribe to SPCMB' s position. Succinctly, Section 11 of the AMLA providing for
ex-parte application and inquiry by the AMLC into certain bank deposits and investments does not
violate substantive due process, there being no physical seizure of property involved at that stage.
In fact, .Eugenio delineates a bank inquiry order under Section 11 from a freeze order under Section
10 on both remedies' effect on the direct objects, i.e. the bank deposits and investments:

On the other hand, a bank inquiry order under Section 11 does not necessitate any form of physical
seizure of property of the account holder. What the bank inquiry order authorizes is the examination
of the particular deposits or investments in banking institutions or non-bank financial institutions. The
monetary instruments or property deposited with such banks or financial institutions are not seized in
a physical sense, but are examined on particular details such as the account holder's record of
deposits and transactions. Unlike the assets subject of the freeze order, the records to be inspected
under a bank inquiry order cannot be physically seized or hidden by the account holder. Said records
are in the possession of the bank and therefore cannot be destroyed at the instance of the account
holder alone as that would require the extraordinary cooperation and devotion of the bank.

At the stage in which the petition was filed before us, the inquiry into certain bank deposits and
investments by the AMLC still does not contemplate any form of physical seizure of the targeted
corporeal property.

On the sole procedural issue of whether SPCMB ought to have impleaded Congress, the contention
of the OSG though novel is untenable. All cases questioning the constitutionality of a law does not
require that Congress be impleaded for their resolution. The requisites of a judicial inquiry are
elementary:

1. There must be an actual case or controversy; party;

2. The question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party;

3. The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and

4. The decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case
itself.9

2. No. The AMLC functions solely as an investigative body in the instances mentioned in Rule 5.b.26
Thereafter, the next step is for the AMLC to file a Complaint with either the DOJ or the Ombudsman
pursuant to Rule 6b. Even in the case of Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, where the conflict arose
at the preliminary investigation stage by the Ombudsman, we ruled that the Ombudsman's denial of
Senator Estrada's Request to be furnished copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents did
not violate Estrada's constitutional right to due process where the sole issue is the existence of
probable cause for the purpose of determining whether an information should be filed and does not
prevent Estrada from requesting a copy of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents during the pre-
trial or even during trial.

Plainly, the AMLC's investigation of money laundering offenses and its determination of possible
money laundering offenses, specifically its inquiry into certain bank accounts allowed by court order,
does not transform it into an investigative body exercising quasi-judicial powers. Hence, Section 11 of
the AMLA, authorizing a bank inquiry court order, cannot be said to violate SPCMB's constitutional
right to due process.

3. No. We now come to a determination of whether Section 11 is violative of the constitutional right to
privacy enshrined in Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. SPCMB is adamant that the CA's denial
of its request to be furnished copies of AMLC's ex-parte application for a bank inquiry order and all
subsequent pleadings, documents and orders filed and issued in relation thereto, constitutes grave
abuse of discretion where the purported blanket authority under Section 11: ( 1) partakes of a general
warrant intended to aid a mere fishing expedition; (2) violates the attorney-client privilege; (3) is not
preceded by predicate crime charging SPCMB of a money laundering offense; and ( 4) is a form of
political harassment [of SPCMB' s] clientele.

We thus subjected Section 11 of the AMLA to heightened scrutiny and found nothing arbitrary in the
allowance and authorization to AMLC to undertake an inquiry into certain bank accounts or deposits.
Instead, we found that it provides safeguards before a bank inquiry order is issued, ensuring
adherence to the general state policy of preserving the absolutely confidential nature of Philippine
bank accounts:
1. The AMLC is required to establish probable cause as basis for its ex-parte application
for bank inquiry order;
2. The CA, independent of the AMLC's demonstration of probable cause, itself makes a
finding of probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to an unlawful activity
under Section 3(i) or a money laundering offense under Section 4 of the AMLA;
3. A bank inquiry court order ex-parte for related accounts is preceded by a bank inquiry
court order ex-parte for the principal account which court order ex-parte for related accounts
is separately based on probable cause that such related account is materially linked to the
principal account inquired into; and
4. The authority to inquire into or examine the main or principal account and the related
accounts shall comply with the requirements of Article III, Sections 2 and 3 of the Constitution.
The foregoing demonstrates that the inquiry and examination into the bank account are not
undertaken whimsically and solely based on the investigative discretion of the AMLC. In
particular, the requirement of demonstration by the AMLC, and determination by the CA, of
probable cause emphasizes the limits of such governmental action. We will revert to these
safeguards under Section 11 as we specifically discuss the CA' s denial of SPCMB' s letter
request for information concerning the purported issuance of a bank inquiry order involving its
accounts.

All told, we affirm the constitutionality of Section 11 of the AMLA allowing the ex-parte application by
the AMLC for authority to inquire into, and examine, certain bank deposits and investments.

De La Llana v. Alba
FACTS:
In 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds
Therefor and for Other Purposes”, was passed. Gualberto De la Llana, a judge in Olongapo, was
assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be one of the judges that would be removed because
of the reorganization and second, he said such law would contravene the constitutional provision which
provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts. He averred that only the Supreme Court can
remove judges NOT the Congress.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a judge like Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature by such
statute (BP 129).

HELD:
Yes. The SC ruled the following way: “Moreover, this Court is empowered “to discipline judges of
inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal.” Thus it possesses the
competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with
such power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the
abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there
is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby
lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any
impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts
abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and
the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the
judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with
accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are
concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear
need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does
not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this
Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it
could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is
there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization.
That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure
therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by
this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the
conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents
vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any
unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with
distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the
choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute,
the former is to be preferred.”

Endencia v. David

FACTS:
  Saturnino David, the then Collector of Internal Revenue, ordered the taxing of Justice Pastor
Endencia’s and Justice Fernando Jugo’s (and other judges’) salary pursuant to Sec. 13 of
Republic Act No. 590 which provides that:
x x x No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic
of the Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the income tax,
payment of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his
compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law. x x x

 The judges however argued that under the case of Perfecto vs Meer, judges are exempt from
taxation – this is also in observance of the doctrine of separation of powers, i.e., the executive,
to which the Internal Revenue reports, is separate from the judiciary; that under the
Constitution, the judiciary is independent and the salaries of judges may not be diminished by
the other branches of government; that taxing their salaries is already a diminution of their
benefits/salaries (see Section 9, Art. VIII, Constitution).
 The Solicitor General, arguing in behalf of the CIR, states that the decision in Perfecto vs Meer
was rendered ineffective when Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 13 of RA 590 is constitutional. Or, stated differently, Can the Legislature validly
do this? May the Legislature lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary of a public
official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and
decided otherwise?

RULING:

When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the legislature by the Constitution,
it is the duty of the courts to declare the act unconstitutional because they cannot shrink from it without
violating their oaths of office.

By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act NO. 590, Congress says that taxing the
salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation. This is a clear example of interpretation
or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase "which shall not be diminished during their continuance
in office," found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers.
This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-
defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.

“The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act
declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts.
A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used
elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term.

The interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province
and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally
provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition,
thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, especially when the
interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already
given in a case by the highest court of the land.
 Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC

This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC and BANAT vs
COMELEC.
FACTS:
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections in the May
2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as representatives for
marginalized or underrepresented sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said party-
lists.
HELD:
No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the
Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some principles established in the
two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along
sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list
system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or
not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only
through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is
by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in
“well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and underrepresented”
include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies” include
professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent.
Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political
constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent those who
lack “well-defined political constituencies,” either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have
a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties
or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice, from
participating in the party-list elections. But, since there’s really no constitutional prohibition nor a
statutory prohibition, major political parties can now participate in the party-list system provided that
they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will
encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the “marginalized and
underrepresented” and to those who “lack well-defined political constituencies.”
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission when
they were drafting the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated
that it was their intention to include all parties into the party-list elections in order to develop a political
system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will
of the people should defeat the intent of the framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the
1987 Constitution, is that the party-list system should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.)
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the
“marginalized and underrepresented” or for parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. It
is also for national or regional parties. It is also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties
who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. The common denominator however is that all of them
cannot, they do not have the machinery – unlike major political parties, to field or sponsor candidates
in the legislative districts but they can acquire the needed votes in a national election system like the
party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system itself unduly
excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to include
only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans,
overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society.
It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes, among others, in its provision for
sectoral representation groups of professionals, which are not per se economically marginalized but
are still qualified as “marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political
constituencies” as they are ideologically marginalized.

This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and desist from
engaging in socio-economic or political experimentations contrary to what the Constitution has
ordained. Judicial power does not include the power to re-write the Constitution. Thus, the present
petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate
in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters prescribed by this Court.

Baker v. Carr

 A Tennessee resident brought suit against the Secretary of State claiming that the failure to
redraw the legislative districts every ten years, as outlined in the state constitution, resulted in
rural votes holding more votes than urban votes.
 The state claimed redistricting was a political question and non-justiciable.
 Baker petitioned to the Supreme Court of the United States.
  The Supreme Court held that an equal protection challenge to malapportionment of state
legislatures is not a political question because is fails to meet any of the six political question
tests and is, therefore, justiciable.

Statement of the Facts:

Under the Tennessee Constitution, legislative districts were required to be drawn every ten years. The
purpose was to adjust to changes in the state’s population. Baker, a Republican citizen of Shelby
County, brought suit against the Secretary of State claiming that the state had not been redistricted
since 1901 and Shelby County had more residents than rural districts. Baker’s argument stated that
because the districts had not been redrawn and the rural district had ten times fewer people, the rural
votes essentially counted more denying him equal protection of the law. Tennessee claimed that
redistricting was a political question and could not be decided by the courts under the Constitution.

Procedural History:
Baker claimed the malapportionment of state legislatures is justiciable and the state of Tennessee
argued such an issue is a political question not capable of being decided by the courts.
Baker petition to the United States Supreme Court.

Issue and Holding:

Is an equal protection challenge to a malapportionment of state legislatures considered non-justiciable
as a political question? No.

Rule of Law or Legal Principle Applied:

A challenge brought under the Equal Protection Clause to malapportionment of state legislatures is
not a political question and is justiciable.

Judgment:
Remanded to the District Court for consideration on the merits.

Reasoning:
The current case is different than Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849), because it is brought under the
Equal Protection Clause and Luther challenged malapportionment under the Constitution’s Guaranty
Clause.

An issue is considered a non-justiciable political question when one of six tests are met:

1. Textually demonstrable constitutional commitment to another political branch;

2. Lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the issue;
3. Impossibility of deciding the issue without making an initial policy determination of a kind not
suitable for judicial discretion;
4. Lack of respect for the other branches of government in undertaking independent resolution in
the case;
5. Unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or
6. Potential for embarrassment for differing pronouncements of the issue by different branches of
government.

This claim does not meet any of the six tests and is justiciable. There are no textually demonstrable
commitments present regarding equal protection issues by other branches of government. Judicial
standards are already in place for the adjudication of like claims. Since Baker is an individual bringing
suit against the state government, no separation of power concerns result.

Concurring and Dissenting opinions:

Concurring (Douglas):
Since the right to vote is inherent in the Constitution, each vote should hold equal weight. The design
of a legislative district which results in one vote counting more than another is the kind of invidious
discrimination the Equal Protection Clause was developed to prevent.

Concurring (Stewart):

The dissenting and concurring opinions confuse which issues are presented in this case. The
majority’s three rulings should be no more than whether:

1. The jurisdiction is proper over the subject matter,

2. Baker states a justiciable cause of action under which he should be entitled to relief, and
3. Baker has standing to challenge Tennessee’s apportionment statutes.
In addition, the proper place for this trial is the trial court, not here.
Dissenting (Frankfurter and Harlan):
The majority’s decision fails to base its holding on both history and existing precedent. Such failure
violates both judicial restraint and separation of powers concerns under the Constitution. Prior cases
involving the same subject matter have been decided as nonjusticiable political questions. The
difference between challenges brought under the Equal Protection Clause and the Guaranty Clause
is not enough to decide against existing precedent.
In addition, the majority’s analysis is clouded by too many indirect issues to focus on the real issue at
hand. The issue in the case is whether or not the complaint sufficiently alleged a violation of a federal
right to the extent a district court would have jurisdiction. The complaint does not state a claim under
Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6). The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not
suggest legislatures must intentionally structure their districts to reflect absolute equality of votes. The
complaint also fails to adequately show Tennessee’s current system of apportionment is so arbitrary
and capricious as to violate the Equal Protection Clause.
Significance:

Baker v. Carr outlined that legislative apportionment is a justiciable non-political question. It

established the right of federal courts to review redistricting issues, when just a few years earlier such
matter were categorized as “political questions” outside the jurisdiction of the courts.

Alejandrino v. Quezon

FACTS:

"Resolved: That the Honorable Jose Alejandrino, Senator for the Twelfth District, be, as he is hereby,
declared guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant violation of the privileges of the Senate for having
treacherously assaulted the Honorable Vicente de Vera, Senator for the Sixth District on the occasion
of certain, phrases being uttered by the latter in the course of the debate regarding the credentials of
said Mr. Alejandrino.

ISSUE:

Whether resolution above quoted is unconstitutional and entirely of no effect, for five reasons. He
prays the court:

(1) To issue a preliminary injunction against the respondents enjoining them from executing the
resolution;
(2) to declare the aforesaid resolution of the Senate null and void; and

(3) as a consequence of the foregoing, to issue a final writ of mandamus and injunction against the
respondents ordering them to recognize the rights of the petitioner to exercise his office as Senator

HELD: As it is unlikely that the petition could be amended to state a cause of action, it must be
dismissed without costs. Such is the judgment of the court. So ordered.

RATIO:

We rule that neither the Philippine Legislature nor a branch thereof can be directly controlled in the
exercise of their legislative powers by any judicial process. The court accordingly lacks jurisdiction to
consider the petition and the demurrer must be sustained.

The power to control is the power to abrogate and the power to abrogate is the power to usurp. Each
department may, nevertheless, indirectly restrain the others. It is peculiarly the duty of the judiciary to
say what the law is, to enforce the Constitution, and to decide whether the proper constitutional sphere
of a department has been transcended. The courts must determine the validity of legislative
enactments as well as the legality of all private and official acts. To this extent, do the courts restrain
the other departments.

In view of the propriety of mandamus

Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its members, or its officers, to compel the
performance of duties purely legislative in their character which therefore pertain to their legislative
functions and over which they have exclusive control. The final arbiter in cases of dispute is the
judiciary, and to this extent at least the executive department may be said to be dependent upon and
subordinate to the judiciary. . . . It is not the office of the person to whom the writ of mandamus is
directed, but the nature of the thing to be done, by which the propriety of issuing a mandamus is to be
determined."

In view of the Organic Law vs Power to Discipline House Members

On the merits of the controversy, we will only say this: The Organic Act authorizes the Governor-
General of the Philippine Islands to appoint two senators and nine representatives to represent the
non-Christian regions in the Philippine Legislature. These senators and representatives "hold office
until removed by the Governor-General." (Organic Act, secs. 16, 17.)

They may not be removed by the Philippine Legislature. However, to the Senate and the House of
Representatives, respectively, is granted the power to "punish its members for disorderly behavior,
and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel an elective member." (Organic Act, sec. 18.) Either
House may thus punish an appointive member for disorderly behavior. Neither House may expel an
appointive member for any reason. As to whether the power to "suspend" is then included in the power
to "punish," a power granted to the two Houses of the Legislature by the Constitution, or in the power
to "remove," a power granted to the Governor-General by the Constitution, it would appear that neither
is the correct hypothesis. The Constitution has purposely withheld from the two Houses of the
Legislature and the Governor-General alike the power to suspend an appointive member of the
Legislature.

In view of effects of punishment

Punishment by way of reprimand or fine vindicates the outraged dignity of the House without depriving
the constituency of representation; expulsion, when permissible, likewise vindicates the honor of the
legislative body while giving to the constituency an opportunity to elect anew; but suspension deprives
the electoral district of representation without that district being afforded any means by which to fill the
vacancy. By suspension, the seat remains filled but the occupant is silenced. Suspension for one year
is equivalent to qualified expulsion or removal.

In view of no remedy

Conceding therefore that the power of the Senate to punish its members for disorderly behavior does
not authorize it to suspend an appointive member from the exercise of his office for one year,
conceding what has been so well stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner, conceding all this
and more, yet the writ prayed for cannot issue, for the all-conclusive reason that the Supreme Court
does not possess the power of coercion to make the Philippine Senate take any particular action. If it
be said that conclusion leaves the petitioner without a remedy, the answer is that the judiciary is not
the repository of all wisdom and all power.

Vera v. Avelino

FACTS:

The Commission on Elections submitted last May 1946 to the President and the Congress a report
regarding the national elections held in 1946. It stated that by reason of certain specified acts of
terrorism and violence in certain provinces, namely Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the
voting in said region did not reflect the accurate feedback of the local electorate.

During the session on May 25, 1946, a pendatum resolution was approved referring to the report
ordering that Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero – who had been included among the
16 candidates for senator receiving the highest number of votes and as proclaimed by the
Commissions on Elections – shall not be sworn, nor seated, as members of the chamber, pending the
termination of the protest filed against their election.

Petitioners then immediately instituted an action against their colleagues who instituted the resolution,
praying for its annulment and allowing them to occupy their seats and to exercise their senatorial
duties. Respondents assert the validity of the pendatum resolution.

ISSUES:
Whether or Not the Commission on Elections has the jurisdiction to determine whether or not votes
cast in the said provinces are valid.

Whether or Not the administration of oath and the sitting of Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose
Romero should be deferred pending hearing and decision on the protests lodged against their
elections.

HELD:

The Supreme Court refused to intervene, under the concept of separation of powers, holding that the
case was not a “contest”, and affirmed that it is the inherent right of the legislature to determine who
shall be admitted to its membership. Following the powers assigned by the Constitution, the question
raised was political in nature and therefore not under the juridical review of the courts

As was explained in the Alejandrino case, we could not order one branch of the Legislature to reinstate
a member thereof. To do so would be to establish judicial predominance, and to upset the classic
pattern of checks and balances wisely woven into our institutional setup.

Mabanag v. Lopez Vito

FACTS:
Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended by senate
due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the lower
House except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some senators and House Reps
were not considered in determining the required ¾ vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution
(proposing amendments to the Constitution) – which has been considered as an enrolled bill by then.
At the same time, the votes were already entered into the Journals of the respective House. As a
result, the Resolution was passed but it could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these
members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment
would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. Petitioners
filed or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said resolution amending the constitution. Respondents
argued that the SC cannot take cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by the
conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether or not the said resolution
was duly enacted by Congress.

HELD:
It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities that political questions are not within
the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with such questions has been
conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory provision. This doctrine is predicated
on the principle of the separation of powers, a principle also too well known to require elucidation or
citation of authorities

As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from each House and an
authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis
of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due
enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as
amended. The SC found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not
bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did
not do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals
behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if
the two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to
have been noted between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to
understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the
explicit provision that duly certified copies “shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and
of the due enactment thereof.”

**Enrolled Bill – that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by the
proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state.

Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210, provides:
“Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission,
or of any legislatives body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the
journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies
certified by the clerk of secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the
Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by
the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of
such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.”

The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the legislature. In
case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the journals.

ARNAULT vs. BALAGTAS

Topic: Legislative investigation; may Senate hold a person in contempt as a punitive measure.

FACTS:
This was a petition for habeas corpus filed by Jean Arnault against the Director of Prisons, Balagtas.
Arnault was incarcerated pursuant to a resolution by the Senate finding Arnault in contempt for refusing
to disclose the name of a person with whom he transacted business in relation to a government
purchase of of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates. The circumstances of Arnault's incarceration
are described in the companion case Arnaultvs. Nazareno (1950) which affirmed the Legislature's
power to hold a person in contempt for defying or refusing to comply with an order in a legislative
inquiry.

Arnault eventually divulged that he had transacted with one Jess D. Santos in relation to the
Buenavista and Tambobong deal. Upon further inquiry, the Senate, obviously not satisfied with
Arnault's explanations, adopted Resolution No. 114. The title of the resolution states:

RESOLUTION APPROVING THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE

BUENAVISTA AND TAMBOBONG ESTATES DEAL, AND ORDERING THE DIRECTOR OF PRISON
TO CONTINUE HOLDING JEAN L. ARNAULT IN HIS CUSTODY, AND IN CONFINEMENT AND
DETENTION AT THE NEW BILIBID PRISON AT MUNTINLUPA, RIZAL, UNTIL THE SAID ARNAULT
SHALL HAVE PURGED HIMSELF OF CONTEMPT OF THE SENATE.

xxx

WHEREAS, the Senate holds and finds that the situation of the said Jean L. Arnault has not materially
changed since he was committed to prison for contempt of the Senate, and since the Supreme Court
of the Philippines, in a judgment long since become final, upheld the power and authority of the Senate
to hold the said Jean L. Arnault in custody, detention, and confinement, said power and authority
having been held to be coercive rather than punitive, and fully justified until the said Jean L. Arnault
should have given the information which he had withheld and continues contumaciously to withhold;

WHEREAS, the insolent and manifest untruthful statements made by the said Jean L. Arnault on the
occasions above referred to constitute a continuing contempt of the Senate, and an added affront to
its dignity and authority, such that , were they to be condoned or overlooked, the power and authority
of the Senate to conduct investigations would become futile and ineffectual because they could be
defied by any person of sufficient stubbornness and malice;

xxx

The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of Petitioner Arnault and ordered his release.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner may be released from his Senate-imposed incarceration.

1. Whether or not the CFI has the right to review the findings of the Senate.

2. Whether or not the Senate may hold a person in contempt or incarcerate him as a punitive rather
than as a coercive measure.

HELD:
YES. The Senate may continue to keep Petitioner incarcerated.

1. NO. In the first place, the CFI did NOT have the right to review the findings of the Senate. In the
above quoted resolution, the Senate in stating that petitioner “has failed and refused, and continues
to fail and refuse, to reveal the person to whom he gave the amount of P440,000” and that the situation
of petitioner “has not materially charged since he was committed to prison”, clearly shows that the
Senate believes that Arnault was still trying to deceive them. The CFI on the other hand arrogated
unto itself to review such finding and held that Arnault satisfactorily answered the questions of the
Senate in its investigation of the Buenavista and Tambobong deal.

There is an inherent fundamental error in the course of action that the lower court followed. It assumed
that courts have the right to review the findings of legislative bodies in the exercise of the prerogative
of legislation, or interfere with their proceedings or their discretion in what is known as the legislative
process. The Judicial department has no right or power or authority to do this, in the same manner
that the legislative department may not invade the judicial realm in the ascertainment of truth and in
the application and interpretation of the law, in what is known as the judicial process, because that
would be in direct conflict with the fundamental principle of separation of powers established by the
Constitution. The only instances when judicial intervention may lawfully be invoke are when
there has been a violation of a constitutional inhibition, or when there has been an arbitrary
exercise of the legislative discretion.

2. YES. The legislature may hold a person in contempt or incarcerate him as a punitive measure.

Although the resolution studiously avoids saying that the confinement is a punishment, but merely
seeks to coerce the petitioner into telling the truth, the intention is evident that the continuation of the
imprisonment ordered is in fact partly punitive. This may be inferred from the confining made in the
resolution that petitioner's acts were arrogant and contumacious and constituted an affront to the
Senate's dignity and authority.

The legislature has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses. This power is founded upon reason
and policy. Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative power,
or necessary to effectuate said power. How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge and
information on which to base intended legislation if it cannot require and compel the disclosure of such
knowledge and information, if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its power and authority? The
legislative department should not be constrained to look to the courts whenever for every act of refusal,
every act of defiance, every act of contumacy with which it is faced.

The exercise of the legislature's authority to deal with the defiant and contumacious witness should be
supreme and is not subject to judicial interference, except when there is a manifest and absolute
disregard of discretion and a mere exertion of arbitrary power coming within the reach of constitutional
limitations.

The judgment appealed from should be, as it hereby is, reversed, and the petition for the issuance of
the writ of habeas corpus denied. The order of the court allowing the petitioner to give bail is declared
null and void and the petitioner is hereby ordered to be recommitted to the custody of the respondent.
With cost against the petitioner-appellee.

Osmeña v. Pendatun

FACTS:

 Congressman Sergio Osmeña Jr., herein petitioner, delivered his privilege speech before the
House making serious imputations of bribery against the President of the Philippines. Because
of this, a Resolution was issued authorizing the creation of special House Committee to
investigate the truth of the charges made against the President, to summon petitioner to
substantiate his charges, and in case petitioner fails to do so, to require petitioner to show
cause why he should not be punished by the House.
  Petitioner then resorted to the Court seeking for the annulment of said resolution on the ground
that it infringes his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in
the House. Meanwhile, the Special Committee continued with its proceeding, and after giving
petitioner a chance to defend himself, found the latter guilty of seriously disorderly behavior. A
House resolution was issued and petitioner was suspended from office for 15 months.

 Thereafter, respondents filed their answer challenging the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain
the petition, and defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension.

ISSUE:

1. Whether the House Resolution violated petitioner’s constitutionally granted parliamentary immunity
for speeches
2. Whether the court can pass upon the question if the conduct of the legislator-petitioner is disorderly?

RULING:

Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that “for any speech or debate” in Congress, the
Senators or Members of the House of Representative “shall not be questioned in any other place.”
This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States.
In that country, the provision has always been understood to mean that although exempt from
prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may,
nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that “they shall not be questioned in any
other place” than Congress.

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every
legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose “is to enable
and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success”
for “it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should
be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom exercise of that liberty
may occasion offense.” It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of
being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the
Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body
itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming
a member thereof.

On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly
conduct for which Osmeña may be discipline, We believe, however, that the House is the judge of
what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon
it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows
best but which cannot be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the
Courts.

Under our form of government, the judicial department has no power to revise even the most arbitrary
and unfair action of the legislative department, or of either house thereof, taking in pursuance of the
power committed exclusively to that department by the Constitution. It has been held by high authority
that, even in the absence of an express provision conferring the power, every legislative body in which
is vested the general legislative power of the state has the implied power to expel a member for any
cause which it may deem sufficient.
 Romulo v Yniguez

FACTS:
1. Petitioners, representing more than one-fifth of all members of the Batasan in 1985, filed with the
Batasan Resolution No. 644 and complaint calling for the impeachment of President Marcos. Said
resolution and complaint were referred by the Speaker to the Committee on Justice, Human Rights
and Good Government. The Committee found the complaint not sufficient in form and substance to
warrant its further consideration and disapproved and dismissed all the charges contained in the
complaint attached. It then submitted its report which was duly noted by the Batasan and sent to the
archives.

2. On August 14, 1985, MP Ramon V. Mitra filed with the Batasan a motion praying for the recall from
the archives of Resolution No. 644 and the verified complaint attached thereto. Said motion was
disapproved by the Batasan.

3. Hence, this petition for prohibition to restrain respondents from enforcing Sections 4, 5, 6 and 8 of
the Batasan Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings and mandamus to compel the Batasan
Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to recall from the archives and report
out the resolution together with the verified complaint for the impeachment of the President of the
Philippines. Petitioner contend that said provisions are unconstitutional because they amend Sec. 3
of Article XI I of the 1973 Constitution, without complying with the mandatory amendatory process
provided for under Article XVI of the Constitution, by empowering a smaller body to supplant and
overrule the complaint to impeach endorsed by the requisite 1/5 of all the members of the Batasan
Pambansa and that said questioned provisions derail the impeachment proceedings at various stages
by vesting the Committee on Justice, etc. the power to impeach or not to impeach, when such
prerogative belongs solely to Batasan Pambansa as a collegiate body.

4. Petitioners further contend that Section 8 of the Rules is unconstitutional because it imposes an
unconstitutional and illegal condition precedent in order that the complaint for impeachment can
proceed to trial before the Batasan. By requiring a majority vote of all the members of the Batasan for
the approval of the resolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment, the Rules impose a condition
not required by the Constitution for all that Section 3, Article XIII requires is the endorsement of at
least one-fifth of all The members of the Batasan for the initiation of impeachment proceedings or for
the impeachment trial to proceed.

5. Respondents Speaker and the Members of the Committee on Justice of the Batasan Pambansa
contend that that the petition should be dismissed because (1) it is a suit against the Batasan itself
over which this Court has no jurisdiction; (2) it raises questions which are political in nature; (3) the
Impeachment Rules are strictly in consonance with the Constitution and even supposing without
admitting that the Rules are invalid, their invalidity would not nullify the dismissal of the complaint for
impeachment for the Batasan as a body sovereign within its own sphere has the power to dismiss the
impeachment complaint even without the benefit of said Rules; and (4) the Court cannot by mandamus
compel the Batasan to give due course to the impeachment complaint.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court can interfere with the Batasan’s power of impeachment

RULING:
NO.
1. The dismissal by the majority of the members of the Batasan of the impeachment proceedings is an
act of the Batasan as a body in the exercise of powers that have been vested upon it by the
Constitution beyond the power of this Court to review. This Court cannot compel the Batasan to
conduct the impeachment trial prayed for by petitioners. A dismissal by the Batasan itself as a body
of the resolution and complaint for impeachment makes irrelevant under what authority the Committee
on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government had acted.

2. Aside from the fact that said Committee cannot recall from the Archives said resolution and complaint
for impeachment without revoking or rescinding the action of the Batasan denying MP Mitra's motion
for recall (which of course it had no authority to do and, therefore, said Committee is in no position to
comply with any order from the Court for said recall) such an order addressed to the Committee would
actually be a direct order to the Batasan itself.

3. The Court held that if it has no authority to control the Philippine Senate, then it does not have the
authority to control the actions of subordinate employees acting under the direction of the Senate. The
secretary, sergeant-at-arms, and disbursing officer of the Senate are mere agents of the Senate who
cannot act independently of the will of that body. Should the Court do as requested, there will be the
spectacle presented of the court ordering the secretary, the sergeant-at-arms, and the disbursing
officer of the Philippine Senate to do one thing, and the Philippine Senate ordering them to do another
thing.

4. The writ of mandamus should not be granted unless it clearly appears that the person to whom it is
directed has the absolute power to execute it.

Arroyo vs. De Venecia

FACTS:

A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives,
charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-
mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain amendments.
A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House
and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the
interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after
a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep.
Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the
approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the
motion. Then the Chair declared: “There being none, approved.” At the same time the Chair was
saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, “What is that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were
talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s
motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the
Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The
enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House

HELD:

Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural.
Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying
the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject
to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the
legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to
question in a case where private rights are involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of
seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court
should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was
effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to
adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a
quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously
present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.

Metrobank v. Tobias

FACTS:

Tobias opened a savings/current account for and in the name of Adam Merchandising, his frozen meat
business. Six months later, Tobias applied for a loan from METROBANK, which in due course
conducted trade and credit verification of Tobias that resulted in negative findings. The property
consisted of four parcels of land located in Malabon City, Metro Manila.

His loan was restructured to 5-years upon his request. Yet, after two months, he again defaulted. Thus,
the mortgage was foreclosed, and the property was sold to METROBANK as the lone bidder.
When the certificate of sale was presented for registration to the Registry of Deeds of Malabon, no
corresponding original copy of TCT No. M-16751 was found in the registry vault. Presidential Anti-
Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) concluded that TCT No. M-16751 and the tax declarations
submitted by Tobias were fictitious. PAOCTF recommended the filing against Tobias of a criminal
complaint for estafa through falsification of public documents under paragraph 2 (a) of Article 315, in
relation to Articles 172(1) and 171(7) of the Revised Penal Code.

The Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon ultimately charged Tobias with estafa through falsification
of public documents. Tobias filed a motion for reinvestigation, which was granted. Nonetheless, on
December 27, 2002, the City Prosecutor of Malabon still found probable cause against Tobias, and
recommended his being charged with estafa through falsification of public document. Tobias appealed
to the DOJ and then Acting Secretary of Justice Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez issued a resolution
directing the withdrawal of the information filed against Tobias. On November 18, 2005, Secretary of
Justice Raul M. Gonzalez denied METROBANK's motion for reconsideration. Hence, METROBANK
challenged the adverse resolutions. METROBANK maintains that what the Secretary of Justice did
was to determine the innocence of the accused, which should not be done during the preliminary
investigation; and that the CA disregarded such lapse.

ISSUE:

Did the CA err in dismissing METROBANK's petition?

HELD:

Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to directly decide matters over
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive Branch of the Government

The settled policy is that the courts will not interfere with the executive determination of probable
cause for the purpose of filing an information, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. That abuse
of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, such as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.

In this regard, we stress that a preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining the existence
of probable cause is not part of a trial. At a preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutor or
the Secretary of Justice only determines whether the act or omission complained of constitutes the
offense charged. Probable cause refers to facts and circumstances that engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. There is no
definitive standard by which probable cause is determined except to consider the attendant conditions;
the existence of probable cause depends upon the finding of the public prosecutor conducting the
examination, who is called upon not to disregard the facts presented, and to ensure that his finding
should not run counter to the clear dictates of reason.

We do not lose sight of the fact that METROBANK, a commercial bank dealing in real property, had
the duty to observe due diligence to ascertain the existence and condition of the realty as well as the
validity and integrity of the documents bearing on the realty. Its duty included the responsibility of
dispatching its competent and experienced representatives to the realty to assess its actual location
and condition, and of investigating who was its real owner. Yet, it is evident that METROBANK did not
diligently perform a thorough check on Tobias and the circumstances surrounding the realty he had
offered as collateral. As such, it had no one to blame but itself. Verily, banks are expected to exercise
greater care and prudence than others in their dealings because their business is impressed with
public interest. Their failure to do so constitutes negligence on its part.
 Avelino v. Cuenco

FACTS:

 On February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo Tañada invoked his right to speak on the senate floor
to formulate charges against the then Senate President Jose Avelino. He requested to do so
on the next session (Feb. 21, 1949).
 On the next session day however, Avelino delayed the opening of the session for about two
hours. Upon insistent demand by Tañada, Mariano Cuenco, Prospero Sanidad and other
Senators, Avelino was forced to open session. He however, together with his allies initiated all
dilatory and delaying tactics to forestall Tañada from delivering his piece. Motions being raised
by Tañada et al were being blocked by Avelino and his allies and they even ruled Tañada and
Sanidad, among others, as being out of order. Avelino’s camp then moved to adjourn the
session due to the disorder. Sanidad however countered and they requested the said
adjournment to be placed in voting. Avelino just banged his gavel and he hurriedly left his chair
and he was immediately followed by his followers. Senator Tomas Cabili then stood up, and
asked that it be made of record — it was so made — that the deliberate abandonment of the
Chair by the Avelino, made it incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore Melencio Arranz
and the remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze the
functions of the Senate. Tañada was subsequently recognized to deliver his speech. Later,
Arranz yielded to Sanidad’s Resolution (No. 68) that Cuenco be elected as the Senate
President. This was unanimously approved and was even recognized by the President of the
Philippines the following day. Cuenco took his oath of office thereafter.
 Avelino then filed a quo warranto proceeding before the SC to declare him as the rightful
Senate President.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the SC can take cognizance of the case.

RULING:

DECISION (MARCH 4, 1949)

By a vote of 6 to 4, the SC held that they cannot take cognizance of the case. This is in view of the
separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate
of the power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by
the judiciary. The SC should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affects
only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate
them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want
petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall — not in the Supreme Court.

Supposed the SC can take cognizance of the case, what will be the resolution?
There is unanimity in the view that the session under Senator Arranz was a continuation of the morning
session and that a minority of ten senators (Avelino et al) may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the
other (Cuenco et al) twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous
endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution been approved only by ten or less.
*Two senators were not present that time. Sen. Soto was in a hospital while Sen. Confesor was in the
USA.

Is the rump session (presided by Cuenco) a continuation of the morning session (presided by
Avelino)? Are there two sessions in one day? Was there a quorum constituting such session?
The second session is a continuation of the morning session as evidenced by the minutes entered
into the journal. There were 23 senators considered to be in session that time (including Soto,
excluding Confesor). Hence, twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty three
senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of “each House” shall constitute a quorum,
“the House” does not mean “all” the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute “the
House”. There is a difference between a majority of “all the members of the House” and a majority of
“the House”, the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore, an absolute majority (12) of all
the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the
purpose of a quorum. Furthermore, even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have
ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would
be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as
there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained.

RESOLUTION (March 14, 1949)

Avelino and his group (11 senators in all) insist that the SC take cognizance of the case and that they
are willing to bind themselves to the decision of the SC whether it be right or wrong. Avelino contends
that there is no constitutional quorum when Cuenco was elected president. There are 24 senators in
all. Two are absentee senators; one being confined and the other abroad but this does not change the
number of senators nor does it change the majority which if mathematically construed is ½ + 1; in this
case 12 (half of 24) plus 1 or 13 NOT 12. There being only 12 senators when Cuenco was elected
unanimously there was no quorum.
The Supreme Court, by a vote of seven resolved to assume jurisdiction over the case in the light of
subsequent events which justify its intervention. The Chief Justice agrees with the result of the
majority’s pronouncement on the quorum upon the ground that, under the peculiar circumstances of
the case, the constitutional requirement in that regard has become a mere formalism, it appearing
from the evidence that any new session with a quorum would result in Cuenco’s election as Senate
President, and that the Cuenco group, taking cue from the dissenting opinions, has been trying to
satisfy such formalism by issuing compulsory processes against senators of the Avelino group, but to
no avail, because of the Avelino’s persistent efforts to block all avenues to constitutional processes.
For this reason, the SC believes that the Cuenco group has done enough to satisfy the requirements
of the Constitution and that the majority’s ruling is in conformity with substantial justice and with the
requirements of public interest. Therefore, Cuenco has been legally elected as Senate President and
the petition is dismissed.

Justice Perfecto’s Concurring Opinion

Judicial "hands-off" policy is, in effect, a showing of official inferiority complex. Consequently like its
parallel in the psychological field, it is premised on notions of reality fundamentally wrong. It is an
upshot of distorted past experience, warping the mind so as to become unable to have a healthy
appraisal of reality in its true form.

It is futile to invoke precedents in support of such an abnormal judicial abdication. The decision in the
Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83, is absolutely devoid of any authority. It was rendered by a colonial
Supreme Court to suit the imperialistic policies of the masters. That explains its glaring inconsistencies.

Also frivolous is to invoke the decision in Vera vs. Avelino, (77 Phil., 192), and Mabanag vs. Lopez
Vito, (78 Phil., 1), both patterned after the colonial philosophy pervading the decision in
Alejandrino vs. Quezon, (46 Phil., 83.) Judicial emancipation must not lag behind the political
emancipation of our Republic. The judiciary ought to ripen into maturity if it has to be true to its role as
spokesman of the collective conscience, of the conscience of humanity.

For the Supreme Court to refuse to assume jurisdiction in the case is toviolate the Constitution. Refusal
to exercise the judicial power vested in it is to transgress the fundamental law. This case raises vital
constitutional questions which no one can settle or decide if this Court should refuse to decide them.
It would be the saddest commentary to the wisdom, foresight and statesmanship of our Constitutional
Convention to have drafted a document leaving such a glaring hiatus in the organization of Philippine
democracy ifit failed to entrusted to the Supreme Court the authority to decide such constitutional
questions.

Our refusal to exercise jurisdiction in this case is as unjustifiable as the refusal of senators on strike to
attend the sessions of the Senate and to perform their duties. A senatorial walkout defeats the
legislative power vested by the Constitution in Congress. Judicial walkouts are even more harmful
than a laborers' strike or a legislative impasse. Society may go on normally while laborers temporarily
stop to work. Society may not be disrupted by delay in the legislative machinery. But society is
menaced with dissolution in the absence of an effective administration of justice. Anarchy and chaos
are its alternatives.

Tañada v. Cuenco

FACTS:
After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was overwhelmingly occupied by the
Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo Tañada who belonged to the Citizen’s
Party. Diosdado Macapagal on the other hand was a senatorial candidate who lost the bid but was
contesting it before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). But prior to a decision the SET would have
to choose its members. It is provided that the SET should be composed of 9 members comprised of
the following: 3 justices of the Supreme Court, 3 senators from the majority party and 3 senators from
the minority party. But since there is only one minority senator the other two SET members supposed
to come from the minority were filled in by the NP. Tañada assailed this process before the Supreme
Court. So did Macapagal because he deemed that if the SET would be dominated by NP senators
then he, as a member of the Liberalista Party will not have any chance in his election contest. Senator
Mariano Cuenco et al (members of the NP) averred that the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance
of the issue because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the members
of the SET is vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for Tañada and Macapagal was not to raise
the issue before judicial courts but rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the issue is a political question.

HELD:
No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a justiciable question. The
term Political Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It
refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme Court is not being asked
by Tañada to decide upon the official acts of Senate. The issue being raised by Tañada was whether
or not the elections of the 5 NP members to the SET are valid – which is a judicial question. Note that
the SET is a separate and independent body from the Senate which does not perform legislative acts.
But how should the gridlock be resolved?
The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the supposed seat of the minority members)
must not come from the majority party. In this case, the Chairman of the SET, apparently already
appointed members that would fill in the minority seats (even though those will come from the majority
party). This is still valid provided the majority members of the SET (referring to those legally sitting)
concurred with the Chairman. Besides, the SET may set its own rules in situations like this provided
such rules comply with the Constitution.

Sanidad v. COMELEC

FACTS:
On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for the
Citizens Assemblies (“barangays”) to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim
assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of
the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers. Twenty days after, the President
issued another related decree, PD No. 1031, amending the previous PD No. 991, by declaring the
provisions of PD No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in “barangays”
applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031
repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No.
1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16,
1976. The Decree recites in its “whereas” clauses that the people’s continued opposition to the
convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and
replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be
submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the
Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to
declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose
amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the
Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite
scheduled on October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there
is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to
the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no
constitutional or legal basis. The Soc-Gen contended that the question is political in nature hence the
court cannot take cognizance of it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the Constitution.

HELD:
Yes. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a judicial question. This is
especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by
proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted.
Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution
resides in the interim National Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions).
After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose
amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1
and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling
the interim National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent President
undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential
Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of
the procedure for amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be
amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and
1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus
the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this Court
to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the new Constitution provides: “All cases involving the
constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme
Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without
the concurrence of at least ten Members. . . ..” The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction
not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The amending, like all other powers
organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme
Court is vested with that authority to determine whether that power has been discharged within its
limits.
This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose amendments to the Constitution and
he was able to present those proposals to the people in sufficient time. The President at that time also
sits as the legislature
 DAZA vs. SINGSON

FACTS:

After the May 1987 Congressional Elections, the House of Representatives proportionally apportioned
its twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments (COA) among the several political parties
represented in the chamber, as pursuant to Article 6, Section 18 of the Constitution. Herein Petitioner
Daza was among those chosen and listed as representative of the Liberal Party (LP).

However, on 16 September 1988, Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) reorganized which resulted
to political realignment in the House; 24 members of LP resigned and joined LDP, thereby swelling
the former’s number from 159 to 17.

Due to such, the House revised its representatives in the COA by withdrawing the seat of Petitioner
and giving it to the newly LDP, respondent Singson.

Hence, petitioner filed a complaint in the Supreme Court on the ground of his removal from the COA.
Consequently, the Court issued a TRO to prevent both petitioner and respondent from serving in the
COA.

Petitioner contends that he cannot be removed because his appointment is permanent, citing a ruling
in Cunanan v. Tan, and asserting that the rerganization of LDP is not based on permanent political
realignment since LDP is not a duly registered pol. party.

On the other hand, respondent avers that the question raised by petitioner is political in nature and
beyond the jurisdiction of the court. Moreover, he invokes that nowhere in the Constitution requires
that a political party be registered to be entitled to proportional representation in the COA.

ISSUE:

WON petitioner’s removal from the COA by the HRep is legal?

RULING:

First, Ruling first on the jurisdictional issue, we hold that, contrary to the respondent's assertion, the
Court has the competence to act on the matter at bar. Our finding is that what is before us is not a
discretionary act of the House of Representatives that may not be reviewed by us because it is political
in nature. What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing
the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The
reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature,
we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us
that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question/.

Second, on the issue of removal, the Court ruled that petitioner’s contention that the LDP’s
reoirganization is invalid since it is not yet registere. However, on 23 November 1989, the COMELEC
en banc already affirmed the registration of the LDP.

On the contention that LDP has not yet passed the test of stability is ikewise untenable. The Court
stated that if such theory be followed, petitioner’s party (LP) will also fall under such category and will
not be entitled representation in the COA since the Liberal Party was just reorganized before for Pres.
Roxas be able to run.

Further, the Court stressed that LDP had already been existing for more than a year and having 157
members in the House and 6 in the Senate is enough for it to be considered an eligible pol. party and
if petitioner’s contention be pursued, the members of LDP will be denied of representation in the COA.

Francisco v. House of Representatives

FACTS:

1. On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved
the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House
Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress.
2. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the
Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF).
3. On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first
impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices
of the Supreme Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and
other high crimes.” The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to
the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI
of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October
2003 for being insufficient in substance.
4. The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the
Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House
Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.
5. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court
against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the
second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article
XI of the Constitution that “[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year.”
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid
impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
2. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th
Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution.
3. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.

RULINGS:

1. This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of the judicial power of
the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
1. Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a determination of what
constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which
the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
2. Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the
very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
2. The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is unconstitutional.
1. Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment
to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules
on impeachment is limited by the phrase “to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.”
Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules
were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for
other specific limitations on its power to make rules.
2. It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If
as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication
have the power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.
3. It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the
meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has
been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within
a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
2. Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court,
on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the
second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional
prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable
officer within a one-year period.

Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which
were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional.
Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which
was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office
of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under
paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
 Araneta v. Dinglasan

FACTS:

 Antonio Araneta is being charged for allegedly violating of Executive Order 62 which regulates
rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. Judge Rafael Dinglasan was the judge
hearing the case. Araneta appealed seeking to prohibit Dinglasan and the Fiscal from
proceeding with the case. He averred that EO 62 was issued by virtue of Commonwealth Act
(CA) No. 671 which he claimed ceased to exist, hence, the EO has no legal basis.
 Three other cases were consolidated with this one. L-3055 which is an appeal by Leon Ma.
Guerrero, a shoe exporter, against EO 192 which controls exports in the Philippines; he is
seeking to have permit issued to him.

 L-3054 is filed by Eulogio Rodriguez to prohibit the treasury from disbursing funds [from ’49-
‘50] pursuant to EO 225.

 L-3056 filed by Antonio Barredo is attacking EO 226 which was appropriating funds to hold the
national elections.

 They all aver that CA 671, otherwise known as AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL
EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING
THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH
EMERGENCY or simply the Emergency Powers Act, is already inoperative and that all EOs
issued pursuant to said CA had likewise ceased.

ISSUE:
Whether or not CA 671 has ceased.

RULING:
Commonwealth Act No. 671, which granted emergency powers to the president, became
inoperative ex proprio vigore when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that
Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In setting the first
regular session of Congress instead of the first special session which preceded it as the point of
expiration of the Act, the SC is giving effect to the purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In
a special session, the Congress may “consider general legislation or only such subjects as he
(President) may designate.” Such acts were to be good only up to the corresponding dates of
adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature, “unless sooner amended or repealed by the
National Assembly.” Even if war continues to rage on, new legislation must be made and approved in
order to continue the EPAs, otherwise it is lifted upon reconvening or upon early repeal.

Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its effectiveness. The intention of the
Act has to be sought for in its nature, the object to be accomplish, the purpose to be subserved, and
its relation to the Constitution. The consequences of the various constructions offered will also be
resorted to as additional aid to interpretation. We test a rule by its results.

Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides:

In time of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President,
for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules
and regulations to carry out a declared national policy.

Article VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be "for a limited
period." "Limited" has been defined to mean "restricted; bounded; prescribed; confined within positive
bounds; restrictive in duration, extent or scope." (Encyclopedia Law Dictionary, 3rd ed., 669; Black's
Law Dictionary, 3rd ed., 1120.) The words "limited period" as used in the Constitution are beyond
question intended to mean restrictive in duration. Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of
emergency powers, "must be temporary or it can not be said to be an emergency."

It is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was approved with this limitation in view. The
opposite theory would make the law repugnant to the Constitution, and is contrary to the principle that
the legislature is deemed to have full knowledge of the constitutional scope of its powers. The assertion
that new legislation is needed to repeal the act would not be in harmony with the Constitution either.
If a new and different law were necessary to terminate the delegation, the period for the delegation, it
has been correctly pointed out, would be unlimited, indefinite, negative and uncertain; "that which was
intended to meet a temporary emergency may become permanent law," for Congress might not enact
the repeal, and even if it would, the repeal might not meet the approval of the President, and the
Congress might not be able to override the veto. Furthermore, this would create the anomaly that,
while Congress might delegate its powers by simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except
by a two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take
them back

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V POEA

G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988 [Non delegation of legislative power; subordinate legislation]

FACTS:
A Chief Officer of a ship was killed in an accident in Japan. The widow filed a complaint for charges
against the Eastern Shipping Lines with POEA, based on a Memorandum Circular No. 2, issued by
the POEA which stipulated death benefits and burial for the family of overseas workers. ESL
questioned the validity of the memorandum circular as violative of the principle of non-delegation of
legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said
regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative
discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation. Nevertheless, POEA assumed
jurisdiction and decided the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-delegation of powers.

RULING:
No. SC held that there was a valid delegation of powers.
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No.
797. ... "The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall promulgate
the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the
Administration (POEA)."
It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What
can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall
be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot
be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable
to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar
problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative
agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called
the "power of subordinate legislation."

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by
"filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This
is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the
implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations
have the force and effect of law.

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative
power:
1. Completeness test - the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it.
2. Sufficient standard test - there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.

Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is
not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

US v. Ang Tang Ho

FACTS:
In July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No. 2868
entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act, under
extraordinary circumstances, authorizes the Governor General (GG) to issue the necessary Rules and
Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, in August 1919, the
GG issued Executive Order No. 53 which was published on August 20, 1919. The said EO fixed the
price at which rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, sold a ganta of rice
to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed
by the EO. The sale was done on the 6th of August 1919. On August 8, 1919, he was charged
for violation of the said EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months
imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue
delegation of power to the Governor General.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.

HELD:
First of, Ang Tang Ho’s conviction must be reversed because he committed the act prior to the
publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime. Further, one cannot
be convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law and
the order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt.
Anent the issue of undue delegation, the said Act wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the
standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the
place of all others without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters
involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act
could not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it
leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors
or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its
details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment
of any prescribed fact or event.
 People v. Rosenthal

FACTS:
Jacob Rosenthal and Nicasio Osmeña were founders and shareholders of the ORO Oil Company.
Later, Rosenthal and Osmeña were found guilty of selling their shares to individuals without actual
tangible assets. Their shares were merely based on speculations and future gains. This is in violation
of Sections 2 and 5 of Act No. 2581.
Section 2 provides that every person, partnership, association, or corporation attempting to offer to
sell in the Philippines speculative securities of any kind or character whatsoever, is under obligation
to file previously with the Insular Treasurer the various documents and papers enumerated therein
and to pay the required tax of twenty-pesos.
Section 5, on the other hand, provides that “whenever the said Treasurer of the Philippine Islands is
satisfied, either with or without the examination herein provided, that any person, partnership,
association or corporation is entitled to the right to offer its securities as above defined and provided
for sale in the Philippine Islands, he shall issue to such person, partnership, association or corporation
a certificate or permit reciting that such person, partnership, association or corporation has complied
with the provisions of this act, and that such person, partnership, association or corporation, its brokers
or agents are entitled to order the securities named in said certificate or permit for sale”; that “said
Treasurer shall furthermore have authority, when ever in his judgment it is in the public interest, to
cancel said certificate or permit”, and that “an appeal from the decision of the Insular Treasurer may
be had within the period of thirty days to the Secretary of Finance.”
Rosenthal argued that Act 2581 is unconstitutional because no standard or rule is fixed in the Act
which can guide said official in determining the cases in which a certificate or permit ought to be issued,
thereby making his opinion the sole criterion in the matter of its issuance, with the result that, legislative
powers being unduly delegated to the Insular Treasurer.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is undue delegation of power to the Internal Treasurer.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the Act furnishes a sufficient standard for the Insular
Treasurer to follow in reaching a decision regarding the issuance or cancellation of a certificate or
permit. The certificate or permit to be issued under the Act must recite that the person, partnership,
association or corporation applying therefor “has complied with the provisions of this Act”, and this
requirement, construed in relation to the other provisions of the law, means that a certificate or permit
shall be issued by the Insular Treasurer when the provisions of Act No. 2581 have been complied with.
Upon the other hand, the authority of the Insular Treasurer to cancel a certificate or permit is expressly
conditioned upon a finding that such cancellation “is in the public interest.”
In view of the intention and purpose of Act No. 2581 — to protect the public against “speculative
schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of blue sky” and against the “sale of stock in
fly-by-night concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold mines, and other like fraudulent exploitations”,
— the SC held that “public interest” in this case is a sufficient standard to guide the Insular
Treasurer in reaching a decision on a matter pertaining to the issuance or cancellation of certificates
or permits.
Rosenthal insists that the delegation of authority to the Commission is invalid because the stated
criterion is uncertain. That criterion is the public interest. It is a mistaken assumption that this is a mere
general reference to public welfare without any standard to guide determinations. The purpose of the
Act, the requirement it imposes, and the context of the provision in question show the contrary. . .

CERVANTES v. AUDITOR GENERAL

FACTS :
•This is a petition to review a decision of Auditor General denying petitioner’s claim for quarters
allowance as manager of the National Abaca and other Fibers Corp. (NAFCO).

•Petitioner was general manager in 1949 of NAFCO with annual salary of P15,000.00

•NAFCO Board of Directors granted P400/mo. Quarters allowance to petitioner amounting to P1,650
for 1949.

•This allowance was disapproved by the Central Committee of the government enterprise council
under Executive Order No. 93 upon recommendation by NAFCO auditor and concurred in by the
Auditor general on two grounds:
a. It violates the charter of NAFCO limiting manager’s salary to P15,000/year.
b. NAFCO is in precarious financial condition.

ISSUES:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 93 exercising control over Government Owned and Controlled
Corporations (GOCC) implemented under R.A. No. 51 is valid or null and void.
Whether or not R.A. No. 51 authorizing presidential control over GOCCs is Constitutional.

DECISION:
R.A. No. 51 is constitutional. It is not illegal delegation of legislative power to the executive as argued
by petitioner but a mandate for the President to streamline GOCC’s operation. Executive Order 93 is
valid because it was promulgated within the 1 year period given. Petition for review DISMISSED with
costs

It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act No. 548 by which the Director of Public Works,
with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, is authorized to promulgate
rules and regulations for the regulation and control of the use of and traffic on national roads and
streets is unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. This
contention is untenable. As was observed by this court in Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil,
660, 700), "The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge
Ranney, and since followed in a multitude of cases, namely: ’The true distinction therefore is between
the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be,
and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance
of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.’ (Cincinnati, W. & Z.
R. Co. v. Comm’rs. Clinton County, 1 Ohio St., 88.) Discretion, as held by Chief Justice Marshall in
Wayman v. Southard (10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the Legislature to an executive department
or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments or subordinate officials
thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. (U.S. v.
Kinkead, 248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the decisions is to give prominence to the ’necessity’
of the case." -Calalang v. Williams

People v. Vera

FACTS:

 Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration and
four motions for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court and the
Supreme Court remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial.
 While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime
he was convicted of. The Judge of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation
Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by
petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging
that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec.
11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power
to provide a system of probation to convicted person.
 Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only
indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it
is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws.
The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue
delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of the power of
the executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as
in pardon.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Act No. 4221 constituted an undue delegation of legislative power.

RULING:
The Court concludes that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation
of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void. There
is no set standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system
of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution
and the doctrine of the non delegation of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the
constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act
shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the
salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said
probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of
the Probation Office.
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation
Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act
are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have
the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for
the salary of a probation officer.

An act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite
standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary
powers delegated to it. The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose
upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is
granted, as mentioned by Justice Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a “roving
commission” which enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the
Act, the legislature does not seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to
the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine.

Ynot v. IAC

FACTS:
There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen
the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from
interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting
6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO
626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. He said that
the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is
unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police
power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the law is valid.

HELD:
The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A ctreated a
presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to
the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to
defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated.
The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the
method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law
and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property
confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished.
The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed
offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation
of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned
therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.
 Tatad v. Executive Secretary

I. THE FACTS

Petitioners assailed §5(b) and §15 of R.A. No. 8180, the Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation
Act of 1996.

§5(b) of the law provided that “tariff duty shall be imposed . . . on imported crude oil at the rate
of three percent (3%) and imported refined petroleum products at the rate of seven percent (7%) . .
.” On the other hand, §15 provided that “[t]he DOE shall, upon approval of the President, implement
the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later than March 1997. As far as practicable,
the DOE shall time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the
world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar
is stable . . .”

Petitioners argued that §5(b) on tariff differential violates the provision of the Constitution
requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title.

They also contended that the phrases “as far as practicable,” “decline of crude oil prices in the
world market” and “stability of the peso exchange rate to the US dollar” are ambivalent, unclear and
inconcrete since they do not provide determinate or determinable standards that can guide the
President in his decision to fully deregulate the downstream oil industry.

Petitioners also assailed the President’s E.O. No. 392, which proclaimed the full deregulation
of the downstream oil industry in February 1997. They argued that the Executive misapplied R.A. No.
8180 when it considered the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor in the implementation of full
deregulation.

Finally, they asserted that the law violated §19, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting
monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition

II. THE ISSUES

1. Did §5(b) violate the one title-one subject requirement of the Constitution?
2. Did §15 violate the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power?
3. Was E.O. No. 392 arbitrary and unreasonable?
4. Did R.A. No. 8180 violate §19, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting monopolies, combinations in
restraint of trade and unfair competition?

III. THE RULING

[The Court GRANTED the petition. It DECLARED R.A. No. 8180 unconstitutional and E.O.
No. 372 void.]

1. NO, §5(b) DID NOT violate the one title-one subject requirement of the Constitution.

As a policy, this Court has adopted a liberal construction of the one title-one subject rule. [T]he
title need not mirror, fully index or catalogue all contents and minute details of a law. A law having a
single general subject indicated in the title may contain any number of provisions, no matter how
diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and
may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying
out the general subject. [S]ection 5(b) providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject of R.A.
No. 8180 which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. The section is supposed to sway
prospective investors to put up refineries in our country and make them rely less on imported
petroleum.

2. NO, §15 DID NOT violate the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of
power.

Two tests have been developed to determine whether the delegation of the power to execute
laws does not involve the abdication of the power to make law itself. We delineated the metes and
bounds of these tests in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. VS. POEA, thus:
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of
legislative power, viz: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the
law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it
reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard
test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a
total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of
the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. It will be
noted that Congress expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end of
March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is
mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any purported reason. Thus, the law
is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation. The discretion given to the President
is to advance the date of full deregulation before the end of March 1997. Section 15 lays down the
standard to guide the judgment of the President --- he is to time it as far as practicable when the
prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange
rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.

Petitioners contend that the words “as far as practicable,” “declining” and “stable” should have
been defined in R.A. No. 8180 as they do not set determinate or determinable standards. The
stubborn submission deserves scant consideration. The dictionary meanings of these words are well
settled and cannot confuse men of reasonable intelligence. Webster defines “practicable” as meaning
possible to practice or perform, “decline” as meaning to take a downward direction, and “stable” as
meaning firmly established. The fear of petitioners that these words will result in the exercise of
executive discretion that will run riot is thus groundless. To be sure, the Court has sustained the
validity of similar, if not more general standards in other cases.

3. YES, E.O. No. 392 was arbitrary and unreasonable.

A perusal of section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 will readily reveal that it only enumerated two factors
to be considered by the Department of Energy and the Office of the President, viz.: (1) the time when
the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining, and (2) the time when
the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable. Section 15 did not mention the
depletion of the OPSF as a factor to be given weight by the Executive before ordering full
deregulation. On the contrary, the debates in Congress will show that some of our legislators wanted
to impose as a pre-condition to deregulation a showing that the OPSF fund must not be in deficit. We
therefore hold that the Executive department failed to follow faithfully the standards set by R.A. No.
8180 when it considered the extraneous factor of depletion of the OPSF fund. The misappreciation of
this extra factor cannot be justified on the ground that the Executive department considered anyway
the stability of the prices of crude oil in the world market and the stability of the exchange rate of the
peso to the dollar. By considering another factor to hasten full deregulation, the Executive department
rewrote the standards set forth in R.A. 8180. The Executive is bereft of any right to alter either by
subtraction or addition the standards set in R.A. No. 8180 for it has no power to make laws. To cede
to the Executive the power to make law is to invite tyranny, indeed, to transgress the principle of
separation of powers. The exercise of delegated power is given a strict scrutiny by courts for the
delegate is a mere agent whose action cannot infringe the terms of agency. In the cases at bar, the
Executive co-mingled the factor of depletion of the OPSF fund with the factors of decline of the price
of crude oil in the world market and the stability of the peso to the US dollar. On the basis of the text
of E.O. No. 392, it is impossible to determine the weight given by the Executive department to the
depletion of the OPSF fund. It could well be the principal consideration for the early deregulation. It
could have been accorded an equal significance. Or its importance could be nil. In light of this
uncertainty, we rule that the early deregulation under E.O. No. 392 constitutes a misapplication of R.A.
No. 8180.

4. YES, R.A. No. 8180 violated §19, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting
monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition.

[I]t cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an
oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players
in the oil market. All other players belong to the lilliputian league. As the dominant players, Petron,
Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore
works to their immense benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts
and cuts deep in the heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New
players that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of
their own will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with
them will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing
on an uneven field. The argument that the 4% tariff differential is desirable because it will induce
prospective players to invest in refineries puts the cart before the horse. The first need is to attract
new players and they cannot be attracted by burdening them with heavy disincentives. Without new
players belonging to the league of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil industry
is an idle dream.

The provision on inventory widens the balance of advantage of Petron, Shell and Caltex
against prospective new players. Petron, Shell and Caltex can easily comply with the inventory
requirement of R.A. No. 8180 in view of their existing storage facilities. Prospective competitors again
will find compliance with this requirement difficult as it will entail a prohibitive cost. The construction
cost of storage facilities and the cost of inventory can thus scare prospective players. Their net effect
is to further occlude the entry points of new players, dampen competition and enhance the control of
the market by the three (3) existing oil companies.

Finally, we come to the provision on predatory pricing which is defined as “. . . selling or offering
to sell any product at a price unreasonably below the industry average cost so as to attract customers
to the detriment of competitors.” Respondents contend that this provision works against Petron, Shell
and Caltex and protects new entrants. The ban on predatory pricing cannot be analyzed in isolation.
Its validity is interlocked with the barriers imposed by R.A. No. 8180 on the entry of new players. The
inquiry should be to determine whether predatory pricing on the part of the dominant oil companies is
encouraged by the provisions in the law blocking the entry of new players. Text-
writer Hovenkamp gives the authoritative answer and we quote:
xxx xxx xxx
 The rationale for predatory pricing is the sustaining of losses today that will give a firm
monopoly profits in the future. The monopoly profits will never materialize, however, if the market is
flooded with new entrants as soon as the successful predator attempts to raise its price. Predatory
pricing will be profitable only if the market contains significant barriers to new entry.

As aforediscussed, the 4% tariff differential and the inventory requirement are significant
barriers which discourage new players to enter the market. Considering these significant barriers
established by R.A. No. 8180 and the lack of players with the comparable clout of PETRON, SHELL
and CALTEX, the temptation for a dominant player to engage in predatory pricing and succeed is a
chilling reality. Petitioners’ charge that this provision on predatory pricing is anti-competitive is not
without reason.

[R.A. No. 8180 contained a separability clause, but the High Tribunal held that the offending
provisions of the law so permeated its essence that it had to be struck down entirely. The provisions
on tariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing were among the principal props of R.A. No. 8180.
Congress could not have deregulated the downstream oil industry without these provisions.]

ABAKADA Guro v. Purisima

FACTS:

Petitioners seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335.
R.A. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and
BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and
sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance
Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least
six months of service, regardless of employment status.

Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA
9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives,
the law “transforms the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty
hunters” as they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards
and incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials
and employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.

Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials
and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There
is no valid basis for classification or distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials
and employees of all other government agencies.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the
President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335
provides that BIR and BOC officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall
short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved.
Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to the President without sufficient standards.
It will therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss
BIR or BOC personnel.

Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it
violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished
and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional
oversight committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the scope of the system of rewards and incentives limitation to officials and employees
of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.

Whether or not there was an unduly delegation of power to fix revenue targets to the President.
Whether or not the doctrine of separation of powers has been violated in the creation of a
congressional oversight committee.

Discussions:
The Court referred to the ruling of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, which states that “the
guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon
all citizens of the State.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law,
as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or
practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of
simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that
the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality.

The Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. “

To determine the validity of delegation of legislative power, it needs the following: (1) the completeness
test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it
provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s
authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the
limits of the delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under
which it is to be implemented.
Based from the ruling under Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, it is clear that congressional
oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment
on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers.
Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It
may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in
the executive branch.

RULING:
The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary.22 With respect to RA 9335, its expressed
public policy is the optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the
BOC.23 Since the subject of the law is the revenue- generation capability and collection of the BIR
and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said
agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common
distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national government through the collection of
taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.
Both the BIR and the BOC principally perform the special function of being the instrumentalities
through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions – taxation. Indubitably, such
substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the
classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under R.A. 9335 fully satisfy the
demands of equal protection.

R.A. 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets
and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law under Sec 2 and 4 of the said
Act. Moreover, the Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: “public interest,” “justice
and equity,” “public convenience and welfare” and “simplicity, economy and welfare.”33 In this case,
the declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and
the BOC is infused with public interest.
The court declined jurisdiction on this case. The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335
was created for the purpose of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by
the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR. From then
on, it became functus officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the
executive function of implementing and enforcing the law may be considered moot and academic.

Pelaez v. Auditor General

FACTS:
In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities – this was
purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides in part:
The President may by executive order define the boundary… of any… municipality… and may change
the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require…
The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil action to prohibit the
auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that
the EOs were unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly repealed by
Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may “not be created or their boundaries altered nor
their names changed” except by Act of Congress. Pelaez argues: “If the President, under this new
law, cannot even create a barrio, how can he create a municipality which is composed of several
barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?”
The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were barred from being
created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a municipality can be created
without creating barrios. He further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has
delegated such power to create municipalities to the President.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec.
68 of the RAC.

HELD:
No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the
government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it
is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be
complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by
the delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. In this case,
Sec. 68 lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate
would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the
aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether
the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.
Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause “as the public welfare may require” – which
would mean that the President may exercise such power as the public welfare may require – is
present, still, such will not replace the standard needed for a proper delegation of power. In the first
place, what the phrase “as the public welfare may require” qualifies is the text which immediately
precedes hence, the proper interpretation is “the President may change the seat of government within
any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require.” Only the seat of government
may be changed by the President when public welfare so requires and NOT the creation of
municipality.
The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially and eminently
legislative in character not administrative (not executive).

YES. The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-delegability since legislators are
effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which, as settled
in Philconsa, is lodged in Congress. The power to appropriate must be exercised only through
legislation, pursuant to Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states: “No money shall
be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” The power of
appropriation, as held by the Court in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor,
involves (a) setting apart by law a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose.
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from
which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project
or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. Since these two acts comprise the exercise
of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article
authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been
conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow. -BELGICA V.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

ABAKADA Guro Party List vs. Ermita

FACTS:

ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for prohibition o questioning the constitutionality of
Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).
Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties;
Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods; and
Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties;

These provisions contain a provision which authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the
Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after specified conditions
have been satisfied.

ISSUES:

Whether or not there is a violation of Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution.

Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec 28(2) of the
Constitution.

Whether or not there is a violation of the due process and equal protection of the Constitution.

RULING:

No, the revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of Representatives, the Senate was acting
within its constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill when it included provisions
in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes, percentage, and excise and franchise
taxes.

No, there is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of
a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate
power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority;
in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward.
In this case, it is not a delegation of legislative power but a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon
which enforcement and administration of the increased rate under the law is contingent.
No, the power of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications for the purposes of taxation
has long been established. Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of property, the rates
to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment, valuation and collection, the
State’s power is entitled to presumption of validity. As a rule, the judiciary will not interfere with such
power absent a clear showing of unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness.