Fact Value and Norm in PDF

Fact, Value, and Norm in Stevenson's Ethics
Author(s): Kurt Baier

Source: Noûs, Vol. 1, No. 2 (May, 1967), pp. 139-160
Published by: Wiley
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Fact, Value, and Yormn in
Stevenson's Ethics'
KURT BAIER
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH
It is now almost thirty years since the first appearance in

Mind of Stevenson's three justly celebrated articles on ethics:2
and five years since the appearance of his "Retrospective Comi-
ments," a survey article appended to a collection of ten of his
earlier papers including the three first ones. Although there are
in this latter article interesting new points as well as modifications
and refinements of old ones,3 they leave untouched the radical
heart of his theory. Stevenson's first three articles and his book,
Ethics and Language (1944), which grew out of them, have prob-
ably had a greater impact on the views and preoccupations of
writers in ethics during the last thirty years than anything that
1 Work on the problems discussed in this article was made possible by

a research grant to the Department of Philosophy of the University of Pitts-
burgh from The Carnegie Corporation and International Business Machines
Corporation for a philosophical examination of values.
2"The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms" Mind, XLVI (1937); "Ethi-
cal Judgments and Avoidability", Mind, XLVII (1938); "Persuasive Defini-
tions" Mind, XLVII (1938). I have made use of the following works by C. L.
Stevenson: Ethics and Language (New Haven, 1944); Facts and Values,
Studies in Ethical Analysis (New Haven and London, 1963). This collection
of articles is the collection to which I refer in the text. I have also made use
of a very recent article, "Ethical Fallibility," in Ethics and Society, ed.
Richard T. DeGeorge (New York, 1966). I refer to these three works as EL,
FV, and EF respectively. The numbers after the letters give the page reference.
I have also made use of the writings of various moral philosophers who have
commented on Stevenson, and I have greatly profited from all of them.
3 E.g. a discussion of the role of "uncertainty in attitude" in the creation
of ethical problems (FV 187-203); a serious downgrading in ethical discourse
of descriptive meaning and disagreement in belief and so a diminutioui of the
differences between Stevenson's views and those of Ayer (FV 204-214); and
some "unfinished business," above all the elucidation of the "distinction be-
tween beliefs and attitudes" (FV 232).
139
140 NOdS
has appeared since, and they are likely to be influential for a

long time to come. This would therefore seem a good moment
to examine, from the vantage point of whatever progress ethical
theory has made (much of it due to Stevenson's own contribu-
tions), how well his central theses have stood the continuous scru-
tiny they have received.
It is easy to explain the enormous appeal of Stevenson's
work. His papers and the book based on them were, for a long
time, the most detailed, careful, and persuasive statement of an
approach to ethics (Noncognitivism) which seemed the only one
capable of breaking the stubborn impasse between Naturalism and
Nonnaturalism. Despite the fact that his talk of "intuition" and
"nonnatural qualities" went against their empiricist grain, Moore
had succeeded in convincing many moral philosophers, by "the
force of certain logical and epistemological considerations, that
good must be an indefinable quality, however elusive it is, em-
pirically' (Stevenson, quoting Perry, EL 109). Stevenson's account
therefore seemed a remarkable advance, for it could explain, with-
out having to fall back on nonnatural qualities and "unique sorts
of truth which must be apprehended a priori" (FV 30: cf. also
FV 9; EL 109, 272/3), why the problems, judgments, and terms
of ethics could not be handled by the methods of empirical science.
If his theory undermined the foundations of ethics, Naturalists
and Nonnaturalists were in no position to complain, for the foun-
dations on which they had relied were visibly rotten. For many
their destruction was a welcome liberation from antiquated norms.
The undoubted destructive value of Stevenson's theory does
not, however, license any conclusions about its constructive mer-
its. Indeed, some of the central and most widely accepted con-
tentions in Stevenson's theory seem to me quite certainly false.
Section I of this paper attempts to deal with some of these. Section
II tries to bring to light and to modify or replace some of the
important but unstated assumptions which have helped to make
these falsehoods plausible.
Stevenson's central ideas, as I have said before, are a novel

interpretation of the nature of ethical problems, and a method
suitable for coping with ethical problems so interpreted (Cf. e.g.
FV 193). To support this novel interpretation of ethical problems,
FACT, VALUE, AND NORM IN STEVENSON'S ETICS 141
Stevenson embeds it within an account of ethics as a whole.

Ethics in Stevenson's view, is a set of tasks, problems, and ques-
tions which, like those of a science, naturally fall into two related
subsets: Those which preoccupy the engaged, committed, perhaps
biassed participants, and those which are the concern of the de-
tached, natural, unbiassed analysts and methodologists. The former
set he calls normative or evaluative ethics, the latter analytic
ethics or metaethics (EL 1; FV 194). Philosophers can claim no
special expertise in normative ethics, the more important of the
two branches of the subject, but must share that field on, at best,
an equal footing with the man in the street, and with experts of
various kinds such as legislators and clergymen (EL 1). But as
experts in conceptual analysis, moral philosophers have a key role
to play in meta-ethics: they are eminently well qualified for the
task of sharpening the conceptual tools which so many want to and
have to employ in the primary business of ethics, the drawing of
"conclusions about what conduct is right or wrong." (EL 1)
As Stevenson treats it, meta-ethics itself has three layers or
levels. The first and most important4 is occupied with an account
of ethical problems, supplemented by an elucidation of the mean-
ing of the so-called ethical terms and the function of the so-called
ethical sentences. Concerning this level of ethical theory, Steven-
son makes the following claims: (1) Unlike scientific problems,
ethical problems are not or not only problems of belief (EL 13, 17,
36, 108-110; FV 3/4, 9, 213) but are problems of attitude, whether
interpersonal disagreements in attitude, or personal conflicts in
attitude (EL 130-134), or uncertainties in attitude (FV 187-
203); (2) Unlike the meaning of scientific or descriptive terms,
the meaning of ethical terms is essentially emotive and not solely
descriptive (EL Ch. 3; FV 204-210; for a modification, see FV
210-214); (3) Unlike the function of scientific discourse, the func-
tion of ethical discourse is not or not solely descriptive, informa-
tive, or fact-stating, but is essentially dynamic (EL 11-19; FV
18/19, 31).
Stevenson rightly regarded the nature of ethical problems or
questions as the most urgent topic for conceptual clarification.
(EL 2; FV 1, 10, 186/7). In his opinion, ethical problems and
questions are best studied in the context of ethical disagreements,
and such a study reveals that they are essentially disagreements
' I discuss the other two below, pp. 19 f. and pp. 20 f.
142 NOUS
in attitude. I want to subject this central thesis to a simple test. I

want to examine whether it can accommodate a certain apparent
counter example. My example consists of an ethical judgment by
one person, and three different possible rejoinders by another,
each rejoinder giving rise to different types of agreement and dis-
agreement. The idea is to examine whether ethical disagreement
can be prized apart from disagreement in attitude-and if so,
under what conditions.
The example: Mrs. Jones, who wants to go on a cruise, ad-
dresses her husband as follows: "I know we ought to save up
money for Jack's education, but I want that vacation in the Ba-
hamas this winter while you and I are still young and fit enough
to enjoy it. So please let's ignore our obligation, and for once, have
a good time instead."
1st Rejoinder: Her son, Jack, may be greatly in favor of conserv-
ing the family resources for his education, and opposed to their
depletion by an expensive vacation. His attitude towards the cruise
is then in opposition to that of his mother. He disagrees with her
in attitude. Yet he may be in perfect ethical agreement with her.
He could express his position as follows: "You admit you have an
obligation to save up for my education, so how can you ask Dad
to waste it on a pleasure cruise?"
2nd Rejoinder: Altermatively, Jack may be a loving and selfless

son and, while being in perfect ethical agreement with her, may
yet not disagree in attitude either. He could express his view in
this way: "While I cannot honestly deny that you have an obli-
gation to lay aside some money for my education, I don't want
you to do it. You and Dad take the cruise this winter and have a
good time."
3rd Rejoinder: Lastly, Jack may be in ethical disagreement with
his Mother, yet at the same time favor conservation of the family
resources for his education. He may then say something like this:
'I don't believe for a moment that you have an obligation to save
up for my education, but, obligation or no, please think of my
future, and what sort of career I can have without a proper edu-
cation, and don't just waste it all on a trip which you won't enjoy
anyway."
So it seems that ethical disagreement and disagreement in
attitude are logically independent of each other. Two people can
agree on a moral issue and either agree or disagree in attitude.
FACT, VALUE, AND NORM IN STEVENSON S ETHICS 143
Conversely they may disagree on a moral issue and either agree

or disagree in attitude. An ethical disagreement thus need not be
a disagreement in attitude.
By the same token, it would seem that the quasi-imperatival,
dynamic, emotive, expressive, evocative, quasi-invitational (FV
209) meaning of ethical judgments cannot be "the distinguishing
feature" of ethical judgments (FV 3/4, 9, 206), for it seems that
a person's ethical judgment need not express the attitude which
(in an obvious sense) corresponds to the judgment, nor evoke
that same attitude in the hearer. Thus Mrs. Jones acknowledges
that she has an obligation and so ought to do x, yet favors not
doing x, and urges her husband to cooperate in making this possi-
ble. Similarly, in the case of Jack. His own moral judgment and his
own attitude may diverge, or there may simply be no connection
between the two, as in the third rejoinder. The attitude he most
obviously expresses or evokes may not be in any manner de-
termined or implied or expressed by his ethical judgment.
Lastly, it seems that the function or purpose of ethical dis-
course cannot be to settle disagreements in attitude or to bring
about settled attitudes. For clearly, Jack and his mother may re-
solve their disagreement in attitude without settling their ethical
disagreement or solving their ethical problem.
How could Stevenson meet these objections? I believe that
he would try to meet them by denying that the example was a
genuine counter-instance. He would admit that his analysis does
not hold for the ethical disagreements in the Jones family, but
would go on to say that their disagreements were ethical only in
a wider, weaker, less important sense. For Stevenson draws a dis-
tinction between ethical disagreements in a wider and a narrower
(stricter, normative) sense by reference to the differences in con-
text in which they occur. Ethical disagreements in the narrower
sense are those which occur in "typically ethical contexts"; those
in the wider sense are those which occur in contexts which are
not typically ethical (Cf. EL 83/4, 206; FV 204-214). His gen-
eral view appears to be that contexts are typically ethical unless
they are of one or other of a small number of recognizable types
which, as it were, emasculate or altogether eliminate the ethical
force of the disagreement. Stevenson frequently discusses two of
these, which I shall call "Relativization' and "Insincerity," respec-
tively, and he uses an argument which implies that they are the
only two types of context which are not typically ethical.
144 NOUS
Relativization. Mrs. Jones' words in our example might be

interpreted to mean, not indeed that she has an obligation to do
x but only that in her society she would be considered to have
such an obligation (EL 83/4, 206-208; FV 87-93, 194, EF 205-
206). If that is what she means, then the emotive meaning of the
ethical terms she uses is "checked" (EL 83), is shorn of its "emo-
tive effects" (Ibid) or is otherwise "rendered inactive" (EL 84).
If that is what she means, then while the context, and her re-
mark, may perhaps be called "ethical" in a rather wide sense, it
would "impose a greater strain on our linquisitic habits, perhaps,
to call (it) 'normative'". (Ibid). Moreover, such relativized con-
texts are methodologically unproblematic: "the methods of proving
them are the ordinary methods of science" (Ibid).
Clearly, Stevenson here recognizes a context in which one
might speak of an ethical disagreement, (though perhaps not a
normative one), which yet need not be a disagreement in atti-
tude. For Mrs. Jones and her son may agree in attitude, i.e., ap-
prove of her taking the cruise, and also agree (or disagree) about
whether she would be considered to have an obligation to save up
money and so considered not to be morally free to take the cruise.
Moreover, Stevenson draws a distinction betwen cases of express-
ing disagreement in attitude and cases of reporting divergence
between the prevalent public and some personal attitude (or dis-
agreement about what is in fact the prevalent public attitude);
and this is analogous to the distinction between cases of express-
ing disagreement in ethical opinion and cases of reporting diverg-
gence between the prevalent public and some personal ethical opin-
ion (or disagreement about what is in fact the prevalent public
ethical opinion). Stevenson is therefore quite right in not regard-
ing contexts of relativization as typically ethical. In such contexts,
the expressed ethical difference does not amount to genuine ethi-
cal disagreemrent.
Insincerity. A second atypical context would be one in which
a person is not sincere, i.e. does not believe or mean what he
says. Thus if Mrs. Jones says, 'We ought to save up for Jack's
education', her "words tend and so seem to express" (FV 207)
a favorable attitude in the hearer. But if Mrs. Jones is not sin-
cere, but hypocritical or a liar (Ibid), then her "words don't ex-
press what they tend and thus seem to express" (Ibid).
In this case, too, one can agree with Stevenson that the ex-
pressed ethical difference does not amount to genuine ethical dis-
agreement. For if Mrs. Jones does not mean or believe what she
says, then though her words express disagreement, she does not
really disagree. In one sense, there is of course a perfectly real
and genuine disagreement, quite irrespective of whether Mrs.
Jones is sincere or insincere: in that sense she disagrees with any-
one who denies (and agrees with anyone who affirms) that she
has an obligation to save up for Jack. For this sense of disagree-
ment, her mental state is simply irrelevant; what counts is what
she says. All the same, in another sense, she does not really dis-
agree but merely says she does. I shall not therefore challenge
Stevenson's claim that where ethical disagreement is insincere, it
is not typically ethical.
I now turn to Stevenson's argument which implies that rela-
tivization and insincerity are the only features which turn a con-
text from a typically ethical one into one which is not. Stevenson
argues (FV 206/7, EF 206) that a person involved in typically
ethical disagreement with another but not disagreeing with him in
attitude would be involved in absurdity.
Suppose a person says, 'I approve of segregation and it is
wrong' (EF 206) or 'Jones ought not to insult Smith but I approve
of his doing so' (FV 206/7). Such a person, Stevenson claims, is
guilty of the same sort of absurdity as one who says, 'Jones in-
sulted Smith but I don't believe he did' (FV 206/7). "We want
to ask 'But if you really approve of it, what's the point of saying
that it's wrong?' And we would be likely to use the same indig-
nant tone of voice that we would use, for the parallel example
from science, in asking, 'But if you really believe that it's the
case, what's the point of saying that it isn't?"' (EF 206).
Now, in his various explorations of this argument (FV 204-
214, EF 206), Stevenson implies that, unless the context is one of
relativization or insincerity, a person having an ethical disagree-
ment with another but not disagreeing with him in attitude is
necessarily involved in absurdity. I conclude that Stevenson rec-
ognizes only these two contexts as being not typically ethical. But
then the disagreements of the Jones family really are counter ex-
amples to Stevenson's analysis of 'ethical disagreement', provided
only that these disagreements can conceivably occur in contexts
not characterized by relativization or insincerity. It does, however,
seem perfectly clear that this proviso is satisfied in the situation as
I described it. Mrs. Jones may really think that she ought to save
up, and not merely that her society considers she ought. Simi-
146 NOUTS
larly, she may at the same time be perfectly sincere in what she
says. She may mean and believe what she says. And she need not
be in the least bit "muddled" or "guilty of absurdity" (EF 206),
for there is a perfectly good point to what she says. In saying
that she knows she has an obligation to save up for Jack, she
acknowledges among other things that anyone is entitled to take
an unfavorable attitude towards a mother not saving up for her
son in such a case, that any mother not saving up deserves to be
condemned, that any son of such a mother would be entitled to
treat her with lack of respect and gratitude, and that she, too, de-
serves such treatment if she acts in this way. At the same time,
she expresses a favorable attitude towards ignoring her obligation
and urges her husband to take the same attitude. She acknowl-
edges the justice of the principle but expresses a desire for, and
urges on her husband, the making of an exception in their case.
This is not at all absurd or muddled. It is only uncommonly can-
did. Unlike Mrs. Jones, people do not readily admit that they
are unwilling to make the sacrifices they know they ought to
make; that they are selfish, undutiful, unmotherly, and so forth;
and that they are therefore morally at fault. Mrs. Jones would in-
deed contradict herself, if she maintained that she was a moral
(virtuous) person, that she had an obligation to do x, and that
she wanted her husband to cooperate with her in not doing x.
If she maintained all that, then if she did not notice the contra-
diction, she would indeed be muddled, and if she persisted after
it was pointed out to her, this would be quite absurd. But her
unusual candor about her own immorality saves her from any
contradiction, muddle or absurdity.
Stevenson might perhaps argue that ethical disagreement in
the narrow sense involves, not indeed disagreement in attitude of
any and every sort, but only disagreement in attitude of a certain
sort. What sort of attitude might that be?
We must, to begin with, note that the sort cannot be "domi-
nant attitude"; the sort whose defining characteristic is that it
prevails in the circumstances in question. For our example shows
clearly that the ethical disagreement between Mrs. Jones and her
son is compatible with agreement in dominant attitude. Mrs. Jones'
behavior shows that one may conceivably resolve to act, and ex-
hort (invite-so-to-speak) others to act in a way which conflicts
with the moral attitude expressed in one's moral judgment. If by
'disagreement in attitude' Stevenson means 'disagreement in dom-
FACT, VALUE, AND NORM IN STEVENSON'S ETHICS 147
inant attitude (whether manifested in one's actual behavior or in

the expression of one's attitude), then ethical disagreement cannot
be elucidated in terms of disagreement in attitude. For, as we have
seen from our example, genuine ethical disagreement (in typically
ethical contexts) can go hand in hand with agreement in domi-
nant attitudes.
I conclude that Stevenson is wrong in thinking that ethical
disagreement is typically disagreement in dominant attitude, and
that ethical judgments typically express and invite-so-to-speak a
dominant favorable or unfavorable attitude towards the t-hing or
conduct to which they attribute an ethical characteristic, such as
'good' or 'right' or 'just', and their opposites. Stevenson seems to
have overlooked the possibility that someone might quite gen-
uinely support the institution of morality, engage in moral talk,
by and large follow the precepts of a morality, but occasionally
want to and actually go counter to them, express feelings and
attitudes opposed to moral requirements and urge others to coop-
erate with him in this if he deems that necessary for his selfish
purposes. And this need not be a case of weakness of will.
I must guard against a possible misunderstanding here. I
do not wish to maintain that there is nothing to criticize about
such an attitude. On the contrary, I think Stevenson is quite right
in saying both that there is something wrong with such conduct
and such talk, and t-hat it is not just moral wrongness, though it
is not "the genuine contradiction of logic" (FV 212, footnote 16)
either. But Stevenson seems to me mistaken in thinking that such
behavior and talk would necessarily be muddled or absurd. The
question of what exactly is wrong with it is one of the central
and very difficult questions in theoretical ethics. I believe the
correct characterization of it is inconsistency, a way of acting con-
trary to reason, but not necessarily one that is absurd, muddled,
or foolish. But this cannot be developed here.
Stevenson may not, of course, have this sort of attitude in
mind when he analyses ethical disagreements in the narrow sense
as disagreements in attitude. He may have in mind what he calls
"peculiarly moral attitudes" (EL 90). Well, is it true, then, that
ethical disagreement (in typically ethical contexts) is necessarily
disagreement in moral attitude whether dominant or not?
A. It is not true, if by 'moral attitudes' we mean what Steven-
son calls the "peculiarly moral attitudes". "Suppose that a man
morally disapproves of a certain kind of conduct. If he observes
148 NOUS
that conduct in others, he may' then feel indignant, mortified, or

shocked; and if he finds himself given to it, he may feel guilty
or conscience-stricken. But suppose that he dislikes this conduct,
as distinct from morally disapproving of it. He may then be simply
displeased when he observes it in others, and simply annoyed
with himself when he finds that he is given to it. Similarly, if
he morally approves of something . . . " (EL 90). But surely young
Jack may believe that his mother has an obligation to save up
for his education yet not have this sort of "peculiarly moral atti-
tude" towards her. He may instead be simply displeased, or cha-
grined to find his mother selfish, unloving, or immoral, or not have
any feelings of any sort; or, if he does not like or admire her, he
may even experience feelings of perverse gratification at finding
her such an unadmirable person. What feelings or attitudes he will
actually have will depend as much on his innate makeup and up-
bringing as on the moral judgment he makes of her conduct.
B. It is not true if by 'moral attitude' we mean approval-
disapproval. Thus Jones may disagree with Smith about whether
or not it is wrong for young men to cultivate a certain appearance.
"Really," says Smith, "the way these fellows dress, they always look
filthy and unkempt. One is frightened to come near them for fear
of catching something. I suppose they mean no harm and there
is nothing wrong or indecent about going around like this, but I
strongly disapprove of it," And Jones replies, "I agree with every-
thing you say. I gave Jack a piece of my mind only yesterday.
But he does not care whether I approve or disapprove. I am sur-
prised, though, to hear you say there is nothing wrong with it,
for it seems very wrong to me." Here, then, we have ethical dis-
agreement, Jones thinking such behavior wrong, Smith thinking
there is nothing wrong with it, yet agreement in moral attitude:
both disapproving strongly.
C. It is true, however, if by 'moral attitude' we mean an at-
titude which is wholly determined by one's moral reasons and
which therefore necessarily coincides with one's moral judgments
as made in typically ethical situations. But if we mean that, then
such a claim is empty. For from having and expressing such a
'moral attitude' (through the corresponding ethical judgment
based on the corresponding ethical reasons) nothing follows about
one's actual dispositions. We have been able to ensure a necessary
connection between ethical judgments made in typically ethical
contexts and moral attitudes only at the cost of severing the nor-
mal connection between having an attitude and tending to behave

accordingly. We can grant that if a person in a typically ethical
situation says that a certain type of conduct is wrong, he neces-
sarily expresses an unfavorable attitude towards that type of con-
duct and that we shall expect him not to engage in that type of
conduct himself. But that is a moral expectation, and one which
we must be prepared to find frequently disappointed. It is more-
over one of which he himself can, without absurdity, disabuse us.
I conclude that Stevenson has not shown that ethical dis-
agreements, in typically ethical contexts, are disagreements in dom-
inant, or moral attitude. In fact, our examination has shown that
no significant necessary connection can be established between
making typically ethical judgments and holding any obviously
moral attitude. It is simply a mistake to represent ethical disagree-
ment as primarily a conflict of wills (Cf. below, p. 22).
The second level of Stevenson's meta-ethical theory is oc-
cupied with contentions about the available methods for solving
ethical problems of the various kinds distinguished on the lower
level. At this level, Stevenson's chief contentions are: By contrast
with the situation in science, there is no absolutely definitive
method for normative ethics by the use of which one could rule
out the possibility of rival moral codes, each equally well sup-
ported by reasons (EL 31); and unlike factual reasons, ethical
reasons are related to the judgments they support in a psychologi-
cal, rather than a logical manner (EL 30/31, 113, 114/115; FV
6-8, 28, 29, 89/90, 170-172). Stevenson insists that "persons who
make opposed ethical judgments may so far as theoretical pos-
sibility is concerned continue to do so in the face of all manner
of reasons that their argument includes, even though neither
makes any logical or empirical error" (EL 30/31).
I can now turn to Stevenson's most important point concern-
ing the second or methodological level of metaethical theory,
namely that t-here can be "no absolutely definitive method for
normative ethics." Although Stevenson frequently discusses this
question (EL 31, also the whole of Ch. VII; FV 68-90, and again
EF, 211 ff.), his only explicit reason for this claim is that the
choice of a method for settling normative ethical disagreements
is "itself a normative ethical matter," and therefore open to the
same difficulties as normative ethical matters themselves. (EL
158-160, also FV 86-90). But what exactly are these difficulties?
What are the crucial differences between factual and evaluative-
150 NOUS
discourse which make it possible to construct an absolutely de-

finitive method for settling disagreements in belief but impossible
to construct such a method for disagreements in attitude?
In his earlier writings, Stevenson seemed to attribute the
difficulties to the different purposes of speakers engaged in factual
and evaluative discourse. "There are two different purposes which
lead us to use language. On the one hand we use words (as in
science) to record, clarify, and communicate beliefs. On the other
hand we use words to give vent to our feelings (interjections),
or to create moods (poetry) or to incite people to actions or atti-
tudes (oratory). The first use of words I shall call 'descriptive,'
the second, 'dynamic.' Note that the distinction depends solely
upon the purpose of the speaker. When a person says 'hydrogen
is the lightest known gas,' his purpose may be simply to lead the
hearer to believe this, or to believe that the speaker believes it.
In that case the words are used descriptively. When a person
cuts himself and says 'damn,' his purpose is not ordinarily to re-
cord, clarify, or to communicate a belief. The word is used dy-
namically." (FV 18/19).
As it stands, this distinction is unhelpful. It rather confus-
ingly divides language uses according to both purpose and content.
But the two divisions do not coincide. One can record or com-
municate attitudes as well as beliefs. Conversely, one can change,
modify, or preserve beliefs as well as attitudes. Either purpose
for using language, "descriptive" or "dynamic," is compatible with
either type of content, belief or attitude. So the different speaker
purpose cannot be the explanation of the possibility of a definitive
method in science, and the impossibility of such a method in ethics.
At later stages of his thought, Stevenson appears to have
abandoned the idea that some speaker's purposes are tied to be-
liefs and others to attitudes. In fact, he lays increasing stress on the
parallels. "Just as a factual sentence typically invites-so-to-speak
the hearer to share the speaker's expressed belief, so an evaluative
sentence. . .typically invites-so-to-speak the hearer to share the
speaker's expressed attitude" (FV 209). Why, then, does he still
think there is more to scientific discourse than the battle of con-
flicting beliefs? Why can one in addition determine which beliefs
are true, and should therefore be believed, in preference to those
that are false? Why can we not devise a similarly definitive
method in the field of attitudes?
An obvious answer suggests itself: in the case of beliefs there
is something to verify or falsify by empirical observation, but

plainly in the case of attitudes there is not. However, Stevenson
does not appear to favor this approach. In his most recent essay
(EF esp. 211-217), he suggests that direct and conclusive empiri-
cal verification and falsification are as unavailable in scientific dis-
agreements as they are in ethical ones. In both cases, we must
rely on reasons. (EF215/216).
Why, then, does Stevenson say that in scientific matters, as
in logical ones, reasons have logical force (EL 152, footnote 2),
that they provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the ra-
tional acceptance of the conclusions they support, whereas in ethics
they provide only psychological push? (EL 30/31, 113, 114-115,
133-135). His first answer is that the methods of reasoning used
in logic and in the inductive sciences may be divided into those
methods which are valid and those which are invalid, whereas
the methods of reasoning in ethics may not. But "any decision
about what methods are to be used, if it cannot be made with
reference to validity, is itself a normative ethical matter" (EL
158). Therefore the question of what method to use for settling
ethical disagreements, whether a rational or an emotive (non ra-
tional) method, is itself a normative ethical question, and so
with regard to it, we can and must again ask what method to
choose, which in turn also is a normative ethical question, and so
on, indefinitely. Thus the difference between the two fields lies
in the applicability and inapplicability, respectively, of the con-
cept of validity to the methods for settling disagreements.
At this point, an objection occurs to Stevenson, namely,
that one might say "that 'validity' itself, even in the conventional
sense that applies to logic and science, is a normative term"
(EL 158, footnote 4). But he is not convinced by this objection
and answers it as follows: "But the writer suspects that any such
contention would involve a misleading use of either the term
'validity' or the term 'normative.' A logician who points out an in-
ference as valid is not exhorting anyone to use it; he is simply
saying that if anyone does make such an inference, using true
premises, his conclusion, being contained in the premises, must
also be true." (EL 158, footnote 4).
Stevenson's reply notwithstanding, this objection seems to me
well taken. To call 'validity' "a normative term" is hardly a misuse
of either expression. For if we call an argument or a conclusion
valid, we surely imply that it would be a mistake not to accept
152 NOUS
it, and so surely imply that one should accept it; since presumably
one should not do that which would constitute a mistake. Of course
a logician who points out that a piece of reasoning is valid is
not "exhorting" anyone to use it (though if he says that it is
invalid, he comes pretty close to exhorting a person not to use
it); but that shows only that the use of "normative terns" does
not necessarily amount to exhortation, it does not show that
'validity is not a "normative term."
Why t-hen does Stevenson reject this apparently sound ob-
jection? Well, if he admits that 'valid' is a normative term, and if
he adheres to his own criteria for applying 'validity' (what he
might want to call the "descriptive meaning" of 'validity'), then
we have here a case of a conclusive argument from a nonnorma-
tive premise to a normative conclusion. For here we move from
some premise to some conclusion and, having checked that move
by the rules of logic, we conclude that our argument was valid;
and this surely is a normative conclusion, for it tells us that we
.would be misguided, and so ought not, to reject such an argu-
ment. If this is sound, we must either give up the theory that
we cannot deduce normative conclusions from non-normative
premises or must refuse the epithet 'valid' to logically certified
arguments. But of course neither of these alternatives is open to
Stevenson.
The weakness of Stevenson's position becomes apparent if
we examine the grounds on the basis of which he draws the line
between the areas to which the concept of validity applies, and
the areas to which it does not apply. In his opinion, it applies to
logic and science, and it does not apply to ethics. But why draw
the line there? Why not rather between logic on the one hand,
and science and ethics on the other? Are not our techniques for
ensuring thfat scientific laws and theories "hold" for the phenomena
which they are used to explain, analogous to our techniques for
ensuring that universal moral principles "hold" for the variety of
circumstances and agents who use them as guides? Do we not
use in much the same way the concepts of boundary conditions
and of prima facie validity to preserve some of the advantages of
unapplied systems after we have applied them to circumstances
which, from the nature of the case, must always remain incom-
pletely and inadequately explored? Is not, then, the difficulty of
arguing from 'is' to 'ought' in ethics comparable to the difficulty of
arguing from 'is' to 'is' in the empirical sciences? And since these
difficulties have not prevented Stevenson from regarding validity

applicable to the methods of the empirical sciences, (Cf. EL 171-
173) why should the comparable difficulties in ethics prevent him
from regarding validity also applicable to the methods of ethics?
It seems to me that inductive arguments can be no closer to de-
ductive validity than ethical arguments can. Hence the proof
that ethical arguments cannot be deductively valid cannot be a
sufficient reason for refusing the title validity to ethical methods
and reasons.
At this point Stevenson may want to retreat to the third
level of his meta-ethical theory. At the third level, Stevenson ex-
plains by what method he arrived at the contentions of the two
lower levels. His chief claim here is, that the characterization of
ethical problems and the elucidation of those of their aspects
which lead to problem solving must be regarded, "not from a moral
point of view (which would attend any attempt to settle the
problems) but rather from the point of view of an informal, com-
mon sense psychology." (FV 187). Hence Stevenson may claim
that as an analyst he is not entitled nor required to make any
evaluations of alternative methods available but is simply report-
ing the outcome of his empirical study, conducted from the point
of view of an informal, common sense psychology. But how could
such a psychological study yield such results? It would seem im-
possible for empirical psychology to discover that ethical problems
are disagreements in attitude, or that the function of ethical dis-
course is to mold attitudes, or that there is and can be no abso-
lutely definitive method in ethics, though there can be and is in
empirical science. One reason why this appears impossible is that
such claims involve the use of the terms 'ethical-nonethical.' Hence
the question of what is the nature of ethical disagreements, the
function of ethical discourse, and the meaning of ethical terms,
depends in the first place on how these terms are in fact used.
But this is an informal common sense linguistic, not an informal
common sense psychological investigation. In any case, whatever
is the correct label for such an investigation, Stevenson does not
appear to have conducted it. Or if he has, we have seen reason
to believe that his findings are in error, as is shown by the ethi-
cal disagreement between Mrs. Jones and her son. But if his
findings about ethical disagreement-which is central for metho-
dology-are seriously in error, we can have little confidence in
any supposed empirical findings about the methods by which such
154 NOUS
ethical disagreements are in fact resolved, particularly since it is

not clear that such an investigation has actually been undertaken
or that it would be even relevant let alone decisive.
I shall now take it for granted that Stevenson does not suc-
ceed in establishing the central contentions of his ethical theory.
Since these contentions are still very widely held, though some-
times in modified form, I devote the second part of my paper to a
few positive suggestions about where Stevenson, and some of his
followers, have erred.
II
The most plausible feature of Stevenson's theory has proba-

bly been his emphasis on, and his explanation of, the practical,
i.e. nontheoretical, i.e. nonscientific nature of ethics. "The critics
of 'ethical naturalism' . . . have seen that normative ethics is
something more than a branch of psychology or of any other
science; and they have realized that ethical judgments have a
function in influencing, guiding, and remolding attitudes" (EL
108). Ethical, (evaluative - normative) problems are practical
problems, i.e. problems of settling unsettled attitudes, whether
conflicts of attitude or uncertainty about attitudes (FV 186-203).
Their solutions provide guidance for those who have such prob-
lems. Such guidance consists in molding and remolding their at-
titudes thereby disposing them to act in certain ways. Ethics, in
Stevenson's view, is not a science but neither is it a superscience,
a science of nonnatural fact, such as the Nonnaturalists had made
it out to be.
Although many writers sympathetic to Stevenson's approach
have refined and improved Stevenson's analysis, they have re-
mained faithful to this emphasis. Thus, Stevenson, Hare, and
Nowell-Smith, give as the typical formulation of a practical prob-
lem, the question, 'What shall I do?' Stevenson explains this ques-
tion as "a request for influence" (EL 93), which "can be roughly
compared to a request to be commanded, as in the context, 'Shall
I take the left turn or the right?'" (Ibid). Admittedly, Hare re-
jects this account of this question, on the grounds that it ignores
the important difference between influencing or getting someone
to do something (Stevenson's account of the answer to a practical
question) and telling someone to do something (Hare's account;
R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals, 19). Hare rightly insists
that in answering such a practical question, we are not neces-
FACT, VALUE, AND NORM IN STEVENSON'S ETHICS 155
sarily influencing the questioner (Ibid, 15). However, Hare agrees

with Stevenson that a question of the form 'What shall I do?'
can be answered only by "commands," that is, by utterances
"whose main function is to regulate conduct, and they can do
this only if they are interpreted in such a way as to have impera-
tive or prescriptive force" (Ibid 16). And he explains that utter-
ances have prescriptive force if and only if we cannot "in the
fullest sense accept them," i.e. "sincerely assent to them" without
"conforming to them" (Ibid. p. 19/20, 143). Similarly, Nowell-
Smith maintains that "the central activities for which moral lan-
guage is used are choosing and advising others to choose," i.e.
answers to practical questions such as 'What shall I do?". And he
explains that such answers when "put to myself are decisions, res-
olutions, expressions of intention, or moral principles" and when
put to someone else, they are in the form of "an order, injunction,
or piece of advice, a sentence in the form 'Do such and such'."
(H. P. Nowell-Smith, Ethics, 11).
I believe that this type of account of practical problems is
accepted by the majority of post-Moorean moral philosophers, such
as Ayer, Stevenson, Popper, Hare, Nowell-Smith, and Falk, and
that it is seriously mistaken. It confuses two plausible interpreta-
tions of 'accepting guidance' accepting what is said as the solution
to a problem, and adopting the solution offered. An example will
make this clearer. Suppose I ask the sales woman in a Department
Store how much material I would need to recover an armchair.
She works it out for me and tells me that I would need 6 yards.
This gives me practical guidance. Of course I need not accept
it in either of the two interpretations, and I may accept it in the
first without accepting it in the second. The sales woman might
express her guidance in some "imperative" form, e.g. 'Take 6
yards' or 'For a chair that size you should get 6 yards' etc. Clearly
she need not be trying to influence me, as Hare rightly argues
against Stevenson, but neither need she be telling me to do some-
thing, or to command, prescribe, dictate, or what have you, as
Hare and Nowell-Smith would maintain. I can in perfect sincerity
"assent to" what she tells me, or "in the fullest sense accept what
she says," without buying or resolving to buy six yards. I may
believe what she says, i.e. accept what she says as a solution, or
even the solution, to my problem and yet (to be on the safe
side) buy 7 yards, or not buy anything at all, or buy a different
material, and so on.
My point is simply this. There are practical problems for
156 NOUS
which there are correct and incorrect, adequate and inadequate,

sensible and foolish solutions. The solutions can be formulated in
directives, i.e. in specifications of the type of behavior, engaging
in which tvould constitute the solution. Now, where there are such
methods, we can ask the question of whether the offered solution
was arrived at in accordance with the method, or whether the
proper use of the method would expose it as somehow faulty. A per-
son receives guidance if he is given a directive as a solution to his
problem. (A command or injunction would not typically be such
guidance.) He accepts the guidance, in the first sense, if he be-
lieves it to be the solution to his problem, i.e. arrived at by the
faultless use of the best method available. He accepts it, in the
second sense, if he follows the guidance, i.e. acts as directed.
Thus although Stevenson and his followers seem to me right
in insisting that moral problems are practical problems which are
solved by providing guidance, I do not agree with Stevenson that
they are disagreements in attitude solved by bringing about agree-
ments in some way or another; nor with Hare and Nowell-Smith
that they are solved by decisions, resolutions, choices, or "some-
thing volitional" (RM Hare, Freedom and Reason, p. 198). The
implication of all their remarks is that there is and cannot be a
proper, absolutely definitive, method for normative ethics. This
view I have already given reason for rejecting. But if there is a
proper method, then the offered solutions to practical problems,
the guidance provided by a particular person, can in principle
be evaluated by anyone including the person to whom the guid-
ance is offered. And the results of his evaluation are logically
separable from the "volition" which determines whether or not he
will follow the guidance.
A second and perhaps equally influential feature of Steven-
son's ethical theory has been his large-scale distinction between
fact and value; questions of fact and questions of value; factual
statements and value-judgments. Although the corresponding dis-
tinction between, on the one hand, explanatory theories, advanced
by the various positive sciences, and on the other, evaluative or
normative theories advanced by disciplines such as law, politics,
ethics, has undoubtedly had many salutary effects, Stevenson's
fairly coarse-grained distinction seems to me to be now more of a
hindrance than a help to further progress. More specifically, the
identification of the ethical with both the normative and the eval-
uative, and of both these with the emotive and/or imperatival, is
FACT, VALUE, AND NORM IN STEVENSON S ETlICS 157
responsible for the methodological anarchism characteristic of re-

cent ethics.
Let me then suggest for further development a few distinc-
tions within the large area delineated rather loosely as the area of
the ethical, the evaluative, the normative, and also the emotive/
imperatival/prescriptive.
To begin with, let me introduce the technical term, "direc-
tives." By it I shall refer to those uses of words in which possible
behavior is specified with sufficient precision to enable anyone un-
derstanding the specification to know, for some situations, what
it would be like to act in accordance with, or contrary to, what
is said with these words. 'Take three eggs' or 'I would apply if
I were you' are such directives. They specify possible behavior,
taking three eggs, and applying, and anyone understanding them
would know what it was for someone to act in accordance with,
what contrary to what is said by these words.
Such directives can be used for a variety of purposes, and we
can usefully distinguish between their applicability and their
soundness. Given that someone wants to bake a strudel, 'take three
eggs' may purport to be part of a recipe for baking a strudel, and
is then applicable. It would not be applicable for instance where
someone wanted to install an air conditioner. If taking three eggs is
part of the recipe for a strudel, then the directive is sound, other-
wise not. Applicability and soundness thus depend on a great many
factors, two important ones being the purposes (wants, needs,
goals, requirements etc.) of a person, and the status and point of
the directive, e.g. a recipe.
Now, where there are methods for determining the soundness
or otherwise of directives with a certain status and point, such as
recipes, advice, instructions for doing things, and so on, we can
attribute applied or practical knowledge to a person who can give
or formulate sound directives of that kind. A cook usually can give
recipes, a man experienced in administration good advice in ad-
ministrative problems, an automechanic good advice in how to per-
form car maintenance. Where we have a body of practical knowl-
edge of this sort, there we usually have an epithet for acting in
accordance with, and another for acting contrary to directives of
this sort, e.g. 'wise-foolish' 'prudent-imprudent' 'polite-rude' etc.
And where we have such ways of thinking about this body of
knowledge and people making or failing to make use of it, there
it is natural to think of the directives as norms, particularly if they
158 NOUS
are general, and of statements implying the applicability of such

a laudatory or critical epithet for following or disregarding such a
directive as normative statements. The remark, 'you ought to have
your car greased' for instance, is a normative statement which must
be analyzed along the following lines. Since you own a car and
your car has not been greased for three months, the directive "Have
your car greased" is applicable to you and sound, and it would be
in your interest to follow the directive, contrary to your interest to
ignore it.5 It is also perfectly clear that such normative statements
and disagreements are or involve claims about the applicability
and soundness of directives of a certain status and point. We could
distinguish normative disagreements from what (in imitation of
Stevenson) we might call disagreements in directive, as when Jones
says 'Take three eggs' and Smith says 'Don't take three eggs-take
four yolks.' Unlike disagreements in directive, normative disagree-
ments presuppose an agreed, tested, and proven apparatus for es-
tablishing the applicability and soundness of directives of the type
to which the conflicting normative statements purport to refer.
It should now be clear that normative statements are very differ-
ent from evaluative ones and from value judgments. When I say,
'Your comments were very valuable' or 'Your encouraging remarks
at that time were of great psychological value to me' or 'Its literary
value is negligible, though its entertainment value is not,' I am not
making a nornative statement in any sense, not even in the rather
artificial sense adopted by Stevenson, and others in that tradition.
A value judgment or evaluative judgment, that is, one which attrib-
utes a certain value to something, does not essentially express an
attitude, feeling, or emotion, nor evoke one in the listener, nor does
it necessarily command, recommend, praise (or the opposite) that
to which it attributes some value, nor of course is it of the sort to
which a person cannot give his sincere or full assent without con-
forming to it. For, unlike a normative statement, it does not typi-
cally contain a directive and so the question of conformity or other-
wise does not arise directly.
I cannot here go into the question of the differences between
judgments of value and judgments of merit or excellence. But this
at least should be clear: in speaking of the value of a thing we are
not necessarily or even typically speaking of its excellence, quality
or merit, as an individual (or exemplar) of a kind. The question
' Cf. For further details see my paper, "Moral Obligation." American
Philosophical Quarterly, July, 1966.
FACT, VALUE, AND NORM IN STEVENSON'S ETIICS 159
of whether something is a good strudel or one of poor quality is

quite a different question from that of its (various kinds of) value:
monetary, nutritive, aesthetic, or decorative. Lastly, it is of course
different also from the question of whether that strudel (knife, gun,
flashlight) was or was not on that occasion of any value to me,
and if so, how great that value was, and how it was to be ex-
pressed, i.e. what sort of benefit my having or using it on that
occasion bestowed on me.
A third point of considerable significance though (as we have
seen) played down by Stevenson rather than highlighted, is the
conviction that answers to questions of value, normative questions,
or practical questions are incapable of being empirically supported.
This conviction, though never made explicit (as far as I know), is
however plainly taken over from Moore. Stevenson accuses Dewey
(rightly, in my opinion) of failing to distinguish adequately be-
tween the "predictive" and the "de jure" function (EL 254-264) of
ethical terms and therefore of failing to appreciate the inapplica-
bility of the scientific, i.e. empirical, method to the de jure function
of ethical judgments. He praises Moore for having got this point
right (EL 271), but criticizes him for replacing the scientific em-
pirical method by some pseudoempirical method of "intuition"
(EL 108) or apprehension of a nonnatural quality (Cf. also FV 9).
In Stevenson's opinion the substitution of a persuasive definition
for Moore's naturalistic fallacy, and of emotive meaning for non-
natural qualities, disposes of the need in ethics for empirical or for
superempirical methods. (EL 273).
This seems to me a serious mistake. There is an empirical
factor in ethics! Of course, it is not empirical observation, but it is
experience. We learn many things from bitter (or sweet) experi-
ence (e.g. not to touch a flame), which we can not be said to
learn from observation, or at any rate from observation alone (as
we learn that dogs that bark don't usually bite.) The notions of
pleasure-pain, positive and negative intrinsic value, reward and
penalty, worthwhileness and the opposite, have all been used in
attempts to isolate discriminable units of experience in terms of
whose presence or absence "the experiential flow" can be rated.
The idea is to develop an economy or budget, not merely of our
time and energy, but also of the pay-off, yield, or return, i.e. of
what there is to show for the way we spend our lives. The mean-
ingfulness of such a way of looking at things suggests strongly that
there are some things which we find to be obnoxious and unpleas-
160 NONS
ant. But if there is such an experiential element with a plus and

minus quality to it, then it should be possible to determine the
soundness of our directives, and so of the correctness or truth of
our normative statements.
My last point is very general. I feel that the linguistic inves-
tigations which have preoccupied so many moral philosophers dur-
ing the last thirty years or so have been merely preliminary and to
a considerable extent irrelevant to the solution of moral problems.
The trend began with Moore's investigation of the peculiar mean-
ing of the so-called ethical terms. Much ingenuity was expended on
the question of whether or not 'good' was the name of a simple,
indefinable, nonnatural quality. In the course of this many impor-
tant matters became clearer: the idea of a quality, of the natural,
of evidence, of the relation between evidence and what it is evi-
dence for, the idea of necessity, of entailment and implication, of
synthetic necessary connections and so on, but comparatively little
light was shed on moral problems.
This tendency continued with the examination of the nature
of ethical judgments; an equal amount of ingenuity was lavished
on topics such as whether ethical judgments were assertions, state-
ments, propositions, descriptions, reports, or whether they were
ejaculations, imperatives, commands, proposals, ceremonial re-
marks, and so on, and so on. Here too, much came to light that
was fascinating, though not perhaps always strictly relevant to
moral problems. Similarly, my own remarks in this paper about the
differences between expressions of attitudes, normative statements
and value judgments make some things clearer without, however,
bearing directly on the ethical. Just as ethical terms, imperatives,
proposals, expressions of attitudes, and so forth are not peculiar to
or characteristic of the language of ethics or morals, so value judg-
ments and normative statements are not either. What we must in-
vestigate now, if we want to advance the subject, is the nature of
morality, as distinct from all those other things, such as law, cus-
tom, manners, religion, politics, in which the same linguistic ma-
chinery is used. I am not of course saying that these preliminary
investigations were useless. On the contrary, they set themselves a
limited task: "to sharpen the tools" which others (from legislators
to clergymen) employ (EL p. 1). They did not perhaps quite suc-
ceed in that. But at least they sharpened the tools which manufac-
ture the tools which . . . And who dare laugh at that in a tech-
nological society?

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Fact, Value, and Norm in Stevenson's Ethics

Author(s): Kurt Baier

It is now almost thirty years since the first appearance in

1 Work on the problems discussed in this article was made possible by

has appeared since, and they are likely to be influential for a

Stevenson's central ideas, as I have said before, are a novel

Stevenson embeds it within an account of ethics as a whole.

' I discuss the other two below, pp. 19 f. and pp. 20 f.

in attitude. I want to subject this central thesis to a simple test. I

2nd Rejoinder: Altermatively, Jack may be a loving and selfless

Conversely they may disagree on a moral issue and either agree

Relativization. Mrs. Jones' words in our example might be

inant attitude (whether manifested in one's actual behavior or in

that conduct in others, he may' then feel indignant, mortified, or

mal connection between having an attitude and tending to behave

discourse which make it possible to construct an absolutely de-

is something to verify or falsify by empirical observation, but

difficulties have not prevented Stevenson from regarding validity

ethical disagreements are in fact resolved, particularly since it is

The most plausible feature of Stevenson's theory has proba-

sarily influencing the questioner (Ibid, 15). However, Hare agrees

which there are correct and incorrect, adequate and inadequate,

responsible for the methodological anarchism characteristic of re-

are general, and of statements implying the applicability of such

of whether something is a good strudel or one of poor quality is

ant. But if there is such an experiential element with a plus and

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