Lynda Birke1

Intimate Familiarities? Feminism and

Human-Animal Studies

The study of human-nonhuman animal relationships,

like women’s studies, is a relative newcomer to the
academy. Both grew partly out of political move-
ments of the 1970s, challenging different forms of
oppression. Here, I ask whether there are insights
each could draw from the other, despite their dif-
ferences. I do so from personal academic experience
of both: But I write also from my own engagement
in those social movements of the 1970s and my belief
that politics that ignore other oppressions cannot be
liberatory politics for anyone. Undoubtedly, there is
some overlap between the concerns of both move-
ments: Both, for example, have a concern with rights
(however problematic that concept (Donovan, 1990;
Slicer, 1991)). Another common ground is in their
respective critiques of Western culture’s profound
commitment to distinguishing “us” from “others,”
which extinguishes differences among those others
(Plumwood, 1993) and in turn can help to reinforce
oppressions or abuse (Adams, 1993; Pagani, 2000).

Society & Animals 10:4

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2002
Despite overlaps, feminism and animal/human studies inevitably pursue dif-
ferent concerns and different directions. However, in so doing, some ideas
may be overlooked that could usefully inform one another’s research. My
purpose here is to draw—in very general terms—from some of these ideas
to suggest potential developments and dialogue. A signiécant point is that
both éelds generally ignore the central focus of the other; thus, academic fem-
inism tends to ignore animals while studies of human/animal relationships
tend to play down gender.2 If nonhuman animals are outside modern femi-
nist theory, it is partly because of the way that women and animals are linked
as “others.” As a result, women have long been denigrated by animal epi-
thets (Dunayer, 1995) mostly loaded with loathing.3 Societal assumptions are
so often read onto nature in terms redolent of gender stereotypes. Macho
males and coy females frequent scientiéc narratives (Schiebinger, 1993), while
ornithological éeld guides commonly dismiss females as “somewhat duller,”
subordinating females to descriptions of males (van de Pitte, 1998; Gruen,
1990).

Sexism in animal observation remains common and is one reason why fem-
inism has shied away from considering animals. In doing so, however, fem-
inism unwittingly relies on evolutionary discontinuity. Feminist scholarship
emphasizes how gender and sexuality are socially constructed and rejects
ideas rooted in biological determinism (e.g. that gender depends on biology).
Fine—but the èexibility implied by social constructionism extends only to
human behavior: Bodily functions remain biological, beyond èexibility, and
often untheorized (Birke, 1999). Moreover, the behavior of nonhuman ani-
mals remains largely in the realm of biology, outside the remit of most fem-
inist inquiry (Noske, 1993; Birke, 1994). So, discontinuity is reinforced implicitly,
and the chasm yawns between human culture and the rest of nature.

Nevertheless, several feminist theorists have analyzed the ways that gender,
race, and animality are deeply entwined concepts in our culture—they are
concepts that discursively construct one another (Haraway, 1989). Similarly,
Bryld and Lykke (2000) discuss the multiple and shifting meanings attached
to dolphins. That is, images of whales and dolphins have become particu-
larly potent symbols in cultural debate about what it means to be human.
“‘Human’ is deénitely not a neutral or innocent category, but a highly gen-
dered and racialized one,” as Bryld and Lykke (p. 33) point out. So, while

430 ï Lynda Birke

animals are absent from much modern feminism, these authors remind us
that how we think about both animality and gender is complex and inter-
dependent.

Empirical research on human-animal relationships has tended to equate gen-

der with male versus female but—in my view—rarely engages with gender
as a complex construct. In this éeld, the focus of social constructionism is on
the meanings we give to animals rather than on details of human behavior
(such as gender). Yet, we now understand gender in feminist scholarship to
be a highly nuanced construct with multiple meanings changing over time
(Nicholson, 1998; Butler, 1990). Butler ’s work has been inèuential here: For
her, gender is something people perform—we act out societal prescriptions of
gender to create identities (p. 25). The meanings of gender thus are not éxed
but èuid and multiple. What could human-animal studies take from this?

Ways Forward?
Clearly, cultural meanings of animals and gender are complex and power-
ful. But both éelds of inquiry could beneét from greater dialogue. Human-
animal studies could make more use of ideas of gender as a construct, as
something performed (Butler, 1990) rather than something we intrinsically
are.4 Although Butler was not addressing animals, we might ask how “gen-
der” becomes performed whenever we observe nonhuman animals. Is the
performance in the animals’ behavior or in our understandings of it (if we
can make that separation)? Or is it in our own performance in relation to that
of the animals?

We also might ask about performance within human-animal relationships.

Other species often are assumed hard-wired—even domesticated animals dif-
fering only slightly from “wild” counterparts—instinctively adapted to their
environment. But animals living with us also perform, while we too act out
roles in relation to them. Indeed, there are (human-imposed) cultural pre-
scriptions for the performance of the role of “companion animal”—not just
any old behavior will do. Let me give an example: In the “horsey” world
that I know well, stallions now are more popular. Their behavior often accords
with human beliefs—if people believe stallions are hormone-crazy males,
difécult and dangerous, they will probably be so; or, they can be docile and

Feminism and Human-Animal Studies ï 431

easy to handle, if associated people believe they can be and act accordingly.
So, in a sense, these animals learn to perform a role emerging from their rela-
tionships with people. It could be, I suggest, a useful rubric for research to
ask how participants of any species come to perform relationships. Domesti-
cation, indeed, could be a historical process of performances of the roles of
companion animal and human caretaker, deeply intertwined.5

Feminist studies, by contrast, need to think more about what animals are and
the gender-laden meanings of both generalized and speciéc kinds of “ani-
mals.” Relatedly, feminist theory needs to consider its reliance on evolution-
ary discontinuity (Hawkins, 1998). It does not help feminism to assume,
however implicitly, that “animals” are “other.” Feminist theory focuses par-
ticularly on the creation and meaning of difference; but, important though
that move is, it still rests on a generalized, nonhuman “other,” just a differ-
ent one (Kappeler, 1995). It is ironic that, while feminist theorists emphasize
the èuidity of gender, the same theory assumes an underlying éxity of nature
and animals. Moreover, in rejecting biological determinism, feminists should
not fear a “dumbing down” to what has emerged culturally as “animality”;
rather, we should recognize the myriad ways in which various nonhumans
engage with their worlds. We need other ways to include animals in femi-
nist theories rather than rejecting them as “outside culture.” Doing so might
move us beyond simple dichotomies of biology/determinism versus social
constructionism (Birke, 1994).

Relatedly, while feminists often emphasize the “situatedness” of each per-

son’s knowledge (Haraway, 1991), this tends to assume a human social con-
text. Rarely is the living environment part of this emerging understanding.6
Yet, we create knowledge in relation to a plethora of other life forms, not
only humans. Seeing other kinds of lives as situated like our own might pro-
mote empathy with them, a shift paralleling growing demands for more
empathy7 in scientiéc studies of nonhuman animals (Galdikas, 1996; Bekoff,
1994). Calls for more empathy in studying animals are part of a groundswell
of changing attitudes toward reductionist science and the impoverished view
of the lives of animals that it encourages. Empathy, moreover, must involve
relating to others who are different—of whatever species—and whose indi-
vidual life histories are seen as part of that relation. It is not enough solely
to focus only on those who are similar, leaving “others” as an undifferenti-

432 ï Lynda Birke

ated mass. That has been a key insight of modern feminist theory, at least in
relation to women. It needs extending beyond boundaries of species. There
is growing evidence, too, that some kinds of nonhuman animals clearly have
a social self who can recognize and take the role of “the other.” Sanders’
(1999) study of dogs in relation to humans—and the complexities of both—
is one example: He argues, “Intimate familiarity with others—be they human
or nonhuman—offers the richest of information” (p. 148).

I have sketched here some areas of potentially fruitful dialogue. Human-ani-

mal studies have made some marvelous insights into how we humans relate
to nonhumans. However, they could usefully apply feminist insights about
how gender also structures our social world and our performance within it.
But feminist theory, too, must abandon its separation from the rest of the liv-
ing world. This limits feminist theory and politics, and feminists could learn
much about the signiécance of nonhumans in our culture. Our lives are sit-
uated not only within human social engagements but also—whether we know
or acknowledge it—profoundly with other species. This, I think, is an insight
that comes from dialogue between these two disparate éelds. We all share in
making and remaking the world. We all share in co-creating our situated-
ness. Perhaps, indeed, we all need theories based on intimate familiarities.

* Lynda Birke, University of Lancaster

Notes
1
Correspondence should be addressed to Lynda Birke, Institute of Women’s Studies,
University of Lancaster, Lancaster, UK LA1 4YW. Email: ghv37@dial.pipex.com. I
am very grateful to Consuelo Rivera, Lori Gruen, Nina Lykke, and Mette Bryld for
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper and to my various canine and
equine friends who ensure that I sometimes leave the computer.
2
There are exceptions: Several ecofeminist writers focus on animals (Adams, 1994;
Gaard, 1993; Gruen, 1994). Gender is sometimes included as a variable in empir-
ical studies of human/animals (Kruse, 1999) but is rarely problematized as a
concept.
3
There are numerous examples of denigrating animal words applied to women—
chick, cow, beaver, pussy, for example. When animal words refer to men, it is usu-
ally to imply something more highly valued, even if ambivalently: Calling men
studs or stags are examples.

Feminism and Human-Animal Studies ï 433

4
Butler emphasizes the èuidity rather than éxity of gender. But we perform gen-
der according to societal precepts: In that sense, we learn to “play by the rules”,
thus channeling gender. These processes may not be conscious (except in parodic
performances such as drag: Butler, 1990, p. 137).
5
I want to stress here that I see such performance as constraining (gender constrains
how we behave, just as companion animals are constrained by our cultural assump-
tions about what is appropriate for them). I do not wish to imply positive or neg-
ative evaluation, just that this might be a useful way of thinking about how our
relationships with animals develop.
6
The “situatedness” of knowledge refers to the speciécities and context of the knower;
thus, how people know the world (in terms, say, of gender) depends upon their
social context. There is thus no one way of knowing. This idea is explored by
Haraway (1991). Haraway is, however, rather more inclusive of other species than
many other feminist writers who have used her idea of situated knowledge.
7
By empathy, I mean an ability to recognize another’s pain or experience. To stress
empathy/compassion in this way may help to move away from notions of raw
emotion (often seen as sentimentality), which can bedevil discussions of animals:
I am grateful to L. Gruen for pointing this out (personal communication).

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