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RULE 128
General Provisions
Section 2. Scope. — The rules of evidence shall be the same in all courts and in
all trials and hearings, except as otherwise provided by law or these rules. (2a)
Comments
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the
prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques. Based
on Dr. de Ungrias testimony, it was determined that the gene type and DNA profile
of appellant are identical to that of the extracts subject of examination. The blood
sample taken from the appellant showed that he was of the following gene types:
vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP29/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical with
semen taken from the victims vaginal canal. Verily, a DNA match exists between
the semen found in the victim and the blood sample given by the appellant in open
court during the course of the trial.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow (509 U.S. 579 (1993); 125 L. Ed. 2d 469) it was ruled that
pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used as long
as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater
discretion over which testimony they would allow at trial, including the introduction
of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure.
DNA is the fundamental building block of a persons entire genetic make-up. DNA
is found in all human cells and is the same in every cell of the same person.
Genetic identity is unique. Hence, a persons DNA profile can determine his
identity.
The chemical structure of DNA has four bases. They are known
as A (adenine), G (guanine), C (cystosine) and T (thymine). The order in which
the four bases appear in an individuals DNA determines his or her physical
makeup. And since DNA is a double-stranded molecule, it is composed of two
specific paired bases, A-T or T-A and G-C or C-G. These are called genes.
Every gene has a certain number of the above base pairs distributed in a
particular sequence. This gives a person his or her genetic code. Somewhere
in the DNA framework, nonetheless, are sections that differ. They are known
as polymorphic loci, which are the areas analyzed in DNA typing (profiling,
tests, fingerprinting, or analysis/DNA fingerprinting/genetic tests or
fingerprinting). In other words, DNA typing simply means determining
the polymorphic loci.
The 2002 case of People v. Vallejo discussed DNA analysis as evidence. This
may be considered a 180 degree turn from the Courts wary attitude towards DNA
testing in the 1997 PeLim case, where we stated that DNA, being a relatively new
science, xxx has not yet been accorded official recognition by our courts.
In 2004, there were two other cases that had a significant impact on jurisprudence
on DNA testing: People v. Yatar and In re: The Writ of Habeas Corpus for
Reynaldo de Villa. In Yatar, a match existed between the DNA profile of the
semen found in the victim and the DNA profile of the blood sample given by
appellant in open court. The Court, following Vallejos footsteps, affirmed the
conviction of appellant because the physical evidence, corroborated by
circumstantial evidence, showed appellant guilty of rape with homicide. In De
Villa, the convict-petitioner presented DNA test results to prove that he is not the
father of the child conceived at the time of commission of the rape. The Court ruled
In the present case, the various pleadings filed by petitioner and respondent refer
to two United States cases to support their respective positions on the admissibility
of DNA analysis as evidence: Frye v. U.S. and Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals. In Frye v. U.S., the trial court convicted Frye of murder. Frye
appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. During
trial, Fryes counsel offered an expert witness to testify on the result of a systolic
blood pressure deception test made on defendant. The state Supreme Court
affirmed Fryes conviction and ruled that the systolic blood pressure deception test
has not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition among physiological
and psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert
testimony deduced from the discovery, development, and experiments thus far
made. The Frye standard of general acceptance states as follows:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in
this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and
while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a
well recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
In 1989, State v. Schwartz modified the Frye standard. Schwartz was charged
with stabbing and murder. Bloodstained articles and blood samples of the
accused and the victim were submitted for DNA testing to a government facility
While we agree with the trial court that forensic DNA typing has gained
general acceptance in the scientific community, we hold that admissibility of
specific test results in a particular case hinges on the laboratorys compliance
with appropriate standards and controls, and the availability of their testing
data and results.
In 1993, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. further modified the Frye-
Schwartz standard. Daubert was a product liability case where both the trial and
appellate courts denied the admissibility of an experts testimony because it failed
to meet the Frye standard of general acceptance. The United States Supreme
Court ruled that in federal trials, the Federal Rules of Evidence have superseded
the Frye standard. Rule 401 defines relevant evidence, while Rule 402 provides
the foundation for admissibility of evidence. Thus:
Rule 401. Relevant evidence is defined as that which has any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.
Daubert cautions that departure from the Frye standard of general acceptance
does not mean that the Federal Rules do not place limits on the admissibility of
scientific evidence. Rather, the judge must ensure that the testimonys reasoning or
method is scientifically valid and is relevant to the issue. Admissibility would
depend on factors such as (1) whether the theory or technique can be or has been
tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and
publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error; (4) the existence and
maintenance of standards controlling the techniques operation; and (5) whether
the theory or technique is generally accepted in the scientific community.
Another product liability case, Kumho Tires Co. v. Carmichael, further modified
the Daubert standard. This led to the amendment of Rule 702 in 2000 and which
now reads as follows:
This Rule does not pose any legal obstacle to the admissibility of DNA analysis as
evidence. Indeed, even evidence on collateral matters is allowed when it tends in
any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in
issue.
Indeed, it would have been convenient to merely refer petitioner to our decisions
in Tijing, Vallejo and Yatar to illustrate that DNA analysis is admissible as
evidence. In our jurisdiction, the restrictive tests for admissibility established
by Frye-Schwartz and Daubert-Kumho go into the weight of the evidence.
Despite our relatively liberal rules on admissibility, trial courts should be cautious in
giving credence to DNA analysis as evidence. We reiterate our statement
in Vallejo:
We also repeat the trial courts explanation of DNA analysis used in paternity
cases:
In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable
regions in an individual to produce a DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA
profiles of the mother and child, it is possible to determine which half of the
childs DNA was inherited from the mother. The other half must have been
inherited from the biological father. The alleged fathers profile is then
examined to ascertain whether he has the DNA types in his profile, which
match the paternal types in the child. If the mans DNA types do not match
that of the child, the man is excluded as the father. If the DNA types match,
then he is not excluded as the father.
It is not enough to state that the childs DNA profile matches that of the putative
father. A complete match between the DNA profile of the child and the DNA profile
of the putative father does not necessarily establish paternity. For this reason,
following the highest standard adopted in an American jurisdiction, trial courts
should require at least 99.9% as a minimum value of the Probability of Paternity
(W) prior to a paternity inclusion. W is a numerical estimate for the likelihood of
paternity of a putative father compared to the probability of a random match of two
unrelated individuals. An appropriate reference population database, such as the
DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from paternity should be conclusive
proof of non-paternity. If the value of W is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA
analysis should be considered as corroborative evidence. If the value of W is
99.9% or higher, then there is refutable presumption of paternity. This refutable
presumption of paternity should be subjected to the Vallejo standards.
Section 17, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides that no person shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself. Petitioner asserts that obtaining
samples from him for DNA testing violates his right against self-incrimination.
Petitioner ignores our earlier pronouncements that the privilege is applicable only
to testimonial evidence. Again, we quote relevant portions of the trial courts 3
February 2000 Order with approval:
The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the
paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children, is without
prejudice to the right of the putative parent to claim his or her own
defenses. Where the evidence to aid this investigation is obtainable through
the facilities of modern science and technology, such evidence should be
considered subject to the limits established by the law, rules, and
jurisprudence.”
If the student therefore dreams of litigating cases in court, poking holes in the
testimony of a witness, reducing exaggerations to their proper proportions, and
unmasking a perjurer who pretends to be a purveyor of truth in the witness stand,
then a mastery of this subject matter is a must. And that is not all. A mastery of the
Rules on Evidence, it must be remembered, could help ease the court dockets or
calendar. No less than Wellman’s “The Art of Cross Examination” attests to this.
Thus:
Xxx
This congestion is not due to the fact that there are too few judges, or
that they too are not capable and industrious men; but is largely, it seems to me,
the fault of the system in vogue in all our American courts of allowing any lawyer
duly enrolled as a member of the Bar, to practice in the highest courts. X x x One
The conduct of a case in court is a peculiar art for which many men,
however learned in the law, are not fitted; and where a lawyer has but one or even
a dozen appearances in court in each year, he can never become a competent
trial lawyer. I am not addressing myself to clients, who often assume that, because
we are duly qualified as lawyers, we are therefore competent to try their cases; I
am speaking in behalf of our courts, against the congestion of the calendars, and
the consequent crowding out of weighty commercial litigations.
One experienced in the trial of causes will not require, at the utmost,
more than a quarter of the time taken by the most learned inexperienced lawyer in
developing his facts. His case will be thoroughly prepared and understood before
the trial begins. His points of law and issues of fact will be clearly defined and
presented to the court and jury in the fewest possible words. He will in this way
avoid many of the erroneous rulings on questions of law and evidence which are
now upsetting so many verdicts on appeal. He will not only complete his trial in
shorter time, but he will be likely to bring about an equitable verdict in the case
which may not be appealed from at all, or, if appealed, will be sustained by a
higher court, instead of being sent back for a retrial and the consequent
consumption of the time of another judge and jury in doing the work all over again.
X x x”
Either for the purpose of mere lawyerly intellectual calisthenics or for the more
sublime reason of re-affirming Christian faith viewed through the prism of the law
on evidence, it is a most strikingly intriguing question to answer whether the Bible
can qualify as “admissible or competent documentary piece of evidence” and the
testimonies of the Four Evangelists, i.e, Matthew, Mark, Luke and John, as
competent testimonial evidence, in our courts.
“Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals wrongfully applied the “ancient
document rule” provided in Sec. 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. The rule states
that:
Sec. 22. Evidence of execution not necessary.— Were a private writing is more
than thirty years old, is produced from a custody in which it would naturally be
found if genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of
suspicion, no other evidence of its execution and authenticity need be given.
We are not persuaded by the contention. Under the “ancient document rule,” for a
private ancient document to be exempt from proof of due execution and
authenticity, it is not enough that it be more than thirty (30) years old; it is
also necessary that the following requirements are fulfilled; (1) that it is
produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine; and
(2) that it is unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion.
Documents which affect real property, in order that they may bind third parties,
must be recorded with the appropriate Register of Deeds. The documents in
question, being certified as copies of originals on file with the Register of Deeds of
As to the last requirement that the document must on its face appear to be
genuine, petitioners did not present any conclusive evidence to support their
allegation of falsification of the said documents. They merely alluded to the fact
that the lack of signatures on the first two (2) pages could have easily led to their
substitution. We cannot uphold this surmise absent any proof whatsoever. As held
in one case, a contract apparently honest and lawful on its face must be treated as
such and one who assails the genuineness of such contract must present
conclusive evidence of falsification.
Moreover, the last requirement of the “ancient document rule” that a document
must be unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion refers to the
extrinsic quality of the document itself. The lack of signatures on the first pages,
therefore, absent any alterations or circumstances of suspicion cannot be held to
detract from the fact that the documents in question, which were certified as
copied of the originals on file with the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, are
genuine and free from any blemish or circumstances of suspicion.
Academic scholars have had some acrimonious debate on the veracity of the
accounts in the Gospels of Matthew, Mark, Luke and John about the “Resurrection
of Jesus Christ”.
The only source of evidence to support a theory either in favour of, or against, the
proposition that indeed the Resurrection is a historical truth and not a hoax, is the
New Testament which comprise of the testimonies of the Evangelists.
While teaching law at Harvard, Professor Greenleaf stated to his class that the
resurrection of Jesus Christ was simply a legend; as an atheist he thought
miracles to be impossible. In a rebuttal, three of his law students challenged
him to apply his acclaimed rules of evidence to the resurrection account.
After much prodding, Greenleaf accepted his students’ challenge and began
an investigation into the evidence. Focusing his brilliant legal mind on the
facts of history, Greenleaf attempted to prove the resurrection account was
false.
Greenleaf was unable to explain several dramatic changes that took place
shortly after Jesus died, the most baffling being the behavior of the disciples.
It wasn’t just one or two disciples who insisted Jesus had risen; it was all of
them. Applying his own rules of evidence to the facts, Greenleaf arrived at his
verdict.
Greenleaf begins his book by arguing for the need to suspend prejudices and
to be open to conviction, “to follow the truth wherever it may lead us” (p. 1).
He cites Bishop Daniel Wilson’s Evidences by stating that Christianity does
Greenleaf proceeds to argue that “In matters of public and general interest,
all persons must be presumed to be conversant, on the principle that
individuals are presumed to be conversant with their own affairs” (p. 9). On
the basis of this legal rule, Greenleaf briefly profiles those traditionally
attributed as authors of the Four Gospels, Matthew, Mark, Luke and John,
concerning (in the case of John and Matthew) their firsthand knowledge of
the life of Jesus of Nazareth and (in the case of Mark and Luke) their intimate
personal links with Jesus’ original band of disciples.
Greenleaf then argues that the gospel writers can be shown to be honest in
their character and do not show any motives to falsify their testimony (pp. 28–
31). He claims that keen observations and meticulous details are related by
Matthew and Luke, and he concludes this demonstrates their ability (pp. 31–
32). Greenleaf notes that there are parallel accounts from the evangelists
concerning the central events of Jesus’ life and that these accounts are not
verbally identical. He maintains that discrepancies in their accounts are
evidence that the writers are not guilty of collusion, and that the discrepancies
in their respective accounts can be resolved or harmonized upon careful
cross-examination and comparison of the details (pp 32–35). Greenleaf
argues against the scepticism of the Scottish empirical philosopher David
Hume concerning reports of miracles. He finds fault with Hume’s position
about “immutable laws from the uniform course of human experience” (p. 36),
and goes on to assert that it is a fallacy because “it excludes all knowledge
derived by inference or deduction from facts, confining us to what we derive
from experience alone” (pp. 37–38). Greenleaf takes as his own assumption
that as God exists then such a being is capable of performing miracles. He
then argues that the various miracles reported in Jesus’ ministry occurred in
open or public contexts where friend and foe alike were witnesses (pp 39–
“All that Christianity asks of men on this subject, is, that they would be
consistent with themselves; that they would treat its evidences as they treat
the evidence of other things; and that they would try and judge its actors and
witnesses, as they deal with their fellow men, when testifying to human affairs
and actions, in human tribunals. Let the witnesses be compared with
themselves, with each other, and with the surrounding facts and
circumstances; and let their testimony be sifted, as if it were given in a court
of justice, on the side of the adverse party, the witnesses being subjected to a
rigorous cross-examination. The result, it is confidently believed, will be an
undoubting conviction of their integrity, ability and truth … Either the men of
Galilee were men of superlative wisdom, and extensive knowledge and
experience, and of deeper skill in the arts of deception, than any and all
others, before or after them, or they have truly stated the astonishing things
which they saw and heard” (pp. 46 & 53).
In the history of Christian apologetics there have been many lawyers who
have written texts commending and defending their faith. In recent years
writers such as John Warwick Montgomery, Ross Clifford and Philip Johnson
have described the contributions made by lawyers as a distinct school of
thought and use the terms “juridical apologetics”, “jural apologetics” and
“legal apologetics”. These writers point to the Seventeenth century Dutch
Critical assessment
There are two examples of writers in recent years who have made critical
assessments of Greenleaf’s work, and of legal apologists who model their
arguments on his book. Howard Richard Packham is a retired foreign
language instructor and former part-time estate planning attorney who holds
to an atheist worldview. He has written an internet article criticising the
technical arguments set forth by Greenleaf and others. Packham holds that
what Greenleaf submits as eyewitness testimony is technically hearsay and
therefore does not comprise direct evidence to demonstrate the resurrection
of Jesus. He also holds that the criteria for the “ancient documents rule” is not
met by the gospel documents and that the force of Greenleaf’s argument is
thereby undermined. Packham argues that the ancient documents rule
technically only applies to a limited genre of legal documents, such as wills
and contracts and other specific legal instruments, to which the gospels do
not belong. However, there are problems in Packham’s argument. The Ancient
Documents Rule is not limited to express legal instruments, but covers any
type of documents. The criteria for the Ancient Documents Rule is simple and
straightforward. According to legal authorities, documents of any type must
meet three criteria in order to qualify for the Ancient Documents Rule: 1) that
the document is at least 20 years old, 2) presumed to be genuine, 3) come
from proper custody (cf. Black’s Law Dictionary, FRE 901(b)(8)). Greenleaf, as
a writer of highest legal authority, concluded that the Gospels should be
received under the ancient documents rule. In §9 of his Testimony of the
Ross Clifford, who is a former Australian barrister and a theologian, has often
written about the subject of legal apologists. Clifford affirms the case for the
resurrection of Jesus. He states that it may appear to opponents that legal
apologists like Greenleaf have at different points overstated their case. In his
first book Leading Lawyers’ Case for the Resurrection he devoted a brief
chapter on Greenleaf’s life and work. In that text he raised a technical
question about the ancient documents rule and suggested that hypothetically
a court could admit the gospels as ancient documents, but that does not
mean that their specific contents are automatically acknowledged as facts
(p. 141). However, the trier of fact is allowed to weigh the evidence of the
contents of the writings. Clifford clarifies the purpose of the ancient
“The ‘Ancient Documents’ rule at common law has traditionally related more
to the authentication of the document than with the admissibility of its
contents. It does not automatically lead to admission of the substance of the
document irrespective of its credibility. (It can be argued this is even true
today for the United States, even though the Federal Rule of Evidence 803
[16] states statements in Ancient Documents are admissible as exemptions to
hearsay). Greenleaf takes no cognisance of this position and asserts that
when an instrument is admitted under the said rule the court is bound to
receive into evidence its substance as well unless the opposing party is able
to impeach it … The question as to whether the authentication of the gospels
under the ‘Ancient Documents’ rule leads to receiving their substance into
evidence is contentious. It could be strongly pleaded there is justification for
doing so. Yet, it should be noted such pleading would be met by the adverse
party’s strong rejoinder” (pp. 60-61 & 63).
But regardless of whether Faith has been increased or decreased, what is vital is
the point that the “Ancient Document Rule” is a universal rule on evidence which
purpose is to shun rigidity in requiring authentication of any and all documents. Of
course, authentication under Sec. 22, Rule 132 is accomplished by “any witness
who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the
person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has
acted or been charged x x x”. But this witness may sometimes be unavailable or
even if available, may refuse to participate in the trial. Thus, the expedience of the
“Ancient Document Rule” which in the end may either correct a skewed part of
history or unearth a long historically hidden truth.
Indeed, faith or religion may not be totally divorced from law after all.