1 On 7 August 1989, the Trial Court1 denied the Writ of Prohibition and upheld the power of respondent Mayor

to order the demolition without judicial authority, adverting to Zoning Ordinance No. 147 of the Municipality
of Isabela, Basilan. Petitioner duly interposed an appeal.
G.R. No. 95279 July 25, 1991

On 6 September 1989, petitioner's quonset building was completely demolished (Rollo, p. 49). In its place
ESTATE OF GREGORIA FRANCISCO, herein represented by SILVESTRE F. TAN,
sprang shanties and nipa huts, photographs of which have been attached to petitioner's Memorandum.
Administrator, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SALVADOR A. MEMORACION, in his capacity as Presiding Judge On 25 January 1990, the Court of Appeals (in CA-G.R. SP No. 18822)2 initially reversed the Trial Court and
of the Regional Trial Court of Isabela, Basilan Province, Branch 2, MUNICIPALITY OF ISABELA, issued a Writ of Prohibition. It ruled that Respondent Mayor was not vested with power to order summarily,
Basilan Province, herein represented by BENJAMIN VALENCIA, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor, and without any judicial proceeding, the demolition of the quonset building, which was not a nuisance per
Isabela, Basilan Province, ROGELIO L. IGOT, FELICISIMO PIOQUINTO, DANIEL PADINAS, ANTONIO se and that petitioner is in legal possession of the land on which the building stands by virtue of the permit
CABANGON, FELIX ROXAS, BENJAMIN FERRER, GREGORIO TABADA, EFREN DELOS REYES, issued by the Philippine Ports Authority (Zamboanga Province). The restoration to petitioner of the building
FLORENCIO HUGO, JESUS FRANCISCO, ALFREDO TUBILAG, PABLO ANDRES, respondents. materials removed upon demolition, and the payment to it of attorney's fees of P10,000.00, were also
ordered.
Bienvenido G. Martin for petitioner.
Laurencio Saavedra for private respondents. However, upon reconsideration sought by reswever, upon reconsideration sought by respondent officials,
Respondent Court3 reversed itself on 13 June 1990 stating that "although Municipal Mayor Valencia initially
issued an order demolition without judicial process, the deficiency was remedied when appellant (petitioners
herein) filed a petition for prohibition and injunction and was heard on oral argument after appellees
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
(respondent officials) filed their answer." Respondent Court then quashed the Writ of Prohibition and set
aside the order of restitution and payment of attorney's fees.
Litigated herein is a quonset building situated in Port Area, Strong Boulevard, Isabela, Basilan, which was
ordered demolished by respondent Municipal Mayor, Benjamin Valencia. Respondent municipal employees
Petitioner's plea for reconsideration having been denied, it is now before us seeking a reversal.
implemented the demolition, for which reason they are also impleaded.

The focal issue for determination is whether or not Respondent Mayor could summarily, without judicial
The quonset was constructed by the American Liberation Forces in 1944. It was purchased in 1946 by
process, order the demolition of petitioner's quonset building.
Gregoria Francisco, who died in 1976. It stands on a lot owned by the Philippine Ports Authority and faces
the municipal wharf. By virtue of Proclamation No. 83 issued by President Elpidio Quirino, said land was
declared for the exclusive use of port facilities. Respondent justify the demolition in the exercise of police power and for reasons of health, safety and
general welfare. It also relies on Ordinance No. 147 (CA Records, pp. 85-104) of the Municipality of Isabela.
For its part petitioner consistently denies to the Mayor, such power, invoking provisions of the Local
On 10 January 1989, the Philippine Ports Authority (Port of Zamboanga) issued to Tan Gin San, surviving
Government Code.
spouse of Gregoria Francisco, a permit to occupy the lot where the building stands for a period of one (1)
year, to expire on 31 December 1989. The permittee was using the quonset for the storage of copra.
Ordinance No. 147, enacted on 27 December 1977, and relied upon by respondents, is entitled "An
Ordinance Establishing Comprehensive Zoning Regulations for the Municipality of Isabela . . ." It is not
On 8 May 1989, Respondent Mayor, through respondent Municipal Action Officer, notified Tan Gin San by
disputed that the quonset building, which is being used for the storage of copra, is located outside the zone
mail to remove or relocate its quonset building, citing Zoning Ordinance No. 147 of the municipality; noting
for warehouses. It is referred to in Ordinance as a non-conforming structure, which should be relocated. And
its antiquated and dilapidated structure; and. stressing the "clean-up campaign on illegal squatters and
in the event that an immediate relocation of the building can not be accomplished, Section 16 of the
unsanitary surroundings along Strong Boulevard." This was followed by another letter of 19 May 1989 of the
Ordinance provides:
same tenor.

A certificate of non-conformance for all non-conforming uses shall be applied for by the owner or
Since the notifications remained unheeded by petitioner, Respondent Mayor ordered the demolition on 24
agent of the property involved within twelve (12) months from the approval of this Ordinance,
May 1989.
otherwise the non-conforming use may be condemned or removed at the owner's expense.

Aggrieved, petitioner sought a Writ of Prohibition with Injunction and Damages before the Regional Trial
Even granting that petitioner failed to apply for a Certificate of Non-conformance, the foregoing provision
Court of Basilan, Branch 2 (docketed as S.P. No. 4).
should not be interpreted as authorizing the summary removal of a non-conforming building by the municipal
government. For if it does, it must be struck down for being in contravention of the requirements of due manner of its operation, that question cannot be determined by a mere resolution of the board.
process, as originally held by the respondent Court. The petitioner is entitled to a fair and impartial heating before a judicial tribunal. (Iloilo Cold Storage
v. Municipal Council, 24 Phil. 47 [1913]).
Moreover, the enforcement and administration of the provisions of the Ordinance resides with the Zoning
Administrator (Article VII, Secs. 1 and 2, Ordinance No. 147). It is said official who may call upon the City Petitioner was in lawful possession of the lot and quonset building by virtue of a permit from the Philippine
Fiscal to institute the necessary legal proceedings to enforce the provisions of the Ordinance (id., Sec. Ports Authority (Port of Zamboanga) when demolition was effected. It was not squatting on public land. Its
2, Ibid.). And any person aggrieved by the decision of the Zoning Administrator regarding the enforcement property was not of trifling value. It was entitled to an impartial hearing before a tribunal authorized to decide
of the Ordinance may appeal to the Board of Zoning Appeals (id., Sec. 7, Ibid.). whether the quonset building did constitute a nuisance in law. There was no compelling necessity for
precipitate action. It follows then that respondent public officials of the Municipality of Isabela, Basilan,
transcended their authority in abating summarily petitioner's quonset building. They had deprived petitioner
That a summary remedy can not be resorted to is further evident from the penal provisions of said Ordinance,
of its property without due process of law. The fact that petitioner filed a suit for prohibition and was
reading:
subsequently heard thereon will not cure the defect, as opined by the Court of Appeals, the demolition having
been a fait accompli prior to hearing and the authority to demolish without a judicial order being a prejudicial
Any person who violates any of the provisions of this ordinance shall, upon conviction, be issue.
punished by a fine of not less than fifty pesos (P50.00) but not more than two hundred pesos
(P200.00) or by imprisonment of not less than one (1) month but not exceeding six (6) months, or
For the precipitate demolition, therefore, petitioner should be entitled to just compensation, the amount of
both, at the discretion of the Court . . . (ibid., Sec. 11). [Emphasis ours].
which is for the Trial Court to determine. We are not inclined to grant petitioner damages, however, as it
simply ignored the demand to remove or relocate its quonset building.
Violation of a municipal ordinance neither empowers the Municipal Mayor to avail of extra-judicial
remedies.1avvphi1 On the contrary, the Local Government Code imposes upon him the duty "to cause to
WHEREFORE, the judgment under review of respondent Court of Appeals, dated 13 June 1990, is SET
be instituted judicial proceedings in connection with the violation of ordinances" (Local Government Code,
ASIDE; its original Decision, promulgated on 25 January 1990, is REINSTATED; and this case is ordered
Sec. 141 [2] [t]).
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Basilan, Branch 2, for the determination of the just compensation
due petitioner for the demolition of its quonset building.
Respondents can not seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances
without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se or one which affects the immediate
SO ORDERED.
safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity
(Monteverde v. Generoso, 52 Phil. 123 [1982]). The storage of copra in the quonset building is a legitimate
business. By its nature, it can not be said to be injurious to rights of property, of health or of comfort of the
community.1âwphi1 If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that
purpose. It is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention. 2

The provincial governor, district engineer or district health officer is not authorized to destroy G.R. No. 40243 March 11, 1992
private property consisting of dams and fishponds summarily and without any judicial proceedings
whatever under the pretense that such private property constitutes a nuisance. A dam or a fishery
CELESTINO TATEL, petitioner,
constructed in navigable rivers is not a nuisance per se. A dam or fishpond may be a nuisance per
vs.
accidens where it endangers or impairs the health or depreciates property by causing water to
MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC, SALVADOR A. SURTIDA, in his capacity as Mayor of Virac, Catanduanes;
become stagnant. (Monteverde v. Generoso, supra).
GAVINO V. GUERRERO, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of Virac, Catanduanes; JOSE T. BUEBOS, in
his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; ANGELES TABLIZO, in his capacity as Councilor
While the Sangguniang Bayan may provide for the abatement of a nuisance (Local Government Code, Sec. of Virac, Catanduanes; ELPIDIO T. ZAFE, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes;
149 [ee]), it can not declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se and order its condemnation. The nuisance MARIANO ALBERTO, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; JULIA A. GARCIA, in her
can only be so adjudged by judicial determination. capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; and PEDRO A. GUERRERO, in his capacity as
Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes, respondents.
[Municipal councils] do not have the power to find as a fact that a particular thing is a nuisance
when such thing is not a nuisance per se nor can they authorize the extra judicial condemnation
and destruction of that as a nuisance which, in its nature, situation or use is not such. These things
must be determined in the ordinary courts of law. In the present case, . . . the ice factory of the
plaintiff is not a nuisance per se. It is a legitimate industry . . . . If it be in fact a nuisance due to the
NOCON, J.:
This is a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction with the Court of First Instance of Catanduanes
filed by appellant, Celestino Tatel, a businessman engaged in the import and export of abaca and other
products against the Municipal Council of Virac, Catanduanes and its municipal officials enjoining them from
enforcing Resolution No 29 1of the Council, declaring the warehouse of petitioner in barrio Sta. Elena of the
said municipality a public nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and
directing the petitioner to remove and transfer said warehouse to a more suitable place within two (2) months
from receipt of the said resolution.
2. Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, is a legitimate and valid exercise of police power
by the Municipal Council of Virac is not (sic) unconstitutional and void as claimed by the
petitioner;
3. The storage by the petitioner of abaca and copra in the warehouse is not only in
violation of the provisions of the ordinance but poses a grave danger to the safety of the
lives and properties of the residents of the neighborhood due to accidental fire and
constitutes a public nuisance under the provisions of Article 694 of the New Civil code
of the Philippines and may be abated;

It appears from the records that on the basis of complaints received from the residents of barrio Sta. Elena 4. Accordingly, the petitioner is hereby directed to remove from the said warehouse all
on March 18, 1966 against the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside the abaca and copra and other inflammable articles stored therein which are prohibited
warehouse of petitioner which affected the peace and tranquility of the neighborhood due to the smoke, under the provisions of Ordinance No. 13, within a period of two (2) months from the
obnoxious odor and dust emitted by the machine, a committee was appointed by the municipal council of time this decision becomes final and that henceforth, the petitioner is enjoined from
Virac to investigate the matter. The committee noted the crowded nature of the neighborhood with narrow storing such prohibited articles in the warehouse. With costs against petitioner.
roads and the surrounding residential houses, so much so that an accidental fire within the warehouse of
the petitioner occasioned by the continuance of the activity inside the warehouse and the storing of
Seeking appellate review, petitioner raised as errors of the court a quo:
inflammable materials created a danger to the lives and properties of the people within the neighborhood.

1. In holding that Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, of the Municipality of Virac,
Resultantly, Resolution No. 29 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac on April 22, 1966 declaring the
Catanduanes, is a legitimate and valid exercise of police power of the Municipal Council,
warehouse owned and operated by petitioner a public nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the New
and therefore, constitutional;
Civil Code. 2

2. In giving the ordinance a meaning other than and different from what it provided by
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Municipal Council of Virac, petitioner instituted the
declaring that petitioner violated the same by using the warehouse for storage of abaca
present petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction.
and copra when what is prohibited and penalized by the ordinance is the construction
of warehouses.
Respondent municipal officials contend that petitioner's warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance
No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the
3. In refusing to take judicial notice of the fact that in the municipality, there are
poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to
numerous establishments similarly situated as appellants' warehouses but which are
avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire.
not prosecuted.

On the other hand, petitioner contends that said ordinance is unconstitutional, contrary to the due process
We find no merit in the Petition.
and equal protection clause of the Constitution and null and void for not having been passed in accordance
with law.
Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police
power. It is a settled principle of law that municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion
The issue then boils down on whether petitioner's warehouse is a nuisance within the meaning of Article 694
and maintenance of local self-government and as such are endowed with the police powers in order to
of the Civil Code and whether Ordinance No. 13, S. 1952 of the Municipality of Virac is unconstitutional and
effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. 3 Its authority emanates from the
void.
general welfare clause under the Administrative Code, which reads:

In a decision dated September 18, 1969, the court a quo ruled as follows:
1. The warehouse in question was legally constructed under a valid permit issued by
the municipality of Virac in accordance with existing regulations and may not be
destroyed or removed from its present location;
The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not
repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers
and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to
provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace,
good order, comfort and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof,
and for the protection of property therein. 4
For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the municipality to enact but
must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, and must be in consonance with certain
well established and basic principles of a substantive nature. These principles require that a municipal
ordinance (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3)
must not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and
consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable. 5 Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1952, meets
these criteria.
As to the petitioner's second assignment of error, the trial court did not give the ordinance in question a
meaning other than what it says. Ordinance No. 13 passed by the Municipal Council of Virac on December
29, 1952, 6 reads:
AN ORDINANCE STRICTLY PROHIBITING THE CONSTRUCTION OF WAREHOUSE
IN ANY FORM NEAR A BLOCK OF HOUSES EITHER IN POBLACION OR BARRIO
WITH NECESSARY DISTANCE TO AVOID GREAT LOSSES OF PROPERTY AND
LIVES BY FIRE ACCIDENT.
Section 1 provides:
It is strictly prohibited to construct warehouses in any form to any person, persons,
entity, corporation or merchants, wherein to keep or store copra, hemp, gasoline,
petroleum, alcohol, crude oil, oil of turpentine and the like products or materials if not
within the distance of 200 meters from a block of houses either in the poblacion or
barrios to avoid great losses of properties inclusive lives by fire accident.
Section 2 provides: 7
Owners of warehouses in any form, are hereby given advice to remove their said
warehouses this ordinance by the Municipal Council, provided however, that if those
warehouses now in existence should no longer be utilized as such warehouse for the
above-described products in Section 1 of this ordinance after a lapse of the time given
for the removal of the said warehouses now in existence, same warehouses shall be
exempted from the spirit of the provision of section 1 of this ordinance,provided further,
that these warehouses now in existence, shall in the future be converted into non-
inflammable products and materials warehouses.
In spite of its fractured syntax, basically, what is regulated by the ordinance is the construction of warehouses
wherein inflammable materials are stored where such warehouses are located at a distance of 200 meters
from a block of houses and not the construction per se of a warehouse. The purpose is to avoid the loss of
life and property in case of fire which is one of the primordial obligation of the government.
This was also the observation of the trial court:
A casual glance of the ordinance at once reveals a manifest disregard of the elemental
rules of syntax. Experience, however, will show that this is not uncommon in law making
bodies in small towns where local authorities and in particular the persons charged with
the drafting and preparation of municipal resolutions and ordinances lack sufficient
education and training and are not well grounded even on the basic and fundamental
elements of the English language commonly used throughout the country in such
matters. Nevertheless, if one scrutinizes the terms of the ordinance, it is clear that what
is prohibited is the construction of warehouses by any person, entity or corporation
wherein copra, hemp, gasoline and other inflammable products mentioned in Section 1
may be stored unless at a distance of not less than 200 meters from a block of houses
either in the poblacion or barrios in order to avoid loss of property and life due to fire.
Under Section 2, existing warehouses for the storage of the prohibited articles were
given one year after the approval of the ordinance within which to remove them but were
allowed to remain in operation if they had ceased to store such prohibited articles.
The ambiguity therefore is more apparent than real and springs from simple error in
grammatical construction but otherwise, the meaning and intent is clear that what is
prohibited is the construction or maintenance of warehouses for the storage of
inflammable articles at a distance within 200 meters from a block of houses either in the
poblacion or in the barrios. And the purpose of the ordinance is to avoid loss of life and
property in case of accidental fire which is one of the primordial and basic obligation of
any government. 8
Clearly, the lower court did NOT add meaning other than or differrent from what was provided in the
ordinance in question. It merely stated the purpose of the ordinance and what it intends to prohibit to
accomplish its purpose.
As to the third assignment of error, that warehouses similarly situated as that of the petitioner were not
prosecuted, suffice it to say that the mere fact that the municipal authorities of Virac have not proceeded
against other warehouses in the municipality allegedly violating Ordinance No. 13 is no reason to claim that
the ordinance is discriminatory. A distinction must be made between the law itself and the manner in which
said law is implemented by the agencies in charge with its administration and enforcement. There is no valid
reason for the petitioner to complain, in the absence of proof that the other bodegas mentioned by him are
operating in violation of the ordinance and that the complaints have been lodged against the bodegas
concerned without the municipal authorities doing anything about it.
The objections interposed by the petitioner to the validity of the ordinance have not been substantiated. Its
purpose is well within the objectives of sound government. No undue restraint is placed upon the petitioner
or for anybody to engage in trade but merely a prohibition from storing inflammable products in the
warehouse because of the danger of fire to the lives and properties of the people residing in the vicinity. As
far as public policy is concerned, there can be no better policy than what has been conceived by the
municipal government.
As to petitioner's contention of want of jurisdiction by the lower court we find no merit in the same. The case
is a simple civil suit for abatement of a nuisance, the original jurisdiction of which falls under the then Court
of First Instance.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
3 beginning July 1, 1982. 10The reaction of the petitioners was to file a petition for prohibition with the Court
G.R. No. L-61311 September 2l, 1987
FELICIDAD VILLANUEVA, FERNANDO CAISIP, ANTONIO LIANG, FELINA MIRANDA, RICARDO
PUNO, FLORENCIO LAXA, and RENE OCAMPO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MARIANO CASTAÑEDA, JR., Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga,
Branch III, VICENTE A. MACALINO, Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Mayor, San Fernando,
Pampanga, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
There is in the vicinity of the public market of San Fernando, Pampanga, along Mercado Street, a strip of
land measuring 12 by 77 meters on which stands a conglomeration of vendors stalls together forming what
is commonly known as a talipapa. This is the subject of the herein petition. The petitioners claim they have
a right to remain in and conduct business in this area by virtue of a previous authorization granted to them
by the municipal government. The respondents deny this and justify the demolition of their stalls as illegal
constructions on public property. At the petitioners' behest, we have issued a temporary restraining order to
preserve the status quo between the parties pending our decision. 1 Now we shall rule on the merits.
This dispute goes back to November 7, 1961, when the municipal council of San Fernando adopted
Resolution No. 218 authorizing some 24 members of the Fernandino United Merchants and Traders
Association to construct permanent stags and sell in the above-mentioned place. 2 The action was protested
on November 10, 1961, in Civil Case No. 2040, where the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch 2,
issued a writ of preliminary injunction that prevented the defendants from constructing the said stalls until
final resolution of the controversy. 3 On January 18, 1964, while this case was pending, the municipal council
of San Fernando adopted Resolution G.R. No. 29, which declared the subject area as "the parking place
and as the public plaza of the municipality, 4 thereby impliedly revoking Resolution No. 218, series of 1961.
Four years later, on November 2, 1968, Judge Andres C. Aguilar decided the aforesaid case and held that
the land occupied by the petitioners, being public in nature, was beyond the commerce of man and therefore
could not be the subject of private occupancy. 5 The writ of preliminary injunction was made permanent. 6
The decision was apparently not enforced, for the petitioners were not evicted from the place; in fact,
according to then they and the 128 other persons were in 1971 assigned specific areas or space allotments
therein for which they paid daily fees to the municipal government. 7 The problem appears to have festered
for some more years under a presumably uneasy truce among the protagonists, none of whom made any
move, for some reason that does not appear in the record. Then, on January 12, 1982, the Association of
Concerned Citizens and Consumers of San Fernando filed a petition for the immediate implementation of
Resolution No. 29, to restore the subject property "to its original and customary use as a public plaza. 8
Acting thereon after an investigation conducted by the municipal attorney, 9 respondent Vicente A. Macalino,
as officer-in-charge of the office of the mayor of San Fernando, issued on June 14, 1982, a resolution
requiring the municipal treasurer and the municipal engineer to demolish the stalls in the subject place
of First Instance of Pampanga, docketed as Civil Case No. 6470, on June 26, 1982. The respondent judge
denied the petition on July 19, 1982, 11 and the motion for reconsideration on August 5, 1982, 12 prompting
the petitioners to come to this Court on certiorari to challenge his decision. 13
As required, respondent Macalino filed his comment 14 on the petition, and the petitioners countered with
their reply. 15 In compliance with our resolution of February 2, 1983, the petitioners submitted their
memorandum 16 and respondent Macalino, for his part, asked that his comment be considered his
memorandum. 17 On July 28, 1986, the new officer-in-charge of the office of the mayor of San Fernando,
Paterno S. Guevarra, was impleaded in lieu of Virgilio Sanchez, who had himself earlier replaced the original
respondent Macalino. 18
After considering the issues and the arguments raised by the parties in their respective pleadings, we rule
for the respondents. The petition must be dismissed.
There is no question that the place occupied by the petitioners and from which they are sought to be evicted
is a public plaza, as found by the trial court in Civil Case No. 2040. This finding was made after consideration
of the antecedent facts as especially established by the testimony of former San Fernando Mayor Rodolfo
Hizon, who later became governor of Pampanga, that the National Planning Commission had reserved the
area for a public plaza as early as 1951. This intention was reiterated in 1964 through the adoption of
Resolution No. 29. 19
It does not appear that the decision in this case was appealed or has been reversed. In Civil Case G.R. No.
6740, which is the subject of this petition, the respondent judge saw no reason to disturb the finding in Civil
Case No. 2040 and indeed used it as a basis for his own decision sustaining the questioned order. 20
The basic contention of the petitioners is that the disputed area is under lease to them by virtue of contracts
they had entered into with the municipal government, first in 1961 insofar as the original occupants were
concerned, and later with them and the other petitioners by virtue of the space allocations made in their favor
in 1971 for which they saw they are paying daily fees. 21 The municipal government has denied making such
agreements. In any case, they argue, since the fees were collected daily, the leases, assuming their validity,
could be terminated at will, or any day, as the claimed rentals indicated that the period of the leases was
from day to day. 22
The parties belabor this argument needlessly.
A public plaza is beyond the commerce of man and so cannot be the subject of lease or any other contractual
undertaking. This is elementary. Indeed, this point was settled as early as in Municipality of Cavite vs.
Rojas, 23decided in 1915, where the Court declared as null and void the lease of a public plaza of the said
municipality in favor of a private person.
Justice Torres said in that case:
According to article 344 of the Civil Code: "Property for public use in provinces and in
towns comprises the provincial and town roads, the squares, streets, fountains, and
 public waters, the promenades, and public works of general service supported by said
towns or provinces.
The said Plaza Soledad being a promenade for public use, the municipal council of
Cavite could not in 1907 withdraw or exclude from public use a portion thereof in order
to lease it for the sole benefit of the defendant Hilaria Rojas. In leasing a portion of said
plaza or public place to the defendant for private use the plaintiff municipality exceeded
its authority in the exercise of its powers by executing a contract over a thing of which it
could not dispose, nor is it empowered so to do.
The Civil Code, article 1271, prescribes that everything which is not outside the
commerce of man may be the object of a contract, and plazas and streets are outside
of this commerce, as was decided by the supreme court of Spain in its decision of
February 12, 1895, which says: "communal things that cannot be sold because they are
by their very nature outside of commerce are those for public use, such as the plazas,
streets, common lands, rivers, fountains, etc."
Therefore, it must be concluded that the contract, Exhibit C, whereby the municipality
of Cavite leased to Hilaria Rojas a portion of the Plaza Soledad is null and void and of
no force or effect, because it is contrary to the law and the thing leased cannot be the
object of a was held that the City of contract.
In Muyot vs. de la Fuente, 24 it was held that the City of Manila could not lease a portion of a public sidewalk
on Plaza Sta. Cruz, being likewise beyond the commerce of man.
Echoing Rojas, the decision said:
Appellants claim that they had obtained permit from the present of the City of Manila, to
connect booths Nos. 1 and 2, along the premises in question, and for the use of spaces
where the booths were constructed, they had paid and continued paying the
corresponding rentals. Granting this claim to be true, one should not entertain any doubt
that such permit was not legal, because the City of Manila does not have any power or
authority at all to lease a portion of a public sidewalk. The sidewalk in question, forming
part of the public plaza of Sta. Cruz, could not be a proper subject matter of the contract,
as it was not within the commerce of man (Article 1347, new Civil Code, and article
1271, old Civil Code). Any contract entered into by the City of Manila in connection with
the sidewalk, is ipso facto null and ultra vires. (Municipality of Cavite vs. Roxas, et a1,
30 Phil. 603.) The sidewalk in question was intended for and was used by the public, in
going from one place to another. "The streets and public places of the city shall be kept
free and clear for the use of the public, and the sidewalks and crossings for the
pedestrians, and the same shall only be used or occupied for other purpose as provided
by ordinance or regulation; ..." (Sec. 1119, Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila.)
The booths in question served as fruit stands for their owners and often, if not always,
blocked the fire passage of pedestrians who had to take the plaza itself which used to
be clogged with vehicular traffic.
Exactly in point is Espiritu vs. Municipal Council of Pozorrubio, 25 where the Supreme Court declared:
There is absolutely no question that the town plaza cannot be used for the construction
of market stalls, specially of residences, and that such structures constitute a nuisance
subject to abatement according to law. Town plazas are properties of public dominion,
to be devoted to public use and to be made available to the public in general They are
outside the common of man and cannot be disposed of or even leased by the
municipality to private parties.
Applying this well-settled doctrine, we rule that the petitioners had no right in the first place to occupy the
disputed premises and cannot insist in remaining there now on the strength of their alleged lease contracts.
They should have realized and accepted this earlier, considering that even before Civil Case No. 2040 was
decided, the municipalcouncil of San Fernando had already adopted Resolution No. 29, series of 1964,
declaring the area as the parking place and public plaza of the municipality.
It is the decision in Civil Case No. 2040 and the said resolution of the municipal council of San Fernando
that respondent Macalino was seeking to enforce when he ordered the demolition of the stags constructed
in the disputed area. As officer-in-charge of the office of the mayor, he had the duty to clear the area and
restore it to its intended use as a parking place and public plaza of the municipality of San Fernando,
conformably to the aforementioned orders from the court and the council. It is, therefore, not correct to say
that he had acted without authority or taken the law into his hands in issuing his order.
Neither can it be said that he acted whimsically in exercising his authority for it has been established that he
directed the demolition of the stalls only after, upon his instructions, the municipal attorney had conducted
an investigation, to look into the complaint filed by the Association of Concerned Citizens and Consumers
of San Fernando. 26 There is evidence that the petitioners were notified of this hearing, 27which they chose
to disregard. Photographs of the disputed area, 28 which does look congested and ugly, show that the
complaint was valid and that the area really needed to be cleared, as recommended by the municipal
attorney.
The Court observes that even without such investigation and recommendation, the respondent mayor was
justified in ordering the area cleared on the strength alone of its status as a public plaza as declared by the
judicial and legislative authorities. In calling first for the investigation (which the petitioner saw fit to boycott),
he was just scrupulously paying deference to the requirements of due process, to remove an taint of
arbitrariness in the action he was caged upon to take.
Since the occupation of the place in question in 1961 by the original 24 stallholders (whose number later
ballooned to almost 200), it has deteriorated increasingly to the great prejudice of the community in general.
The proliferation of stags therein, most of them makeshift and of flammable materials, has converted it into
a veritable fire trap, which, added to the fact that it obstructs access to and from the public market itself, has
seriously endangered public safety. The filthy condition of the talipapa, where fish and other wet items are
sold, has aggravated health and sanitation problems, besides pervading the place with a foul odor that has
spread into the surrounding areas. The entire place is unsightly, to the dismay and embarrassment of the
inhabitants, who want it converted into a showcase of the town of which they can all be proud. The vendors
in the talipapa have also spilled into the street and obstruct the flow of traffic, thereby impairing the
convenience of motorists and pedestrians alike. The regular stallholders in the public market, who pay
substantial rentals to the municipality, are deprived of a sizable volume of business from prospective
customers who are intercepted by the talipapa vendors before they can reach the market proper. On top of
all these, the people are denied the proper use of the place as a public plaza, where they may spend their
leisure in a relaxed and even beautiful environment and civic and other communal activities of the town can
be held.
The problems caused by the usurpation of the place by the petitioners are covered by the police power as
delegated to the municipality under the general welfare clause. 29 This authorizes the municipal council "to
enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into
effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and
proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order,
comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property
therein." This authority was validly exercised in this casethrough the adoption of Resolution No. 29, series
of 1964, by the municipal council of San Fernando.
Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the resolution could have effectively terminated the
agreement for it is settled that the police power cannot be surrendered or bargained away through the
medium of a contract. 30 In fact, every contract affecting the public interest suffers a congenital infirmity in
that it contains an implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal order. 31 This
power can be activated at any time to change the provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for
the promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such an act will not militate against the impairment clause,
which is subject to and limited by the paramount police power. 32
We hold that the respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the petition for
prohibition. On the contrary, he acted correctly in sustaining the right and responsibility of the mayor to evict
the petitioners from the disputed area and clear it of an the structures illegally constructed therein.
The Court feels that it would have been far more amiable if the petitioners themselves, recognizing their own
civic duty, had at the outset desisted from their original stance and withdrawn in good grace from the disputed
area to permit its peaceful restoration as a public plaza and parking place for the benefit of the whole
municipality. They owned this little sacrifice to the community in general which has suffered all these many
years because of their intransigence. Regrettably, they have refused to recognize that in the truly democratic
society, the interests of the few should yield to those of the greater number in deference to the principles
that the welfare of the people is the supreme law and overriding purpose. We do not see any altruism here.
The traditional ties of sharing are absent here. What we find, sad to say, is a cynical disdaining of the spirit
of "bayanihan," a selfish rejection of the cordial virtues of "pakikisama " and "pagbibigayan" which are the
hallmarks of our people.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The decision dated July 19, 1982, and the order-dated August
5, 1982, are AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order dated August 9, 1982, is LIFTED. This decision is
immediately executory. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
4
JOSE D. SANGALANG and LUTGARDA D. SANGALANG, petitioners, FELIX C. GASTON and
DOLORES R. GASTON, JOSE V. BRIONES and ALICIA R. BRIONES, and BEL-AIR VILLAGE
ASSOCIATION, INC., intervenors-petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and AYALA
CORPORATION, respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
I
Before the Court are: (1) two motions for reconsideration (G.R. No. 71169) of our Decision, promulgated on
December 22, 1988, the first one having been filed by Atty. J. Cezar Sangco on behalf of the spouses Jose
and Lutgarda Sangalang, and the second, by Atty. Raul Sison, counsel for Bel-Air Village Association
(BAVA); and (2 ) a motion for reconsideration and/or motion for clarification filed by Atty. Richard Funk (G.R.
Nos. 74376, 76394, 78182, and 82281) of the said Decision.
The motion for reconsideration (G.R. No. 71169), filed by the Sangalangs, is anchored on two grounds: (1)
that contrary to our decision, Jupiter Street is for the exclusive use of Bel-Air Village residents; and (b) that
the Ayala Corporation did contrive to acquire membership at the Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA)
purposely to bargain for access to Jupiter Street by the general public. Subsequently, BAVA informed the
Court that it was adopting the Sangalangs' motion for reconsideration. The motion for reconsideration (in
G.R. Nos. 74376, 76394, 78182, and 82281) raises more or less the same questions and asks furthermore
that we delete the award of damages granted by the Court of Appeals.
The Court: (1) DENIES the motions filed by both the Sangalangs and BAVA with finality, no new arguments
having been presented to warrant reconsideration, and (2) DENIES Atty. Richard Funk's own motion for the
same reason, with the further word that the grant of attorney's fees has been deemed to be just and proper
under Article 2208, par. II, of the Civil Code.
II
The lone issue in G.R. No. 67027 is whether or not the Mayor of Makati could have validly opened Jupiter
and Orbit Streets to vehicular traffic. The facts, as stated in the assailed decision of the respondent court, in
CA-G.R. No. 11803-SP, entitled, "Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., Petitioner, vs. Hon. Celso L. Magsino,
Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XX, Pasig, Metro Manila; Mayor Nemesio
Yabut, Municipal Mayor of Makati, Metro Manila, Arturo R. Gabuna, Secretary to the Mayor for
Administration, Makati, Josefo S. Lingad, Acting Municipal Engineer, Nelson Erasga, of the Municipal
Engineer's Office, Makati; and Ruperto Acle, Station Commander, Southern Police District, Makati,
Respondents," are as follows:
In its chronological sequence, the petition avers as follows: On October 24, 1979, petitioner instituted a
petition for prohibition and damages with preliminary injunction with the respondent Court docketed as Civil
Case No. 34948. On October 25, 1979, the respondent court issued an order directing respondents to
answer and denying the issuance of a temporary restraining order. Petitioner filed an urgent motion for
reconsideration of the denial of its prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, adding as new
ground the continuation of the commission of acts of dispossession by the respondents. The said urgent
motion was denied.
On November 6, 1979, the parties were directed to submit their affidavits and counter-affidavits as well as
memoranda as basis for resolving the application for preliminary injunction. In due time, the parties complied.
On December 11, 1979, respondents filed their answer to the petition.
On March 4, 1980, the respondent Court denied the application for preliminary injunction. On November 14,
1980, an order was issued denying the motion for reconsideration.
It is alleged by petitioner that by its orders of March 4, 1980 and November 14, 1980, the respondent Court
has unlawfully deprived the petitioner of its right to due process to which it is entitled under the Constitution,
and that respondents' acts are tantamount to grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction.
In their comment, respondents allege that prior to January, 1977, upon the instructions of respondent Mayor
Nemesio T. Yabut of Makati, Metro Manila, studies were made by the other respondents on the feasibility of
opening streets in Bel-Air Village calculated to alleviate traffic congestions along the public streets adjacent
to Bel-Air Village. The studies revealed that the subdivision plan of Bel-Air Village was approved by the Court
of First Instance of Rizal on condition, among others, that its major thoroughfares connecting to public streets
and highways shall be opened to public traffic. Accordingly, it was deemed necessary by the Municipality of
Makati in the interest of the general public to open to traffic Amapola, Mercedes, Zodiac, Jupiter, Neptune,
Orbit and Paseo de Roxas streets. On January 28, 1977, a meeting was held between representatives of
the Municipality of Makati and petitioner.
At this meeting, respondents claim that the representatives of petitioner, particularly Rufino R. Santos,
president of petitioner, had agreed to the opening of Bel-Air Village streets. Regarding Jupiter Street, the
Municipality opened it because public welfare demanded its opening which allegation the petitioner never
questioned. With respect to Orbit Street, whose opening was temporarily suspended until the flood control
project from Buendia Extension up to the mouth of the Pasig River, was about to be completed, it was
opened only after another meeting attended by Rufino R. Santos who agreed to the opening of the street
from J.P. Rizal Avenue up to Imelda Avenue and later up to Jupiter Street, subject to certain conditions.
To bolster their side, respondents cite: specifically, Section 44 of the Land Registration Act No. 496, as
amended, the deeds of donation of Jupiter and Orbit streets executed by and between the Ayala Corporation
and the petitioner, Presidential Decrees No. 957, Secs. 22 and 29 thereof, and No. 1216, Sec. 2 thereof,
and Municipal Ordinance No. 17 of the Municipal Government of Makati, Metro Manila, as amended by
Resolution No. 139, dated November 21, 1948, and contend that the opening of the two (2) streets was
demanded by public necessity and in the exercise of its police powers, and, ultimately on the argument that
petitioner has not shown a clear legal right to the writ of preliminary injunction.
With leave of court, petitioner filed a reply to the respondents' comment. They assert that the streets
mentioned in the comment, other than Jupiter and Orbit streets, have always been kept open voluntarily by
the Association, that Rufino R. Santos, president of petitioner, has never agreed on the opening of Jupiter
and Orbit streets, and that the Torrens titles covering these streets do not contain similar conditions as those
titles for the other street lots.
Petitioner relies on its ownership of the streets of which it should not (be) deprived without due process of
law, and without just compensation, Article 539 of the Civil Code, an existing Ordinance of the Metro Manila
Commission No. 2, Sec. 14 thereof, and the concurrence of all the requisites for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. 1
The Court of Appeals found that the certificates of title (Transfer Certificates of Titles Nos. S-76020, S-76021,
S-76022, S-76024, and S-76055, for Jupiter Street, and 206824, for Orbit Street) do not contain the
restrictions imposed by Section 44 of Act No. 496, now, Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, for
which reason, and so the Appellate Court held, the Mayor of Makati did not have the legal right to open them
up to traffic.
In Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 2 we held that Ayala Corporation, the former owner of the
Bel-Air subdivision, can not be held responsible for the opening of Jupiter Street, among other things,
because it was the Mayor of Makati who ordered such an opening. 3 The issue herein, as we indicated, is
whether or not the Mayor could legally have done it. With respect, specifically, to Jupiter Street, Sangalang
avers:
Among other things, there is a recognition under both Ordinances Nos. 81 and 81-01 that Jupiter Street lies
as the boundary between Bel-Air Village and Ayala Corporation's commercial section. And since 1957, it
had been considered as a boundary ---- not as a part of either the residential or commercial zones of Ayala
Corporation's real estate development projects. Thus, the Bel-Air Village Association's articles of
incorporation state that Bel-Air Village is "bounded on the NE., from Amapola St., to de los Santos Ave., by
Estrella St., on the SE., from Estrella St., to Pedestrian Lane, by E. De los Santos Ave., on the SW., from
Pedestrian Lane to Reposo St., by Jupiter Street.." Hence, it cannot be said to have been "for the exclusive
benefit" of Bel-Air Village residents. 4
Sangalang also had occasion to invoke Ortigas & Co., Limited Partnership v. Feati Bank and Trust Co. 5 We
reiterate Ortigas herein:
xxx xxx xxx
2. With regard to the contention that said resolution cannot nullify the contractual obligations assumed by
the defendant-appellee ---- referring to the restrictions incorporated in the deeds of sale and later in the
corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title issued to defendant-appellee ---- it should be stressed, that while
non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be
reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., "the power to prescribe regulations to promote
the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people." Invariably
described as "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers" and "in a sense, the greatest and most
powerful attribute of government," the exercise of the power may be judicially inquired into and corrected
only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a
violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee. As this Court held through Justice Jose P. Bengzon
in Philippine Long Distance Company vs. City of Davao, et. al., police power "is elastic and must be
responsive to various social conditions; it is not confined within narrow circumscriptions of precedents resting
on past condition; it must follow the legal progress of a democratic way of life." We were even more emphatic
in Vda. de Genuino vs. The Court of Agrarian Relations, et al., when We declared: 'We do not see why public
welfare when clashing with the individual right to property should not be made to prevail through the state's
exercise of its police power."
Resolution No. 27, s-1960 declaring the western part of Highway 54, now E. de los Santos Avenue (EDSA,
for short) from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River as an industrial and commercial zone, was obviously
passed by the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police power to safeguard or
promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the locality. Judicial notice
may be taken of the conditions prevailing in the area, especially where Lots Nos. 5 and 6 are located. The
lots themselves not only front the highway; industrial and commercial complexes have flourished about the
place. EDSA, a main traffic artery which runs through several cities and municipalities in the Metro Manila
area, supports an endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and pollution are hardly conducive
to the health, safety or welfare of the residents in its route. Having been expressly granted the power to
adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations, the municipality of Mandaluyong, through its
Municipal Council, was reasonably, if not perfectly, justified under the circumstances, in passing the subject
resolution. 6
The Bel-Air Village Association can not therefore rightfully complain that His Honor, the Mayor of Makati, in
opening up Jupiter Street, had acted arbitrarily.
In connection with Orbit Street, the Court reaches the same conclusion. We repudiate, therefore, that part
of the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it held that the condition imposed by Section 44,
of Act No. 496, now Section 50, of Presidential Decree No. 1529, 7 that "no portion of any street or
passageway .. shall be closed or otherwise disposed of by the registered owner without approval of the court
of first instance (being first) had ." 8 does riot apply for lack of an annotation of such a condition on the
certificate of title (Transfer Certificate of Title No. 206824). To begin with, Transfer Certificate of Title No.
206824 does contain the annotation in question:
. . . subject to such of the encumbrances mentioned in Section 39 of said Act as may be subsisting, and the
condition that the above lots are subject to the conditions imposed by Republic Act 440. 9
Furthermore, the very Deed of Donation executed by the Ayala Corporation 10 covering Jupiter and Orbit
Streets, amongst others, and so we found in Sangalang, effectively required both passageways open to the
general public. We quote:
The alleged undertaking, finally, by Ayala in the deed of donation (over Jupiter Street) to leave Jupiter Street
for the private use of Bel-Air residents is belied by the very provisions of the deed. We quote:
xxx xxx xxx
"IV. That the offer made by the DONOR had been accepted by the DONEE subject to the condition that the
property will be used as a street for the use of the members of the DONEE, their families, personnel, guests,
domestic help and, under certain reasonable conditions and restrictions, by the general public, and in the
event that said lots or parts thereof cease to be used as such, ownership thereof shall automatically revert
to the DONOR. The DONEE shall always have Reposo Street, Makati Avenue, and Paseo de Roxas open
for the use of the general public. It is also understood that the DONOR SHALL continue the maintenance of
the street at its expense for a period of three years from date hereof. (Deed of Donation, p. 6, Exh. 7).
xxx xxx xxx
The donation on the contrary, gave the general public equal right to it. 11
As regards Orbit Street, it was stipulated:
1. That the property donated shall be used and maintained as "private roads or streets for the use of the
members of the Donee, their families, personnel, domestic helps and under certain reasonable conditions
and restrictions, by the general public;
2. In the event that the properties covered by this donation are no longer used as such, the same shall
automatically revert to the Donor; and
3. That the Donee shall always have Reposo Street open for the use of the general public and shall transfer
its present gate barrier located in the intersection of Orbit and Jupiter to the southern boundary of street Lot
8 of the Plan (LRC) Psd-77820." 12
As we asserted in Sangalang, the opening of Jupiter Street was warranted by the demands of the common
good, in terms of traffic decongestion and public convenience. 13 We also uphold the opening of Orbit Street
for the same rationale.
There is no merit in BAVA's claims that the demolition of the gates at Orbit and Jupiter Streets amounts to
deprivation of property without due process of law or expropriation without just compensation. 14 There is
no taking of property involved here. The act of the Mayor now challenged is, rather, in the concept of police
power. In the case of Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 15 we said:
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority
to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general
welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster
the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms
to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.
"Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could
be done provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus
assuring the greatest benefits."
It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the Charter. Along
with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a
fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance.
Marshall, to whom the expression has been credited, refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the State
"to govern its citizens."
"The police power of the State . . . is a power coextensive with self-protection, and it is not inaptly termed
the 'law of overwhelming necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which
enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society."
It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando, it is "rooted in the conception
that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional
rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably
the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to ensure communal peace, safety, good order, and
welfare." Significantly, the Bill of Rights itself does not purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights
and liberties "Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act accordingly to
one's will." It is subject to the far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number. 16
Unlike the power of eminent domain, police power is exercised without provision for just compensation:
Art. 436. When any property is condemned or seized by competent authority in the interest of health, safety
or security, the owner thereof shall not be entitled to compensation, unless he can show that such
condemnation or seizure is unjustified. 17
However, it may not be done arbitrarily or unreasonably. 18 But the burden of showing that it is unjustified
lies on the aggrieved party. 19
Our considered opinion is that BAVA has failed to show that the opening up of Orbit Street was unjustified,
or that the Mayor acted unreasonably. The fact that it has led to the loss of privacy of BAVA residents is no
argument against the Municipality's effort to ease vehicular traffic in Makati. Certainly, the duty of a local
executive is to take care of the needs of the greater number, in many cases, at the expense of the minority.
The next question is whether or not the Mayor, by himself, is vested with the power to order the demolition
so questioned, without the backing of a proper ordinance. On this score, the Mayor submitted in evidence
Municipal Ordinance No. 17, as amended by Resolution No. 139, dated November 21, 1948, 20 requiring a
Mayor's permit to erect construction anywhere in Makati. The respondent court rejected, however, the
Mayor's reliance on the Ordinance. We quote:
Respondents also invoke Municipal Ordinance No. 17, as amended by Resolution No. 139, dated November
21, 1948, requiring a Mayor's permit before any construction of any kind shall be built, erected or constructed
in any place in the Municipality, and empowering the corresponding authorities especially the Mayor to
remove and demolish any such illegal construction. For a long time the gates and fences removed by agents
of respondents have been in the sites where they were removed. We fail to comprehend why the
respondents did not invoke the Ordinance much earlier. They cannot pretend ignorance of a condition or
situation which was never concealed from respondents and their agents. At any rate, the Torrens titles of
these street lots which bore no restrictions whatsoever was authority for its owner to close them. 21
Quite to the contrary, the Court is convinced that Ordinance No. 17 is a valid justification for the questioned
act of the Mayor. The fact that some time had elapsed before the Mayor acted, can not render the ordinance
uneforceable or void. At any rate, the gate, the destruction of which opened Orbit Street, has the character
of a public nuisance, 22 in the sense that it "hinders or impairs the use of property," 23 which the Civil Code
disposes of as follows:
Art. 699. The remedies against a public nuisance are:
(1) A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local ordinance; or
(2) A civil action; or
Other than BAVA's claims that the opening of Orbit Street led to the loss of privacy of BAVA residents, there
is no showing that the Mayor, in carrying out the demolition of the Orbit gate, had acted in disregard of due
process or, as the respondent court would put it, with a "show of arrogance". 29 As we said, the gate in
question was a nuisance, which could have been legally abated by summary means. The fact that it was
accomplished summarily does not lend to it a "show of arrogance" because, precisely, a summary method
is allowed by law. In any event, there is a showing that the Mayor notified BAVA that Orbit (and Jupiter)
Streets would be opened up. 30 The Court finds that such a notice is compliance enough with due process.
31
What has been left unsaid is that the nation today is witnessing profound changes occurring in its midst. A
decade ago, we were a people of forty or so million. Today, the number is knocking on sixty million. We are
reaping the cost that population explosion carries with it. Housing the homeless has been one of the first
casualties. And so has been the transport system. Giving the homeless homes and bringing them there
safely is a formidable burden and the task of the hour. Parochial concerns can not be an impediment to the
greater needs of the greatest number.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 60727 is GRANTED; the motions for reconsiderations in G.R. Nos.
71169, 74376, 76394, 78182, and 82281 are DENIED with FINALITY.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
5
G.R. No. 192861 June 30, 2014
LINDA RANA, Petitioner,
vs.
TERESITA LEE WONG, SPS. SHIRLEY LEE ONG and RUBEN ANG ONG, represented by their
Attorney-in-fact WILSON UY, and SPS. ROSARIO and.WILSON UY, Respondents.

(3) Abatement, without judicial proceedings. 24

x-----------------------x
In The Homeowners Associations of El Deposito, Barrio Corazon de Jesus, San Juan, Rizal v. Lood, 25 we
held: G.R. No. 192862

At any rate, the decisive point is that independently of the said ordinance, petitioners' constructions which
have been duly found to be public nuisances per se (without provision for accumulation or disposal of waste SPS. ROSARIO and WILSON UY, WILSON UY as attorney-in-fact of TERESITA LEE WONG, and SPS.
matters and constructed without building permits contiguously to and therefore liable to pollute one of the SHIRLEY LEE ONG and RUBEN ANG ONG, Petitioners,
main water pipelines which supplies potable water to the Greater Manila area) may be abated without judicial vs.
proceedings under our Civil Code. 26 SPS. REYNALDO. and LINDA RANA, Respondents.

In addition, under Article 701 of the Code, summary abatement may be carried out by the Mayor himself. DECISION

Although estoppel is a valid defense against abatement of nuisance, 27 judicially or summarily, the Mayor
is not being condemned for estoppel here, but, rather, for inaction. Under, however, the Civil Code: PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Art. 698. Lapse of time cannot legalize any nuisance, whether public or private. 28
Assailed in these consolidated petitions for review on certiorari 1 are the Decision2 dated July 13, 2005 and
the Resolution3 dated June 18, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 78463 which affirmed
the Decision4 dated December 20, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, 7th Judicial Region, Branch
22 (RTC) in Civil Case Nos. CEB-20893 and CEB-21296.
The Facts
Teresita Lee Wong (Wong) and Spouses Shirley and Ruben Ang Ong (Sps. Ong) are co-owners pro-
indivisoof a residential land situated in Peace Valley Subdivision, Lahug, Cebu City, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 1391605 (Wong-Ong property), abutting6 a 10-meter7 wide subdivision road
(subject road).
On the opposite side of the subject road, across the Wong-Ong property, are the adjacent lots of Spouses
Wilson and Rosario Uy (Sps. Uy) and Spouses Reynaldo and Linda Rana (Sps. Rana), respectively covered
by TCT Nos. 1240958 (Uy property) and T-1155699 (Rana property). The said lots follow a rolling
terrain10 with the Rana property standing about two (2) meters11 higher than and overlooking the Uy property,
while the Wong-Ong property is at the same level with the subject road.12
Sometime in 1997, Sps. Rana elevated and cemented a portion of the subject road that runs between the
Rana and Wong-Ong properties (subject portion) in order to level the said portion with their gate. 13 Sps.
Rana likewise backfilled a portion (subject backfilling) of the perimeter fence separating the Rana and
Uyproperties without erecting a retaining wall that would hold the weight of the added filling materials. The
matter was referred to the Office of the Barangay Captain of Lahug14 as well as the Office of the Building
Official of Cebu City (OBO),15 but to no avail.16
The RTC Proceedings
On September 19, 1997, Wong, Sps. Ong, and Sps. Uy (Wong, et al.) filed a Complaint17 for Abatement of
Nuisance with Damages against Sps. Rana before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-20893,
seeking to: (a) declare the subject portion as a nuisance which affected the ingress and egress of Wong and
Sps. Ong to their lot "in the usual and [normal] manner, such that they now have to practically jump from the
elevated road to gain access to their lot and scale the same elevation in order to get out";18 (b) declare the
subject backfilling as a nuisance considering that it poses a clear and present danger to the life and limb of
the Uy family arising from the premature weakening of Sps. Uy’s perimeter fence due to the seeping of rain
water from the Rana property that could cause its sudden collapse; 19 (c) compel Sps. Rana to restore the
subject portion to its original condition; (d) compel Sps. Rana to remove the backfilling materials along Sps.
Uy’s perimeter fence and repair the damage to the fence; and (e) pay moral and exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs of suit.20
In their Answer dated October 23, 1997,21 Sps. Rana countered that prior to the construction of their
residence, there was no existing road and they merely developed the subject portion which abuts their gate
in view of the rolling terrain. They claimed thatWong and Sps. Ong do not have any need for the subject
portion because their property is facing an existing road, i.e., Justice Street. They likewise denied having
undertaken any backfilling along the boundary of the Uy property considering the natural elevation of their
own property, which renders backfilling unnecessary.22
After the filing of Sps. Rana’s Answer, Wong, et al., in turn, filed a Motion for Leave to be Allowed to Bring
in Heavy Equipment23 for the intermediate development of the Wong-Ong property with a view to the use of
the subject road as access to their lot. Notwithstanding Sps. Rana’s opposition, the RTC granted Wong,et
al.’s motion in an Order24dated November 27, 1997 (November 27, 1997 Order), the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, as prayed for, the motion is hereby GRANTED. Consequently, the
plaintiffs are hereby allowed to use heavy equipments/machineries in order to develop the area and make
use of the right of way which is located between the [Wong-Ong and Rana properties]. (Emphasis supplied)
Despite the limited tenor of the November 27, 1997 Order, Wong, et al., on May 23 and 24, 1998, proceeded
to level the subject portion, which, in the process, hampered Sps. Rana’s ingress and egress to their
residence, resulting too to the entrapment of their vehicle inside their garage. 25 Feeling aggrieved, Sps.
Rana, on June 19, 1998, filed a Supplemental Answer,26 praying for: (a) the restoration of the soil, boulders,
grade, contour, and level of the subject portion; and (b) payment of moral damages, actual and consequential
damages, and exemplary damages.
Meanwhile, on December 8, 1997, Sps. Rana filed with another branch of the same trial court a
Complaint27 for Recovery of Property and Damages against Sps. Uy, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-
21296. They alleged that in October 1997, theycaused a resurvey of their property which purportedly showed
that Sps. Uyencroached upon an11-square meter (sq. m.) portion along the common boundary of their
properties. Their demands for rectification as well as barangay conciliation efforts were, however, ignored.
Thus, they prayed that Sps. Uy be ordered to remove their fence along the common boundary and return
the encroached portion, as well as to pay moral damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses. After the
filing of Sps. Rana’s complaint, Civil Case No. CEB-21296 was consolidated with Civil Case No. CEB-
20893.28
In response thereto, Sps. Uy filed an Answer with Counterclaim, 29 averring that prior to putting up their fence,
they caused a relocation survey of their property and were, thus, confident that their fence did not encroach
upon the Rana property. In view of Sps.Rana’s complaint, they then caused another relocation survey which
allegedly showed, however, that while they encroached around 3 sq. m. of the Rana property, Sps. Rana
intruded into 7 sq. m. of their property. Hence, theyposited that they had "a bigger cause than that of [Sps.
Rana] in [so] far as encroachment is concerned."30 Accordingly, they prayed for the dismissal of Sps. Rana’s
complaint with counterclaim for damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses.
In light of the foregoing, the RTC appointed three (3) commissioners to conduct a resurvey of the Uy and
Rana properties for the purpose of determining if any encroachment occurred whatsoever. 31
The RTC Ruling
On December 20, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision32 in the consolidated cases.
In Civil Case No. CEB-20893, the RTC found that: (a) Sps. Rana, without prior consultation with the
subdivision owner or their neighbors, developed to their sole advantage the subject portion consisting of
one-half of the width of the 10-meter subject road by introducing filling materials, and rip rapping the side of
the road; (b) the said act denied Wong and Sps. Ong the use of the subject portion and affected the market
value of their property; (c) Sps. Uy have no intention of using the subject portion for ingress or egress
considering that theybuilt a wall fronting the same; and (d) Wong, et al.’s manner of enforcing the November
27, 1997 Order caused damage and injury to Sps. Rana and amounted to bad faith. In view of these findings,
the RTC declared that the parties all acted in bad faith, and, therefore, no relief can be granted to them The Court’s Ruling
against each other.33
The petitions are partly meritorious.
Separately, however, the RTC found that the backfilling done by Sps. Rana on their property exerted
pressure on the perimeter fence of the Uy property, thereby constituting a nuisance. As such, the former
As both petitions traverse the issues intersectingly, the Court deems it apt to proceed with its disquisition
were directed to construct a retaining wall at their own expense. 34 Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. CEB-21296,
according to the subject matters of the cases as originally filed before the RTC.
the RTC, despite having adopted the findings of Atty. Reuel T. Pintor (Atty. Pintor) – a court-appointed
commissioner who determined that Sps. Uy encroached the Rana property by 2 sq. m35 – dismissed both
the complaint and counterclaim for damages because of the failure ofboth parties to substantiate their A. Civil Case No. CEB-20893
respective claims of bad faith against each other.36
For Abatement of Nuisance and Damages.
Dissatisfied with the RTC’s verdict, the parties filed separate appeals with the CA.
Under Article 694 of the Civil Code, a nuisance is defined as "any act, omission, establishment, business,
The CA Ruling condition of property, or anything else which: (1) Injures or endangers the healthor safety of others; or (2)
Annoys or offends the senses; or(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or (4) Obstructs or
interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water;or (5) Hinders or impairs
On July 13, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision37 affirming the RTC.
the use of property." Based on case law, however, the term "nuisance" is deemed to be "so comprehensive
that it has been applied to almost all ways which have interfered with the rights of the citizens, either in
With respect to Civil Case No. CEB-20893, the CA found that (a) Sps. Rana’s act of elevating and cementing person, property, the enjoyment of his property, or his comfort."48
the subject portion curtailed the use and enjoyment by Wong and Sps. Ong of their properties; (b) the undue
demolition of the subject portion by Wong, et al.hampered Sps. Rana’s ingress and egress to their residence
Article 695 of the Civil Code classifies nuisances with respect to the object or objects that they affect. In this
and deprived them of the use of their vehicle which was entrapped in their garage; and (c) both parties were
regard, a nuisance may either be: (a) a public nuisance (or one which "affects a community or neighborhood
equally at fault in causingdamage and injury to each other and, thus, are not entitled to the reliefs sought
or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon
for.38
individuals may be unequal"); or (b) a private nuisance (or one "that is not included in the foregoing definition"
[or, as case law puts it, one which "violates only private rights and produces damages to but one or a few
On the other hand, the CA found that the backfilling done by Sps. Rana on their property requires necessary persons"]).49
works to prevent it from jeopardizing someone’s life or limb. 39
Jurisprudence further classifies nuisances in relation to their legal susceptibility to summary abatement (that
As for Civil Case No. CEB-21296, the CA sustained the dismissal of the complaint as well as the parties’ is, corrective action without prior judicial permission). In this regard, a nuisance may either be: (a) a nuisance
respective claims for damages for lack of legal and factual bases. 40 per se(or one which "affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated
under the undefined law of necessity");50 or (b) a nuisance per accidens(or that which "depends upon certain
conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact, it cannot be abated without due
The parties filed separate motions for reconsideration41 which were, however, denied in the
hearing thereon ina tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing does in law constitute a nuisance.")51
Resolution42 dated June 18, 2010, hence, the instant petitions.

It is a standing jurisprudentialrule that unless a nuisance is a nuisance per se, it may not be summarily
The Issues Before the Court
abated. In Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. Jac Liner, Inc., 52 the Court, citing other cases on the
matter, emphasized the need for judicial intervention when the nuisance is not a nuisance per se, to wit:
In G.R. No. 192861, petitioner Linda Rana (Linda Rana)43 faults the RTC in (a) not finding Wong and Sps.
Uyguilty of malice and bad faith both in instituting Civil Case No. CEB-20893 and in erroneously
In Estate of Gregoria Francisco v. Court of Appeals, this Court held:
implementing the November 27, 1997 Order, and (b) failing or refusing to grant the reliefs initially prayed
for,among others, the reconveyance of the encroached property. 44
Respondents can not seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances
without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 192862, petitioners Wong, et al. fault the RTC in (a) applying the in pari
safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. The
delictodoctrine against them and failing to abate the nuisance 45 which still continues and actually exists as
storage of copra in the quonset building is a legitimate business. By its nature, it can not be said to be
Sps. Rana caused the same to be reconstructed and restored to their prejudice, 46 and (b) not finding Sps.
injurious to rights of property, of health or of comfort of the community. If it be a nuisance per accidensit may
Rana guilty of bad faith in instituting Civil Case No. CEB-21296 and ordering them to pay damages to
petitioners Wong, et al.47
be so proven in a hearing conducted for thatpurpose. It is not per sea nuisance warranting its summary Yu Bun Guan v. Ong64 (Yu Guan).In said case, the Court discussed the in pari delicto principle with respect
abatement without judicial intervention. to the subject matter ofinexistent and void contracts, viz.:

In Pampanga Bus Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Tarlacwhere the appellant-municipality similarly argued that Inapplicability of the in Pari Delicto Principle
the terminal involved therein is a nuisance that may be abated by the Municipal Council viaan ordinance,
this Court held: "Suffice it to say that in the abatement of nuisances the provisions of the Civil Code (Articles
The principle of in pari delictoprovides that when two parties are equally at fault, the law leaves them as they
694-707) must be observed and followed. This appellant failed to do."53 (Emphases supplied; citations
are and denies recovery by either one of them. However, this principle does not apply with respect to
omitted)
inexistent and void contracts. Said this Court in Modina v. Court of Appeals:

Aside from the remedy of summary abatement which should be taken under the parameters stated in Articles
"The principle of in pari delicto non oritur actio denies all recovery to the guilty parties inter se. It applies to
70454(for public nuisances) and 70655 (for private nuisances) of the Civil Code, a private person whose
cases where the nullity arises from the illegality of the consideration orthe purpose of the contract. When
property right was invaded or unreasonably interfered with by the act, omission, establishment, business or
two persons are equally at fault, the law does not relieve them. The exception to this general rule is when
condition of the property of another may file a civil action to recover personal damages.56 Abatement may
the principle is invoked with respect to inexistent contracts." 65 (emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
be judicially sought through a civil action therefor57 if the pertinent requirements under the Civil Code for
summary abatement, or the requisite that the nuisance is a nuisance per se, do not concur. To note, the
remedies of abatement and damages are cumulative; hence, both may be demanded.58 Clearly, no void or inexistent contract is hereinat issue, hence, the Court’s disagreement with the CA’s
invocation of Yu Guanin this respect.
In the present cases, Wong, et al. availed of the remedy of judicial abatement and damages against
Sps.Rana, claiming that both the elevated and cemented subject portionand the subject backfillingare As for the subject backfillingtouching the perimeter fence of the Uy property, records show that the said
"nuisances" caused/created by the latter which curtailed their use and enjoyment of their properties. fence was not designed to act as a retaining wall66 but merely to withhold windload and its own load.67 Both
the RTC and the CA found the subject backfilling to have added pressure on the fence, 68 consequently
endangering the safety of the occupants of the Uy property, especially considering the higher elevation of
With respect to the elevated and cemented subject portion, the Court finds that the same is not a nuisance
the Rana property. With these findings, the Court thus agrees with the courts a quothat there is a need for
per se. By its nature, it is not injurious to the health or comfort of the community. It was built primarily to
Linda Rana to construct a retaining wall69 which would bear the weight and pressure of the filling materials
facilitate the ingress and egress of Sps. Rana from their house which was admittedly located on a higher
introduced on their property. The Court, however, observed that neither the RTC nor the CA specified in
elevation than the subject road and the adjoining Uy and Wong-Ong properties.Since the subject portion is
their respective decisions the backfilled areas which would require the retaining wall. Due to the technicality
not a nuisance per se(but actually a nuisance per accidensas will be later discussed) it cannot be summarily
of the matter, and considering that the due authenticity and genuineness of the findings/recommendation70 of
abated. As such, Wong, et al.’s demolition of Sps. Rana’s subject portion, which was not sanctioned under
the OBO and the accompanying sketch71 thereto were not specifically denied by Sps. Rana, 72 the required
the RTC’s November 27, 1997 Order,remains unwarranted. Resultantly, damages ought to be awarded in
retaining wall shall beconstructed in accordance with the said sketch which showed the area backfilled.
favor of Sps. Rana particularly that of (a) nominal damages59 – for the vindication and recognition of Sps.
Rana’s right to be heard before the court prior to Wong, et al.’sabatement of the subject portion (erroneously
perceived as a nuisance per se) – and (b) temperate damages60 – for the pecuniary loss owing to the B. Civil Case No. CEB-21296
demolition of the subject portion, which had been established albeit uncertain as to the actual amount of
loss.
For Recovery of Property.

Sps. Rana’s entitlement to the above-mentioned damages, however, only stands in theory.1âwphi1 This is
because the actual award thereof is precluded by the damage they themselves have caused Wong, et al. in
view of their construction of the subject portion. As the records establish, Sps. Rana, without prior
consultation with Wong, et al. and to their sole advantage, elevated and cemented almost half 61 of the 10-
meter wide subject road. As homeowners of Peace Valley Subdivision, Wong, et al. maintain the rights to
the unobstructed use of and free passage over the subject road. By constructing the subject portion, Sps.
Rana introduced a nuisance per accidensthat particularly transgressed the aforesaid rights. Thus, for the
vindication and recognition of Wong, et al.’srights, Sps. Rana should be similarly held liable for nominal
damages. Under Article 2216 of the Civil Code,62courts have the discretion to determine awards of nominal
and temperate damages without actual proof of pecuniary loss, as in this case. Assessing the respective
infractions of the parties herein, the Court finds it prudent to sustain the CA’s verdict offsetting the damage
caused by said parties against each other. The Court can, however, only concur with the CA in result since
the latter inaccurately applied,63 as basis for its ruling, the in pari delictoprinciple enunciated in the case of
Now, with respect to Civil Case No. CEB-21296, the Court finds that the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s
dismissal thereof considering that it was determined that Sps. Uy had actually encroached upon the Rana
property to the extent of 2 sq. m.
Settled is the rule that in order that an action for the recovery of property may prosper, the party prosecuting
the same need only prove the identity of the thing and his ownership thereof.73 In the present cases, the
Report74 of the court-appointed commissioner, Atty. Pintor, who conducted a relocation survey75 of the Rana
and Uy properties identified and delineated the boundaries of the two properties and showed that Sps. Uy’s
perimeter fence intruded on 2 sq. m.of the Rana property. 76 Both the RTC and the CA relied upon the said
report; thus, absent any competent showing that the said finding was erroneous, the Court sees no reason
to deviate from the conclusions reached by the courts a quo. Having sufficiently proven their claim, Sps.
Rana are, therefore entitled to the return of the 2 sq.m. encroached portion. Corollary thereto, compliance
by Linda Rana with the directive in Civil Case No. CEB-20893to build a retaining wall on their property shall temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages."79 Bluntly placed, the Court does not view the present
be held in abeyance pending return of the encroached portion. matters of such caliber. Hence, there is no reason to grant the parties’ claims for the same.

C. Claims Common to Both Civil Case No. CEB-20893 and Civil Case No. CEB-21296: Malicious
Prosecution of Both Cases, Moral and Exemplary Damages, Attorney’s Fees, and Litigation
Expenses.
As a final matter, the Court resolvesthe claims common to both Civil Case No. CEB-20893 and Civil Case
No. CEB-21296, particularly those on malicious prosecution, as well asmoral and exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses.
Lastly, considering that neither of the parties was able to successfully prove (a) their claims for malicious
prosecution,80 (b) their entitlement to moral and exemplary damages,81 and (c) the attendance of any of the
circumstances under Article 220882 of the Civil Code, their respective claims for attorney’s fees and litigation
expensesagainst each other are also denied. WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 13, 2005 and the
Resolution dated June 18, 2010 in CA-G.R. CV No. 78463 are SET ASIDE and a new one is entered as
follows:
In Civil Case No. CEB-20893:

(a) The awards of damages in favor of each party are OFFSETagainst each other as herein
As the Court sees it, the filing bythe parties of their respective complaints against each other was notclearly
discussed;
and convincingly shown to have been precipitated by any maliceor bad faith, sufficient enough to warrant
the payment of damages in favor of either party. As correctly pointed out by the CA, malicious prosecution,
both in criminal and civil cases, requires the presence oftwo (2) elements, namely: (a) malice; and (b) (b) Linda Rana is hereby ORDEREDto build, at her own expense, a retaining wall on the property
absence of probable cause. Moreover, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister covered by TCT No. 124095 in accordance with the sketch of the Office of the Building Official of
design to vex and humiliate a person; and that it was initiated deliberately knowing that the charge was false Cebu City attached to the records of the case, subject to the condition as shall be hereunder set;
and baseless.77 Hence, the mere filing of a suitwhich subsequently turns out to be unsuccessful does not and
render a person liable for malicious prosecution, for the law could not have meant toimpose a penalty on the
right to litigate.78 As the aforementioned elements were not duly proven, the claims for malicious prosecution
(c) All other claims and counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack of legal and factual bases.
are hereby denied.

In Civil Case No. CEB-21296:

With respect to the claims for moral damages, although the Court found the parties to have sustained
nominal damages as a result of the other parties’ acts, an award of moral damages would nonetheless be
improper in this case. Article 2217 of the Civil Code states that "[m]oral damages include physical suffering, (a) Spouses Rosario and Wilson Uy are DIRECTED to return to Linda Rana the 2-square meter
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social encroached portion as reflected in the relocation survey conducted by court-appointed
humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be commissioner Atty. Reuel T. Pintor, after which Linda Rana shall be OBLIGED to build the
recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act for omission." Corollary thereto, retaining wall as directed by the Court; and
Article 2219 of the same code (Article 2219) states that "[m]oral damages may be recovered in the following
and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical
injuries; (3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts; (4) Adultery or concubinage; (5) Illegal or (b) All other claims and counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
arbitrary detention or arrest; (6) Illegal search; (7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation; (8)
Malicious prosecution; (9) Acts mentioned in Article 309; [and] (10) Actsand actions referred to in Articles SO ORDERED.
21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35."

Here, it was not proven thatthe damage caused by (a) Sps. Rana against Wong, et al., arising from the
elevation and cementing of the subject portion and the subject backfilling, and (b) Sps. Uy against Sps. 6
Rana, by virtue of their 2 sq. m. encroachment, could be characterized as a form of or had resulted in physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, GUILLERMO M. TELMO, G.R. No. 182567
social humiliation, or any other similar injury. Neitherwas it convincingly shown that the present controversies
fall within the class of cases enumerated under Article 2219. Therefore, no moral damages should be Petitioner,
awarded. Present:

Similarly, the Court deems that an award of exemplary damages would be inappropriate since these
damages are imposed only "by way of example or correction for the publicgood, in addition to the moral,
 YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Naic, Cavite, Danilo Consumo, Barangay (Brgy.) Chairman, Brgy. Halang, Naic, Cavite, and Elizalde Telmo,
Chairperson,
a private individual.
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA, and
The complaint alleged that respondent is a co-owner of a real property of 616 square meters in
PERALTA, JJ.
Brgy. Halang, Naic, Cavite, known as Lot 952-A and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-957643

of the Register of Deeds of Cavite. Petitioner and Elizalde Telmo (Telmos) are the owners of the two (2)
LUCIANO M. BUSTAMANTE, Promulgated:
parcels of land denominated as Lot 952-B and 952-C, respectively, located at the back of respondents
Respondent.
lot. When his lot was transgressed by the construction of the Noveleta-Naic-Tagaytay Road, respondent
July 13, 2009
offered for sale the remaining lot to the Telmos. The latter refused because they said they would have no

use for it, the remaining portion being covered by the roads 10-meter easement.
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

The complaint further alleged that, on May 8, 2005, respondent caused the resurvey of Lot 952-A
DECISION
in the presence of the Telmos. The resurvey showed that the Telmos encroached upon respondents

lot.Petitioner then uttered, Hanggat ako ang municipal engineer ng Naic, Cavite, hindi kayo makakapagtayo
NACHURA, J.:
ng anuman sa lupa nyo; hindi ko kayo bibigyan ng building permit.

For our consideration is a Petition[1] for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
On May 10, 2005, respondent put up concrete poles on his lot. However, around 7:00 p.m. of the
in relation to Section 27, paragraph 3 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6770).Subject of the
same day, the Telmos and their men allegedly destroyed the concrete poles. The following day, respondents
Petition is the Decision[2] dated October 13, 2005 and the Order[3] dated March 17, 2006 of the Office of the
relatives went to Brgy. Chairman Consumo to report the destruction of the concrete poles. Consumo told
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.
them that he would not record the same, because he was present when the incident occurred. Consumo

never recorded the incident in the barangay blotter.

This case arose from the Verified Complaint[4] filed by respondent Luciano M. Bustamante before

the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon against petitioner Guillermo Telmo, Municipal Engineer of
 Respondent complained that he and his co-owners did not receive any just compensation Consumo further alleged that after putting up the fence, respondent and his companions left

from the government when it took a portion of their property for the construction of the Noveleta-Naic- without waiting for the arrival of petitioner. When petitioner arrived, he explained to the people present that

Tagaytay Road. Worse, they could not enjoy the use of the remaining part of their lot due to the abusive, the property enclosed by respondent is owned by the government and that no one is allowed to construct

Illegal, and unjust acts of the Telmos and Consumo. Respondent charged the latter any fence without a permit from him, as the Municipal Engineer, or from any building official of the local

criminallyfor violation of Article 312[5] of the Revised Penal Code and Section 3(e)[6] of Republic Act No. government of Naic, Cavite. Consumo said that the residents affected by the fence constructed by
[7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
3019 and administrativelyfor violation of Section 4 (a) , (b) , (c) , and (e) of Republic Act No. 6713. respondent were the ones who pulled out the concrete posts in order to provide access to the national

road. These residents included the petitioner, whose trucks used for delivering sand and hollow blocks were

enclosed and also denied access.

[13]
In his Counter-Affidavit, petitioner denied having uttered the words attributed to him by

respondent, and claimed that he only performed his official duties in requiring an application for a building

permit before any structure can be erected on government property. He said that respondent insisted on In his Counter-Affidavit,[14] Elizalde Telmo denied having encroached, occupied or taken

enclosing with barbed wire and concrete posts the lot that already belonged to the national government, possession of respondents property. He claimed that, on May 10, 2005, he was merely an onlooker to the

which had now been converted into a national road. He also alleged that if he allowed the enclosures erected altercation between petitioner and respondent. He said that petitioner, his brother, insisted that respondent

by the respondent, other residents would be denied ingress to and egress from their own properties. could not enclose the property in question unless the latter obtains a building permit from the Office of the

Municipal Engineer/Building Official, since it appeared that the subject property was no longer a property of

respondent but was converted into government property by virtue of the 30-meter road set-back imposed by
In his own counter-affidavit, Consumo denied collusion with petitioner in not recording in the Zoning Ordinance of the Municipality of Naic, Cavite. Elizalde Telmo stated that he did not offer any
the barangay blotter the subject incident. He explained that on May 10, 2005 at around 5:00 p.m., he was resistance to the fencing of the property in question. He observed, though, that when they learned that
summoned by petitioner to intercede, because the respondent and his men were fencing the subject petitioner was arriving at the place, respondent and his companions just left the vicinity.

property. Consumo obliged, personally saw the fence being built, and observed that even the trucks owned

by petitioner were enclosed therein. When he asked respondent if he had the necessary permit and the

proper barangay clearance to do so, respondents lawyer, Atty. San Gaspar, replied that there was no need Later, petitioner and respondent filed their respective position papers[15] upon the directive of the

for the permit and clearance since respondent was just fencing his own property. Thus, Consumo could not Graft Investigating and Prosecuting Officer. Their position papers reiterated the allegations made in their

prevent the ongoing fencing, but told respondent and company to wait for petitioner to decide the matter. respective affidavits earlier submitted.
 In the Decision[16] dated October 13, 2005, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found

petitioner and Danilo Consumo administratively liable, but dismissed the charge against Elizalde Telmo for
Hence, this petition anchored on the following grounds:
lack of jurisdiction over his person, he being a private individual. The dispositive portion of the Decision

states
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
respectfully recommends the following, to wit:
A. THE HONORABLE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON SERIOUSLY
ERRED WHEN HE DECLARED THAT THERE WAS NO VALID TAKING OF
RESPONDENTS LOT BY MEANS OF EXPROPRIATION.
the undersigned investigator

B. THE HONORABLE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON SERIOUSLY

ERRED WHEN HE DECLARED THAT PETITIONER SHOULD BE AUTHORIZED BY
(1) That the administrative complaint against respondent Elizalde Telmo THE MUNICIPAL MAYOR OR BY THE COURT TO ABATE PUBLIC NUISANCE OR
be DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction; NUISANCE PER SE.

(2) That respondent Guillermo Telmo be meted the PENALTY OF FINE C. THE HONORABLE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON ERRED WHEN
EQUIVALENT TO SIX (6) MONTHS SALARY for violation of Section 4 of HE METED THE PENALTY OF FINE EQUIVALENT TO SIX (6) MONTHS SALARY
Republic Act No. 6713; and FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 4 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6713.[20]

(3) That respondent Danilo Consumo be meted the PENALTY OF FINE

EQUIVALENT TO THREE (3) MONTHS HONORARIA for violation of
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6713. In essence, petitioner contends that the property claimed and enclosed with concrete posts by

respondent was validly taken by the National Government through its power of eminent domain, pursuant to
[17]
SO DECIDED. Executive Order No. 113, as amended by Executive Order No. 253, creating the Noveleta-Naic-Tagaytay

Road. In this context, petitioner contends that the concrete posts erected by respondent were a public

nuisance under Article 694 (4)[21] of the Civil Code, more particularly a nuisance per se, which may be
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[18] wherein he elaborated that he just performed his
summarily abated under Article 699 (3)[22] of the same Code. Petitioner says that as the Municipal Engineer,
official duties when he summarily removed the concrete posts erected by respondent to enclose the property.
he is also the Building Official of Naic, Cavite; and thus, it was well within his authority, pursuant to Section

214, paragraph two (2) of the National Building Code, to order the removal of the concrete posts. Petitioner

In the Order[19] dated March 17, 2006, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon denied the likewise claims that Section 23 of Revised Philippine Highway Act (Presidential Decree No. 17)[23] mandated

Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. him to remove respondents concrete posts. Petitioner concludes that since he merely performed his official
duties in removing the concrete posts erected by petitioner from the property, which is already owned by the
government, he must be absolved of any administrative liability.
Instead of filing his comment on the petition, respondent manifested through counsel that he is no
[24]
longer interested in pursuing this case, submitting therewith his Affidavit of Desistance dated December
5, 2007. Respondent alleged in the affidavit that the administrative charges he lodged against petitioner
were brought about by a misunderstanding between them, which differences have already been
settled. Consequently, this case should now be dismissed.
We disagree.
The desistance of the complainant does not necessarily result in the dismissal of the administrative
complaint because the Court attaches no persuasive value to a desistance, especially when executed as an
[25]
afterthought. It should be remembered that the issue in an administrative case is not whether the complaint
states a cause of action against the respondent, but whether the public officials have breached the norms
and standards of the public service.[26] Considering that petitioner admitted in his pleadings that he summarily
removed the concrete posts erected by respondent, allegedly within the parameters of his authority as
Municipal Engineer of Naic, Cavite, it is only proper that this case be decided on its merits rather than on the
basis of the desistance of respondent.
It cannot be denied that respondents property was taken by the National Government thru the
Department of Public Works and Highways when it constructed the Noveleta-Naic-Tagaytay Road. What is
not clear from the records of this case is whether respondents property was taken as part of the national
road itself or only as part of the right-of-way easement therefor. We observe that the re-survey plan[27] of his
property attached by respondent to his complaint and the survey plan[28] of the Noveleta-Naic-Tagaytay
Road submitted by petitioner appear to be different. Nevertheless, it is evident from the sketch plans that
respondent could not enclose his property because it is now being used by the National
Government. Therefore, whatever cause of action respondent may have in his claim for just compensation
for the taking of his property, the same should be lodged against the National Government.
While it is settled that respondent does not have the legal right to enclose the property, we should
now determine whether petitioner indeed performed his official functions properly.
First. Petitioner claims that his act of summarily removing respondents concrete posts was
authorized under the National Building Code (Presidential Decree No. 1096). The provision he cites correctly
pertains to Section 215, which reads
Sec. 215. Abatement of Dangerous Buildings.When any building or structure
is found or declared to be dangerous or ruinous, the Building Official shall order its
repair, vacation or demolition depending upon the decree of danger to life, health, or
safety. This is without prejudice to further action that may be taken under the provisions
of Articles 482 and 694 to 707 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
To better understand this provision, we refer to Section 214 of the same law, which defines what
are dangerous and ruinous buildings or structures susceptible of abatement. It provides
 Sec. 214. Dangerous and Ruinous Buildings or Structures. Dangerous
buildings are those which are herein declared as such or are structurally unsafe or not should be construed in the context of the definition of the word building. The concrete posts put up by
provided with safe egress, or which constitute a fire hazard, or are otherwise dangerous
to human life, or which in relation to existing use, constitute a hazard to safety or health respondent on the property are not properly covered by the definition of the word building nor is it embraced
or public welfare because of inadequate maintenance, dilapidation, obsolescence, or
in the corresponding interpretation of the word structure.
abandonment, or which otherwise contribute to the pollution of the site or the community
to an intolerable degree.

Second. Petitioner contends that respondents concrete posts were in the nature of a nuisance per

se, which may be the subject of summary abatement sans any judicial proceedings. Again, we disagree.
A careful reading of the foregoing provisions would readily show that they do not apply to the

respondents situation. Nowhere was it shown that the concrete posts put up by respondent in what he

believed was his and his co-owners property were ever declared dangerous or ruinous, such that they can A nuisance per se is that which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be

be summarily demolished by petitioner. summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity.[31] Evidently, the concrete posts summarily removed

by petitioner did not at all pose a hazard to the safety of persons and properties, which would have

necessitated immediate and summary abatement. What they did, at most, was to pose an inconvenience to
What is more, it appears that the concrete posts do not even fall within the scope of the provisions the public by blocking the free passage of people to and from the national road.
of the National Building Code. The Code does not expressly define the word building. However, we find

helpful the dictionary definition of the word building, viz:

Third. Petitioner likewise maintains that his authority to perform the assailed official act sprang

from Section 23 of the Revised Philippine Highway Act. He posits that this provision is particularly
[A] constructed edifice designed usually covered by a roof and more or less
completely enclosed by walls, and serving as a dwelling, storehouse, factory, shelter for implemented by Department Order No. 52,[32] Series of 2003 of the Department of Public Works and
animals, or other useful structure distinguished from structures not designed for
occupancy (as fences or monuments) and from structures not intended for use in one Highways for the Removal of Obstructions and Prohibited Uses within the Right-of-Way of National Roads.
place (as boats or trailers) even though subject to occupancy. [29]

Department Order No. 52 directs all District Engineers to immediately remove or cause the

removal of all obstructions and prohibited uses within the right-of-way of all national roads in their respective
The provisions of the National Building Code would confirm that building as used therein conforms
jurisdictions. These obstructions and prohibited uses include, among others, all kinds of private, temporary
to this definition. Thus, applying the statutory construction principle of ejusdem generic,[30] the word structure
and permanent structures, such as buildings, houses, shanties, stores, shops, stalls, sheds, posts,
canopies, billboards, signages, advertisements, fences, walls, railings, basketball courts, garbage

receptacles, and the like. The Department Order requires the District Engineers to issue notices to the
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 13, 2005 and the Order dated March 17, 2006 of the
concerned persons to remove the obstructions and prohibited uses within the right-of-way, and shall follow
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon finding petitioner Guillermo M. Telmo, Municipal Engineer of
through prompt compliance with these notices and full implementation of the Order. It further provides that
Naic, Cavite, administratively culpable for violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6713, imposing upon
appropriate sanctions will be taken against those who fail to comply with its provisions.
him the penalty of fine equivalent to his six 6-month salary, must be MODIFIED.Guillermo M. Telmo is

instead found administratively guilty of DISCOURTESY IN THE COURSE OF OFFICIAL DUTIES and is

hereby REPRIMANDED. Costs against petitioner.

Gauging the action of petitioner based on the guidelines set by Department Order No. 52, from

which he claims his authority, we cannot but conclude that petitioner went beyond the scope of his official

power because it is the concerned District Engineer of the Department of Public Works and Highways who
SO ORDERED.
should have ordered respondent to remove the concrete posts. The petitioner failed to show that he was

duly authorized by the District Engineer to implement the Department Order in Naic, Cavite. More
7
importantly, even assuming that petitioner had been duly authorized to order the removal of the concrete
SPOUSES RICARDO HIPOLITO, JR. G.R. No. 174143
posts of respondent, he failed to prove that he issued the required notice to respondent to remove the said
and LIZA HIPOLITO,
structures before he did the removal himself. Note that petitioner, in fact, admitted in his pleadings that he Petitioners, Present:
summarily removed the said posts.

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

The Revised Philippine Highway Act and Department Order No. 52 do not expressly provide for BERSAMIN,

DEL CASTILLO, and

the administrative sanction to be taken against public officials violating their provisions. Hence, we must
TERESITA CINCO, VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
refer to the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. We believe that the administrative
CARLOTA BALDE CINCO
offense committed by petitioner through the questioned act was only Discourtesy in the Course of Official
and ATTY. CARLOS CINCO, Promulgated:
Duties, which is a light offense under Rule IV, Section 52 of the said Rules. The penalties imposable for
Respondents. November 28, 2011
such an offense are a reprimand for the first offense, a suspension from 1 day to 30 days for the second
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x
offense, and dismissal from public service for the third offense. Since this appears to be petitioners first
DECISION
offense, his action warrants only a REPRIMAND.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
[1]
Findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally accorded great respect, if not finality, by the courts by
reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said administrative agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction.
Challenged in this Petition for Review on Certiorari[2] are the May 19, 2006 Decision[3] and August 15, 2006
[4]
Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 89783 which dismissed petitioners Petition for Review and
denied their Motion for Reconsideration respectively. Said assailed CA Decision which affirmed the February 28, 2005
Resolution[5] of the Office of the President (OP), in O.P. Case No. 04-F-262, states, viz:
In fine, we hold that public respondent Office of the President, in affirming the resolution
of the Secretary of the DPWH which sustained the resolution and the demolition order of the OBO,
committed no grave abuse of discretion, the same being supported by evidence and having been
issued in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolution dated February
28, 2005 of the Office of the President of the Philippines, issued through the Deputy Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs in O.P. Case No. 04-F-262, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Petitioners beseech this Court to reverse and set aside said Decision and consequently, to alter a string of
consistent Resolutions issued by the OP in the said O.P. Case No. F-262, the Secretary of the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) in NBC Case No. 17-03-I-MLA,[7] and the Office of the Building Official (OBO) of the City
of Manila in NBC Case No. NG-2002-06.[8]
Factual Antecedents
Petitioner-spouses Ricardo Hipolito, Jr. and Liza Hipolito (petitioners) allege that on June 15, 1989, Edeltrudis
Hipolito y Mariano (Edeltrudis)[9] entered into an agreement[10] with Francisco Villena[11] (now deceased) to rent a portion of
the property located at 2176 Nakar Street, San Andres Bukid, Manila and to construct an apartment-style building adjacent
to the existing house thereon. The contract was for a period of 20 years. Pursuant to the agreement, Edeltrudis built a
three-storey apartment building without securing a building permit. Petitioners inherited the apartment building upon the
death of Edeltrudis.
In 2002 or 13 years after the execution of the agreement, petitioners and the heirs of Francisco Villena, all
residing in the property, were informed that respondent Atty. Carlos D. Cinco (Atty. Cinco) acquired the subject property
through a deed of sale sometime in 1976.
On June 17, 2002, herein respondents Atty. Cinco, Teresita Cinco and Dr. Carlota Balde Cinco (respondents)
filed with the OBO a verified request[12] for structural inspection of an old structure located at 2176 Nakar Street, San
Andres Bukid, Manila.
Acting on the request, Building Inspector Engineer Leonardo B. Rico (Engr. Rico) conducted an initial inspection. In his
memorandum Engr. Rico reported that two old and dilapidated buildings made of wooden materials were found in the
premises and recommended that the matter be referred to the Committee on Buildings (Committee) for further appropriate
action and disposition.
Deemed as a petition for condemnation/abatement pursuant to the National Building Code (NBC) and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations, the verified request of the respondents was referred to the Committee for Hearing/
Investigation.
With prior notices to the parties and the tenants, three hearings were subsequently held from August 12, 2002
to September 20, 2002 for purposes of resolving the focal issue of the structural stability, architectural presentability,
electrical and fire safety aspect to determine [whether] or not the subject buildings are still safe for continued
occupancy.[13] On September 20, 2002, Victoria Villena, wife and heir of Francisco Villena and owner of one of the two
buildings, filed a counter manifestation questioning respondents personality to file the petition for condemnation, and
refuting the technical evaluation reports of Engr. Rico and respondents commissioned engineer. Whereupon, the
Committee was constrained to schedule an ocular inspection of the subject buildings on October 7, 2002. A report on the
Ruling of the Office of the Building Official
ocular inspection conducted was thereafter submitted through a Memorandum[14] dated October 8, 2002, which states:

x x x The subject structure is a 3-storey at the rear portion and Two (2)[-] storey at the front made In a Resolution[15] dated March 26, 2003, the OBO declared the buildings dangerous and ruinous, and
up of wooden materials with G.I. sheet roofings.
recommended their demolition, to wit:
II. Findings:

1. Corrugated G.I. sheet roofings and its accessories incurred extensive xxxx
deterioration/[dilapidation] due to weathering.
On the basis of the ocular inspection report submitted by the Committee on Buildings
2. Ceiling boards [bulging] attributed to water leaks from defective roofing. and the findings of the OIC, City Electrical Division DEPW which form part of this resolution, it
appearing that the subject structures incurred an extensive degree of [dilapidation]/deterioration by
3. Exterior and interior wooden boards deteriorated. 60-80% attributed mainly to long weather exposure, termite infestation and neglect of maintenance
on its architectural and structural component which constitute architectural eyesore, structurally
4. Doors/windows including its jambs deteriorated/[dilapidated]. unsafe as well as electrical hazards thereby endangering the life, health property and welfare of
the general public particularly the tenants thereat [sic].
5. No provisions of firewall on the sides abutting private lot.
Such sorry condition of said structures exist to the extent that remedial/ rehabilitation
6. Rafters, purlins, and girts deteriorated due to neglect of maintenance. which is no longer practical and economical as it would entail/ necessitate a total overdone thereof
[sic].
7. Vibrations were felt on the wooden flooring when exerting wt. An indication that its
support suffered [material] fatigue due to wear and tear and termite infestation. WHEREFORE, premises considered the Committee on Buildings and in consonance
with the findings of the OIC, City Electrical Division DEPW the subject buildings are hereby found
8. Wooden columns incurred deterioration/[dilapidation] due to weathering and and declared Dangerous and Ruinous and strongly recommending the issuance of the
termite infestation. corresponding Demolition Order in pursuance of Section[s] 214 and 215 of the National Building
Code and Rule VII and VIII of its Implementing Rules and Regulations further directing the tenants/
9. Open wiring installation/fire hazard. occupants thereat to vacate the premises within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof to pave the
way for its peaceful and orderly [d]emolition activity.
10. With notices of condemned installation No. 2K3-62042 EPM issued by OIC, City
Electrical Division, DEPW. SO ORDERED.

11. Inadequate water supply and drainage system.

12. Outmoded T & G due to neglect of maintenance. A Demolition Order[16] addressed to the respondents was accordingly issued on even date with petitioners and

13. Inadequate sanitary/plumbing installation. their tenants duly furnished with a copy thereof.
III. RECOMMENDATION:

From the foregoing, the subject buildings [appear] to have incurred extensive
deterioration/[dilapidation] [attributed] mainly to long weather exposure, poor maintenance and Petitioners thus appealed[17] to the DPWH.
termite infestation on its architectural and structural components by 60-80% which constitutes an
Architectural eyesore, structurally unsafe as well as fire and electrical hazard thereby endangering
the life, safety, health and welfare [of] the general public specifically the tenants thereat, hence, it is
strongly recommended that the subject building be declared dangerous and ruinous in pursuance Ruling of the Department of Public Works and Highways
of Sec. 214 and 215 and Rules VII and Rule VIII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
P.D. 1096.
 In their appeal, petitioners prayed for the reversal of the Resolution of the OBO and for the setting aside of the
Demolition Order on the ground that same were anomalously issued. They likewise contended that respondents petition
for condemnation was actually an attempt to circumvent their rights as builders in good faith. Petitioners prayed for a
separate inspection of the two buildings by an impartial body.
Thus, another ocular inspection was conducted by the Inspectorate Team of the DPWH to determine the
actual physical condition of the subject buildings. The Inspectorate Team reported thus:
There are two (2) Buildings/Structures subject of this appeal. For proper identification
of the two (2) Storey Residential Building located at front No. 2176 Nakar Street, San Andres
Bukid, is designated as Building I while the Three (3) Storey Residential Building located at the rear
portion is designated as [B]uilding 2.
Building 1
Building I is pre-war vintage (t)wo (2)[-](s)torey structure generally made of wooden materials.
Corrugated G.I. roofing sheets and its accessories are extensively corroded and deteriorated due
to long existence, weather exposure and improper maintenance. Gutters and [down spouts] are
already missing. Interior and exterior wooden board partitions are deteriorated by about eighty
percent (80%). Roof eaves and media agues are deteriorated and some wooden members are
ready to collapse. Doors and windows including [their] jambs are deteriorated by about eighty
percent (80%). Wooden stair[s] leading to second floor is rotten and deteriorated due to long
existence and termite infestation. Wooden board floorings are sagging and vibration can be felt
when walking on it. Plywood ceiling boards are deteriorated by about eighty percent (80%).
The wooden roof framing parts such as rafters, purlins, and girts are rotten. Majority of the wooden
posts are termite infested and deteriorated. The wooden beams and floor joists are noted to have
incurred deterioration. Vibration is felt at the second floor wooden flooring when walked upon, an
indication that its wooden structural supports show signs of material fatigue due to wear and tear
and termite infestation. Structural components of the structure were observed to have deteriorated
by about seventy five percent (75%).
Sanitary/Plumbing fixtures and systems within the building are noted outmoded, inadequate and
not properly maintained. Inadequate water supply and drainage system within the building is noted.
The comfort room is useable and functioning but is not properly ventilated and unsanitary.
The electrical wiring insulation shows sign of brittleness due to excessive exposure to ambient
heat, moisture and time element. Excessive octopus connections and dangling of wires/extensions
[sic] cords are observed. Some switches and convenience outlets are detached and defective.
Junction/pullboxes are not properly covered thus exposing electrical wiring connections. Some
electrical wiring installations are attached to deteriorated parts of the building. The electrical wiring
installations are already old, not properly maintained and inadequate to conform to the rules and
regulations of the Philippine Electrical Code (PEC).
Building 2
Building 2 is a three (3)[-](s)torey structure located at the back of the Building I, and the usage is
purely for residential purposes. The building is constructed [out] of wooden materials, corrugated
G.I. roofing sheets and plain G.I. sheets for its accessories. The said building was constructed
sometime in 1989, however, the construction is not in accordance with the standard and the
requirements of the National Building Code (PD 1096). Corrugated G.I. roofing sheets are
corroded and deterioration is about seventy percent (70%). [Down spouts] and gutters are no
longer in place. Interior and exterior wooden board sidings have incurred about sixty percent (60%)
deterioration. Some rooms have no proper ventilation due to excessive partitioning. Eaves [have]
no ceiling. Wooden board floorings are sagging and vibration is felt when walked upon due to
undersized wooden framing. Substandard ceiling height. Plywood ceiling boards are bulging. No
fire resistive wall provided between the two buildings.
As to the Structural, Sanitary/Plumbing and Electrical aspects, Building 2 has the same findings as
in Building I.
From the foregoing, it appears that the subject building attained a degree of dilapidation that repair
works are no longer practical and economical to undertake.
Therefore, it is recommended that the Demolition Order issued by the OBO, Manila be
sustained.[18]
On May 19, 2004, the Secretary of the DPWH rendered a Resolution[19] dismissing the appeal of the petitioners
for lack of merit and affirming the Resolution of the OBO and the issuance of the Demolition Order.
In the same Resolution, the Secretary of the DPWH opined:
xxxx
In condemnation proceedings of dangerous and ruinous building pursuant to the
National Building Code (NBC) and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), the authority of
the Building Official is confined to the assessment of the physical condition of the building sought
to be condemned and abated, and depending on the degree of its deterioration and dilapidation,
to issue appropriate order, taking into consideration the welfare and safety not only of its occupants,
but the public in general as well. Corollary thereto, said official is mandated under the Code, even
in the absence of a petitioner or complainant, to motu propio initiate condemnation proceedings of
reported dangerous and ruinous buildings. The inclusion thereof of the 3-storey building which
appellant claims to have been built by Ediltrudis Villena on the subject property in the
hearing/investigation of the case was within the bounds of the duties and responsibilities of the
OBO. In the said proceedings, the Building Official shall not delve on issues affecting contract
involving the property or of the building subject of the case or of lessee-lessor relationship, since
those are matters within the competence of the court to pass upon.
 Appellants allegation that inspection of the premises was done without their
participation and [that they were] not given the chance to engage the services of an engineer However, the CA dismissed the petition for review and affirmed the OP Resolution without addressing the
deserves scant consideration. Records revealed that appellants who actively participated in the
proceedings of the case were duly furnished with copies of appellees petition for condemnation issue of ownership. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[26] but same was denied in a Resolution[27]dated August
and the technical evaluation report of their (appellees) commissioned engineer, and were enjoined
to submit their counter technical report. They however failed to comply. Appellants who at the same 15, 2006 for being a mere rehash or repetition of the issues raised in the petition.
time are residents of the building subject of the proceedings could have easily participated or hire[d]
an engineer to represent them in the inspection conducted by the Committee on Buildings on the
premises as they were duly notified about it and of which they signified their conformity during the
hearing on September 20, 2002. x x x[20] Unwilling to concede, petitioners now come before this Court by way of Petition for Review on Certiorari under

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Undaunted, petitioners filed an appeal[21] with the OP.

Issues

Ruling of the Office of the President

Petitioners raise the following issues:

Before the OP, the petitioners asserted that the findings of the DPWH Inspectorate Team is erroneous and
A.
that they are builders in good faith. However, the OP found no reversible error to justify the reversal or modification of the WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RESOLUTION OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES SUSTAINING THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
DPWH Resolution, and thus resolved to dismiss the appeal in a Resolution[22] dated February 28, 2005. OFFICE OF THE BUILDING OFFICIAL OF MANILA.

The OP likewise subsequently denied with finality petitioners Motion for Reconsideration[23] in an Order[24] dated B.
WHETHER X X X THE OFFICE OF THE BUILDING OFFICIAL GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
April 25, 2005. OBSERVING THE CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS/DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS IN THE
CONDUCT OF THE HEARING AND IN THE CONTENTS OF THE INSPECTION REPORT
SUBMITTED BY THE INSPECTION TEAM INCLUDING THE RESOLUTION OF THE OBO.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Petition for Review[25] with the CA. C.

WHETHER X X X [THE] OFFICE OF THE BUILDING OFFICIAL (OBO)
OF MANILA OVERSTEPPED THE BOUNDS OF ITS AUTHORITY IN NOT APPLYING
ARTICLE 482 AND ARTICLES 694 TO 707 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE IN IMPLEMENTING
Ruling of the Court of Appeals THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 215 OF THE BUILDING CODE P.D. 1096 IN THIS CASE.

D.
WHETHER X X X THE PETITIONER[S] OR THEIR PREDECESSOR IN INTEREST [ARE]/IS A
Before the CA, petitioners again raised the issues they advanced before the administrative bodies, particularly the issue BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH OF THE 3[-]STOREY APARTMENT BUILDING LOCATED AT THE
REAR PORTION OF THE PROPERTY AND REFERRED TO AS BLDG. 2.
regarding the ownership of the lot vis--vis their right as builders in good faith.
E.
WHETHER X X X THE ACTION FOR EXTRAJUDICIAL ABATEMENT OF NUISANCE IS
PROPER IN THIS CASE.[28]
 Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
At the outset, [i]t bears stressing that in a petition for review on certiorari [under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court],
the scope of this Courts judicial review of decisions of the [CA] is generally confined only to errors of law, and questions of
fact are not entertained.[29] The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and it is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again
the evidence considered in the proceedings below.[30] More so, this Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh evidence
pertaining to factual issues which have not been subject of any proper proceedings below. Well-entrenched and settled is
the rule that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court adequately and on
time need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on
[31]
appeal. The determination of who owns the subject property, the authenticity of the evidence of both parties, and
whether petitioners are builders in good faith are questions of fact, the resolution of which requires the examination of
evidence that should be ventilated in a separate action brought before a proper forum.
As correctly stated by the Secretary of the DPWH in its Resolution,[32] the administrative agencies jurisdiction
in this case is confined to the assessment of the physical condition of the building sought to be condemned and the
issuance of the appropriate order relative thereto. Issues affecting contract involving the property or of the buildings subject
of the case are not within their competence to rule upon. Lest this Court becomes a court of first instance instead of a court
of last resort, we decline to act on matters that have not run the proper legal course.
Nevertheless, we note that petitioners purported right to occupy the property has already ended two years ago
when the 20-year period of the lease agreement expired in year 2009. There being no provision in the contract, tacit or
otherwise, for renewal or extension of the lease, petitioners no longer have basis to keep hold of Building 2. Hence, the
determination of whether petitioners are builders in good faith is no longer necessary.
As to the other issues, suffice it to say that they boil down to the question of whether the issuance of the OBO
Resolution and Demolition Order was proper, and whether the CA erred when it affirmed the Resolutions of the OP and
the Secretary of the DPWH, which in turn, likewise affirmed the said OBO Resolution.
A Building Official has the authority to order the
condemnation and demolition of buildings which are
found to be in a dangerous or ruinous condition.
[I]t is unquestionable that the Building Official has the authority to order the condemnation and demolition of
buildings which are found to be in a dangerous or ruinous condition.[33] This authority emanates from Sections 214 and
215 of the National Building Code (Presidential Decree [P.D.] No. 1096) which provides:
Section 214. Dangerous and Ruinous Buildings or Structures
Dangerous buildings are those which are herein declared as such or are structurally unsafe or not
provided with safe egress, or which constitute a fire hazard, or are otherwise dangerous to human
life, or which in relation to existing use, constitute a hazard to safety or health or public welfare
because of inadequate maintenance, dilapidation, obsolescence, or abandonment; or which
otherwise contribute to the pollution of the site or the community to an intolerable degree.
Section 215. Abatement of Dangerous Buildings
When any building or structure is found or declared to be dangerous or ruinous, the
Building Official shall order its repair, vacation or demolition depending upon the degree of danger
to life, health, or safety. This is without prejudice to further action that may be taken under the
provisions of Articles 482 and 694 to 707 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
There is, therefore, no question as to the authority of the OBO to render the challenged issuances. Here, the
Building Official was authorized to issue the questioned Demolition Order in view of his finding that the disputed structures
are dangerous and ruinous buildings within the purview of P.D. No. 1096, in relation to its Implementing Rules and
Regulations. Correspondingly, no irregularity in the process in which the resolution and demolition order were issued is
evident. As found by the CA, the records show that the OBO issued the resolution and Demolition Order only after ocular
inspections and hearings were conducted. Notably, the Inspectorate Team of the DPWH came up with the same
conclusion as the OBO when it conducted its own ocular inspection of the premises, that is both Buildings 1 and 2 had Petitioners find error in the CAs reliance on the report of the OBO in affirming the resolution of the OP.
[34]
structural, sanitary, plumbing and electrical defects of up to 80%. Petitioners contend that the initiation of the proceedings in the OBO was calculated to oust them from the property and to

circumvent their rights as builders in good faith thereby making the findings and issuances of the OBO

What is more, contrary to the position of the petitioners that the provisions of the Civil Code on abatement of nuisances unreliable. Petitioners thus beseech this Court to ascertain facts that have already been determined by the administrative

should have been applied in their case, the fact that the buildings in question could also constitute nuisances under the agencies involved and thereafter reviewed and affirmed by the CA.

Civil Code does not preclude the Building Official from issuing the assailed Demolition Order. As provided by P.D. No.

1096, the authority of the Building Official to order the repair, vacation or demolition, as the case may be, is without We find the contention without merit.
[35]
prejudice to further action that may be undertaken under the relevant provisions of the Civil Code.

The mandate of the OBO is to act motu proprio, or upon petition validly received, on reported dangerous and

The position taken by petitioners that the OBO is duty-bound to first order the repair of ruinous and dangerous buildings ruinous buildings and structures that pose a threat to the life, health and well-being of the inhabitants, and the general

is erroneous. Petitioners, in their Memorandum,[36] quoted Section 215 of the National Building Code, thus: public. Hence, the OBO, based on its findings, can still act on the matter pursuant to such mandate, notwithstanding

petitioners claim that respondents initiated the proceedings to circumvent their rights under the law as builders in good
Section 215. Abatement of Dangerous Buildings
faith. Otherwise stated, respondents motive in initiating the proceedings which led to the issuance of the challenged OBO
When any building or structure is found or declared to be dangerous or ruinous, the
Building Official shall order its repair, vacation or demolition depending upon the degree of danger Resolution and Demolition Order is immaterial as far as the OBO is concerned, so long as it is satisfied that a building or
to life, health, or safety. This is without prejudice to further action that may be taken under the
provisions of Articles 482 and 694 to 707 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.[37] structure is dangerous and ruinous.

A careful reading of the provision shows that it does not require the OBO to take actions in the same order or Remarkably, both the DPWH and the OP found no irregularities in the manner that officials of the OBO

sequence that Section 215 enumerates them. Instead, it authorizes the Building Official to order either the repair, vacation, performed their duties and in coming up with its Resolution and Demolition Order. This conclusion was affirmed by the

or demolition of the building depending on the circumstances presented before it, particularly on the degree of danger to CA when it resolved the petition before it.

life, health and safety. In the case at bench, the OBO, based on its assessment of the buildings, deemed it necessary to We find no error on the part of the CA when it relied on the findings of fact of the OBO and the other

recommend and order the demolition of the said buildings, having found them dilapidated and deteriorated by up to 80%. administrative bodies. As correctly stated by the CA in its Decision:

The Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the The powers granted by law, particularly the National Building Code to the Building
resolution issued by the Office of the President Official regarding demolition of buildings are executive and administrative in nature. It is a well-
recognized principle that purely administrative and discretionary functions may not be interfered
with by the courts. In general, courts have no supervising power over the proceedings and actions
of the administrative departments of the government. This is generally true with respect to acts
involving the exercise of judgment or discretion and findings of fact. The established exception to
the rule is where the issuing authority has gone beyond its statutory authority, exercised
 unconstitutional powers or clearly acted arbitrarily and without regard to his duty or with grave 8
abuse of discretion. None of these obtains in the case at bar. (Citations omitted.)[38]
G.R. No. 202124

By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said administrative agencies over matters falling under G.R. No. 202124

their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment thereon; thus, their findings of fact in that regard are generally
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
accorded great respect, if not finality, by the courts.[39] Such findings must be respected as long as they are supported by vs.
IRENEO JUGUETA, Accused-Appellant.
substantial evidence, even if such evidence is not overwhelming or even preponderant.[40] It is not the task of the appellate
DECISION
court to once again weigh the evidence submitted before and passed upon by the administrative body and to substitute

its own judgment regarding sufficiency of evidence.[41] PERALTA, J.:

Similarly, this Court will not disturb these factual findings absent compelling reasons to do so. This Court, in
numerous occasions, has cited exceptions to the general rule that it is not a trier of facts. None of the said exceptions is
This resolves the appeal from the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated January 30, 2012 in CA-
G.R. CR HC No. 03252. The CA affirmed the judgments of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61,
Gumaca, Quezon, finding accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta y Flores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Double Murder in Criminal Case No. 7698-G and Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G.

present in this case. The conclusion reached by the administrative agencies involved after thoroughly conducting their In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, appellant was charged with Double Murder, defined and penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, allegedly committed as follows:
ocular inspections and hearings and considering all pieces of evidence presented before them, which finding was affirmed

by the CA, must now be regarded with great respect and finality by this Court.
We take this opportunity to inform petitioners that the appellate court cannot be expected to actually perform
That on or about the 6th day of June 2002, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, at Barangay Caridad Ilaya,
Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, armed with a caliber.22 firearm, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with
said firearm Mary Grace Divina, a minor, 13 years old, who suffered the following:

the inspection itself for purposes of validating the findings of the administrative bodies. Reliance on findings of fact of the "Gunshot wound -
lower courts or, in this case, administrative bodies, does not mean that the appellate court does not conduct its own review.
Point of Entry – lower abdomen, right, 2 cm. from the midline and 6 cm. from the level of the umbilicus,
In fact, the appellate court painstakingly studies every piece of document that comes into its hands, putting together every directed upward toward the left upper abdomen."

piece of the puzzle to come up with the whole picture of the controversy brought before it. That is no easy task.
and Claudine Divina, a minor, 3 ½ years of age, who suffered the following:

"Gunshot wound -
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 19, 2006 and the Resolution dated August

15, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89783 are AFFIRMED. Point of Entry - 9th ICS along the mid-axillary line, right, 1 cm. diameter

Point of Exit - 7th ICS mid-axillary line, left;"

SO ORDERED.

which directly caused their instant death.

That the crime committed in the dwelling of the offended party who had not given provocation for the attack
and the accused took advantage of nighttime to facilitate the commission of the offense.
Contrary to law.2
In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, appellant, together with Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel, was charged
with Multiple Attempted Murder, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about 9:00 o’clock in the evening of 6th day of June, 2002, at Barangay Caridad Ilaya, Municipality
of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, armed with short
firearms of undetermined calibres, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery, with evident premeditation and
abuse of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot
with the said firearms the house occupied by the family of Norberto Divina, thereby commencing the
commission of the crime of Murder, directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of execution which
would have produced it by reason of some cause or accident other than the spontaneous desistance of the
accused, that is, the occupants Norberto Divina, his wife Maricel Divina and children Elizabeth Divina and
Judy Ann Divina, both elementary pupils and who are minors, were not hit.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Roger San Miguel, however, moved for reinvestigation of the case against them. At said proceedings, one
Danilo Fajarillo submitted his sworn statement stating that on June 6, 2002, he saw appellant with a certain
"Hapon" and Gilbert Estores at the crime scene, but it was only appellant who was carrying a firearm while
the other two had no participation in the shooting incident. Fajarillo further stated that Roger San Miguel was
not present at the crime scene. Based on the sworn statement of Fajarillo, the Provincial Prosecutor found
no prima facie case against Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel.4 Thus, upon motion of the prosecution,
the case for Attempted Murder against Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel was dismissed, and trial
proceeded only as to appellant.5
At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Norberto Divina, the victim, and Dr. Lourdes
Taguinod who executed the Medico-Legal Certificate and confirmed that the children of Norberto, namely,
Mary Grace and Claudine, died from gunshot wounds. Dr. Taguinod noted that the trajectory of the bullet
wounds showed that the victims were at a higher location than the shooter, but she could not tell what kind
of ammunitions were used.6
Norberto testified that the appellant is his brother-in-law. He recounted that in the evening of June 6, 2002,
as his entire family lay down on the floor of their one-room nipa hut to sleep, the "sack" walling of their hut
was suddenly stripped off, and only the supporting bamboo (fences) remained. With the covering of the wall
gone, the three (3) men responsible for the deed came into view. Norberto clearly saw their faces which
were illuminated by the light of a gas lamp hanging in their small hut. Norberto identified the 3 men as
appellant, Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel.
The 3 men ordered Norberto to come down from his house, but he refused to do so. The men then uttered,
"Magdasal ka na at katapusan mo na ngayon." Norberto pleaded with them, saying, "Maawa kayo sa amin,
matanda na ako at marami akong anak. Anong kasalanan ko sa inyo?" Despite such plea for mercy, a
gunshot was fired, and Norberto immediately threw his body over his children and wife in an attempt to
protect them from being hit. Thereafter, he heard successive gunshots being fired in the direction where his
family huddled together in their hut.7
When the volley of shots ceased and the three (3) men left, Norberto saw that his two (2) young daughters
were wounded. His wife went out of their house to ask for help from neighbors, while he and his older
daughter carried the two (2) wounded children out to the street. His daughter Mary Grace died on the way
to the hospital, while Claudine expired at the hospital despite the doctors' attempts to revive her. 8
In answer to questions of what could have prompted such an attack from appellant, Norberto replied that he
had a previous altercation with appellant who was angered by the fact that he (Norberto) filed a case against
appellant's two other brothers for molesting his daughter.9
On the other hand, appellant was only able to proffer denial and alibi as his defense. Appellant's testimony,
along with those of Gilbert Estores, Roger San Miguel, Isidro San Miguel and Ruben Alegre, was that he
(appellant) was just watching TV at the house of Isidro San Miguel, where he had been living for several
years, at the time the shooting incident occurred. However, he and the other witnesses admitted that said
house was a mere five-minute walk away from the crime scene.10
Finding appellant’s defense to be weak, and ascribing more credence to the testimony of Norberto, the trial
court ruled that the evidence clearly established that appellant, together with two other assailants, conspired
to shoot and kill the family of Norberto. Appellant was then convicted of Double Murder in Criminal Case No.
7698-G and Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G.
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s judgment in Criminal Case No. 7698-G reads:
WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Ireneo Jugueta guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for Double Murder defined and punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and
is hereby sentenced to suffer Reclusion Perpetua for the death of Mary Grace Divina and to indemnify her
heirs in the amount of Php50,000.00 and another to suffer Reclusion Perpetua for the death of Claudine
Divina and accused is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of Claudine Divina in the sum of Php50,000.00.
In addition, he is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victims actual damages in the amount of
Php16,150.00 and to pay for the costs.
SO ORDERED.11
On the other hand, the dispositive portion of the trial court’s judgment in Criminal Case No. 7702-G, reads:
WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Ireneo Jugueta guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for Multiple Attempted Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 in relation to Article
51 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO
(2) MONTHS of Prision Correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision
Mayor as maximum for each of the offended parties; Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and
Judy Ann Divina. Further, accused is ordered to pay for the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.12
Aggrieved by the trial court's judgments, appellant appealed to the CA. On January 30, 2012, the CA
rendered a Decision affirming appellant's conviction for the crimes charged. 13
Dissatisfied with the CA Decision, appellant elevated the case to this Court. On July 30, 2012, the Court
issued a Resolution14 notifying the parties that they may submit their respective Supplemental Briefs. Both
parties manifested that they will no longer submit supplemental briefs since they had exhaustively discussed
their positions before the CA.15
The main issue advanced in the Appellant's Brief deals with the inconsistencies in Norberto's testimony,
such as his failure to state from the beginning that all three assailants had guns, and to categorically identify
appellant as the one holding the gun used to kill Norberto’s children.
The appeal is unmeritorious.
At the outset, it must be stressed that factual findings of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of
witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions based on these factual findings
are to be given the highest respect. Thus, generally, the Court will not recalibrate and re-examine evidence
that had been analyzed and ruled upon by the trial court and affirmed by the CA.16
The evidence on record fully supports the trial court's factual finding, as affirmed by the CA, that appellant
acted in concert with two other individuals, all three of them carrying firearms and simultaneously firing at
Norberto and his family, killing his two young daughters. Norberto clearly saw all of the three assailants with
their firearms as there is illumination coming from a lamp inside their house that had been laid bare after its
walling was stripped off.
Appellant and the two other malefactors are equally responsible for the death of Norberto's daughters
because, as ruled by the trial court, they clearly conspired to kill Norberto's family. Conspiracy exists when
two or more persons come to an agreement regarding the commission of a crime and decide to commit it.
Proof of a prior meeting between the perpetrators to discuss the commission of the crime is not necessary
as long as their concerted acts reveal a common design and unity of purpose. In such case, the act of one
is the act of all.18 Here, the three men undoubtedly acted in concert as they went to the house of Norberto
together, each with his own firearm. It is, therefore, no longer necessary to identify and prove that it is the
bullet particularly fired from appellant's firearm that killed the children.
Murder is defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as the unlawful killing of a person, which is
not parricide or infanticide, attended by circumstances such as treachery or evident premeditation. 19 The
presence of any one of the circumstances enumerated in Article 248 of the Code is sufficient to qualify a
killing as murder.20 The trial court correctly ruled that appellant is liable for murder because treachery
attended the killing of Norberto’s two children, thus:
x x x Evidence adduced show that the family of Norberto Divina, were all lying down side by side about to
sleep on June 6, 2002 at around 9:00 o’clock in the evening, when suddenly their wall made of sack was
stripped off by [appellant] Ireneo Jugueta, Roger San Miguel and Gilberto Alegre (sic) [Gilbert Estores]. They
ordered him to go out of their house and when he refused despite his plea for mercy, they fired at them
having hit and killed his two (2) daughters. The family of Norberto Divina were unarmed and his children
were at very tender ages. Mary Grace Divina and Claudine who were shot and killed were 13 years old and
3 ½ years old respectively. In this case, the victims were defenseless and manifestly overpowered by armed
assailants when they were gunned down. There was clear showing that the attack was made suddenly and
unexpectedly as to render the victims helpless and unable to defend themselves. Norberto and his wife and
his children could have already been asleep at that time of the night. x x x 21
Verily, the presence of treachery qualified the killing of the hapless children to murder. As held in People v.
Fallorina,22 the essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim without
the slightest provocation on his part. Minor children, who by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected
to put up a defense. When an adult person illegally attacks a child, treachery exists.
As to the charge of multiple attempted murder, the last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code
states that a felony is attempted when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt
acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some
cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. In Esqueda v. People,23 the Court held:
If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter survives, the crime committed is either consummated
physical injuries, if the offender had no intention to kill the victim, or frustrated or attempted homicide or
frustrated murder or attempted murder if the offender intends to kill the victim. Intent to kill may be proved
by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or number of weapons used in the commission of the crime; (c)
the nature and number of wounds inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; and (e)
the words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries are inflicted by him on the victim.
In this case, the prosecution has clearly established the intent to kill on the part of appellant as shown by the
use of firearms, the words uttered24during, as well as the manner of, the commission of the crime. The Court
thus quotes with approval the trial court’s finding that appellant is liable for attempted murder, viz.:
In the case at bar, the perpetrators who acted in concert commenced the felony of murder first by suddenly
stripping off the wall of their house, followed by successive firing at the intended victims when Norberto
Divina refused to go out of the house as ordered by them. If only there were good in aiming their target, not
only Mary Grace and Claudine had been killed but surely all the rest of the family would surely have died.
Hence, perpetrators were liable for Murder of Mary Grace Divina and Claudine Divina but for Multiple
Attempted Murder for Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina. But as
[appellant] Ireneo Jugueta was the only one charged in this case, he alone is liable for the crime committed. 25
Meanwhile, the supposed inconsistencies in Norberto's testimony, i.e., that he failed to state from the very
beginning that all three assailants were carrying firearms, and that it was the shots from appellant’s firearm
that killed the children, are too trivial and inconsequential to put a dent on said witness's credibility. An
examination of Norberto's testimony would show that there are no real inconsistencies to speak of. As ruled
in People v. Cabtalan,26 "[m]inor inconsistencies and discrepancies pertaining to trivial matters do not affect
the credibility of witnesses, as well as their positive identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the
crime."27 Both the trial court and the CA found Norberto's candid and straightforward testimony to be worthy
of belief and this Court sees no reason why it should not conform to the principle reiterated in Medina, Jr. v.
People28 that:
 Time and again, this Court has deferred to the trial court's factual findings and evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses, especially when affirmed by the CA, in the absence of any clear showing
that the trial court overlooked or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances that would justify
altering or revising such findings and evaluation. This is because the trial court's determination
proceeds from its first-hand opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, their conduct
and attitude under grilling examination, thereby placing the trial court in unique position to assess
the witnesses' credibility and to appreciate their truthfulness, honesty and candor x x x. 29
It is also well-settled that when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but
the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as many offenses as are charged
and proved, and impose upon him the proper penalty for each offense. 31
Appellant can therefore be held liable for all the crimes alleged in the Informations in Criminal Case Nos.
7698-G and 7702-G, i.e., 2 counts of murder and 4 counts of attempted murder, respectively, and proven
during trial.

The records of this case, particularly the testimonies of the witnesses, reveal no outstanding or exceptional
Meanwhile, in People v. Nelmida,32 the Court explained the concept of a complex crime as defined in Article
circumstance to justify a deviation from such long-standing principle. There is no cogent reason to overturn
4833 of the Revised Penal Code, thus:
the trial court's ruling that the prosecution evidence, particularly the testimony of Norberto Divina identifying
appellant as one of the assailants, is worthy of belief. Thus, the prosecution evidence established beyond
any reasonable doubt that appellant is one of the perpetrators of the crime. In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however, in the eyes of the law and in the
conscience of the offender they constitute only one crime, thus, only one penalty is imposed. There are two
kinds of complex crime. The first is known as a compound crime, or when a single act constitutes two or
However, the Court must make a clarification as to the nomenclature used by the trial court to identify the
more grave or less grave felonies while the other is known as a complex crime proper, or when an offense
crimes for which appellant was penalized. There is some confusion caused by the trial court's use of the
is a necessary means for committing the other. The classic example of the first kind is when a single bullet
terms "Double Murder" and "Multiple Attempted Murder" in convicting appellant, and yet imposing penalties
results in the death of two or more persons. A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts result
which nevertheless show that the trial court meant to penalize appellant for two (2) separate counts of Murder
in a number killed. Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shot, such
and four (4) counts of Attempted Murder.
acts constitute separate and distinct crimes.34

The facts, as alleged in the Information in Criminal Case No. 7698-G, and as proven during trial, show that
Here, the facts surrounding the shooting incident clearly show that appellant and the two others, in firing
appellant is guilty of 2 counts of the crime of Murder and not Double Murder, as the killing of the victims was
successive and indiscriminate shots at the family of Norberto from their respective firearms, intended to kill
not the result of a single act but of several acts of appellant and his cohorts. In the same vein, appellant is
not only Norberto, but his entire family. When several gunmen, as in this case, indiscriminately fire a series
also guilty of 4 counts of the crime of Attempted Murder and not Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case
of shots at a group of people, it shows their intention to kill several individuals. Hence, they are committing
No. 7702-G. It bears stressing that the Informations in this case failed to comply with the requirement in
not only one crime. What appellant and his cohorts committed cannot be classified as a complex crime
Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court that an information must charge only one offense.
because as held in People v. Nelmida,35 "each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective
firearms, aiming each particular moment at different persons constitute distinct and individual acts which
As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one offense, otherwise, the same is defective. cannot give rise to a complex crime."36
The reason for the rule is stated in People of the Philippines and AAA v. Court of Appeals, 21st Division,
Mindanao Station, et al.,30 thus:
Furthermore, the Court notes that both the trial court and the CA failed to take into account dwelling as an
ordinary, aggravating circumstance, despite the fact that the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and
The rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or informations is to give the accused the 7702-G contain sufficient allegations to that effect, to wit:
necessary knowledge of the charge against him and enable him to sufficiently prepare for his defense. The
State should not heap upon the accused two or more charges which might confuse him in his defense. Non-
Criminal Case No. 7698-G for Double Murder:
compliance with this rule is a ground for quashing the duplicitous complaint or information under Rule 117
of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the accused may raise the same in a motion to quash before he
enters his plea, otherwise, the defect is deemed waived. That the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party who had not given provocation for the
attack and the accused took advantage of nighttime to facilitate the commission of the offense. 37
However, since appellant entered a plea of not guilty during arraignment and failed to move for the quashal
of the Informations, he is deemed to have waived his right to question the same. Section 9 of Rule 117 Criminal Case No. 7702-G for Multiple Attempted Murder:
provides that "[t]he failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the
complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said
x x x the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another,
motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in
paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule." armed with short firearms of undetermined calibres, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery, with evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, and shoot with the said firearms the house occupied by the family of Norberto Divina, thereby
commencing the commission of the crime of Murder, directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts
of execution which would have produced it by reason of some cause or accident other than the spontaneous
desistance of the accused x x x38
In People v. Agcanas,39 the Court stressed that "[i]t has been held in a long line of cases that dwelling is
aggravating because of the sanctity of privacy which the law accords to human abode. He who goes to
another's house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere." Dwelling
aggravates a felony where the crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party provided that the
latter has not given provocation therefor.40The testimony of Norberto established the fact that the group of
appellant violated the victims' home by destroying the same and attacking his entire family therein, without
provocation on the part of the latter. Hence, the trial court should have appreciated dwelling as an ordinary
aggravating circumstance.
In view of the attendant ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court must modify the penalties imposed on
appellant. Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, thus, with an ordinary aggravating
circumstance of dwelling, the imposable penalty is death for each of two (2) counts of murder. 41 However,
pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, proscribing the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty to be
imposed on appellant should be reclusion perpetua for each of the two (2) counts of murder without eligibility
for parole. With regard to the four (4) counts of attempted murder, the penalty prescribed for each count
is prision mayor. With one ordinary aggravating circumstance, the penalty should be imposed in its maximum
period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty should be from ten (10) years and
one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next
lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional, in any of its periods, or anywhere from six (6) months and one (1)
day to six (6) years. This Court finds it apt to impose on appellant the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years,
two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, for each of the four (4) counts of attempted murder.
Anent the award of damages, the Court deems it proper to address the matter in detail as regards criminal
cases where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Generally, in these types of criminal
cases, there are three kinds of damages awarded by the Court; namely: civil indemnity, moral, and
exemplary damages. Likewise, actual damages may be awarded or temperate damages in some instances.
First, civil indemnity ex delicto is the indemnity authorized in our criminal law for the offended party, in the
amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and apart from other proven actual damages, which itself
is equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil law.42 This award stems from Article 100 of the RPC
which states, "Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."
It is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a fine; hence, it can be increased by the
Court when appropriate.43 Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three
thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased,
and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every
case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of
permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at
the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article
291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of
testate or intestate succession, may demand support from the person causing the
death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the
deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of
the deceased.
In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution or
compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction that was done to the latter by the accused, which in
a sense only covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in
addition to the penalty of imprisonment imposed to the offender, the accused is also ordered to pay the
victim a sum of money as restitution. Also, it is apparent from Article 2206 that the law only imposes a
minimum amount for awards of civil indemnity, which is ₱3,000.00. The law did not provide for a ceiling.
Thus, although the minimum amount for the award cannot be changed, increasing the amount awarded as
civil indemnity can be validly modified and increased when the present circumstance warrants it. 44
The second type of damages the Court awards are moral damages, which are also compensatory in
nature. Del Mundo v. Court of Appeals45 expounded on the nature and purpose of moral damages, viz.:
Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to compensate one for manifold injuries such as
physical suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social
humiliation. These damages must be understood to be in the concept of grants, not punitive or corrective in
nature, calculated to compensate the claimant for the injury suffered. Although incapable of exactness and
no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of
indemnity being left to the discretion of the court, it is imperative, nevertheless, that (1) injury must have
been suffered by the claimant, and (2) such injury must have sprung from any of the cases expressed in
Article 221946 and Article 222047 of the Civil Code. x x x.
Similarly, in American jurisprudence, moral damages are treated as "compensatory damages awarded for
mental pain and suffering or mental anguish resulting from a wrong." 48 They may also be considered and
allowed "for resulting pain and suffering, and for humiliation, indignity, and vexation suffered by the plaintiff
as result of his or her assailant's conduct, as well as the factors of provocation, the reasonableness of the
force used, the attendant humiliating circumstances, the sex of the victim, [and] mental distress."49
The rationale for awarding moral damages has been explained in Lambert v. Heirs of Rey Castillon: "[T]he
award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits possible, of the spiritual status quo ante;
and therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted." 50
Corollarily, moral damages under Article 222051 of the Civil Code also does not fix the amount of damages
that can be awarded. It is discretionary upon the court, depending on the mental anguish or the suffering of
the private offended party. The amount of moral damages can, in relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so
long as it does not exceed the award of civil indemnity.52
Finally, the Civil Code of the Philippines provides, in respect to exemplary damages, thus:
ART. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public
good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
ART. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the
crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct
from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve
as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the
rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but
not always, used interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the use of exemplary damages
when the award is to account for injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by
a person as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted, 53 the theory being that
there should be compensation for the hurt caused by the highly reprehensible conduct of the defendant –
associated with such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross negligence or recklessness,
oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud54 – that intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or vindictive
damages are often used to refer to those species of damages that may be awarded against a person to
punish him for his outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages are intended in good measure to deter
the wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the future. 55
The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified otherwise, is to be
understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on
the public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim as it causes personal
sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the
accused and by an award of additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a
graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances,
whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State
concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who
suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended
party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the
ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of
consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect
of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party
to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code. 56
57
The reason is fairly obvious as to why the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires aggravating
circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, to be stated in the complaint or information. It is in order not
to trample on the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature of the alleged offense that
he or she has committed. A criminal complaint or information should basically contain the elements of the
crime, as well as its qualifying and ordinary aggravating circumstances, for the court to effectively determine
the proper penalty it should impose. This, however, is not similar in the recovery of civil liability. In the civil
aspect, the presence of an aggravating circumstance, even if not alleged in the information but proven during
trial would entitle the victim to an award of exemplary damages.
Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only due to the presence of
an aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible
or outrageous conduct of the offender. In much the same way as Article 2230 prescribes an instance when
exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the main provision, lays down the very basis of the
award. Thus, in People v. Matrimonio,58 the Court imposed exemplary damages to deter other fathers with
perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters. Also, in People
v. Cristobal,59 the Court awarded exemplary damages on account of the moral corruption, perversity and
wickedness of the accused in sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman. In People v. Cañada,60 People
v. Neverio61 and People v. Layco, Sr.,62 the Court awarded exemplary damages to set a public example, to
serve as deterrent to elders who abuse and corrupt the youth, and to protect the latter from sexual abuse.
Existing jurisprudence pegs the award of exemplary damages at ₱30,000.00, 63 despite the lack of any
aggravating circumstance. The Court finds it proper to increase the amount to ₱50,000.00 in order to deter
similar conduct.
If, however, the penalty for the crime committed is death, which cannot be imposed because of the provisions
of R.A. No. 9346, prevailing jurisprudence64 sets the amount of ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Before awarding any of the above mentioned damages, the Court, however, must first consider the penalty
imposed by law. Under RA 7659 or An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes,
Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Laws, and for Other Purposes, certain crimes under the RPC
and special penal laws were amended to impose the death penalty under certain circumstances.65 Under
the same law, the following crimes are punishable by reclusion perpetua: piracy in general,66 mutiny on the
high seas,67 and simple rape.68 For the following crimes, RA 7659 has imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death: qualified piracy;69 qualified bribery under certain
circumstances;70 parricide;71 murder;72 infanticide, except when committed by the mother of the child for the
purpose of concealing her dishonor or either of the maternal grandparents for the same
purpose;73kidnapping and serious illegal detention under certain circumstances; 74 robbery with violence
against or intimidation of persons under certain circumstances; 75 destructive arson, except when death
results as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under the article; 76 attempted or
frustrated rape, when a homicide is committed by reason or on occasion thereof; plunder;77 and carnapping,
when the driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission
of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.78 Finally, RA 7659 imposes the death penalty on the following
crimes:
(a) In qualified bribery, when it is the public officer who asks or demands the gift or present.
(b) In kidnapping and serious illegal detention: (i) when the kidnapping or detention was committed
for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person; (ii) when the victim is
killed or dies as a consequence of the detention; (iii) when the victim is raped, subjected to torture
or dehumanizing acts.
(c) In destructive arson, when as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized
under Article 320, death results.
(d) In rape: (i) when by reason or on occasion of the rape, the victim becomes insane or homicide
is committed; (ii) when committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: (1) when the
victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law-
spouse of the parent of the victim; (2) when the victim is under the custody of the police or military
authorities; (3) when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children
 or other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity; (4) when the victim is a religious or a
child below seven years old; (5) when the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease; (6) when committed by any member of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency; and (7) when
by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation.
From these heinous crimes, where the imposable penalties consist of two (2) indivisible penalties or single
indivisible penalty, all of them must be taken in relation to Article 63 of the RPC, which provides:
Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - In all cases in which the law prescribes a single
indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances
that may have attended the commission of the deed.
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules
shall be observed in the application thereof:
1. when in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the
greater penalty shall be applied.
2. when there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed,
the lesser penalty shall be applied.
3. when the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no
aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
4. when both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act, the
courts shall reasonably allow them to offset one another in consideration of their number and
importance, for the purpose of applying the penalty in accordance with the preceding rules,
according to the result of such compensation. (Revised Penal Code, Art. 63)
Thus, in order to impose the proper penalty, especially in cases of indivisible penalties, the court has the
duty to ascertain the presence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Accordingly, in crimes where
the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death, the court can impose either reclusion perpetua or
death, depending on the mitigating or aggravating circumstances present.
But with the enactment of RA 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines,
the imposition of death penalty is now prohibited. It provides that in lieu of the death penalty, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties
of the RPC.79
As a result, the death penalty can no longer be imposed. Instead, they have to impose reclusion perpetua.
Despite this, the principal consideration for the award of damages, following the ruling in People v.
Salome80 and People v. Quiachon,81 is "the penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense because of
its heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the offender." 82
When the circumstances surrounding the crime would justify the imposition of the death penalty were it not
for RA 9346, the Court has ruled, as early as July 9, 1998 in People v. Victor,83 that the award of civil
indemnity for the crime of rape when punishable by death should be ₱75,000.00 We reasoned that "[t]his is
not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over
time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against
chastity."84 Such reasoning also applies to all heinous crimes found in RA 7659. The amount was later
increased to ₱100,000.00.85
In addition to this, the Court likewise awards moral damages. In People v. Arizapa,86 ₱50,000.00 was
awarded as moral damages without need of pleading or proving them, for in rape cases, it is recognized that
the victim's injury is concomitant with and necessarily results from the odious crime of rape to warrant per
se the award of moral damages.87 Subsequently, the amount was increased to ₱75,000.00 in People v.
Soriano88 and P100,000.00 in People v. Gambao.89
Essentially, despite the fact that the death penalty cannot be imposed because of RA 9346, the imposable
penalty as provided by the law for the crime, such as those found in RA 7569, must be used as the basis for
awarding damages and not the actual penalty imposed.1avvphi1
Again, for crimes where the imposable penalty is death in view of the attendance of an ordinary aggravating
circumstance but due to the prohibition to impose the death penalty, the actual penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua, the latest jurisprudence90 pegs the amount of ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱100,0000.00
as moral damages. For the qualifying aggravating circumstance and/or the ordinary aggravating
circumstances present, the amount of ₱100,000.00 is awarded as exemplary damages aside from civil
indemnity and moral damages. Regardless of the attendance of qualifying aggravating circumstance, the
exemplary damages shall be fixed at ₱100,000.00. "[T]his is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal
perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuation over time, but also an expression of the displeasure
of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes x x x."91
When the circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only, there being
no ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court rules that the proper amounts should be ₱75,000.00 as
civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages and ₱75,000.00 exemplary damages, regardless of the
number of qualifying aggravating circumstances present.
When it comes to compound and complex crimes, although the single act done by the offender caused
several crimes, the fact that those were the result of a single design, the amount of civil indemnity and moral
damages will depend on the penalty and the number of victims. For each of the victims, the heirs should be
properly compensated. If it is multiple murder without any ordinary aggravating circumstance but merely a
qualifying aggravating circumstance, but the penalty imposed is death because of Art. 48 of the RPC wherein
the maximum penalty shall be imposed,92 then, for every victim who dies, the heirs shall be indemnified with
₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as moral damages and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In case of a special complex crime, which is different from a complex crime under Article 48 of the RPC, the
following doctrines are noteworthy:
In People of the Philippines v. Conrado Laog,93 this Court ruled that special complex crime, or more properly,
a composite crime, has its own definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Justice Regalado, in his Separate Opinion in the case of People v. Barros,94 explained that composite crimes
are "neither of the same legal basis as nor subject to the rules on complex crimes in Article 48 [of the Revised
Penal Code], since they do not consist of a single act giving rise to two or more grave or less grave felonies
[compound crimes] nor do they involve an offense being a necessary means to commit another [complex
crime proper]. However, just like the regular complex crimes and the present case of aggravated illegal
possession of firearms, only a single penalty is imposed for each of such composite crimes although
composed of two or more offenses."95
In People v. De Leon,96 we expounded on the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, as follows:
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide
perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede the
taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery. It is only the result
obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening
in the commission of the crime that has to be taken into consideration. There is no such felony of robbery
with homicide through reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive elements of the crime,
namely, robbery with homicide, must be consummated.
It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of homicide is other than
the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed, or that aside from the homicide, rape, intentional
mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise
immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would still be robbery with
homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is
robbery with homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are
integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word "homicide" is used in its generic
sense. Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and infanticide. 97
In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term "homicide" is to be understood in its generic
sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries committed by reason or on occasion of the
rape.98 Hence, even if any or all of the circumstances (treachery, abuse of superior strength and evident
premeditation) alleged in the information have been duly established by the prosecution, the same would
not qualify the killing to murder and the crime committed by appellant is still rape with homicide. As in the
case of robbery with homicide, the aggravating circumstance of treachery is to be considered as a generic
aggravating circumstance only. Thus we ruled in People v. Macabales:99
Finally, appellants contend that the trial court erred in concluding that the aggravating circumstance of
treachery is present. They aver that treachery applies to crimes against persons and not to crimes against
property. However, we find that the trial court in this case correctly characterized treachery as a generic
aggravating, rather than qualifying, circumstance. Miguel was rendered helpless by appellants in defending
himself when his arms were held by two of the attackers before he was stabbed with a knife by appellant
Macabales, as their other companions surrounded them. In People v. Salvatierra, we ruled that when
alevosia (treachery) obtains in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, such treachery is to be
regarded as a generic aggravating circumstance.
Robbery with homicide is a composite crime with its own definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal
Code. There is no special complex crime of robbery with murder under the Revised Penal Code. Here,
treachery forms part of the circumstances proven concerning the actual commission of the complex crime.
Logically it could not qualify the homicide to murder but, as generic aggravating circumstance, it helps
determine the penalty to be imposed.100
Applying the above discussion on special complex crimes, if the penalty is death but it cannot be imposed
due to RA 9346 and what is actually imposed is the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the civil indemnity and
moral damages will be ₱100,000.00 each, and another ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages in view of the
heinousness of the crime and to set an example. If there is another composite crime included in a special
complex crime and the penalty imposed is death, an additional ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00
moral damages and ₱100,000.00 exemplary damages shall be awarded for each composite crime
committed.
For example, in case of Robbery with Homicide101 wherein three (3) people died as a consequence of the
crime, the heirs of the victims shall be entitled to the award of damages as discussed earlier. This is true,
however, only if those who were killed were the victims of the robbery or mere bystanders and not when
those who died were the perpetrators or robbers themselves because the crime of robbery with homicide
may still be committed even if one of the robbers dies.102 This is also applicable in robbery with rape where
there is more than one victim of rape.
In awarding civil indemnity and moral damages, it is also important to determine the stage in which the crime
was committed and proven during the trial. Article 6 of the RPC provides:
Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. - Consummated felonies, as well as those which
are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are
present; and it is frustrated when an offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the
felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the
will of the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and
does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
As discussed earlier, when the crime proven is consummated and the penalty imposed is death but reduced
to reclusion perpetua because of R.A. 9346, the civil indemnity and moral damages that should be awarded
will each be ₱100,000.00 and another ₱100,000.00 for exemplary damages or when the circumstances of
the crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only, the civil indemnity and moral damages should be
₱75,000.00 each, as well as exemplary damages in the amount of ₱75,000.00. If, however, the crime proven
is in its frustrated stage, the civil indemnity and moral damages that should be awarded will each be
₱50,000.00, and an award of ₱25,000.00 civil indemnity and ₱25,000.00 moral damages when the crime
proven is in its attempted stage. The difference in the amounts awarded for the stages is mainly due to the
disparity in the outcome of the crime committed, in the same way that the imposable penalty varies for each
stage of the crime. The said amounts of civil indemnity and moral damages awarded in cases of felonies in
their frustrated or attempted stages shall be the bases when the crimes committed constitute complex crime
under Article 48 of the RPC. For example, in a crime of murder with attempted murder, the amount of civil
indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages is ₱100,000.00 each, while in the attempted murder,
the civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages is ₱25,000.00 each.
In a special complex crime, like robbery with homicide, if, aside from homicide, several victims (except the b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
robbers) sustained injuries, they shall likewise be indemnified. It must be remembered that in a special
complex crime, unlike in a complex crime, the component crimes have no attempted or frustrated stages
c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00
because the intention of the offender/s is to commit the principal crime which is to rob but in the process of
committing the said crime, another crime is committed. For example, if on the occasion of a robbery with
homicide, other victims sustained injuries, regardless of the severity, the crime committed is still robbery with 1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:
homicide as the injuries become part of the crime, "Homicide", in the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide, is understood in its generic sense and now forms part of the essential element of robbery, 103 which
is the use of violence or the use of force upon anything. Hence, the nature and severity of the injuries a. Frustrated:
sustained by the victims must still be determined for the purpose of awarding civil indemnity and damages.
If a victim suffered mortal wounds and could have died if not for a timely medical intervention, the victim i. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
should be awarded civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages equivalent to the damages
awarded in a frustrated stage, and if a victim suffered injuries that are not fatal, an award of civil indemnity,
moral damages and exemplary damages should likewise be awarded equivalent to the damages awarded ii. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
in an attempted stage.
iii. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
In other crimes that resulted in the death of a victim and the penalty consists of divisible penalties, like
homicide, death under tumultuous affray, reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, the civil indemnity b. Attempted:
awarded to the heirs of the victim shall be ₱50,000.00 and ₱50,000.00 moral damages without exemplary
damages being awarded. However, an award of ₱50,000.00 exemplary damages in a crime of homicide
shall be added if there is an aggravating circumstance present that has been proven but not alleged in the i. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
information.
ii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
Aside from those discussed earlier, the Court also awards temperate damages in certain cases. The award
of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages in homicide or murder cases is proper when no evidence of burial and iii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
funeral expenses is presented in the trial court.104 Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages
may be recovered, as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victims suffered pecuniary loss although the
exact amount was not proved.105 In this case, the Court now increases the amount to be awarded as 2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-
temperate damages to ₱50,000.00. mentioned:

In the case at bar, the crimes were aggravated by dwelling, and the murders committed were further made a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
atrocious by the fact that the victims are innocent, defenseless minors – one is a mere 3½-year-old toddler,
and the other a 13-year-old girl. The increase in the amount of awards for damages is befitting to show not b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
only the Court's, but all of society's outrage over such crimes and wastage of lives.
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
In summary:

2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:

I. For those crimes106 like, Murder,107 Parricide,108 Serious Intentional
Mutilation,109 Infanticide,110 and other crimes involving death of a victim where the penalty consists
of indivisible penalties: a. Frustrated:

1.1 Where the penalty imposed is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of i. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
RA 9346:
ii. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
 b. Attempted: c. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00

i. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00 III. For Complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code where death, injuries, or
sexual abuse results, the civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages will depend on
the penalty, extent of violence and sexual abuse; and the number of victims where the penalty
ii. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00
consists of indivisible penalties:

iii. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00

1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of
RA 9346:
II. For Simple Rape/Qualified Rape:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of
RA 9346:
b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00

a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00

1.2 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:

c. Exemplary damages111 – ₱100,000.00

a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00

1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated but merely attempted: 112
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00

a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00

The above Rules apply to every victim who dies as a result of the crime committed. In
other complex crimes where death does not result, like in Forcible Abduction with Rape,
c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00 the civil indemnity, moral and exemplary damages depend on the prescribed penalty
and the penalty imposed, as the case may be.
2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:
IV. For Special Complex Crimes like Robbery with Homicide, 113 Robbery with Rape,114 Robbery
with Intentional Mutilation,115 Robbery with
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00

Arson,116 Rape with Homicide,117 Kidnapping with Murder,118 Carnapping with Homicide119 or
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00 Carnapping with Rape,120 Highway Robbery with Homicide,121 Qualified Piracy,122 Arson with
Homicide,123 Hazing with Death, Rape, Sodomy or Mutilation124 and other crimes with death,
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00 injuries, and sexual abuse as the composite crimes, where the penalty consists of indivisible
penalties:
2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, but merely attempted:
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of
RA 9346:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00

a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00
 b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00 b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00 c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00

In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of damages is the same as the above 2.3 For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:
if the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua although death did
not occur.
a. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00

1.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds125 and could have died if not for a
b. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00
timely medical intervention, the following shall be awarded:

c. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00

a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00

In Robbery with Physical Injuries,126 the amount of damages shall likewise be

b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
dependent on the nature/severity of the wounds sustained, whether fatal or non-fatal.

c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00

The above Rules do not apply if in the crime of Robbery with Homicide, the robber/s or
perpetrator/s are themselves killed or injured in the incident.1âwphi1
1.3 For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:
Where the component crime is rape, the above Rules shall likewise apply, and that for
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00 every additional rape committed, whether against the same victim or other victims, the
victims shall be entitled to the same damages unless the other crimes of rape are
treated as separate crimes, in which case, the damages awarded to simple
b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
rape/qualified rape shall apply.

c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00

2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of damages is the same as the above
if the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua.
2.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds and could have died if not for a
timely medical intervention, the following shall be awarded:
V. In other crimes that result in the death of a victim and the penalty consists of divisible
penalties, i.e., Homicide, Death under Tumultuous Affray, Infanticide to conceal the dishonour of
the offender,127 Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide, Duel, Intentional Abortion and
Unintentional Abortion, etc.:
1.1 Where the crime was consummated:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, except those crimes where
there are no stages, i.e., Reckless Imprudence and Death under tumultuous affray:
a. Frustrated:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00 i. Civil indemnity – ₱30,000.00

 ii. Moral damages – ₱30,000.00 To reiterate, Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that the minimum amount for awards of civil indemnity
is P3,000.00, but does not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount cannot be changed,
increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be validly modified and increased when the present
b. Attempted:
circumstance warrants it.131

i. Civil indemnity – ₱20,000.00

ii. Moral damages – ₱20,000.00
If an aggravating circumstance was proven during the trial, even if not alleged
in the Information,128 in addition to the above mentioned amounts as civil
indemnity and moral damages, the amount of ₱50,000.00 exemplary
damages for consummated; ₱30,000.00 for frustrated; and ₱20,000.00 for
attempted, shall be awarded.
Prescinding from the foregoing, for the two (2) counts of murder, attended by the ordinary aggravating
circumstance of dwelling, appellant should be ordered to pay the heirs of the victims the following damages:
(1) ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity for each of the two children who died; (2) ₱100,000.00 as moral damages
for each of the two victims; (3) another ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages for each of the two victims; and
(4) temperate damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 for each of the two deceased. For the four (4) counts
of Attempted Murder, appellant should pay ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages
and ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages for each of the four victims. In addition, the civil indemnity, moral
damages, exemplary damages and temperate damages payable by the appellant are subject to interest at
the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this decision until fully paid.132

Lastly, this Court echoes the concern of the trial court regarding the dismissal of the charges against Gilberto
VI. A. In the crime of Rebellion where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua and death
Estores and Roger San Miguel who had been identified by Norberto Divina as the companions of appellant
occurs in the course of the rebellion, the heirs of those who died are entitled to the following: 129 on the night the shooting occurred. Norberto had been very straightforward and unwavering in his
identification of Estores and San Miguel as the two other people who fired the gunshots at his family. More
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00 significantly, as noted by the prosecutor, the testimonies of Estores and San Miguel, who insisted they were
not at the crime scene, tended to conflict with the sworn statement of Danilo Fajarillo, which was the basis
for the Provincial Prosecutor's ruling that he finds no probable cause against the two. Danilo Fajarillo's sworn
b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00 statement said that on June 6, 2002, he saw appellant with a certain "Hapon" and Gilbert Estores at the
crime scene, but it was only appellant who was carrying a firearm and the two other people with him had no
c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00130 participation in the shooting incident. Said circumstances bolster the credibility of Norberto Divina's testimony
that Estores and San Miguel may have been involved in the killing of his two young daughters.
B. For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds in the course of the rebellion and
could have died if not for a timely medical intervention, the following shall be awarded: After all, such reinvestigation would not subject Estores and San Miguel to double jeopardy because the
same only attaches if the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy has attached before the second;
(2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00 the first. In turn, a first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c)
after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00 convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. 133 In this case, the
case against Estores and San Miguel was dismissed before they were arraigned. Thus, there can be no
double jeopardy to speak of. Let true justice be served by reinvestigating the real participation, if any, of
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00 Estores and San Miguel in the killing of Mary Grace and Claudine Divina.

C. For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
VII. In all of the above instances, when no documentary evidence of burial or funeral expenses is
presented in court, the amount of ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages shall be awarded.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 30,
2012 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03252 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, the Court finds accused-appellant Ireneo
Jugueta GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of the crime of murder defined under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, attended by the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, and
hereby sentences him to suffer two (2) terms of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole
under R.A. 9346. He is ORDERED to PAY the heirs of Mary Grace Divina and Claudine Divina
the following amounts for each of the two victims: (a) ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b)
₱100,000.00 as moral damages; (c) ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (d) ₱50,000.00 as
temperate damages.
 (2) In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, the Court finds accused-appellant Ireneo
Jugueta GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of the crime of attempted murder
defined and penalized under Article 248 in relation to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code,
attended by the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, and sentences him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, for each of the four (4)
counts of attempted murder. He is ORDERED to PAY moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00, civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and exemplary damages of PS0,000.00 to each of the
four victims, namely, Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina.
(3) Accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta is also ORDERED to PAY interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the time of finality of this decision until fully paid, to be imposed on the civil
indemnity, moral damages, exemplary damages and temperate damages.
(4) Let the Office of the Prosecutor General, through the Department of Justice, be FURNISHED a
copy of this Decision. The Prosecutor General is DIRECTED to immediately conduct
a REINVESTIGATION on the possible criminal liability of Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel
regarding this case. Likewise, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Secretary of Justice for
his information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
9 After trial, the court below rendered judgment on May 23, 1977 in favor of the herein private respondent and
G.R. No. 80194 March 21, 1989
EDGAR JARANTILLA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE KUAN SING, respondents.
Corazon Miraflores and Vicente P. Billena for petitioner.
Manuel S. Gemarino for private respondent.
REGALADO, J.:
The records show that private respondent Jose Kuan Sing was "side-swiped by a vehicle in the evening of
July 7, 1971 in lznart Street, Iloilo City" 1 The respondent Court of Appeals concurred in the findings of the
court a quo that the said vehicle which figured in the mishap, a Volkswagen (Beetle type) car, was then
driven by petitioner Edgar Jarantilla along said street toward the direction of the provincial capitol, and that
private respondent sustained physical injuries as a consequence. 2
Petitioner was accordingly charged before the then City Court of Iloilo for serious physical injuries thru
reckless imprudence in Criminal Case No. 47207 thereof. 3 Private respondent, as the complaining witness
therein, did not reserve his right to institute a separate civil action and he intervened in the prosecution of
said criminal case through a private prosecutor. 4 Petitioner was acquitted in said criminal case "on
reasonable doubt".5
On October 30, 1974, private respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner in the former Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, Branch IV, 6 docketed therein as Civil Case No. 9976, and which civil action involved the
same subject matter and act complained of in Criminal Case No. 47027. 7 In his answer filed therein, the
petitioner alleged as special and affirmative detenses that the private respondent had no cause of action
and, additionally, that the latter's cause of action, if any, is barred by the prior judgment in Criminal Case No.
47207 inasmuch as when said criminal case was instituted the civil liability was also deemed instituted since
therein plaintiff failed to reserve the civil aspect and actively participated in the criminal case. 8
Thereafter, acting on a motion to dismiss of therein defendant, the trial court issued on April 3, 1975 an order
of denial, with the suggestion that "(t)o enrich our jurisprudence, it is suggested that the defendant brings
(sic) this ruling to the Supreme Court by certiorari or other appropriate remedy, to review the ruling of the
court". 9
On June 17, 1975, petitioner filed in this Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, which was
docketed as G.R. No. L-40992, 10 assailing the aforesaid order of the trial court. Said petition was dismissed
for lack of merit in the Court's resolution of July 23, 1975, and a motion for reconsideration thereof was
denied for the same reason in a resolution of October 28, 1975. 11
ordering herein petitioner to pay the former the sum of P 6,920.00 for hospitalization, medicines and so forth,
P2,000.00 for other actual expenses, P25,000.00 for moral damages, P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, and
costs. 12
On July 29, 1987, the respondent Court of Appeals 13 affirmed the decision of the lower court except as to
the award for moral damages which it reduced from P25,000.00 to P18,000.00. A motion for reconsideration
was denied by respondent court on September 18, 1987. 14
The main issue for resolution by Us in the present recourse is whether the private respondent, who was the
complainant in the criminal action for physical injuries thru reckless imprudence and who participated in the
prosecution thereof without reserving the civil action arising from the act or omission complained of, can file
a separate action for civil liability arising from the same act or omission where the herein petitioner was
acquitted in the criminal action on reasonable doubt and no civil liability was adjudicated or awarded in the
judgment of acquittal.
Prefatorily, We note that petitioner raises a collateral issue by faulting the respondent court for refusing to
resolve an assignment of error in his appeal therein, said respondent court holding that the main issue had
been passed upon by this Court in G.R. No. L-40992 hereinbefore mentioned. It is petitioner's position that
the aforesaid two resolutions of the Court in said case, the first dismissing the petition and the second
denying the motion for reconsideration, do not constitute the "law of the case' which would control the
subsequent proceed ings in this controversy.
1. We incline favorably to petitioner's submission on this score.
The "doctrine of the law of the case" has no application at the aforesaid posture of the proceedings when
the two resolutions were handed down. While it may be true that G.R. No. L-40992 may have involved some
of the issues which were thereafter submitted for resolution on the merits by the two lower courts, the
proceedings involved there was one for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing an interlocutory order
of the court a quo, specifically, its order denying therein defendants motion to dismiss. This Court, without
rendering a specific opinion or explanation as to the legal and factual bases on which its two resolutions
were predicated, simply dismissed the special civil action on that incident for lack of merit. It may very well
be that such resolution was premised on the fact that the Court, at that stage and on the basis of the facts
then presented, did not consider that the denial order of the court a quo was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. 15 To repeat, no rationale for such resolutions having been expounded on the merits of that
action, no law of the case may be said to have been laid down in G.R. No. L-40992 to justify the respondent
court's refusal to consider petitioner's claim that his former acquittal barred the separate action.
'Law of the case' has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More
specifically, it means that whatever is once irrevocably established, as the controlling
legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the
law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on
which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court
(21 C.J.S. 330). (Emphasis supplied). 16
It need not be stated that the Supreme Court being the court of last resort, is the final
arbiter of all legal questions properly brought before it and that its decision in any given
case constitutes the law of that particular case . . . (Emphasis supplied). 17
It is a rule of general application that the decision of an appellate court in a case is the
law of the case on the points presented throughout all the subsequent proceedings in
the case in both the trial and the appellate courts, and no question necessarily involved
and decided on that appeal will be considered on a second appeal or writ of error in the
same case, provided the facts and issues are substantially the same as those on which
the first question rested and, according to some authorities, provided the decision is on
the merits . . . 18
2. With the foregoing ancillary issue out of the way, We now consider the principal plaint of petitioner.
Apropos to such resolution is the settled rule that the same act or omission (in this case, the negligent
sideswiping of private respondent) can create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil
liability ex delicto and civil liability ex quasi delicto. Since the same negligence can give rise either to a delict
or crime or to a quasi-delict or tort, either of these two types of civil liability may be enforced against the
culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover
damages under both types of liability. 19
We also note the reminder of petitioner that in Roa vs. De la Cruz, et al., 20 it was held that where the
offended party elected to claim damages arising from the offense charged in the criminal case through her
intervention as a private prosecutor, the final judgment rendered therein constituted a bar to the subsequent
civil action based upon the same cause. It is meet, however, not to lose sight of the fact that the criminal
action involved therein was for serious oral defamation which, while within the contemplation of an
independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code, constitutes only a penal omen and cannot
otherwise be considered as a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code.
And while petitioner draws attention to the supposed reiteration of the Roa doctrine in the later case
of Azucena vs. Potenciano, et al., 21 this time involving damage to property through negligence as to make
out a case of quasi-delict under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, such secondary reliance is
misplaced since the therein plaintiff Azucena did not intervene in the criminal action against defendant
Potenciano. The citation of Roa in the later case of Azucena was, therefore, clearly obiter and affords no
comfort to petitioner.
These are aside from the fact that there have been doctrinal, and even statutory, 22 changes on the matter
of civil actions arising from criminal offenses and quasi-delicts. We will reserve our discussion on the
statutory aspects for another case and time and, for the nonce, We will consider the doctrinal developments
on this issue.
In the case under consideration, private respondent participated and intervened in the prosecution of the
criminal suit against petitioner. Under the present jurisprudential milieu, where the trial court acquits the
accused on reasonable doubt, it could very well make a pronounce ment on the civil liability of the
accused 23 and the complainant could file a petition for mandamus to compel the trial court to include such
civil liability in the judgment of acquittal. 24
Private respondent, as already stated, filed a separate civil aciton after such acquittal. This is allowed under
Article 29 of the Civil Code. We have ruled in the relatively recent case of Lontoc vs. MD Transit & Taxi Co.,
Inc., et al. 25that:
In view of the fact that the defendant-appellee de la Cruz was acquitted on the ground
that 'his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt' the plaintiff-appellant has the
right to institute a separate civil action to recover damages from the defendants-
appellants (See Mendoza vs. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113). The well-settled doctrine is that a
person, while not criminally liable may still be civilly liable. 'The judgment of acquittal
extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the
facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist'. (Padilla vs. Court of Appeals,
129 SCRA 558 cited in People vs. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, et al., G.R. No. 74041, July 29,
1987; Filomeno Urbano vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72964, January 7,
1988). The ruling is based on Article 29 of the Civil Code which provides:
When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the
ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may
be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of
evidence ... 26
Another consideration in favor of private respondent is the doctrine that the failure of the court to make any
pronouncement, favorable or unfavorable, as to the civil liability of the accused amounts to a reservation of
the right to have the civil liability litigated and determined in a separate action. The rules nowhere provide
that if the court fails to determine the civil liability it becomes no longer enforceable. 27
Furthermore, in the present case the civil liability sought to be recovered through the application of Article
29 is no longer that based on or arising from the criminal offense. There is persuasive logic in the view that,
under such circumstances, the acquittal of the accused foreclosed the civil liability based on Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code which presupposes the existence of criminal liability or requires a conviction of the
offense charged. Divested of its penal element by such acquittal, the causative act or omission becomes in
effect a quasi-delict, hence only a civil action based thereon may be instituted or prosecuted thereafter,
which action can be proved by mere preponderance of evidence. 28 Complementary to such considerations,
Article 29 enunciates the rule, as already stated, that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an
acquittal on reasonable doubt for the same criminal act or omission.
The allegations of the complaint filed by the private respondent supports and is constitutive of a case for a
quasi-delict committed by the petitioner, thus:
3. That in the evening of July 7, 197l at about 7:00 o'clock, the
plaintiff crossed Iznart Street from his restaurant situated at 220
lznart St., Iloilo City, Philippines, on his way to a meeting of the
Cantonese Club at Aldeguer Street, Iloilo City and while he was
standing on the middle of the street as there were vehicles coming
from the Provincial Building towards Plazoleta Gay, Iloilo City, he
was bumped and sideswiped by Volkswagen car with plate No. B-
2508 W which was on its way from Plazoleta Gay towards the
Provincial Capitol, Iloilo City, which car was being driven by the
defendant in a reckless and negligent manner, at an excessive rate
of speed and in violation of the provisions of the Revised Motor
Vehicle (sic) as amended, in relation to the Land Transportation
and Traffic Code as well as in violation of existing city ordinances,
and by reason of his inexcusable lack of precaution and failure to
act with due negligence and by failing to take into consideration
(sic) his degree of intelligence, the atmospheric conditions of the
place as well as the width, traffic, visibility and other conditions of
lznart Street; 29
Since this action is based on a quasi-delict, the failure of the respondent to reserve his right to file a separate
civil case and his intervention in the criminal case did not bar him from filing such separate civil action for
damages. 30 The Court has also heretofore ruled in Elcano vs. Hill 31 that —
... a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act whether or not he is
criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is
not allowed, if he is also actually charged criminally, to recover damages on both scores;
and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming
the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability
referred to in Par. (c) of Sec. 3 Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; whereas the civil liability for the same act
considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has
not been committed by the accused . . .
The aforecited case of Lontoc vs. MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc., et al. involved virtually the same factual
situation. The Court, in arriving at the conclusion hereinbefore quoted, expressly declared that the failure of
the therein plaintiff to reserve his right to file a separate civil case is not fatal; that his intervention in the
criminal case did not bar him from filing a separate civil action for damages, especially considering that the
accused therein was acquitted because his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt; that the two
cases were anchored on two different causes of action, the criminal case being on a violation of Article 365
of the Revised Penal Code while the subsequent complaint for damages was based on a quasi-delict; and
that in the judgment in the criminal case the aspect of civil liability was not passed upon and resolved.
Consequently, said civil case may proceed as authorized by Article 29 of the Civil Code.
Our initial adverse observation on a portion of the decision of respondent court aside, We hold that on the
issues decisive of this case it did not err in sustaining the decision a quo.
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is hereby DENIED and the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED, without costs.
SO ORDERED.
10
G.R. No. 116100 February 9, 1996
SPOUSES CRISTINO and BRIGIDA CUSTODIO and SPOUSES LITO and MARIA CRISTINA
SANTOS,petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF PACIFICO C. MABASA and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG,
METRO MANILA, BRANCH 181, respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
29115, promulgated on November 10, 1993, which affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court,
as well as its resolution dated July 8, 1994 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 1
On August 26, 1982, Civil Case No. 47466 for the grant of an easement of right of way was filed by Pacifico
Mabasa against Cristino Custodio, Brigida R. Custodio, Rosalina R. Morato, Lito Santos and Maria Cristina
C. Santos before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig and assigned to Branch 22 thereof. 2
The generative facts of the case, as synthesized by the trial court and adopted by the Court of Appeals, are
as follows:
 Perusing the record, this Court finds that the original plaintiff Pacifico Mabasa died during the
pendency of this case and was substituted by Ofelia Mabasa, his surviving spouse [and children].
The plaintiff owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected thereon situated at Interior
P. Burgos St., Palingon, Tipas, Tagig, Metro Manila. The plaintiff was able to acquire said property
through a contract of sale with spouses Mamerto Rayos and Teodora Quintero as vendors last
September 1981. Said property may be described to be surrounded by other immovables
pertaining to defendants herein. Taking P. Burgos Street as the point of reference, on the left side,
going to plaintiff's property, the row of houses will be as follows: That of defendants Cristino and
Brigido Custodio, then that of Lito and Maria Cristina Santos and then that of Ofelia Mabasa. On
the right side (is) that of defendant Rosalina Morato and then a Septic Tank (Exhibit "D"). As an
access to P. Burgos Street from plaintiff's property, there are two possible passageways. The first
passageway is approximately one meter wide and is about 20 meters distan(t) from Mabasa's
residence to P. Burgos Street. Such path is passing in between the previously mentioned row of
houses. The second passageway is about 3 meters in width and length from plaintiff Mabasa's
residence to P. Burgos Street; it is about 26 meters. In passing thru said passageway, a less than
a meter wide path through the septic tank and with 5-6 meters in length, has to be traversed.
When said property was purchased by Mabasa, there were tenants occupying the remises and
who were acknowledged by plaintiff Mabasa as tenants. However, sometime in February, 1982,
one of said tenants vacated the apartment and when plaintiff Mabasa went to see the premises,
he saw that there had been built an adobe fence in the first passageway making it narrower in
width. Said adobe fence was first constructed by defendants Santoses along their property which
is also along the first passageway. Defendant Morato constructed her adobe fence and even
extended said fence in such a way that the entire passageway was enclosed. (Exhibit "1-Santoses
and Custodios, Exh. "D" for plaintiff, Exhs. "1-C", "1-D" and "1-E") And it was then that the
remaining tenants of said apartment vacated the area. Defendant Ma. Cristina Santos testified
that she constructed said fence because there was an incident when her daughter was dragged
by a bicycle pedalled by a son of one of the tenants in said apartment along the first passageway.
She also mentioned some other inconveniences of having (at) the front of her house a pathway
such as when some of the tenants were drunk and would bang their doors and windows. Some of
their footwear were even lost. . . .3 (Emphasis in original text; corrections in parentheses supplied)
On February 27, 1990, a decision was rendered by the trial court, with this dispositive part:
Accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Ordering defendants Custodios and Santoses to give plaintiff permanent access ingress and
egress, to the public street;
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendants Custodios and Santoses the sum of Eight Thousand
Pesos (P8,000) as indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway.
The parties to shoulder their respective litigation expenses.4
Not satisfied therewith, therein plaintiff represented by his heirs, herein private respondents, went to the
Court of Appeals raising the sole issue of whether or not the lower court erred in not awarding damages in
their favor. On November 10, 1993, as earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming
the judgment of the trial court with modification, the decretal portion of which disposes as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION only insofar as the herein grant of damages to plaintiffs-appellants. The Court
hereby orders defendants-appellees to pay plaintiffs-appellants the sum of Sixty Five Thousand
(P65,000) Pesos as Actual Damages, Thirty Thousand (P30,000) Pesos as Moral Damages, and
Ten Thousand (P10,000) Pesos as Exemplary Damages. The rest of the appealed decision is
affirmed to all respects.5
On July 8, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 6 Petitioners then took
the present recourse to us, raising two issues, namely, whether or not the grant of right of way to herein
private respondents is proper, and whether or not the award of damages is in order.
With respect to the first issue, herein petitioners are already barred from raising the same. Petitioners did
not appeal from the decision of the court a quo granting private respondents the right of way, hence they are
presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication therein. With the finality of the judgment of the trial court as
to petitioners, the issue of propriety of the grant of right of way has already been laid to rest.
For failure to appeal the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, petitioners cannot obtain any
affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision of the trial court. That decision of the court below
has become final as against them and can no longer be reviewed, much less reversed, by this Court. The
rule in this jurisdiction is that whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case, an appellee who has not himself
appealed may not obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than what was granted in the
decision of the lower court. The appellee can only advance any argument that he may deem necessary to
defeat the appellant's claim or to uphold the decision that is being disputed, and he can assign errors in his
brief if such is required to strengthen the views expressed by the court a quo. These assigned errors, in turn,
may be considered by the appellate court solely to maintain the appealed decision on other grounds, but not
for the purpose of reversing or modifying the judgment in the appellee's favor and giving him other affirmative
reliefs.7
However, with respect to the second issue, we agree with petitioners that the Court of Appeals erred in
awarding damages in favor of private respondents. The award of damages has no substantial legal basis. A
reading of the decision of the Court of Appeals will show that the award of damages was based solely on
the fact that the original plaintiff, Pacifico Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of unrealized rentals when the
tenants vacated the leased premises by reason of the closure of the passageway.
However, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages. To
warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the
defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without
wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the
injury caused by a breach or wrong.8
There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right;
damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those A person has a right to the natural use and enjoyment of his own property, according to his pleasure, for all
instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are the purposes to which such property is usually applied. As a general rule, therefore, there is no cause of
often called damnum absque injuria.9 action for acts done by one person upon his own property in a lawful and proper manner, although such acts
incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss to another, as such damage or loss is damnum absque
injuria. 18 When the owner of property makes use thereof in the general and ordinary manner in which the
In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that
property is used, such as fencing or enclosing the same as in this case, nobody can complain of having
such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff a concurrence of injury
been injured, because the incovenience arising from said use can be considered as a mere consequence
to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. 10 The underlying basis for the award of tort
of community life. 19
damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be the
breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; it is not
sufficient to state that there should be tort liability merely because the plaintiff suffered some pain and The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action will lie, 20 although
suffering.11 the act may result in damage to another, for no legal right has been invaded. 21 One may use any lawful
means to accomplish a lawful purpose and though the means adopted may cause damage to another, no
cause of action arises in the latter's favor. An injury or damage occasioned thereby is damnum absque
Many accidents occur and many injuries are inflicted by acts or omissions which cause damage or loss to
injuria. The courts can give no redress for hardship to an individual resulting from action reasonably
another but which violate no legal duty to such other person, and consequently create no cause of action in
calculated to achieve a lawful means. 22
his favor. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone. The law affords no
remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. 12
WHEREFORE, under the compulsion of the foregoing premises, the appealed decision of respondent Court
of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the judgment of the trial court is correspondingly
In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act must be not only
REINSTATED.
hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria.13 If, as may happen in many cases, a person sustains
actual damage, that is, harm or loss to his person or property, without sustaining any legal injury, that is, an
act or omission which the law does not deem an injury, the damage is regarded as damnum absque injuria.14

In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the claim of private
respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. In order that the
principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is essential that the
following requisites concur: (1) The defendant should have acted in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There was damage or injury to the
plaintiff.15

The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners, hence
not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and
dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law.16 It is within the right of petitioners,
as owners, to enclose and fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that "(e)very owner
may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other
means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon."

At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes. There was no easement
of way existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or by contract. The fact that private respondents
had no existing right over the said passageway is confirmed by the very decision of the trial court granting a
compulsory right of way in their favor after payment of just compensation. It was only that decision which
gave private respondents the right to use the said passageway after payment of the compensation and
imposed a corresponding duty on petitioners not to interfere in the exercise of said right.

Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute right over their property and their act of fencing
and enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully perform in the employment and exercise of said
right. To repeat, whatever injury or damage may have been sustained by private respondents by reason of
the rightful use of the said land by petitioners is damnum absque injuria.17