HERMANO OIL MANUFACTURING & SUGAR reasonable that not all forms of transport could use
CORPORATION, Petitioner, it.
vs.
TOLL REGULA TORY BOARD, ENGR. JAIME S.
DUMLAO, JR., PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION (PNCC) and DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH), Respondents.
G.R. No. 167290 November 26, 2014
PONENTE: Bersamin
TOPIC: Easement of right of way, due process,
equal protection, eminent domain
FACTS:
The petitioner owned a parcel of land
located at the right side of the Sta. Rita Exit of the
NLEX. The parcel of land was bounded by an
access fence along the NLEX. In its letter, the
petitioner requested that respondent Toll
Regulatory Board (TRB) grant an easement of right
of way, contending that it had been totally
deprived of the enjoyment and possession of its
property by the access fence that had barred
its entry into and exit from the NLEX. However, the
TRB denied the petitioner’s request.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioner has the right to
demand access to the North Luzon Expressway
(NLEX) by way of an easement of right of way.
2. Whether or not the limited access imposed on the
petitioner’s property may be considered as a
compensable taking due to the exercise of the
power of eminentdomain.
HELD:
First issue: NO
The putting up of the access fence on the
petitioner’s property was in the valid exercise of
police power, assailable only upon proof that such
putting up unduly violated constitutional limitations
like due process and equal protection of the law. In
Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and
Highways, the Court has further noted that:
A toll way is not an ordinary road. As a
facility designed to promote the fastest access to
certain destinations, its use, operation, and
maintenance require close regulation. Public
interest and safety require the imposition of certain
restrictions on toll ways that do not apply to
ordinary roads. As a special kind of road, it is but
Clearly, therefore, the access fence was a
reasonable restriction on the petitioner’s property
given the location thereof at the right side of Sta.
Rita Exit of the NLEX. Although some adjacent
properties were accorded unrestricted access to
the expressway, there was a valid and reasonable
classification for doing so because their owners
provided ancillary services to motorists using the
NLEX, like gasoline service stations and food stores.
A classification based on practical convenience
and common knowledge is not unconstitutional
simply because it may lack purely theoretical or
scientific uniformity.
Second issue: NO
The limited access imposed on the
petitioner’s property did not partake of a
compensable taking due to the exercise of the
power of eminent domain. There is no question that
the property was not taken and devoted for public
use. Instead, the property was subjected to a
certain restraint, i.e. the access fence, in order to
secure the general safety and welfare of the
motorists using the NLEX. There being a clear and
valid exercise of police power, the petitioner was
certainly not entitled to any just compensation.
FERRER V BAUTISTA
Facts:
 The City of Quezon passed two ordinances
namely.
 The first one was the Socialized Housing Tax
of QC allowing the imposition of special
assessment (1/2 of the assessed valued of
land in excess of P100k)
 The second one was Ordinance No. SP-
2235, S-2013 on Garbage Collection Fees
imposing fees depending on the amount of
the land or floor area).
 Jose Ferrer, as a property in Quezon City
questioned the validity of the city
ordinances.
 According to Ferrer:
 The city has no power to impose the
tax.
 The SHT violates the rule on equality
because it burdens real property
owners with expenses to provide
 funds for the housing of informal
settlers.
 The SHT is confiscatory or oppressive.
 Also, he assails the validity of the garbage
fees imposition because:
 It violates the rule on double
taxation.
 It violates the rule on equality
because the fees are collected
from only domestic households and
not from restaurants, food courts,
fast food chains, and other
commercial dining places that
spew garbage much more than
residential property owners.
Issue: WON the ordinances were valid.
Held:
1st ordinance: Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon
City is valid.
Cities have the power to tax
It must be noted that local government units such
as cities has the power to tax. The collection for the
socialized housing tax is valid. It must be noted that
the collections were made to accrue to the
socialized housing programs and projects of the
city.
The imposition was for a public purpose (exercise of
power of taxation + police power)
In this case, there was both an exercise of the
power to tax (primary) and police power
(incidental). Removing slum areas in Quezon City is
not only beneficial to the underprivileged and
homeless constituents but advantageous to the real
property owners as well.
The situation will improve the value of the their
property investments, fully enjoying the same in
view of an orderly, secure, and safe community,
and will enhance the quality of life of the poor,
making them law-abiding constituents and better
consumers of business products.
There is no violation of the rule on equality
Note: There is a substantial distinction between: real
property owner and an informal settler. In fact, the
Supreme Court said that the disparity is so obvious.
It is inherent in the power to tax that a State is free
to select the subjects of taxation. Inequities which
result from a singling out of one particular class for
taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional
limitation.
All these requisites are complied with: An ordinance
based on reasonable classification does not violate
the constitutional guaranty of the equal protection
of the law. The requirements for a valid and
reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to
the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply
equally to all members of the same class.
The ordinance is not oppressive or confiscatory
The ordinance is also not oppressive since the tax
rate being imposed is consistent with the UDHA
(Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992).
While the law authorizes LGUs to collect SHT on
properties with an assessed value of more than
P50,000.00, the questioned ordinance only covers
properties with an assessed value exceeding
P100,000.00. As well, the ordinance provides for a
tax credit equivalent to the total amount of the
special assessment paid by the property owner
beginning in the sixth (6th) year of the effectivity of
the ordinance.
2nd ordinance: The imposition of garbage fee is
invalid.
Note: There was no violation of double taxation but
there was a violation of the rule on equity.
There is no violation of double taxation: the
garbage fees are not taxes
In Progressive Development Corporation v. Quezon
City, the Court declared that:
"if the generating of revenue is the primary purpose
and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is
a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the
fact that incidentally revenue is also obtained does
not make the imposition a tax."
Contention of Ferrer: that the imposition of garbage
fee is tantamount to double taxation because
garbage collection is a basic and essential public
service that should be paid out from property tax,
business tax, transfer tax, amusement tax,
community tax certificate, other taxes, and the IRA
of the Quezon City Government. All these are valid
taxes. The garbage fees are license fees
Footnote: In order to constitute double taxation in
the objectionable or prohibited sense the same
property must be taxed twice when it should be
taxed but once; both taxes must be imposed on
the same property or subject-matter, for the same
purpose, by the same State, Government, or taxing
authority, within the same jurisdiction or taxing
district, during the same taxing period, and they
must be the same kind or character of tax.
There is a violation of the rule on equality: no
substantial distinction
There is no substantial distinction between an
occupant of a lot, on one hand, and an occupant
of a unit in a condominium, socialized housing
project or apartment, on the other hand.
Most likely, garbage output produced by these
types of occupants is uniform and does not vary to
a large degree; thus, a similar schedule of fee is
both just and equitable.
The garbage fees or rates are unjust and
inequitable
A resident of a 200 sq. m. unit in a condominium or
socialized housing project has to pay twice the
amount than a resident of a lot similar in size; unlike
unit occupants, all occupants of a lot with an area
of 200 sq. m. and less have to pay a fixed rate of
Php100.00; and the same amount of garbage fee is
imposed regardless of whether the resident is from a
condominium or from a socialized housing project.
The classifications are not germane to the purpose
of the ordinance
The declared purpose is: "promoting shared
responsibility with the residents to attack their
common mindless attitude in over-consuming the
present resources and in generating waste."
Instead of simplistically categorizing the payee into
land or floor occupant of a lot or unit of a
condominium, socialized housing project or
apartment, respondent City Council should have
considered factors that could truly measure the
amount of wastes generated and the appropriate
fee for its collection. Factors include, among others,
household age and size, accessibility to waste
collection, population density of the barangay or
district, capacity to pay, and actual occupancy of
the property.
SC:
→ Validity of Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon City
is upheld.
→ Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013, which collects an
annual garbage fee on all domestic households in
Quezon City, is unconstitutional and illegal.
KABATAAN PARTY LIST, et. al., Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 221318 December 16, 2015
PONENTE: Perlas-Bernabe
TOPIC: Biometrics validation
FACTS:
RA 10367 mandates the COMELEC to
implement a mandatory biometricsregistration
system for new voters in order to establish a clean,
complete, permanent, and updated list of voters
through the adoption of biometric technology.
RA 10367 likewise directs that “registered
voters whose biometrics have not been captured
shall submit themselves for validation.” “Voters who
fail to submit for validation on or before the last day
of filing of application for registration for purposes of
the May 2016 elections shall be deactivated x x x.”
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9721 as
amended by Resolutions No. 9863 and 10013.
Among others, the said Resolution provides that:
“the registration records of voters
without biometrics data who failed to submit for
validation on or before the last day of filing of
applications for registration for the purpose of the
May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections shall
be deactivated.
Herein petitioners filed the instant petition
with application for temporary restraining order
(TRO) and/or writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction (WPI) assailing the
constitutionality of the biometrics validation
requirement imposed under RA 10367, as well as
COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, all
related thereto.
 ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the statutory requirement
of biometrics validation is an unconstitutional
requirement of literacy and property.
2. Whether or not biometrics validation passes the
strict scrutiny test.
3. Whether or not Resolution No. 9863 which fixed the
deadline for validation on October 31, 2015 violates
Section 8 of RA 8189.
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE:
No. The Court held
that biometrics validation is not a “qualification” to
the exercise of the right of suffrage, but a mere
aspect of the registration procedure, of which the
State has the right to reasonably regulate.
The Court reiterated their ruling in several
cases that registration regulates the exercise of the
right of suffrage. It is not a qualification for such
right. The process of registration is a procedural
limitation on the right to vote.
Thus, although one is deemed to be a
“qualified elector,” he must nonetheless still comply
with the registration procedure in order to vote.
Thus, unless it is shown that a registration
requirement rises to the level of a literacy, property
or other substantive requirement as contemplated
by the Framers of the Constitution -that is, one
which propagates a socio-economic standard
which is bereft of any rational basis to a person’s
ability to intelligently cast his vote and to further the
public good -the same cannot be struck down as
unconstitutional, as in this case.
SECOND ISSUE:
Yes. In applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on
the presence of compelling, rather than
substantial, governmental interest and on the
absence of less restrictive means for achieving that
interest, and the burden befalls upon the State to
prove the same.
Presence of compelling state interest
Respondents have shown that
the biometrics validation requirement under RA
10367 advances a compelling state interest. It was
precisely designed to facilitate the conduct of
orderly, honest, and credible elections by
containing -if not eliminating, the perennial
problem of having flying voters, as well as dead
and multiple registrants. The foregoing
consideration is unquestionably a compelling state
interest.
Biometrics validation is the least restrictive means
for achieving the above-said interest
Section 6 of Resolution No. 9721 sets the
procedure for biometrics validation, whereby the
registered voter is only required to: (a) personally
appear before the Office of the Election Officer; (b)
present a competent evidence of identity; and (c)
have his photo, signature,
and fingerprints recorded.
Moreover, RA 10367 and Resolution No. 9721
did not mandate registered voters to submit
themselves to validation every time there is an
election. In fact, it only required the voter to
undergo the validation process one (1) time, which
shall remain effective in succeeding elections,
provided that he remains an active voter.
Lastly, the failure to validate did not
preclude deactivated voters from exercising their
right to vote in the succeeding elections. To rectify
such status, they could still apply for reactivation.
THIRD ISSUE:
No. Section 8 of RA 8189 provides that:
System of Continuing Registration of Voters. – x x x
No registration shall, however, be conducted
during the period starting one hundred twenty (120)
days before a regular election and ninety (90) days
before a special election.
The Court held that the 120-and 90-day
periods stated therein refer to the prohibitive period
beyond which voter registration may no longer be
conducted. The subject provision does not
mandate COMELEC to conduct voter registration
up to such time; rather, it only provides a period
which may not be reduced, but may be extended
depending on the administrative necessities and
other exigencies.