PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE - FULL TEXT

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

A.M. No. 2505-MJ November 12, 1981
FRANCISCA SALOMON vs. JUDGE FROILAN BLANCO

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. 2505-MJ November 12, 1981

FRANCISCA SALOMON, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE FROILAN BLANCO, respondent.

DE CASTRO, J.:

This is an administrative case against above-named respondent with respect to

which the Court Administrator submitted a memorandum dated October 13,
1981, from which the following is quoted:

The complaint against respondent Froilan Blanco, then Municipal

Judge of Pilar, Bataan and now Judge of the Municipal Circuit
Court of Orion-Pilar Bataan, revolves around his notarization of
the "Extra-Judicial Partition and Absolute Deed of Sale" in the
absence of complainant Francisca Salomon and Abraham
Gatdula and without seeing them signed the document and at the
time when Abraham Gatdula was only 13 or 14 years old.

The findings of PC Document Examiners Manuel Doctura and

Crispin Tabo is that the signatures of Francisca Salomon and
Abraham Gatdula on the Extra-Judicial Partition and Absolute
Sale were forged. In fact, in Civil Case No. 3861 of the Court of
First Instance of Bataan, entitled: Francisca Salomon, et al. vs.
Araceli Calimbas, et al. for the nullification of said document, the
court rendered judgment declaring null and void said instrument,
ordering the cancellation of TCT Nos. 7544 and 7545, and the
restoration of TCT No. 5333. 1

The memorandum submitted by Deputy Court Administrator Romeo D.

Mendoza, also dated October 13, 1981, is likewise hereunder quoted:

Mrs. Francisca Salomon in an administrative complaint dated July

29, 1974, filed with the CFI of Bataan, Branch I, charged Judge
Froilan Blanco of the Municipal Circuit Court of Orion-Pilar
Bataan, with gross misconduct, irregularity and falsification in the
performance of his duties as Ex- Officio Notary Public.

Complainant alleged that she is the registered pro-indiviso owner

together with her sister Josefa Salomon (now deceased) survived
by two sons Rogelio and Abraham Gatdula, of the property
described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5333 of the Registry
of Property of Bataan; that sometime in 1972, herein complaint
discovered that the aforecited property have been conveyed to
one Araceli Calimbas of Pilar. Bataan, by virtue of an Extra-
Judicial Partition and Deed of Absolute Sale, purportedly executed
by complainant and her two nephews and notarized by
respondent judge in his capacity as Ex-Officio Notary Public; that
she and her two nephews never ceded nor conveyed the said
property registered in her name to anybody else; that they never
appeared before the respondent judge to execute the aforecited
intrument nor exhibited their respective Residence Certificate to
respondent, more particularly, Abraham Gatdula, who was then
barely fourteen (14) years old and therefore did not have any
residence certificate and suspicious that gross irregularity,
misconduct and falsification were resorted to in the execution of
the questioned instruments, complainant submitted a certified
xerox copy of the said Extra-judicial Partition and Deed of
Absolute Sale for examination and analysis at the Crime
Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City which came up with the
findings that the signatures of both Francisca Salomon and
Abraham Gatdula were forged.

Complainant further alleged that respondent judge personally

worked for the registration of the questioned property and
received from the Register of Deeds of Bataan Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 7545 with Araceli Calimbas as the registered owner
thereof.

Respondent filed a Motion dated August 6, 1974 praying for the

suspension of filing an answer and hearing of Administrative Case
No. 23, until after the final termination of Civil Case No. 3861
(Francisco Salomon, et al. vs. Araceli Calimbas, et al.) alleged to
be a condition precedent to Administrative Case No. 23. (Now
docketed as AM 2505-MJ).

Hon. Abraham P. Vera, Executive Judge, Court of First Instance of

Bataan, Branch I at Balanga in an Order dated August 26, 1974
denied said Motion and respondent was required to file his
answer.

The respondent judge filed his answer dated September 6, 1974,

and alleged:

a) that he admits having notarized an Extra-judicial Partition with

Deed of Absolute Sale, in his capacity as Ex- Officio Notary Public
but the same was regularly, properly and legally made. He
complied with all the requirements and formalities of law in
notarizing the questioned instruments;

b) that he contests the allegation of complainant to the findings of

the Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, the same being misleading
and erroneous. Respondent claims that complainant Salomon, did
not mention in her complaint whose signatures were submitted to
hand writing experts and when those signatures were written in
her effort to determine the genuineness of the questioned
signatures;

c) that he admits par. 4 and 5 of the complaint relative to the

transfer made and he finds nothing illegal or irregular in working
for the registration of the questioned property in favor of Araceli
Calimbas; and,

d) that the complaint is groundless and is purely for harassment

purposes only.

Respondent further avers that there is a pending case docketed

as Civil Case No. 3861 entitled "Francisca Salomon, et al vs.
Araceli Calimbas, et al." for nullification of Document and Titles,
with Damages before the CFI of Bataan.

Considering that Administrative Case No. 23 and Civil Case No.

3861 involves the same parties and involves the same question of
fact, the counsel for the complainants moved for the issuance of
an Order directing the parties' respective evidence in Civil Case
No. 3861 insofar as they are concerned be adopted as evidence
in the Administrative Case. In an order dated March 9, 1977 Hon.
Abraham P. Vera, finding said Motion to be meritorious, directed
complainant to submit a written motion and/or an offer of the
relevant evidence he has presented in Civil Case No. 3861 so that
such evidence may be considered as his evidence in the
administrative case. Complainant and respondent further agreed
to suspend the investigation of Administrative Case No. 23 (AM
2505-MJ) until after the termination of Civil Case No. 3861 as the
evidences adduced therein will be adopted in this administrative
case. The inquest judge, examining the documents and other
records of the case, found the following apparent and visible
infirmities and discrepancies:

1. Ramon Gatdula, husband of Josefa, was stated in the

document to have died on November 18,1950 but certified to have
died on May 17,1951 (Exhibit J);

2. Josefa, mother of Abraham and Rogelio Gatdula was stated in

the document to have died on May 18, 1951 but certified to have
died on November 18, 1950 (Exhibit I);

3. The signature of Abraham (Exhibit A-4; Exhibit 21-B) on the left

hand margin of page one of the document and his
signature(Exhibit 21-F-2) on page two of the same document are
visibly different;

4. To the typewritten title "Notary Public" on page two of the

document was added Ex-Officio" in hand writing and under the
typewritten phrase "Until December 31, 1953" was added the
handwritting "Justice of the Peace".

These additions in handwriting which were of the judge would

belie the judge's testimony that he himself prepared the document
(tsn, p. 4 May 3, 1979). Otherwise, there would be no need for the
additions in handwritting.

5. Rogelio was supposed to have exhibited Residence Certificate

No. A-3799787 issued on February 26, 1953 at Pilar, Bataan and
Abraham was supposed to have exhibited Residence Certificate
No. 3799788 issued also on February 26, 1953 at Pilar, Bataan.
The issuance of the residence certificates seemed to be dubious
considering that the brothers were issued the consecutive
certificates on the same day in February 1953, a good six-month
period before the execution of the document. This would be quite
abnormal and not in the regular performance of official business.
The issuance of the residence certificate to Abraham appeared to
be more patently a last minute move as its number "3799788" and
its date of issuance "February 26" were typewritten on what
before were blank spaces of the document. Moreover, Abraham
was a minor who ought not to be issued a residence certificate.

6. Francisca Salomon was stated in the document to be a resident

of and with postal address at 11th Avenue, Caloocan, Rizal and
yet exhibited Residence Certificate No. A-0326637 issued on
June 17, 1953 in Manila and not in Caloocan City, her supposed
residence at the time.

From the foregoing defects in the documents, the investigating

judge is correct to conclude that the questioned documents was
(sic) inaccurately and hurriedly prepared and as a result thereof,
vital data were misstated and some necessary details were
added.

It is clear that respondent judge has been negligent in not

requiring vendees Francisca Salomon and Abraham Gatdula to
personally appear before him and attest to the truth of the
contents of the instrument which is one of the basic requirements
of the instrument. Why he ratified a document with infirmities and
intercalation without being wary about them is perhaps indicative
that he was really in haste and careless. If he had only observed
the formalities required by law before notarizing the questioned
instrument, Araceli Calimbas would not have been able to register
the residential lot, subject of the controversy owned by the
complainants herein.

The hearing judge rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 3861 on

May 5, 1981, the dispositive portion of which are as follows:

Resultingly, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring as null and void the Extra Judicial Partition and Deed
of Absolute Sale dated August 10, 1953;

2. Cancelling Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7.544 and Transfer

Certificate of Title No. 7545 covering Lot 50 of the Pilar (Bataan)
Irrigation cadastre;

3. Restoring the efficacy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5333,

likewise, covering Lot 50 of the Pilar (Bataan) Irrigation cadastre;

4. Ordering defendant Araceli Calimbas to remove at her expense

her house constructed on Lot 50 and directing the said defendant
to pay to plaintiffs the amount of P50.00 as reasonable monthly
rental on Lot 50 since the construction of her house on the said
lot;

5. Restoring plaintiffs to the possession of Lot 50;

6. Directing defendants, jointly and severally, to pay attorney's

fees in the sum of P3,500 and to pay the costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED.

From the foregoing dispositive portion of the decision in Civil Case

No. 3861, it is clear that respondent's notarization of the
questioned document was irregular, improper and not in
accordance with law. The discrepancies, infirmities and
intercalations very plainly reveal that the requirements of the law
had been ignored in the notarial act. While it is true that during the
time that the respondent judge was following up the registration of
the changes in the Transfer Certificate of title of the land,
Municipal Judges were allowed to practice, nonetheless for a
judge to follow-up papers in registering document with the
Register of Deeds, is not appropriate and befitting of the conduct
of a judge. As a notary public, he should show impartiality and
 integrity. Respondent's particular conduct in this case is wanting
for which reason we find him negligent and careless. 2

After we have thoroughly and conscientiously gone over the records of the
case, We are sufficiently satisfied that the observations and conclusions
contained in the foregoing memoranda are fully substantiated and supported by
the evidence on record in that respondent Judge had been nonchalantly
negligent in notarizing the alleged "Extra-judicial Partition and Deed of Absolute
Sale", supposedly executed by complainant and her nephews sans their
presence, and in further determining the right age of Abraham Gatdula before
notarizing the said deed, which led to the ceding to one Araceli Calimbas of a
residential parcel of land in Pilar, Bataan, especially so, that Article 1327 (1) of
the new Civil Code is quite explicit that an unemancipated minor, like Abraham
at the time of the execution of the document in question, cannot give consent to
a contract, consent being one of the essential requisites of a contract, as
provided by Article 1318 of the same code.

Had it not been for the notarized deed in question, the property involved herein
could not have possibly been registered in Araceli's name, which registration
was made easier thru respondent's ill-advised act of notarizing said deed
without requiring the supposed deponents to personally appear before him and
attest to the truth of the contents of said document which is one of the basic
requirements of an acknowledgment. It is worth noting, as it is significant, that a
notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face, and for
this reason notaries public must observe the utmost care to comply with the
elementary formalities in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the
confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyancing would be
undermined. 3

Be that as it may, however, We take the view that the penalty of suspension
from office for a period of six (6) months without pay, as recommended both by
the Court Administrator and the Deputy Court administrator, is too severe a
penalty under the premises. We believe that the act committed by respondent
Judge is not so grave enough to warrant suspension. A fine equivalent to one
(1) month of respondent's salary will be sufficient, if only to remind respondent
and other notaries public of the delicate nature of their sworn duties.

WHEREFORE, finding respondent, Judge Froilan Blanco, guilty of notarizing

the questioned Extrajudicial Partition and Deed of Absolute Sale in the absence
of complainant, one of the supposed deponents to said document, he is
ordered to pay a fine equivalent to his salary of one (1) month, with warning that
a repetition of the same or similar errors will not be countenanced and will be
the subject of a stern disciplinary action.

Let this decision be noted in respondent's record.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE ? FULL TEXT
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
G.R. No. 125283 February 10, 2006
PAN PACIFIC INDUSTRIAL SALES CO., INC.,
VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 125283 February 10, 2006

PAN PACIFIC INDUSTRIAL SALES CO., INC., Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and NICOLAS CAPISTRANO,
Respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Petitioner Pan Pacific Industrial Sales Co., Inc. (Pan Pacific) filed
the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Decision2
dated 4 June 1996 of the Court of Appeals Fourteenth Division in
C.A. G.R. No. CV-41112. The challenged Decision affirmed in toto
the Decision3 dated 24 April 1992 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila, Branch 18 in Civil Case No. 88-46720.

The case arose when on 22 December 1988, private respondent

Nicolas Capistrano (Capistrano) filed an Amended Complaint 4
before the RTC of Manila against Severo C. Cruz III (Cruz), his
spouse Lourdes Yap Miranda, and Atty. Alicia Guanzon, 5 pleading
two causes of action.6

The first cause of action is for the nullification, or alternatively, for

the "rescission," of a Deed of Absolute Sale7 covering a parcel of
land that Capistrano owned, located at 1821 (Int.), Otis Street (now
Paz Guanzon Street), Paco, Manila, and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 143599 to Cruz. 8 This is the subject lot.
Capistrano denied having executed the deed.

The second cause of action is for the rescission of another

agreement with an alternative prayer for specific performance.
Capistrano alleged that he agreed to sell another parcel of land in
the same vicinity to Cruz. According to Capistrano, Cruz only paid
P100,000.00 of the stipulated purchase price, thereby leaving
P250,000.00 still unpaid.9

The operative facts follow.

On 10 September 1982, Capistrano executed a Special Power of

Attorney10 authorizing Cruz to mortgage the subject lot in favor of
Associated Bank (the Bank) as security for the latter?s loan
accommodation.11

Shortly, by virtue of the Special Power of Attorney, Cruz obtained a

loan in the amount of P500,000.00 from the Bank. Thus, he
executed a Real Estate Mortgage12 over the subject lot in favor of
the Bank.13

Capistrano and Cruz then executed a letter-agreement dated 23

September 1982 whereby Cruz agreed to buy the subject lot for the
price of P350,000.00, of which P200,000.00 would be paid out of
the loan secured by Cruz, and the balance of P150,000.00 in eight
(8) quarterly payments of P18,750.00 within two (2) years from 30
October 1982, without need of demand and with interest at 18% in
case of default.14

On 15 March 1983, Capistrano executed the Deed of Absolute

Sale15 over the subject lot in favor of Cruz. Two (2) days later, on 17
March 1983, Notary Public Vicente J. Benedicto (Benedicto)
notarized the deed. However, it was earlier or on 9 March 1983 that
Capistrano?s wife, Josefa Borromeo Capistrano, signed the Marital
Consent16 evidencing her conformity in advance to the sale. The
Marital Consent was also sworn to before Benedicto.

Following the execution of the deed of sale, Cruz continued

payments to Capistrano for the subject lot. Sometime in October
1985, Capistrano delivered to Cruz a Statement of Account 17 signed
by Capistrano, showing that as of 30 October 1985, Cruz?s balance
stood at P19,561.00 as principal, and P3,520.98 as interest, or a
total of P23,081.98.

Thus, in May 1987, with the mortgage on the subject lot then being
in danger of foreclosure by the Bank, Cruz filed a case with the RTC
of Manila, Branch 11, docketed as Civil Case No. 87-40647, to
enjoin the foreclosure. Cruz impleaded Capistrano and his spouse
Josefa Borromeo Capistrano as defendants, the title to the subject
lot not having been transferred yet to his name. 18

Cruz also devised a way to save the subject lot from foreclosure by
seeking a buyer for it and eventually arranging for the buyer to pay
the mortgage debt. Towards this end, Cruz succeeded in engaging
Pan Pacific. Thus, on 22 September 1988, Pan Pacific paid off
Cruz?s debt in the amount of P1,180,000.00.19 Consequently, on 23
September

1988, the Bank executed a Cancellation of Real Estate Mortgage. 20

On even date, Cruz executed a Deed of Absolute Sale 21 over the
subject lot in favor of Pan Pacific, attaching thereto the previous
Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Capistrano in favor of Cruz.

Surprisingly, on 20 October 1988, Capistrano filed a Revocation of

Special Power of Attorney22 with the Register of Deeds of Manila.
Less than a week later, Capistrano sent the Register of Deeds
another letter informing said officer of his having come to know of
the sale of the subject lot by Cruz to Pan Pacific and requesting the
officer to withhold any action on the transaction. 23

Before long, in November 1988, Capistrano filed the precursory

complaint before the Manila RTC in Civil Case No. 88-46720.

Pan Pacific, which bought the subject lot from the Cruz spouses,
was allowed to intervene in the proceedings and joined Cruz, et al.
in resisting the complaint insofar as the first cause of action on the
subject lot is concerned.24

Then on 24 April 1992, a Decision was rendered by the trial court in

favor of Capistrano on both causes of action, the dispositive portion
of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff

and against the defendant, Severo E. (sic) Cruz III, his spouse,
Lourdes Miranda Cruz, and the intervenor, Pan Pacific Industrial
Sales Co., Inc., as follows:

1. Declaring the Letter-Agreement, dated September 23,

1982, Exhibit "C", as resolved and/or rescinded;

2. Declaring both the Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit "H", and

the document entitled, "Marital Consent", Exhibit "K", null and
void;

3. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the

spouses Severo C. Cruz, III and Lourdes Miranda Cruz in
favor of the intervenor, Pan Pacific Industrial Sales, Co., Inc.,
Exhibit "8", null and void;

4. Making the writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court

on November 23, 1988, permanent;

5. Ordering the intervenor, thru its legal counsel and corporate

secretary, Atty. Senen S. Burgos, who has possession of the
owner?s copy of TCT No. 143599 of the Register of Deeds of
Manila, in the name of the plaintiff, to surrender the same to
this Court within ten days from finality of the decision for turn
over to the plaintiff;

6. Ordering Defendant Register of Deeds of Manila to reject

and not give due course to the documents submitted to it,
which have for their purpose the transfer of the real estate
property covered by TCT No. 143599 from the name of the
plaintiff to Defendant Cruz and/or to the intervenor; and

7. Ordering the spouses Severo C. Cruz, III and Lourdes

Miranda Cruz to pay the plaintiff the sum of P69,561.00 as net
amount due to the latter as per the computation in the end-
 part of this decision.

The counterclaims of both Severo C. Cruz, III and spouse, and of

the intervenor, Pan Pacific Industrial Sales Co., Inc., are both
dismissed, for lack of merit.

Double costs against the defendants-Cruz spouses.

SO ORDERED.25

To arrive at the conclusion that the first Deed of Absolute Sale and
the Marital Consent are spurious, the trial court mainly relied on
Capistrano?s disavowal of his signature and that of his wife?s,
together with extrinsic factors which in its opinion evinced the
spuriousness.

Pan Pacific and the Cruz spouses interposed separate appeals to

the Court of Appeals, their common concern being the trial court?s
finding that the Deed of Absolute Sale and the Marital Consent were
spurious.26

In assailing this finding, Pan Pacific and the Cruz spouses

contended that Capistrano failed to present clear and convincing
evidence to overturn the presumption of regularity of public
documents like the documents in question.27

The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision. Concerning the

subject lot, it held that while a notarial document cannot be
disproved by the mere denial of the signer, the denial in this case
should be taken together with the other circumstances of the case
which in sum constitute clear and convincing evidence sufficient to
overcome the presumption of regularity of the documents. 28

The Cruz spouses did not elevate the Court of Appeals? Decision to
this Court. Thus, the RTC Decision became final as to them.

Pan Pacific, however, filed the instant Petition solely concerning the
first cause of action in the Amended Complaint. Pan Pacific
contends that the genuineness and due execution of the Deed of
Absolute Sale and Marital Consent cannot be overridden by the self-
serving testimony of Capistrano. It stresses that the trial court
cannot rely on irrelevant extrinsic factors to rule against the
genuineness of the deed.29 Finally, it points out that Capistrano
cannot contest the sale of the subject lot to Cruz, as the sale had
already been consummated.30

For his part, Capistrano posits in his Memorandum 31 that Pan Pacific
is not an innocent purchaser for value and in good faith as Cruz was
never the registered owner of the subject lot. Pan Pacific was bound
at its peril to investigate the right of Cruz to transfer the property to
it. Moreover, Capistrano asserts that the legal presumption of
regularity of public documents does not obtain in this case as the
documents in question were not properly notarized. He adds that
the parties never appeared before the notary public as in fact the
deed had only been delivered by Capistrano to the house of Cruz?s
mother.

Furthermore, Capistrano maintains that his spouse?s signature on

the Marital Consent is a forgery as it was virtually impossible for her
to have signed the same. Lastly, Capistrano disputes Cruz?s
assertion that the sale had been consummated, pointing out that the
Amended Complaint consisted of two (2) causes of action pertaining
to two (2) separate lots, and Cruz had only paid P100,000.00 of the
total price of the lot subject of the second cause of action.
1avvphil.net

The petition is imbued with merit.

Pan Pacific disputes the common conclusion reached by the courts

below that the presumption of regularity of the Deed of Absolute
Sale and the Marital Consent, which in its estimation are both public
documents, has been rebutted by Capistrano?s countervailing
evidence. The correctness of the conclusions on the alleged
spuriousness of the documents in question drawn by the courts
below from the facts on record is before this Court. The issue is a
question of law cognizable by the Court.32

Deeply embedded in our jurisprudence is the rule that notarial

documents celebrated with all the legal requisites under the
safeguard of a notarial certificate is evidence of a high character
and to overcome its recitals, it is incumbent upon the party
challenging it to prove his claim with clear, convincing and more
than merely preponderant evidence.33

A notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon

it with respect to its due execution, and it has in its favor the
presumption of regularity which may only be rebutted by evidence
so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all controversy as to
the falsity of the certificate. Absent such, the presumption must be
upheld. The burden of proof to overcome the presumption of due
execution of a notarial document lies on the one contesting the
same. Furthermore, an allegation of forgery must be proved by clear
and convincing evidence, and whoever alleges it has the burden of
proving the same.34

Evidently, as he impugns the genuineness of the documents,

Capistrano has the burden of making out a clear-cut case that the
documents are bogus. The courts below both concluded that
Capistrano had discharged this burden. However, this Court does
not share the conclusion. Indeed, Capistrano failed to present
evidence of the forgery that is enough to overcome the presumption
of authenticity.

To support the allegation of the spuriousness of his signature on the

Deed of Absolute Sale and that of his wife on the Marital Consent,
Capistrano relied heavily on his bare denial, at the same time taking
sanctuary behind other circumstances which supposedly cast doubt
on the authenticity of the documents. Capistrano did not bother to
present corroborating witnesses much less an independent expert
witness who could declare with authority and objectivity that the
challenged signatures are forged. It befuddles the Court why both
the courts below did not find this irregular considering that the Court
has previously declared in Sy Tiangco v. Pablo and Apao,,35 "that the
execution of a document that has been ratified before a notary
public cannot be disproved by the mere denial of the alleged signer."

The case of Chilianchin v. Coquinco36 also finds application in this

regard wherein we stated that:

As the lower court correctly said, the plaintiff did not even present a
sample of his authentic signature to support his contention that it is
not his the (sic) signature appearing in said document. He did not
call a handwriting expert to prove his assertion. His attorney, at the
beginning of the trial, made it of record that if the defendant present
an expert in hand-writing to show that the signature in question is
genuine, the plaintiff will also present an expert to the contrary, as if
it were incumbent upon the defendant to show that the signature of
the plaintiff in Exhibit A is genuine . . . . 37

Corollarily, he who disavows the authenticity of his signature on a

public document bears the responsibility to present evidence to that
effect. Mere disclaimer is not sufficient. At the very least, he should
present corroborating witnesses to prove his assertion. At best, he
should present an expert witness.

On the other hand, the Court cannot understand why an unfavorable

inference arose not from Capistrano?s but from Cruz?s failure to
have the documents examined by an expert witness of the National
Bureau Investigation (NBI) and to present the notary public as
witness. Specifically, the courts below took Cruz?s inability to obtain
the NBI examination of the documents as he had somehow
undertaken as an indication that the documents are counterfeit. 38

The courts below may have forgotten that on Capistrano lies the
burden to prove with clear and convincing evidence that the
notarized documents are spurious. Nothing in law or jurisprudence
reposes on Cruz the obligation to prove that the documents are
genuine and duly executed. Hence it is not incumbent upon Cruz to
call the notary public or an expert witness. In contrast, Capistrano
should have called the expert witness, the notary public himself or
the witnesses to the document to prove his contention that he never
signed the deed of sale, that its subscribing witnesses never saw
him sign the same, and that he never appeared before the notary
public before whom the acknowledgment was made.

In fact, there is no evidence that the notarization of the documents

did not take place. All that Capistrano could say on this matter was
that he had not seen Benedicto, the notary public. 39 The assertion
that the parties to the deed never appeared before the notary public
is not supported by evidence either. The courts below drew an
inference to that effect from Cruz?s testimony that the deed of sale
was dropped or delivered to his mother?s house. 40 That is not a
reasonable deduction to make as it is plainly conjectural. No
conclusion can be derived therefrom which could destroy the
genuineness of the deed. The testimony means what it declares:
that the copy of the deed was dropped at the house of Cruz?s
mother. That is all.

Nor can the Court lend credence to the thinking of the courts below
that since Cruz had a balance of P132,061.00 owing to Capistrano
as of the date of the deed of sale, the latter could not have possibly
executed the deed. This is plain guesswork. From the existence of
Cruz?s outstanding balance, the non-existence of the deed of sale
does not necessarily follow.

Indeed, a vendor may agree to a deed of absolute sale even before

full payment of the purchase price. Article 1478 of the Civil Code
states that "the parties may stipulate that ownership in the thing
shall not pass to the purchaser until he has fully paid the price." A
sensu contrario, the parties may likewise stipulate that the
ownership of the property may pass even if the purchaser has not
fully paid the price.

The courts below also assigned an adverse connotation to Cruz?s

impleading of the Capistrano spouses as party-defendants in the
action against the Bank to enjoin the foreclosure of the mortgage on
the subject lot. Cruz?s move is congruent with both his strong desire
to protect his interest in the subject lot and the reality that there was
an existing deed of sale in his favor. Precisely, his interest in the lot
is borne out and had arisen from the deed of sale. As purchaser of
the lot, he had to avert the foreclosure of the mortgage thereon. And
to ensure against the dismissal of the action for failure to join a real
party-in-interest, he had to implead Capistrano in whose name the
title to the subject lot was registered still.

Apart from Capistrano?s abject failure to overcome the presumption

of regularity and genuineness with which the Deed of Absolute Sale
is impressed as a public document, Capistrano?s cause is
eviscerated by his own acts in writing before and after the execution
of the deed. Said written acts constitute indelible recognition of the
existence and genuineness of the Deed of Absolute Sale.

First is the letter-agreement41 dated 23 September 1982 made and

signed by Capistrano in favor of Cruz, which the latter also signed
subsequently, stating that Cruz will, as he did, purchase the subject
lot for P350,000.00 to be paid according to the terms provided
therein.

Second is the Statement of Account42 signed by Capistrano, which

he delivered to Cruz, showing that as of 30 October 1985, Cruz?s
balance of the stipulated purchase price consisted of P19,561.00 as
principal and P3,520.98 as interest, or a total of P23,081.98.

Third is Capistrano?s Amended Complaint itself which illustrates his

own manifest uncertainty as to the relief he was seeking in court. He
demanded that the Deed of Absolute Sale be nullified yet he prayed
in the same breath for the "rescission" of the same 43?evidently, a
self-defeating recognition of the contract. In asking for "rescission,"
Capistrano obviously was invoking Article 1191 of the Civil Code
which provides that the "power to rescind," which really means to
resolve or cancel, is implied in reciprocal obligations "in case one of
the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him."
When a party asks for the resolution or cancellation of a contract it
is implied that he recognizes its existence. A non-existent contract
need not be cancelled.

These are unmistakable written admissions of Capistrano that he

really intended to sell the subject lot to Cruz and that he received
payments for it from the latter as late as the year 1985. It is thus a
little baffling why in 1988, he decided to disown the Deed of
Absolute Sale. The most plausible explanation for his sudden
change of mind would be his belated realization that he parted with
the subject lot for too small an amount (P350,000.00), compared to
the price pegged by Cruz (P1,800,000.00) in the sale to Pan Pacific.

Now, to the Marital Consent. The fact that the document contains a
jurat, not an acknowledgment, should not affect its genuineness or
that of the related document of conveyance itself, the Deed of
Absolute Sale. In this instance, a jurat suffices as the document only
embodies the manifestation of the spouse?s consent, 44 a mere
appendage to the main document.

The use of a jurat, instead of an acknowledgement does not elevate

the Marital Consent to the level of a public document but instead
consigns it to the status of a private writing. 45 The lack of
acknowledgment, however, does not render a deed invalid. The
necessity of a public document for contracts which transmit or
extinguish real rights over immovable property, as mandated by
Article 1358 of the Civil Code, is only for convenience; it is not
essential for validity or enforceability. 46

From the perspective of the law on evidence, however, the

presumption of regularity does not hold true with respect to the
Marital Consent which is a private writing. It is subject to the
requirement of proof under Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court which states:

Section 20. Proof of private document.- Before any private

document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved either:

(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or

handwriting of the maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which is

claimed to be.

The requirement of proof of the authenticity of the Marital Consent

was adequately met, in this case, through the testimony of Cruz to
the effect that, together with the other witnesses to the document,
he was present when Capistrano?s wife affixed her signature
thereon before notary public Benedicto.47 Viewed against this
positive declaration, Capistrano?s negative and self-serving
assertions that his wife?s signature on the document was forged
because "(i)t is too beautiful" and that his wife could not have
executed the Marital Consent because it was executed on her natal
day and she was somewhere else, crumble and become unworthy
of belief.

That the Marital Consent was executed prior to the Deed of

Absolute Sale also does not indicate that it is phoney. A fair
assumption is that it was executed in anticipation of the Deed of
Absolute Sale which was accomplished a scant six (6) days later.

With respect to whatever balance Cruz may still owe to Capistrano,

the Court believes that this is not a concern of Pan Pacific as the
latter is not a party to the Deed of Absolute Sale between
Capistrano and Cruz. But of course, Pan Pacific should enjoy full
entitlement to the subject lot as it was sold to him by Cruz who
earlier had acquired title thereto absolutely and unconditionally by
virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale. Otherwise laid down, Cruz had
the right to sell the subject lot to Pan Pacific in 1988, as he in fact
did. Thus, the question of whether or not Pan Pacific is a purchaser
in good faith should be deemed irrelevant. 1avvphil.net

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 4

June 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41112 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Nicolas Capistrano is
ordered to surrender the owner?s duplicate certificate of Transfer of
Certificate of Title No. 143599 to the Register of Deeds of Manila to
enable the issuance of a new title over the subject lot in the name of
petitioner Pan Pacific Industrial Sales, Inc. Costs against
respondent Nicolas Capistrano.

SO ORDERED.

PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE ? FULL TEXT

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
G.R. No. 127857 June 20, 2006
PASTOR DE JESUS VS. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 127857 June 20, 2006

PASTOR DE JESUS, Petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RONALDO, ALICIA, FLORANTE,
NELSON, BELLAFLOR, MARIO, ARNOLFO, JOCELYN and GODFREY, all
surnamed DE JESUS, all represented by RONALDO DE JESUS,
Respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

In this Petition1 for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, petitioner Pastor de Jesus assails the Decision 2 dated 11
September 1996 of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 47008 and its
Resolution3 dated 15 January 1997. The challenged Decision affirmed in part
the Decision4 dated 28 October 1994 of the Regional Trial Court of Tabuk,
Kalinga Apayao, Branch 25 in Special Civil Action Case No. 44 entitled,
"Ronaldo, Alicia, Florante, Nelson, Bellaflor, Mario, Arnolfo, Jocelyn, and
Godfrey, all surnamed De Jesus, all represented by Ronaldo De Jesus v.
Pastor De Jesus." The trial court declared null and void the Extrajudicial
Settlement with Simultaneous Sale of Rights and Interests in the Estate of a
Deceased Person (Deed of Sale) dated 13 September 1979 and directed the
partition of the real property subject of the litigation in pro indiviso equal shares
among Pastor de Jesus, respondents?all surnamed de Jesus (respondents de
Jesus)?and Consolacion Resurreccion de Jesus Abando (Consolacion).

The factual and legal antecedents culled from the decision of the Court of
Appeals follow.

Herein respondents de Jesus, in their capacity as legal heirs and successors-

in-interest to the property inherited by their late father Fermin de Jesus (Fermin)
filed a petition before the trial court on 3 June 1991, seeking the partition of a
parcel of land left by their deceased grandparents.

From the pleadings and evidence presented by the parties, the following facts
were established: that respondents de Jesus, namely Ronaldo, Alicia, Florante,
Nelson, Bellaflor, Mario, Arnolfo, Jocelyn, and Godfrey, all surnamed de Jesus,
represented by Ronaldo de Jesus (Ronaldo), are the legitimate children of
Fermin; that Pastor de Jesus is their uncle, being the brother of Fermin; that the
parties are all residents of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga-Apayao; that the spouses
Juan and Eustaquia de Jesus were the parents of Fermin, Consolacion and
Pastor de Jesus from whom they inherited through intestate succession the
parcel of land in dispute consisting of more or less five (5) hectares located in
Ipil, Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga-Apayao and covered by Tax Declaration No.
16100; that Juan de Jesus died on 7 December 1964 while Fermin died on 24
September 1979; that as of the filing of the petition, the title to the property
remained in the name of Juan de Jesus.

Mainly in dispute is the claim of respondents de Jesus that ownership of the

said property had never been transferred to anyone and/or partitioned among
the legal heirs thereto, and that as legitimate children of Fermin and by right of
representation under the law of intestate succession, they are entitled to their
rightful share of the estate left by their grandfather Juan de Jesus.

Pastor de Jesus contended that respondents de Jesus are no longer entitled to

their father?s share in the subject property as the latter has already sold to
Pastor de Jesus his property right along with only sister Consolacion for a
consideration of P10,000.00. This is evidenced by the notarized Deed of Sale
dated 13 September 1979, which respondent admits has not yet been
registered with the Registry of Deeds. Pastor de Jesus prayed, among others,
for the dismissal of the petition for lack of factual and legal basis.

The trial court ordered the Deed of Sale to be submitted to the NBI for
examination in order to determine its genuineness and due execution.

Respondents de Jesus presented as witnesses Alicia de Jesus Oakes, Ronaldo

de Jesus and the NBI Handwriting Expert Zenaida Torres. Their rebuttal
witnesses were Ronaldo and Maura Maramag de Jesus (Maura).

On the other hand, Pastor de Jesus?s witnesses were his sister Consolacion,
Atty. Marcos C. Diasen, Jr., Zenaida Tuazon and himself.

After trial, the trial court rendered its decision on 28 October 1994, disposing as
follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Declaring null and void Extra-judicial Settlement with Simultaneous

Sale of Estate of Deceased Person dated September 13, 1979;

2. Directing the Partition of Lot 769, Pls-93 covered by Original

Certificate of Title No. P-131 under the registered name of the late Juan
de Jesus;

3. Appointing commissioners to make partition over Lot 769, Pls-93

covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-131 of decedent Juan de
Jesus, namely: (a) The Clerk of Court of RTC, Branch 25; (b) The
Municipal Treasurer of the Municipality of Tabuk; and (c) The Municipal
Assessor of the Municipality of Tabuk, in the Province of Kalinga-
Apayao, and for said commissioners to submit a report of Partition not
later than December 30, 1994;

4. Directing Respondents to pay Petitioners the sum of THIRTY

THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) by way of attorney?s fees; and to pay
costs.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Register of Deeds of Kalinga-

Apayao.

SO ORDERED.5

Aggrieved, Pastor de Jesus interposed an appeal before the Court of Appeals

claiming that the trial court erred: (1) in not giving weight to the evidence he
offered to prove that the Deed of Sale was duly executed by the heirs of Juan
de Jesus; (2) in relying on the testimony of the expert witness than on the
testimonies of disinterested and knowledgeable witnesses asserting the
genuineness of the signatures; and (3) in declaring, without substantial basis,
null and void the Deed of Sale.6

The Court of Appeals found Pastor de Jesus?s appeal to be devoid of merit. It

shared the lower court?s observations: that a mere look at the signature above
the name Fermin de Jesus7 evinces a disparity of the signature with that
appearing on page two (2) of the Deed of Sale; 8 that despite the assertion of
petitioners Alicia de Jesus Oakes and Ronaldo de Jesus that the signature on
page two (2) of the questioned document is that of their father?s, it cannot be
better than or absolute as the conclusions found by expert witness Zenaida
Torres that the signature on the second page of the Deed of Sale and by
standard signatures "were not written by one and the same person;" and that
since the genuineness of the signature becomes the crux of the proceedings, a
closer examination of the questioned signature and the circumstances then
prevailing becomes of utmost necessity. The Court of Appeals thus declared
that there is sufficient evidence to warrant the declaration of Fermin?s signature
as a forgery.9

However, even without the testimony of the handwriting expert, the appellate
court ruled that there are valid reasons to doubt the due execution of the
document in question.10

It observed that the testimony of Consolacion on the physical condition of

Fermin was fraught with contradictions and inconsistencies seriously eroding
her credibility. Consolacion testified that Fermin had been admitted to various
hospitals and was eventually released because his illness was already beyond
treatment or hopeless yet she insisted that Fermin was still strong. Consolacion
contradicted herself when she testified that Fermin was fetched with a
wheelchair when they alighted from the helicopter on their way to the medicare
room. This shows that Fermin not only could not withstand the rigors of long
travel, as pointed out by the trial court, but could not also walk by himself. This
affirms Maura?s testimony that Fermin was already very weak and very thin
when he arrived in the Kalinga-Apayao Hospital, which is why he had to be
carried on a stretcher to the emergency room and later on bodily carried to his
bed when he went home. Under these given facts, Consolacion?s
uncorroborated claim that Fermin was strong and that she saw him seated in
the balcony when she fetched the latter to go to the notary public, is unworthy
of belief.11

The appellate court likewise ruled that Pastor de Jesus?s credibility was not
impressive. During the pre-trial conference, Pastor de Jesus admitted being in
possession of the original copy of the Deed of Sale but when later pressed to
produce the original, his reply was that Fermin left him only a duplicate copy. 12

In conclusion, the Court of Appeals stated that the rule that "a notarized
document is admissible in evidence without proof of its due execution and is
conclusive as to the truthfulness of its contents" is not absolute and may be
rebutted by evidence to the contrary, which respondents de Jesus were able to
present convincingly in the case at bar. The appellate court thus declared that
the notarized Deed of Sale is null and void. Inconsistently, however, it declared
the same valid and binding with regard to Pastor de Jesus and his sibling
Consolacion. The Court of Appeals disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision of the court a quo is
AFFIRMED with the modification that the Extrajudicial Settlement with
Simultaneous Sale of Estate of Deceased Person dated September 13, 1979 is
declared NULL AND VOID only insofar as the one-third (1/3) share of Fermin de
Jesus is concerned.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.13

With the denial of his motion for reconsideration, 14 Pastor de Jesus filed the
instant petition wherein he argues in the main that the testimony of the parties
and their witnesses to a notarized agreement, including that of the notary public
who notarized the same, should be given more weight than the opinion of an
expert witness denying the authenticity of a signature on the document.

In addition, Pastor de Jesus asserts in his Supplemental Petition for Review on

Certiorari15 that the presumption of regularity of notarized documents has not
been rebutted in the case at bar. Hence, the appellate court erred in declaring
the subject document as null and void.

In their Comment,16 respondents de Jesus maintain that the instant petition is

but a reiteration of Pastor de Jesus?s brief before the appellate court and that
there is nothing new in the points raised therein. They further contend that the
document entitled "Extrajudicial Settlement with Simultaneous Sale of Rights
and Interests in the Estate of a Deceased Person" suffers from grave infirmities
such that it cannot be considered as a duly executed document. 17

The petition is without merit.

At the outset, it should be stressed that under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on
certiorari, the reason being that the Court is not a trier of facts. For a question to
be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value
of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. 18 lavvphi1.net

It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh evidence all over again,
unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid
of support or are glaringly erroneous as to constitute palpable error or grave
abuse of discretion.19

The theory advanced by respondents de Jesus that Fermin?s signatures on the

Deed of Sale is a forgery involves a question of fact previously raised and
satisfactorily ruled upon by the two lower courts. Generally, findings of fact of
the Court of Appeals, affirming those of the trial court, are final and conclusive.
The Supreme Court cannot review those findings on appeal, especially when
they are borne out by the records or are based on substantial evidence. 20 The
reliance of appellate tribunals on the factual findings of the trial court is based
on the postulate that the latter had firsthand opportunity to hear the witnesses
and to observe their conduct and demeanor during the proceedings. 21

Although this rule admits of several exceptions, 22 none of the exceptions is

available in the instant case which gives us reason to deviate from the rule. The
courts a quo had sufficient factual basis in holding that the questioned
signatures are spurious.

In any event, we are not convinced that the courts a quo erred in declaring null
and void the Deed of Sale. Generally, a notarized document carries the
evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and has
in its favor the presumption of regularity. However, this presumption is not
absolute and may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary.23

To prove forgery, respondents de Jesus presented Alicia de Jesus Oakes and

Ronaldo de Jesus, children of Fermin who were familiar with his handwriting;
and NBI Handwriting Expert Zenaida Torres.

Alicia de Jesus Oakes and Ronaldo asserted that the signature on page one (1)
of the Deed of Sale was not Fermin?s signature but the signature on the
second page was his. Zenaida Torres, on the other hand, came up with the
finding that the purported signature of Fermin on page two (2) of the Deed of
Sale was not written by the same person whose signatures appear on the
documents that served as standard signatures of Fermin. As stated in the
decisions of the courts a quo, some of the striking differences noted by the
expert witness are as follows:

First- On the sample signature, the "T" bar on the "F" is either little bit
straight coming from below while that of the signature on page 2 comes
from the top.
 Second- Looking at letter "E", there is a very small but significant
difference. The beginning of the letter "E" is hooking from the top while
that cannot be seen on the sample signatures because all the "E?s" are
either straight or hooking comes from below.

Third-That, another unusual thing is that when you cover the first and
second "s" in Jesus on the sample signature, you can decipher a letter
"W." But on the questioned signature, even if the letter "s" is not covered
does not form a letter "W" but letter "U" instead because the stroke tends
to go straight down.

Fourth- The crown in F on the signature on page 2 shows a pronounced

tremor and shaky appearance which is not visible in the sample
signature.

Fifth- Letter R is of the signature on page 2 is fundamentally different

from those of the specimen signatures.24

With regard to Fermin?s abbreviated signature on page one (1) of the Deed of
Sale, expert witness Torres initially testified that she could not make a definite
opinion about it because the sample signatures, which are long hand
signatures, cannot be used as bases for comparative examination. However, on
cross-examination, she clarified that there are indications that the signature on
page one (1) and the standard/sample signatures compared were also not
written by one and the same person. 25

It is true that the opinion of handwriting experts are not necessarily binding
upon the court,26 the expert?s function being to place before the court data
upon which the court can form its own opinion. 27 Handwriting experts are
usually helpful in the examination of forged documents because of the technical
procedure involved in analyzing them. But resort to these experts is not
mandatory or indispensable to the examination or the comparison of
handwriting. A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of
handwriting experts, because the judge must conduct an independent
examination of the questioned signature in order to arrive at a reasonable
conclusion as to its authenticity.28 As held in Estacio v. Jaranilla,29 to wit:

It bears stressing that the trial court may validly determine forgery from its own
independent examination of the documentary evidence at hand. This the trial
court judge can do without resorting to experts, especially when the question
involved is mere handwriting similarity or dissimilarity, which can be determined
by a visual comparison of specimen of the questioned signatures with those of
currently existing ones. Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly
authorizes the court, by itself, to make a comparison of the disputed
handwriting with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against
whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the
judge.30

The courts below did exactly this. They conducted their independent
examination of the signatures and concluded that the disparity of the signatures
on page one (1) and page two (2) of the Deed of Sale is readily noticeable upon
inspection. Moreover, the appellate court observed that a scrutiny of the
documents where Fermin?s specimen signatures appear show that most of
them do not bear his printed name but Fermin consistently signed his name in
full and never in the abbreviated style as the one on page one (1) of the Deed
of Sale.

In support of Pastor de Jesus?s contention, on the other hand, Pastor de

Jesus, Consolacion, Atty. Marcos C. Diasen, Jr., and Zenaida Tuazon all
testified that Fermin signed the Deed of Sale in their presence.
However, the trial court held that their inconsistent and incredible testimonies
together with the circumstances at the time of its alleged execution rendered
doubtful the genuineness of the Deed of Sale. 31 Moreover, the trial court found it
irregular that two (2) typewriters were used in preparing the Deed of Sale when
only one secretary typed the document. The reason for this was not explained
to the full satisfaction of the trial court. 32

Thus, considering the testimonies of the witnesses and a plain comparison of

the questioned signatures with admittedly genuine ones, the Court finds no
reason to reverse the findings of the two lower courts. Although the Deed of
Sale was a public document having in its favor the presumption of regularity,
such presumption of regularity was adequately refuted by competent witnesses
and the visual analysis of the signatures made by the courts below.

Since the signatures of Fermin were forged, the Deed of Sale is effectively
nullified. The document should not be annulled only with respect to Fermin?s
share. The document bearing the forged signatures is in fact an extrajudicial
settlement which requires the assent of all the heirs to the extrajudicial
partition.33 It is not binding upon any person who has not participated therein or
had notice thereof.34

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The

Decision dated 11 September 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
47008 is AFFIRMED except insofar as it declared the Extrajudicial Settlement
with Simultaneous Sale of Estate of Deceased Person dated 13 September
1979 null and void only with respect to the 1/3 share of Fermin de Jesus. The
Decision dated 28 October 1994 of the Regional Trial Court of Tabuk, Kalinga
Apayao, Branch 25 in Special Civil Action Case No. 44 is REINSTATED. Costs
against petitioner Pastor de Jesus.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE ? FULL TEXT

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
G.R. No. 146550 March 17, 2006
FELIPA DELFIN, ET AL. VS. PRESENTACION D.
BILLONES, ET AL.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 146550 March 17, 2006

FELIPA DELFIN, GINA MAALAT, SHIRLEY TAMAYO, RECIO DAÑOS, and

ROBERTO DELFIN, Petitioners,
vs.
PRESENTACION D. BILLONES, ROSARIO D. DEMONARCA (accompanied
by husband Pedro and Demonarca), WENEFREDO DEGALA (representing
Pedro Degala), RAMON DELA CRUZ (representing his deceased wife
Maria Daradar dela Cruz), TERESITA DALIVA DEVIENTE (daughter of
Esperanza Daradar Daliva), and JOLLY DATAR (representing his deceased
mother Trinidad D. Datar) and the COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
 DECISION

TINGA, J.:

This treats of the petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision 1 and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54035 entitled
Presentacion D. Billones, et al. v. Felipa Delfin, et al., promulgated on 13
October 2000 and 26 December 2000, respectively, which reversed the 27 May
1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15 of Roxas City.

The antecedents are as follows:

On 29 July 1960, a Deed of Absolute Sale2 over Lot No. 213, covered by RO-
5563 (14516) of the Cadastral Survey of Panitan, Capiz, was executed by
Teresa Daños, Esperanza Daradar, Estrella Daradar and Maria Daradar, with
the marital consent of Cipriano Degala, husband of Teresa Daños, in favor of
the spouses Rodolfo Delfin and Felipa Belo (spouses Delfin). The document, so
it appears, bore the signatures of Esperanza and Estrella, as well as the thumb
marks of Teresa, Maria, and Cipriano, and was acknowledged before a notary
public. On 18 November 1980, the spouses Delfin registered the Deed of
Absolute Sale with the Register of Deeds of the Province of Capiz. Thereupon,
a new title, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-17071, was issued in the
name of the spouses Delfin.3

Meanwhile, on 26 March 1965, an Extra-Judicial Partition and Absolute Deed of

Sale4 involving Lot No. 3414 then covered by TCT No. T-16804 was made
between Teresa Daños, Trinidad Degala, Leopoldo Degala, Presentacion
Degala, Rosario Degala and Pedro

Degala, on one part, and the spouses Delfin, on the other. The deed, bearing
either the thumb marks or the signatures of the sellers, was likewise notarized.
Said document was registered by the spouses Delfin on 24 June 1980. Thus,
TCT No. T-16804 covering Lot No. 3414 was cancelled and a new one, TCT
No. T-16805, was issued in the names of the spouses Delfin on 24 June 1980. 5

The spouses Delfin then consolidated Lots No. 213 and No. 3414 and
subdivided the resulting lot into six (6) smaller lots. 6 Lot No. 1, covered by TCT
No. T-19618, was sold to Roberto Delfin on 21 October 1989; Lot No. 2 covered
by TCT No. T-19619 to Recio Daños on 25 April 1985; Lot No. 3 covered by
TCT No. T-19620 to Gina Maalat on 14 June 1989, and; Lot No. 4 covered by
TCT No. T-19621 to Shirley Tamayo on 11 August 1989. Lot No. 5 remained
with the spouses Delfin, while Lot No. 6 was used as an access road. 7

On 12 April 1994, herein respondents, claiming to be the heirs of the former

owners of Lots No. 213 and No. 3414, filed an action for annulment,
reconveyance, recovery of ownership and possession and damages. 8
According to them, it was only in 19899 when they

discovered that Teresa Daños, sick and in dire need of money, was constrained
to mortgage the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 3414 to the spouses Delfin for
P300.00 sometime in 1965.10 Taking advantage of her condition, the spouses
Delfin made her sign a document purporting to be a mortgage, but which turned
out to be an extrajudicial partition with deed of absolute sale. As to Lot No. 213,
respondents averred that the Deed of Sale covering the property was fictitious
and the signatures and thumb marks contained therein were all forged because
three (3) of the signatories therein died before the alleged sale in 1960, namely:
Estrella Daradar, who died in 1934, and Esperanza Daradar and Cipriano
Degala, who both died in 1946.11 As proof thereof, respondents presented
certifications12 on the deaths of Esperanza Daradar and Cipriano Degala by the
Local Civil Registrar of Panitan, Capiz.
To counter respondents? arguments, petitioners alleged that respondents?
action was already barred by prescription and laches. Further, they argued that
the spouses Delfin, as well as the subsequent owners of the subject properties,
are innocent purchasers for value and in good faith, whose titles to the lots at
the time of the purchase were all clean and free from liens and
encumbrances.13 The documents

evidencing the conveyance of the properties were personally and unilaterally

executed by the vendors-signatories therein without any intervention from the
spouses Delfin, and duly acknowledged before a notary public, petitioners
averred.14

Giving credence to the claims of petitioners, the trial court ruled that
respondents? claim of ownership over the subject properties was not
established by a preponderance of evidence. Compared to respondents? verbal
claims of ownership, the spouses Delfin were able to prove that they bought the
properties from the original owners, the trial court added. The trial court held
that the deeds of sale being duly executed notarial and public documents, they
enjoy the presumption of regularity which can only be contradicted by clear and
convincing evidence. In addition, respondents? claims based on fraud were
barred by prescription, having been filed more than four (4) years from the time
the instruments were registered with the Register of Deeds, and they are
estopped from annulling the documents by reason of laches, the action having
been filed 15 years after the deeds were registered. The trial court also denied
respondents? claims for damages.15

Respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the
ruling of the trial court. In its Decision,16 the Court of Appeals ruled that while an
action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten
(10) years from the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the
property, such prescriptive period does not apply if the person claiming to be
the owner of the property is in possession thereof, such as respondents in this
case.17 Moreover, considering that a similar action for reconveyance was filed
by respondents as early as 1989 which was eventually dismissed without
prejudice, respondents? action to annul the two (2) deeds on the ground of
fraud has not yet prescribed, according to the Court of Appeals. 18

The appellate court annulled the Extra-Judicial Partition and Deed of Sale
covering Lot No. 3414. The appellate court noted that: (i) Teresa Daños was a
very old and sickly woman; (ii) she and her children lacked formal education to
fully comprehend the document to which they affixed their signatures and/or
thumb marks; (iii) P300.00 was inadequate consideration for a lot consisting of
1,565 square meters even in 1965; (iv) respondents were allowed to remain in
the subject properties; and (v) the questioned document was registered in the
name of the spouses Delfin 15 years after the alleged date of its execution,
when most of the alleged vendors have already died. These circumstances
surrounding the execution of the said document show that the real intention
was merely to secure the loan of P300.00. Thus, what took place was in fact,
an equitable mortgage and not a sale.19

As for Lot No. 213, the Court of Appeals held that the Deed of Absolute Sale
could not have been executed on 9 July 1960. Relying on the certifications of
death presented by respondents, the Court of Appeals ruled that the defense of
due execution cannot prevail over the fact that two (2) of the signatories therein
have already died prior to said date.20 Roberto Delfin, Recio Daños, Gina
Maalat, and Shirley Tamayo, buyers of the subdivided lot, could not be
considered as purchasers in good faith nor entitled to be protected in their
rights because they were informed by respondents prior to the purchase that
they, and not the spouses Delfin, are the real owners of the lots, the appellate
court added.21
The Court of Appeals thus ruled:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby GRANTED.

The Decision dated May 27, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City,
Capiz, Branch 15 presided over by Judge Roger B. Patricio is hereby
REVERSED and SET SIDE and a new one entered:

(1) Annulling the Extra-Judicial Partition and Deed of Absolute Sale

dated March 26, 1965 and Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 9, 1960;

(2) Reinstating OCT No. RO-5563 (14516) referring to Lot 213 registered
in the names of Teresa Daños (1/2 portion), and the children of Lucia
Daños, namely: Esperanza Daradar, Estrella Daradar and Maria Daradar
(1/2 pro-indiviso) and OCT No. (4650) RO-5529 referring to Lot 3414
registered in the names of the late spouses Cipriano Degala and Teresa
Daños, and canceling the TCTs issued thereafter;

(3) Ordering plaintiffs-appellants, jointly and severally, to pay defendant

Felipa Belo Delfin the amount of P300.00 within thirty (30) days from the
date of finality of this decision;

(4) Ordering defendants-appellees to free Lots 3414 and 213 from any
and all obligations and encumbrances that may have been attached to
both lots and thereafter to deliver possession of the same to plaintiffs-
appellants; and

(5) Ordering defendants-appellees, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiffs-

appellants P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and [sic] for attorney?s
fees and P10,000.00 as litigation expenses.

Costs against defendants-appellees.

SO ORDERED.22

In the present petition for review under Rule 45, petitioners claim that the Court
of Appeals erred in finding that respondents retained possession of the subject
properties. Moreover, petitioners posit that respondent?s allegations of fraud
and forgery confine their action to a four (4)-year prescriptive period which has
long expired. Additionally, they argue that respondents failed to: (i) prove the
inadequacy of the selling price of Lot No. 3414; (ii) prove the frail condition of
Teresa Daños; (iii) show that fraud attended the sale of Lot No. 213; (iv) show
that Roberto Delfin, Recio Daños, Gina Maalat and Shirley Tamayo are not
purchasers in good faith; and (v) overcome the presumption of regularity
enjoyed by the notarized deeds of sale. Petitioners also question the award of
exemplary damages and attorney?s fees in favor of respondents. 23 On the other
hand, respondents for the most part merely reiterated the ruling of the Court of
Appeals.24

The complete resolution of the issues presented before the Court requires a
determination of facts, which this Court, not being a trier of facts, does not
normally exercise in an appeal by certiorari.25 This rule, however, is subject to
exceptions, such as where the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the
trial court are conflicting or contradictory, 26 as in the instant case.

When one?s property is registered in another?s name without the former?s

consent, an implied trust is created by law in favor of the true owner. 27 Implied
trusts are those which, without being expressed, are deducible from the nature
of the transaction by operation of law as matters of equity, independently of the
particular intention of the parties. Meanwhile, constructive trusts are created in
order to satisfy the demands of justice and prevent unjust enrichment. They
arise against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or
holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good
conscience, to hold.28 An action for reconveyance based upon an implied or
constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years from the registration of the deed
or from the issuance of the title, registration being constructive notice to all
persons.29 However, an action for reconveyance based on fraud is
imprescriptible where the plaintiff is in possession of the property subject of the
acts.30

In essence, petitioners insist that respondents failed to prove that fraud

attended the sale of Lots No. 213 and No. 3414. The Court agrees.

A contract or conduct apparently honest and lawful must be treated as such

until it is shown to be otherwise by either positive or circumstantial evidence. 31 A
duly executed contract carries with it the presumption of validity. The party who
impugns its regularity has the burden of proving its simulation. 32 A notarized
document is executed to lend truth to the statements contained therein and to
the authenticity of the signatures. Notarized documents enjoy the presumption
of regularity which can be overturned only by clear and convincing evidence. 33

As plaintiffs in the action before the trial court, respondents have the burden to
establish their case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence which is of
greater weight or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it.
Hence, parties who have the burden of proof must produce such quantum of
evidence, with plaintiffs having to rely on the strength of their own evidence, not
on the weakness of the defendant?s.34

As regards Lot No. 3414, respondents specifically alleged that the spouses
Delfin "tricked the plaintiffs and their late mother into signing a fictitious and
simulated document," and that "TCT No. T-16805 was the product of a fictitious
and simulated transaction [that] was obtained through fraud, the same should
be declared null and void".35 They claimed that the original owners of Lot No.
3414 did not intend to execute a deed of extra-judicial partition and absolute
sale but only a mortgage instrument. However, all that respondents came out
with were bare allegations that the said owners were either old and sickly or
illiterate; that the purported selling price of P300.00 was unconscionable; and
that petitioners failed to eject respondents from the subject land, as
respondents were unable to present any evidence to substantiate their claims,
much less the charge of fraud.

Respondents did not present any witness to testify on the execution of the
deed, nor on the condition of the signatories thereto. At best, their witnesses
merely testified as to the identity of the previous owners of the property. Worse,
petitioners Presentacion Degala Billones and Rosario Degala Demonarca, both
signatories to the subject deed, were not presented to testify on the real
circumstances surrounding the assailed transaction. As for the selling price of
P300.00, suffice it to say that respondents did not even present a witness to
testify as to its alleged unconscionability vis-a-vis the prevailing market value of
the property at the time of the sale. Meanwhile, the belated registration of the
document with the Register of Deeds can be explained by the fact that the
original of OCT No. 4650 covering Lot No. 3414 was either lost or destroyed
and was reconstituted only in 1971, while the original copy of the deed of sale
was lost by Felipa Delfin.36

Even respondents? claim of possession of the subject properties has not been
sufficiently proved. This Court has uniformly held that "the one who is in actual
possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his
possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate
his right. His undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the
aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse
claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed
only by one who is in possession."37 Actual possession of land consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as those a party
would naturally exercise over his own property.38

Contrary to the appellate court?s illation, respondents have not established

possession of the subject properties. Save for the lone testimony of Orlando
Buday, a neighbor, that Rosario Degala Daradar was the only one still residing
in the properties in dispute, no other evidence was presented to show that
respondents are in actual occupation and possession thereof. Not even Rosario
herself testified. Doubts also arise as to the veracity of respondents? claim of
possession since respondents themselves averred in their complaint that the
spouses Delfin had immediately taken possession of the subject properties in
the same year that the sale was made, and appropriated the produce found in
the subject lots from then on.39 Admissions made in the complaint are judicial
admissions which are binding on the party who made them and cannot be
contradicted40 absent any showing that it was made through palpable mistake.
No amount of rationalization can offset such admission. 41 By their very own
admissions, it can be inferred that respondents or their predecessors-in-interest
did not exercise actual occupancy, as they had ceased to perform acts of
dominion over the property upon the sale thereof.

Fraud may be, and often is, proved by or inferred from circumstances, and the
circumstances proved may in some cases raise a presumption of its existence.
However, while fraud may be proved by circumstances or presumed from them,
it cannot be demonstrated by mere construction, but must be proven in all
cases.42 Respondents indeed failed to prove that fraud attended the execution
of the Extra-Judicial Partition and Deed of Absolute Sale. Their bare and
unsupported allegations are not enough to overthrow the presumption of the
validity of said agreement or to raise the presumption of fraud.

Considering that respondents failed to establish the existence of fraud in the

spouses Delfin?s acquisition of Lot No. 3414, it cannot be said that implied or
constructive trust was created between respondents and the spouses Delfin.
The action for reconveyance of Lot No. 3414 must fail. Further, in view of
respondents? failure to show their valid title to Lot No. 3414 or even their
occupation thereof, the case cannot prosper even when it is viewed as one for
quieting of title.

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals annulled the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated 9 July 1960 covering Lot No. 213 because "one of the vendors therein
was already dead,"43 relying on the certifications issued by the Local Civil
Registrar. In assailing this declaration, petitioners once more point out that the
Deed of Sale, being a duly notarized document, should be given full faith and
credit. Also, they argue that the appellate court?s conclusion is based on the
disputable presumption that identity of names means identity of persons.

Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a

duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.44
Public documents are (i) the written official acts, or records of the official acts of
the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers,
whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country; (ii) documents acknowledged
before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and (iii) public records,
kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered
therein.45 Public documents may be proved by the original copy, an official
publication thereof, or a certified true copy thereof; 46 and when a copy of a
document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation by
the officer having legal custody of the record must state that the copy is a
correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. 47 A
duly-registered death certificate is considered a public document and the
entries found therein are presumed correct, unless the party who contests its
accuracy can produce positive evidence establishing otherwise. 48 Nevertheless,
this presumption is disputable and is satisfactory only if uncontradicted, and
may be overcome by other evidence to the contrary.

The documents presented by respondents were mere certifications and not the
certified copies or duly authenticated reproductions of the purported death
certificates of Esperanza Daradar

and Cipriano Degala. They are not the public documents referred to by the
Rules of Court, nor even records of public documents; thus, they do not enjoy
the presumption granted by the Rules. Respondents did not even present the
local civil registrar who supposedly issued the certifications to authenticate and
identify the same. Likewise, respondent Jolly Datar who adverted to the
certifications did not testify on how the certifications were obtained, much less
his role therein.49 As a consequence, the trial court did not admit the
certifications as independent pieces of evidence but merely as part of the
testimony of respondent Jolly Datar.50 A document or writing which is admitted
not as an independent evidence but merely as part of the testimony of a
witness does not constitute proof of the facts related therein. 51 Clearly then, the
certifications cannot be given probative value, and their contents cannot be
deemed to constitute proof of the facts therein stated.

More importantly, the very exhibits of respondents dispel the presumption of

regularity of the issuance of the certifications of death relied upon by the Court
of Appeals. The certifications state that both Esperanza Daradar and Cipriano
Degala died in 1946 at ages 24 and 63, respectively. However, a careful study
of the records of the case shows that in OCT No. RO 5563 (14516), 52
Esperanza Daradar was already 20 years old in 1929, making her date of birth
to be sometime in 1909. This is totally incongruous with her supposed age of 24
years in 1946, which places the year of her birth in 1922. Likewise, the Court
takes note of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 31739, 53
wherein the appellate court in its statement of facts found that Esperanza
Daradar died on 10 August 1940, while Estrella Daradar died on 15 June 1943,
contrary to the claim of respondents in this case.54 The Esperanza Daradar
named in the OCT and the one referred to in the aforesaid Decision could not
have been the same Esperanza Daradar in the Local Civil Registrar?s
certification.

As for the Cipriano?s thumb mark on the deed, suffice it to say that his consent
was not in fact needed to perfect the sale. Teresa Daños Degala?s share in Lot
213 was paraphernal property and, under the provisions of the Civil Code
applicable at the time of the sale, she could alienate or dispose of the said
property without the permission or consent of her husband. 55 Thus, with or
without such thumb mark, whether it was forged or not, the Deed of Absolute
Sale remains valid and effectual.

Under the circumstances, therefore, respondents were unable to overthrow the

presumption of validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale. Said deed, as well as the
titles derived as a result thereof must be accorded respect and must remain
undisturbed.

Anent the charge of bad faith on the part of petitioners, the Court takes note of
respondents? statement in their Plaintiff-Appellants? Brief, 56 to wit:

From the facts and circumstances of this case, Lot 213 and 3414 both of
Panitan Cadastre which were consolidated, into one single lot, per consolidated
plan as appearing at the back of TCT No. T-17071, and after the two lots were
consolidated, and the same was subdivided, into six smaller lots, Lots 1, 4 and
5 thereof still remained in the names of appellees spouses Rodolfo Delfin and
Felipa Belo, while Lots 2 and 3 thereof were transferred by the said spouses?
appellees to Recio Daños and Gina Maalat, respectively. These two transferees
are innocent purchasers for value which appellants admit, and this appeal is
only an appeal by appellants against defendant-appellees spouses Rodolfo
Delfin and Felipa Belo, and not against Recio Daños and Gina Maalat. 57
(Emphasis supplied.)

In effect, contrary to the testimony of respondents? witness Myrna Degala-

Distura that her mother warned petitioners against buying the subject lots, 58
respondents admitted that the only persons they consider to be not innocent
purchasers are the spouses Delfin. However, in view of respondents? failure to
prove the fraud attributed to the spouses Delfin, the Court has no choice but to
declare all petitioners to be purchasers for value and in good faith.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals

dated 13 October 2000 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court dated 27 May 1996 is REINSTATED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

(On Official Leave)

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairman

ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice
Acting Chairman

ATTE STATI O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court?s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairman, Third Division

C E R TI F I CATI O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairman?s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court?s Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 147792 January 23, 2006

LAZARA P. VIAJE, FAUSTINO O. PAMINTEL, ANTONIO O. PAMINTEL,

LODIVINA O. PAMINTEL, ANGELITO P. TULABOT, DORETEA P.
TULABOT and MARIA P. TULABOT, (in substitution of deceased
spouses Pedro A. Pamintel and Ciriaca Olaso), Petitioners,
vs.
FELICISIMA PAMINTEL, DANIEL, CAMELA, DEMETRIA, LEONCIA, all
surnamed PAMINTEL; CRISPINA RAMOS, FELIPE RAMOS, ANGELINA
TENIENTE and

PEDRO TENIENTE, as surviving children of the late TANZAN

PAMINTEL; CELIA, ANASTACIA, ANTONIO, TERESITA, ROSENDA and
ENGRACIA, all surnamed PADUA, as surviving children of the late
DIONISIA PAMINTEL, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review1 of the Decision2 dated 20 October 1999

of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated 16 April 2001. The
Decision of 20 October 1999 affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court
of Trece Martires City, Branch 23, in a suit for cancellation of title,
declaration of nullity of contract, and damages. The Resolution, dated 16
April 2001, denied petitioners? motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

Petitioners Lazara P. Viaje, Faustino O. Pamintel, Antonio O. Pamintel,

Lodivina O. Pamintel, Angelito P. Tulabot, Doretea P. Tulabot and Maria P.
Tulabot ("petitioners") are successors-in-interest of Pedro Pamintel
("Pedro") and his spouse Ciriaca Olaso ("Ciriaca"). 3 Pedro and respondents
Felicisima, Daniel, Camela, Demetria, Leoncia, all surnamed Pamintel, are
the children of the late Silverio Pamintel ("Silverio"). The other respondents
are Silverio?s grandchildren representing his two deceased daughters,
Tanzan and Dionisia.4
Silverio owned a parcel of land in Punta, Tanza, Cavite ("Lot No. 1993-A")
measuring 951 square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-19110 ("TCT No. T-19110") issued in his name by the Registry of
Deeds of Cavite ("Registry of Deeds") on 1 June 1966. 5

On 5 July 1968, Pedro secured the cancellation of TCT No. T-19110 and
obtained Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-30457 ("TCT No. T-30457") 6
issued in his name based on a Bilihan ng Lupa dated 3 July 1968 ("Deed of
Sale").7 Under the Deed of Sale, Silverio sold Lot No. 1993-A to Pedro for
P500. An unidentified notary public notarized the Deed of Sale on the same
day, 3 July 1968.

In November 1968, Pedro obtained a P3,000 loan from the Cavite

Development Bank ("Cavite bank") and mortgaged Lot No. 1993-A to
secure the loan.

In October 1976, respondent Felicisima Pamintel ("respondent Felicisima")

paid Pedro?s loan with the Cavite bank. Hence, the Cavite bank cancelled
the mortgage.

Silverio died on 1 November 1977. lavvphil.ne+

On 2 July 1991, respondent Felicisima secured the cancellation of TCT No.

T-30457 and obtained Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-312870 ("TCT No.
T-312870")8 issued in Silverio?s name based on a Deed of Reconveyance
dated 19 March 1974 ("Deed of Reconveyance"). 9 Under the Deed of
Reconveyance, Pedro and Ciriaca resold Lot No. 1993-A to Silverio for
P3,000. A certain Atty. Mapalad P. Santera ("Atty. Santera") notarized the
Deed of Reconveyance also on 19 March 1974.

On 30 October 1991, Pedro and Ciriaca, represented by petitioner Lazara

P. Viaje, sued respondents in the Regional Trial Court, Trece Martires City,
Branch 23 ("trial court"), for "Cancellation of TCT No. T-312870 With
Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Reconveyance Plus Damages" ("Civil
Case No. TM-336"10). Pedro and Ciriaca alleged in their complaint that they
did not execute the Deed of Reconveyance, thus they prayed that the trial
court cancel TCT No. T-312870 and declare them true owners of Lot No.
1993-A. Pedro and Ciriaca also sought payment of damages.

In their Answer with counterclaim, respondents countered that it was Pedro

who fraudulently obtained TCT No. T-30457 because he misled Silverio into
affixing his thumbmark on the Deed of Sale on 3 July 1968. According to
respondents, Pedro falsely represented to Silverio, then 95 years old, that
the Deed of Sale merely authorizes Pedro to "get the title of [Lot No. 1993-
A] from the [Registry] of Deeds." Respondents further contended that
Pedro and Ciriaca voluntarily executed the Deed of Reconveyance.
Respondents prayed for the award of damages in their counterclaim. 11

During the trial, Pedro and Ciriaca presented in evidence a letter dated 16
June 1977 ("letter-complaint")12 and Salaysay dated 21 June 1977
("Salaysay")13 of respondent Felicisima charging Pedro with Estafa before
the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Cavite. In her letter-complaint,
respondent Felicisima stated that despite her having paid Pedro?s loan
with the Cavite bank to cancel the mortgage over Lot No. 1993-A, Pedro
and Ciriaca still refused to transfer Lot No. 1993-A in Silverio?s name. 14
Neither the letter-complaint nor the Salaysay mentioned the Deed of
Reconveyance.

For their part, respondents presented two affidavits of Silverio, dated 29

October 197315 and 8 February 1974,16 stating that the contents of the Deed
of Sale were not explained to him and that he had no intention of selling Lot
No. 1993-A. Respondent Felicisima also testified that Atty. Santera, who
prepared and notarized the Deed of Reconveyance, was Pedro?s lawyer. 17

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In its Decision of 27 June 1995, the trial court dismissed the complaint of
Pedro and Ciriaca and also respondents? counterclaim. The trial court
upheld the validity of TCT No. T-312870 and the Deed of Reconveyance.
The trial court held:

Jurisprudentially settled in (sic) the rule that a Torrens Title is generally a

conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to therein. A
strong presumption exists that Torrens Titles were regularly issued and that
they are valid. The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to
land. Once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the
necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the mirador de su
casa, to avoid the possibility of losing his land (Salao vs. Salao, 70 SCRA
65). Apropos, the validity and efficacy of the certificate of title in the name
of Silverio Pamintel cannot be doubted. Concomitantly, the quantum and
quality of evidence submitted by plaintiffs failed to convince this Court that
Silverio Pamintel really sold the disputed property to his son Pedro. The
financial capability of Pedro Pamintel to buy said property is doubtful
considering that said property has to be mortgaged with a bank in order
that Pedro Pamintel may be able to go abroad. Needless to say, it will not
be amiss to state that the burden of proving the action is upon the plaintiff.
Neither is there a preponderance of evidence that the Deed of
Reconveyance is an invalid document. Except the mere say-so (sic) of
plaintiff Pedro Pamintel which is self-serving, there is no competent
evidence to show that said Deed of Reconveyance was not really signed by
plaintiffs. Anyhow, it is presumed although disputable that said private
transaction has been fair and regular (Rule 131, Sec. 5 (p)[)]. Arrayed
against the sole testimony of plaintiff Pedro Pamintel are the testimonies of
Felicisima Pamintel, Camila Cubol and Demetria Pamintel which show the
due execution and genuiness of said Deed of Reconveyance. While as a
general rule, the number of witnesses should not in and by itself determine
the weight of evidence, but in case of conflicting testimonies of witnesses,
the numerical factor maybe given certain weight (Caluna vs. Vicente, CA
G.R. No. 3911-R, February 17, 1951).

And lastly, but not the least, it appears that Silverio Pamintel was old and
illiterate when his thumbmark was affixed in the deed of sale of the
disputed property to Pedro Pamintel. Plaintiffs failed to prove that the deed
of sale in favor of Pedro Pamintel was explained to said Silverio Pamintel.
Sans any evidence to said effect, the case of plaintiffs must necessarily
crumble like a house of cards[.]18
Petitioners, who had substituted Pedro and Ciriaca, appealed to the Court
of Appeals.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The appellate court, in its Decision of 20 October 1999, affirmed the trial
court?s ruling. The Court of Appeals held:

It is not disputed that the subject parcel of land was originally titled in the
name of Silverio Pamintel (Exh. "I"). Appellants? evidence shows that
Silverio Pamintel executed a deed of sale (Bilihan ng Lupa) involving the
land in dispute in favor of appellants (Exh. "B"). At the time of the execution
thereof on July 3, 1968, Silverio Pamintel was 95 years old and illiterate.
Such being the case, appellants are required to show that the terms thereof
have been fully explained to Silverio Pamintel (Art. 1332, Civil Code).
Except for appellants? self-serving testimonies, no convincing evidence
was adduced to prove that Silverio Pamintel fully understood the tenor of
the document.

Contrary to appellants? contention, the testimony of Silverio Pamintel is not

required to impugn the validity of the deed of sale. Considering the seller?s
mental weakness and physical condition, the Court doubts the due
execution thereof. xxx

Anent appellants? claim that the Deed of Reconveyance (Exh. "5") is a

forgery, it is well settled that the signatures on a questioned document can
be sighted by a judge who can and should exercise independent judgment
on the issue of authenticity of such signatures (Alcos vs. IAC, 162 SCRA
823). xxx

In a nutshell, the Court finds no cogent reason to modify or reverse the

court a quo?s decision dismissing the complaint.19

In this petition, petitioners reiterate their claim that Pedro and Ciriaca did
not execute the Deed of Reconveyance. Petitioners also point to
respondent Felicisima?s letter-complaint and Salaysay, which did not
mention the Deed of Reconveyance even though she executed those
documents after Pedro and Ciriaca had signed the Deed of Reconveyance.
Petitioners argue that this omission negates the execution of the Deed of
Reconveyance. Petitioners also contend that respondents are time-barred
from questioning the validity of the Deed of Sale under Article 1144 of the
Civil Code.20

The Issues

The petition raises these issues:

(1) Whether the Deed of Reconveyance is valid; and

(2) Whether respondents are time-barred from questioning the validity

of the Deed of Sale.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

On the Validity of the Deed of Reconveyance

Petitioners insist that the signatures of Pedro and Ciriaca in the Deed of
Reconveyance were forged. Thus, the Court should overturn the findings of
the lower courts by annulling that contract and, consequently, TCT No. T-
312870.

We find no merit in this contention.

The question of forgery is one of fact.21 Petitioners improperly raise such

claim in this petition for review on certiorari in which parties can raise only
questions of law.22

At any rate, the Court finds no reason to disturb the finding of the trial court,
as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that Pedro and Ciriaca duly signed the
Deed of Reconveyance. Atty. Santera, whom Pedro confirmed was his
former counsel,23 notarized the Deed of Reconveyance. As a notarized
instrument, the Deed of Reconveyance enjoys the presumption of due
execution.24 Only a clear and convincing evidence to the contrary can
overcome this presumption.25 Petitioners have presented no such evidence.
Indeed, other than his own denial that he did not sign the Deed of
Reconveyance (as allegedly shown by the specimens of his signature),
Pedro presented no other proof to corroborate his claim. 26 In an earlier
case,27 this Court held that such allegation and evidence are insufficient to
overcome a notarized deed?s presumption of due execution, thus:

Far from being clear and convincing, all private respondent had to offer by
way of evidence was her mere denial that she had signed the same. Such
mere denial will not suffice to overcome the positive value of the subject
Deed, a notarized document. Indeed, even in cases where the alleged
forged signature was compared to samples of genuine signatures to show
its variance therefrom, this Court still found such evidence insufficient, to
wit ?

xxx

["]Documents acknowledged before a notary public have the evidentiary

weight with respect to their due execution. The questioned power of
attorney and deed of sale, were notarized and therefore, presumed to be
valid and duly executed. Atty. Tubig denied having notarized the said
documents and alleged that his signature has also been falsified. He
presented samples of his signature to prove his contention. Forgery should
be proved by clear and convincing evidence and whoever alleges it has the
burden of proving the same. Just like the petitioner, witness Atty. Tubig
merely pointed out that his signature was different from that in the power of
attorney and deed of sale. There had never been an accurate examination
of the signature, even that of the petitioner. To determine forgery, it was
held in Cesar vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. Nos. 54719-50, 17 January 1985,
quoting Osborn, The Problem of Proof) that:

[?]The process of identification, therefore, must include the determination of

the extent, kind, and significance of this resemblance as well as of the
variation. It then becomes necessary to determine whether the variation is
due to the operation of a different personality, or is only the expected and
inevitable variation found in the genuine writing of the same writer. It is also
necessary to decide whether the resemblance is the result of a more or
less skillful imitation, or is the habitual and characteristic resemblance
which naturally appears in a genuine writing. When these two questions are
correctly answered the whole problem of identification is solved.["?]

xxx

[W]e cannot accept the claim of forgery where no comparison of

private respondent's signatures was made, no witness (save for
private respondent herself) was presented to testify on the same,
much less an expert witness called, and all that was presented was
private respondent's testimony that her signature on the questioned
Deed was forged. Indeed, even when the evidence is conflicting, the
public document must still be upheld. (Emphasis supplied)

The other evidence petitioners invoke to support their claim of forgery ?

respondent Felicisima?s failure to mention the Deed of Reconveyance in
her letter-complaint and Salaysay ? also does not suffice to rebut the Deed
of Reconveyance?s presumptive genuineness. Such omission and
respondent Felicisima?s statement in her letter-complaint that Pedro
"refus[ed] to transfer in Silverio?s name Lot No. 1993-A" do not negate the
Deed of Reconveyance?s execution. That statement could well mean that
Pedro (and Ciriaca) failed to have the title to that property transferred in
Silverio?s name. This is not incompatible with the Deed of Reconveyance?
s prior execution.

Thus, we affirm the Court of Appeals? ruling upholding the validity of the
Deed of Reconveyance and, consequently, of TCT No. T-312870. A Torrens
title enjoys the presumption of having been regularly issued. 28

On the Other Issue Petitioners Raise

The Court sees no need to pass upon petitioners? other contention that
respondents are time-barred from questioning the Deed of Sale?s validity.
The Deed of Reconveyance superseded the Deed of Sale. With our
affirmance of the Court of Appeals? ruling upholding the Deed of
Reconveyance?s validity, the Deed of Sale ceased to confer any right on
petitioners.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 20

October 1999 and the Resolution dated 16 April 2001 of the Court of
Appeals.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

Chairman
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice Asscociate Justice