136. G.R. No.

168973 August 24, 2011 CITY OF DUMAGUETE, herein Represented by

City Mayor, Agustin R. Perdices, Petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE PORTS
AUTHORITY,Respondent. Facts : The City of Dumaguete represented by its mayor,
Agustin R. Perdices, filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Decision1 dated March 4, 2005 and Resolution2 dated June 6, 2005 of
the Court Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 64379. The Court of Appeals granted the f
granted the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition of respondent Philippine Ports
Authority and set aside the Orders dated December 7, 2000 and February 20, 2001
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 44 of the City of Dumaguete in LRC Case
No. N-201. The genesis of the case started when the City of Dumaguete, through
Mayor Felipe Antonio B. Remollo (Remollo),filed before the RTC an Application for
Original Registration of Title over a parcel of land with improvements, located at
Barangay Looc, City of Dumaguete (subject property), under the Property
Registration Decree. However the application for registration of the City of
Dumaguete for the said lot was opposed by the Republic of the Philippines
represented by the Director of Lands, and respondent, represented by the Office of
the Government Corporate Counsel, filed separate Oppositions to the application for
registration of petitioner. Both the Republic and respondent averred that petitioner
may not register the subject property in its name since petitioner had never been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the said property for at
least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of the application; and the subject
property remains to be a portion of the public domain which belongs to the
Republic. The city of Dumaguete insisted that it has occupied the land in open,
continous exclusive and notorious manner for more than 30 years. However , the
government filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the trial court has no jurisdciton
because the lot being claimed by Dumaguete is not alienable and disposable because
said lot is a foreshore lot which can never be alienable and disposable based on the
Presidential Property Decree 1529. Petitioner invoked Republic Act No. 1899,9
which authorizes chartered cities and municipalities to undertake and carry out, at
their own expense, the reclamation of foreshore lands bordering them; and grants
said chartered cities and municipalities ownership over the reclaimed lands. The
present claim of petitioner that the subject property is reclaimed land should not be
allowed for it would improperly change the earlier theory in support of the
application for registration. Respondent reiterated that the subject property is
foreshore land which cannot be registered; and that Presidential Proclamation No.
1232 is very material to LRC Case No. N-201 because it confirms that areas within
the Dumaguete Port Zone, including the subject property, are not alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain.1avvp On September 7, 2000, the RTC issued
an Order granting the Motion to Dismiss of respondent. It said that indeed said lot
comes within the purview non alienable and nod disposable land of the public
domain which makes the contention of Dumaguete lacking in merits. Dumaguete
filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that the dismissal will violated its right to
due process. Respondent based its Opposition (To Applicant’s Motion for
Reconsideration dated September 28, 2000)21 and Opposition (To Applicant’s
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration)22 on technical and substantive grounds.
According to respondent, the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner violated
Sections 4 (Hearing of motion), 5 (Notice of hearing), and 6 (Proof of service
necessary), Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner did not set its Motion for
Reconsideration for hearing even when the said Motion could not be considered as
non-litigable.In its Order23 dated November 16, 2000, the RTC initially agreed with
respondent that the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner violated Sections 4, 5,
and 6, Rule 15 and Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. Resultantly, the Motion
for Reconsideration of petitioner was considered as not filed and did not toll the
running of the period to file an appeal, rendering final and executory the order of
dismissal of LRC Case No. N-201. However, after taking into consideration the
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner, the RTC issued another
Order24 dated December 7, 2000, setting aside its Order dated September 7, 2000
in the interest of justice and resolving to have a full-blown proceeding to determine
factual issues in LRC Case No. N-201. It was then the turn of respondent to file with
the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated December 7, 2000. In an
Order dated February 20, 2001, the RTC denied the motion of respondent and
admitted that it made a mistake when it declared the said lot as shorelot when its
adjoining lots are aready titled. And it is for this reason that the court reconsidered
and set aside said September 7, 2000 Order, to correct the same while it is true that
said September 7, 2000 Order had attained its finality, the Court cannot in
conscience allow injustice to perpetuate in this case and that hearing on the merits
must proceed to determine the legality and truthfulness of its application for
registration Dumaguete. Respondent sought relief from the Court of Appeals via a
Certiorari and Prohibition claiming that theRTC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Respondent reiterated that the RTC
Order dated September 7, 2000, dismissing LRC Case No. N-201 had already attained
finality. The defects of the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner rendered the
same as a mere scrap of paper, which did not toll the running of the prescriptive
period to appeal the RTC Order dated September 7, 2000. The Court of Appeals, in
its Decision dated March 4, 2005, found merit in the Petition of respondent and set
aside the RTC Orders dated December 7, 2000 and February 20, 2001. The appellate
court, in its Resolution dated June 6, 2005, denied the Motion for Reconsideration of
petitioner. Hence the instant appeal to the Supreme Court as a final recourse by
Dumaguete. ISSUE : Is the order granting the motion for reconsideration of the
plaintiff valid considering that it has violated the Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15 and
Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court? Held : The supreme Court ruled that
procedural rules were conceived to aid the attainment of justice. If a stringent
application of the rules would hinder rather than serve the demands of substantial
justice, the former must yield to the latter. Although the Supreme Court has held
time and again that violatiopn of the rules of the court pertaining to motion, notices
and services is fatal and makes the mmmmmotion for reconsideration as a mere
scrap of paper, nevertheless the Court declares that a rigid application of that rule
will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, then the rule may be
relaxed, especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the
questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the
recitals contained therein. Technicalities may thus be disregarded in order to resolve
the case. After all, no party can even claim a vested right in technicalities. Litigations
should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicalities.

137. Civ Pro Rule 14, Sec 7

Chu vs. Mach Asia

G.R. No. 184333
April 1, 2013

Facts:
Respondent Mach Asia Trading Corporation is a corporation engaged in importing
dump trucks and heavy equipments.

On December 8, 1998, petitioner Sixto N. Chu purchased on installment one (1)

Hitachi Excavator worth P900,000.00 from the respondent. Petitioner initially
paid P180,000.00 with the balance of P720,000.00 to be paid in 12 monthly
installments through Prime Bank postdated checks. On March 29, 1999, petitioner
again purchased two (2) heavy equipments from the respondent on installment
basis in the sum of P1,000,000.00, namely: one (1) motorgrader and one (1)
payloader. Petitioner made a down payment of P200,000.00 with the balance
of P800,000.00 payable in 12 monthly installments through Land Bank postdated
checks.

However, upon presentment of the checks for encashment, they were dishonored by
the bank either by reason of "closed account," "drawn against insufficient funds," or
"payment stopped."

On November 29, 1999, the RTC issued an Order6 allowing the issuance of a writ of
replevin on the subject heavy equipments.
On December 9, 1999, Sheriff Doroteo P. Cortes proceeded at petitioner's given
address for the purpose of serving the summons, together with the complaint, writ
of replevin and bond. However, the Sheriff failed to serve the summons personally
upon the petitioner, since the latter was not there. The Sheriff then resorted to
substituted service by having the summons and the complaint received by a certain
Rolando Bonayon, a security guard of the petitioner.7chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid substituted service

Rulings:
No. As a rule, summons should be personally served on the defendant. It is only
when summons cannot be served personally within a reasonable period of time that
substituted service may be resorted to. 15Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
provides:
SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served
within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be
effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with
some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving
the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent
person in charge thereof.
It is to be noted that in case of substituted service, there should be a report
indicating that the person who received the summons in the defendant's behalf was
one with whom the defendant had a relation of confidence, ensuring that the latter
would actually receive the summons.

Also, impossibility of prompt personal service must be shown by stating that efforts
have been made to find the defendant personally and that such efforts have failed.
This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of
service. It is a method extraordinary in character, hence, may be used only as
prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. The statutory
requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and
any substituted service other than that authorized by statute is considered
ineffective.

In the case at bar, it was not shown that the security guard who received the
summons in behalf of the petitioner was authorized and possessed a relation of
confidence that petitioner would definitely receive the summons. This is not the
kind of service contemplated by law. Thus, service on the security guard could not
be considered as substantial compliance with the requirements of substituted
service.

Evidently, plaintiff-appellee cannot be penalized, through no fault of its own, for an

irregular or defective return on service of summons.

In the interest of fairness, the process server's neglect or inadvertence in the service
of summons should not, thus, unduly prejudice plaintiff-appellee's right to speedy
justice.

The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due process. As a

rule, if defendants have not been validly summoned, the court acquires no
jurisdiction over their person, and a judgment rendered against them is null and
void.20 Since the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner,
the judgment rendered by the court could not be considered binding upon him for
being null and void.

138. Macasaet v. Co
G.R. No. 156759, June 5, 2013
Nota bene: This case involves two sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14.
OVERVIEW: RTC Sheriff proceeded to serve the summon in person (Sec 6 of
Rule 14). However, because the person named in the summons were then out of
the office and unavailable for two consecutive visit of the RTC Sheriff. The RTC
Sheriff decided to resort to substituted service of the summons, and
explained why in his sheriff’s return. (Sec 7 of Rule 14)
FACTS:
On July 3, 2000, respondent, a retired police officer assigned at the Western
Police District in Manila, sued Abante Tonite, a daily tabloid of general circulation;
its Publisher Allen A. Macasaet; its Managing Director Nicolas V. Quijano; its
Circulation Manager Isaias Albano; its Editors Janet Bay, Jesus R. Galang and
Randy Hagos; and its Columnist/Reporter Lily Reyes (petitioners), claiming
damages because of an allegedly libelous article petitioners published in the June
6, 2000 issue of Abante Tonite.
The suit, docketed as Civil Case No. 00-97907, was raffled to Branch 51 of the
RTC, which in due course issued summons to be served on each defendant,
including Abante Tonite, at their business address at Monica Publishing
Corporation, 301-305 3rd Floor, BF Condominium Building, Solana Street corner A.
Soriano Street, Intramuros, Manila.

RTC Sheriff Raul Medina proceeded to the stated address to effect the
personal service of the summons on the defendants. But his efforts to
personally serve each defendant in the address were futile because the
defendants were then out of the office and unavailable.
He returned in the afternoon of that day to make a second attempt at
serving the summons, but he was informed that petitioners were still out of
the office. He decided to resort to substituted service of the summons, and
explained in his sheriff’s return (why he can’t serve the summons in person)
Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint through counsel’s special
appearance in their behalf,alleging lack of jurisdiction over their persons because
of the invalid and ineffectual substituted service of summons. They contended
that the sheriff had made no prior attempt to serve the summons personally on
each of them in accordance with Section 6 and Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court.
ISSUE:
WON substituted service of summons was proper.
RULING:
YES
Under the Rules of Court, the service of the summons should firstly be effected on
the defendant himself whenever practicable. Such personal service consists either
in handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in person, or, if the
defendant refuses to receive and sign for it, in tendering it to him. The rule on
personal service is to be rigidly enforced in order to ensure the realization of the
two fundamental objectives earlier mentioned. If, for justifiable reasons, the
defendant cannot be served in person within a reasonable time, the service of the
summons may then be effected either (a) by leaving a copy of the summons at
his residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein, or (b) by leaving the copy at his office or regular place of business with
some competent person in charge thereof. The latter mode of service is known as
substituted service because the service of the summons on the defendant is
made through his substitute.
There is no question that Sheriff Medina twice attempted to serve the summons
upon each of petitioners in person at their office address, the first in the morning
of September 18, 2000 and the second in the afternoon of the same date. Each
attempt failed because Macasaet and Quijano were “always out and not
available” and the other petitioners were “always roving outside and gathering
news.” After Medina learned from those present in the office address on his
second attempt that there was no likelihood of any of petitioners going to the
office during the business hours of that or any other day, he concluded that
further attempts to serve them in person within a reasonable time would
be futile. The circumstances fully warranted his conclusion. He was not
expected or required as the serving officer to effect personal service by all
means and at all times, considering that he was expressly authorized to
resort to substituted service should he be unable to effect the personal
service within a reasonable time. In that regard, what was a reasonable time
was dependent on the circumstances obtaining. While we are strict in insisting on
personal service on the defendant, we do not cling to such strictness should the
circumstances already justify substituted service instead. It is the spirit of the
procedural rules, not their letter, that governs.

139. 253 SCRA 705 – Remedial Law – Civil Procedure – Service of Summons –
Voluntary Appearance
In 1983, Joven Yasay filed an ejection case against Antonio Navale, Eligio
Valdehueza, and several others. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (in Cagayan de
Oro) took cognizance of the said case. The court’s sheriff issued summonses to
Navale et al however, only Valdehueza personally accepted his summons. Navale
and the rest either refused to accept or refused to disclose their identity. The Sheriff
was left with no recourse but to leave the summonses in the residences of Navale
and the others.
Valdehueza filed an Answer but Navale et al did not hence, Navale et al were
declared in default. Yasay eventually won the ejection case.
Navale, through a certiorari petition before the Regional Trial Court, is now
contesting the result of the case as he averred that he never received any summons.
The RTC dismissed the petition. So did the Court of Appeals.
The RTC and the CA found that as the record showed, Navale et al voluntarily
appeared in court hence, whatever defect was there in the service of summons, the
same was already cured.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a proper service of summons.
HELD: Yes. As a rule, the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant through summons. However, Section 23 of Rule 14 also provides that the
defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service. There
are four types of voluntary appearance, to wit:
1. filing of the corresponding pleading,
2. filing of a motion for reconsideration of the judgment by default,
3. filing a petition to set aside the judgment of default,
4. when defendant and plaintiff jointly submits a compromise agreement.
In this case, there was a corresponding pleading filed by Navale et al through their
co-defendant Valdehueza. The Answer filed by Valdehueza was unqualified. Note
that Yasay sued Navale, Valdehueza, and the others altogether. Further, as the
records show, when Navale et al failed to appear in court, Yasay filed a contempt
case against them. To the contempt charge in the same court, Navale et al filed their
Answers – this shows that they voluntarily appeared. The Supreme Court even noted
that Navale’s filing of his certiorari petition is also tantamount to voluntary
appearance.

140. YUK LING ONG vs. BENJAMIN T. CO

Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional
cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy. Rule 47 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, governs actions for annulment of judgments or
final orders and resolutions, and Section 2 thereof explicitly provides only two grounds
for annulment of judgment, that is, extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Annulment of
judgment is an equitable principle not because it allows a party-litigant another
opportunity to reopen a judgment that has long lapsed into finality but because it enables
him to be discharged from the burden of being bound to a judgment that is an absolute
nullity to begin with.
Facts:
Petitioner Yuk Ling Ong (Ling), a British-Hong Kong national married to Benjamin
Co, a Filipino, received a subpoena from the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation directing her to appear because her permanent residence visa was
being subjected to cancellation proceedings. When she did, she was furnished
copies of the following documents: petition for declaration of nullity of marriage in
Civil Case No. CV-01-01777, petition for declaration of nullity of marriage in Civil
Case No. 02-0306, Decision dated December 11, 2002 by the RTC Paranaque
City declaring her marriage void in Civil Case No. 02-0306, and copy of her
marriage certificate, with the decision annotated therein. From the documents,
she learned that Benjamin first filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
in Civil Case No. CV-01-01777; without any inkling as to what happened to the
first petition, Civil Case No. 02-0306 was again filed by Benjamin, indicating her
address as 23 Sta. Rosa Street, Unit B-2 Manresa Garden Homes, Quezon City;
substituted service of summons allegedly made in the case by the Sheriff, the
RTC proceeded to hear the case without her participation, and rendered the
decision annulling her marriage with Benjamin on the ground of psychological
incapacity. On the basis thereof, Ling Consequently filed a petition for annulment
of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court before the CA, claiming that she
was never notified of the cases filed against her. She prayed that the RTC
decision in Civil Case, be nullified on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction. Petitioner alleged that first, respondent committed extrinsic fraud
because he deliberately indicated a wrong address to prevent her from
participating in the trial; second, jurisdiction over her person was not acquired
because of an invalid substituted service of summons as no sufficient
explanation, showing impossibility of personal service, was stated before
resorting to substituted service of summons; third, the alleged substituted service
was made on a security guard of their townhouse and not on a member of her
household; and fourth, she was not psychologically incapacitated to perform her
marital obligations. The CA rendered the assailed decision finding the petition for
annulment of judgment to be devoid of merit. It held that there was no sufficient
proof to establish that respondent employed fraud to insure petitioner’s non-
participation in the trial of Civil Case.
Issue:
Whether or not the facts proven by the petitioner constitute extrinsic fraud within
the purview of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.
Held:
Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional
cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy. Rule 47 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, governs actions for annulment of judgments or
final orders and resolutions, and Section 2 thereof explicitly provides only two grounds
for annulment of judgment, that is, extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Annulment of
judgment is an equitable principle not because it allows a party-litigant another
opportunity to reopen a judgment that has long lapsed into finality but because it enables
him to be discharged from the burden of being bound to a judgment that is an absolute
nullity to begin with.
Petitioner raises two grounds to support her claim for annulment of judgment: (1)
extrinsic fraud and (2) lack of jurisdiction. Her contention on the existence of extrinsic
fraud, however, is too unsubstantial to warrant consideration. The discussion shall then
focus on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the judgment or final order is
either lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action, or lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. The former is a matter of substantive law
because statutory law defines the jurisdiction of the courts over the subject matter or
nature of the action. The latter is a matter of procedural law, for it involves the service of
summons or other processes on the petitioner.

141. G.R. No. 164041. July 29, 2005 ROSENDO ALBA, minor, represented by his
mother and natural guardian, Armi A. Alba, and ARMI A. ALBA, in her personal
capacity, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ROSENDO C. HERRERA,
respondents. PONENTE: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. Facts: On 21 October 1996,
respondent filed a petition in RTC Manila for cancellation of entries in the birth
certificate of petitioner minor, to wit: (1) minor’s surname ‘Herrera’; (2) his filiation
as father; and (3) marriage to minor’s mother, Armi, alleging they are false and that
he married only once with Ezperanza Santos. On 13 January 1997, the RTC issued an
Amended Order re - scheduling the hearing of petition to 26 February 1997. Copy of
which was published in ‘Today’ in its Jan 20, 27, and Feb 3, 1997 issues, and were
also sent to Armi at No. 418 Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila (address per minor’s birth
certificate), Local Civil Registrar and Solicitor General. During the hearing, only OSG
appeared but filed no opposition, while Armi was not present for she did not receive
the Order, the address provided being wrong. On 1 April 1997, the RTC granted the
petition which became final on 2 June 1997. On 24 November 2000, petitioners filed
a petition for annulment of judgment with CA on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction over their person. Armi averred that: (1) respondent knew all
along of her true address where they cohabited as husband of wife, result of which is
the minor; and (2) she knew of the decision only on 26 February 1998; hence due
process was denied. On 27 February 2004, CA dismissed the petition. Motion for
reconsideration was denied hence, the instant petition for certiorari. Issues: 1.
Whether or not jurisdiction over Armi’s person was NOT acquired; and 2. Whether
or not extrinsic fraud is present, to warrant annulment of judgment. Ruling: NO.
Petition is Dismissed. Under Section 2, Rule 47 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, judgments may be annulled on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and
extrinsic fraud.[19] Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the
person of petitioner and her minor child depends on the nature of private
respondents action, that is, in personam, in rem or quasi in rem. An action in
personam is lodged against a person based on personal liability; an action in rem is
directed against the thing itself instead of the person; while an action quasi in rem
names a person as defendant, but its object is to subject that persons interest in a
property to a corresponding lien or obligation.[20] Hence, petitions directed against
the thing itself or the res, [21] which concerns the status of a person,[22] like a
petition for adoption,[23]annulment of marriage,[24] or correction of entries in the
birth certificate,[25] as in the instant case, are actions in rem. In an action in
personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to
validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction
 over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the
court, provided that the latter has jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res
is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it
is brought into actual custody of the law; or (b) as a result of the institution of legal
proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective.
[26]The service of summons or notice to the defendant is not for the purpose of
vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process
requirements.[27] In the case at bar, the filing with the trial court of the petition for
cancellation vested the latter jurisdiction over the res. Substantial corrections or
cancellations of entries in civil registry records affecting the status or legitimacy of a
person may be effected through the institution of a petition under Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court, with the proper Regional Trial Court.[28] Being a proceeding
in rem, acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner is therefore not
required in the present case. It is enough that the trial court is vested with
jurisdiction over the subject matter. The service of the order at No. 418 Arquiza St.,
Ermita, Manila and the publication thereof in a newspaper of general circulation in
Manila, sufficiently complied with the requirement of due process, the essence of
which is an opportunity to be heard. Said address appeared in the birth certificate of
petitioner minor as the residence of Armi. Considering that the Certificate of Birth
bears her signature, the entries appearing therein are presumed to have been
entered with her approval. Moreover, the publication of the order is a notice to all
indispensable parties, including Armi and petitioner minor, which binds the whole
world to the judgment that may be rendered in the petition. An in rem proceeding is
validated essentially through publication.[29] The absence of personal service of the
order to Armi was therefore cured by the trial courts compliance with Section 4,
Rule 108, which requires notice by publication,

142. Samartino v. Raon, CA Digest

Facts:

1. Respondents Leonor Bernardo-Raon and Agustin G. Crisostomo are the surviving

sister and spouse, respectively, of the late Filomena Bernardo-Crisostomo, who
passed away on May 17, 1994. Among the properties left by the deceased was her
one-half share in a parcel of land in Noveleta, Cavite, registered under in the name
of co-owners Lido Beach Corporation and Filomena Bernardo.
2. 2. In 1996, respondents instituted a complaint for ejectment against petitioner
Regalado P. Samartino a complaint for ejectment alleging that during the lifetime of
Filomena, she leased her share to petitioner for a period of five years counted from
1986; that the said lease expired and was not extended thereafter; and that
petitioner refused to vacate the property despite demands therefor.
3. Summons was served on Roberto Samartino, brother of petitioner. At the time of
service, he was not at home as he was then confined at the NBI rehab center since
January 19, 1996, where he was undergoing treatment and rehabilitation for drug
dependency. Thus, on February 2, 1996, a liaison officer of the NBI-TRC appeared
 before the trial court with a certification that petitioner will be unable to comply with
the directive to answer the complaint within the reglementary period, inasmuch as it
will take six months for him to complete the rehabilitation program and before he can
be recommended for discharge by the Rehabilitation Committee. ]
4. The trial court, despite the written certification from NBI-TRC, declared petitioner in
default and ordered them to present evidence ex-parte. On March 21, 1996, the trial
court rendered judgment in favor of respondents. Counsel of respondent filed a
motion to set aside judgement at the RTC, RTC affirmed lower court decision. This
decision became final, the property was sold in an auction to the respondents,
Petitioner filed petition for relief from judgement alleging that the parcel of land from
which he was being evicted had been sold to him by Filomena Bernardo-Crisostomo,
as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 13, 1988. Petition was
dismissed by RTC. Petitioner filed petition for certiorari before CA which was also
dismissed, including his MR, hence this petition for review.
Issue: Whether or not the court (MTC & RTC) acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the petitioner

NO. The summon was ineffective. There being no valid substituted service of
summons, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. In
actions in personam, summons on the defendant must be served by handing a copy
thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to
him. If efforts to serve the summons personally to defendant is impossible, service
may be effected by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s dwelling house
or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion residing therein, or by
leaving the copies at the defendant’s office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof.

1. Service of summons upon the defendant shall be by personal service first and only
when the defendant cannot be promptly served in person will substituted service be
availed of.
2. The impossibility of personal service justifying availment of substituted service
should be explained in the proof of service; why efforts exerted towards personal
service failed. The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of
summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officer’s Return; otherwise, the
substituted service cannot be upheld.
3. It is only under exceptional terms that the circumstances warranting substituted
service of summons may be proved by evidence aliunde. It bears stressing that
since service of summons, especially for actions in personam, is essential for the
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, the resort to a substituted
service must be duly justified. Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent
proceedings on jurisdictional grounds

4. Furthermore, nowhere in the return of summons or in the records of this case is it

shown that petitioner’s brother, on whom substituted service of summons was
effected, was a person of suitable age and discretion residing at petitioner’s
residence.
 143. same as 137
144. valmonte vs ca
G.R. No. 108538 January 22, 1996
Ponente: Mendoza, J.:

Service of Summons

Facts:

1. Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a foreign resident. Petitioners Lourdes and Alfredo are
husband and wife both residents of 90222 Carkeek Drive South Seattle, Washington, U.S.A.
Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte, who is a member of the Philippine bar, however, practices his
profession in the Philippines, commuting for this purpose between his residence in the state of
Washington and Manila, where he holds office at S-304 Gedisco Centre, 1564 A. Mabini, Ermita,
Manila.
2. Private respondent Rosita Dimalanta, who is the sister of petitioner filed an
action for partition against former and her husband. She alleged that, the plaintiff is
of legal age, a widow and is at present a resident of 14823 Conway Road,
Chesterfield, Missouri, U.S.A., while the defendants are spouses but, for purposes of
this complaint may be served with summons at Gedisco Center, Unit 304, 1564 A.
Mabini St., Ermita, Manila where defendant Alfredo D. Valmonte as defendant
Lourdes Arreola Valmonte’s spouse holds office and where he can be found.He
husband was also her counsel, who has a law office in the Philippines. The
summons were served on her husband.
3. Petitioner in a letter, referred private respondent’s counsel to her husband as the party
to whom all communications intended for her should be sent. Service of summons was then
made upon petitioner Alfredo at his office in Manila. Alfredo D. Valmonte accepted his
summons, but not the one for Lourdes, on the ground that he was not authorized to accept the
process on her behalf. Accordingly the process server left without leaving a copy of the summons
and complaint for petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte.
4. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte thereafter filed his Answer with Counterclaim. Petitioner
Lourdes A. Valmonte, however, did not file her Answer. For this reason private respondent
moved to declare her in default. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte entered a special appearance in
behalf of his wife and opposed the private respondent’s motion. RTC denied the MR of
respondents. CA declared petitioner Lourdes in default. Said decision was received by Alfredo
hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was validly served with
summons.
NO.
There was no valid service of summons on Lourdes.
1. The action herein is in the nature of an action quasi in rem. Such an action is essentially for the
purpose of affecting the defendant’s interest in a specific property and not to render a judgment
against him. As petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a nonresident who is not found in the
Philippines, service of summons on her must be in accordance with Rule 14, § 17. Such service,
to be effective outside the Philippines, must be made either (1) by personal service; (2) by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court
 may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court should be sent by
registered mail to the last known address of the defendant; or (3) in any other manner which the
court may deem sufficient.
2. In the case at bar, the service of summons upon petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was not done
by means of any of the first two modes. This mode of service, like the first two, must be made
outside the Philippines, such as through the Philippine Embassy in the foreign country where the
defendant resides. The service of summons on petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte was not made
upon the order of the court as required by Rule 14, § 17 and certainly was not a mode deemed
sufficient by the court which in fact refused to consider the service to be valid and on that basis
declare petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte in default for her failure to file an answer.
3. Secondly, the service in the attempted manner on petitioner was not made upon prior leave of
the trial court as required also in Rule 14, § 17. As provided in § 19, such leave must be applied
for by motion in writing, supported by affidavit of the plaintiff or some person on his behalf and
setting forth the grounds for the application.
4. Finally, and most importantly, because there was no order granting such leave, petitioner
Lourdes was not given ample time to file her Answer which, according to the rules, shall be not
less than sixty (60) days after notice.

145.