Hist. Sci.

, xxxiii (1995)

THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF SCIENTISM: A CRITICAL

REVIEW

Casper Hakfoort
University of Twente

Wilhelm Ostwald (1853-1932) was a Nobel-Prize-winning scientist. In the

historiography of science he is known as one of the founding fathers of physical
chemistry, as well as the main protagonist of 'energetics', a general theory of
energy based on the generalized laws of thermodynamics. In 1895 energetics
met with fierce opposition from such influential figures as Boltzmann and Planck,
and after that it soon ceased to be a serious candidate for the unifying theory of
physical science.
Ostwald never ceased to believe in energetics. In 1905, he published a theory
of happiness, on his own account based on energetics. According to Ostwald,
happiness can be completely expressed in terms of energy. The core of his theory
was a mathematically expressed formula: G = (E + W) (E - W). Here G is the
degree of happiness, E the amount ofenergy spent voluntarily, and W the energy
exercised unwillingly. The happiness formula signals the widening of Ostwald's
thoughts that had taken place in the meantime. He had been developing a phi-
losophy of nature and culture, generalizing the concepts and laws of scientific
energetics. The article on happiness was one of its early fruits. In Ostwald's
mind, theory and practice were never far apart. Hence, the happiness formula
was not an academic exercise but was intended to be of help in making decisions
in one's personal life, including Ostwald's own. In his view, science, or more
precisely energetics, provided him with a basis for a philosophy of nature and
culture, for moral theory and practice, for political action and indeed, for being
happy, celebrating Christmas and living one's daily life. Ostwald's life and work
provide, therefore, a particularly rich embodiment of what is often called
scientism.'
While studying Ostwald's thoughts and actions I became interested in the
secondary literature on the history of scientism. My attempt to make sense of
these writings led to the present article. More important perhaps than this per-
sonal motive, is the growing interest in the subject over the last few years, sig-
nalled by the recent publication of volumes by Olson and Midgley.' These books
seem to have been written in isolation from each other, as well as from some
earlier important contributions to the subject. The present article provides a selec-
tive, comparative and critical analysis of the secondary literature, old and new.

0073-2753/95/3304-0375/$2.50 © 1995 Science History Publications Ltd

Downloaded from hos.sagepub.com at DALHOUSIE UNIV on June 24, 2015

376 . CASPER HAKFOORT

The reader may have felt the inclination to laugh at Ostwald's happiness for-
mula (this is what has happened on most of the occasions I have presented it in
public). In accordance with this inclination you may jump to the conclusion that
the difference between scientism and science is obvious. However, in general,
and even in this case, stating the difference presents a serious analytical diffi-
culty, to which we will return.
A second reaction to the specific example given, may have been the urge to
condemn scientistic thoughts and thinkers. For some, the term 'scientism' itself
entails a negative evaluation of the phenomenon. Though the term has been used
in a positive sense by others, as we will see, in my view the historian of scientism
should use it in a neutral and analytical way. A further discussion of the evalu-
ative connotations of the term will be given below.
Finally, Ostwald's happiness formula was chosen as an introductory example
in order to convey a sense of the many aspects converging in his scientistic
thought and actions and, as I will argue, in scientism generally. In the literature
the many sides of scientism have often been treated separately, ifat all. Intellec-
tual aspects have been discussed from a relatively early date onwards, i.e., for at
least five decades. Social aspects of scientism have been treated for twenty or
thirty years now, and the psychological dimension has begun to be studied in
some detail within the last decade. Intellectual, social and psychological studies
of the history of scientism may illustrate the richness of the phenomenon, but
they do not exhaust it. Nevertheless I hope that this review will be of help in
showing the fascinating diversity in both the history and the historiography of
scientism.

1. SCIENTISM AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS

In 1912, discussing the widening of his ideas, Ostwald explained that "energist
thought [took] hold of one domain of my mind after another't.' In a personal way
characteristic of Ostwald, he expressed the basic structure of many definitions
ofscientism in the history-of-ideas tradition. Olson, for example, takes scientism
to be present whenever "scientific attitudes and modes ofthought [are] extended
and applied beyond the domain of natural phenomena to a wide range of cultural
issues that involve human interactions and value structures".' Ostwald and Olson
share a similar image: from the domain of science something intellectual is trans-
ferred to a domain outside science.!
This approach naturally gives rise to three questions. What exactly is the do-
main of science? What is transferred to another domain? How is the domain
outside science to be described? These are straightforward questions, but they
involve serious problems. First, the distinction between science and non-science
is difficult to define. Some even hold that a definition is impossible. If this were
true, the very idea of scientism, as distinct from science, would seem vacuous.
However, up to now this issue has been addressed in a-historical, i.e., either

Downloaded from hos.sagepub.com at DALHOUSIE UNIV on June 24, 2015

 THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF SCIENTISM • 377

philosophical or sociological terms. Therefore, a second, fundamentally

historiographical problem has been ignored: when, how and why did scientism
originate, and how and why did it develop? This sounds like an irrelevant ques-
tion, as long as the first problem has not been settled. However, in my view the
two problems should be considered together, for this, as I will argue, may make
a solution possible.
Unlike many other historians, Richard Olson, in his Science deified and sci-
ence defied, acknowledges the importance of explicitly defining science, devot-
ing most ofchapter 1, vol. i, to this issue. Using the term "in a very broad sense",
including "the speculations of Ionian thinkers" as well as the philosophies of
Plato and Aristotle, he defines science as "a set of activities and habits of mind
aimed at contributing to an organized, universally valid, and testable body of
knowledge about phenomena"." Discussing his definition for the ancient and
medieval period, Olson makes it clear that the activities and habits of mind "we
now naturally see" as scientific, were almost invariably "integrated components
of craft traditions ..., religious traditions, magical traditions, or broadly philo-
sophical traditions". In this way he seems to acknowledge major historical
changes in the institutional and intellectual context of science. However, in the
remainder ofhis first volume Olson focuses on those intellectual elements ("habits
of mind") in all kinds of ancient and medieval traditions which converged, no
earlier than the seventeenth century, in the concept and institution of modern
science.
Though this approach to the premodern period has its dangers, it may not be
an impossible one. However, in my view Olson stretches it beyond its limits. As
an example, let us review how he argues, carefully but unconvincingly, that
"Western culture was first infused with scientism" in the pre-Socratic period.
First, Olson quotes extensively from a general analysis of pre-Socratic philoso-
phy by the classicist and literary critic Hermann Frankel, and he compares
Frankel's characterization of pre-Socratic philosophy to his own definition of
science. Noting a one-to-one correspondence between the two descriptions, he
concludes that "there seems to be no way to distinguish between what is meant
by philosophy and what is meant by science"."
Leaving this point aside, although it is a controversial one, we consider Olson's
next steps. His second claim is that the logical and temporal relation generally
assumed to exist between philosophy and science should be reversed. Pre-Socratic
philosophy is not "both temporally prior and more inclusive than science"; on
the contrary, "the whole Western philosophical enterprise" owes "its very ori-
gins to scientific attitudes and activities". 8 Olson cites Aristotle and Adam Smith
as supporters of this alternative interpretation of the history of philosophy and
science (or more appropriately, the history of science and philosophy), which is
somewhat scanty evidence for so radical a view. However, on his own admis-
sion, he still needs a third and crucial claim in order to apply his concept of
scientism and "to speak of the impact of science upon culture". He recalls that

Downloaded from hos.sagepub.com at DALHOUSIE UNIV on June 24, 2015

378 . CASPER HAKFOORT

"we associated science not only with a set of attitudes and a range of subject
matters but also with a set of activities, saying that we should be warranted in
attributing an impact to science only when the adoption and spread of attitudes
and ideas was demonstrably associated with the latter". Was this the case in
connection with pre-Socratic philosophy? This "complex question", he writes,
"has no clear-cut answer". Nevertheless, since he uses the language of scientism
throughout, the implicit answer is a clear-cut 'yes'. 9
Olson's admirably explicit and detailed argument highlights the dangers of a
very broad concept of science and its concomitant broad concept of scientism.
Proclaiming that Thales, Plato and Aristotle are scientists on a par with Newton,
Maxwell and Einstein, because their attitudes of mind fall within the same broad
definition of science, is to pervert historical continuities into identity, while ig-
noring the difficult but essential question of how the mixture of continuities and
discontinuities should be conceived. Olson's concept of science leads to such
far- fetched questions as whether Plato's Timaeus is scientifie, and, given Olson's
use of his definition, to the consistent but uninformative answer: " ... the Timaeus
clearly seems to meet any reasonable requirements of a scientific document.!"?
More importantly for the historiography of scientism, Olson's valuable contri-
butions to the 'prehistory' of this subject are badly labelled. This may have been
one ofthe reasons why Olson's first volume has attracted little attention so far,
in my view undeservedly. For example, his discussion of the influence of pre-
Socratic thought on religion, politics and morality is flawed by his insistence on
redefining pre-Socratic philosophy as science. However, if we forget this
idiosyncracy, Olson provides a perspicacious analysis of some conceptual rela-
tions between philosophical thought, striving for independence from other areas
of cultural life, and at the same time influencing these areas. Indeed, there are
interesting parallels with what happened in the early modem period, apart from
the well-known intellectual ties between ancient Greek philosophy and modem
European philosophy and science. Finally, by discussing 'activities' in contrast
to 'habits of mind', Olson has touched upon the institutionalization of science
as a condition to be fulfilled before one can meaningfully speak of scientism. In
the next section we will meet explicit discussions of this issue.
The second volume of Olson's Science deified traces the relations between
science and political, theological and social thought in the seventeenth and eight-
eenth centuries. With more justification than in his first volume he analyses
these developments as direct influences from science to other areas, for example
in his discussion of William Petty's 'political arithmetic"." However, important
qualifications should be made. Within the framework of the history of ideas,
crucial questions involve the (in)dependence of science from philosophy, as well
as the relations between the way the general (and partly undifferentiated) area of
science, natural philosophy and philosophy was related to theology and reli-
gion. To obtain a first grip on this issue, we can profitably tum to Cassirer's
classic The philosophy ofthe Enlightenment. 12

Downloaded from hos.sagepub.com at DALHOUSIE UNIV on June 24, 2015

 THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF SCIENTISM . 379

According to Cassirer the success of the natural philosophers, especially New-

ton, changed philosophy in general, i.e., it changed metaphysics, epistemology,
social philosophy, ethics and aesthetics. The nature of the change did not con-
sist primarily in an application of scientific concepts or laws in wider contexts
(though this was part of the change), nor did natural philosophy as a body of
knowledge replace revealed religion, natural theology or metaphysics as the basis
for philosophy as a whole. The key issue in this change was the adoption of a
new method of philosophising, modelled on the method allegedly used in natu-
ral philosophy by Newton and others." Three claims or assumptions made by
Cassirer are crucial to this view. The first is mentioned in a few words, the sec-
ond is treated at some length, while the third is not stated at all.
Cassirer's first claim is that the Enlightenment considered Newton's Principia
to be the first unambiguous triumph of human reason. Newton showed that hu-
man reason was able to unlock the secrets of the world, at the same time refuting
scepticism, bypassing revealed religion and natural theology, and putting a stop
to seemingly endless metaphysical discussions." Whereas we are tempted to see
here a success for science, as distinct from philosophy and other domains of
thought, eighteenth-century thinkers saw the triumph of philosophy, using one,
undivided concept ofphilosophy. The wider influence of the Principia was there-
fore conceived as the wider influence of philosophy in general. In this case, as
in ancient Greece in general, it does not make much sense to use the term
'scientism'. It would be more appropriate, though not wholly satisfactory either,
to use the awkward term 'philosophism'.
Cassirer's second point is a thesis on the continuity and discontinuity be-
tween seventeenth-century and eighteenth-century philosophy (he identifies the
latter with Enlightenment philosophy). According to Cassirer, in both centuries
the unity and indivisibility of human reason was widely assumed. That is to say,
the main philosophers in both centuries made the assumption that one method is
appropriate for the entire domain of philosophy and the sciences. The main dis-
continuity between the philosophical views in the two centuries was the particu-
lar method which was considered universally valid. Descartes, Spinoza and other
seventeenth-century philosophers took as their model mathematics (or their im-
age of it), whereas the eighteenth century did the same with Newton's natural
philosophy. IS Cassirer's second thesis cannot be rephrased as: modern science
influenced eighteenth-century philosophy by the transference of scientific method
to the latter's domain. However, this thesis gives us a clue to an important change
in philosophy as a whole, at a time when parts of philosophy gradually acquired
more autonomy as well as social recognition.
The third assumption of the neo-Kantian Cassirer is an implicit one. He as-
sumes that theology and religion are not relevant to the development of eight-
eenth-century science and philosophy. On a more positive note, he assures us
time and again that the Enlightenment's confidence in human reason was one of
its main characteristics. The primacy of human reason and scientific method

Downloaded from hos.sagepub.com at DALHOUSIE UNIV on June 24, 2015

380 . CASPER HAKFOORT

conflicted with the dominance of institutionalized religion."

In comparison with the descriptions of scientism cited so far, Cassirer's view
has an advantage, especially for the early modern period. In the case of philoso-
phy, it replaces the somewhat crude question, "How and why did scientific con-
cepts and methods influence other domains of thought?", with two related and
more subtle questions: why did most philosophers make the assumption of "one
reason" or one method throughout philosophy (including natural philosophy or
science), and why did natural philosophy replace mathematics as the universal
methodological model in philosophy? Cassirer's approach helps to correct and
supplement a view of early modern science as a distinct body of ideas directly
influencing other domains of thought.
Reading another classic, Peter Gay's The Enlightenment: An interpretation
(though on his own admission this is largely informed by Cassirer's image of
the Enlightenment), we meet a somewhat different picture. Gay stresses the im-
portance of ancient, especially Roman, sources for the self-image of the
philosophes. Cicero, Lucretius and others were authoritative authors, not only
for the philosophes, but for every educated person. According to Gay, many of
the Enlightenment ideas, as well as the confidence to use them, were derived
from pre-Christian sources. Therefore, the philosophes were in many respects
"modern pagans". Their concept of human reason and human rationality was
framed by classical sources, emphasizing secularity, social virtues and political
duties. 17 This informs a concept of the relation between philosophy and what we
call science that is different from Cassirer's. Newton's 'experimental method',
or what they took this to be, fitted the approach of the modern pagans, but it was
neither their intellectual source nor their main argument. In Gay's account, the
philosophes' views were mainly formed by, as well as justified by, classical
philosophical sources. Newton's prestige in philosophy merely provided addi-
tional weight to their views."
Another enrichment of Cassirer's view derives from attempts to study the
Enlightenment, or should we say the eighteenth century, in its social and cul-
tural settings, for example, in different national contexts.'? First of all, this ex-
tended the set of historical actors from Cassirer's big philosophers or Gay's
"little flock" (actually pretty much the same figures) to human beings other than
philosophers or philosophes, such as theologians. A major point arising from
these studies was the complex relationship between Enlightenment ideas and
religion or theology. Far from being natural opposites, they had been in har-
mony in many cases, or they had at least been associates.P
Both Cassirer and Gay (but not Olson) ignore the use of natural philosophical
concepts, laws and methods by Christian theologians. In line with the medieval
uses of Aristotelian philosophy of nature, modern natural philosophy was used
to underpin Anglican and other Christian theologies of widely differing denomi-
nations." Moreover, people like Voltaire and Holbach reached their deist or
atheist conclusions using the same material, in a different but structurally similar

Downloaded from hos.sagepub.com at DALHOUSIE UNIV on June 24, 2015

 THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF SCIENTISM • 381

way. Modern natural philosophy seemed able to become part of a variety of

Christian theologies, as well as to sustain all kinds of secular cosmologies. What
mattered, so it seems, was not the inherent harmony or disharmony between
scientific and religious ideas, but the intellectual and social authority of early
modern science and philosophy. Here we have reached a limit of the history-of-
ideas approach to scientism. Authority, prestige, social status: these concepts
can only be incorporated to some extent in this approach; they will acquire more
significant roles in other approaches to be considered in the two sections below.
So far, we have discussed intellectual aspects of scientism up to the eight-
eenth century. We now turn to the nineteenth century. An important contribu-
tion to our subject is The counter-revolution ofscience by the economist Hayek.
It was written mainly during the Second World War and published, as a book, in
1952. The second part of the title reads Studies in the abuse of reason, disclos-
ing the deeply felt aversion towards what Hayek took to be scientism. This aver-
sion may be explained, in part, by the close connection he saw between scientism
and totalitarian socialism.
Hayek's work is divided into three parts. The third and shortest one is a re-
print of an article in which Hayek attempts to show points of intellectual contact
between Comte and Hegel. It is meant to underpin his thesis that scientism and
totalitarian socialism are intrinsically as well as historically connected. The first
part of Hayek's book is a philosophical discussion ofthe natural and the social
sciences. Arguing for a fundamental difference between the two, he holds that
scientistic approaches to the social sciences are, by their very nature, misguided
and wrong." Formulating this view, he seems to be echoing the debate on the
nature of the social and human sciences as compared to the natural sciences at
the turn of the nineteenth century, a debate that was especially lively in Ger-
many. The German controversy signalled the growing intellectual authority and
independence of the natural sciences. Science, and therefore scientism, had be-
come more visible and powerful. Historiographically this means that the model
of science directly influencing other domains of thought becomes more appro-
priate when discussing a period of time in which science was no longer consid-
ered to be part of a greater whole. In contrast, some claimed it to be the greater
whole itself.
Hayek's general analysis offers an instance ofa philosophical analysis in com-
bination with a negative evaluation of scientism. Scientism is defined in a non-
historical way as well as rejected. The historian of scientism cannot follow this
lead, if only because he knows how historical phenomena like science and
scientism change over the centuries, and because he is bound to attempt a non-
partisan view of history. A philosophical stance which defines scientism, or for
that matter science, for all times and cultures, is too easy a solution for a real and
difficult problem. Of course, an historian may have his personal views on cer-
tain manifestations of scientism. If he holds these views he does well to voice
them to himself and to his readers, but it is his duty not to let them interfere with

Downloaded from hos.sagepub.com at DALHOUSIE UNIV on June 24, 2015

382 . CASPER HAKFOORT

a fair and non-partisan account of history."

The second part of Hayek's volume is a critical and historical study of Henri
de Saint-Simon, Auguste Comte and the Saint-Simonians. Hayek discusses the
conceptual and institutional connections between science and technology. He
draws attention to the close ties between the Ecole Polytechnique and Saint-
Simon and his circle. As to the conceptual nexus, Hayek points out the ideal of
the scientifically educated engineer who, on the basis of scientific knowledge,
literally creates a new world. The world created by chemical, civil and military
engineers is a world of chemicals, bridges and cannons. However, according to
Hayek, the ideal of creating a new world by using science and technology was
expanded to include the social world. State and society should be recreated, the
traditional forms were treated with disrespect and should be abandoned. This
attitude he calls "the engineering point of view" of society, which for him is
closely related to scientism." Another aspect of nineteenth-century scientism is
put forward by Hayek in a revealing way. Both Saint-Simon and Comte founded
a religion. The former designated his self-made religion "new Christianity" and
the latter's creation was called "the religion of Humanity". Hayek pays exclu-
sive attention to the new ideas in these religions and does not go into their cuitic
details or the role they played in the individual and social lives of believers.
Indeed, these themes would have taken him out of the dominant approach in the
history of ideas at that time.P

2. SOME SOCIAL ASPECTS OF SCIENTISM

A slim but very rich contribution to the literature on scientism is SCientific im-
ages and their social uses: An introduction to the concept ofscientism, written
by lain Cameron and David Edge, and published in 1979.26 It is part ofa SISCON
series (project on Science in a Social Context) and it is informed by a critical
attitude to science and technology.
In chapter 1 the authors discuss the links between ethics and the practice of
science. They analyse attempts to propose the professional norms of the scien-
tific community as examples to be followed in society at large." For our pur-
poses it is important that they add another item, the ethos of science, to the range
of scientific elements used in a different context - theories, laws, concepts and
methods. Chapter 2 is on ethics and the contents of science. It discusses the
relations between biological theories ofevolution and moral theories. Their treat-
ment of evolutionary ethics is mainly analytical and critical, not historical. This
particular example serves the authors in bringing out the importance of the dis-
tinction between 'is' and 'ought', often disregarded in scientistic arguments in
the area of moral theory. Though not uncontroversial, it is one of the key con-
ceptual tools in any critical analysis of scientistic arguments."
So far, 'Cameron and Edge have not gone beyond the history-of-ideas tradi-
tion reviewed above. In their third and final chapter however, they discuss

Downloaded from hos.sagepub.com at DALHOUSIE UNIV on June 24, 2015

 THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF SCIENTISM . 383

fundamentally different aspects of scientism, which are announced in the defi-

nition of scientism they provide in their introductory comments.
Scientism is present where people draw on widely shared images and no-
tions about the scientific community and its beliefs and practices in order to
add weight to arguments they are advancing, or to practices they are pro-
moting, or to values and policies whose adoption they are advocating.... 29
The concept of scientism implies an attitude to science: those who use
scientistic language acknowledge and respect the authority ofthe scientific
community, and wish to capitalize on that authority, in order to make their
discourse more persuasive. In so doing, they reinforce and consolidate that
authority."
Cameron and Edge sketch a social process presupposed in the transference of
ideas and practices. To consider science as a social, religious or political au-
thority, is a key factor in this process. There is a hint in the second quotation at
their favourite way of explaining why people use scientific resources in a
scientistic way; the suggested explanation is stated a few lines later: "to support,
consolidate or advance their own social positions.'?'
In my view Cameron and Edge rightly stress the importance of science taken
as an authority by social groups and the society at large. However, they barely
explore the related historical questions. When, how and why did science acquire
authority in social, religious and political matters, and how and why did it main-
tain this authority?
These questions had been raised and given a tentative answer in The scien-
tist's role in society, published in 1971 by Joseph Ben-David. His subject is the
institutionalization of science in Western society in the early modern period,
and the rise and decline of science in different national settings since then. The
process of institutionalization is one in which science became a socially valued
and relatively autonomous activity. Concomitant with this process is the emer-
gence of the scientist's role: a relatively autonomous function, which is appreci-
ated by society.
According to Ben-David "the scientistic movement" was instrumental in this
process of institutionalization. This was a group of people furthering the prac-
tice of science because they "believe]d] in science ... as a valid way to truth and
to effective mastery over nature as well as to the solution ofthe problems of the
individual and his society". For example, in seventeenth-century England the
scientistic movement advocated the belief that "Baconian philosophy and ex-
perimental science were general principles to be applied to all human and social
problems"." The possible fruits of science in Baconian Utopia were oftwo kinds:
technological progress and social change. The social strata furthering science
were pre-eminently the middle classes. For Ben-David there is a close connec-
tion between emerging natural science (especially the scientific ethos), the

Downloaded from hos.sagepub.com at DALHOUSIE UNIV on June 24, 2015

384 . CASPER HAKFOORT

scientistic movement, the middle classes and the rise of liberal political values.
Moreover, his positive tone towards scientism is matched by his sympathy for
liberalism. For France, Germany and the United States, three other countries
Ben-David discusses in his book, the influence ofthe scientistic movement came
later or was not as crucial as it was in England. Nevertheless, Ben-David seems
to claim that science as an autonomous institution cannot live on without a widely
shared scientistic belief in science.P
There are a few problematic assumptions and claims in Ben-David's overall
picture. First, his concept of science is objectivist and anachronistic: scientific
knowledge is objective and knowledge in the past is evaluated by modern stand-
ards. As a result his agenda for the historical sociology of knowledge and sci-
ence is to enquire into the social factors furthering or impeding the growth of
knowledge; knowledge itself, the content of science, is not part of his job. Sec-
ond, Ben-David assumes an almost inherent connection between scientism and
liberal values, intimately tied up with the influence and interests of the middle
classes. We have seen this before: the exclusive (positive or negative) linkage
between the authority of science and a specific (anti)religious or political posi-
tion, and in Ben-David's case, a particular social group, though in these other
cases the positions were quite different (only think of Hayek connecting social-
ist totalitarianism with scientism). In my view, the interesting historical phe-
nomenon is not the one or the other linkage (and certainly not an intrinsic linkage),
but the fact that so many different positions are all linked to the authority of
science. The fascinating thing about scientism is that it is so widespread in West-
ern culture.
Cameron and Edge cannot be called anachronistic or objectivist in their con-
cept of science, nor do they take one particular kind of scientism as their a priori
definition. Instead, they provide a useful perspective on the social functions
scientism may serve, though they unfortunately confine their analytical tool-kit
to the self-interests of social groups. In 1979 only a few studies were available
to Cameron and Edge to illustrate the kind of approach they advocated. They
presented their social analysis of scientism "as an introduction to a promising
and as yet barely developed area of study". 34 Since then, the situation has changed
considerably. We do have more monographs and articles relevant to the subject.
However, as far as the social aspects of scientism are concerned, Cameron and
Edge's general analysis is still valuable and has not been superseded.
The first social function of scientism that Cameron and Edge discuss is the
internal and external legitimation or strengthening of positions held by scien-
tists themselves. In cases where there are tensions or conflicts within the scien-
tific community or between this community and external groups, scientistic
rhetoric may be used to serve the interests of the scientific community, or one or
more parts of it. Even when there is no apparent conflict, celebrations and jubi-
lations are welcome opportunities for reinforcing the social role of the scientist
by contemplating the great benefits to society of science. The prestige and

Downloaded from hos.sagepub.com at DALHOUSIE UNIV on June 24, 2015

 THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF SCIENTISM • 385

autonomy of the scientific community is served by these rituals."

The authority of science may also be used to add weight to a social philoso-
phy to which scientists or non-scientists adhere. Cameron and Edge stress the
latter group: people who do not take a professional interest in science, and who
use the authority of science for their own social interests. At a time when sci-
ence was a discernible entity but when a sharply defined professional commu-
nity did not exist, provincial scientific societies provided a platform for competent
practitioners, amateurs and laymen. In these places science might become part
of the prestigious backing for social philosophies. Cameron and Edge, discuss-
ing an article by Arnold Thackray on the Manchester Literary and Philosophical
Society, bring up the point that the social outlook of the people involved changed
from progressivist to conservative, in tune with their changing social positions.
Accordingly, there was a change in the specific conclusions they drew from the
methods and general contents of science. However, they continued to use the
authority of science. Their scientistic rhetoric persisted; only the arguments
changed." Thackray's approach illustrates a key difference between the narrow
and partisan concepts of scientism held by Hayek and Ben-David, and the wider
and descriptive senses ofthe concept in an historical analysis. There seems to be
no such thing as an intrinsic relationship between 'objective science' and a par-
ticular social philosophy.
The third and final category discussed by Cameron and Edge concerns a situ-
ation in which science is professionalized and laymen use scientific theory, rather
than general characteristics of science as in the previous case. In the example
they discuss - American social thought on heredity between 1850 and 1900-
there is a shift in the social views without substantial modifications in the scien-
tific theory used to bolster up these quite different views. Again, this is taken as
an argument for the primacy of social needs and goals in determining the spe-
cific use of the authority of scientific theories."
Barry Barnes's About science is an example of the new social history of
scientism, following in the footsteps of Cameron and Edge." Not surprisingly,
Barnes makes a plea for the descriptive and neutral approach to scientism, ob-
serving that "people differ on what is right or wrong, legitimate or illegitimate,
scientific or scientistic: one group's science may be another group's scientism"."
According to Barnes, "in a given society there tends to be a generally accepted
view ofthe scope of scientific authority". Its "boundary ... represents a kind of
dynamic equilibrium", changing over time. "Historically, the tendency has been
for the scope of the authority of science to expand. "40 This historical remark on
the expanding scope of the authority of science is made in passing. In my view,
this is symptomatic. So far, the new literature on the social aspects of scientism
has not yielded a general historical picture of scientism in modern Western cul-
ture, such as Ben-David had attempted to provide. Some of Ben-David's as-
sumptions have been rightly rejected; unfortunately one of his goals seems to
have been skipped, as well.

Downloaded from hos.sagepub.com at DALHOUSIE UNIV on June 24, 2015

386 . CASPER HAKFOORT

Barnes's view of scientism is a mixture of sociological and historical princi-

ples and observations. In the recent past, some sociologists and social historians
of science have proclaimed a symmetry principle for science and non-science:
scientific knowledge should not be given a preferred position. In particular, the
fact that after some time a certain piece of knowledge comes generally to be
considered scientific and true, should not be taken as a sufficient explanation
for the origins of that knowledge. There is some truth in this principle, but on its
own it may readily lead to the mirror image of objectivism, i.e., relativism, which
suffers from equally serious historiographical problems. We see the dangers of
relativism exemplified when Barnes advances a symmetry principle for science
and scientism: "one group's science may be another group's scientism." This
seems to entail following the historical actors in particular cases, each time care-
fully describing how one group capitalizes on the authority of science and how
another group furthers its own interests by accusing the former of scientism.
There is a significant historiographical problem in this approach, namely: What
are the many case studies cases of? What is the general story they tell?"
The problem is not as serious as we may be inclined to think. Barnes does
offer a suggestion, though a rudimentary one, for an integrating theme with his
observation that "[h]istorically, the tendency has been for the scope of the au-
thority of science to expand". As is the case in the history of science, the history
of scientism requires answers to a few basic historical questions. First, if we
accept the idea that the authority of science is a key factor in scientism (as Barnes
and I do), we should analyse and describe how science became intellectually
more distinct as well as institutionalized, gaining intellectual and social status
in Western culture from the seventeenth century onwards. Secondly, we ought
to describe and analyse how the intellectual and social borders of science were
constructed as the complex outcome of, amongst other things, the actions of
working scientists as well as of pro-scientistic and anti-scientistic public rela-
tions." Ifwe have done this, our third and final task is to tell the story of the ups
and downs experienced in using the authority of science outside its domain (as
generally accepted at a certain period), or to tell the story of scientism.
There is no need to avoid the term 'scientism' here, as long as we use it in a
descriptive and neutral way. Barnes seems to use it exclusively as an actors'
category, applied by the historical actors in a pejorative way. Probably because
he does not want to side with the attackers of scientism, he is not in favour of
using 'their' language. I agree with Barnes's motive - an historian should not
take sides in his narrative - but I disagree with his conclusions about the term.
As we have seen, writers have used it in negative, neutral and positive ways, so
there is no danger of taking sides simply by using the terrri. Scientism, though as
complex as science (or, for that matter, religion or ideology), is, perhaps be-
cause of its complexity, a useful term if we want to tell the larger story of sci-
ence in modem culture. Barnes's sensitivity to the actors' point of view and
language is essential for the historians' job, but it cannot be our final word, if we

Downloaded from hos.sagepub.com at DALHOUSIE UNIV on June 24, 2015

 THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF SCIENTISM • 387

want to tell a larger story. Of course, a philosophical stance on what the bounda-
ries of science are, is a-historical: the boundary issue is an empirical and histori-
cal one but, like many historical problems, it cannot be solved, or even stated, if
we do not go beyond the minute description of actor's positions.
Another perspective on the history of scientism may be introduced by a per-
spicacious observation in Barnes's book on the authority ofscience in our present
society. Barnes makes a comparison between the standing of scientists today
and that of priests and clerics a few centuries ago. In those days the authority of
the priests was limited by the difference of opinions between them, which to
some extent reflected the difference of opinions in the wider society. "Society
was dominated by religion, yes; but by its priests, no." In a similar way, Barnes
claims, "we might say that modem society is dominated by science; but not by
scientific experts't.v This is an attractive, though perhaps somewhat extreme,
picture of the present-day social functions of science and scientists. However,
exploration of the similarities in psychological functions between religion and
scientism falls outside Barnes's sociological framework. We shall now tum to
these.

3. SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF SCIENT/SM

Scientism is an historical phenomenon as richly textured as religion. It has its

intellectual aspects and it serves the interests of social groups. Taking the anal-
ogy one step further, we may ask whether the authority of science fulfils psy-
chological functions similar to the ones served by religion.
A particularly instructive example is provided by Cantor's analysis of the
life and work of Faraday. In his book Michael Faraday: Sandemanian and sci-
entist Cantor has provided, amongst other things, an integrated psychological
picture of Faraday's attitudes towards religion and science. Faraday was one of
the members of a small Christian church, known as the Sandemanians. He expe-
rienced and expressed a harmony between his religious life and his practice of
science. By enquiring into the psychological motives underlying Faraday's de-
cision to join the Sandemanians and to follow a career in science, Cantor is
drawing attention to a level of analysis we have not encountered so far. In his
view there is no eternal and causal relationship between science and religion,
conceived as two rigid bodies of ideas. By-passing this kind of analysis, Cantor
carefully expounds the view that "both his [i.e., Faraday's] science and religion
were chosen responses to his psychological needs. Since they fulfilled very similar
roles, no strong causal arrow can be drawn from his Sandemanianism to his
science (or vice versa)."44 According to Cantor, a key feature of Faraday's per-
sonality was the psychological role played by such polar constructs as order and
confusion, which were linked to the pair safety and danger: " ... both science and
Sandemanianism ... offered ways of ordering his experience and rendering the
world safe." Normally, Faraday succeeded in using his religion and science in

Downloaded from hos.sagepub.com at DALHOUSIE UNIV on June 24, 2015

388 . CASPER HAKFOORT

maintaining the order he so much needed. However, in a few critical events, in

both his religious and his scientific life, great tensions broke to the surface."
In Faraday's case the psychological need for order was met by two related,
but nevertheless distinct systems of belief: science and religion. Scientistic sub-
stitute religions, for example, the one advocated by many members of the Ger-
man Monist League (including Ostwald), attempt to meet psychological needs,
such as the need for order, by science alone. Of course, attention to psychologi-
cal functions does not render it inappropriate to ask whether scientistic substi-
tute religions served group interests." However, the important point is that we
get a richer, and more adequate, analysis of scientism by considering psycho-
logical motives and needs, in addition to the conceptual and sociological as-
pects of scientism we have encountered in the previous sections.
In her recent book Science as salvation: A modern myth and its meaning,
Midgley has integrated the psychological significance of scientism into a so-
phisticated philosophical position on science and scientism. In her view, scientism
is the exaggeration of a perfectly legitimate position. Science does disclose real
aspects of the world and it does contribute to our salvation, but it is not the only
key to the world and it is not the only road to salvation. Her goal is to sort out the
ways in which science is used in modern myth-making, not because she opposes
such a role in principle, but because she makes a plea for the proper use of
science in such a context." Most of her book is devoted to the criticism of "dis-
torted exaltations of science" in a language which is both philosophical and
psychological." She discusses twentieth-century popular books on physical sci-
ence, written by Bernal, Haldane, Monod, Barrow and Tipler, Davies, Dyson,
Hawking, Weinberg, and Wheeler. She insists on using the word 'salvation',
and she asks herself: "Why not just talk about the value of science?" Her answer
is: " ... the point of using stronger, less everyday language is to show how much
the whole thing matters, and especially to draw attention to the high ambitions
underlying strong claims about that value. These are the claims that have brought
science into a competitive relation with religion.?"
According to Midgley, in twentieth-century Western culture, science some-
times serves the same needs traditionally served by religion. She does not dis-
cuss the use of science in Christian theologies and so she appears to presuppose
disharmony or conflict between scientism and Christian theology. However, in
my opinion, her approach may also be used to analyse the psychological aspects
of scientism in a Christian theological context.
Midgley argues her thesis by discussing common themes in popular books on
science, because there the official prohibition of teleology, values and religion
is disregarded, especially in the closing chapters where all these themes tend to
arise. One of her most revealing examples is The anthropic cosmological prin-
ciple written by Barrow and Tipler. These authors offer an explanation for the
remarkable cosmological coincidences that have actually resulted in the uni-
verse we know, including the Earth and its human inhabitants. Their suggestion

Downloaded from hos.sagepub.com at DALHOUSIE UNIV on June 24, 2015

 THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF SCIENTISM . 389

is to reintroduce a teleological principle, the Anthropic Principle. The universe

as it has developed has a goal: humanity. Using a particular version of the
Anthropic Principle, they claim that the universe only came into existence by
being observed by humans, i.e., scientists. In Midgley's words, they claim "that
this world - among all possible worlds - is one that has been made real by
being observed by human scientists't." Those who remember the crucial role in
Berkeley's philosophy for God perceiving the world, may notice the structural
similarity: in Barrow and Tipler's account Man (or the Scientist) replaces God
in securing the reality of the world. This particular use of the Anthropic Princi-
ple is certainly metaphysical, as Midgley observes, and not scientific, as Barrow
and Tipler suggest."
Insofar as the Anthropic Principle is used in a more detailed way, Barrow and
Tipler's strategy is reminiscent of what has been called a "God of the gaps":
whatever science cannot explain is attributed to God's action. Here, Midgley
argues, we have a "Man of the gaps" to explain cosmic coincidences. So, in
many ways Man the Scientist is becoming the Supreme Being. There is one
place in Barrow and Tipler's text where the supremacy of intelligent life is ex-
pressed in a similar quasi-theological vocabulary, though significantly in a foot-
note and accompanied by an implicit disclaimer. At the "Omega Point" where
the universe will find its fulfilment, they claim, the totality of life (not just hu-
man life) "will have spread into all spatial regions in all universes which could
logically exist, and will have stored an infinite amount of information, includ-
ing all bits of knowledge which it is logically possible to know. And this is the
end." The revealing footnote adds: "A modem-day theologian might wish to say
that the totality of life at the Omega Point is omnipotent, omnipresent, and om-
niscientl'P?
What is behind these modem quasi-scientific dreams of omnipotence, omni-
presence and omniscience? Midgley's answer is an attempt to list the psycho-
logical motives. She discusses the fear of death, the fear of one's body, the lust
for power, and the exaltation of the intellect. The last motive Midgley considers
more positive than the others. However, the motive is stretched beyond its limits
and becomes intertwined with the others when scientists offer salvation by sci-
ence alone: "The project therefore must be ambitious indeed. It must be able to
promise glory and immortality reminiscent ofthe strongest offers available from
religion, but more seductive still because they offer complete supremacy.':"
Midgley's psychological approach may be fruitfully applied to the case of
Ostwald. The German scientist and philosopher maintained that our needs and
ideals formerly (and erroneously) personified in a God, were now realized in
science. Science - he claimed - is, or soon will be, omnipresent, eternal, al-
mighty and absolutely good." In his view, it is no exaggeration, but rather an
understatement to call science our Saviour." Ostwald expressed these views not
in a footnote with a disclaimer, but in front of audiences, in pamphlets and in
many of his weekly Sunday sermons. There one can find in an explicit way what

Downloaded from hos.sagepub.com at DALHOUSIE UNIV on June 24, 2015

390 . CASPER HAKFOORT

Midgley reads between the lines of her popular books: strong language about
Science the Saviour and about Science replacing God, as well as the concept of
science meeting psychological needs."
Midgley's analysis constitutes a pioneering attempt to address the psycho-
logical aspects of scientistic dreams. Her attempt may be coloured by the as-
sumption of conflict between scientism and Christian religion. As we have seen
in Cantor's analysis of Faraday, science and Christian religion may both, and in
harmony, serve the same psychological needs. Together, Cantor and Midgley
signal the promises of the psychological approach in the historiography of
scientism.

4. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Scientism is a phenomenon characteristic of modern Western culture, which has

many, quite different aspects. It involves using the authority of science in con-
texts other than science, thereby serving intellectual, social and psychological
needs and ends. This broad description of scientism is a result of the discussion
so far. Let us review some crucial steps towards this conclusion.
Consider the dimensions of time and place. Olson casts his net too widely,
turning Thales and Plato into scientistic thinkers. He is, of course, right to point
to Greek Antiquity as a source of ideas which were, among other ideas, taken
over in scientistic thought. However, these ideas were not typical of scientism
and, even more importantly, science as a more or less autonomous institution
did not exist in pre-modern times. The existence of science as a distinct and
socially recognized entity is essential, if one wants to talk about scientism as a
social and cultural phenomenon, and not only as the influence of ideas on other
ideas. The view taken here is, that scientism and modern science were born in
the same period, of course with intellectual roots in earlier times, but with enough
conceptual, social and psychological differences to justify the reservation of the
concept of scientism for the modern period in history.
At the other extreme, people may want to restrict scientism to, for example,
scientific naturalism in nineteenth-century Britain and Germany. This has two
great disadvantages. First, this restrictive concept gives rise to the misleading
idea that scientism has always been anti-religious, or anti-Christian. The use of
science by Christians to bolster their beliefs becomes somehow a totally differ-
ent activity, while the similarities are more striking. Secondly, in a cross-cultural
perspective both scientism, in the sense advocated here, and modern science are
complex phenomena characteristic of modern Western culture. From that per-
spective eighteenth-century physico-theology, nineteenth-century scientific natu-
ralism and twentieth-century quantum-based New Age holism are all part of the
same Western pattern of using the authority of science in matters of religion,
world-view and politics." Narrowing down scientism to scientific naturalism in
the nineteenth century is like narrowing down modern science to mechanics in

Downloaded from hos.sagepub.com at DALHOUSIE UNIV on June 24, 2015

 THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF SCIENTISM • 391

its Machian interpretation.

Turning from time spans and places to contents and contexts, once again we
encounter concepts of scientism that are too narrow or too broad. The first, nar-
row, concept is to take scientism as a purely intellectual activity. Though intel-
lectual activity is part of the story, and though scientific ideas influencing other
ideas belong to the intellectual part ofthe story, this is simply not enough. Since
scientism is a phenomenon on a par with religions, political movements, etc., it
cannot be treated as a purely intellectual phenomenon. It possesses other inter-
esting and important aspects. The use of science by certain social groups to
enhance their positions of power was one example; the use of science as a means
of meeting the psychological needs of individuals and groups was another. Of
course, in these contexts scientific concepts, methods, and so on, are still rel-
evant. However, the analysis of the intellectual contents of what happens is not
the whole story, just as an intellectual history of Christianity is only part of its
history.
The second concept is of a quite different nature: assuming scientism to be
present whenever groups of people use science to defend or to reinforce their
positions of social power. This is a useful perspective on a particular aspect of
scientism. However, in its practical applications this approach may become ei-
ther too narrow or too broad. It becomes too narrow when (this particular model
of) social dynamics is viewed as the only relevant aspect of scientism,
downplaying intellectual and psychological aspects, for example. Another, less
obvious, practical limitation of the new social history of scientism is that it has
not so far resulted in a long-term historical synthesis. (As yet, there is also no
history of modern science written from this perspective, though this may change
soon. 58) Is the strong, almost exclusive, emphasis on social context not specific
enough to catch the 'fish' of scientism? Does the exclusively sociological ap-
proach preclude a meaningful combination of all those 'case studies' into one
picture spanning four centuries of Western culture?
What historiographical suggestions and questions may be derived from the
multi-dimensional view of scientism advocated here? What may be said about
the development ofscientism in modern Western culture when we integrate ideas,
social interests and psychological functions? Let me illustrate the kind of re-
search questions to be asked when the different approaches are combined, by
giving a tentative summary of the literature discussed in this review.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, modern science, its borders and
its authority are still emerging. Insofar as science and philosophy can be distin-
guished in the early modern period, the first is embedded in the latter, and the
authority of science backs up the authority of philosophy as a whole. Therefore,
emerging scientism is very much part of the inherited role of philosophy, espe-
cially natural philosophy. For example, the relations of science with theology
are, in their positive manifestations, new versions of the older, medieval rela-
tionships between philosophical thought and Christian theology. Deist or atheist

Downloaded from hos.sagepub.com at DALHOUSIE UNIV on June 24, 2015

392 . CASPER HAKFOORT

uses of the authority of science essentially follow the same lines of argument,
though with a different conclusion. The point is that the theological or anti-
theological significance of science is, in its early uses, a continuation of West-
ern patterns of thought. However, both socially and psychologically, the
authority of philosophy and science is changing. Philosophy and science are
used by new groups (for example, the middle classes) to further their own
interests. In addition, they are beginning to be used to serve the psychological
needs of individuals and groups (physico-theological sermons may be early
examples).
In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the conceptual structure ofscientism
changes, because science grows into a professionalized institution. The con-
cepts and methods of science are now often directly transplanted into other areas,
though sometimes the indirect route via philosophy is still used. Parallel to this
process, the authority of science increases because of its successes (and because
of those of technology, which is thought to be closely connected with science).
Moreover, the widespread though not universal decline of traditional religion,
as well as the advent of such ideological movements as liberalism, socialism
and nationalism, drastically transform the cultural and social landscape. As a
result of all these changes, the authority of science is used to sustain a perplex-
ing variety of Christian, liberal, socialist and nationalist beliefs. In addition, the
concept of science as a complete psychological substitute for religion is formu-
lated. This process may have found its most explicit and widespread expres-
sions in the decades before and after the turn of the last century; the diverse
manifestations of social Darwinism, fulfilling different social functions as well
as psychological needs, constitute a well-known example.
Whether this particular summary will be fruitful for further research, I dare
not say. However, it is my conviction that some kind of multi-dimensional analy-
sis of the history of scientism is needed to do justice to a phenomenon which is
as characteristic of modern Western culture as are science, Christian religion
and political ideologies, and which is intellectually, socially and psychologi-
cally related to all of them.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Comments on an earlier draft of this paper by J. C. Boudri, H. F. Cohen, J. M.

Engelbrecht, M. J. Sparnaay, B. Theunissen and T. P. Vanheste are gratefully
acknowledged. G. N. Cantor, J. R. R. Christie, M. J. S. Hodge and R. C. Olby
were very helpful in the early stages of my research, when I was a Visiting
Research Fellow at the Division of the History and Philosophy of Science, Uni-
versity of Leeds, sponsored by the British Council and the Netherlands Organi-
zation for Scientific Research. E. Perlin-West corrected my English text.

Downloaded from hos.sagepub.com at DALHOUSIE UNIV on June 24, 2015

 THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF SCIENTISM • 393

REFERENCES

I. C. Hakfoort, "Science deified: Wilhelm Ostwald's energeticist world-view and the history of
scient ism", Annals ofscience, xlix (1992), 525-44, especially pp. 529-32, and 534-5.
2. R. Olson, Science deified & science defied: The historical significance ofscience in Western
culture, ii: From the early modern age through the early Romantic era, ca. 1640 to ca.
1820 (Berkeley, 1990); see also vol. i, From the Bronze Age to the beginnings of the
modern era ca. 3500 B.C. to ca. A.D. 1640 (Berkeley, 1982); a third volume is projected.
See also idem (ed.), Science as metaphor: The historical role of scientific theories in
forming Western culture (Belmont, 1971). M. Midgley, Science as salvation: A modern
myth and its meaning (London, 1992); see also idem, Evolution as a religion (London,
1985). Compare T. Sorell, Scientism: Philosophy and the infatuation with science (London,
1991).
3. W. Ostwald, "Wie der energetische 1mperativ entstand", in his Der energetische Imperativ:
Erste Reihe (Leipzig, 1912), 1-24, especially p. 11: "das energetische Denken [nahrn] von
einem Gebiete meines Geistes nach dem andern Besitz."
4. Olson, Science deified (ref. 2), i, 62; see also ibid., ii, 8, where scientism is defined as "the
wholesale extension of scientific ideas, attitudes, and activities to other domains".
5. The same basic structure is common in recent editions of dictionaries and encyclopedias. In
one ofthese sources scientism is defined as "the view that the method ofthe natural sciences
should be applied in all areas of investigation, including philosophy, the humanities, and
the social sciences and that this is the only fruitful method in the pursuit of knowledge".
Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th edn (Chicago, 1975), Micropaedia, viii, 985. Note that in
this case method is the thing transferred, and that philosophy is in the domain outside
science.
6. Olson, Science deified (ref. 2), i, 7-8, 12, quotations on pp. 8, 7 (in the original the second
quote is italicized throughout).
7. Ibid., 62, 72-74, quotations on pp. 62, 74.
8. Ibid., 74, 75.
9. Ibid., 75. Compare ibid., 14: "Unless we can show that elements of the scientific mentality
have entered (or at least become prominent in) our culture in connection with the processes
and products of unquestionable scientific activities it would be wrong to claim that this
book deals with science and culture at all" (emphasis in the original).
10. Ibid., 119-20, quotation on p. 120.
II. Ibid., ii, 72-86, especially p. 73. Compare ibid., 7: "The present work ... seeks to explore in
some detail the attempts of members of the scientific specialty to expand the influence of
science into religious, social, political, economic, and even artistic domains."
12. E. Cassirer, The philosophy ofthe Enlightenment (Princeton, 1951).
13. Ibid., 6-27.
14. Ibid., 9.
15. Ibid., 12-16.
16. For example, ibid., 238.
17. P. Gay, The Enlightenment: An interpretation (London, 1967-70), i: The rise of modern
paganism, pp. xiii-xiv, 9-10, 69-71.
18. Ibid., ii: The science offreedom, 127-8, 135, 138-9, 164; ibid., i, 398-401.
19. R. Porter and M. Teich (eds), The Enlightenment in national context (Cambridge, 1981).
20. For example, ibid., 112: "the Protestant Aufklarung [in Germany] is characterized by its close

Downloaded from hos.sagepub.com at DALHOUSIE UNIV on June 24, 2015

394 . CASPER HAKFOORT

relationship with progressive theology and with the churches, rather than by radical criticism
or opposition."
21. See, for example, Olson, Science deified (ref. 2), ii, chap. 3, "The religious implications of
Newtonian science".
22. Sorell, op. cit. (ref. 2), is a recent philosophical introduction to the concept of scientism. It
does not highlight significant aspects of the history of scientism that are not contained in
the historical volumes I discuss in the text.
23. In an essay on Stephen Hawking's A briefhistory oftime: From the Big Bang to black holes
(Toronto, 1988), for a general readership, I have tried to follow this recipe. With some
hesitation as well as reflection on the task of the historian, I voiced my doubts about some
aspects of Hawking's views, while attempting to be fair to him. C. Hakfoort, "Fysica en
wereldbeeld van Descartes tot Hawking" ("Physics and world-view from Descartes to
Hawking"), De Gids, clv (1992), 713-22.
24. F. A. Hayek, The counter-revolution of science: Studies on the abuse of reason (Glencoe,
1952; 2nd edn, Indianapolis, 1979), 25, 202-3, quotation on p. 166.
25. Ibid., 263-91, 355. F. E. Manuel, The prophets of Paris: Turgot, Condorcet, Saint-Simon.
Fourier, and Comte (I st edn 1962; New York, 1965), 138-48,263-96, pays some attention
to cultic aspects and psychological motives. Significantly, in his preface Manuel apologises
for "the intrusion of flesh-and-blood personages" in the history of ideas (ibid., p. viii). In
Manuel's account the role of science and scientism in Saint-Simon's and Comte's religions
is not prominent.
26. I. Cameron and D. Edge, Scientific images and their social uses: An introduction to the concept
ofscientism (London, 1979).
27. Ibid., 13-26.
28. See, for example, A. G. N. Flew, Evolutionary ethics (London, 1967); S. E. Toulmin,
"Contemporary scientific mythology" (published in 1957), republished as "Scientific
mythology" in: Toulmin, The return to cosmology: Postmodern science and the theology
of nature (Berkeley, 1982), 19-85. For the philosophical discussion about the is-ought
distinction, see W. D. Hudson (ed.), The is-ought question (London, 1969).
29. Cameron and Edge, op. cit. (ref. 26), 3. From "where" onwards, the original text is in italics.
30. Ibid., 3, emphasis in the original.
31. Ibid., 5 (in the original the passage is italicized).
32. J. Ben-David, The scientist's role in society: A comparative study (Chicago, 1971; 2nd edn,
1984), 78. See also Olson, Science deified (ref. 2), i, 278-90.
33. Ben-David,op. cit. (ref. 32), 182.
34. Ibid., 52.
35. See, for example, J. Morrell and A. W. Thackray, Gentlemen of science: Early years of the
British Associationfor the Advancement of Science (Oxford, 1981), 28, 31-32.
36. Cameron and Edge, op. cit. (ref. 26), 57-58, 61. A. W. Thackray, "Natural knowledge in
cultural context: The Manchester model", The American historical review, Ixxxix (1974),
672-709, especially pp. 681-2.
37. Cameron and Edge, op. cit. (ref. 26), 60-62. The example they use is: C. E. Rosenberg,
"Scientific theories and social thought", in: B. Barnes (ed.), Sociology of science
(Harmondsworth, 1972), 292-305, especially pp. 302-4.
38. B. Barnes, About science (Oxford, 1985), chap. 4, "Expertise in society". In the first section of
this chapter, headed "Scientism", Barnes refers the reader "for a more extended discussion
of the concept of scient ism" to Cameron's and Edge's book (ibid., 155).

Downloaded from hos.sagepub.com at DALHOUSIE UNIV on June 24, 2015

 THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF SCIENTISM • 395

39. Ibid., 91. Barnes observes that for critics scientism amounts to "the pretence of being scientific:
a scientistic argument is one which involves an illegitimate appeal to science; a scientistic
attitude is one which makes a fetish of science and wrongly treats it as the only possible
form of understanding" (ibid.). See also Cameron and Edge, op. cit. (ref. 26), 4-5.
40. Barnes,op. cit. (ref. 38), 90.
41. For the history of science this problem has recently been recognized by J. R. R. Christie,
"Aurora, Nemesis and Clio", The British journal for the history of science, xxvi (1993),
391-405. He proposes to use power as the integrating theme in the history of science.
Though 1 feel that there is more to science than power, this theme may well serve an
integrating function, the more so because it seems to connect science and scientism.
However, in my opinion Christie's concept of power needs clarification to fulfil its
integrating role.
42. S. Shapin and S. Schaffer, Leviathan and the air-pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the experimental
life (Princeton, 1985), can be read as a meticulous analysis of how science and non-science
as well as the authority of science were constructed in a specific debate in seventeenth-
century England. This is only a beginning of what would be desirable. The authors'
contention that "we have examined the origins of a relationship between our knowledge
and our polity that has, in its fundamentals, lasted for three centuries" seems to be premature
(ibid., 343).
43. Barnes, op. cit. (ref. 38), 110-11.
44. G. N. Cantor, Michael Faraday: Sandemanian and scientist. A study ofscience and religion in
the nineteenth century (Houndmills, 1991),289-93, quotation on p. 293.
45. Ibid., 272-88, quotation on p. 283.
46. Hakfoort, "Science deified" (ref. I), 538.
47. Midgley, Science as salvation (ref. 2), 1-2,33, 36-37.
48. Ibid., 37.
49. Ibid., 51.
50. Ibid., 199.
51. Ibid., 199.
52. Ibid., 66, 199-200. J. D. Barrow and F. J. Tipler, The anthropic cosmological principle (Oxford,
1986), 682 (emphasis in the original).
53. Midgley, Science as salvation (ref. 2), 162-4, quotation on p. 164.
54. W. Ostwald, "Die Wissenschaft", in: W. BloBfeldt, Der erste internationale Monisten-Kongrefi
in Hamburgvom 8.-11. September 1911 (Leipzig, 1912),94-112, especially pp. 94,107-11.
55. W. Ostwald, Religion und Monismus (Leipzig, 1914),70.
56. Hakfoort, "Science deified" (ref. 1),537-42.
57. T. P. Vanheste is studying the role of science and scientism in New Age literature. A first
result of his research is found in: T. P. Vanheste, "Hoe de New Age-beweging de
natuurwetenschap claimde" ("How science was claimed by the New Age movement"), De
Gids, clvii (1994), 24-36.
58. See ref. 41.

Downloaded from hos.sagepub.com at DALHOUSIE UNIV on June 24, 2015