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26 SC/PF/3345/GRP-1

BLENDING CONVENTIONAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL

METHOD OF OPERATION AS A FIGHTING CONCEPT
FOR BANGLADESH ARMY

INTRODUCTION
1. The geo-strategic environment demands that Bangladesh maintains
sizeable army for protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. However,
economic constraints prohibit Bangladesh from maintaining an army of
reasonable size and also from equipping the existing army with weapons with
adequate range and sophistication to carry the battle into enemy territory. To
strike a balance between these two opposing factors our present concept of
operations envisage a conventional method of operation (CMO) against the
potential aggressor for a limited period and then transiting into guerilla warfare.

2. This existing concept is purely defensive in nature that is most likely to be

adopted after a prescribed period. Besides, this concept has virtually no specific
plan to exploit enemy’s vulnerabilities, which is so essential for success in war. To
replace this age-old concept and ‘’postulate a definable, recognizable element of
victory’’ the draft operation of war volume one states, “ In future conflicts
Bangladesh Army must be prepared to blend conventional and unconventional
warfare in the implementation of national strategy”. 1 It also goes on to state that “
unconventional warfare is not regarded as an aftermath of the conventional war,
rather should be waged simultaneously with conventional war. In fact, the
campaign plan should conceive the operational employment of the unconventional
forces as one of its major operations or battle and establish its relationship with
other component parts”. 2

3. The existing force structure of the army, para military and auxiliary forces
are quite capable of undertaking Unconventional Method of Operation (UCMO)
with some restructuring and command and control set up. Some modification to
infantry battalions may also be necessary. Raising of special force like para
commando elements would strengthen the operational efficiency. The expected
shortfall of regular troops for UCMO at the outbreak of hostility would necessitate
the preservation of reservist form retired personnel up to a certain age limit.
Different options are to be formulated within existing command structure to offset
enemy's aggression. Mission oriented training, smooth logistic support and finally
economic viability would expedite the blending operation to a success.

4. This blending of CMO and UCMO is not a new concept in Bangladesh

Army. People had been thinking over it as they tried to grapple with the problem of
fighting hopelessly outnumbered. The concept provided a ray of hope of fighting
1
Draft Operations of War Volume One p. 2-6
2
Loc cit
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with numerical disadvantage and still retaining the chances to win. Over the years,
the concept crystallized through extensive brainstorming by numerous
individuals/groups/ organization/ institutions. The above strategy obviously would
call for conducting battles behind the enemy line, that is engaging the enemy right
from his preparatory stage and destroying logistic bases. The modern concept of
conducting a deep battle will play an important role in shaping the battle in our
advantage, so that our ‘ main effort can strike the enemy at our desired time and
place. It is assumed that this concept is likely to be considered as the cornerstone
of our future doctrine.

5. However, before a concept can mature into a doctrine it involves a tedious

process of research, tests, trials and analysis. This research work is one such
step in our effort towards crystallization of the future doctrine of war for
Bangladesh Army. This paper will discuss a few conceptual and relevant issues
including threat analysis. The concept of blending will be then discussed in detail,
the main focus of the research being to highlight infrastructural changes for it's
implementation. Finally the paper will suggest recommendations to implement this
concept.

AIM
6. The aim of this paper is to examine the concept of blending conventional
and unconventional method of operation in order to suggest measures for
implementation of the concept in Bangladesh Army.

DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTUAL ISSUES

Definitions

7. Conventional Method of Operation (CMO). Operations, which

are conducted by conventional forces i.e. Army, Navy and Airforce following
established doctrine and principles of war, are termed as CMO. These forces
wear uniform during operations and are subjected to Geneva Convention.3

8. Unconventional Method of Operation (UCMO). Operations, which

are conducted by forces other than conventional forces, are known as UCMO.
These forces normally do not wear uniform during operations, live off the mass
population and are not subjected to Geneva Convention. A broad spectrum of
military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy held/ controlled or
politically sensitive territory. Unconventional warfare includes, but is not limited to,
the interrelated fields of guerilla warfare, evasion and escape, subversion,
sabotage, and other operations of a low visibility, covert or clandestine nature.
These interrelated aspects of unconventional warfare may be prosecuted singly or
collectively by predominantly indigineous personnel, usually supported and
directed in varying degrees by external source during all condition of war.4
3
AHQ Project Study-1998 by HQ 46 Indep Inf Bde
4
Loc cit
2
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9. Guerilla Warfare. Military or paramilitary operations conducted in enemy

held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. It is
conducted to complement, support, or extend conventional military operations or
to wear down his resistance.

10. Total People’s War. Total people’s war means all conventional and
unconventional forces of a nation fighting unconventional form of warfare against
the enemy. It means complete utilization and mobilization of all resources
available to a nation, that is, economic, political and social to the war effort. In
other words, the entire population is drawn or involved in the war effort in some
form or the other and the nation is unable to defend itself with conventional form
of war.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
11. General. Most of the wars fought by weaker countries against a
superior enemy have blended the method of both conventional and
unconventional warfare. The Chinese and Russians in Second World War fought
two wars simultaneously. However, the Vietnam War and Afghan War are worth
mentioning and provide lessons relevant to our requirement.

12. Vietnam. In the Vietnam War the Vietminh conducted both

conventional and unconventional war simultaneously. It shows us how a peasant
force comprised of common mass were organised to fight a revolutionary war that
defeated French and American Forces. The strategy of revolutionary war in
Vietnam had its objectives of seizing political power of the state. In operation it
totally integrated two principle forms of conflicts, armed conflict and political
conflict. The strategy they followed can be summarized as follows:

a. It was a total war which mobilised all the people and used every
available facet of the power.

b. It was waged with total unity of effort. Every element of power was
coordinated with the others to gain the objectives.

c. It was by necessity and choice a protracted war.

d. It stressed on gaining and keeping of initiative. This

involved not only to the military initiatives but to the political and
psychological initiatives as well.

e. It was a changing war. At the same time it constantly mixed all

phases of war. The most important part in Vietnam War, was the difficulty
in distinguishing the phases of war at a particular time. In one area it was
phase-3 while nearby it was phase 2 and somewhere else it was phase 1
insurgency.

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13. Afghanistan. The war in Afghanistan was another example of

peoples’ war against an occupation army. Though the war initially started as a
resistance movement ultimately it turned into a full-scale war. When the Soviets
invaded Afghanistan the resistance was weak, forces were ill armed and
disorganised. It had no experience of fighting a war against the professional army
of a super power. However with strong determination the resistance movement
turned into a formidable force known as Mujahideen. After seven years of fighting,
Mujahideen took control of more than 80 percent of the land. Within next seven
years they evicted the super power from Afghan soil causing fourteen thousand
killed and sixty thousand wounded.

14. Bangladesh. We all are aware of our liberation war. During the
liberation war of Bangladesh a large number of civilian volunteers joined the
regular forces. Major General D K Palit in his book ‘The Lightning Campaign’ said,
“ Never in the history of man’s resistance to a foreign oppressor has there total
motivation as was displayed by the people of Bangladesh”. The well known Mukti
Bahini carried out both conventional and unconventional operations deep inside
enemy held territories. These operations helped the allied forces to shape the
battlefield to their design. Even during the final offensive by the Allied Forces
unconventional operations were carried out throughout the length and breadth of
the battlefield. As a result the final offensive could achieve its objectives easily
and rapidly.

THREAT PERCEPTIONS
15. General. Bangladesh is surrounded from all sides by India except for a
small portion in the south-east with Myanmar and Bay of Bengal in the south.
Considering this geographical reality, Bangladesh is likely to be subjected to
physical threat from India and Myanmar only. The chances of a limited war
between Bangladesh and India always exists; while Myanmar poses a low threat
because of limited common borders of almost inaccessible terrain.

16. India. India is a regional super power. She possesses the 5th largest
army in the world, which is likely to pose a great threat for it's neighbours. His
military venture in Sri -Lanka and Maldives bears the testimony of this possibility.
India has bilateral problems with almost all her neighbours and Bangladesh no
exception to it. In the event of a conflict of interest, the possibilities of a full-scale
escalation of war against Bangladesh can not be ruled out. However, considering
the strained relations that India has with her other powerful neighbours like China
and Pakistan, it may be assumed that only a part of her forces will be mustered
against Bangladesh in the event of a full scale war. Besides, India also poses
threat to the economy, culture and overall internal security of Bangladesh. The
likely pattern of offensive by our potential aggressor may be envisaged as under:

a. During war, India may muster a sizeable proportion of mechanised

forces and combat helicopters against Bangladesh to rapidly secure the

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military objectives. However, their Armed Forces will encounter certain
difficulties to apply rapid manoeuvre concept in our terrain.

b. Enemy Armed forces has the capabilities to cause attrition to our

forces and combat assets, with long range weapons while remaining
disengaged. The same will also provide them with added advantage during
the conduct of manoeuvre and close engagement.

c. Enemy Armed forces ‘ initial thrusts are likely to be directed to

secure defiles, across the rivers Jamuna, Brahmaputra, Meghna and
Padma by dominant manoeuvre and then subsequently converge on
Dhaka from north, east and west as situation permits.

d. During the entire period of battle, enemy Air force is likely to be

employed for providing close support to ground forces and keep the defiles
over the rivers under constant surveillance to prevent movement of our
forces and logistics support.

e. While progressing operations towards the defiles, enemy Armed

Forces are likely to tackle the defences en-route with bypassing
manoeuvre and simultaneous development of operations in its flanks and
rear areas. The aim of manoeuvre would be to engage the entire depth of
the defended sector, isolate and gain positional advantages to capture the
defensive positions.

17. Analysis. Any confrontation with our potential enemy will have the
following implications for Bangladesh, which must be kept in mind:

a. Bangladesh will be deprived of sanctuary outside its border, a much-

needed support, to conduct and continue a war against a superior enemy.
Vietminh had China and Afghans had Pakistan as their sanctuaries for their
struggle against USA and the then USSR respectively.

b. Bangladesh will face difficulty in procuring war materiel from abroad.

Potential aggressor borders Bangladesh on three sides, and can effectively
block air and water routes as well. The only possibility is through Myanmar,
if diplomatic manoeuvre can be won.

c. The threat is likely to dominate air space throughout that will hinder
the movement and operations of own conventional forces.

d. The threat will have overwhelming superiority in terms of

conventional force ratio as well as resources including long range
weapons.

18. Myanmar. The border between Bangladesh and Myanmar is a rugged

hilly terrain. The movement of large body of troops through this terrain is a remote
possibility. As such conventional military threat from Myanmar is of less
significance. However, the chances of irregular border disturbances and low
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intensity conflict on the plea of Rohingya issue can not be ruled out. Myanmar is
likely to undertake offensive by small-scale infiltration through the hilly areas of
Bandarban and Cox’s Bazar or across river Naf. An amphibious assault against St
Martin Island may also be contemplated.

CONCEPT OF BLENDING
19. Objective and Method of Blending.

a. Objective. ‘’ Unconventional war assumes greater importance in

defensive operation as it significantly compensates the numerical
disadvantage of the defending forces. It makes the theatre/ battlefield
cellular by allowing simultaneous engagement of enemy forces throughout
the length and breadth of the area of operation ‘’.5 Therefore, the main
objective of the blending CMO and UCMO is to compensate the numerical
inferiority and lack of modern fighting assets of our conventional forces
against our potential adversary. It also involves the population right from
the beginning in the conduct of war.

b. Method. The concept envisages blending of CMO and UCMO

right from the beginning of hostilities as opposed to the age old concept of
transition into UCMO in the last phase of the war. The unconventional
forces will carryout operations under the over all command of the
conventional force commander. For the peace time training and
coordination a separate chain of command will be maintained in each
divisional Area of Responsibility (AOR).

20. Blending CMO and UCMO and Clausewitz’ Paradoxical Trinity.

According to Clausewitz, the outcome of a war depends on the perfect harmony
and balance between the people, government and military, which he termed as
‘paradoxical trinity’. The government decides to wage a war, directs its military to
conduct it and provides all necessary resources. The military prosecutes the war
to achieve the end-state set by government. The people support government’s
decision and provide moral and material assistance to both the government and
the military. In modern wars it is the peoples’ support, which determines the
ultimate outcome of war; without it no military can continue the war. The USA had
to withdraw from Vietnam and Somalia because of its people negative attitude
towards the war. In war where CMO and UCMO are blended, people are involved
at all echelons of the war effort. This should be more pertinent in those countries
whose military has less sophistication, but morale is high and peoples’ support is
the main driving force. Their elected leaders decide to go to war if forced upon,
their national military plays the key role in conducting the war and the population
provides both physical and moral support. Thus the blending of CMO and UCMO
validates Clausewitz’ paradoxical trinity for prosecution of war.

5
Draft GSTP Operation of War Volume one, P. 9-27
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21. Blending of CMO and UCMO and Modern Fighting Concept. To
understand the modern fighting concept certain relevant aspects need to be
clarified, understood and identified:

a. Definition of Victory. According to Richard E. Simpkin, one of

the foremost military thinkers and writers of recent times, “ the purpose of
military operation can not be simply to avert defeat rather it must be to win.
The defensive strategy must extend beyond simply denying victory to other
side. It must instead postulate a definable, recognizable victory for the
defender”.6 The definition of victory is derived from the national security
strategy. However the definition at national level in general term may be ‘
defeat enemy’s aggression’. But for planners, this definition will be further
narrowed down and given measurable statistics. While the threat‘s victory
is the capture of our capital, own victory is likely to be forcing him to pull
back immediately.

b. Identify Center of Gravity (CG) of Both Enemy and Own.

Considering the definition of victory stated above in case of an aggression
by the potential enemy, the threat’s strategic CG s are likely to be,” popular
support and his diplomacy to carry international support for war effort.”
Own strategic CGs may be identified as “ capital Dhaka, maintaining
peoples’ support, continuous supply of arms and ammunition and
maintaining command and control arrangement”. To achieve victory we are
to tilt enemy’s CG and protect our own. To effectively tilt enemy’s CG, we
are to cause large scale casualty right form beginning. This is possible by
taking the battle in to enemy’s territory from the outset of hostilities.

22. Relevance of the Concept of Blending Conventional and

Unconventional Method of Operation for Our Army. The geographical
location of Bangladesh clearly dictates that our potential adversary would leave no
room outside national border from the beginning of hostilities. As such, we are to
conduct operation within own territory. On the other hand, the approaches to own
formation’s area of responsibility have increased over last few years due to
development of communication net work. All these will pose difficulty for our army
to disperse and deploy. Similarly the shifting of troops from one sector to other
would also be difficult and risky for lack of effective air cover. The inadequate
depth of the country and imbalance in force ratio signifies that a prolonged
conventional war against enemy would be a remote possibility. Therefore, both
CMO and UCMO have to be blended to neutralise enemy’s CG and protect our
own.

23. Outcome of Blending CMO and UCMO.7

a. Blending of CMO and UCMO will allow us to conduct deep

operations well inside enemy territory as well as behind enemy lines when
he is inside our own territory. It may be conducted as under:

6
Richard E. Simpkin, Race to the Swift, Brassey’s London, 1994, p- X.
7
AHQ Project Study-1998 by HQ 46 Indep Inf Bde
7
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(1) Right from the beginning the battle must be taken to enemy
territory to exploit his geo-political vulnerabilities. These forces can
be special/commando and unconventional forces in civil dress. They
will hit high value and strategic targets to play havoc and create
chaos within civil population. As a result at the very outset of the war
enemy will be concerned about his rear area security and employ
more troops to protect those. Enemy civil population will find the
battle in their own area. This will also manifest our preparedness
and determination to fight the war.

(2) As the enemy enters own territory in considerable depth the

unconventional force hit enemy’s high value targets (HVTs) and his
flanks by continuously laying ambushes and conducting raids. The
targets for deep operation will be selected at Army/Division/Brigade
level based on the situation templates. Whether specially trained
conventional force (commando) or unconventional forces are to be
tasked will depend on the location of target and capability of the
force. So we are actually in the process of neutralizing enemy’s CG
before the main battles are fought. These operations are also
shaping the battlefield to own design. All these are conducted under
overall operational framework and conventional leadership.

b. The net result of blending CMO and UCMO are as under:

(1) Large-scale casualties will provoke his population against the

government. People will question government for the justification of
sacrifice. For example, Indian Peacekeeping Force was forced to
withdraw from Sri Lanka because of large-scale casualty. The outcry
of the civil population was evident in the newspaper.

(2) When the battlefield is taken in to their ground, people are

likely to lose confidence in their armed forces and react adversely.

(3) Continuous hitting of logistic installations and disruption of

lines of communication will force enemy to commit more troops in
protecting those. This gives us the advantage of having lucrative
targets for unconventional operations.

(4) He can not concentrate on the main battle and bring in forces
to achieve concentration

(5) Simultaneously all echelons of enemy are engaged.

INFRASTRUCTURAL MODIFICATIONS : FORCE

STRUCTURE AND RELEVANT ISSUES
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General

24. For blending CMO and UCMO not many of changes have been suggested
for the regular forces. The main focus has been on the unconventional/ reserve
forces who will complement the operations of the regular forces. The economic
aspect has been generally highlighted without going into the details of
calculations, for it is beyond the scope of this presentation.

Force Structure

25. Composition and Size of Forces. Composition of unconventional

force and its size is the most important aspect of blending conventional with
unconventional method of war. From the core concept of the new operational
doctrine we find that the unconventional force should comprise of elements from
regular force, second line/paramilitary and trained segment of the population.
Bangladesh is a populous nation and there is no dearth of population to form
unconventional force if properly trained and motivated. Options for force
structuring are discussed in subsequent paragraphs.

Options.

26. Nobody is ever sure when the next war will take place and whether or not
we will have all our existing deficiencies of the conventional forces filled up before
it happens. It leaves us with three options as regards the quantum of regular and
paramilitary forces that can be spared for the unconventional effort right from the
beginning. 8 These options are as follows:

Seria Options Army Components BDR

Co
mp
one
nts
1. Option-1(Army 2X Battalions per division (when 3 X Company
8

Ibid

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having full division is in full strength) per
strength) secto
r
2. Option-2(with 1 X Platoon per Infantry Battalion 1 X Company
existing deficiency) (when division having existing per
deficiency) secto
r
3. Option-3(with Each Infantry Battalion provides 2 X Company
existing deficiency) organizational framework as under: per
1 X Major secto
2 x Junior Commissioned Officer r
7 X Other Ranks
(when division having existing
deficiency)

Note: Embodied Ansar- 1x platoon per Battalion and Armed police-50%

shall be common to all the options shown above.

a. Option-1. This option is based on the assumption that the

existing deficiency of the Army has been filled up. The main advantage of
this option is that the unconventional force is quite strong, well balanced
and has a better command and control right from the beginning. However
the only weakness or disadvantage is the weakening of the conventional
force itself affecting its reserve capability and flexibility. This, in all
probability will be offset by the rich dividends that a strong unconventional
force will be able to achieve.

b. Option-2. In this option, due to existing deficiency of regular

troops, one platoon from each Infantry Battalion and one Company from
each BDR Sector will be dedicated for the unconventional forces at the
outset. These elements will be yet quite effective in making the
unconventional force fairly strong and balanced producing a positive
outcome. At the same time, the conventional force is not seriously
depleted. This is the recommend option if we have to go to war with
existing deficiencies.

c. Option-3. In this option, due to paucity of regular forces, the

emphasis is placed on retaining the combat power of the conventional
force. Only minimum essential elements are taken from the Army to
provide an organizational framework along with Ansar and Armed Police
elements which will still make the unconventional force fairly balanced and
strong. The main advantage of this option is retention of combat power for
the conventional force which will be better prepared to take the initial
onslaught. The disadvantage of this course is the weakness of the
unconventional force and the possibility of their initial inertia to set into
motion.

27. Reservist Policy.

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a. Reserve policy will be a key factor in the force structure for it will
play vital role in creating reserves and forming unconventional force
structure/reserve units.

b. We suggest 4/5 years of voluntary service for soldiers. At the end of

the tenure only selected individual may be promoted/retained as non-
commissioned officers (NCO). Rest of the soldiers to be in reservist list for
next 10 years. This will help to create a large pool of reservist who will form
the core of unconventional forces.

c. The voluntary service contract will not have any retirement liability.
As they retire, they should leave the job with a handsome amount of money
i.e. 2-3 lacs taka , a portion of this may be the forced saving from their pay.
This will help them to pursue a different career later. It will act as a great
incentive to younger generation to join army for five-year contract.

d. An average soldier retiring at the age of 25, will be in reserve list till
the age of 35. Reserve pool will be of younger generation. In addition we
will have better quality NCOs’ who will form the backbone of the army.

e. This will also have positive economic implications such as:

(1) Large number of trained/disciplined soldiers will retire every

year.

(2) Society will benefit with the input of increased number of

disciplined people. They can help in the socio-economic upliftment
of the country.

(3) Government may be free of pension, accommodation and

ration liabilities.

28. Modifications in Infantry Battalions. All battles will revolve

around the infantry battalions. These battalions, therefore, need to be self
sufficient in respect of reconnaissance, air defence and anti-tank capabilities. At
present, infantry battalions do not have proper reconnaissance assets. A scout
platoon may be added to the organizational set-up of infantry battalions that would
help the battalion commander to keep the Named Area of Interest (NAI) in his
AOR under constant surveillance. In order to make them self contained in air-
defence and anti-tank capability, light air-defence and anti-tank guided weapons
may be provided to the infantry battalions. Two shoulder controlled air-defence
missiles may be provided to the infantry battalions. Three hand launchers instead
of one may be allotted to rifle platoon. These inclusions will be cost effective
compared to the costly air defence assets and anti-tank missiles and tanks.

29. Raising of Para Commando Brigade. Bangladesh Army should

have a para-commando brigade as its strategic offensive force. The brigade has
one para commando battalion and two more para commando battalions need to

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be raised. The Army Commander may use them to engage deep targets' across
the international border.

Command Structure

30. Command and Control. Command and control (C2) of unconventional

forces and their operations will be a challenging task for the leadership at all level.
Without proper C2 management, the whole thing will become a fruitless exercise.
Here we have two options with regard to chain of command.

a. Option-1. In this particular option, unconventional forces will

conduct operation within their respective AOR under the command and
control of regular force commanders at all level. The division commander
will act as the highest authority to direct and coordinate both conventional
and unconventional operations simultaneously within respective formation
AOR. This option is better for peacetime coordination, training, orientation,
planning and setting up organizational framework. The major advantage is
that the induction of more army elements at a later stage would be smooth
they are already in command and oriented with their AOR and situation.
The main limitation is with the dual command functions by the military
commanders particularly brigade and below who will not be in direct
communication and control of the unconventional forces. A suggested
chain of command is shown below:

DIV ISION COMMANDER

FORMATION AREA

BRIGADE COMMANDER
SECTOR AREA
(Two or more Districts)

BATTALION COMMANDER
ZONE (One District)

COMPANY COMMANDER
Patrol Base Area
Two or More Thanas

PLATOON COMMANDER
Patrol

b. Option -2. In this option, the unconventional forces will conduct

operations independently within the allotted AOR. The division commander
remains the highest commander to control and coordinate the
unconventional operations. Separate commanders at Sector and below
level will be designated to organise, plan and conduct unconventional
operations maintaining separate chain of command. This is the option we
recommend since there are separate people to command respective

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troops. The main disadvantage, however is the lack of coordination
between the regular and the irregular forces. For peace time the chain of
command suggested in the option 1 shall remain in force. The chain of
command is shown below:

DIVISION COMMANDER

UW FORCE COMD Normal Chain of Comd

for Conventional Force
SEC COMD
(One or more Dists)
ZONE COMD
One Dist or No of
Thanas
PTL BASE COMD
Ptl Base Area
One Thana or No of Unions
PL COMD
One Unions or No of
Villages

31. Communication. All available means of communication will be used for

maintaining communication. These include:

a. Conventional High Frequency sets(Command net).

b. Telephone Civil/military exchange.

c. Existing Telegraph, railway communication.

d. Mobile/Cellular phones etc.

Training of Unconventional Forces

32. While the present practice of training on unconventional war by the

conventional forces, that is the regular forces must continue with increased
importance, it is the training for the other elements of the unconventional forces
that we are primarily concerned with. This training will be organised both during
the peacetime and during the war.

33. Bangladesh Navy and Airforce should include unconventional training for
all their personnel during peacetime. They should also organise refresher training
annually for duration of two weeks for all their retired personnel below the age of
55.

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34. All second line forces, that is Bangladesh Rifles, Bangladesh Ansars and
Village Defence Party, Bangladesh National Cadet Corps and Armed Police
Battalions of Bangladesh police should train all their personnel on unconventional
warfare during the peacetime below the age of 50.

35. Training on unconventional war shall mainly comprise minor operations,

that is raid, ambush, patrolling, tank- hunting, hideout, guerrilla warfare, use of
mines and explosives, sabotage, small scale attacks, field craft and training on
small arms including firing.

36. Compulsory military training may be introduced for all able-bodied male
personnel who are seeking higher education after intermediate, both at home and
abroad or taking public or private jobs. This training can be organised annually for
a duration of 4 weeks in each district headquarters by each area Headquarters of
the Army. This training can be open to all civilian volunteers as well.

37. Unconventional training should also be organised by each Area

Headquarters in their respective districts as soon as the government orders
general mobilisation. This training should continue throughout the war for all
civilian volunteers who would join the unconventional war.

38. Training may be provided to the reservists, paramilitary forces and civilian
volunteers (BNCC) as a continuous process. Formations may arrange training
camps once in every 2 years for all reservists under that formation AOR. The
reservists can be trained as a full-fledged reserve unit in the operational role.
Formations may organize 'Formation Battle School' to conduct this training. A joint
exercise may be conducted every three years. The training curriculum may be as
follows.

a. Basic Military Training. All reservists, paramilitary and selected

volunteers will be provided with basic military training for a period of four
weeks. Following subjects may be covered:

(1) Field craft.

(2) Weapon training (handling and firing)

(3) Minor tactics.

b. Advance Training. Advanced training may be provided to

specially selected personnel after basic military training, which may last for
about four weeks. Following subjects may be covered in their training:

(1) Explosive handling.

(2) Combat intelligence.

(3) Special operations.

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39. Joint Exercises. Joint exercises involving conventional and
unconventional forces, civil administration and bureaucrats may be conducted to
bring in cohesiveness. Mutual understanding, and co-ordination with a view to
pursuing a common cause during national crisis. The exercise may be organised
once in every 3 years as mentioned before under the overall supervision of Armed
Forces Division. Such exercise will help to identify the training requirements,
feasibility of logistic system, areas of co-ordination between armed forces, civil
administration and mass population. It will also help the formation commander to
prepare a checklist of actions, which they would need to implement/undertake in
case of actual mobilisation and execution of operations.

Logistics Support

40. Logistics Cell. The unconventional forces Headquarters at the

respective district headquarters shall have its in built logistics cell with required
number of men and staff who will be responsible for organizing logistics support
for the unconventional forces in coordination with the Army and local authority.
Conventional logistics support system which relies on central bases and well
established lines of communications will be unable to provide necessary support
to the unconventional forces operation behind enemy lines.

41. Food, Shelter, Medicare, Repair and Transportation. The

unconventional forces shall depend on local resources for their food, shelter,
Medicare, repair and transportation. They would mostly live off the land and use
indigenous transportation system.

42. Arms, Ammunition, Mines and Explosives. Small arms,

ammunition, mines and explosives will be the principal commodities of the
unconventional forces. The logistics staff at the Army Headquarters must work out
the overall requirement. Sufficient quantity of these weapons and ammunition are
to be procured, stocked and maintained in each Army formation area. Formation
logistics staff is to work out requirement for each Thana and make arrangements
to place these stocks at the selected bordering Thanas only on declaration of
emergency according to the operational plan. The logistics cells shall arrange
replenishment from the central/forward depot which are still unaffected and
functional in the area occupied by own force. This replenishment will be carried
out using unspecified and undesignated line of communications through cross-
country and difficult terrain. Indigenous transportation system, particularly riverine
transportation will be quite effective. In extreme emergency, important items may
be air dropped to meet urgent demands. Unconventional forces should also
wherever possible, try to capture arms and ammunition from the enemy. There is
sufficient stock of small arms mainly rifles available with the Army and the police
to arm the unarmed segment of the unconventional force.

Economic Aspects

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43. This is a key element that comes in, when force structure and defence
policy is discussed. We have not gone into the details of this but we will highlight a
few aspects to suggest that defence budget can be better managed. A study on
defence budget shows:9

a. Operating -81% (1) Pay and allowances 40%

(2) Food, clothing, POL and office

16%

(3) MES project/ minor works

18%

(4) Miscellaneous 7%

b. Development/ -19%
procurement

44. Modernisation of army is possible only if operation cost can be reduced.

We believe that it is very much possible. Suggested reserve policy and detailed
study on budgetary issues can reduce the operating cost in following heads:

a. Pay and allowances. Can be reduced. Less pension liability

with five years voluntary service to be introduced.

b. Food, Clothing and Miscellaneous expenditure. Can be

similarly reduced.

c. Military Engineering Service (MES). The present

expenditure is 18%. This can be substantially reduced. For example, if
bunk system can be introduced in the barracks, the army will not have to
construct any more SM barrack. One SM barrack costs about 2.2 crore
taka to construct. This is just one example.

d. Logistic/Tail Arms Versus Fighting Arms. It is time to

think the relevance of having heavy tail arms in peacetime. Some of these
can be raised during war. Some of their jobs can be taken over by civil
contractors. We hope that, a deliberate study on this subject can save lot of
money in this aspect.

45. With deliberate and dynamic planning and a commitment in it, there are
enough possibilities to reduce unnecessary expenditure and save money. This
money can be used to modernise and improve the operational effectiveness of the
Army.

46. We must also think of having defence production infrastructure of our own-
may be in a small scale. At least we should be able to produce small arms, anti-

9
Study Period Conducted by 71 Infantry Brigade
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tank weapons and their ammunition. During war we should not fall short of these
basic fighting equipment.

Conclusion
47. CMO is undertaken by regular force wearing uniform and subjected to
Geneva Convention. Contrary, UCMO is conducted by forces other than
conventional force devoid of uniform and Geneva Convention. The forces live off
the mass population and conduct clandestine operation. Similarly Guerilla war is
conducted by both military and para military forces in enemy held or controlled
area. Total Peoples’ War involves both conventional and unconventional forces
and fight only unconventional method of operation utilizing and mobilising national
resources.

48. There are number of examples in the military history where a weaker
nation had fought against its adversary blending conventional and unconventional
warfare. In Vietnam War the Vietminh blended the conventional and
unconventional war from beginning to end. Spontaneous participation of common
mass was the main strength of Vietminh. By following the technique of changing
war they created fluidity in the battlefield. It was difficult to divide the war into
phases. Rather all phases of war were fought simultaneously. The Afghan war
was another example of people’s war against occupation army. The Afghans
evolved their own technique of fighting and conducted a protracted war against
Soviet Army. They also established a remarkable logistics system and intelligence
network to support the unconventional warfare. Participation of common mass
and national will was the center of gravity during our liberation war. The
unconventional war conducted by the Mukhtibahini shaped the battlefield for Allied
offensive. During the final offensive unconventional warfare operated extensively
throughout the length and breadth of the battlefield.

49. The main objective of blending CMO and UCMO is to compensate the
numerical superiority and lack of modern fighting asset of our conventional forces
against our potential adversary. It involves the population right form the beginning
in the conduct of war. Thereby it validates Clausewitz paradoxical trinity for
prosecution of war. As per modern fighting concept, victory can be achieved by
tilting enemy's CG and at the same time protecting that of own. The strategic CG
of our potential adversary is likely to be it's continuous peoples support for the war
effort. Our CG may be identified as the capital Dhaka and popular support. It
envisages that CMO alone can not effectively assail enemy's CG neither it can
effectively protect our own CG. Large-scale casualty and engagement of enemy
key installations, HVTs within enemy's territory will denude the hostile
government's popular support. On the other hand it will show success of our
people right from beginning and entails confidence in them. Hence blending CMO
and UCMO will help us achieving victory by tilting enemy's CG while protecting
own CG. The concept thus fulfilled the requirement of fighting concept of weaker
country of ours to face the superior adversary.

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50. Our Armed Forces lack the required forces and equipment to meet the
challenges of a powerful adversary. But the overwhelming populous support and
their integration can easily form strong unconventional forces. This organised
force structure can easily offer strong resistance against enemy from the outset of
hostility. Considering the availability of regular troops, three options are suggested
to organize unconventional forces. The first option demands handsome amount of
troops to embody powerful unconventional forces. The second option provides
only limited strength while maintaining reasonable conventional forces. The third
option only provides command setup to organize and train unconventional forces
keeping strong regular forces intact. The chain of command is the pre-requisite to
make any operation successful. Similarly the unconventional forces also require
proper chain of command for smooth conduct of operation. There are two types of
chain of command suggested for unconventional forces. The division commander
will act as the highest commander to direct and coordinate both conventional and
unconventional forces within formation AOR. However, one option is to have
unconventional forces conducting operation within their respective AOR under the
command and control of regular forces commander at all levels. The second
option entails unconventional forces operating independently within their allotted
AOR under separate leadership. From the operational point of view the second
option appears to be more viable.

51. Reservist policy is of prime importance in order to maintain large forces

and employ them at the time of urgency. 4/5 years of voluntary service for soldiers
are to be introduced and suitable lot to be retained in the army. Rest of them is to
be kept in reservist list for 10 years after retirement. Incorporation of scout platoon
and changes of weapon and equipment in infantry battalion would facilitate
unconventional warfare. The necessity of para commando brigade in
unconventional warfare can not be overruled, therefore, it needs to be raised in
our army. All available means of communication are to be integrated while
blending CMO and UCMO to achieve a desired goal. Training of unconventional
forces by regular forces is the key element for organizing a strong force.
Bangladesh Airforce and Navy should also include unconventional training in their
routine training activities for a specific duration including retired personnel.
Similarly second line forces should also train their personnel on unconventional
warfare during peacetime. This operation mainly involves raid, ambush, patrol,
tank hunting, hideout and sabotage. Compulsory basic military training for able-
bodied citizen particularly college going students of each district should be
organized annually for specific duration. To make the future operation successful,
a coordinated joint exercise comprising conventional, unconventional, civil
administration and bureaucrats should be planned once in every three years.

52. Logistics is the lifeline for maintaining steady fighting capability of

unconventional forces. These forces would mainly depend on local resources for
food, medicine, shelter and transportation for operating behind enemy line. Unlike
conventional forces, the supply of different commodities should be based at
district, thanas and unions level by logistic staff. The replenishment should be
done through indigenous line of communication like cross country and riverine
route. In extreme emergency items should be air-dropped for unconventional
forces. These forces should make all out effort to live on captured items of enemy.
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Economy is the backbone of proper execution of operation by either conventional
or unconventional forces. The lack of which would slow down the fighting spirit of
any fighting formation. The operational budget needs to be maintained at any
cost. Reduction of budget in pay and allowance, MES and other construction work
would increase budget for operation. We should produce small arms, anti-tank
ammunition and other war material to maintain fighting efficiency at any cost.

Recommendations.
53. Most of the recommendations regarding the options of force and command
structure of the unconventional forces are already stated earlier. Only the other
important recommendations will be covered here.

54. All the three Services and the paramilitary forces should carry out regular
training on unconventional operations for their personnel. They should also
organize refresher training on the same annually for their retired personnel.

55. Compulsory military/training may be introduced for all able-bodied male

personnel who are seeking higher education after intermediate both at home and
abroad or taking public or private jobs. This training will be organized annually for
a duration of 4 weeks in each district headquarters by each area Headquarters of
the Army. This training may be open to all civilian volunteers as well.

56. Enactment of laws should be made in favour of people's participation in war

efforts.

57. Provision of small arms, mines and explosives for the irregular forces to be
made available to the Army.

58. Training for civilian volunteers to be organised in each district

Headquarters with the declaration of emergency till the end of the war under the
arrangement of respective Infantry Division.

Mirpur Cantonment S M SALAHUDDIN ISLAM

Major
November 2001 Group Leader

Distribution :

Sponsor Directing Staff

Defence Services Command and Staff College
Mirpur Cantonment
Dhaka

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books
1. Richard E. Simpkin. Race to the Swift- Thoughts on Twenty First
Century Warfare, Brassey’s, London,1994.

2. Martin Van Creveld, On Future War, Brassey’s (UK), 1991

3. Lieutenant General Philip B. Davidson, USA (Retd), See References of

Vietnam War , New Delhi,Lancers Publishers pvt ltd, 1992.

4. John Fullerton, The Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan, Hong Kong, Far

Eastern Economic Review Ltd, 1983.

5. Singh, Major General Lachhman, Victory in Bangladesh, Dehra Dun :

Natraj Publishers, 1991.

Journal

6. Lieutenant Colonel Alauddin Mohammad Abdul Wadud, BP,psc, “ Military

Theory and Doctrine-An Analysis of Their Relationship”, Bangladesh Army
Journal, 22nd Issue, June 1994.

7. Haque, Major Md Fayzul, " Bangladesh : A Geo-political Study",

Bangladesh Army Journal, 13th Issue, December 1988.

Training Manual

8. Draft GSTP Operation of War, Volume One.

9. FM 100-5 Operations, US Army Command and General Staff Colege, Fort

Leavenworth, kansas, 1993.

AHQ Project Study Papers/Div Level Study Papers

10. AHQ Project Study –1998 by 46 Independent Infantry Brigade.

11. Division Level Study Period conducted by 71 Infantry Brigade

12. Division Level Study Period conducted by 19 Infantry Division.

13. Military Research Project on Blending Conventional and

Unconventional Warfare by Major Anwarul Momen.

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Discussions/Other Documents

14. Major Kane, US Army ,(Student Officer of 26th Army Staff Course)

15. Major Rajiv Kumar Singh, India Army, (Student Officer of 26th Army Staff
Course)

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